Pepsi Cola v.

Gal-lang

GR No. 89621

Labor Relations: Jurisdiction

Facts:

The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the
irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal
complaint for theft against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint
for falsification of private documents. On November 26, 1987, after a preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court, the complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were dismissed by the
petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter, and demanded reinstatement with damages. They also filed a separate civil complaint
against the petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution
before the RTC.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case because it involved employee-employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the
labor arbiter.

The motion was granted. However, the respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration,
reinstated the complaint, saying it was “distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the
labor courts.”

Issue:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

The petitioners invoke Article 217 of the Labor Code and a number of decisions of this Court to support
their position that the private respondents’ civil complaint for damages falls under the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter. The Court held at the outset that the case is not in point because what was involved there
was a claim arising from the alleged illegal dismissal of an employee, who chose to complain to the
regular court and not to the labor arbiter.

It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved
only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a “reasonable causal connection” between the
claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217.
Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of
their civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The case at bar involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the
Regional Trial Court by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a
“reasonable causal connection” between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and
employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations. What the employees are alleging is that the
petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint. This is a matter which the labor
arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal
Code.

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EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003

Facts: Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired
through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities upon
the vessel’s departure from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater.
Subsequently, he contracted fever on November 11 which was later on accompanied by loose bowel
movement for the succeeding 12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast Guard
Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he could be evacuated, he died on November
18, 1992.

Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for damages against Pedro Garate, Chief
Mate of the vessel, Mario Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to
the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus legal interest, as
well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was vacated and the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining the NLRC, the
CA ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by
petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort.
Under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-
employee relation, the damages awarded were not proper as she is not an employee, but merely the
wife of an employee.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner’s action.

(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has already reached finality.

Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming damages under the
Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court was convinced that the allegations were based on a
quasi-delict or tort. Also, she had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning capacity based on a life
expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can be recovered in an action based
on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction of
labor arbiters and the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual connection
with the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBA’s. It must be noted that a worker’s loss of earning capacity
and backlisting are not to be equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other
labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or
claim resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the realm of Civil Law. In the present case,
Evelyn Tolosa’s claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor
statutes, or CBA’s. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does
not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of
the same Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. It is not the NLRC
but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages, in which the employer-employee
relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation such as a tort.

(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the attention of the Court of
Appeals first, this cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the
right to due process against the respondents to do so.