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Totalitarian Movements and Political

Religions
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Between ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political

Orthodoxy: Orthodox Christianity and
Nationalism in Interwar Serbia
a
Maria Falina
a
Central European University, Budapest
Published online: 18 May 2007.

To cite this article: Maria Falina (2007) Between ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy:
Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Interwar Serbia, Totalitarian Movements and Political
Religions, 8:2, 247-258, DOI: 10.1080/14690760701321155

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 Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,
Vol. 8, No. 2, 247–258, June 2007

Between ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy:

Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Interwar
Serbia
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MARIA FALINA
Central European University, Budapest
MariaFalina
Totalitarian
10.1080/14690760701321155
1469-0764
Original
Taylor
8202007
hphfam01@phd.ceu.hu
000002007
&Article
Francis
FTMP_A_232011.sgm
and (print)/1743-9647
Movements
FrancisLtd and Political
(online)Religions

Background and Context

In recent years, religion(s), religious identity, church institutions, clergy, and so
on, have been heavily emphasised in many discussions on nationalism and politi-
cal ideology. Within these debates central, eastern and south-eastern Europe have
gradually become new foci of attention and scholarly interest. This paper aims to
integrate specific issues in south-east European history into wider methodological
and theoretical debates, and thus addresses both of the above-mentioned research
areas. Through enquiring into the relationship – and indeed, some of the existing
connections – between Eastern Orthodoxy and Serbian nationalism in the inter-
war period, I will discuss the adaptability and fruitfulness of the analytical
concept ‘clerical fascism’. To commence with an argumentative point, I propose
that the analytical tools of fascism studies as such, in some cases, do not help and
may even impede the understanding of certain key phenomena and processes.
Yet another general issue also worth considering in respect to this Serbian case-
study is the widely acknowledged, yet arguable, dichotomy between East and
West; between eastern and western Christianity.
Emphasis on the marginal political movement of Dimitrije Ljotić , called Zbor,ca[cu
e]t

which never succeeded in the parliamentary elections and therefore never had its
members elected to the parliament, is justified by the assumption that Zbor, being
classified as a fascist, para-fascist or ultra-nationalist movement, represents a
perfect example of how Orthodoxy was incorporated into nationalist political
thinking in a new, more radical, way than had ever happened before.
Todor Kuljić , a Yugoslav sociologist, has defined Zbor as a pro-fascist move-
ca[cu
e]t

ment sharing some characteristics with radical fascism. He regarded the ideology
of Zbor to be a mixture of various political views and religious thinking: from the
ideas of Serbian Orthodoxy to Serbian conservatism, and to certain basic features
of the doctrine of the peasant commune [zadruga].1 At the same time, Branislav
Gligorijević has highlighted those teachings of Zbor which are shared with
ca[cu
e]t

German National Socialism.2 Mladen Stefanović has also underlined Zbor’s ties
ca[cu
e]t

with Italian Fascism and German Nazism, and maintained that Ljotić was under ca[cu
e]t

considerable ideological influence by both Mussolini and Hitler.3

Clearly, the ideology of Zbor, especially its religiosity, cannot be fully
understood outside the context it belonged to, yet for the sake of the argument, I
ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647 Online/07/020247-12 © 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14690760701321155
 248 M. Falina

shall focus primarily on Ljoti ć and Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirovi ć , who was one
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

of the major Serbian religious thinkers of the time and had significant intellectual
influence on Ljoti ć . To be sure, the relationship between religion and nationalism
ca[cue]t

is hard to measure and evaluate. Nonetheless, there are some instances of political
and intellectual activities that can undoubtedly be assessed as a profound and
radical integration (or collusion) of religion and nationalism. One salient example
of such integration is the close cooperation and connection of Ljoti ć ’s Zbor with ca[cue]t

the teachings of Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirovi ć . Here again, depending on ca[cue]t

where a scholar stands, more attention may be paid to either Ljoti ć or ca[cue]t

Velimirovi ć , for each of the protagonists in this account can be easily interpreted
ca[cue]t

as illustrating a number of historical phenomena and processes. Still, as far as this

paper is concerned, the focus will be placed upon the political uses of religion.
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There is an unfortunate lack of reliable secondary literature on a number of

important subjects relating to Serbia, such as the relationship between Orthodoxy
and nationalism throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Works by
Sabrina Ramet are virtually the only attempt at a comparative analysis of reli-
gious politics and political involvement by churches in the region.4 Nevertheless,
there are reasons to remain hopeful. A recent book by Klaus Buchenau on Ortho-
dox and Catholic churches in post-1945 socialist Yugoslavia,5 as well as thorough
research by Radmila Radi ć on the same period,6 indeed raise important issues
ca[cue]t

and provide quite sophisticated analyses of church–state relations.

Yet, for the interwar period – the lifetime of the so called ‘first Yugoslavia’ –
there is no available research of the same quality and depth. That is, of course, for
a good reason. During the socialist period, Yugoslav historiography was highly
ideological, and was used as a tool for the creation of a new Yugoslav historical
memory that all the states in the nation would share. Therefore, the centre of
attention for decades was Josip Tito’s partisan movement, while other national
forces like the Serbian Chetniks, Croatian Ustaš a, and indeed Dimitrije Ljoti ć ’s casor[n] ca[cue]t

Zbor, were all largely neglected in historical research. Anti-communism was one
of the central points of Ljoti ć ’s teaching; consequently, in postwar Yugoslavia
ca[cue]t

Zbor was, by default, regarded as negative phenomenon, preferably the result of

foreign influences.
Serbian historiography remains politically sensitive to this today, which by no
means makes the historian’s task easier. In respect of the subject of this paper, the
amount of reputable research on Ljoti ć ’s views is very limited. Most of the schol-
ca[cue]t

arly debates around the Zbor movement are concerned with the question of
whether it was a fascist movement or not, as well as the related issue of its collab-
oration with Nazi Germany during the wartime occupation of Yugoslavia. Unfor-
tunately, in the majority of these scholarly works, ‘fascism’ is understood as a
moral judgment rather than an analytical concept.
From the pool of available publications, the lengthy essay by Nebojša Popov on o
acsrn
[]

the tradition of Serbian populism,7 in addition to a study by Dragan Suboti ć ,8 are ca[cue]t

especially of interest. These two authors strongly disagree in their evaluation of

Ljoti ć ’s ideological heritage; thus they, by definition, emphasise different aspects
ca[cue]t

of Ljoti ć ’s thinking, writings and actions. Both Popov and Suboti ć have their own
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

political agendas, and their interest in Ljoti ć , populism and conservatism is not ca[cue]t

simply fortuitous. Although both are exciting to read and valuable sources of
information, such studies do not offer methodological and/or theoretical insights
into the nature of Serbian fascism or nationalism, let alone the issue of ‘clerical
fascism’.
 ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy 249

If we remove the politicised evaluations of Zbor, one is more or less left with the
opinion of Roger Griffin, who stated that Zbor was not a fascist movement, as the
stress on the rebirth of the nation was not strong enough.9 Moreover, Ljoti ć ’s ca[cue]t

nationalism is a problem in itself, as he referred equally often to both Serbian and

Yugoslav nations, therefore making it difficult to reconstruct a coherent narrative
of nationalism in his writings. His understanding of Yugoslavism transformed in
the decade between 1935 and 1945 through the influence of dramatically chang-
ing circumstances, and still awaits scholarly analysis.
It would seem that a change of perspective is necessary. The question of
whether the movement belonged to the ‘family’ of fascist ideologies and regimes
is an important one, but leads into a deadlock. There is a little chance that this
question will ever have a definite answer, but even if it happens, a yes–no dichot-
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omy will not help assess peculiar features so characteristic of this movement. As
such, other questions need to be posed. If one wonders, for example, ‘Why did the
movement remain marginal?’, then a possibility of new research areas opens up.
Lately, many students of fascism and other radical ideologies of the last century
have been puzzled over large theoretical issues in the field. One of the possible
ways to conduct fruitful research was found to be through the close examination
of religious aspects within fascist movements (and totalitarian movements in
general). This takes the form of the discussion of fascism as a ‘political religion’,
but can also lead to the questions about the role of clergy, churches and religion in
the ideology of fascist movements and regimes. In this latter case, the concept of
‘clerical fascism’ becomes a rather important one.
The concept of ‘clerical fascism’ is rather loose, as it lacks a precise definition at
the time of writing. Seemingly, it can refer to both clerical involvement in a given
fascist movement, and to the incorporation and interpretation of religion into
fascism. Nevertheless, one can find certain benefits in this position, as it provokes
more research without too many methodological, regional or confessional limita-
tions. The difficulty in framing the definition proves that more research in this
direction is necessary.
Coming back to interwar Serbia and the problem of Dimitrije Ljoti ć and his ca[cue]t

movement, I would suggest that it was the already-existing tradition of Serbian

nationalism to emphasise the role of Orthodoxy in the framing of national iden-
tity that prevented Zbor from gaining mass support in the country. There were
better ‘institutionalised’ alternatives sharing a number of ideas with Ljoti ć ’s ca[cue]t

thinking, but these were not purely fascist. Interestingly enough, an ideology (or,
at least, set of ideas) which seems to been Zbor’s main ‘rival’ was elaborated by
Archbishop Nikolaj Velimirovi ć , whose teachings inspired, among many others,
ca[cue]t

Ljoti ć himself. Velimirovi ć ’s views themselves, despite the fact that they had
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

inspired Ljoti ć and his followers – in addition to their striking resemblance to

ca[cue]t

fascism at some points – cannot be labelled as such, for they belong to a different
tradition linking religion and nationalism.
There are three major lines in Ljoti ć ’s thinking: the corporatist state; ‘organic
ca[cue]t

thought’; and Orthodoxism, which included very strong elements of antisemit-

ism. None of these was purely original. Corporatist ideas (mostly borrowed from
Italian Fascism) did not find much support or understanding amongst Serbs;
neither did his ‘organicism’. Orthodoxism, on the contrary, did. That is why it is
important for the understanding of the political atmosphere in interwar Serbia.
In order to answer the question, it is necessary to analyse Ljoti ć , not in the
ca[cue]t

framework of fascism studies, but from a rather different angle, for it is possible
 250 M. Falina

to gain some new insights in approaching Zbor and Ljoti ć from the perspective of
ca[cue]t

links between political nationalism and Orthodoxy. In this way, connections

between Ljoti ć and Velimirovi ć become important, and the crucial concepts
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

become the politicisation of religion and the re-interpretation of the national char-
acter. It is also important to locate certain ideologies, Ljoti ć ’s and Velimirovi ć ’s in
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

this case, in the context (both contemporary political and methodological) in

which they belonged. Finally, there is yet another important consideration: if there
was no ‘clerical fascism’ what was there instead?
There are at least two ways to approach and interpret religiosity, not to
mention the countless religious references Ljoti ć ’s writings contain. First, one
ca[cue]t

may consider Ljoti ć to be an advocate of the ‘old’ narrative, which claimed Ortho-
ca[cue]t

doxy to be an integral part of ‘Serbianness’. Second, it is possible to understand

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Ljoti ć as a symbol of his epoch; namely, the one that started after the First World
ca[cue]t

War and was characterised by the rise of such new ideologies and movements as
fascism and communism. In the Yugoslav case, the immediate context of political
and ideological complications – which arose after the creation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – was particularly important. Clearly, both positions
are justified, but neither is self-sufficient, and it is the combination of both that is
necessary. These two dimensions of analysis provide answers to rather different,
although closely connected, questions: how does Ljoti ć ’s understanding of ca[cue]t

Serbian Orthodoxy fit into the long-term development of Serbian religious

philosophy and political thinking; and to what degree was the existence and
development of this understanding dependent upon the contemporary political
and ideological contexts?

Serbian Nationalism and Orthodoxy

The close ties between Orthodoxy and nationalism on the one hand, and various
manifestations of national consciousness in Serbia on the other, have always been
an important characteristic of Serbian history. By the nineteenth century, religion
and politics became two more or less separate spheres of life; nonetheless, strong
interconnections remained in place.10 This close tie was formed partly by the
actual development of the nation- and state-building process, the role Orthodox
clergy played in the Ottoman system of rule and, starting from the eighteenth
century, the struggle for national independence.11 Also relevant here were the
discursive practices of the Serbian Orthodox Church throughout the nineteenth
century, and it is this last feature that is most interesting to the question of
‘clerical fascism’.
The Serbian Orthodox Church established a tradition of connecting church and
state in a ‘positive’ way: it claimed to occupy a central role in the Serbian national
movement and in national life generally. The crucial points in the church’s narra-
tive were the preservation of national culture, identity and history by the clergy,
in addition to the indispensability of Orthodoxy for the survival of the nation. The
inception and development of this narrative depended, to a large extent, on the
social and political status of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The church success-
fully used all available means to secure its position; thus, the more insecure the
position, the more radical the rhetoric. Interestingly, up to the late nineteenth
century lay politicians and intellectuals largely accepted this view and did not
challenge it too directly.12 By the turn of the century, however, the views of the
church and the secular, liberal, political elite split. These divisions grew during
 ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy 251

the interwar period. One of the major points of ‘debate’ concerned whether or not
Orthodoxy is a core characteristic of Serbian national identity. Yet the background
against which these debates were raised is as important as the discussions
themselves.
Clearly, the Serbian Orthodox Church – like any other religious institution –
had its own understanding of political events and trends, including those on
communism, democracy, and so on. It is important to take these streams of think-
ing within the church into account, although the church should not be treated as a
homogeneous intellectual body. On the other hand, it is worth looking in detail
into the church’s anti-modernism. As Klaus Buchenau has summarised:

Anti-modernism and nationalism could unite and lead to a reinforced

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image of the enemy: in the Croat clergy of the 1930s, there was a convic-
tion that atheism could spread mainly because of the Serbian Orthodox
laissez-faire in pastoral work and theological education. A counter-
argument of the Orthodox side was that communism is a Western idea
that was able to emerge only because Western society had been perverted
before by popes’ lack of humility and quest for power. In the second half
of the 1930s, nationalism and anti-modernism led parts of the clergy as
well as engaged lay people into the embrace of extremely nationalist and
even fascist movements. In Croatia, the Ustaša benefited from the situa-
o
acsrn
[]

tion; in Serbia right-wing believers turned to the greater-Serbian royalist

Chetniks and Dimitrije Ljoti ć ’s Zbor-Movement.13
ca[cue]t

The Orthodox Church was not the only actor connecting Orthodoxy to ‘Serbi-
anness’ and vice versa. One of the most important political figures in Serbian
modern history, the charismatic leader of the Serbian Radical Party, Nikola Paši ć , o
acsrn
[] ca[cue]t

paid much attention to this question. Indeed, some of the concepts that Paši ć orig-
o
acsrn
[] ca[cue]t

inally used had religious meaning. The most important one was sobornost [‘sobor’
meaning council] – a concept he borrowed from the Russian philosopher Alexei
Khomiakov, but one that was ‘secularised’ to apply to the Serbian case. Paši ć o
acsrn
[] ca[cue]t

combined the idea of Orthodoxy as an integral part of the Serbian national

identity with the emphasis on Serbian communitarianism [zadruga].

The Political Milieu of Interwar Yugoslavia

As mentioned above, the other context in which Serbian political ideas from the
interwar era should be placed is the actual political milieu of the first Yugoslavia.
The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 was a radical change in the political, but also
the intellectual, context for Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian politicians and intel-
lectuals. Most of the thinking, writing and talking was centred on the national
question. Even if the question was not addressed directly, the mode of thinking
was national (whatever that might mean in multinational and multiconfessional
Yugoslavia). In the realm of ideologies Yugoslavism was the key-notion. There
were quite a few different understandings of Yugoslavism: the two extremes
being ‘great Serbianism’ on the one hand, and integral Yugoslavism, as a new
type of supra-national identity, on the other.14
The period from 1918 to 1929 was marked by an endless political struggle and
debates between the king, Serbian politicians and their Croatian counterparts,
which failed to provide any sort of stable agreement at the national level. As a
 252 M. Falina

remedy to this ongoing impasse, King Alexandar declared a personal royal dicta-
torship in 1929, dissolving the parliament [Skupš tina], and banning all nationalist
oacn
rs[]

political parties. In these circumstances, ‘religious manifestations gained political

symbolism, and the major churches even more than before become surrogates for
national representation’.15
It is important to bear in mind that, alongside the creation of the new state, the
centralisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church also took place. The unification of
six previously independent church organisations (which consisted of 28 Dioceses)
into a single Serbian Patriarchy was a long-standing dream of the Serbian clergy.
Despite the fulfilment of this dream (the Patriarchy was proclaimed in 1920, but
the reforms were completed only in 1924), the Serbian Orthodox Church faced a
new challenge – for the first time in its history the Serbian Church, previously the
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only state church in the Kingdom of Serbia, found itself amongst other religious
communities theoretically equal in rights.
Under the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution, all legally acknowledged religions had
full equality of rights; Paragraph 12 proclaimed the liberty of conscience and reli-
gion.16 The Orthodox clergy felt that its position as the country’s leading spiritual
force was threatened by other religious institutions, primarily the Roman Catholic
Church. Although the constitution abandoned the hegemony of the state church,
the principle of church–state separation was not accepted. As such, the Serbian
Orthodox Church in the interwar period enjoyed certain benefits compared with
other Yugoslav churches, yet the concern over its position was one of the reasons
why it got so involved in political struggles.
Translated into the language of nationalism, the rivalry between Orthodox and
Catholic churches in Yugoslavia primarily centred on the Serbo-Croatian conflict.
Its climax was reached in 1937, during the so-called Concordat crisis. The crisis
itself deserves special attention, but an important aspect for my argument here is
that it shows how both sides (the state and the church) used the crisis in order to
achieve their ends. This crisis can be seen as a striking example of both politicisa-
tion of traditional religions and sacralisation of politics.
The Serbian Patriarch Rosi ć Varnava, in one of his wrathful speeches against
ca[cue]t

the Concordat, stated:

We are accused of bringing politics into the church! We do not bring in

politics into the church, but those who have lost reason, patriotism and
respect bring poison to the entire national organism … Who else will tell
the truth to the people if not the national saint church?17

One of the main arguments against the Concordat by the Orthodox Church was
that, if signed, the Concordat would allow an external power (Rome) to influence
the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.18 In other words, the position of the Orthodox
Church was equated with national security. Street demonstrations led by the
Orthodox clergy started after the prime minister presented the Concordat to
parliament for approval. The fact that the Patriarch died the very night the docu-
ment was ratified by the parliament only added fuel to the fire. Eventually, the
government had to withdraw the agreement with the Vatican from Skupš tina, oacn
rs[]

thus conceding the battle to the Serbian Orthodox Church. One can argue that this
was an instance of the ultimate blending of religion and politics. On the
discursive level, the radicalisation of the atmosphere led to the emergence (or
more explicit articulation) of a radical discourse that blended nationalism and
 ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy 253

Orthodoxy into an indivisible whole, both by the Orthodox Church and the
clergy, as well as by lay politicians. Two of the most radical and therefore relevant
ideologues here are Velimirovi ć and Ljoti ć . ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

Main Characters of the Story

Nikolaj Velimirovi ć was primarily a theologian and an archbishop, not a lay
ca[cue]t

philosopher; yet his writings contain ideas that do not belong to the ecclesiastical
sphere. They are better understood as ideological. Moreover, his anti-modernist,
largely anti-western and anti-democratic discourse was picked up by Ljoti ć ’s ca[cue]t

movement, Zbor, and thus can be regarded as an important part of Serbian politi-
cal philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. I will focus on several
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aspects of Velimirovi ć ’s teaching, namely his understanding of history, Serbian

ca[cue]t

history and the Serbian people. For Velimirovi ć , an interest in history meant not ca[cue]t

just an interest in the past and its relevance to the present, but in the future as
well. He referred frequently to Serbian history as ‘Christian history’ [krš tena oacn
rs[]

istorija].19 According to Velimirovi ć Christianity is the essence of Serbian history, ca[cue]t

and the main characteristics of the latter are that it is dramatic and tragic: the
historical fate of the Serbian people is identical to the fate of Christ, for it has
always been a history of suffering and humiliation, but at the same time, a history
of resurrection and glorification.
The Serbian nation, in Velimirovi ć ’s understanding, is a ‘divine-bearing nation’ ca[cue]t

[bogonosni narod]. Serbs were a messianic people, in whose past all the contradic-
tions of Christian history were solved in the best possible way. Needless to say,
the idea that a certain nation had its own mission in world history is neither new
nor exclusively Serbian. This fact, however, does not make it a less important
aspect of Velimirovi ć ’s philosophy; it also sheds light upon the problem of inter-
ca[cue]t

preting national character according to spiritual and metaphysical rules.

Combined with these messianic views on ‘Serbianness’, explicit anti-modernist
ideas are essential to Velimirovi ć . He rejected modern European culture, on the
ca[cue]t

basis that it has lost its Christian faith and, consequently, its connection to the
divine. The historic ‘mission’ of the Serbian people, then, was to connect West and
East, as it was symbolically situated not between them, but above them. Here, one
of Velimirovi ć ’s most important contributions on the link between Orthodoxy
ca[cue]t

and Serbianness is the Svetosavlje theory, or the ‘Nationalism of St Sava’. The

National church [narodna crkva] was claimed to be ‘the spirit that resuscitates the
entire national organism’.20 Saint Sava, the mediaeval founder of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, was interpreted by Velimirovi ć as a founder of both the ca[cue]t

national state and the national church.

Velimirovi ć ’s attitude towards fascism, totalitarianism and communism also
ca[cue]t

deserves attention. On the one hand, he explicitly disliked all of them, but on the
other hand, he also rejected democracy as an appropriate political system. In the
mid-1930s, he showed some admiration for the regime established in Germany.
As he wrote in a programmatic article from, published in 1935 in Nacionalizam
Svetog Save [The Nationalism of St Sava]: ‘One must render homage to the present
German leader, who … realised that nationalism without religion is an anomaly,
a cold and insecure mechanism’.21
Antisemitism was another vital feature in Velimirovi ć ’s discourse. In line with ca[cue]t

the traditional narrative of the Orthodox Church, he accused Jews of every

conceivable tension in European modernity: strikes, capitalism, socialism,
 254 M. Falina

atheism, communism, religious tolerance, and so forth. These ideas, nonetheless,

were formulated in his work Kroz tamnič ki prozor [Through the cell window], written acorn
[]

while serving a prison sentence in Dachau. It would thus not be surprising, as

some critics have claimed, that the concentration camp environment influenced
him.
Dimitrije Ljoti ć appeared on the Serbian political scene as an independent actor
ca[cue]t

in the early 1930s. Prior to that, he was a member of the Serbian Radical Party,
between 1920 and 1929, although he always occupied a marginal position within
it. Ljoti ć enthusiastically greeted the dictatorship imposed by King Alexandar
ca[cue]t

and, in 1931, was appointed by the king as the Minister for Justice in Petar
Živkovi ć ’s government. Ljoti ć held this position for only several months though,
Z
[o
acrn] ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

as he resigned after Alexandar rejected his amended Constitution, which was

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designed along the lines of a corporatist state. Then, in 1935, Ljoti ć formed and ca[cue]t

headed Zbor which, in the elections of 1935, won a total 0.86% share of votes
(meaning that none of its members were elected to the National Assembly).
Ljoti ć and his followers believed in the preservation of old values and tradi-
ca[cue]t

tions, vieweing atheism, materialism and liberalism as responsible for the misfor-
tunes of the Serbian people. Communism was (literally) a Satanic curse aimed at
the destruction of the Christian world. Ljoti ć was himself revered by his followers ca[cue]t

as a prophet, but outside of his movement he was unpopular, largely due to the
inflexibility of his beliefs. According to some scholars, these were views leading
him to cooperate with the Germans in the fight against Tito’s partisans. Eventu-
ally Ljoti ć became the inspector and chief political officer of the volunteer corps in
ca[cue]t

Serbia.
Given the complicated political context in which Zbor functioned, it is no
surprise that Ljoti ć ’s nationalism is difficult to assess. He referred both to the
ca[cue]t

Yugoslav nation and the Serbian people, without actually explaining what he
meant by the first notion. Most likely, his understanding of Yugoslavism may be
interpreted as the extension of Serbian nationalism to all the peoples of Yugosla-
via. One argument for this interpretation is the fact that the bond between Ortho-
doxy and Serbian nationalism was one of Ljoti ć ’s core ideas. For instance, Zbor’s ca[cue]t

motto was ‘With faith in God and the victory of Zbor’. [‘Sa verom u Boga i pobedu
Zbora’]. Apparently, Ljoti ć was highly influenced by Velimirovi ć ’s reading of
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

Svetosavlje, and regarded the Archbishop as his mentor. Velimirovi ć , in his turn, ca[cue]t

confirmed this view on multiple occasions. It is interesting that the penetration of

religion and religious symbolism into Zbor can be clearly seen in the ideology and
organisation of the movement, such as the references to Ljoti ć as a prophet. ca[cue]t

In a text entitled A Letter to Friends [Pismo drugovima], written in 1944 and

addressed to the members of the Zbor, Ljoti ć wrote that every minute of each day ca[cue]t

was spent working, in order to find what would please God, a knowledge he then
transmitted to his followers.22 At the same time, Ljoti ć did not claim to be any ca[cue]t

better than other members of the movement, and referred to himself as a ‘sinful
and unworthy man’ whose only merit was that he could communicate the will of
God.23 This rhetorical pattern resembles the way in which Biblical prophets
addressed the people, and thus returns us to the issue of the sacralisation of polit-
ical culture.
That said, the connection of Ljoti ć ’s thinking to the religious sphere was much ca[cue]t

deeper than a formal resemblance. On multiple occasions he wrote that there is no

other life outside ‘the life and the truth of Christ’; there was no other way of salva-
tion for an individual – or a nation – outside Christ and the Orthodox Church.24
 ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy 255

According to Ljoti ć , normal national development is closely connected to God,

ca[cue]t

Fatherland and household, in a system that was supposed to secure the stability
and well-being of the nation. In this respect, he differentiated the ideology and
the programme of Zbor from that of German National Socialism and Italian
Fascism. He wrote that Fascism and Nazism were based on purely pagan
concepts of ancient Rome and medieval Germanic tribes, respectively; that Italian
Fascism represented the deification of the state, while Nazism valorised the race.
In this sense, both ideologies saw the Divine in the wrong concepts, and thus did
not see the actual divinity of the world. For Ljoti ć , this was a clear example of the ca[cue]t

‘atheist and anti-Christian understanding of the world’.25

Such an emphasis on Christianity definitely unites Ljoti ć with other prominent ca[cue]t

thinkers in interwar Yugoslavia, one of whom was the Archbishop Nikolaj

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Velimirovi ć . The links between Velimirovi ć and Ljoti ć can be traced over at least
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

two levels: the discursive level of ideas, and the ‘real-life interaction’ of two
figures bearing political significance. On the ideological level, Velimirović may be ca[cue]t

called the ‘dominant partner’, while on the level of political interaction the rela-
tionship was more even. Both acknowledged the similarities in their thinking, in
addition to similar political goals. It still remains unclear whether the members of
the Evangelical movement Bogomoljci [God worshippers], led by Velimirovi ć , ca[cue]t

joined Zbor en masse in the end of the 1930s; nonetheless, there is no doubt that
the membership of Bogomoljci and Zbor overlapped considerably.26 Among those
with ‘double membership’ were those like Dimitrije Najdanovi ć and Doko ca[cue]t D
[orkt]s

Slijepčevi ć , both of whom actively contributed in the early 1930s to Svetosavlje, the
o
acrn
[] ca[cue]t

theology journal at Belgrade University.27 Yet Ljoti ć and Velimirovi ć did not ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

agree on the issue of the Nazi’s occupation of Yugoslavia; their relationship was
broken off and not restored until 1945. Later in 1945, Velimirovi ć gave a speech at ca[cue]t

Ljoti ć ’s funeral. He praised the late politician for his political activities, and called
ca[cue]t

him ‘a politician of world significance’. He also praised Ljoti ć ’s devotion and ca[cue]t

commitment to Orthodoxy. The Archbishop then claimed Ljoti ć to be ‘a politician ca[cue]t

with the cross’ [politič ar sa krstom].28 oacn

r[]

Conclusions
This case study of a relatively marginal political movement, and its ties with one
of the major Orthodox thinkers of the twentieth century, evokes questions and
considerations relevant to other fields of historical studies. One of these regards
how the ideas are borrowed from one intellectual context to another. The example
of Ljoti ć and Velimirovi ć provides much material for contemplation on this score.
ca[cue]t ca[cue]t

The same question may be phrased in terms of exchange, borrowing, or appropri-

ation of ideas that originally belonged to the realm of the sacred, subsequently
taken over by a secular political movement. This brings us to the question posed
at the beginning: whether ‘clerical fascism’ is a fruitful concept to use in discus-
sions of Dimitrije Ljoti ć ’s ideology, a man for whom religion was an essential part
ca[cue]t

of his world view. In this respect, Roger Eatwell’s recent statement is relevant:

‘Clerical fascism’ is essentially a misleading concept outside groups such

as the Iron Guard. Although notably different forms of syncretism were
possible within the matrix of fascist ideology, few leading members of the
Church in Germany or Italy believed that a true symbiosis was possible
with fascism.29
 256 M. Falina

My view on the limitations of this concept runs along the same lines. One can see
easily that, in the interwar Serbian context, the link between Orthodoxy and
nationalism was an important aspect for many ideological positions, not just that
of the radical right. One also has to keep in mind that Ljoti ć ’s movement is
ca[cue]t

usually not classified as a fully fascist one; therefore, it seems more appropriate to
talk about the ‘politics of Orthodoxy’ rather than of ‘clerical fascism’.
Yet the ‘politics of Orthodoxy’ or ‘political Orthodoxism’ is as loose a notion as
‘clerical fascism’. Keith Hitchins defined ‘political Orthodoxism’ ‘as a characteris-
tic expression of Romanian identity that was a result of fusion of Eastern Chris-
tian spirituality and the fascination with the Romanian rural world’.30 When
extended to other national contexts, the concept of ‘political Orthodoxism’ can
nevertheless be a useful analytical tool. It provides for a change of perspective
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regarding the interaction between political regimes and religion. The crucial
analytic categories for this discussion are the ‘politicisation of traditional reli-
gions’, the ‘sacralisation of politics’, the ‘instrumentalisation of religion’, and so
on. Emilio Gentile especially underlines that, in his understanding, the concept
‘sacralisation of politics’ ‘does not refer to the political mobilisation of traditional
religions, but to the modern political ideologies and movements which adapted
religious habits to secular ends’.31 At the same time, there is no doubt that the
politicisation of traditional religions went hand in hand with the sacralisation of
politics; they represent the two sides of the same coin. The events of the 1937
Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia is just one example in this regard.
For a further enquiry along these lines, Gentile’s understanding of the ‘state of
the art’ is interesting. He has recently sketched a new set of questions regarding
the interaction of politics, religion, and the notion of the sacred in the modern era:

to what extent could the experiences of political religions, as modern and

unused experiences of symbiosis between religion, politics and moder-
nity, have influenced new forms of politicisation of traditional religions,
which equally tend to combine faith and technology, tradition and
modernity, politics and the sacred?32

This forces us to once again reconsider the possible ways of understanding the
relationship(s) between politics and religion, or in the current discussion,
between religion and a given fascist movement. Mark Biondich, in his analysis of
the wartime regime in Croatia, came to the important conclusion that, for the
Ustaš a regime, Catholicism was vital as ‘an instrument designed to strengthen the
oacn
rs[]

nascent Croatian state’, and that, unlike the Hlinka movement in Slovakia, it was
not genuinely Catholic, and neither did it use religious mysticism like the Roma-
nian Iron Guard.33 While a central place for religion in the ideologies of these
regimes and movements is beyond doubt, the ways in which religion and politics
were connected differed greatly.
Is it possible, then, to generalise about ‘political Christianity’? Can this concept
be of any help in the discussion of political and intellectual debates suffusing the
first half of the twentieth century in Europe? The response to this point itself chal-
lenges the division between eastern and western Christianity, and my intuitive
answer is yes. In the secondary literature on this subject, however, there is a clear
preponderance of works analysing western Europe, which consequently focus on
western Christianity. In this part of the world there exists a quite well-elaborated
concept of ‘political Catholicism’ – the ‘political articulation of Catholicism’.34
 ‘Clerical Fascism’ and Political Orthodoxy 257

Martin Conway has stated that ‘All European countries with significant Catholic
populations experienced in one form or another influence of Catholic political
ideas’. Furthermore, he discusses and considers ‘political movements that
claimed a significant, though not necessarily exclusively, Catholic inspiration for
their actions’.35 One of the possibilities to enrich this stream of research is to
extend it towards other Christian confessions, just like the proposed concept of
‘political Orthodoxy’ may be applied to the Orthodox countries.
Yet this conceptual expansion should not be undertaken in a simple, mechanis-
tic way. Understanding the instrumentalisation of religion by political actors in
Serbia (or in any other Orthodox country) requires taking into account the long-
term ties between Orthodoxy and nationalism on the one hand, and new
phenomena such as the sacralisation of politics on the other. In this sense, nation-
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alism can be understood as one of the most important vehicles enabling religion
to be politicised.

Notes
1. Todor Kulji c´, “Srpski fašizam i sociologija”, Sociološ ki pregled, 2 (1974), pp.241–56.
ca[u
e]t caso
r[n] oacn
rs[]

2. Branislav Gligorijevi c´, “Jugoslovenstvo izmedu dva svetska rata”, Jugoslovenski istorijski č asopis,
ca[cu
e]t o
d
rk
[ts] on
arc][

1–4 (1986), pp.72–87.

3. Mladen Stefanovi c´, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotić a, 1934–1945 (Beograd: Narodna Knjiga, 1984), p.21.
ca[cu
e]t acu
][et

4. Pedro Ramet, ed., Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1988); Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
5. Klaus Buchenau, Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien, 1945–1991: Ein serbisch-kroatischer
Vergleich (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004).
6. Radmila Radi c´, Hilandar u drž avnoj politici kraljevine Srbije i Jugoslavije 1896–1970 (Beograd:
ca[cue]t on
azrc[]

Slu žbeni list SRJ 1998).

zcao
[rn]

7. Neboj ša Popov, Srpski populizam: od marginalne do dominantne pojave, available at: http://
csao
r[n]

147.91.230.480/ifdt/izdanja/casopisi/ifdt/IV/D4/document (last accessed 20 September 2006).

This essay was originally published in Filozofija i drustvo in 1993.
8. Suboti c´, Dragan, Zatomljena Misao: O politič kim idejama Dimitrije Ljotić a (Beograd: Clio, 1994).
ca[cue]t acorn
[] acu
][et

9. Roger Griffin, ed., Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

10. According to some sociological theories, secularisation meant that society was freed from religion;
that religion was separated into its own sphere and thus became a matter for the individual. In this
sense, the examination of the ties between Orthodoxy and political nationalism in nineteenth and
twentieth century Serbia is an interesting case of secularisation.
11. See the works by Peter F. Sugar, Milorad Ekmeč i c´ and Ivo Banac. For a detailed account of the o
acrn
[] ca[cue]t

church’s involvement in national liberation, see Rol’ religii v formirovanii yuzhnoslavianskih naciy
(Moskva: Editorial URSS, 1999); and Vasa Čubrilovi c´, “Srpska pravoslavna crkva pod Turcima od C
[o
acrn] ca[cue]t

XV do XIX veka”, in his Odabrani Istorijski Radovi (Beograd: Narodna Knjiga, 1983).
12. It is very interesting to note that, until recently, this church discourse was accepted by mainstream
historiography. One of the first studies that challenged this discourse was Ju. V. Kostiashov, Serbi
v Avstriyskoy monarkhii v XVIII veke (Kaliningrad: Izdatel’stvo KGU, 1997).
13. Klaus Buchenau, “What Went Wrong? Church–State Relations in Socialist Yugoslavia”, Nationali-
ties Papers, 33/4 (2005), p.552.
14. For more detailed discussion see Andrew B. Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Litera-
ture and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998): Jelena Milojk-
ovic-Djuric, Tradition and Avant-garde: Literature and Art in Serbian Culture, 1900–1918 (Boulder:
East European Monographs, 1988); and Jovo Baki c´, Ideologije Jugoslovenstva izmed u Srpskog i ca[cue]t dork[t]s

Hrvatskog Nacionalizma, 1918–1941: Sociološ ko-istorijska studija (Zrenjanin: Gradska narodna oacn
rs[]

biblioteka Žarko Zrenjanin, 2004). One of the most recent publications on the topic is Dejan
Z
[o
acrn]

Djoki c´, ed., Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992 (London: Hurst, 2003), which
ca[cue]t

provides a good overview of the main problems related to the Yugoslav national idea through-
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
15. Buchenau (note 5), p.552.
 258 M. Falina

16. Radmila Radi c´, Dr ž ava i verske zajednice: 1945–1970. 2 Vols (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju
ca[cue]t zacor[n]

Srbije, 2002), p.21.

17. Patriarch Varnava cited in Miloš Mišovic´, Srpska crkva i konkordatska kriza (Belgrade: Sloboda, caso
r[n] caso
r[n] ca[u
e]t

1983), p.61.
18. Episkop Platon, “I opet o konkordatu: Pravoslavno gledište na ovo pitanje”, Glasnik Srpske o
acsrn
[]

Patrijarš ije, 13–14 (1937), pp.394–417. This lengthy text summarises the main arguments of the
casor[n]

Serbian Orthodox Church against the Concordat, presenting them in a strict legal style.
19. In its most elaborated form this idea can be found in Srpski Narod kao Teodul recently republished
by Nikolaj Velimirovi c´ as Teodul: Srpski narod kao Teodul (Beograd: Evro, 2001).
ca[cue]t

20. Nikolaj Velimirovi c´, Nacionalizam Svetog Save: Predavanje odr ž ano na proslavi nedelje pravoslavlja u
ca[cue]t zacor[n]

Beogradu 1935 (Beograd: Udru ženje srpskog pravoslavnog sveštenstva Arhiepiskopije beograd- zo
acr[n] caso
r[n]

sko-karlovač ke, 1935), p.21.

cao
r[n]

21. Ibid.
22. Dimitrije Ljoti c´, “Pismo drugovima”, Subotić (note 8), p.119.
ca[cue]t acu
][et
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23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p.120.
25. Dimitrije Ljoti c´, “Ni fašizam, ni hitlerizam”, Subotić (note 8), p.75.
ca[cue]t caso
r[n] acu
][et

26. Jovan Byford, “Distinguishing ‘Anti-Judaism’ from ‘Antisemitism’: Recent Championing of

Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi c´”, Religion, State and Society, 34/1 (2006), p.10. ca[cue]t

27. Doko Slijepč evi c´, Istorija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve: Knj. 3, Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata i posle njega
D
[orkt]s o
acrn
[] ca[cue]t

(Beograd: BIGZ, 1991), p.17.

28. “Introduction” to Dragan Suboti c´ (note 8). ca[cue]t

29. Eatwell, Roger, “Reflections on Fascism and Religion”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Reli-
gions, 4/ 3 (2003), p.148.
30. Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866–1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
31. Emilio Gentile, “Political Religion: A Concept and its Critics – A Critical Survey”, Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions, 6/1 (2005), p.29.
32. Ibid., p.31.
33. Mark Biondich, “Religion and Nation in Wartime Croatia: Reflections on the Ustaša Policy of caso
r[n]

Forced Religious Conversions, 1941–1942”, The Slavonic and East European Review, 83/1 (2005),
p.113.
34. Martin Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe: 1918–1945 (London: Routledge, 1997), p.1.
35. Ibid.