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11/15/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 272
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC
*
G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997.
PHILIPPINE **
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or

considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against
discrimination afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution.—In the case at bar, petitioner’s
policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work
any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test
of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to peti-tioner’s as sertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Same; Same; While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated.—Verily,
private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her
status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful
or in bad faith as s he was m oved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status
for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is
a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by
the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it
should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016715064833bd235def003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** The phrase “herein represented by DELIA M. OFI CIAL,” added hereto in

the title of this case as stated in the petition, has been deleted for being
unnecessary and violative of the rules on pleadings, and is commented upon in the
text of this opinion.
597
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 597
Same; Same; The primary standard of determining regular

employment is the reasonable connection between the activity
performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of
the employer.—Private respondent, it mus t be observed, had
gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was
served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to
complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was
contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991.
That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary
period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion
that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of
tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as
reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the
same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which
were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of
PT&T. The primary standard of determining regular employment
is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by
the employee in relation to the busines s or trade of the employer.
Same; Same; Policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that
prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be
automatically separated from the service once they marry declared
void in Zialcita, et al. v. Philippine Air Lines.—It would be
worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in
Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, a decision that emanated
from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air
Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single
and that they will be automatically s eparated from the service
once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear
mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to
discrimination against married women.
Same; Same; While it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms and conditions that they may
deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,

good customs, public order or public policy.—Petitioner’s policy is
not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment,
but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as
it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the
parties to a contract may estab-
598
lish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem
convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against
legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Same; Same; The relations between capital and labor are not
merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public
interest that the same should yield to the comm on good.—
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor
state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and
labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so
much public interest that the same should yield to the common
good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should
visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest
or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of
just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is
that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage
as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as
the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively
interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms
as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not
only in order but imperatively required.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

D.P. Mercado & Associates for petitioner.
A.C. Estrada & Partners for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari,

petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,
(hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil
status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee,
herein private respondent G race de Guzman, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her
services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment,
599
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 599

which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.

She thus claims that she was discriminated against in
gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer
being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a
reliever, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker,”
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,1
1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with
petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed
period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and
from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent’s
services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this
time in replacement of one 2Erlinda F. Dizon who went on
leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once
more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form that was furnished her to be filled up
for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status
therein that she was single although she had contracted 3
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the
same representation in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same
later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M.
Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated
January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy.

In that memorandum, she was reminded about the
company’s policy
4
of not accepting married women for
employment.
______________
1 Rollo, 42; Annex D.

2 Ibid., 44-45; Annexes F and G.
3 Ibid., 46-48; Annexes H and I.
4 Ibid., 49; Annex J.
600

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private

respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along5
she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was 6 dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily
contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled w ith a claim for non-payment of cost of living
allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Comm ission in Baguio
City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection
therewith, private respondent volunteered the information,
and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts
between the parties, that she had failed to remit the
amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed
7
a
promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. All
of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the
agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R.
Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her
reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back
wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor
arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground
relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent
was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she
had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter
and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that
private respondent had indeed been the subject of an
unjust and unlaw-
______________
5 Id., 50; Annex K.

6 Id., 51; Annex L.
7 Id., 53; Annex N.
601
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 601

ful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the

decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the
qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be
suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature
of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other
respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor
arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private
respondent in her employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its
resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil
action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor
arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial
resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that
women should be regarded with love and respect but,
through the ages, men have responded to that injunction
with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women
constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice
against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of
labor, especially on the matter of equal employm ent
opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting,
women have traditionally been considered as falling within
the vulnerable groups or types of workers w ho must be
safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation
against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring,
training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights
betw een men and women in almost all phases of social and
political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.8 To
cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly

recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
commands the State to ensure, at all times, the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article
_______________
8 The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall

ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men (Sec.
14, Art. II).
602

9
XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935
and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to
afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial
security
10
of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article
XIII mandates that the State shall protect working
women through provisions for opportunities that w ould
enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality
have emerged with more frequency in the years since the
Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential
Decree No. 442, largely due to our country’s commitment as
a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the
Elimina-
______________
9 The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized or unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes of
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investment, and to
expansion and growth (Sec. 3, Art. XIII).
10 The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal
functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation (Sec. 14, Art. XIII ).
603
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 603

tion of11All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CE-

DAW). 12
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727
which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women
with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion,
13
and training opportunities; Republic Act No.
6955 which bans the “mail-order-bride” practice for a fee
and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to14 the rights of women workers;
Republic Act No. 7192, also known as the “Women in
Development and Nation Building Act,” which affords
women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter
into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training,
graduation, and commissioning in all m ilitary or similar
schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the 15
Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322
increasing the maternity benefits granted
16
to women in the
private sector; Republic Act No. 7877 which ou tlaw s an d
pun-ishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the
education
17
and training environment; and Republic Act No.
8042,
______________
11 Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, it is regarded as the

most comprehensive international treaty governing the rights of women.
The Philippines became a signatory thereto a year after its adoption by
the UN and in 1981, the country ratified it.
The Philippines had likewise been an active participant in all the four
U.N. World Conferences on Women, namely those held in Mexico in 1975,
Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995.
Other relevant international laws to which the Philippines adheres as a
member of the international community include the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
12 Approved, June 9, 1989.
14 Approved, February 12, 1992.
15 Approved, March 30, 1992.
16 Approved, February 14, 1995.
604

or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

1995,” which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women,
only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it18
would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,
women’s rights in the field of civil law have been greatly
enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of
women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof.
Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of
night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to
be provided with facilities and standards which the
Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health
and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a
woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, m assage
clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be
considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135,
on the other hand, recognizes a woman’s right against
discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this
brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage
of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process
scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to
labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required,
as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the
employment ties of an individual under his employ, to
convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the
existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the
services of such employee, one’s labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of

manpower by the company falls within the so-called
management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass
the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work
assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as
regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers,
and the discipline, dis-
______________
18 Effective August 3, 1988.
605
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 605

19
missal, and recall of employees. As put in a case, an
employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and
best business judgment, all aspects of employment, “from
hiring to firing,” except in cases of unlawful
20
discrimination
or those which may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers
by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty,
the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum
sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words
of the latter, that “you’re fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women 21
employee (sic), as it was
verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the termination
notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private
respondent was made to understand that her severance
from the service was not only by reason of her concealment
of her married status
______________
19 Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. National Labor

Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102993, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA
271; Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 111905, July 31, 1995, 246 SCRA
794; Nuez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
107574, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 518; San Miguel Corporation vs.
Ubaldo, et al., G.R. No. 92859, February 1, 1993, 218 SCRA 293.
20 NAFLU vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
90739, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 346.
21 Quoted in the Decision of the Third Division, NLRC, in NLRC Case
No. RAB-CAR-02-0042-92, Annex B of petition; Rollo, 35. See also Annex
J, supra, Fn. 4.
606

but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the

company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that
married women employees 22
are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.”) Parenthetically, this seems to
be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the
initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this
case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest
ranking officers who23
would otherwise be solidarily liable w
ith the corporation.
Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true
nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to
act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just
cause for 24termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed 25
by the employee and not on the employer’s
caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge 26for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified.
In the present controversy, petitioner’s expostulations
that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter
got
_______________
22 Annex L, id.; Rollo, 51.
23 Art. 289, Labor Code; see AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 69494, June 10,
1986, 142 SCRA 269; Chua vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 81450, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA 353.
24 Mapalo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
107940, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 266; PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
79182, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 487.
25 San Antonio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R.
No. 100829, November 21, 1995, 250 SCRA 359; Labor vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA
183.
26 Hospicio de San Jose de Basili vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 75997, August 18, 1988, 164 SCRA 516.
607
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 607

married but because she concealed that fact, does have a

hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks
dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her
which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate,
therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it
nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that
fact. This improbable reasoning, w ith interstitial
distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent
may well be minded to claim that the imputation of
dishonesty should be the other w ay around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although
private respondent defied its policy against its female
employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as
unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the
same time, declaring that marriage is a trivial matter to
which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T
says it gives its blessings to its female employees
contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and
other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have w anted to avoid. If that employee
confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction;
but if such employee conceals the same instead of
proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This
line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true
management policy or that we are being regaled with
responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained

reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse
through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against
married women, both on the aspects of qualification and
retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal
her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very
policy alone which was the cause of private respondent’s
secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to
recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.
608

Finally, petitioner’s collateral insistence on the admission

of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated
company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her
from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving.
Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of
the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her
collections, but that is an altogether different story. The
fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her
concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of
that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor
arbiter would thus consider petitioner’s submissions on this
supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster
its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that
private respondent deliberately misappropriated the
amount or whether her failure to remit the same was
through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was
in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed
that private respondent execute a promissory note to
refund the same, which she did, and the matter was
deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained
regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was
served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was
about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as
she was contracted as a probationary employee on
September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected
just when her probationary period was winding down
clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done27
in
order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. On
the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as
reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,

even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed
activities which were essential or necessary in
_______________
27 Cielo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.

78693, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA 410; Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, et
al., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 702.
609
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 609

28
the usual trade and business of PT&T. The primary
standard of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the activity performed by
the employee
29
in relation to the business or trade of the
employer.
As an employee who had therefore gained regular
status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause,
she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive
of allowances 30
and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent. However, as she had undeniably committed an
act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the
compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the
three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC
must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that
such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the
employer if she were to return to its fold without any
sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally
justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall
be computed from the time her compensation was withheld
up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced
by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her
three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or
policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T.
The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.—It shall be unlawful for

an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married,
or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually
______________
28 Art. 280, Labor Code; see PLDT vs. Montemayor, et al., G.R. No. 88626,
October 12, 1990, 190 SCRA 427.
29 De Leon vs . National Labor Relations Comm ission, et al., G.R. No. 70705,
August 21, 1989, 176 SCRA 615.
30 Molave Tours Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
112909, November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA 325; see Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6715.
610

dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman

employee merely by reason of marriage.”
This provision had a studied history for its origin31 can be

traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, better
known as the “Women and Child Labor Law,” which
amended
32
paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No.
679, entitled “An Act to Regulate the Employment of
Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations
Thereof, and for Other Purposes.” The forerunner to
Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071
which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated
the employment of women and children in shops, factories,
industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and
other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here
the rationalization
33
in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air
Lines, a decision that emanated from the Office of the
President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring
that prospective flight attendants must be single and that
they will be automatically separated from the service once
they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear
mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to
discrimination against married women. Thus:
“Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent’s

policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is
resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code
applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that
the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and
reasonable, considering the peculiarities of their chosen
profession.
We cannot subs cribe to the line of reasoning pursued by

respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has
already
______________
31 Promulgated on March 13, 1973.

32 Approved on April 15, 1952. It was later amended by Republic Act No. 1131,
which in turn was approved on June 16, 1954.
33 Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977.
611
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 611

met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential

Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor
Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or
their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the
same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at
Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section
12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same
provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code,
which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6)
months later, or on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same
provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it
are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132
enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will
ensure the safety and health of women employees and in
appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to
determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in
special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is
precisely the factor that militates against the policy of
respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set
forth in the firs t paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor
issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or
regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of
respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds
support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full

employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations
between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work x x x.”
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent’s proposition that

termination from employment of flight attendants on account of
marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid
therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so
much against the continued employment of the flight attendant
merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of
Labor, but rather on the cons equence of marriage-pregnancy.
Respondent discussed at length in the ins tant appeal the
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course
of th eir empl oyment . We feel that
612

this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately

explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent
went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of
the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social
institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In
both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight
attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory
to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on
actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world,
sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one
place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that
married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to
prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in
ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so.
The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by
Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment
of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. 34

vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation
considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the
complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female
employees in the project it was undertaking as separated
the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for
married women. Respondent further claimed that
complainant was employed in the project with an oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when

she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an
example of “discriminatory chauvinism” tantamount to
denying equal employment opportunities to women simply
on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down
said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance
to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the
Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which
establish employer pref eren ce or con d ition s relating to
the
_______________
34 CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978.
613
VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 613

marital status of an employee are categorized as a “sex-

plus” discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not
on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied
and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual
group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws.
Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have
been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job
discrimination against employees 35
and applicants on the
basis of, among other things, sex.
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed
against all women but just against married women. And,
where the employer discriminates against married women,
but not against married men, 36
the variable is sex and the
discrimination is unlawful. Upon the other hand, a
requirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could be justified as a “bona fide occupational
qualification,” or BFOQ, where the particular requirements
of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading
work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would
be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one
case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female
flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the
restriction was not37

related to the job performance of the
flight attendants.
5. Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it
likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as
it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the
individual as an intangible and
________________
35 45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, Sec. 506, p. 486.

36 Ibid., id., id.
37 Ibid., id., Sec. 507.
614

38
inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties
to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same
should not be contrary39to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences,
it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against
legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the
contract of labor state that the relations between the
parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public 40
interest that the same should yield to the common good. It
goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit
acts of oppression against the 41other, nor impair the interest
or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the
danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and,42
ultimately, of the family as the foundation
of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as dis-
_______________
38 Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1979 ed., 235;
see Art. 874, Civil Code.
39 Art. 1306, Civil Code.
40 Art. 1700, Civil Code; see Macleod & Co. of the Philippines vs.
Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 (1955).
41 Art. 1701, Civil Code.
42 The 1987 Constitution provides:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x (Sec. 15, Art. II).
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development (Sec. 1, Art. XV).
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State (Sec. 2, Art. XV).
615
VOL. 272, MAY 27, 1997 615

People vs. Dela Torre
criminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is

not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza an d Torres, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—It is the lack of clear, valid and legal cause that

is constitutive of illegal dismissal w arranting
reinstatement and the award of backwages. (General
Textile, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 243
SCRA 232 [1995])
——o0o——
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11/15/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 272

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Labor Law; Dismissals; Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or

** The phrase “herein represented by DELIA M. OFI CIAL,” added hereto in

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 597

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC

Same; Same; The primary standard of determining regular

deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,

598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari,

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 599

which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.

January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy.

1 Rollo, 42; Annex D.

600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission

5 Id., 50; Annex K.

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 601

ful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the

the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly

8 The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall

602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 603

tion of11All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CE-

11 Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, it is regarded as the

of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of

18 Effective August 3, 1988.

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 605

19 Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. National Labor

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the

22 Annex L, id.; Rollo, 51.

23 Art. 289, Labor Code; see AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs.

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 607

married but because she concealed that fact, does have a

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Finally, petitioner’s collateral insistence on the admission

reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,

27 Cielo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 609

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.—It shall be unlawful for

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman

This provision had a studied history for its origin31 can be

“Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent’s

We cannot subs cribe to the line of reasoning pursued by

31 Promulgated on March 13, 1973.

VOL. 272, MAY 23, 1997 611

met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential

“Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent’s proposition that

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. 34

understanding that her services would be terminated when