465

Modern Techniques for Protecting

and Monitoring of Transmission Lines

Working Group
B5.07

June 2011
 Modern Techniques for Protecting and
Monitoring of Transmission Lines

Working Group
B5.07

Members

Simon Chano (CA) – Convenor, João Emanuel Afonso (PT) – Secretary,

Alexander Apostolov (US), Anand Menon (CH), Demetrios Tziouvaras (US),
Florin Balasiu (RO), Gareth Baber (UK), Juan Maria García (ES),
Kai Kühl (CH), Kenneth Opskar (NO), Leif Koppari (SE),
Mohindar Sachdev (CA), Simon Hussey (IE), Stefanos Sofroniou (GR),
Denys Lellys (BR), François L’Homme (FR), Graeme Topham (ZA)

Copyright © 2011
“Ownership of a CIGRE publication, whether in paper form or on electronic support only infers right of use for
personal purposes. Are prohibited, except if explicitly agreed by CIGRE, total or partial reproduction of the
publication for use other than personal and transfer to a third party; hence circulation on any intranet or other
company network is forbidden”.

Disclaimer notice
“CIGRE gives no warranty or assurance about the contents of this publication, nor does it accept any
responsibility, as to the accuracy or exhaustiveness of the information. All implied warranties and conditions are
excluded to the maximum extent permitted by law”.

ISBN: 978- 2- 85873- 154-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMBERS ............................................................................................................................................................. I
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................................... II
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................ VI
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................................................. IX
ABBREVIATIONS ...............................................................................................................................................X
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................................................................. XIII
1 SCOPE AND INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
1.1 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1
2 RELIABILITY, SENSITIVITY & SPEED ............................................................................................... 2
2.1 DEPENDABILITY.................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1.1 Availability ...................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1.2 Redundancy ..................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1.3 Issues Impacting on Dependability ................................................................................................. 4
2.2 SECURITY ............................................................................................................................................. 4
2.3 SENSITIVITY ......................................................................................................................................... 4
2.4 SPEED ................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.5 POWER SUPPLY SEGREGATION AND DEVICE CONTACT USAGE ............................................................ 5
3 DIGITAL RELAY FILTERING................................................................................................................ 6
3.1 FILTER DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS ....................................................................................................... 6
3.2 HOW THE SAMPLING RATE AFFECTS DEVICE OPERATING TIME .......................................................... 6
3.3 DIGITAL RELAY FILTER EVALUATION .................................................................................................. 7
3.4 FOURIER FILTER ................................................................................................................................... 9
3.4.1 Mimic Filter .................................................................................................................................. 10
3.5 LEAST SQUARES FILTERING................................................................................................................ 12
3.6 FREQUENCY MEASUREMENT AND TRACKING ..................................................................................... 12
3.6.1 Zero-Crossing Detection ............................................................................................................... 13
3.6.2 Phasor-Based Methods ................................................................................................................. 15
3.6.3 Frequency Tracking (Small Deviations) ....................................................................................... 15
3.7 PROTECTION ELEMENT PERFORMANCE DURING FREQUENCY EXCURSIONS ....................................... 17
3.8 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 18
4 APPLIED TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES .................................................................. 19
4.1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION ........................................................ 19
4.1.1 Transmission Media and Teleprotection Channels ....................................................................... 22
4.1.2 Teleprotection Interfaces............................................................................................................... 28
4.2 TELECOMMUNICATION FOR REMOTE DATA ACCESS........................................................................... 29
4.2.1 Protection IED Data Interfaces .................................................................................................... 29
4.2.2 Communication Standards and Protocols ..................................................................................... 30
4.2.3 Remote Access ............................................................................................................................... 31
4.3 FUTURE TRENDS ................................................................................................................................. 31
4.3.1 Next Generation Networks ............................................................................................................ 31
4.3.2 Extension of IEC 61850 for Communication Outside of the Substation........................................ 32
4.4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 32
5 PROTECTION FUNCTIONS .................................................................................................................. 34
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 34
5.2 PHASE AND GROUND OVERCURRENT PROTECTION ............................................................................ 34
5.2.1 Non-Directional Phase Overcurrent ............................................................................................. 34
5.2.2 Directional Phase Overcurrent ..................................................................................................... 35
5.2.3 Directional Ground Overcurrent .................................................................................................. 35
5.2.4 Polarisation Techniques................................................................................................................ 36

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 5.2.5 Sensitive Residual Overcurrent Protection ................................................................................... 38
5.3 DISTANCE PROTECTION ...................................................................................................................... 38
5.3.1 Polarizing Methods ....................................................................................................................... 38
5.3.2 Phase Selectors ............................................................................................................................. 43
5.3.3 Increased Number of Distance Zones ........................................................................................... 44
5.3.4 High-Speed Distance Zone ............................................................................................................ 44
5.3.5 More Flexible Characteristic ........................................................................................................ 45
5.3.6 Load Compensation Factor ........................................................................................................... 45
5.3.7 Load Characteristic ...................................................................................................................... 45
5.3.8 Different Parameter Groups ......................................................................................................... 46
5.3.9 Integrated Distance to Fault Location .......................................................................................... 46
5.3.10 Ground Return Compensation Factor ...................................................................................... 46
5.3.11 Mutual Impedance .................................................................................................................... 46
5.3.12 Drifting of Parameters ............................................................................................................. 48
5.3.13 Zone Extension ......................................................................................................................... 48
5.4 LINE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION FUNCTION...................................................................................... 49
5.4.1 Current Differential Protection ..................................................................................................... 49
5.4.2 Digital Current Differential Protection......................................................................................... 50
5.4.3 Advantages of Line Differential Protection Systems ..................................................................... 50
5.4.4 Current Differential Operating Characteristics ............................................................................ 50
5.4.5 Percentage Bias Current Differential Characteristic ................................................................... 51
5.4.6 Alpha-Plane Differential Characteristic ....................................................................................... 52
5.4.7 Charge Comparison ...................................................................................................................... 53
5.4.8 Differential Protection using Zero or Negative-Sequence Current ............................................... 53
5.4.9 Time Synchronization .................................................................................................................... 54
5.4.10 Accommodation of Channel Delay Asymmetry Using GPS...................................................... 56
5.4.11 Redundant Communication Channels ...................................................................................... 57
5.4.12 Improvements in Line Differential Operating Characteristics ................................................. 57
5.5 SWITCH ONTO FAULT PROTECTION .................................................................................................... 59
5.6 TELEPROTECTION FUNCTIONS ............................................................................................................ 61
5.6.1 General.......................................................................................................................................... 61
5.6.2 Permissive Teleprotection ............................................................................................................. 62
5.6.3 Blocking Teleprotection ................................................................................................................ 67
5.7 NON-COMMUNICATIONS BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES FOR PARALLEL LINES ................................. 67
5.8 EFFECT OF INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMER TRANSIENTS ON PROTECTION FUNCTIONS ......................... 69
5.8.1 Current Transformer (CT) Transients ........................................................................................... 69
5.8.2 Effect of CT Saturation on Distance Protection Elements ............................................................ 70
5.8.3 Effect Of CT Saturation On Line Differential Elements ................................................................ 71
5.8.4 Effect of CT Subsidence Current on CB Failure Protection Elements .......................................... 72
5.8.5 Capacitor Voltage Transformer Transients .................................................................................. 73
5.8.6 Effect Of CVT Transients On Distance Protection Elements ........................................................ 74
5.8.7 Bushing Potential Device Transients ............................................................................................ 75
5.8.8 Mitigation Of CVT And BPD Subsidence Transient ..................................................................... 77
5.8.9 CVT Transient Detection Methods ................................................................................................ 77
5.8.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 78
5.9 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 78
6 CONTROL FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 80
6.1 AUTOMATIC RECLOSING..................................................................................................................... 80
6.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 80
6.1.2 Basic Parameters Of An Auto-Reclosing Scheme ......................................................................... 81
6.1.3 AR Operating Mode ...................................................................................................................... 83
6.1.4 Control Of The AR Function ......................................................................................................... 85
6.1.5 Protection Schemes And Auto-Reclosing ...................................................................................... 87
6.1.6 Sequential Auto-Reclosing Features ............................................................................................. 87
6.1.7 Adaptive Auto-Reclosing ............................................................................................................... 87
6.1.8 Synchronism Check ....................................................................................................................... 88
6.2 POWER SWING BLOCKING AND OUT-OF-STEP FUNCTIONS ................................................................. 91
6.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 91
6.2.2 Power Swing Detection ................................................................................................................. 92

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 6.2.3 Power Swing Blocking .................................................................................................................. 94
6.2.4 Protection dependability during power swings ............................................................................. 95
6.2.5 Out-Of-Step Tripping .................................................................................................................... 96
6.2.6 Application Of PSB And OST Functions ....................................................................................... 97
6.3 ZERO VOLTAGE TRIPPING ................................................................................................................... 98
6.4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 99
7 TRANSMISSION LINE AND PROTECTION SYSTEM MONITORING FUNCTIONS .............. 101
7.1 TRANSMISSION LINE MONITORING ................................................................................................... 101
7.1.1 Fault Recorder ............................................................................................................................ 101
7.1.2 Disturbance Recorder ................................................................................................................. 104
7.1.3 Fault Location ............................................................................................................................. 104
7.1.4 Broken Conductor ....................................................................................................................... 106
7.2 PROTECTION SYSTEM MONITORING ................................................................................................. 109
7.2.1 Internal Self Supervision ............................................................................................................. 109
7.2.2 Measurement Supervision ........................................................................................................... 111
7.2.3 Trip Circuit Supervision .............................................................................................................. 113
7.3 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 114
8 AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS.................................................................................................................... 115
8.1 EVENT RECORDER ............................................................................................................................ 115
8.2 REMOTE ACCESS .............................................................................................................................. 116
8.3 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION.................................................................................................................. 118
8.4 CIRCUIT BREAKER CONDITION MONITORING ................................................................................... 120
8.5 POLE DISCREPANCY.......................................................................................................................... 121
8.5.1 Contact Discrepancy Between Poles ........................................................................................... 122
8.5.2 Discrepancy Between Contacts of the Same Pole ....................................................................... 122
8.6 MEASUREMENT ................................................................................................................................ 123
8.7 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................... 123
8.8 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 124
9 INTEGRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT ................................................................................. 125
9.1 PROTECTION FEATURES .................................................................................................................... 125
9.2 NON-PROTECTION FEATURES ........................................................................................................... 126
9.3 PROTECTION APPLICATIONS ............................................................................................................. 127
9.4 CONTROL APPLICATIONS .................................................................................................................. 130
10 IEC 61850 IMPACT ON TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION ................................................... 133
10.1 IEC 61850 BASED SUBSTATION ARCHITECTURE .............................................................................. 133
10.2 PROCESS-BUS BASED SOLUTIONS..................................................................................................... 135
10.3 ADVANTAGES OF PROCESS-BUS BASED SOLUTIONS ........................................................................ 137
10.4 PROTECTION PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................... 138
10.5 ADVANTAGES OF GOOSE BASED SOLUTIONS ................................................................................. 140
10.6 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 142
11 APPLICATION EXAMPLES ................................................................................................................ 143
11.1 BENEFITS OF INCREASED NUMBERS OF DISTANCE PROTECTION ZONES .......................................... 143
11.2 FAULT LOCATION IN TRANSMISSION LINE IEDS .............................................................................. 144
11.3 SYNCHROPHASOR-BASED TRANSMISSION LINE BACKUP PROTECTION ............................................ 145
11.3.1 Faulted Phase Identification .................................................................................................. 146
11.3.2 Negative-Sequence Current Differential ................................................................................ 147
11.3.3 Negative-Sequence Current Directional Element................................................................... 147
11.3.4 Protection Element Performance ........................................................................................... 148
11.4 PARALLEL LINES .............................................................................................................................. 150
11.4.1 Communications-Aided Phase Selection in Distance Protection Schemes............................. 150
11.4.2 Blocking Of High-Speed AR For CB Failure Or Out-Of-Synch Conditions .......................... 151
11.5 THREE-TERMINAL LINES .................................................................................................................. 152
11.5.1 Maintaining High-speed Tripping In The Event Of One-Channel Loss ................................. 152
11.5.2 Loss-Of-Communication Channel In Three-Terminal Line Differential Applications ........... 153
11.6 BREAKER-AND-A-HALF BUSBAR ARRANGEMENT ........................................................................... 153

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 11.6.1 Current Differential Protection with Independent Current Inputs for Through-Fault Stability
154
11.6.2 Stub Fault Condition .............................................................................................................. 154
11.7 CB AND STATION BYPASS ................................................................................................................ 155
11.7.1 CB Bypassing (Substitution) ................................................................................................... 155
11.7.2 Station Bypass ........................................................................................................................ 157
11.8 AUTO-RECLOSING WITH SECONDARY ARC EXTINCTION RECOGNITION .......................................... 159
11.9 MULTI-PHASE AUTO-RECLOSING ..................................................................................................... 160
11.10 SUBSTATION TOPOLOGY AND AUTO-RECLOSING ............................................................................. 161
11.10.1 Double Busbar arrangement .................................................................................................. 161
11.10.2 Breaker-And-A-Half Arrangement ......................................................................................... 164
11.11 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 168
12 TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION TESTING ........................................................................... 169
12.1 TESTING OF DISTANCE PROTECTION IEDS ....................................................................................... 169
12.2 IED TESTING .................................................................................................................................... 170
12.2.1 Testing Of The Analog Signal Processing .............................................................................. 171
12.2.2 Testing Of The Measurement Functions ................................................................................. 172
12.2.3 Testing Of The Main Protection Functions ............................................................................ 172
12.3 TESTING OF TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION SCHEMES ................................................................ 174
12.3.1 What Should Be Tested ........................................................................................................... 174
12.3.2 How is the Test Performed? ................................................................................................... 174
12.3.3 Test Results Analysis .............................................................................................................. 175
12.4 CONVENTIONAL TESTING ................................................................................................................. 176
12.5 VIRTUAL RELAY TESTING ................................................................................................................ 176
12.5.1 Front End ............................................................................................................................... 177
12.5.2 Virtual Relay........................................................................................................................... 177
12.5.3 Analysis And Visualization Tools ........................................................................................... 179
12.5.4 Virtual Testing Applications ................................................................................................... 180
13 FUTURE TRENDS ................................................................................................................................. 182
13.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 182
13.2 GENERAL TRENDS ............................................................................................................................ 182
13.2.1 Engineering ............................................................................................................................ 182
13.2.2 Protection Principles .............................................................................................................. 182
13.2.3 Software .................................................................................................................................. 182
13.2.4 Hardware ............................................................................................................................... 183
13.2.5 Man Machine Interface .......................................................................................................... 183
13.2.6 Setting Procedures.................................................................................................................. 184
13.2.7 Commissioning ....................................................................................................................... 184
13.2.8 Lifecycle ................................................................................................................................. 184
13.3 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 184
13.3.1 Station to Station .................................................................................................................... 184
13.3.2 Station Level ........................................................................................................................... 184
13.4 SPARE PARTS .................................................................................................................................... 185
13.5 TRAINING.......................................................................................................................................... 185
13.6 DEVICE CONFIGURATION .................................................................................................................. 185
14 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 186
15 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................... 187

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 - System conditions Vs Tendency to Operate......................................................................................... 2
Figure 3.1 - Operating time versus sampling rate .................................................................................................. 7
Figure 3.2 - Impedance plot of half-cycle cosine filter ........................................................................................... 7
Figure 3.3 - Evaluation of analog and digital filters .............................................................................................. 8
Figure 3.4 - Cosine and sine filters ......................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 3.5 - Impedance plot of cosine filter ............................................................................................................ 9
Figure 3.6 - Impedance plot of Fourier filter ........................................................................................................ 10
Figure 3.7 - Comparison of cosine and Fourier filters ......................................................................................... 10
Figure 3.8 - Effect of mimic filter followed by a full cycle Fourier filter .............................................................. 11
Figure 3.9 - Response of a mimic filter followed by a half cycle Fourier filter .................................................... 11
Figure 3.10 - Magnitude response of the Least Error Squares technique ............................................................ 12
Figure 3.11 - Software implementation of the zero-crossing detection................................................................. 14
Figure 3.12 - Phasor rotation for measuring frequency ....................................................................................... 15
Figure 3.13 - Effect of off-nominal frequency on phasor estimation .................................................................... 16
Figure 3.14 - Two voltage phasors computed by two different devices ................................................................ 17
Figure 4.1 – Light propagation in single and multi-mode fibre ............................................................................ 24
Figure 5.1 – User-defined curve ........................................................................................................................... 35
Figure 5.2 – Directional Ground Fault Protection Scheme Logic........................................................................ 36
Figure 5.3 – Directional characteristic of a distance relay .................................................................................. 40
Figure 5.4 – Offset and rotation of the directional element for a forward fault due to load angle and source
impedance ............................................................................................................................................................. 41
Figure 5.5 - Polarising quantity (phase-ground fault).......................................................................................... 41
Figure 5.6 - Voltage inversion at bus S on a series-compensated line.................................................................. 42
Figure 5.7 - Distance zones .................................................................................................................................. 44
Figure 5.8 - Basic non-biased current differential protection .............................................................................. 49
Figure 5.9 - Pilot wire differential protection....................................................................................................... 49
Figure 5.10 - Traditional percentage bias current differential characteristics .................................................... 51
Figure 5.11 - Alpha-plane line current differential characteristic ....................................................................... 53
Figure 5.12 – Fault current and load current ....................................................................................................... 54
Figure 5.13 – Id and Ir for a high resistance fault ................................................................................................. 54
Figure 5.14 - Channel time delay measurement using the ping-pong method ...................................................... 56
Figure 5.15 - SOTF Protection ............................................................................................................................. 59
Figure 5.16 – AR (in synchro and voltage check modes) activation of SOTF ...................................................... 60
Figure 5.17 – AR (with zone extension) activation of SOTF ................................................................................. 60
Figure 5.18 –SOTF and faults on adjacent lines .................................................................................................. 61
Figure 5.19 – Permissive Underreach Transfer Tripping..................................................................................... 63
Figure 5.20 – Directional Comparison ................................................................................................................. 63
Figure 5.21 – Permissive Overreach Transfer Tripping ....................................................................................... 64
Figure 5.22 – Directional Comparison Unblocking ............................................................................................. 65
Figure 5.23 – POTT with “echo” and “weak-end infeed” logic .......................................................................... 66
Figure 5.24 – Directional Blocking ...................................................................................................................... 67
Figure 5.25 – Cross-differential protection on double circuit line ....................................................................... 67
Figure 5.26 - Operation of cross-differential protection for a fault in the middle of the line ............................... 68
Figure 5.27 - Operation of superimposed cross-differential protection for a mid-line fault ................................ 69
Figure 5.28 - Simplified CT-equivalent circuit ..................................................................................................... 69
Figure 5.29 - Saturated and normal currents ....................................................................................................... 70
Figure 5.30 - Calculated distance m values with normal and saturated currents ................................................ 71
Figure 5.31 - Mho element phasor diagram showing how CT saturation causes underreach ............................. 71
Figure 5.32 - Alpha Plane (IR/IL) plots of Alpha Plane and conventional differential characteristics ................. 72
Figure 5.33 - Subsidence current from a CT output after the CB poles open ....................................................... 73
Figure 5.34 - Half-cycle cosine filter (50BF) dropout and subsidence detection CBF element (OPHA) ............. 73
Figure 5.35 - CVT circuit ...................................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 5.36 - CVT transients reduce the fundamental voltage magnitude ........................................................... 75
Figure 5.37 - Overreach due to CVT transients .................................................................................................... 75
Figure 5.38 - Voltage and current for a C-phase fault at 64% of line length ....................................................... 76
Figure 5.39 - Apparent impedance seen by the distance protection for the fault at 64% along the line .............. 76
Figure 5.40 - Distance protection performance as a function of SIR ................................................................... 77
Figure 5.41 - CVT transient detection logic prevents distance protection Zone 1 from overreaching ................. 78
Figure 6.1 – AR single shot cycle for a transient fault.......................................................................................... 80

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Figure 6.2 - AR single shot cycle for a permanent fault ....................................................................................... 81
Figure 6.3 - Example of a single-pole AR ............................................................................................................. 84
Figure 6.4 - Example of a three-pole AR .............................................................................................................. 84
Figure 6.5 – Synchronism check with alternative voltage sources ....................................................................... 89
Figure 6.6 – Synchronism check operation ........................................................................................................... 90
Figure 6.7 – Impedance trajectories during an unstable power swing ................................................................. 91
Figure 6.8 - Superimposed component element assertion during a power swing ................................................. 92
Figure 6.9 – Power swing detection with continuous impedance calculation ...................................................... 93
Figure 6.10 – Phasor diagram of a two source inductive system ......................................................................... 94
Figure 6.11 – Positive sequence impedance trajectory during a pole slip ........................................................... 96
Figure 6.12 - Pole slip trip disturbance record .................................................................................................... 97
Figure 6.13 - Zero Voltage Tripping Main Function Block Diagram................................................................... 99
Figure 7.1 – Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (instantaneous time signals) ............................. 102
Figure 7.2 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (RMS computed values) ..................................... 102
Figure 7.3 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (pre-fault and fault phasors).............................. 103
Figure 7.4 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (apparent impedances locus) ............................. 103
Figure 7.5 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (fault location estimation, single-ended) ........... 105
Figure 7.6 - Earth fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (fault location estimated by the IED) .................... 106
Figure 7.7 - Configuration of a line in a substation ........................................................................................... 107
Figure 7.8 - DLO algorithm functional block ..................................................................................................... 107
Figure 7.9 - Kalman filter elements .................................................................................................................... 108
Figure 7.10 – Fuzzyfication of Active Power and DeltaP ................................................................................... 109
Figure 7.12 – VT MCB Contact utilisation ......................................................................................................... 113
Figure 8.1 – Protection data collection and evaluation system .......................................................................... 117
Figure 8.2 – Remote access media options ......................................................................................................... 117
Figure 8.3 – Direct synchronization ................................................................................................................... 119
Figure 9.1 – Zone 1 Distance Element Using a Dual-Filter Scheme .................................................................. 127
Figure 9.2 – A-Phase Impedance Loop Half- and One-Cycle Combination Logic............................................. 128
Figure 9.3 – m Calculations for a Zone 2 A-Phase-to-Ground Fault ................................................................. 128
Figure 9.4 – Cross-Country Fault ...................................................................................................................... 129
Figure 10.1 – Simplified communications architecture ...................................................................................... 134
Figure 10.2 – Conventional IED analog interface.............................................................................................. 135
Figure 10.3 – Distributed application interface (partial implementation) ......................................................... 136
Figure 10.4 – Distributed application interface (complete implementation) ...................................................... 137
Figure 10.5 – Transfer time definition ................................................................................................................ 138
Figure 10.6 – IEC 61850 GSE based CB failure protection scheme .................................................................. 140
Figure 10.7 – Comparison test setup .................................................................................................................. 141
Figure 10.8 – Results from comparison test........................................................................................................ 142
Figure 11.1 – Fault Location from Device 1 (Ideal=25) .................................................................................... 145
Figure 11.2 – Fault Location from Device 2 (Ideal=75) .................................................................................... 145
Figure 11.3 - Relays exchange synchrophasors for backup line protection in a two-terminal line application . 146
Figure 11.4 - Faulted phase identification logic uses total negative-sequence and zero-sequence fault current147
Figure 11.5 - Negative-sequence current directional element, 32IQ, with current magnitude, channel health,
data integrity, and time synchronization supervision. ........................................................................................ 148
Figure 11.6 - Power system parameters and operating conditions to analyze RF coverage capabilities of the
87LQ, and 67Q elements ..................................................................................................................................... 148
Figure 11.7 - 32IQ, 87LQ, and 67Q element RF coverage for phase-to-ground faults at different line locations
............................................................................................................................................................................ 149
Figure 11.8 - 32IQ and 87LQ RF coverage with 0.05•INOM and 0.1•INOM sensitivity .......................................... 149
Figure 11.9 - FPI, 32IQ, and 67Q operating times for an A-phase-to-ground fault located 30% from the local
end ....................................................................................................................................................................... 150
Figure 11.10 – Cross-country fault ..................................................................................................................... 150
Figure 11.11 – Applications of Device-to-Device Communications ................................................................... 151
Figure 11.12 – Three-Terminal System with Independent Communications Paths ............................................ 152
Figure 11.13 – Breaker and a half substation..................................................................................................... 153
Figure 11.14 – Close-up external fault for breaker-and-a-half busbar configuration ....................................... 154
Figure 11.15 – Double-bus single-CB configuration .......................................................................................... 155
Figure 11.16 – Feeder communications channels routed via a fiber-optic switch ............................................. 156
Figure 11.17 – CB3 bypassed while Feeder 3 is protected by the bus coupler CB (CB1) .................................. 157
Figure 11.18 – Looped station configuration with isolators to facilitate line CB maintenance ......................... 157

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Figure 11.19 – Looped station configuration with IEDs and a fiber-optic transfer switch and station bypass
switch open (CB1 and CB2 normal) ................................................................................................................... 158
Figure 11.20 – Looped station configuration with IEDs and a fiber-optic transfer switch and station bypass
switch closed (CB2 out of service) ...................................................................................................................... 158
Figure 11.21 – Vγ is inside the SAED region after the arc extinguishes ............................................................ 159
Figure 11.22 – A-phase voltage phasor enters the SAED region after the secondary arc extinguishes ............. 160
Figure 11.23 – Reclosing relay close supervision using secondary arc extinction detection ............................. 160
Figure 11.24 – Multi-phase auto-reclosing ........................................................................................................ 161
Figure 11.25 – Double busbar arrangement – Common external AR ................................................................ 162
Figure 11.26 – Double busbar arrangement - Main AR with hot standby .......................................................... 163
Figure 11.27 – Double busbar arrangement - Redundant AR, Master/Follower ............................................... 163
Figure 11.28 – Breaker and a half arrangement – Line-line diameter – External AR ....................................... 165
Figure 11.29 – Breaker and a half arrangement. Line-Line diameter. AR/SYN within Main 1 and Main 2 ...... 167
Figure 12.1 – Test system block diagram ........................................................................................................... 170
Figure 12.2 – Testing of transmission line protection IED ................................................................................. 171
Figure 12.3 – Test configuration for analog signal processing and measurement functions tests ..................... 172
Figure 12.4 – Distance characteristic test configuration ................................................................................... 173
Figure 12.5 – Unsuccessful reclosing simulation ............................................................................................... 175
Figure 12.6 – Virtual Testing Tool simplified block diagram ............................................................................. 176
Figure 12.7 – Example settings dialog box ......................................................................................................... 178
Figure 12.8 – Virtual Testing results .................................................................................................................. 179
Figure 12.9 – Locus of Power swing .................................................................................................................. 180
Figure 12.10 – Harmonic filter ........................................................................................................................... 180

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 - Application of Telecommunications Channels to Protection of Transmission Lines .......................... 20
Table 4.2 - Comparison of Telecommunications Channels as Applied to Line Protection ................................... 21
Table 5.1 - Measured values for distance calculation and directional determination. ......................................... 42
Table 7.1 – Hardware self-tests typically performed by protection IEDs ........................................................... 110
Table 7.2 – Software self-tests typically performed by protection IEDs ............................................................. 111
Table 11.1 - Vγ and VΣ Voltages for A, B, and C-Phase SAEDS ......................................................................... 159

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ABBREVIATIONS
ADC Analog to Digital Converter
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AR Automatic Reclosing
BBP Busbar Protection
BCU Bay Control Unit
BER Bit Error Rate
BPD Bushing Potential Device
CB Circuit Breaker
CBF Circuit Breaker Failure (protection)
CCITT International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (English-French
compromise acronym)
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CIGRÉ Conseil International des Grands Réseaux Électriques (International Council on
Large Electric Systems)
COMTRADE Common format for Transient Data Exchange
CT Current Transformer
CVT Capacitor Voltage Transformer
DAR Delayed Automatic Reclosing
DC Direct Current
DCUB Direction Comparison Unblocking (teleprotection)
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
DLD Dead Line Detection
DLL Dynamic Link Library (software file)
DLO Open Line Detector
DR Disturbance Recorder
DSP Digital Signal Processor
DT Definite Time (overcurrent)
DTE Data Terminal Equipment
DTT Direct Transfer Trip
DWDM Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing
ECO Electrical Centre of Oscillation (power swing)
EHV Extra High Voltage
EIA Electronic Industries Alliance
EMTP Electro-Magnetic Transients Program
FACTS Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System
FDM Frequency Division Multiplexing
FIR Finite Impulse Response (filtering)
FPI Faulted Phase Identification
FREC Fault Recorder
FSC Ferroresonance Suppression Circuit
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
GPS Global Positioning System
HMI Human Machine Interface

x
HV High Voltage
IDMT Inverse Definite Minimum Time (overcurrent)
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IED Intelligent Electronic Device – refers to modern numerical multifunction
protection, control and monitoring device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IIR Infinite Impulse Response (filtering)
IOU Input/Output Unit
IP Internet Protocol
ITU International Telecommunications Union
LAN Local Area Network
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LD Laser Diode
LED Light Emitting Diode
LES Least Error Squares (filtering)
MCB Miniature Circuit Breaker
MOV Metal Oxide Varistor
MPLS Multi-Protocol Label Switching
MU Merging Unit
NGN Next Generation Networks
N/C Normally closed
N/O Normally open
OOS Out-Of-Step (unstable power swing)
OPGW Optical Ground Wire
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PDCS Power quality Data Collection and evaluation System
PDH Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy
PDL Pole Discrepancy Logic
PDN Public Data Networks
PLC Power Line Carrier
POTT Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping (teleprotection)
PSB Power Swing Blocking
PSD Power Swing Detection
PSRC Power System Relaying Committee, of the Power Engineering Society of the
IEEE
PSTN Public Subscriber Telephone Network
PT Potential Transformer (see also VT)
PUTT Permissive Underreaching Transfer Tripping (teleprotection)
RAR Rapid Automatic Reclosing
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
Rx Receive
SAED Secondary Arc Extinction Detector
SAS Substation Automation System
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SCL Substation Configuration Language (IEC 61850)

xi
SCV Swing Centre Voltage
SDT Step Down Transformer
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SIR Source Impedance Ratio
SMS Substation Monitoring System
SONET Synchronous Optical Network
SOTF Switch-Onto-Fault
SCV Static VAr Compensator
TIA Telecommunications Industries Association
TDM Time Division Multiplexing
TSO Transmission System Operator
Tx Transmit
VF Voice frequency
VT Voltage Transformer (see also PT)
WAN Wide Area Network
WDM Wavelength Division Multiplexing
ZVT Zero Voltage Tripping

xii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CIGRÉ WG B5-07 was formed to produce a technical brochure on "Modern Techniques for
Protecting and Monitoring Transmission Lines". The scope of B5-07 is to review, describe
and discuss the techniques presently used for protecting and monitoring transmission lines
and discuss advanced technologies for the protection, monitoring and control of transmission
lines. This technical brochure identifies and describes modern techniques including those
that have been developed in modern numerical devices, so called “intelligent electronic
devices” (IEDs) presently used for the protection, control and monitoring of transmission
lines. Modern transmission line protection IEDs include a large number of additional
protection elements, control and monitoring functions, which provide the user with almost
unlimited flexibility to design secure and dependable protection and control schemes.
This freedom of implementation can be an exhilarating challenge to the engineer’s
imagination. This technical brochure addresses subjects related to the reliability of protection
systems; digital relay filtering; applied telecommunication technologies; transmission line
protection; control and monitoring functions; auxiliary functions; integration and data
management; IEC 61850 impact on transmission line functions; application examples;
transmission line protection testing and future trends.
Modern applications for the protection of transmission lines is of big interest to users as
almost all numerical protective relays now give the user the ability to either modify the
existing protection and control logic inside the relay or add specific logic tailored to the user’s
requirements. This advancement in the state of the art has enabled the user to implement a
whole host of tripping, transfer, monitoring and control schemes as part of a custom made
logic inside the main protective relay thus allowing the elimination of external relays, auxiliary
relays, timers, and wiring. Whether they are installed in new substations or as retrofits in old
substations, transmission line multifunctional relays can be successfully applied to satisfy the
protection, control and monitoring requirements and the choice of implementing those
modern features depends largely on the power system operating requirements, and the user
comfort level with modern transmission relays.
There are virtually no limits on the variety of new protection schemes that can be designed
to satisfy specific application requirements. A major challenge for the protection engineer is
to balance the ability to provide adequate redundancy of functions against the requirement
to “keep the system simple”.
Issues and examples impacting dependability is discussed in section 2 of the brochure.
Section 3 reports on digital relay filtering design characteristics where the requirements
depend on the protection principles and applications. Frequency measurement and tracking
methods are also discussed. Section 4 discusses the application of telecommunications for
transmission line protection and compares in a tabulated form advantages and
disadvantages of various telecommunication channels, as applied in transmission line
protection schemes. Section 5 is a detailed topic discussing all the benefits arising from the
implementation of protection functions in modern IEDs. Improvements, as compared to older
versions of transmission line protections, are covered together with other additional functions
used in one modern protection device. Section 6 covers the various aspects of control
functions applied in transmission lines whereas section 7 of the technical brochure
completes the monitoring and supervision functions that are associated with the scope of the
brochure. Auxiliary functions, such as equipments for local and remote access of IEDs, are
provided as a topic in section 8, which elaborates on tools for executing power system
appraisal and system operation benchmarking. Section 9 deals mainly with integration and
data management in protection and control applications. Section 10 of the brochure is
related to the impact of IEC 61850 on transmission line protection and gives the basic
substation and communication architecture in a process bus based environment. Application
examples of improved protection and control schemes have been documented in this

xiii
brochure in section 11 and covers topics in the areas of increased numbers of protection
zones; fault location in transmission line IEDs; synchrophasor-based transmission line
backup protection; communication-aided phase selection and blocking of high-speed auto-
reclosing for circuit breaker failure or out-of-synchronism conditions in parallel lines;
maintaining high-speed tripping in the event of one-channel loss and loss-of-communication
channel for line differential application in three terminal lines; breaker-and-a-half and double
bus arrangement for auto-reclosing. Another application example in monitoring the status of
terminal components for the purpose of modifying protection schemes, such as for circuit
breaker bypassing conditions is also given in this brochure.
In the area of transmission line protection testing, section 12 covers many testing issues in
conventional and virtual testing applications with examples. Finally section 13 is specifically
designated to future trends and gives the opinion of working group members in all areas of
protection, control and monitoring issues that were covered in the report.
To summarize, multifunction digital relays that perform protective, control and monitoring
functions offer unique challenges to the user. Multifunction relays have protective functions
that interact with each other, making testing more complicated. They can also be
programmed to do control logic, which is usually verified along with the protection logic
during commissioning. In addition, digital relays can have multiple setting groups that may
be switched to address varying system conditions. This flexibility increases the
commissioning complexity. Due to the additional complexity it is important for the user to
fully understand the schemes and how they interact. The simple testing of one integrated
protection element in an IED could trigger an undesirable operation of a breaker failure
scheme. The documentation of the schemes is very important and those who test the relays
have to completely understand the behaviour of a system.
Different technologies have been successfully used for decades but modern numerical
relays perform many functions other than protection. An attempt has been made by WG B5-
07 members to provide a detailed coverage of protection, monitoring and control of
transmission lines. This technical brochure of more than 200 pages offers unprecedented
valuable information for engineers and technologists at all levels of experience which can
benefit both the industry and utilities.

xiv
1 SCOPE AND INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE
The scope of B5-07 is to review, describe and discuss the techniques presently used for
protecting and monitoring transmission lines. The scope extends to review the techniques
used for protecting transmission lines including those that have been developed in modern
numerical devices, so called “intelligent electronic devices” (IEDs), and discuss advanced
technologies for the protection, monitoring and control of transmission lines. This report
identifies and describes modern techniques presently used for the protection, control and
monitoring of transmission lines
Modern transmission line protection IEDs include a large number of additional protection
elements and control functions, which provide the user with almost unlimited flexibility to
design secure and dependable protection and control schemes. Traditional pilot relaying
schemes require separate protection and monitoring devices with costly external
communication equipments. Transmission line IEDs integrate many flexible protection,
control and monitoring features including communications functionality within the same
hardware and provide device-to-device digital communications for high-speed line protection,
monitoring, and control. Novel, more secure and dependable protection, control and
monitoring applications are now possible with transmission line IEDs including the relay-to-
relay communications capability. In this technical document, modern transmission line
protection, control and monitoring applications of this technology are reported in protection
design.

1.2 INTRODUCTION
Whereas transmission line IEDs offer a significant number of functional improvements over
previous generations and technologies, the state of the art of transmission line protection,
with its multifunctional integrated capability, provides an unprecedented flexibility in line
protection principles, control and monitoring schemes including fault location techniques. The
improvements in line protection performance are viewed in terms of fault discrimination
techniques and fast fault elimination time, protection selectivity, increased backup principles,
improved measuring algorithms, improved directional discrimination techniques, etc. These
enhancements are considered from a technical perspective but other benefits are directly
related to cost due to substantial reduction of equipment assemblies, wiring and
maintenance.
Control, metering, fault location, disturbance and event recording, maintenance and
monitoring are some of the many additional functions that are also provided in the same
numerical distance device. This technical brochure discusses protection, control and
monitoring features in transmission line IEDs.

1
2 RELIABILITY, SENSITIVITY & SPEED
A protection function will characterize faults so that it may distinguish between conditions
which it defines as internal faults, for which it should operate; and conditions which it defines
as external faults, or indeed healthy operation, for which it should not operate.
The security of a protection system is its tendency not to operate for non-fault or out-of-zone
fault conditions beyond the limit of the particular protection function’s strictly internal fault
definition.
The dependability of a protection system is its tendency to operate correctly for internal faults
from its most sensitive operating levels up to the strictly external fault definition limit of the
particular protection function. Furthermore, failure to rapidly clear internal faults impacts on
localized power quality and may result in loss of system stability.
The particular method of fault characterisation will invariably give rise to a set of operating
characteristics which lie between the strict internal and external fault/healthy operation
definitions, and which are therefore ambiguous. It is desirable that a protection function
should have both secure and dependable aspects; however, it is the function’s behaviour
when presented with ambiguous conditions that will categorise it overall as either secure or
dependable.
Limit of External Fault
Limit of Internal Or Healthy Condition
Fault Def inition Definition

0%

Maloperation

Operation Dependable Operation

Secure Operation
100 %

Close-In Internal Faults System

Internal Indistinguishable Healthy
Fault from Other Conditions

System Conditions

Figure 2.1 - System conditions Vs Tendency to Operate

Whereas many protection devices will offer an extensive suite of protection functions from
which to select; this is primarily driven by the need to minimise the number of device variants
whilst maximising the number of applications for which the device is acceptable. There is a
risk with “à la carte” function selection that the choice of functions may tend towards the
arbitrary, rather than following critical assessment of the relative dependability and security of
the various protection functions in the context of the hardware with which they are intended
to interact (e.g. Instrument transformers, circuit breakers (CB), power supply segregation,
communications media interfaces, etc.). In most cases, the dependability, security, sensitivity
and speed characteristics of a device’s “featured” functionality can be either enhanced or
completely undermined by the physical implementation.
Thus, the overall reliability of a protection scheme is determined not only by the inherent
dependability and security characteristics of the protection functions applied; but also by the

2
quality and physical aspects of the scheme; the variety and choice of functions applied and
the degree of physical and functional redundancy.

2.1 DEPENDABILITY
Failure of a protection system to clear a fault within its primary protection limits has the effect
of exposing the system to longer fault durations than are necessary, and more extensive
tripping of plant due to the operation of remote backup protection. This has a direct impact on
localized power quality and potentially on the stability of the power system. Therefore the
application engineering of the protection system should attempt to maximize its
dependability.
In addition to the fundamental dependability of the protection function, the dependability of
the overall protection system can be increased by maximizing system availability through the
elimination or mitigation of single points of failure. This may be achieved through the use of
device self-monitoring; circuit and measurement supervision; through the use of device,
circuit and functional redundancy; and power supply segregation between the device
auxiliary power and the various command applications.
When using integrated backup functions such as CB Failure protection, consideration should
be given to functional segregation by the use of dedicated contacts and command path for
the re-tripping of the failed CB, which are separate to the normal trip command contacts and
trip command path.

2.1.1 AVAILABILITY
Whereas one of the most significant benefits of modern numerical protection is the device’s
ability to self-monitor and to diagnose internal failures or discrepancies. Any associated
improvement in device availability is contingent upon its ability to annunciate any such
signals, so that they may be acted upon. As a minimum, a device summary “healthy status”
signal should be continuously monitored.
Supervision of the device analog measurements may increase the system’s security due to
the blocking of protection functions for loss of, or discrepancies in, certain measurements;
however, the annunciation of any measurement supervision alarms permits resolution of the
cause of the problem increasing availability.

2.1.2 REDUNDANCY
Two separate protection devices may be applied locally, each as “duplicate main protection”,
which are intended to operate independently of each other providing primary and, as
appropriate, remote backup protection. This achieves physical redundancy, which can be
further improved if both devices are powered from at least segregated power supplies of the
same substation battery, but preferably from separate batteries.
Backup protection is intended to operate only when the primary protection fails, and may
consist of an integrated function in the same device which is either time delayed with respect
to the main protection or conditionally released upon the blocking of the main protection (e.g.
overcurrent released for voltage supervision blocking of distance protection).
Trip circuit supervision identifies open circuits or loss of supply on the trip command circuit
(i.e. due to a short circuit, etc.) However, monitoring of a failure is not as beneficial as
offering a physical alternative. Therefore, operation by the same device of 2 separate trip
coils of the CB using separate contacts and field supplies increases the general availability of
the protection in spite of loss of a field supply (but not where the loss of the field supply
would otherwise block the protection, e.g. when it is used by distance protection to monitor
the voltage transformer (VT) miniature CB (MCB) status). This methodology may also be
applied without loss of security to duplicate protection schemes.

3
2.1.3 ISSUES IMPACTING ON DEPENDABILITY
The use of intermediate devices for communications or between the device and its monitored
or controlled process introduces additional failure modes and time delays which may reduce
dependability (e.g. use of auxiliary relays, external teleprotection interface devices, etc.).

Example 1
When using a separate electrically actuated teleprotection interface device, rather than an
integrated interface on the device, the intermediate electrical stage between the protection
and communication devices introduces the possibility of spurious binary transmit or receive
commands. This should be considered when applying the “echo only” or “echo with trip”
features of directional comparison or permissive overreaching teleprotection schemes, even
where the latter option is voltage supervised.

Example 2
Current transformers (CT) which are not suitably rated in terms of the DC offset, short circuit
current, DC offset and associated X/R ratio, the protection decision time, and functional CB
duty (i.e. trip only or trip-close-trip); may saturate resulting in non-operation of the protection.

2.2 SECURITY
The motivation for security is the requirement to minimise the number of incorrect protection
operations and their impact on power quality, supply continuity and system stability.
Functional security can be improved by the use of multiple operating or supervisory criteria,
such than more than one condition must be fulfilled before a trip command is released;
however, this will also reduce the dependability of the supervised function.

2.3 SENSITIVITY
Sensitivity is the measure of the ability of the protection function to detect faults, either with
low primary quantities, or with small deviations from the healthy state.
The sensitivity is determined, not only by the minimum setting and resolution of the
protection function, but also by the resolution and operational measuring range of the device
analog to digital converters (ADC); and by the accuracy class and ratings of the instrument
transformers.
Manufacturers are increasingly removing restrictions on settings which would previously
have been limited to “reasonable” or plausible values. This places a greater onus on relay
setting engineers to ensure sensitivity consistency between the protection function, any
supervisory element, and with analog measuring system.

2.4 SPEED
Prolonged exposure to system voltage dips arising from slow fault clearance is a significant
power quality issue. Furthermore, on critical feeders, such slow clearance may impact on
power system stability. Therefore in general, protection functions and application designs
which offer improved time performance are to be preferred.
In addition to the speed performance of the protection function, there may also be options on
the device to use binary outputs with different operating times. However, the making duty (at
least) should also be considered when selecting contacts. The highest speeds are available
on reed-relay contacts, with negligible making duty, and which therefore should not be used
for tripping; and solid state (e.g. FET) output contacts with moderate making duty. It may be

4
necessary with this latter output type that the contact may have to be connected in parallel
with a slower “general purpose” binary output to achieve the required making duty.
In general, the declared fastest device operating times will be for optimal conditions; for
significant current magnitudes and for the fastest available output contact. Distance
protection zone 1 non-delayed operation will tend to slow up approaching the zone reach
limits; similarly for differential protection at the boundary of its operating characteristic.
Care should be taken not to undermine the application of high speed protection functions
through the application of time delaying components in the overall trip command path.
Security may be compromised by increased speed of operation. E.g. voltage supervision or
the operation of VT MCBs may not be sufficiently fast to block high speed distance protection
from tripping in the event of loss of voltage measurements.

2.5 POWER SUPPLY SEGREGATION AND DEVICE CONTACT USAGE

In order to maximize the availability of a device’s diagnostic functions, the device should be
powered from an auxiliary DC (battery) power supply which is segregated from the field
supplies, which are likely to be exposed to greater risks due to increased length, possible
switchyard transit, and switching duty. Furthermore, where the substation uses legacy
electrical signal annunciation, the signal supply should be segregated from both the device
auxiliary power and field supplies, so that device and supply failures may be annunciated.
The number of segregated power supplies upon which a function depends for correct
operation should be minimized. E.g. Where the CB is equipped with a single close coil; auto-
reclosing is dependant upon the field supply to this coil; therefore any function control, CB
status/readiness monitoring input circuits should preferably use this same supply.
Functions which use blocking input commands, and which otherwise have default behaviour,
are considered, in this respect, to be dependable. Alternatively, functions which require
permissive input commands for positive operation, and which do not otherwise operate, are
considered to be secure. In accordance with the preferences of a given utility, the control of
function may be engineered to increase either the security or dependability of the function.
As a minimum security measure, binary inputs should be de-sensitising to the highest
available voltage threshold below the lowest operating voltage of the battery, in order to
prevent operation of the inputs for earth faults on the input circuits. Thereafter, the security of
an input command (single point) may be enhanced by using a normally open (N/O) contact at
the command source and setting the binary input to be active with voltage, such that the
input command to the function is actuated only when the source is confirmed as active (and
its contact closes). Alternatively, input command (single point) dependability can be
enhanced by using a normally closed (N/C) contact at the command source and setting the
binary input to be active without voltage, such that the input command to the function is
actuated when the source is either active (and its contact opens) or for an open circuit along
the input command path.
The security of “dependable” blocking schemes may be increased by monitoring the blocking
supply such that the relevant function is NOT blocked if and only if the power supply used for
the blocking is ON and there is no blocking command, i.e. appearance of the “blocking”
command or disappearance of the blocking supply will result in a block.
Where double point input commands are used, the default behaviour for discrepancy states
between the two binary inputs, whether this should be “ON” only when strictly “ON” of when
not “OFF”, may be configured within IEDs rather than resolved with the external wiring.

5
3 DIGITAL RELAY FILTERING
Protective IEDs must filter their inputs to reject unwanted quantities and retain signal
quantities of interest. Distance protection IEDs, for example, have critical filtering
requirements because they must make precise measurements quickly, even with corruption
from DC offsets, CVT transients, travelling wave reflections, and other interference.
Filtering requirements depend on the protection principle and application. In almost all
protective IEDs, the system frequency components are the information, and everything else
represents interfering signals. Among the exceptions are transformer differential IEDs, using
harmonic restraint; and peak-sensitive voltage IEDs, which may need to detect off-frequency
signals.

3.1 FILTER DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

The main characteristics of protective IED filters, whether they use analog components,
digital implementations, or some combination of the two, are [1]:
• Band-pass response about the system frequency 50 or 60 Hz, because other
frequency components may not be of any interest in most protection applications.
• Rejection of both DC and ramping to guarantee decaying exponentials are filtered
out.
• Attenuation or rejection of harmonics to limit the effect of nonlinearities.
• Reasonable bandwidth for fast response.
• Good transient response.
• Simple to design, build, and manufacture.
Whereas digital designs give a choice between finite impulse response (FIR) and infinite
impulse response (IIR) filtering; analog filters are practically limited to IIR. The outputs of FIR
filters depend on a finite-time history of the input; and the outputs of IIR filters depend on all
prior history of the input.
FIR filters subjectively make good sense for protection applications for two reasons:
• FIR filters quickly forget the pre-fault condition and work on analyzing the faulted
system. Once the filters fill up with fault data, their phasor estimates of the faulted
voltage or current are no longer influenced with pre-fault data.
• FIR filters naturally have zeros in their frequency responses. It is relatively easy to
place these zeros where desired, e.g. at DC and harmonic frequencies.
FIR filters have advantages over IIR filters. An FIR filter uses finite samples of an input for its
output. Once the fault inception point propagates through the filtering window, its output is no
longer corrupted with pre-fault data. The outputs of IIR filters, however, rely on the entire
history of an input. This is contrary to the basic requirement of protective relays.

3.2 HOW THE SAMPLING RATE AFFECTS DEVICE OPERATING TIME

Sampling faster results in shorter operating times, but the improvement is tempered by filter
delay. Figure 3.1 plots operating times for a certain fault condition as a function of the
sampling rate. For each sampling rate value, the digital and analog filters are optimized.
Increasing the rate from 4 to 8 samples per cycle decreases the operating time by
approximately 1/8 of a cycle, at the expense of double the computations. Doubling of the
sampling rate again yields a further reduction of only about 1/16 of a cycle; again with double
the computations. Doubling from 16 to 32 samples per cycle speeds up the operation by only
1/32 of a cycle. The advantage of higher sampling rates on the relay speed diminishes when
the filtering window is fixed. Improvements in speed can be achieved from decreasing the
analog low-pass filter delay and computational latency.

6
The shorter the impulse response of a filter, the faster the device becomes. Longer impulse
responses have narrower frequency responses. The one-cycle cosine filter has zeros at DC
and at the harmonics of the system frequency. Rejection of the even harmonics is lost with a
half-cycle filter. The time-response graph for impedance protection using the half-cycle
cosine filter in Figure 3.2 shows the penalty for increasing speed, which is poor transient
response. The half-cycle filter does not have the double-differentiator property and, therefore,
has a poor ability to reject exponentials. The impedance-plane trajectory spirals, indicating
severe overreaching.
0.8
Zone One Element Operating Time (Cycle)

0.7

0.6

0.5
Analog Low-Pass Filter Cutoff = 22 • (Sample/Cycle) Hz
0.4
One-Cycle Fourier Digital Filter
0.3
Fault Location m = 0.0
0.2

.01

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Sampling Rate (Sample/Cycle)

Figure 3.1 - Operating time versus sampling rate

5
IMAG Impedance X, (Ohms)

Prefault
o o
Postfault
0

0 2 4 6 8 10
Real Impedance R (Ohms)

R (Ohms)

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Time (Cycles)

Figure 3.2 - Impedance plot of half-

half-cycle cosine filter

3.3 DIGITAL RELAY FILTER EVALUATION

Digital relay filters are evaluated by studying their steady-state and transient performance.
The frequency response, or Bode magnitude plot, of a filter is an excellent tool to study the
filter’s steady-state performance. The filter’s frequency characteristics are visualized by
which signal frequencies pass or which ones are blocked. The frequency response of a filter
represents its steady-state behaviour. Furthermore, only time-invariant filters, whose filter
coefficients do not change with time, have frequency response plots.

7
Time domain simulations are used to investigate filter transient performance, such as
overreaching and settling time, and to study time-variant filters. Filter simulations also
confirm the filter steady-state properties. The filter simulations must be as simple and basic
as possible, in order to get useful and clear results efficiently. The simulation environment
must be controllable so that different desired filter properties can be unveiled clearly and
separated. Simple power system simulations using MATLAB® and EMTP, for example, can
provide fault voltages and currents to help probe the filter’s ability to reject exponentially
decaying DC offsets, high-frequency transients, and harmonics.
A typical system model used to evaluate digital filters is shown in Figure 3.3. The model
includes analog low-pass filters, an analog-to-digital conversion stage, digital filters, and
impedance calculation.

Vreal
Voltage Analog
Digital
Low-Pass
Filter
Filter
Vimag
Analog-to-
Impedance
Digital
Calculation
Conversion
Ireal
Current Analog
Digital
Low-Pass
Filter
Filter
Iimag

Figure 3.3 - Evaluation of analog and digital filters

filters

The impedance is a complex value and its calculation requires the voltage and current
phasors or their real and imaginary parts. Phasors can be obtained by two different methods.
One is through an orthogonal filter pair, such as the sine and cosine Fourier filter. When
filtering a signal, the filter pair simultaneously gives two filtered outputs with a 90º phase shift,
which constitutes the real and imaginary parts of a phasor. Alternatively, the present and the
quarter-cycle earlier outputs of one filter are 90º apart. One filter plus a quarter-cycle delay is,
thus, another way to get the voltage and current phasors.
The orthogonal filter pair method might be expected to be a quarter-cycle faster than the filter
plus delay method. However, this is not necessarily true because the orthogonal filter pair
method filters a quantity twice to get a phasor and requires twice as many calculations.
FIR filters with less than a one-cycle window cannot reject all harmonics. In fact, it is usually
the lower harmonics (second and third) which are lost first when shortening the window. For
this reason, the discussion shall be limited only to one-cycle-window FIR filters. The analog
low-pass filter used in the evaluation is a second order Butterworth with a cutoff frequency of
360 Hz. A sampling rate of 16 samples per cycle was used to evaluate and compare two
digital filters, namely cosine and Fourier filters.
The cosine filter has its coefficients evenly sampled from a cycle of a cosine waveform. The
cosine filter is a differentiator, a property that is essential to effectively reject exponentially
decaying DC offsets. The cosine filter’s frequency response, shown in Figure 3.4, shows that
the filter rejects exactly all harmonics and has a band-pass filtering property.
The imaginary part of voltage and current phasors comes from a quarter-cycle delayed filter
output. From the start of a fault, it will take one cycle for the fault to fill the filter and a further
quarter-cycle delay to complete the quadrature component. The worst-case filter speed is,
therefore, one and a quarter cycles.

8
 Filter Coefficients (Impulse Response)

+ o o +

+
+ o o +

+
o + o +

+
o + o +

+
+
0
+ o + o

+
o : Sine Filter + o + o

+
+ : Cosine Filter + + o o

+
+
+ + o o
+

+
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Samples
Frequency Response

1
Cosine Filter

0.5
Sine Filter

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency (Harmonics)

Figure 3.4 - Cosine and sine filters

Figure 3.5 shows an impedance plot calculated with the cosine filter.

CASE: Angle = 0, m = 1.0, RF = 0, Noise = 0, Harmonics = None

IMAG Impedance X, (Ohms)

3
o : Integer Cycle Points
2

o Prefault
1 o o
Zoom Area
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Real Impedance R (Ohms)

R (Ohms)

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Time (Cycles)

Figure 3.5 - Impedance plot of cosine filter

3.4 FOURIER FILTER

The elimination of the quarter-cycle delay needed to get the quadrature component can be
accomplished with a filter which is orthogonal to the cosine filter, namely the sine filter. The
frequency response of the sine filter is shown together with that of the cosine filter in Figure
3.4. The response looks like the cosine filter pushed toward the low frequencies. The sine
filter has better high-frequency attenuation and the same total harmonic rejection. However,
the improved high-frequency attenuation comes at the expense of ramp rejection (double
differentiation) capability resulting in poor transient response for the Fourier filter pair.
Figure 3.6 shows the impedance response of the Fourier filter with full DC offset. The
imaginary part of the post-fault impedance is 1 Ω. The zoomed version of the impedance plot
in Figure 3.7 shows that the post-fault impedance circles around the post-fault point and

9
takes a long time to settle. After one and three-quarters cycles, the Fourier filter still has 10%
overreaching and underreaching. In contrast, the cosine filter has less than 2% impedance
variation after one and a quarter cycles. Therefore, the cosine filter is faster and more
accurate than the Fourier filter whenever DC offsets accompany fault currents.

CASE: Angle = 0, m = 1.0, RF = 0, Noise = 0, Harmonics = none

IMAG Impedance X, (Ohms)

Prefault
oo
o o : Integer Cycle Points o
Zoom Area

0 2 4 6 8 10
Real Impedance R (Ohms)

R (Ohms)

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Time (Cycles)

Figure 3.6 - Impedance plot of Fourier filter

1.15

Fourier
1.1
Cosine
IMAG Impedance X, (Ohms)

1.05

oo +
+

1 o o
o

.95

.9
+
+

o : Integer Cycle Points

+: 1.25 Cycles After the Fault
+

.85
–0.1 –0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Real Impedance R (Ohms)

Figure 3.7 - Comparison of cosine and Fourier filters

Across the range of fault incident angles, there are precisely two points where a fault does
not cause any DC offset. A fault incident angle greater than 10º from these two points will
cause transient overreaching and underreaching of the Fourier filter. In order to remedy this
effect, devices using a Fourier filter may also include a digital mimic filter to remove the DC
component from the current signals.

3.4.1 MIMIC FILTER

Digital Mimic filters are used to eliminate the exponential DC component of short-circuit
currents.
The digital mimic filter numerically reproduces an analog mimic circuit commonly applied in
traditional line protection. The basic mimic circuit is a differentiating element, and therefore,
its digital replica is a high-pass digital filter. If this is not corrected using an additional filter,

10
the frequency characteristic of the resulting phasor estimator may be worsened. The key
feature of a digital mimic filter is its significant robustness to the actual value of the time
constant. The coefficients of the filter can be optimized taking into account the time constant
of the protected line.

Figure 3.8 - Effect of mimic filter followed by a full cycle Fourier filter

It can be seen in Figure 3.8 that the result of a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), without the
digital mimic filter, is oscillatory during the first few cycles, due to the exponential DC
component of the current. The use of the digital mimic filter removes this oscillation,
improving the obtained measurement.
The result of a half-cycle DFT after a mimic filter is shown in Figure 3.9. The result of the
DFT, without the mimic filter, is worse than that in Figure 3.8. An improvement in the speed
of the phasor estimation can be obtained using a digital mimic filter.

Figure 3.9 - Response of a mimic filter followed by a half cycle Fourier filter

11
3.5 LEAST SQUARES FILTERING
Least Error Squares (LES) technique [2] may also be used for estimating the phasors of the
fundamental and harmonic frequency components of voltages and currents. It is based on
minimizing the sum of the squares of the errors between the actual and assumed waveforms.
The voltage and/or current waveform can be modelled as a combination of the fundamental
frequency component, an exponentially decaying DC component, and harmonics of specified
orders (this assumption ignores the presence of higher frequencies that are, in most
applications, are eliminated by the anti-aliasing filters).
The magnitude responses of the LES technique that uses 13 samples taken at intervals of
30o electrical are as shown in Figure 3.10.

1.4
Cosine filter
1.2
Sine filter
1
Magnitude

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 60 120 180 240 300 360

Frequency ( Hz )

Figure 3.10 - Magnitude response of the Least Error Squares technique

The leakage at off-harmonic frequencies is more in this case than for the DFT. However, the
overall frequency response is not much worse because anti-aliasing filters are also used in
the devices.

3.6 FREQUENCY MEASUREMENT AND TRACKING

A mismatch between the sampling frequency and power system frequency causes phase
and magnitude oscillating errors in phasor estimation. The amount of error is proportional to
the frequency difference and also depends on the type of filters in use for phasor extraction.
A frequency tracking algorithm adjusts the sampling frequency of an IED to the actual power
system frequency in order to keep the number of samples per power cycle constant and, in
doing so, ensures accurate digital estimation of currents and voltages.
Protective IEDs use numerical algorithms to calculate phasors from sinusoidal voltage and
current inputs based on either power system nominal frequency or the actual measured
frequency. The voltage and current phasors are used to construct different protection
elements such as overcurrent, current differential, and distance elements. Many different
filters help to reduce the impact of noise to phasor estimation and improve overall protection
element accuracy.
The power system frequency, although generally stable, seldom remains at the nominal
value. Major system disturbances such as load shedding or generation shutdowns can cause
great imbalance between load and generation, and the system frequency can experience a
significant change within a short period. Protective IEDs should remain stable during system
frequency excursions to prevent maloperations that may further degrade the system
conditions.
Many IED design aspects influence protection element performance during system frequency
excursions. These include the type of filtering employed to process the input signal and
construct the phasor; whether the IED has a frequency tracking algorithm that adapts the
sampling frequency accordingly; the method by which system frequency is measured;

12
frequency tracking limits and tracking speed (time constant); and the type of polarizing
memory that, for example, the impedance element uses.
Distance protection IEDs may use sophisticated frequency tracking algorithms. This is
particularly true for single-pole tripping relays where no single voltage is a good choice for a
frequency-tracking signal. During single-pole tripping, particular phases may be de-energized
and their voltages may be severely distorted by transients related to shunt reactors. Under
pure zero-sequence injection, the frequency signal can “zero out”, thereby preventing the
IED from measuring and tracking the frequency.
The first step of frequency tracking is to measure power system frequency. Different
frequency measurement algorithms exist [3]. Several methods can be used for tracking
frequency. The object is to estimate the frequency and use it in making accurate decisions
for protecting lines and other equipment. Out of the many techniques that are available for
measuring frequency, zero crossing and phasor tracking techniques are described in this
section. The issue of frequency tracking is then discussed.

3.6.1 ZERO-CROSSING DETECTION

The most common frequency measurement method is to measure the time elapsed between
the zero crossings of input signals. The inverse of this time is twice the system frequency.
The following input quantities are available for this purpose:
• Single-phase voltage
• A combination of three-phase voltages such as alpha component of voltages:
Va = Va + 0.5·Vb - 0.5·Vc
• Single-phase current
• A combination of three-phase currents such as alpha component of currents:
Ia = Ia + 0.5·Ib - 0.5·Ic
Zero-crossing frequency estimation is a method that can be implemented either in the
hardware or software of an IED. This method measures the time between two zero crossings
and calculates the frequency from that measurement. Whereas the time between two
consecutive zero crossings corresponds to one half period; the time between two alternate
half cycles corresponds to one full period of the signal. Other variations of this approach
measure the time between a selected number of zero crossings. These methods use the
following generic equation:
M −1
ƒ (t M ) =
1
(3.1)
2 t M − t1
Where:
th
tM = time of the m zero crossing
t1 = time of the first zero crossing
ƒ = estimate of the frequency

This method is susceptible to spurious zero crossings, therefore it is necessary that the input
waveform be pre-filtered using either a low-pass or a band-pass filter. If implemented in
software, the method requires that the time of a zero crossing be estimated from the
timestamps of the samples in its vicinity as shown in Figure 3.11, except when the samples
are taken at the rate of tens of thousands per second.
This method usually requires additional post filtering, such as averaging several consecutive
measurements; or applying a nonlinear filter, such as the median filter, to cope with the

13
spurious zero crossings. Another solution is to apply validation equations that would reject a
measurement if its value differs dramatically from the previous valid frequency estimate.
Another issue that concerns this approach is the interaction between the frequency estimates
and frequency tracking mechanisms. If the frequency-tracking mechanism adjusts the
sampling frequency, an error may be introduced in a subsequent frequency estimate. The
safest solution for the zero-crossing detection algorithm is to use timestamps of the samples
instead of the sampling frequency, because it may change between the two zero crossings.
Signal

t1 t2
Time

Figure 3.11 - Software implementation of the zero-

zero-crossing detection

Voltages are a good choice for zero-crossing measurements because they have healthy
magnitudes and minimum harmonic contents. For current only IEDs, proper filtering and
smoothing for zero-crossing measurement of the currents must be used. The advantage of
using a combination of all three phase quantities is that the measurement during loss of one
or two phases, such as in a single-pole open condition, can still be obtained. Whereas a zero
crossing is only available every half cycle; frequency measurement using a single-phase
input cannot be faster than half a cycle. Measuring simultaneously on all three phases
accelerates the frequency measurement to as fast as one zero-crossing every 1/6 of a cycle
[4].
As per the phasor calculation, components of voltages and currents other than the sinusoidal
quantity degrade the accuracy of the zero-crossing measurement. These components
include harmonics, white noise, and exponentially decaying DC; of which the DC component
has the greatest impact on the zero-crossing measurement. Prior to the zero-crossing
measurement, proper pre-filtering such as low-pass and cosine filters can attenuate these
components. In this situation, the cosine filter reduces harmonics rather than rejecting them
completely, because the cosine filter coefficients are not synchronized at the input frequency.
Post filtering also improves frequency measurement. The most common type of this filtering
is a simple low-pass averaging filter which measures several zero-crossings and averages
them before calculating the frequency. One ingenious “averager” is the so-called Olympic
filter. With several measurements, the Olympic filter rejects the largest and the smallest
samples before averaging the remaining samples.
While improving frequency measurement accuracy, the pre- and post-filtering processes
delay the measurement. Too much delay can open a window within which the phasor
calculation can be sufficiently inaccurate to impact on the performance of the protection
elements. As with designing protective element filtering, a balance must be struck between
frequency measurement accuracy and speed.

14
3.6.2 PHASOR-BASED METHODS
The voltage and current phasors, estimated from quantized samples by using the protection
algorithms, rotate at their radian frequency as shown in Figure 3.12. This feature allows for
the measurement of frequency from consecutive estimates of the phase angles. The generic
equation for this method is as follows:
1 dϕ
ƒ (t ) = (3.2)
2π dt
Im
t2
Phasor
Rotation

ϕ2
t1

ϕ1 Re

Figure 3.12 - Phasor rotation for measuring frequency

This method is applied in different forms. The variations include the use of differences in
phase angle over different time spans; use of different phasor estimation techniques; use of
different signals such as phase voltage or positive-sequence voltage; and use of different
techniques for filtering the calculated estimates.
This method can update the frequency estimate with each new calculation of the phasor of a
voltage or current. Theoretically, this can be done several times per cycle by using the
voltages and currents and their combinations. The faster the method of estimation, the higher
the susceptibility to estimation errors.
The interaction between the changes in sampling frequency and the frequency estimates
may create some problems. The Fourier transform and several other techniques assume a
constant sampling rate. Should the sampling frequency change from its nominal value, the
number of samples in the data window would not span an integer number of periods of the
signal. This would cause errors in the phasor estimates that would result in errors in the
frequency estimates. Strategies to deal with this problem include a method that adjusts the
length of the data window according to the actual frequency so that the window always
covers exactly one period. This approach keeps the length of the data window fixed but
dynamically adjusts the digital filters to follow the actual frequency; changes the sampling
rate so that the data-window is always integer number of periods; and uses a software re-
sampling approach that recalculates the values of the samples before estimating the
phasors.
Other algorithms for estimating power system frequency include linear regression with
adaptive online readjustment of the input filter; least error squares technique; a Newton-type
algorithm; and a Kalman filter-based approach.

3.6.3 FREQUENCY TRACKING (SMALL DEVIATIONS)

Algorithms for estimating phasors are tuned to a preselected nominal frequency (50 or
60 Hz). At the selected frequency, the gain of the phasor estimator is one. This means that
the magnitude of the input signal is measured accurately if the frequency of the waveform
from which the samples are taken is the same as the selected frequency. When the
frequency of the waveform differs from the pre-selected frequency that was used to design
the phasor estimator, the calculated value of the phasor will oscillate between the lower and
upper envelopes as shown in Figure 3.13.

15
The goal of frequency tracking is to modify the phasor estimation process in such a manner
that the phasor estimates remain correct even if the system frequency deviates from its
nominal value. A simple correction for the frequency error is not possible because the error
changes with time. Conditions that usually affect the frequency tracking are noise, spurious
zero-crossings, fast frequency changes, sub-synchronous oscillations, and power swings.
1.2
Off-Nominal Frequency

Momentary Overestimation
1 Estimated Magnitude Oscillates Between
the Upper and Lower Envelopes
Momentary Underestimation
0.8
Gain

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Frequency (Hz)

Figure 3.13 - Effect of off-

off-nominal frequency on phasor estimation

Two methods are described in this section. The first method calculates the phase difference
from the instantaneous values of the signals, and the second method calculates the phase
difference from the calculated phasors.

3.6.3.1 INSTANTANEOUS VALUES METHOD

If the instantaneous values of the samples and the time at which they are acquired are
available, the zero crossings of the waveforms can be calculated. The time difference
between the zero crossings of two waveforms can be converted to a phase angle if the
waveforms are of a single frequency. Whereas, this is not usually true, it is preferable to
calculate the phase angles from the phasors calculated by one of the techniques previously
described in this report.

3.6.3.2 PHASOR METHOD

Three scenarios are examined in this category. In the first scenario different waveforms are
sampled and quantized by an IED and the quantized values are then used to calculate the
phasors representing those waveforms. In this case, it is assumed that the same algorithm is
used to calculate the phasors. The phase angle displacement is the difference between the
calculated phase angles representing the waveforms.
In the second scenario the phasors are calculated by different IEDs installed in the same
substation, and the master clock of the substation triggers the sampling of the waveforms. In
this case also, the phase angle displacement between signals is the difference between the
angles of the calculated phasors.
In the third scenario, the IEDs are installed in one substation, have clocks synchronized with
the Global Positioning System (GPS) or a similar time signal, and each IED controls its
waveform-sampling process. In this case, the sampling in the IEDs is not synchronized;
therefore, there is a skew between the calculated phasors. Each phasor calculated by the
IEDs is time tagged. The phase displacement between the waveforms is the difference
between the angles of the calculated phasors corrected for the angle due to the difference in
the time tags of the phasors. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.14.

16
 Time Tag = 345 (µs)

V1 Time Tag = 460 (µs )

V2
ϕ1 ϕ2

Figure 3.14 - Two voltage phasors computed by two different devices

The calculated voltage phasors and time tags are as follows:

V1 = 1.05∠50.126° V2 = 0.97∠31.043° (3.3)
tV1 = 345 µs tV2 = 460 µs
The phase difference between the calculated phase angles of the phasors is 19.083°. The
time tags indicate that the phasor of voltage V2 was calculated 115 µs after the phasor of
voltage V1; so that V2 lags by an additional angle of 115•10–6•360•ƒ degrees. If the frequency
is 60 Hz, the angle is 2.484°. The phase displaceme nt is, therefore, 21.567°. This is the
phase difference between the phasors and not the phase displacement between the zero
crossings of the waveforms.

3.7 PROTECTION ELEMENT PERFORMANCE DURING FREQUENCY EXCURSIONS

When an IED employs a frequency tracking scheme to adapt sampling frequency to that of
the input frequency, the device cannot track to an arbitrarily high frequency because of
limited processing power. IEDs also introduce delays in the frequency measurement to
ensure accuracy and delays in tracking to stabilize the sampling frequency.
Different protection elements behave differently during a system frequency excursion. The
accuracy of protection elements based on magnitude, such as overcurrent elements, relates
directly to the magnitude oscillation of a phasor during a frequency excursion. The amount of
overcurrent overreach is proportional to the difference between the input and device tracking
frequencies. This difference depends on the input frequency slew rate and the speed of the
frequency tracking algorithm.
For the current differential element, the calculation of the operating quantity cancels out the
phase and magnitude errors of phasors for external faults. The element therefore remains
secure for external faults regardless of input frequency changes. For internal faults, the
operating quantity has the usual oscillations similar to those of phasor magnitudes during a
frequency excursion. The element should be dependable for an internal fault except in those
extreme boundary cases when fault resistance is large.
The performance of the distance element relates closely to how the device uses memory for
the polarizing quantity. Where positive-sequence or cross polarization is used, the element
incurs oscillating errors similar to that of the phasor magnitude. This type of error is generally
not a concern for lightly loaded systems. When a memory is used for the polarizing quantity,
a system frequency excursion can eventually cause the distance element to maloperate if the
excursion lasts for sufficiently long. For a polarizing memory that uses an IIR type of filtering,
the frequency excursion duration that a distance element can handle without maloperation
depends on the IIR filter time constant.

17
3.8 REFERENCES
[1] E. O. Schweitzer, III and D. Hou, “Filtering for Protective Relays,” in 1992 19th Annual
Western Protective Relay Conference Proceedings.
[2] M. S. Sachdev and M. A. Baribeau, “A New Algorithm for Digital Impedance Relays,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 98, No. 6, 1979, pp. 2232–
2240.
[3] Advancements in Microprocessor Based Protection and Communication, IEEE Tutorial
Course. Piscataway, NJ: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1997.
[4] D. Hou, “Relay Element Performance During Power System Frequency Excursions,” in
2007 34th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference Proceedings.

18
4 APPLIED TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
The provision of telecommunications facilities is indispensable for realising the full
performance and functional capabilities of modern systems for the protection and monitoring
of transmission lines. The application of telecommunication technologies to this field can be
divided into two main categories as follows:
• To provide the data link between transmission line protection terminals operating in
communication-aided protection schemes, i.e. teleprotection.
• To facilitate remote access to data which has been measured or stored by
transmission line protection and monitoring equipment.
These two differing requirements have generally been met by separate communication
systems and will be described separately in this chapter.

4.1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION

CIGRÉ 2001 document JWG 34/35.11 “Protection Using Telecommunications” [1] and IEEE
PSRC WGH9 report “Digital Communications for Relay Protection” [2] are recommended
reading for a comprehensive study of the subject of teleprotection.
Telecommunications channels are routinely established between protection systems at either
end of a line, in order to achieve the following performance criteria:
• Rapid and simultaneous tripping at all terminals of the line for faults occurring at any
location along the line.
• Absolute selectivity, i.e. fast tripping is only executed for faults occurring between the
terminals of the protected line, while maintaining stability in the case of external
faults. Operation for external faults is only permitted as a back-up measure (normally
following some time delay) in the case of failure of remote protection systems or CBs.
A distance protection IED, for example, while quite capable of operating as a stand-alone
device, can usually be applied to provide rapid tripping only for faults within a certain
proportion (typically 80%) of the transmission line, with faults beyond the reach point only
being cleared after a time delay. Increasing the proportion of the line for which fast tripping is
assured can only be achieved at the cost of a loss of selectivity, i.e. unwanted tripping for
faults on adjacent circuits. Delayed tripping for internal faults and non-selective tripping for
external faults present risks to the power system which are usually unacceptable, particularly
at higher voltages, in terms of potential damage to primary equipment; loss of supply to
customers; and loss of stability in the system possibly leading to widespread black-out
conditions in the most severe cases. Therefore, telecommunications facilities are generally
provided to allow distance protection IEDs at the line terminals to communicate with each
other in order to reliably determine the presence of an internal fault condition, and thereby to
achieve the performance criteria outlined above.
Alternatively, analog comparison protection systems cannot function at all without the aid of
end-to-end communications. Such systems compare the electrical magnitudes and/or phase
angles observed at the line ends and make tripping decisions based on the results of the
comparison.
The various types of protection scheme which are applied to achieve the performance criteria
described above are described in detail in [1] and [3].
A variety of types of telecommunication system are available to support these schemes, the
choice of which will depend on a number of factors, such as distance to be covered,
importance of the transmission line, availability of telecommunications facilities, geography
and cost. Table 4.1 lists the types of line protection application commonly in use and
indicates the suitability of the various telecommunications channel types to each application.
Table 4.2 compares the advantages and disadvantages of the various types of channel.

19
 Application Pilot wires Voice Power line Optical Microwave Spread PDH SDH/SONET
frequency carrier fibre radio spectrum Networks Networks
channel radio
Analog Current



comparison differential (Analog (Analog
(if latency and
No
protection devices. devices. Not (if latency delay


experience
schemes Digital types Digital types recommended requirements asymmetry
reported
need special need special are met) requirements
interface) interface) are met)
Phase


No



comparison (Analog (Analog (Analog devices

experience (as current
(as current diff)
devices only) devices only) only) reported diff)
Charge No



comparison




experience (as current
(as current diff)
reported diff)
Distance Permissive
Need to signal
protection underreach (using audio through fault







state (PUTT) tone point may reduce
comparison equipment) dependability
schemes Accelerated


underreach
As PUTT





(As PUTT)
(AUTT)
Permissive


overreach
As PUTT





(As PUTT)
(POTT)
Blocking









overreach (BOP) (As PUTT)
Unblocking


overreach







(As PUTT)
(DCUB)
Direct intertripping


As PUTT





(As PUTT)

Table 4.1 - Application of Telecommunications Channels to Protection of Transmission Lines

20
 Channel Advantages
Metallic pilot - Ease of application
wires
VF circuits - Well suited to analog-type
relays
Power line - Long distances achievable
carrier (100’s of km)
- Complete link controlled by
power company, little danger of
re-routing or switching
Optical fibre - Very high data rate
- Relatively long distance (up to
100km)
- Immune to interference
- Inherent isolation
- Low bit error rate
Microwave - Very high data rate
radio - Largely free from disturbance
during power system faults
Spread - No licensing requirements
spectrum radio - Moderate cost
Tele - - Widespread availability of
communication public networks
networks - Suitable for very long
transmission lines
- Low bit error rate
- Recovery from route failures is
rapid and often automatic
- Largely free from disturbance
during power system faults
Table 4.2 - Comparison of Telecommunications Channels as Applied to Line Protection
Disadvantages
- Low bandwidth
- Limited line length
- Highly susceptible to induced voltages
and earth shift voltage during power
system faults
- Susceptible to induced noise from
other channels
- Not suited to digital protection
- Susceptible to induced noise from
other channels
- Low bandwidth
- Not suitable for current differential
protection
- Susceptible to disturbance during
power system faults
- Complexity of coupling equipment
- Relatively difficult to handle
- Dedicated link often not justifiable for
protection purposes due to cost.
- Very long lines need repeaters.
- Susceptible to signal degradation
during poor weather conditions
- Adversely affected by line-of-sight
obstacles and signal reflections
- Relatively high cost
- Restricted availability of licensed
frequency bands
- Towers susceptible to lightning strikes
- Relatively unproven technology as
applied to protection systems
- Shared nature of the medium may
have unacceptable implications for
reliability.
- Affected by obstacles, reflections and
weather conditions similarly to
licensed microwave links
- Rented channels may be subject to
switching, re-routing and other
undesirable interference without the
utility’s knowledge.
- Channel latency may change
unexpectedly and asymmetrical
delays in SDH / SONET networks
may cause incorrect protection
operation
- Introduction of new technologies by
the service provider may result in
undesirable changes in channel
performance
- Utility-owned networks are expensive
to establish and maintain.
21
A related application of telecommunications is in the field of fault location. Fault location
systems, including protective IEDs with integral fault location functions, which utilise data
sampled at all terminals of a transmission line are able to achieve a greater degree of
accuracy than single terminal methods. This is because multiple-terminal methods are able
to minimise the effects of factors such as fault resistance and line loading which adversely
effect single-terminal methods. In order to achieve multiple-terminal fault location, a
telecommunications link is required to transfer sampled current and voltage data between the
terminals. A detailed analysis of fault location for transmission lines, including multiple-
terminal techniques, can be found in [4].

4.1.1 TRANSMISSION MEDIA AND TELEPROTECTION CHANNELS

There are a number of types of telecommunication media currently in use which can be
applied to the protection and monitoring of transmission lines.
Metallic pilot wires have been used for end-to-end signalling between protection relays since
the 1930s, the copper wires themselves being either privately owned by the power utility or
rented from a telecommunications provider. It later became common to apply voice
frequency communication channels over the pilot wires due to its improved immunity to
power frequency interference. Another method which became common for conveyance of
transmission line protection signals was power line carrier, which involves projecting
teleprotection signals down the protected transmission line itself, and this technique also
remains in use in many countries.
Modern protection systems tend to be digital in nature, and the applied telecommunications
technologies have developed rapidly. Direct end-to-end links may be provided over optical
fibre or microwave media, while telecommunications companies provide digital services over
their networks.
In the cases of both the analog and digital technologies, the choice of private or rented
communication circuits may have important implications. Generally, a utility-owned direct link
is preferable, in that all aspects of the circuit’s installation and operation remain under the
control of the utility. Rented circuits may be cheaper, but introduce a number of risks and
disadvantages as follows:
• Signals may be injected onto the circuit during routine maintenance and testing
procedures which may have an adverse effect on the protection function.
• Rented circuits may be re-routed by the telecommunications company with or without
the knowledge of the power utility. In the case of switched data networks this may
occur periodically as part of the normal functioning of the network and the
implications for protection systems have to be carefully assessed.
• Rapid developments in the technology available to telecommunications providers
have led to major changes in their networks and in the services provided. For
example, analog telephone systems have been superseded by digital hierarchy
networks and these are in turn expected to be replaced by Next Generation Networks
(NGN) built on technologies such as Internet Protocol (IP). The consequent variations
in performance with each evolution may not be beneficial to protection systems.
Alternatively, rented circuits may provide the utility with a greater availability of service than
can be realised with their own dedicated links. This is particularly the case with modern
digital networks which support self-healing recovery mechanisms to provide continuity of
service in the event of the failure of a network connection or node.

22
Each type of telecommunication link has its own characteristics in terms of its suitability for a
given application; and those which typically need to be considered are as follows:
• Maximum length
• Propagation delay, and related issues of delay symmetry and variation
• Data rate / bandwidth
• Susceptibility to electromagnetic noise
• Susceptibility to interference during power system fault conditions
• Typical Bit Error Rates (BER)
• Network related issues (re-routing, addressing, security, quality of service)
The main types of communication media, as applied to transmission line protection, are
discussed in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1.1 METALLIC PILOT CIRCUITS AND VOICE FREQUENCY CHANNELS

Pilot circuits consist of pairs of copper wires, connected between protection equipment at
either end of the protected line. They may be owned by the utility or rented from a
telecommunications provider, and can be used for the transmission of DC, power frequency
or voice frequency (VF) audio-tone signals.
Distance protection is commonly applied in conjunction with teleprotection equipment
operating over pilot wires. The simple binary on/off protection commands are normally
modulated onto a carrier signal in order to improve immunity to induced power frequency
interference. Typically, the carrier operates in the voice frequency (audio) range from 300 Hz
to 3400 Hz, and the telecommunications equipment very often modulates several voice
frequency signals onto the same channel, through the application of Frequency Division
Multiplexing (FDM).
Analog pilot-wire differential devices are another user of metallic pilots, transmitting power
frequency (50 Hz or 60 Hz) signals onto the pilot wires for comparison at each end, although
this type of relay is now rarely used for transmission line protection. The limited bandwidth of
metallic links means that they are not well suited to application of digital differential protection
systems; however, digital communication can be achieved through the use of modems [5] or
other special interfaces [6].

4.1.1.2 POWER LINE CARRIER

Power line carrier (PLC) systems use the protected power line to carry the teleprotection
signals. They are often used in situations where the provision of a separate, dedicated
communication link is difficult, and have the advantage of leaving control of the
communication link entirely in the hands of the utility. They can be applied to extremely long
transmission lines (hundreds of km) without repeaters.
High voltage coupling equipment is used to inject a high frequency signal on to the overhead
transmission line or underground cable, typically at 40 to 500 kHz with the bandwidth
subdivided into slots of 4 kHz. Coupling may be applied either between one phase conductor
and earth, or between any two phase conductors. Line traps, tuned to form a very high
impedance to the signal frequency, are positioned on the station side of the coupling
equipment to prevent the signal from leaking into adjacent circuits.
Most PLC systems in service are of an analog design and have traditionally been limited to
applications entailing relatively undemanding communication requirements, such as binary
on/off signals associated with state comparison schemes or phase comparison signals in
analog comparison protection schemes. More recently, digital PLC transmitters have been
introduced, using sophisticated digital modulation techniques and improving bandwidth
usage to the point where, in theory, even digital current differential protection can be

23
considered for use over PLC. However, caution must be exercised when applying PLC
teleprotection systems, since signal quality tends to be adversely affected by the high noise
levels experienced when a line fault occurs, and also during operation of CBs and line
isolators.
Another issue to be considered when applying PLC systems is the additional signal
attenuation that occurs during a power system fault. Permissive inter-trip schemes and
analog comparison protection systems are required to signal through the fault point and
therefore tend to be adversely affected by this phenomenon.

4.1.1.3 OPTICAL FIBRE

Fibre optic technology offers huge advantages to power utility communication in terms of:
• Immunity to electromagnetic interference
• Natural isolation
• High bandwidth
Multiple strands of fibre are normally run together and integrated into the ground wires of
overhead power lines (called Optical Ground Wire or OPGW). Alternatively, helical wrapping
of the fibre optic cable around a ground or phase wire may be preferred.
Optical fibre consists of an optical core surrounded by optical cladding material, the cladding
having a lower refractive index than the core. Various types of glass or plastic may used,
however, silica glass dominates in telecommunication applications. The optical transmitters
consist of light-emitting diodes (LED) or laser diodes (LD); while receivers use photodiodes
or phototransistors. Light propagates along the core in one of three transmission modes,
depending on the type and diameter of core material used, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Multimode stepped index

TX RX

Core
Cladding Typically 1mm plastic
Multimode graded index

TX RX

50 or 62.5µm glass
Single mode

TX RX

8-10µm glass

Figure 4.1 – Light propagation in single and multi-

multi-mode fibre
fibre

In multimode stepped index fibre, light is guided along the core by multiple reflections at the
core boundary. The reflections cause pronounced dispersion of the transmitted signal and
stepped index fibre is consequently very limited in terms of the bit rate and transmission

24
distance that can be achieved. Multimode graded index fibre achieves lower dispersion by
using a core material with a variable refractive index. Light is refracted by an increasing
amount as it approaches the core boundary, causing it to bend smoothly rather than
reflecting abruptly off the cladding. These fibres also have limited usefulness in direct end-to-
end teleprotection applications because of their limited range of typically 1 or 2 km. However,
they are commonly applied in line protection applications for short runs across the substation
to connect the protection device to a telecommunications network multiplexer (see 4.1.2.2).
Core diameters of 50 µm and 62.5 µm are common for multimode graded index fibre, with
125 µm cladding, the fibres then being classed 50/125 µm and 62.5/125 µm types.
In single mode or mono mode fibre, the core diameter is approximately equivalent to one
wavelength (typically 8-10 µm) and light propagates along a single, dispersionless path,
enabling data rates of some gigabits per second to be achieved. Single mode fibre is
commonly applied, using more expensive LD transmitters, for direct end-to-end line
protection applications, supporting transmission distances of tens of km over 9/125 µm or
10/125 µm fibre. Optical repeaters or amplifiers are required for very long transmission lines
of hundreds of km.
Infrared light, at certain optimal wavelengths, is generally used. Fibre absorption is minimal
for 1550 nm light and dispersion is minimal around 1310 nm. These are consequently the
wavelengths used for longer distance applications, often with LD transmitters. A local
absorption minimum occurs at around 850 nm, a wavelength for which low cost transmitters
and receivers can be designed, and this wavelength is often used for short distance
applications with multimode fibre. The speed of light in fibre is around 200000 km/s, or 70%
of that in air, giving a propagation time of approximately 50 µs for a 10 km run of fibre.
The actual distance that can be covered by a particular fibre optic link depends on the types
of transmitter and receiver module provided at either end and on the type of link used. It can
be determined by carrying out an optical budget calculation, which takes into account the
optical transmitter power, the receiver sensitivity, the losses per km of fibre, and any other
losses caused by connectors and fibre splices.
There are various types of connectors used to terminate optical fibres which differ in their
dimensions and method of mechanical grip. The most common types are denoted LC, FC,
ST and SC. Fibres can be connected together either by the use of connectors or by splicing
their ends together.
The provision of dedicated fibre optic links is very attractive for line protection applications
because of the advantages mentioned previously. Furthermore, they provide low and
consistent propagation delays. However, the cost of dedicated links often cannot be justified
due to the apparently inefficient use of bandwidth by the relatively low data rates required by
protection equipment.
The cost of multiplexed links, where the fibre connections are shared by a number of
applications may be easier to justify. Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), whereby signal
channels from different applications are interleaved in time slots, has been most commonly
applied in the field of line protection communication. The available bandwidth is divided into
64 kbit/s channels, each of which typically use an 8-bit A/D conversion at a sampling rate of
8 kHz; the digital equivalent of a traditional voice channel. The transmitted signal is known as
a Pulse Code Modulated (PCM) signal, and hence the current differential IEDs designed to
operate over this type of link are often referred to as PCM relays.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) is an increasingly widely used technique in fibre
optic systems, in which channels are stacked at different wavelengths within a single fibre.
The most advanced systems apply Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) to
enable a very large number of channels (typically 40 or 80) to be carried by a single link,
enabling data rates in the Tbit/s range to be realised.
A more detailed description of multiplexing techniques can be found in [1].

25
4.1.1.4 MICROWAVE RADIO
Microwave radio channels have been established by various utilities for a number of different
purposes, including protection signalling, and they have the significant advantage of being
relatively immune to interference generated by the power network. They operate in the
frequency range between 400 MHz and 40 GHz and can achieve transmission distances up
to 100 km without the need for repeaters. Modern systems are generally digital and highly
bandwidth-efficient. Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) is routinely applied to combine a
number of digital channels onto an aggregate data stream.
Microwave radio systems are susceptible to signal degradation due to adverse weather
conditions or the presence of obstacles, and suffer multi-path fading as a result of reflections.
Microwaves travel at the speed of light in air, resulting in faster propagation times than those
achieved with optical fibre, typically 33 µs for a 10 km link.

4.1.1.5 SPREAD SPECTRUM RADIO

Spread spectrum technology uses Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) techniques which
allow multiple users to occupy the same frequency band. This is generally applied in areas of
the frequency spectrum reserved for unlicensed applications and therefore no transmission
licence is required, unlike traditional microwave radio applications. It has found a number of
application areas and has recently been applied to line protection; however, field experience
is limited as yet. A detailed review of this technology and its application to protection is
available in [7].

4.1.1.6 TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS

Whereas it is generally considered preferable for line protection communications to be
carried between terminals over a dedicated point-to-point link; this is not always practical or
cost-effective in modern power systems. Not only is the provision of dedicated links over long
distances expensive; the relatively low data rate required by line protection systems is an
apparently inefficient use of the high communication bandwidth that can be supported by
fibre optic and microwave links. As described in 4.1.1.3 and 4.1.1.4 above, utilities have
constructed privately owned multiplexed systems in order to make better use of fibre optic or
microwave technologies. An alternative to the provision of a dedicated link is to make use of
the services of public carrier telecommunications companies.
Public telephone companies commonly provide access to digital channel services over public
data networks (PDN). Modern line protection systems and associated teleprotection
interfaces have been designed specifically to communicate over digital networks.
Two generations of multiplexing structure, or “digital hierarchies”, can be identified as the
backbone technologies of modern digital networks.

PDH – Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy

Digital networks were introduced by telecommunications network providers during the 1970’s
to provide high speed data communications. These consist of multiple channels arranged in
hierarchical levels, with a base rate of 64 kbit/s, which is the digital equivalent of an analog
voice channel. This base signalling rate is variously referred to as DS0 (Digital Signal), T0 (T-
carrier) in North America and E0 (E-carrier) in countries that comply with ITU-T
recommendations.
In North America and Japan, 24 voice channels are grouped together, giving an aggregate
bit rate of 1.544 Mbit/s. These circuits are called DS1 or T1 links. In the ITU-T
recommendations, 30 channels are grouped, giving a rate of 2.048 Mbit/s and are referred to
as E1 links. Higher aggregate link bit rates are achieved by multiplexing several groups
together; and such higher level circuits are referred to as DS2, DS3 and E2, E3 and so on.
Each stream is time division multiplexed and uses a separate timing source and slight

26
differences between clock signals have to be accommodated by “bit-stuffing”, a process
known as plesiochronous, or sometimes asynchronous, multiplexing. The higher-order rates
are called the plesiochronous digital hierarchy (PDH).
PDH networks have proven to be well suited to the requirements of line protection. Whereas
PDH networks are circuit switched (i.e. with a fixed path through the network assigned for
each connection); and are based on time division multiplexing (see 4.1.1.3), they achieve a
constant bit rate and low jitter. The end-to-end propagation delay is relatively low (typically a
few ms) and, crucially for differential protection, is “deterministic” (i.e. predictable and
consistent). The BER of PDH networks tends to be low enough not to affect protection
scheme security or dependability.

SDH – Synchronous Digital Hierarchy

SDH is a standard for digital communications which was developed during the 1980s to
overcome a number of problems associated with PDH. Its North American equivalent is
called SONET (Synchronous Optical Network). In these systems, all equipment is
synchronised to a standard clock. The basic transmission rate in SDH is 155.52 Mbit/s and is
known as STM-1, with higher rates of STM-4, STM-16 and STM-64 defined. The SONET
base rate is 51.84 Mbit/s and is called STS 1 or OC1. Lower-level bit-rate streams, down to
the 64 kbit/s PDH base rate, are called tributaries and can be carried as payload within the
STM/STS aggregate.
The performance of SDH networks in line protection schemes is similar to that of PDH, with
one important difference. SDH allows the development of network topologies that are able to
achieve ‘network protection’ by route switching, in that they are able to survive failures in the
network by reconfiguring themselves through the use of self-healing ring architectures. Route
switching has important implications for differential protection relays, as will be explained
below. Some network operators may allow for the prevention of route-switching by “un-
protecting” the channel.
Route switching in a ring topology can be either ‘uni-directional’ or ‘bi-directional’. Uni-
directional means that only the faulted part of the path is switched while the non-faulted path
follows the original route. With bi-directional protection both the go and return paths are
switched to follow the opposite direction along the ring. Whereas bi-directional switching will
maintain equal signal propagation delays for the go and return path (any differences will be
transient); uni-directional switching may introduce permanent, unequal propagation delays.
The occurrence of a different propagation delay time between the go and return paths in the
communication network will result in a sampling synchronization error for conventional
current differential protection. This synchronisation error appears to the differential protection
as a phase angle difference and consequently as an erroneous differential current,
potentially resulting in maloperation of the protection scheme.
This problem can be resolved if the protection IEDs’ sampling clocks are independently
synchronised at each terminal. Such independent synchronisation can be achieved through
reference to GPS (Global Positioning System), with relays receiving synchronising pulses
from GPS receiving devices and adjusting their internal sampling clocks accordingly.
Successful application of such systems has been reported from the UK, where experience
has shown the following issues to be important:
• A back-up system is required in the device, allowing it to continue to function properly
in the event that the GPS signal is lost, even taking into account subsequent SDH
channel switching, and;
• The GPS receiver must be viewed as an integral part of the protection scheme, and
subject to the same rigorous environmental testing as the protection device.
A detailed analysis of the application of differential protection over SDH networks can be
found in [8].

27
4.1.2 TELEPROTECTION INTERFACES
In addition to selecting the type of channel to be used for conveying protection signals, it is
also necessary to define the interface between the protection equipment and the
communication link. Historically, the interface has been provided as specially designed
teleprotection equipment which converted the output from the protection device into a form
which could be transmitted over the communication channel, be it a VF circuit or PLC link.
More modern teleprotection equipment is designed to interface to digital communication links
but increasingly the teleprotection functionality and interfaces are being integrated within the
protective IEDs themselves, giving the benefits of reduced cost and complexity.

4.1.2.1 ELECTRICAL INTERFACES

Standard interfaces for connecting data communications equipment have been defined by
two major bodies:
• The International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunications Sector (ITU-T),
formerly the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT),
in Europe.
• The Telecommunications Industries Association (TIA), formerly the Electronic
Industries Alliance (EIA) in the United States.
A number of the standards defined by these two organisations have become established in
the field of teleprotection.

ITU-T V.24 (EIA-232D)

Series V of the ITU-T recommendations applies to the connection of data terminal equipment
(DTE) to the telephone network (PSTN) and V.24 was defined to interface the DTE via a
telephone modem at speeds up to 19.2 kbit/s. The electrical signals for V.24 are defined in
V.28, and together these two are largely equivalent to the EIA/TIA specification EIA-232D
(also called RS-232).
Some protection device manufacturers have used this standard for interfaces at data rates
up to 64 kbit/s. Its main drawback is that it uses unbalanced signals and is suitable only for
very short distances (< 15m).

ITU-T V.36 and V.37 (EIA-449, EIA-530)

V.36 and V.37 (which superseded the earlier V.35) were defined to interface the DTE to the
PSTN via wideband modems and are suitable for higher bit rate communication up to
168 kbit/s. Similar EIA/TIA specifications are EIA-530 and EIA-449 (also called RS-530 and
RS-449).
The electrical signals for these interfaces are defined in V.11 (EIA/RS-422) and are used with
twisted pair wires, thus supporting higher transmission rates and longer distances than V.24
(EIA-232D).

ITU-T G.703
Series G of the ITU-T Recommendations are entitled “Transmission Systems and Media,
Digital Systems and Networks” and define the transmission of voice and data over digital
transmission systems. G.703 defines the physical and electrical characteristics of the
hierarchical digital interface and also provides the specification for pulse code modulation.
G.703 has the advantage that it specifies an electrically isolated interface which can be
applied in the substation environment as standard. Most other electrical interface standards
do not call for electrical isolation and, therefore, need to be modified to cope with the harsh
environment likely to be experienced in teleprotection applications.

28
ITU-T X.21
Series X deals with “Data Networks and Open System Communication” and X.21 defines the
interface to a public data network. It has become the preferred interface of many public data
network operators. For its electrical signal definition, X.21 uses the V.11 specification.

4.1.2.2 OPTICAL INTERFACES

It is common in transmission substations for the protection device to be situated a
considerable distance (up to hundreds of metres) from the telecommunications facilities. In
the electrically noisy substation environment, it is not advisable to route low-level, high
frequency electrical signals over this sort of distance. Fibre optic connections provide a
perfect solution in these cases.
Direct fibre optic connection from the protection equipment to the telecommunications
multiplexer has not often been possible due to the lack of suitable standards and protocols. It
has become common, therefore, to provide an electrical to optical conversion unit close to
the multiplexer. Fibre optic connections can then be routed across the substation from the
protection equipment, with the electrical to optical conversion unit providing translation
between the proprietary fibre optic signals used by the protection device and the standard
electrical signals used by the multiplexer. Multi-mode, graded-index, 50/125 µm and
62.5/125 µm fibres are normally sufficient for connections up to one or two km.
Recent standardisation work has facilitated direct fibre optic connection from the protection
equipment to the telecommunications multiplexer.

ANSI / IEEE Std C37.94

An IEEE standard for n times 64 kbit/s optical fibre interfaces between teleprotection and
multiplexer equipment [9] was issued in 2002 and defines the physical connection, frame
structure and communication timing for direct connection by fibre optic link between the
protection and telecommunication equipments.

4.2 TELECOMMUNICATION FOR REMOTE DATA ACCESS

Protection IEDs are often capable of providing a significant level of power system data, such
as real-time measurements of system parameters and recorded information on recent
events. In the modern power system, timely and reliable access to measured and recorded
data is considered vital for the efficient and effective management of the system. Hence, in
addition to their crucial role in the protection of transmission lines described in section 4.1,
telecommunications systems also facilitate remote access to data recorded by transmission
line protection and monitoring IEDs and also for remote control of those devices.

4.2.1 PROTECTION IED DATA INTERFACES

Similar to the teleprotection interfaces described in section 4.1.2, a variety of data interfaces,
or ports, have been fitted to line protection devices. Most IEDs provide a choice to the user in
terms of the number of ports that are available and also the type of port.

ITU-T V.24 (EIA-232D)

Already described in relation to teleprotection (see section 4.1.2.1), this interface type,
commonly referred to as RS-232 has also been applied for data access in line protection
IEDs. It provides a simple, low-cost serial connection to the line protection device. Its
drawbacks are its susceptibility to interference and its suitability for only short transmission
distances (<15m).

29
EIA/TIA-485
Commonly referred to by its original designation RS-485, this is the most commonly applied
electrical interface standard for communication with line protection devices. It defines a two-
wire, half-duplex, multipoint serial connection, allowing a number of communicating devices
to be connected together in an inexpensive local network in the substation.
RS-485 uses differential signalling and is connected by screened, twisted-pair wires, allowing
higher transmission rates and longer distances than can be achieved with RS-232. Typically,
protection devices operate RS-485 ports at 64 kbit/s over links of up to 1200 m in length.
Networks are connected as a series of point-to-point nodes in a bus arrangement (not star or
ring), with terminating resistors fitted at the ends to prevent signal reflections.
It should be noted that RS-485 specifies only the electrical characteristics of the link and
does not specify any data protocol. In fact, it can be applied as the physical layer
specification used to support a variety of higher-level protocols.

Optical fibre
Fibre optic technology provides significant advantages in the substation environment, and for
the same reasons as described in section 4.1.1.3 above, is commonly applied for data
communications. Multi-mode, graded-index fibre provides sufficient range within the confines
of the substation, and local networks can be connected in star or ring configuration.

Local Area Network (LAN) technologies

Ethernet is an increasingly common LAN technology being applied in the substation
environment, bringing the advantages of high data rates and widely available network
components. The introduction of the UCA 2.0 and IEC 61850 standards for substation
communication has led to the provision of Ethernet ports on protection IEDs. Ethernet, as
standardised in IEEE 802.3, is a networking technology which uses the principle of “carrier
sense multiple access / collision detection” (CSMA/CD) by which devices share the channel.
The physical Ethernet interfaces are commonly twisted-pair (10BaseT or 100BaseTX) or
fibre optic (10BaseFL or 100BaseFX), where the numbers 10 or 100 denote the network
transmission rate of 10 Mbit/s or 100 Mbit/s respectively. 1 Gbit/s and 10 Gbit/s Ethernet
technologies are available, but have, as yet not been widely implemented in protection IEDs.
Wireless LAN (WLAN) technology according to IEEE 802.11 has also been trialled for use in
substations but has also not been widely applied as yet.

4.2.2 COMMUNICATION STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS

The most common communication standards and protocols which have been implemented in
protection IEDs are:
• IEC 60870-5-103
• IEC 60870-5-104
• DNP 3.0
• LON
• SPA
• Modbus
• Profibus
• UCA 2.0
• IEC 61850
A description of these standards can be found in [10].

30
4.2.3 REMOTE ACCESS
Remote access to line protection IEDs, either for retrieval of stored data or for remote
settings change or control operations is achieved by one of a number of means.

4.2.3.1 MODEM ACCESS VIA TELEPHONE LINE

If a public telephone line is available in the substation then a commercially available modem
can be used to gain remote access to devices connected to a local network in the substation
on a dial-up basis. Protection IED manufacturers generally provide PC-based software to
facilitate this process.

4.2.3.2 ACCESS VIA SCADA / RTU AND SAS

Many utilities implement Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for
distributed measurement and control purposes. A remote terminal unit (RTU) connects to the
physical equipment in the substation and can access data stored by protection IEDs,
providing protocol conversion if necessary. Communication between the RTU and SCADA
master station (control centre) may be by modem connection; radio link; or increasingly by
incorporation into the utility’s wide area network (WAN) infrastructure.
In larger substations the data concentrator function is often performed by a substation
automation system (SAS) consisting of a station computer which automatically gathers data
from all IEDs in the substation via a LAN. Communication with the remote control centre is
then performed by a router or gateway.
In the past, integration of protection devices into such systems has often been difficult due to
protocol issues and the devices often continued to have their own proprietary access
systems operating in parallel, particularly for data-intensive tasks such as settings changes
and disturbance record retrieval. More recently, new Ethernet-based protocols such as IEC
61850 have enabled protection IEDs to be fully integrated into the SAS.

4.2.3.3 INTERNET / INTRANET ACCESS

IEDs fitted with web-server functionality can be accessed using a standard web-browser
programme via the utility’s intranet, or even over the internet. Data gathered in this way from
distributed devices may be used for a variety of purposes at the system level; and has been
applied for multi-terminal fault location and fault analysis purposes on transmission lines [11].

4.3 FUTURE TRENDS

Developments in telecommunications technology are rapid, bringing both benefits and
challenges for the protection engineer. Some of the issues, expected to have a significant
impact on line protection in the coming years, are outlined as follows:

4.3.1 NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS

The trend in the global telecommunications industry towards the evolution of Next
Generation Networks (NGN) may present significant challenges for line protection IEDs,
particularly in the case of electrical utilities which use the services of public
telecommunications providers to support teleprotection channels. NGNs relate to the creation
of integrated networks which can support all of the services offered by the
telecommunications provider (such as voice, data, video) based on technologies such as
Ethernet, Internet Protocol (IP) and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS).
NGNs are packet-based networks and as such exhibit characteristics which differ markedly
from those of existing circuit-switched networks supported by PDH and SDH technologies.
The most significant issue for line protection communication is that the end-to-end delay
presented by an NGN is non-deterministic, that is, the delay is variable and depends on the

31
quantity of other traffic carried by the network. Measures can be taken to ensure a certain
Quality of Service (QoS) by guaranteeing a minimum bandwidth or a fixed path through the
network to a particular service, but the costs associated with such measures are unclear at
present. In any case, it is certain that the implementation of NGN by telecommunications
providers over the next 5 to 10 years will have a significant impact on any power utilities
which use their services for protection signalling.

4.3.2 EXTENSION OF IEC 61850 FOR COMMUNICATION OUTSIDE OF THE SUBSTATION

IEC 61850, the international standard for substation communications, was originally limited to
use in the exchange of information between the devices of a substation automation system.
Subsequently, however, the concepts of IEC 61850 have been applied outside of the
substation in other utility installations such as distributed generation and renewable energy
plants, and it is increasingly being seen as the foundation for a more wide-ranging standard
for utility communications. Its title is changing to the more general “Communication networks
and systems for power utility automation”, and as part of this process, IEC Technical
Committee TC57 has initiated work towards creation of new parts of IEC 61850 to define the
use of the standard for communication between substations [12], and for communication
between substations and control centres [13], parts 90-1 and 90-2 respectively.
IEC 61850 Part 90-1, under preparation at the time of writing, will standardize the exchange
of information which has previously been implemented using dedicated communication links
and proprietary protocols, for applications such as:
• Line distance protection with teleprotection schemes
• Directional comparison protection
• Transfer tripping
• Interlocking
• Multi-phase auto-reclosing for parallel lines
• Line current differential protection
• Phase comparison protection
• Multi-terminal fault location
This work is clearly of significance for line protection telecommunications.
IEC 61850 Part 90-2, also currently under preparation, will have a less direct impact on line
protection devices, but it is intended that the provision of direct and seamless access from
the control centre to the individual IEDs will bring efficiency benefits to data management.

4.4 REFERENCES
[1] CIGRÉ JWG 34/35.11, “Protection Using Telecommunications”, 2001
[2] IEEE PSRC WGH9, “Digital Communications for Relay Protection”
[3] CIGRÉ SC34 WG01, “Reliable Fault Clearance and Back-up Protection”, 1997
[4] IEEE C37.114, “Guide for Determining Fault Location on AC Transmission and
Distribution Lines”
[5] H. Y. Li and P. A. Crossley, “Optimum Message Transfer Rate for Distribution Feeder
Protection Operating over Switched Telephone Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery, Vol.17, No. 2, April 2002
[6] G. P. Baber, et al, “Numerical Line Differential Protection over Metallic Pilot Circuits”,
15th International Conference on Power System Protection, Bled, Slovenia, 2006.

32
[7] IEEE PSRC WGH2, “Using Spread Spectrum Radio Communications for Power System
Protection Relaying Applications”, 2005
[8] I. Hall, et al, “New Line Current Differential Relays using GPS Synchronisation”, IEEE
PES Bologna Power Tech, 2003
[9] IEEE Std C37.94, “IEEE Standard for N Times 64 Kilobit Per Second Optical Fiber
Interfaces Between Teleprotection and Muliplexer Equipment”, 2002
[10] CIGRÉ SCB5 WG07, “The Automation of New and Existing Substations: Why and How”,
2004
[11] K. Hamamatsu, et al, “A New Approach to the Implementation of Intranet-Based
Measurement and Monitoring”, IEE DPSP, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2001.
[12] IEC TC 57, 57/759/NP “Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations”,
2005
[13] IEC TC 57, 57/760/NP “Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations
and control centres”, 2005

33
5 PROTECTION FUNCTIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the benefits arising from the implementation of protection functions in
modern IEDs. The protection functions themselves have developed from discrete
electromechanical relays, through static electronic relays to early micro-processor based
numerical devices, and ultimately to the latest generation of numerical (and typically
multifunction) IEDs. The fundamental behaviour of functions such as overcurrent, under-
voltage, impedance and differential has not changed significantly since their initial
development more than 50 years ago. However, protection functions are now implemented
using computer techniques to solve physical formulae to distinguish between normal and
faulted system operation; rather than using discrete components.
Numerical techniques make possible the integration of many protection functions into the
same IED. This does not necessarily simplify the protection engineer’s job, because such
integration invariably leads to an increase in the number of device parameter settings,
increasing both the engineer’s workload and the likelihood of setting mistakes.
IEDs should not be considered as the direct “box-for-box” equivalent of older discrete
protection relays, but rather as a single platform for all of the various protection functions in a
cubicle which were previously implemented with a number of protection and/or control relays.
Another significant difference compared with older technologies is the use of faster and more
reliable communications to share data (e.g. possibly synchronised by GPS and time tagged)
between IEDs within the same substation, or between IEDs in different substations, to
implement certain protection functions.

5.2 PHASE AND GROUND OVERCURRENT PROTECTION

Phase and ground overcurrent protection functions were previously implemented in separate
devices; but today are offered as separate functions integrated in a common IED. Typical
overcurrent based functions provided in IEDs include:
• Definite-time (DT) and inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) delayed non-directional
phase overcurrent protection.
• DT and IDMT delayed non-directional ground-fault protection.
• DT and IDMT delayed directional phase overcurrent protection.
• DT and IDMT delayed directional ground-fault protection.
• Sensitive non-directional/directional ground-fault protection.
• Negative sequence overcurrent protection.
The IDMT overcurrent elements can use common ANSI or IEC inverse time curves, or may
have a user defined characteristic. Usually there are several DT and IDMT overcurrent
elements in an IED, and some of these may have additional features such as blocking for
transformer inrush conditions.

5.2.1 NON-DIRECTIONAL PHASE OVERCURRENT

Non-directional phase overcurrent is not typically used as a main protection function on
transmission lines for several reasons. Transmission lines in meshed networks will have
short circuit currents flowing from both ends, requiring the coordination of the overcurrent
elements with devices in either direction. This is not always possible if selectivity and speed
are required. Overcurrent protection is therefore more common in radial distribution networks
where the fault current can only flow in one direction. However, the use of directional phase
overcurrent elements as a means of indicating fault direction, e.g. in distance protection
devices, is a possible application.

34
The phase overcurrent function may be enabled or disabled in software, and may be applied
with various user selected IEC and ANSI time-overcurrent characteristic, in addition to
special user-defined characteristics (e.g. Figure 5.1). The time-current curve of user-defined
characteristics may be defined point by point, with up to, for example, 20 current and time
coordinate pairs. The overcurrent element then approximates the curve using an appropriate
interpolation technique. When utilizing user specified time-current curves, the reset curve
similarly may be user specified. This may offer an advantage where the inverse-time,
directional overcurrent protection must be coordinated with conventional electromechanical
overcurrent relays located toward the source.

Figure 5.1 – User-

User-defined curve

5.2.2 DIRECTIONAL PHASE OVERCURRENT

The directional overcurrent protection responds only to faults in a set direction and is applied
to systems where selectivity depends on knowing both the magnitude of the fault current and
the direction of energy flow to the fault location. Typically it is used in sub-transmission or
distribution lines where the direction of the fault current cannot be known prior to the fault.
This is particularly important in meshed networks and simplified reverse interlocking busbar
protection schemes, where the busbar trip depends on reliable fault detection by the line
overcurrent protection function.

5.2.3 DIRECTIONAL GROUND OVERCURRENT

Directional ground overcurrent protection is commonly applied on all types of transmission
lines. In effectively grounded networks, a phase-to-ground fault will yield a fault current with a
magnitude such that the distance or current differential protection may act as the main
protection. In such cases the ground overcurrent protection is usually set with a time delay so
that it may be selective with respect to, for example, the distance protection. The ground
overcurrent protection will then be the main protection for high impedance ground faults that
are not otherwise cleared by the distance protection, e.g. due to lack of sensitivity arising
from load encroachment considerations.
High set ground directional elements without time delays are often used for direct tripping for
close-in ground faults, and time delayed ground overcurrent elements are often used for
backup protection.
Directional ground overcurrent elements monitor the direction of the residual current for
ground fault conditions and can be used as an independent protection or to control the
operation of the residual overcurrent elements for conditions when the feeder may operate
interconnected.

35
The basic operation principle of directional ground fault protection is shown in Figure 5.2,
where 3I0 is the residual current (i.e. three times the zero sequence current), 3I0-set is the
setting, InstTrip is the non-delayed output of the function, DelayedTrip is the (typically
definite) time delayed output of the function and DirCntr represents the directional control.
Common types of directional control are based on the relative angle of the zero sequence
voltage and current (V0 and I0); the negative sequence voltage and current (V2 and I2); a
cross-polarizing phase voltage signal and the zero sequence current; and the system neutral
current and the zero sequence line current. The most commonly used type is the relative
angle of zero sequence voltage and current.

3I0
+
3I0-set _ InstTrip
&

DirCntr t DelayedTrip
0

Figure 5.2 – Directional Ground Fault Protection Scheme Logic

5.2.4 POLARISATION TECHNIQUES

Directional determination is accomplished by comparing the current with a reference. The
reference is typically a voltage, but may also be a dual polarization source (current and/or
voltage) depending on the switchgear available. Directionality enhances the ability of an
overcurrent function to determine if a fault is within its zone of protection, permitting the
function to be set more sensitively than traditional non-directional elements. The time
coordination is also improved as it need only be coordinated in one direction.
Negative and zero sequence quantities are usually only present in substantial levels during
unbalanced faulted conditions on a power system, when the positive sequence voltage is
likely to be corrupted. Zero sequence quantities are associated with the unbalanced
conditions due to ground faults and can be used to detect phase-to-ground and phase-to-
phase-to-ground faults. Hence, the most common methods of earth fault polarisation use the
zero sequence voltage or the transformer neutral current; however, negative sequence
quantities are also used.
Protection IEDs extract phasors from the measured voltages and currents and determine the
direction based on the sign of the angle between the operating quantity (e.g. residual current)
and the reference quantity (e.g. V0). E.g. the fault is declared in the forward direction for a
positive angle or in the reverse direction for a negative angle.

5.2.4.1 ZERO SEQUENCE VOLTAGE POLARIZATION

The zero sequence voltage polarization technique measures the angle difference between
V0 at the protection location and the residual current (3I0) flowing in the transmission line.
The V0 at the protection location will vary depending on the zero sequence sources of the
system, the line impedance, fault type and location.
Zero sequence voltage is typically obtained from a set of open-delta connected VT
secondary windings. IEDs may also calculate the V0 quantity internally as the summation of
the three phase voltage measurements.
V0 must exceed a certain minimum threshold above the measuring errors of the device and
VTs to act as a stable angle reference for polarizing. Where insufficient voltage is available
(e.g. due to effective system grounding), then another polarization quantity should be used.

36
5.2.4.2 ZERO SEQUENCE CURRENT POLARIZATION
Zero-sequence current polarization may be used if there is a ground current source at the
bus, such as the current measured in a transformer neutral-to-ground connection. However,
the polarizing zero sequence current must flow in the same direction relative to the fault
current in the protected line for all line faults for this method to be accurate. Polarization is
achieved by comparing the angle between the residual current flowing in the line (3I0) with
the transformer neutral current. The transformer neutral current will flow in the same direction
as the line residual current for a forward fault, and in the opposite direction for a reverse fault.
The suitability of the transformer neutral current as a polarizing source will also depend on
the transformer primary-secondary winding connections. When the transformer neutral
current is temporarily unavailable, e.g. due to maintenance etc., dual polarization with both
the zero sequence voltage and transformer neutral current may be effective.

5.2.4.3 NEGATIVE SEQUENCE POLARIZATION

The use of negative sequence quantities for protection has increased due to their ready
availability in IEDs which calculate them from the measured phase quantities. This would
have been both difficult and costly with previous technologies. Negative sequence quantities,
which are a measure of the system unbalance, are not present during normal load conditions
or balanced faults. As such, they are characteristic of phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground
faults. Therefore, they may be set to operate faster and more sensitively than traditional
positive sequence elements (i.e. below the load level).
Negative-sequence directional elements declare a forward or reverse fault based on the
phasor relationship between V2 and I2, adjusted by the impedance angle of the protected
line. When the negative-sequence source behind the protection is strong (i.e. low negative-
sequence source impedance), the amount of V2 measured at the protection location can be
very low. This reduction of V2 is most pronounced for remote faults. In order to overcome low
V2 magnitudes, certain negative-sequence directional protection functions use a
compensated V2 value. Negative-sequence ground directional protection should be applied
with care when set to “look towards” a large source.
The benefits of negative-sequence polarization are:
• V2 may be larger in magnitude than V0.
• Negative-sequence directional elements are not affected by the mutual coupling
associated with parallel transmission lines.
• There is often more I2 than I0 for remote ground faults with high fault resistance,
allowing higher sensitivity with reasonable and secure sensitivity thresholds.
• Negative-sequence quantities are inactive during normal operation. They can
therefore be set to operate faster and more sensitively.
• An additional CT is not required for negative-sequence polarization as is the case for
zero-sequence current polarization.
• Dual polarization is not needed, e.g. when the zero-sequence source is unreliable.
• I2 is accurately obtained from the measured phase currents and is unaffected by V0.
• Negative sequence polarized protection is often applied when zero-sequence mutual
coupling effects would otherwise cause zero-sequence directional protection to fail.
It can be shown that the V2 developed during a fault is inversely proportional to the strength
of the source either behind the protection location for a forward fault or in front of it for a
reverse fault. This coupled with the effect of fault resistance which will tend to lower the
amount of fault and negative-sequence current available during a fault, previously would
have determined the minimum sensitivity for the traditional negative-sequence directional
protection. The negative sequence elements have been developed for use in IEDs which use

37
the ratio of V2 to I2, rather than the previously used product of these quantities. Whereas a
ratio of voltage to current is used, faults with very little V2 can be detected.

5.2.5 SENSITIVE RESIDUAL OVERCURRENT PROTECTION

IEDs may offer a sensitive current input in addition to the other measuring inputs of the
device. This input is typically 10 times more sensitive than the standard inputs and permits
the reliable detection of high impedance ground faults that cannot otherwise be sensed by
the current inputs with normal sensitivity. For many ground fault applications, it is sufficient to
provide the sensitive current input with the summated current from the phase CTs (i.e.
Holmgreen connection); however, for very sensitive measurement it is preferable to use a
dedicated core-balance CT.
General sensitive ground fault protection may be used in isolated or compensated systems
to detect ground faults. In solidly or low-resistance grounded systems, sensitive ground fault
protection is used to detect high impedance ground faults. Due to their high sensitivity,
sensitive current measuring inputs are not suitable for the detection of high magnitude
ground faults.

5.3 DISTANCE PROTECTION

In many countries, distance protection serves as the main protection for overhead lines. The
principle of operation of this function is well documented. There has been significant
progress from the older electromechanical relays to today’s IEDs. A distance protection IED
comprises, amongst others, the following functionality:
• Six independent fault detection systems, one for each of the fault loops (ph-g, ph-ph).
• Measurement circuits, phase selection logic and ground fault processing.
• Digital signal processors for the impedance measuring systems.
• Six directional determination systems with sound phase polarization and memory
stored voltages (also effective for series compensation).
• Adaptive filter algorithms.
• Timers for delayed back-up distance protection stages.
• Reliable discrimination between load and fault conditions combined with high fault
sensitivity.
• Phase segregated tripping logic.
• Initiation of auxiliary functions.
• Channel aided scheme logic.
There have been improvements to distance protection IEDs in terms of filtering, signal
processing, hardware, etc. and to the distance protection function in term of directionality,
impedance characteristic flexibility, setting, number of zones, etc.

5.3.1 POLARIZING METHODS

The use of polarizing quantities for overcurrent protection has been described earlier
(Section 5.2.4). The dependability of a direction function’s response to a specific fault is
related to its polarizing quantity. Distance elements may be voltage or current polarized (or
both), or by zero or negative sequence quantities. Different polarizing techniques may be
applied depending on the manufacturer, the type of impedance characteristic used, or the
type of fault. The most commonly used techniques are:
• Positive sequence voltages.
• Cross polarization.

38
• Self polarization.
• Zero sequence voltage polarization.
• Zero sequence current polarization.
• Negative sequence voltage polarization.
• Memory voltage polarization.
When a fault occurs the polarizing quantity should be stable and last long enough to
guarantee that the protection element remains picked up until the fault is cleared. The
following are basic requirements for the polarizing quantity:
• Reliable operation for all in-zone faults.
• Security against operation for all external faults.
• Stable operation during single-pole open conditions.
• Fault resistance tolerance.

5.3.1.1 MEMORY VOLTAGE

The purpose of memory voltage is to ensure that reliable polarization is available in the case
of a balanced three phase fault. Whereas all of the voltages collapse, it becomes necessary
to use the memorised pre-fault voltages. IEDs are equipped with memory voltage with
adaptive memory depth. The directional element typically needs at least a minimum level of
the normal measured polarizing voltage for correct operation (e.g. 10%). When the measured
voltage is below this level, the device uses the memory voltage (e.g. for close-in short-
circuits). This memory voltage supports several aspects of the distance protection function.
• Allows the distance function to operate for close-in three-phase faults in front of the
protection location.
• Prevents the distance function from operating for close-in three-phase faults behind
the protection location.
• Allows the distance function to maintain directionality during voltage inversion in
series-compensated lines.
The choice of memory time constant (or the length of polarizing memory) is always a critical
design issue. Considerations in choosing the time constant should include the following:
• The maximum clearance times of both internal and external “zero-voltage” faults.
• Backup-zone fault clearance times on system with high source impedance ratio (SIR)
where the available voltage may be very small, even for remote faults.
• The bypass-switch operating time of series-compensation capacitors.
Typically all of the settings can be changed while the IED is in normal service. The maximum
duration of the memory voltage can be fixed (e.g. in the source code of the device software),
user settable, or adaptive. The protection function itself decides whether to use measured or
stored, or a mixture of these voltages. The memory time is mostly variable. It typically starts
with 2 cycles but can be extended up to 20 cycles when there has been no earlier trip
decision. After the maximum memory time has elapsed, the directional decision is
maintained until drop-off of fault detection.
A potential problem with fixed memory time involves faults beyond the reach of the Zone 1.
On lines with high SIR, the magnitude of the steady-state fault voltage at the protection
location for three-phase faults at the remote end of the line may be less than the voltage
required for the protection to operate. For these conditions, the delayed overreaching
distance zones may not operate if the time delay is greater than the fixed memory time.
Voltage inversion in series-compensated lines endangers the directional security; in which
case, the memory voltage is always used.

39
5.3.1.2 DIRECTIONALITY
In the case of distance protection with a quadrilateral characteristic, the function consolidates
several directional elements into one in order to determine the direction of all fault types. This
consolidation permits the function to evaluate the results and to make the best directional
decision. The directional elements serve to determine the fault direction; supervise distance
elements and form polygonal distance characteristics. These properties offer added security
with respect to the distance elements especially for:
• Close-in forward faults with small voltages.
• Reverse faults.
Directional determination is a prerequisite for correct operation of the distance protection
function, and is similar to the impedance calculation. The principle is to obtain a reliable and
secure directional determination that is not affected by sensitivity limitations, load conditions,
source impedances or fault location. For a polygonal distance element a combination of at
least five elements is used to shape a directional (e.g. forward) zone characteristic:
• Directional element.
• Forward reactance reach element (top).
• Forward resistance reach element (right).
• Reverse reactance reach element (bottom)
• Reverse resistance reach element (left).
The quadrilateral distance zone is non-directional and requires a separate directional
element to make a directional distance characteristic. A typical theoretical directional
extension is shown in Figure 5.3.
X

X+ ZLine

Forward
(Operate)
R- R
R+

Reverse
(Restrain)

X-

Figure 5.3 – Directional characteristic of a distance relay

When memory voltage or cross-polarisation is used, the directional determination will be

dependent on the source impedance and load conditions prior to fault inception, as shown in
Figure 5.4. The source impedance will displace the characteristic such that all faults up to the
protection location (CTs) are clearly identified as forward faults. The load condition will result
in a voltage drop across the source impedance which will rotate the characteristic by the load
angle (δ).

40
 X
ZLine
δ

Fo rward
Fault R

ZSource
δ

Figure 5.4 – Offset and rotation of

of the directional element for a forward fault due to load angle and
source impedance

Sound phase and stored memory voltages are typically used as references for directional
determination. A common approach in IEDs is to use the 90° relationship between the
operating and polarizing quantity. The reference voltages for both phase-ground and phase-
phase loops are always at right angles to the short circuit voltages. By comparing the phase
angle between the operating and polarizing quantity the function is able to determine the fault
direction. This is shown in Figure 5.5 for a phase-ground fault.

VL1

If L1

VL3 VL2

V L2-L3

Figure 5.5 - Polarising quantity (phase-

(phase-ground fault)

This phase angle difference will produce a torque like motion such that the comparator will
produce a positive torque if the fault is in the forward direction, and a negative torque if the
fault is in the reverse direction. The comparator is shown below for a phase L1 fault.
|TL1| = |VL2-L3|*|IL1| * Cos(∠VL2-L3 - ∠IL1) (5.1)
That is, if
270º < (VL2-L3 - ∠IL1 ) < 90º  a positive torque and thus a forward fault
90º < (VL2-L3 - ∠IL1 ) < 270º  a negative torque and thus a reverse fault.
Typical fault loops and operating and polarizing quantities are shown in Table 5.1.

41
 Faulted Faulted Loop Current Faulted Loop Voltage Polarizing Voltage
Loop (Distance/Direction) (Distance) (Direction)
L1-E IL1 - kE·IE VL1-E VL2-L3
L2-E IL2 - kE·IE VL2-E VL3-L1
L3-E IL3 - kE·IE VL3-E VL1-L2
L1-L2 IL1-IL2 VL1-L2 VL2-L3 - VL3-L1
L2-L3 IL2-IL3 VL2-L3 VL3-L1 - VL1-L2
L3-L1 IL3-IL1 VL3-L1 VL1-L2 - VL2-L3

Where: kE = ZE/ZL

Table 5.1 - Measured values for distance calculation and directional determination.

Series compensated lines

Series capacitors influence the magnitude and the direction of fault currents which in turn
influences the magnitudes and phase angles of voltages measured at different points in the
network. This has an impact on the performance of protection functions whose operation
depends on the magnitude and phase angle properties of measured voltage and currents.
Other phenomena like voltage and current inversion at the relay location, sub-harmonic
frequency oscillations, series capacitor metal oxide varistor (MOV) protection, and series
capacitor bypassing controls may influence the performance of different protection functions.
Voltage inversion is a phenomenon that affects distance and directional element
discrimination. A voltage inversion is a change of 180° in the voltage phase angle. For
elements responding to phase quantities, voltage inversion can occur for a fault near a series
capacitor if the impedance from the relay to the fault is capacitive rather than inductive. In
general, phase relays that utilize voltage information from the line side (fault side) of the
series capacitor will correctly declare the fault direction. Relays measuring the voltage from
the bus side of the capacitor with respect to the fault location may incorrectly declare the fault
direction.
Memory polarization, which uses prefault voltage to enhance relay directional discrimination,
solves the voltage inversion problem and the zero-voltage, three-phase fault problem for mho
and directional elements responding to phase quantities. In a memory-polarized mho
element, when the memory is active, the relay uses a combination of prefault and fault
voltage information. When the memory expires, the relay uses only fault voltage information.
Memory action needs to be time-limited to avoid relay errors for system disturbances in
which prefault voltage and fault voltage are out of phase with each other [1].

Figure 5.6 - Voltage inversion at bus S on a series-

series-compensated line

Improvements Reverse ground faults

A forward-set ground distance element can pick-up for a reverse ground fault due to the
impact of zero sequence current, which may be due to the unbalanced fault condition, or the
zero sequence current flowing in the sound phases during an open-pole condition on a
reverse line. In distance protection applications, long forward reaching distance elements
may be set to provide remote line backup protection, or to protect the downstream side of a

42
remote transformer. Maloperation of the distance elements may be prevented by supervising
the distance element by an independent directional element, so that tripping for forward
faults only can take place.

Improvements Reverse Phase-Phase Faults

Typically the operating quantities for phase distance elements use phase-phase currents.
That is, an L1-L2 phase distance element uses (IL1 – IL2) as its operating quantity. For a
close-in reverse L1-L3 phase fault, a forward reaching L1-L2 phase distance element can
sense the fault due to the effect of the IL1 current. A negative-sequence directional element
may be used to supervise the phase distance elements and avoid such maloperations.

Improvements Reverse Three-Phase Faults

Forward-reaching distance elements lack security for reverse three-phase faults if all of the
following conditions are fulfilled:
• A significant load current flows into the bus from a weaker source.
• The fault includes a small but critical amount of fault resistance.
• The polarizing memory voltage expires.
Under these conditions, the angle between the polarizing and operating quantities is less
than 90° for forward phase distance elements. This is the angular difference required to pick
up a forward-reaching distance element as described in the torque-like equation:
270º < (VL2-L3 - ∠IL1 ) < 90º  a positive torque and thus a forward fault.
One solution to this problem is to supervise the three-phase distance elements with a
positive-sequence directional element.

5.3.2 PHASE SELECTORS

Some manufacturers have implemented phase selection logic which is an independent
measuring function compared with the distance function. It comprises both impedance and
current-based measurement criteria. Its main purpose is to augment the phase selectivity of
the complete distance protection in networks with long and heavily loaded lines. It is
generally intended for use in directly earthed networks, where correct and reliable phase
selection for single-phase-to-ground faults, combined with single-pole tripping and automatic
reclosing, secures the stability of complete power systems. Independent phase selection,
combined with directional measurement for each fault loop, secures a selective operation for
simultaneous close-in faults on parallel circuits.
For impedance-based phase selection, all six fault loops are measured separately and
continuously. The reactive and resistive reaches are typically independently settable for
phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground faults. Checks based on the level of residual current
determine which loops, i.e. phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase, are evaluated. The faulted
phase(s) is determined by which of the loops operate. Operation of a loop occurs when the
measured impedance within that loop is within the set boundaries of the characteristic. The
impedance-based output will activate the selected loop of the distance protection measuring
zone(s) to which the impedance-based phase selection output is connected. The current-
based phase selection is based on the same residual current checks as those used to select
the phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase loops of the impedance-based phase selection
function for evaluation. In this case the current-based output will activate either all of the
phase-to-ground loops or all the phase-to-phase loops of the distance protection measuring
zone(s) to which the current-based phase selection output is configured.

43
5.3.3 INCREASED NUMBER OF DISTANCE ZONES
The distance function is often used as the primary protection for transmission lines. The
choice of using distance protection is getting more attractive as numerical technology further
improves the performance of this function. The increased number of zones available to the
user means that the distance function can serve as a better main protection, because speed
and selectivity does not have to be compromised. An example of this is shown in Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7 - Distance zones

With fewer zones available, a compromise between speed and selectivity may be required.
Selectivity might be compromised, for example, due to overestimation of the level of infeed;
and speed compromised due to the probability of getting a certain fault at a certain location.
With more zones available the fault clearing time for certain faults can be decreased by
adding a faster zone 2 than would have been possible with fewer zones. Some utilities would
have decreased the speed of the indicated zone 3 despite the inselectivity towards the zones
of downstream protection, or reduced the selectivity margin risking more contingencies.
These zones might easily be switched on/off in the software. In some cases it might be
useful to set a reverse zone covering the busbar if infeed was causing problems for the
remote protection. It is also possible to distinguish the forward backup protection zones. For
instance by having a faster backup zone set selectively over the line distance protection, with
a margin against low voltage transformer faults, and a slower forward backup zone set
selectively over the transformer protection and starting criteria.
It is quite common to offer 5 different zones in an IED, in addition to a starting criterion.
Previously, 2 to 3 zones were offered with the static and electromechanical relays. In many
cases this increased number of zones offers a cost effective solution as it could replace the
need for additional devices, as well as an improved technical solution.

5.3.4 HIGH-SPEED DISTANCE ZONE

IEDs may offer a “high-speed” zone in addition to the traditional distance zones. The “speed”
here refers to the measuring, filtering and algorithm technique rather than to any set time
delay. These high-speed zones generally operate within three quarters of a cycle inclusive of
command output relays. However, they often exhibit high transient overreach.
The loadability of a network depends on the fault clearing time, which must be short in order
to avoid transient instability. The higher speed may be useful for some lines where stability is
critical and where fast tripping is needed. However, it is only possible for certain fault types
and locations on the line, and not all the combinations. This zone can very quickly eliminate
the high short circuit capacity and limit the damage to equipment, reduce the risk for system
instability, etc.
Such high speed zones should be set carefully with regard to security and selectivity.

44
5.3.5 MORE FLEXIBLE CHARACTERISTIC
With legacy electromechanical and static relay technologies, the shape of the distance
characteristic was fixed (e.g. ice cream, circle, etc.). In IEDs, the shape is adjustable, to a
certain degree (e.g. adjustable polygonal). This implies a better fault coverage and
selectivity.

Reactive and resistive reach

In older technologies, the reactive and resistive reach settings were applied in steps using
the available electrical links, knobs or switches. These settings were also dependent, in that,
the X/R ratio would have to be specified. Therefore, the desired calculated settings could not
be applied directly, but rather reasonable compromise settings instead. These compromise
settings could result in lack of resistive or reactive coverage (e.g. insufficient reach for high
impedance faults); load encroachment; or inselective operation, etc.
The characteristics of distance zones in IEDs are independent of one another with regard to
their directionality and reach. The resistive and reactive setting ranges are wider and more
precise (2-3 decimal places) due to an almost continuous setting range, and can be set with
current sensitivity down to 10%. This means that the actual relay setting can directly match
the calculated optimal setting.

Separate settings for ph-ph and ph-g

IEDs facilitate the setting of separate phase-phase and phase-ground characteristics which,
though common with static relays, was unusual with the electromechanical relays.
IEDs normally have separate settings for each zone. A separate reactive and resistive
settings means an even more flexible characteristic to deal with possible differences between
ph-ph and ph-e fault resistances (e.g. due to the zero sequence impedance). This is typically
useful in cabled networks. The zone angle is also adjustable where it depends on the fault
type, ph-ph (per phase basis) or ph-g fault (per loop basis).

5.3.6 LOAD COMPENSATION FACTOR

Some IEDs have an integrated load compensation factor, typically for the non-delayed zone
1, which compensates the zone reactive reach depending on the actual pre-load situation.
The load transfer may have a major impact on the impedance as seen from the relay. With
static relays, the user would have to pre-calculate the worst load transfer and its impact on
the setting. This could result in a low reactive reach e.g. for the zone 1 setting to avoid
spurious tripping for remote busbar faults, with consequent slower tripping for certain fault
locations. By letting the IED adjust the angle, a faster fault clearing time, compared with a
static relay for the same fault, would result.

5.3.7 LOAD CHARACTERISTIC

Some IEDs have a settable load characteristic, which typically cuts into the distance
characteristic. This is settable in resistive reach (to allow maximum load) and load angle (to
permit the worst power factor).
With the load characteristic, the maximum load is now visualized on the distance
characteristic of the device, which ensures that the protection engineer fully controls any
possible load encroachment problems. However, the user must ensure that there is sufficient
coverage for all faults, and that these are not cut off by the load characteristic.

45
5.3.8 DIFFERENT PARAMETER GROUPS
It is possible to have several parameter groups within the same IED, where the user may
select which group to activate by actuating a binary input or via a communications interface
from a substation automation system.
This feature is useful when maintenance on the network results in reduced or different short
circuit capacity for an extended period, and especially when the substations are inaccessible.
Different short circuit capacity may result in stronger infeed from the remote end due to a
higher source impedance behind the protection location. Switching to a different parameter
set could take account of the network change, however, failure to changing the parameters
could, for example, result in slower tripping (back up zones) with severe cascading effects
and blackouts.

5.3.9 INTEGRATED DISTANCE TO FAULT LOCATION

With increasing bandwidth and faster communication between devices, the quality of the
distance to fault measurement is likely to improve as the devices can exchange information
about the source and remote impedances.
This impedance is not adaptive to the real situation, but has to be set in advance by the
engineer based on pre-calculated situations. This will, in some way, limit the distance to fault
calculation itself with respect to accuracy. But its integration within the distance function will,
nevertheless, improve the possibility to find the fault location faster which, in some cases, is
crucial to the restoration process.

5.3.10 GROUND RETURN COMPENSATION FACTOR

Distance protection settings are typically applied as positive sequence impedances.
Therefore, ground return compensation is required to reconcile the phase and residual
quantities measured during single-phase-to-ground faults by the distance protection with
these positive sequence settings.
Furthermore, the impedance of the ground path is not known with the same certainty as the
impedance of the phase conductors, and is dependent on the type of soil (e.g. rock or sand)
and whether the line is equipped with earth conductors, etc.
Setting a correct ground return or zero sequence compensation factor is critical to avoid
incorrect tripping for single-phase-to-ground faults. In IEDs, this factor is typically settable by
value and angle and separately for each zone. This is in contrast to static relays where,
typically, a single common factor for all zones was set. The setting of different compensation
factors may be particularly useful when protecting lines that are partly cabled, or where the
transmission line has been partially upgraded or changed in any way that affects the zero
sequence impedance.
Cables have a significantly different positive to zero sequence impedance relationship
(Z1/Z0) compare with overhead lines. By considering this relationship, more flexible
characteristics can be set. The need for cables is expected to increase in the future due to
environmental considerations, and it will be more common to use partly cabled sections of
transmission lines.

5.3.11 MUTUAL IMPEDANCE

Circuits in a multi-circuit parallel overhead line configuration exercise strong mutual influence
on each other. The influence is primarily in the zero sequence system and can be neglected
in the positive and negative sequence systems. The mutual coupling imposes a particular
problem for the setting procedure in the case of Ph-G faults because it tends to disturb the
measured fault impedance as seen by the protection, depending on the specific fault type,

46
location and load transfer, so that the distance protection would otherwise overreach and trip
inselectively with a non-adjusted setting. In IEDs the earth current of the adjacent line may
be fed into the device so that the impact of the mutual coupling can be accounted for. The
mutual impedance is then set according to the geometry of the parallel circuits and its
impedance, and offers more secure and selective protection.
Most cases, in practice, pertain to Class 1 networks [2] where the positive and zero
sequence sources are common. The impedance based distance measurement without
mutual compensation is distorted and must allow for correct measurement with the parallel
line either in or out of service.
Whereas mutual compensation is of advantage for faults on the protected line, it introduces
disadvantages for faults on the parallel line. Hence, the following are observed:
a) In distance to fault measurement functions, mutual compensation improves accuracy
and is recommended because only faults on the protected line are displayed and
recorded.
b) In distance protection functions with mutual compensation, a close-in fault on the
parallel line might affect the directional element. Therefore, the directional element
may not be compensated. Mutual compensation is omitted or is used only for faults
near or beyond the remote end substation. This can be automatically done by
allowing compensation only if the zero sequence currents in both lines are of same
sign and similar in magnitude.
Distance protection using mho characteristics which combine both measurement and
directionality should not be compensated.
Distance protection often may not be compensated in the following circumstances:
• In case of communication assisted schemes like PUTT, POTT or Blocking, the zero
sequence current compensation does not noticeably improve the overall distance
protection performance provided suitable settings are used.
• In PUTT schemes, the overlapping of the underreaching zone 1 measurements from
both sides is ensured even without compensation. If one end has reduced reach,
other has extended reach.
• In overreaching schemes like POTT or Blocking, the communications dependent
overreaching zone can be set sufficiently long to overreach the opposite bus under all
conditions. In order to allow settings for long overreach, the protection should have an
independent overreaching distance zone used exclusively for communication
schemes. If Zones 2 and 3 are used as back-up protection zones and in the non-
delayed mode also as communication dependent zones, severe limitations in
distance zone impedance grading must be accepted. In principle, the current reversal
logic is applicable to permissive or blocking overreaching schemes. The scheme is
explained in section 5.6.2.6. With permissive schemes, it is necessary to activate the
logic for an overreaching zone set greater than 150% of the line length. However, to
cover all contingencies which may arise due to different settings adopted at either
end, unexpected fault current distributions due to unequal sources, line impedances,
etc.; the logic is, by default, always activated since it is not detrimental in any case.
The ease with which such features can be activated/de-activated is one of the main
advantages in utilisation of IEDs.
The use in IEDs of separate zero sequence compensation factors (k0) in each zone
improves the grading of the back-up distance zones even without mutual compensation. One
commonly used philosophy is as follows:
• Underreaching zone 1 set with normal k0.
• Communication dependent zone (i.e. used for PUTT, POTT or Blocking) set with k0II .

47
• Distance zones 2 and 3 with k0 or k0II , depending on network configuration, i.e. short
or long adjacent lines
• Higher zones with k0.
Mutual zero sequence compensation helps to improve the grading of the overreaching back-
up zones, which shall operate for faults beyond opposite line end. This is a typical sub-
transmission requirement since such systems have no redundancy. Redundancy is provided
by the back-up zones of remote up-stream protection devices and hence selective time-
graded impedance back-up zones become more important.
In networks where parallel lines on common towers have isolated positive, as well as zero
sequence, sources (Class 2 networks, [2]), or where the positive sequence source is
common but the zero sequence is isolated (Class 3 networks, [2]), there is a remote danger
of unwanted trips of the DEF protection function and special solution is necessary.

5.3.12 DRIFTING OF PARAMETERS

The setting of electromechanical relays was an empirical process to reconcile the
mechanical setting links or dials, which could differ from nominal settings due to drift of the
nominal values of the capacitors, resistors and inductors in the relay; to the desired setting.
This drifting could result in different performance to the nominal distance characteristic
settings, e.g. a fault nominally in the set zone 1 being detected in zone 2, resulting in a
slower tripping time. Therefore extensive testing was necessary to verify that the setting was
accurate. With numerical technology this problem is greatly reduced because the impedance
calculation is performed digitally and based on software algorithms.

5.3.13 ZONE EXTENSION

Zone Extension (so called “Poor Man’s Carrier”) is used to achieve fast fault clearance over
the whole line length when a communications link is not available or is out of service for
maintenance etc. It operates by tripping from a non-delayed overreaching forward zone,
which is released by the auto-reclosing function for the first fault. The overreach is then
blocked by the AR close command and subsequent tripping is normal time-graded distance.
Hence, a transient fault beyond the end of the line, but within the overreaching zone, will
result in an unwanted trip and reclosing cycle, and a persistent fault at the end of the line (i.e.
beyond the reach of Zone 1) will result in delayed Zone 2 trip. Caution must be exercised in
the case of parallel lines with 3-pole tripping and reclosing, and it must be ensured that
synchronism is not lost for a fault on adjacent line.
In a redundant transmission protection scheme, the zone extension feature may be
automatically enabled upon either of the following conditions being satisfied:
• Communication links of both redundant protection systems fail.
• Communication link of one system fail and the other IED is in a Test mode or out of
service.
When zone extension is enabled, Zone 1 can still trip phase selectively since zone extension
itself is also a phase selective function.

48
5.4 LINE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION FUNCTION

5.4.1 CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

The basic principle of current differential protection was established by Merz and Price [3]
and is still applicable and independent of specific device technology. The differential principle
is based on Kirchhoff’s current law, which states that the vector sum of the currents entering
a node adds up to zero at any instant. The differential protection principle compares the
magnitude and phase of the measured currents by direct comparison of the instantaneous
values or by phasor comparison.
The current transformers of the differential zone of protection are connected in series on the
secondary side such that currents circulate through the current transformers during an
external fault or normal load flow and no current flows in the branch where the differential
relay is located. Figure 5.8 shows a basic non-biased current differential protection applied to
protect equipment when the current transformers are located in close proximity to each other.
IL IL

Protected Element

I1 I1

Differential ID=0
Relay

Figure 5.8 - Basic non-

non-biased current differential protection

The current transformers for line protection are located far apart. Traditionally, line current
differential protection was provided by schemes requiring continuous metallic circuits, called
pilot wire, between line ends for the exchange of a power frequency replica of the primary
current. Traditional schemes utilized current transformers at each line-end to derive a single-
phase quantity that is a function of the three phase currents. The operating quantity of the
differential relay is the vector addition of the single-phase replica currents fed from each end,
while the bias quantity is the arithmetic sum of the currents. Pilot wire current differential
relay schemes are limited to primary circuit length of about 30 km because of the impedance
of the pilot wire. Pilot wire current differential protection is susceptible to electrical
interference due to coupling with power lines running in parallel with the pilot wire circuit and
to ground potential rise caused by local power system faults flowing through the ground.
Adequate isolation, separation, electrical screening, and grounding measures were adapted
to provide adequate line protection. Figure 5.9 shows a transmission line protected with pilot
wire current differential protection.
IL IL
Transmission Line

I1 I1

Relay A Pilot Wire Relay B

50/60 Hz
Relaying Quantity

Figure 5.9 - Pilot wire differential protection

49
Frequency modulation techniques were later introduced to enable conventional pilot wire
relays to operate over dedicated fibre optic links to avoid the susceptibility of pilot wire
current differential protection systems to electrical interference. These systems were a step
forward in the field of current differential protection for transmission lines. However, a fully
digital approach exploits more fully the benefits of modern digital communication systems
and is discussed in more detail in this section.

5.4.2 DIGITAL CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

The line current differential protection function compares the currents from a local terminal
with the currents received through a communications channel from the remote line terminal
to determine whether the fault is inside or outside of the zone of protection. It provides
instantaneous protection for the entire length of the transmission line circuit. The function can
be implemented on a segregated-phase basis or on a combined sequence-current basis;
where segregated-phase system compares the currents on a per-phase basis and the
combined sequence-current system compares a local and a remote single-phase signal
proportional to the positive, negative, and zero-sequence currents.
Current differential protection systems combine phase and magnitude current information in
a single comparison. The line current differential function requires a wide bandwidth
communications channel to transmit and receive current information to and from the remote
terminal. It is, therefore, channel dependent. The development of high-capacity, long haul
digital communication systems has made possible the application of an all-digital
transmission line current differential protection system. The availability of fibre-optic and
digital microwave communications channels permits modern current differential systems to
exchange raw sampled currents or phasor current information using a 64 kbit/s digital
channel.

5.4.3 ADVANTAGES OF LINE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Line current differential protection only requires line currents to determine if the fault is within
the zone of protection. It does not require voltage information and, therefore, is immune to
the problems associated with loss of potential for close-in faults, blown VT fuses, ferro-
resonance in VTs, and CVT transients [4]. Line differential systems are also immune to:
• Mutual induction effects.
• Stable and unstable power swings.
• Series impedance unbalances.
• Current reversals in parallel-line configurations.
Line current differential systems perform well during evolving, inter-circuit, and cross-country
faults. They are applicable to short transmission lines and can tolerate high line loadings.
Depending upon their operating characteristic, line current differential systems may handle
out-feed conditions that may occur in series-compensated and three-terminal lines; and
during high-resistance faults with high load. The protection settings for current differential
schemes are few and easy to compute, however, the impact of line and cable-charging
currents, and shunt reactor applications in transmission line circuits must be considered.

5.4.4 CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS

The basic non-biased current differential protection shown in Figure 5.8 is not very practical
because it assumes ideal current transformers. Current transformers may have different
excitation characteristics or unequal burdens that may result in a false differential (or spill)
current during external faults. There is a consequent risk of relay operation on a healthy line
under transient conditions, which is clearly unacceptable. The most common causes of false
differential current in transmission line differential relays are the following:

50
• Line-charging current.
• Tapped load.
• Channel time-delay compensation errors.
• Current transformer saturation.
Line-charging current may be significant in cables or long overhead lines. The false
differential current created by tapped loads may be the result of load current, tapped
transformer low-side faults or inrush current in the tapped transformer. Channel time-delay
compensation errors and CT saturation contribute to false differential current in all types of
differential elements. All of these factors serve to reduce the sensitivity of the line current
differential scheme if the scheme is optimized for security.
The most common line current differential operating principles, the percentage bias, the α-
plane (alpha-plane), and the charge comparison characteristics are presented in the
following three sections.

5.4.5 PERCENTAGE BIAS CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC

The percentage bias current differential principle, originally developed for the protection of
transformers and generators, was extended to the protection of short transmission lines in
the 1930s. Early current differential protection systems required a pilot wire channel to
exchange analog information between the line terminals. Advances in digital communications
permit current differential IEDs to exchange current information using a 64 kbit/s digital
channel.
The spill current in the differential element depends on the magnitude of the through current,
which is negligible at low values of through-fault current but which may reach large values for
more severe faults. Setting the operating threshold of the differential protection above the
maximum level of spill current would result in poor sensitivity. The low-level fault sensitivity is
greatly improved by making the differential setting approximately proportional to the fault
current. Figure 5.10 shows typical percentage bias current differential characteristics of
modern devices designed to overcome the problem. At low currents, the bias is small, thus
making the relay sensitive. At higher currents, such as would be obtained from inrush or
through-fault conditions, the bias is higher, and thus the spill current required to cause
operation is higher. The relay is therefore more tolerant of spill current at higher fault currents
and therefore less likely to maloperate, while retaining sensitivity at lower current levels.

IOP IOP
IOP=|IL+IR| IOP=|IL+IR|

K2 K2
Operate Operate

K1 Restrain K1 Restrain
ITH ITH
IOP=K1•IRT IOP=K1•IRT+ITH
IRT IRT
(a) IRT=|IL|+|IR| (b) IRT=|IL|+|IR|

Figure 5.10 - Traditional percentage bias current differential characteristics

The operating current, IOP, is the magnitude of the vector sum of the currents. IOP is
proportional to the fault current for internal faults and ideally approaches zero for any other
operating conditions.

51
 r r
I OP = I L + I R (5.2)

The most common alternatives for obtaining the restraint current, IRT, are given below:
r r
I RT = k I L − I R (5.3)

(r r
I RT = k I L + I R ) (5.4)
r
( r
I RT = Max I L , I R ) (5.5)

The coefficient k is a constant that usually takes a value of 1 or 0.5. The operating condition
of the biased differential characteristic shown in Figure 5.10a is given by (5.6). K1 in (5.6) is
the percentage bias representing the slope of the characteristic.
I OP ≥ K 1 I RT (5.6)
A minimum pick-up current, ITH, is added as a condition:
I OP ≥ I TH (5.7)
Another possible definition of the operating condition of a biased differential characteristic
shown in Figure 5.10b is given by (5.8).
I OP ≥ K 1 I RT + I TH (5.8)
Errors relating to differential protection performance can be classified as fixed and
proportional component errors. Whereas fixed component errors occur regardless of the
magnitude of the system’s primary current; proportional component errors are in proportion
to the magnitude of the system’s primary current.
In general, the minimum sensitivity of the function, ITH, is determined taking into account
fixed component errors, such as offset and quantisation errors within the protection device.
ITH is also applied to accommodate external factors such as line charging current, although
this requirement can largely be eliminated by the implementation of a dedicated charging
current compensation function within the IED [5]. Differential protection IEDs can achieve
sensitivity in the range of 10% - 20% of rated current.
Proportional component errors, such as CT measuring errors and errors related to channel
delay asymmetry, are accommodated by the slope, K1, of the percentage bias characteristic.
Often, a dual bias slope characteristic is adopted, with a second slope introduced in the high-
current region, the gradient of which, K2, is determined so as to accommodate false
differential current caused by CT saturation under heavy through-fault conditions.

5.4.6 ALPHA-PLANE DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC

Some of the key factors to consider in defining a line differential protection characteristic are:
channel time-delay compensation errors, power system impedance non-homogeneity, CT
saturation, and low frequency oscillations in series-compensated lines.
Figure 5.11 shows the α-plane differential element characteristic for transmission line
protection [6]. The restraining region in the current-ratio plane is the area between two circle
arcs and two straight lines and includes the a = –1 point. Two amplitude and one phase
comparison elements are needed to create this characteristic. Amplitude comparison
provides the circular parts of the characteristic with independent settings R and 1/R (circle
radii). Phase comparison provides the linear parts of the characteristic and defines the
angular setting α. The horizontal axis variable “a” is the real part of the complex ratio of IR/IL
(5.9) and the vertical axis variable b is the imaginary part of the complex ratio of IR/IL (5.10).

52
 I 
a = Re R  (5.9)
 IL 
I 
b = Im R  (5.10)
 IL 
Note that the characteristic is designed to match the different fault and load regions depicted
in Figure 5.10 and yet accommodate CT saturation, channel delay errors and current out-
feed; in addition to low-frequency oscillations present in series-compensated lines. The
characteristic is symmetrical with respect to the a-axis, and the radii of both circle arcs are
reciprocal.
jb

R Operating
region
a
-1
1/R

Restraining
region

Figure 5.11 - Alpha-

Alpha-plane line current differential characteristic

5.4.7 CHARGE COMPARISON

Charge comparison is an alternate form of line current differential protection intended to
reduce the communications channel bandwidth requirements [7]. Charge comparison
performs a numerical integration of the samples of the phase and residual currents over half
a cycle. The sample integration process takes place between current zero-crossings. The
system stores the resulting ampere-seconds area in memory (converted into an r.m.s.
current equivalent), together with polarity and start/finish time-tag information. Storage
occurs only if the magnitude exceeds a certain threshold, and the half-cycle pulse width is
greater than or equal to 6 ms. Every half cycle the local system also sends information to the
remote terminal. The charge comparison system provides higher tolerance to channel
asymmetry and out-feed than traditional phase comparison or traditional current differential
systems. However, the required zero-crossing detection introduces a half cycle latency that
penalizes speed and introduces an additional time delay for internal faults with full DC offset.
External faults with CT saturation that affect zero crossings may jeopardize system security.

5.4.8 DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION USING ZERO OR NEGATIVE-SEQUENCE CURRENT

In general, phase-segregated current differential protection can achieve high sensitivity,
giving good coverage for high-resistance faults. However, maintaining this high sensitivity
under heavy load conditions can be difficult.
In the case of a high resistance fault, a large proportion of the pre-fault load current can
continue to flow, although the fault current itself may be small. This situation is presented in
Figure 5.12 below.

53
 Terminal A I’L+IfA -I’L+IfB Terminal B

IfA+IfB=IF
Relay A Rf Relay B

Figure 5.12 – Fault current

current and load current

If it is assumed that load and fault currents are at almost the same angle, the differential
current (Id) and restraining current (Ir) are typically calculated as follows:
I d = I ' L + I fA − I ' L + I fB = I fA + I fB = I F (5.11)

I r = I ' L + I fA + − I ' L + I fB ≈ 2 I ' L + I F (5.12)

This condition is shown on a biased differential characteristic in Figure 5.13. As the load
current increases, so too does the restraining current, with the result that it becomes
increasingly difficult to achieve the required fault sensitivity. In some applications it may not
be possible to select a pick-up setting which can accommodate the worst case conditions of
maximum load resistance and maximum fault current.

Id
Operating
Zone

IF Restraining
characteristic
Pick up

0 IF+2I’L Ir

Figure 5.13 – Id and Ir for a high resistance fault

A solution to this problem is the application of differential protection based on zero or

negative-sequence currents, which are inherently insensitive to balanced load current. For
example, in the case of zero-sequence differential protection, the differential current (Id0) and
restraining current (Ir0) are calculated from the residual currents measured at Terminals A
and B, IA0 and IB0 respectively.
I d 0 = I A0 + I B 0 (5.13)

I r 0 = I A0 + I B 0 (5.14)

Whereas load current is balanced, it does not appear in either Id0 or Ir0. Therefore, both Id0
and Ir0 are almost equivalent to the fault current for an internal single-phase-to-ground fault.
A pick-up setting just below the minimum fault current will be sufficient to operate for the
maximum fault resistance, regardless of the magnitude of the load current. When particularly
high accuracy and sensitivity is required, a dedicated core balanced CT should be used.

5.4.9 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION

When a protective IED compares local samples or phasors with those generated in a remote
IED for the purposes of differential protection, the relative time between the local and remote
samples must be known. The current samples from the two line terminals must be time

54
aligned to evaluate the differential function. This requires knowledge of the transmission
delay between the devices, for which four techniques are possible:
a) Assume a value.
b) Measure during commissioning only.
c) Continuous online measurement.
d) Global Positioning System (GPS) time tagging.
Method (a) is not used, as the error between the assumed and actual values could be too
high.
Method (b) provides reliable data if direct communication between relays is used. Whereas
signal propagation delays may change over time, repeat measurements may be required at
intervals and devices re-programmed accordingly. There is some risk of maloperation due to
changes in signal propagation time causing incorrect time synchronization between
measurement intervals. Therefore, this technique is less suitable if rented fibre optic
channels are used, since the owner may perform circuit re-routing for operational reasons
without warning, resulting in the propagation delay being outside of limits and leading to
scheme maloperation. Where re-routing is limited to a few routes, it may be possible to
measure the delay on all routes and pre-program the devices accordingly, with the device
binary inputs and ladder logic being used to detect changes in route and to select the
appropriate delay accordingly.
Method (c) which continuously senses the signal propagation delay is a robust technique. A
key building block for achieving clock synchronization is a “ping-pong” method for
determining clock offsets between clocks at different locations, which uses four time stamps
gathered in a round trip communications exchange, described by Mills [8] in a paper on
Internet time synchronization.
The "ping-pong" algorithm computes the clock offset from four time measurements collected
during a round-trip pair of messages. Once the nodes are synchronized, the "ping-pong"
mechanism continues to exchange round-trip messages between nodes on the network to
maintain clock synchronism. The algorithm assumes that the communications channel delay
is the same in each direction. If it is not, the timing error is equal to one half of the difference
between the delays in each direction.
The transmitting device effectively realigns the data to the instant of transmission, so that the
receiving device need only account for the transmission delay. The one-way transmission
delay is estimated as half of the round-trip delay. To measure the round trip delay, a device
tags each message as it goes out with a counter value, and times how long it takes to
receive a response to that message. The response contains a field which represents the
amount of time elapsed at the remote device between reception and transmission. The local
device estimates the one-way transmission delay by:
Td = (Tr − Th ) 2 (5.15)

Where:
Td is the one-way transmission delay.
Tr is measured round-trip delay.
Th is the time the remote device held the message before responding.

55
 Td = (Tr-Th)/2
Tr Th

Td

Time at Time at
Local Relay Remote Relay

Figure 5.14 - Channel time delay measurement using the ping-

ping-pong method

Method (d) is also a robust technique, which requires that both devices are capable of
receiving a time signal from a GPS satellite. Knowledge of the propagation delay on each
communication channel is no longer required because both devices are synchronized to a
common time reference. In order to meet the required performance of the protection scheme
in respect of availability and maloperation, the GPS signal must be capable of reliable receipt
under all atmospheric conditions. Satellite signal receiving equipment is required at both
ends of the line, which implies extra cost.
Communications channel asymmetry between the transmit (TX) and receive (RX) paths
presents a more difficult challenge to line differential IEDs. This can occur in self-healing ring
topologies of modern SONET / SDH digital communications systems. After self-healing the
new configuration will most likely have asymmetrical communication channel delays,
because the time delay for the TX signal is different to that of the RX signal. The result is a
differential current whish is proportional to the value of the channel asymmetry. If the channel
asymmetry is sufficiently high, the line differential protection may maloperate, even for steady
state conditions. However, this depends on the line differential operating characteristic, and
on the required minimum sensitivity of the scheme. Some line differential algorithms can
accommodate higher levels of channel asymmetry without the need for GPS synchronization
[6]. Other line differential IEDs have a special mechanism built into the line differential
algorithm to cope with the differences between the transmit and receive paths.

5.4.10 ACCOMMODATION OF CHANNEL DELAY ASYMMETRY USING GPS

Asymmetrical communication channel delays introduce an error in the computation of the
clock offset equal to half of the channel asymmetry, and a resultant error in the calculation of
the differential current. E.g. an asymmetry of 1 ms will result in an erroneous differential
current of more than 30% of the load current being measured, which has a significant impact
on the sensitivity that can be achieved by the differential protection scheme. There are two
methods in which GPS technology can be applied to achieve differential protection operation
with asymmetrical channels, while retaining the sensitivity and speed of the protection.
The first method compensates for the channel asymmetry by exchanging a second set of
time stamps from the GPS clocks at each end in addition to the sampling clock stamps.
Whereas the offset of the GPS clocks is practically zero, the offset calculated from the GPS
time stamps, using the “ping-pong” algorithm, arises entirely from the channel asymmetry. If
the GPS time stamps are taken at the same time as the sampling clock time stamps, it is
possible to exactly compensate for the delay in each message exchange, even if the
asymmetry is dynamically changing. The deviation computed from local time stamps is equal
to the actual deviation plus one half of the channel asymmetry. The deviation computed from
the GPS time stamps is equal to one half of the channel asymmetry, since the GPS deviation
is zero. Subtracting the GPS based deviation from the local time stamp deviation exactly

56
compensates for channel asymmetry. When channel asymmetry changes, there is no
change to the inputs to the loop filters, so the sampling clocks maintain synchronism, with no
transient disturbance.
In the second method, each device physically synchronises its sampling clock relative to the
GPS signal, so that samples at each terminal are taken at practically the same instant in
time. Each sample is tagged with a reference before transmission to the remote terminal(s)
and the differential protection calculation can then be made using matching pairs of
synchronised samples, regardless of the propagation delays of the send or receive
communication routes. Changes in the communication path propagation delay time have no
effect on the sampling timing or on the differential protection calculation.
The addition of an algorithm that relies on an external GPS source to handle the asymmetry
in communication channels incorporates a new potential point of failure that has to be
addressed. There are two main points of failure in the GPS system: loss of the GPS signal
and failure of the GPS receiver. For these reasons, GPS based current differential protection
IEDs have been fitted with suitable back-up functions which allow the protection to continue
operating following loss of the GPS signal. Back-up systems have been developed which
allow for long-term continued differential protection operation following loss of the GPS signal
combined with multiple changes in the communication path propagation delay caused by
channel switching [5].
If the GPS signal is lost or if GPS is not used, and the communication channel is interrupted
for a long period of time, then the clocks at the various terminals will continue to run on their
own (i.e. free-wheeling). Due to inaccuracies in the device reference (crystal) there will be a
drift between the clocks and therefore the current comparisons will cease to be reliable after
a certain time. The differential protection is then blocked under this condition.

5.4.11 REDUNDANT COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

Redundancy in the communication medium is preferred in some instances to improve
dependability. In such situations, two links (e.g. fibre optic) are in operation but one of them
is referred as the “Primary”. In the case of degradation of quality or loss of the Primary
communication link, a switchover to the “Secondary” is made after a set time delay. Upon
return of the “Primary”, a re-switching is done after a further set time delay.

5.4.12 IMPROVEMENTS IN LINE DIFFERENTIAL OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS

“In-Circuit” Transformers
Some IEDs can support the introduction of one or more transformers with two or three
windings into the line differential zone of protection, with facilities for vector group and
magnitude compensation, zero sequence suppression and harmonic restraint (typically 2nd
and 5th harmonic for inrush and overexcitation respectively). The harmonic restraint may
incorporate cross-blocking between phases, whereby a high harmonic content in the
differential current of any one phase, blocks operation of the other two phases.
The need to cover a transformer by the line differential protection may be due to the non-
availability of a CB or CT core for zone separation at the interface between the line and the
transformer (e.g. tapped or “tail-fed” transformer), or purely for function integration reasons.
Depending on the size of a tapped transformer, it may be included in the line differential
protection or excluded. However, if excluded, care must be taken to ensure security during
transformer energizing, etc. When small tapped transformers (i.e. rated current < 50%
differential current minimum pickup setting) are excluded, trips for low differential currents
may be time delayed to co-ordinate with downstream overcurrent devices.

57
The analysis associated with the harmonic restraint for “in-zone” transformers is likely to slow
the trip decision, unless overcome by complementary features. One such feature is negative
sequence (current) directional comparison which discriminates between internal and external
faults in the order of 8 – 10 ms. If the negative sequence currents at each line end are in
phase, the fault is internal. If they are 180º out of phase, the fault is external. In practice, a
realistic setting angle of +/- 60º is applied for the operate region. If there is more than one CT
at either end, the directional comparison is applied between that particular CT and the sum of
the remaining currents, including the second local CT. The fault is declared as “internal” if
detected as such by any one comparison.
The speed of operation may be improved by bypassing the harmonic analysis if the fault is
declared as “internal” in the presence a minimum differential current. The minimum pick-up
current level Ith (Figure 5.10) is automatically raised to a higher value for certain conditions to
improve security:
• Energization of the line.
• Fault is classified as “External”.
• Switching in of Tap transformer.

Charging Current Compensation

The line charging current is related to capacitive coupling and increases with the line length.
It appears as a differential current and can reduce the sensitivity of the differential protection
unless measures are taken to suppress it. Estimation of the current, based on measured
voltage and the capacitance is a conventional approach that also needs voltage inputs on the
IED. A newer approach which obviates the need to use voltage inputs is described below.
When a differential current is detected it is automatically deducted from the differential
current before evaluation against the bias current. This is done gradually, rather than in one
step. Furthermore, the current deducted cannot be more than the minimum differential
current setting. During disturbances, the pre-fault differential currents are not updated and
the updating process is only resumed after normal conditions are restored. Such a principle
is seen to produce good results for stability on external faults. The advantage of this feature
is that voltage analog inputs are not required for the differential protection.

Open Circuit CT Detection

An “open CT circuit” feature may be used to block the differential protection function. This
feature aims to improve sensitivity by de-coupling the maximum load current or CT rating
from the differential pick-up setting. It must act faster than the differential protection function
in order to block it and to prevent possible maloperation.
IEDs may incorporate such a feature internally in the line differential function itself since the
algorithm has access to each CT set. Furthermore, the particular CT and the phase on which
the open circuit was detected can be identified. Such principles normally detect the open
phase, provided that all phase currents are above a certain fixed value (e.g. 10% of Ir). The
principle is not applicable to situations where the CT was open before the primary current
was considered in the algorithm. The advantage is that no additional analog input is
necessary for neutral current comparison.
An alternative method is to compare the residual neutral current from a different set of cores
on the same CT, but for which additional current measuring input on the IED is required.
In any case, a 3-phase open circuit cannot be detected.

Differential Protection Communication Control

A comprehensive solution is to equip the IEDs at all ends with the differential function to
achieve independent operation. An option is to have a mixed approach with a combination of

58
more than one Master and Follower IEDs. It should be noted that failure of any particular
communication link automatically places the two IEDs concerned as Followers. Using this
approach, operation at the Follower ends is guaranteed, although with the signal propagation
delay because it is unlikely that all available Masters will be put out of operation by
communication link failures on different routes.

5.5 SWITCH ONTO FAULT PROTECTION

The switch-onto-fault (SOTF) function permits accelerated three-phase tripping, typically by
one of the distance protection zones or by a dedicated overcurrent element, for faults
detected on the entire line during line energization. Such faults are most typically due to the
failure to remove three-phase grounding clamps after maintenance work. SOTF tripping is
typically non-directional in order to ensure tripping for close-in three-phase faults, when there
may be insufficient measured or memory voltage for polarisation. The function must first
recognize the de-energized state of the line and then, on fault detection, rapidly trip the CB.
The de-energized state (or dead line condition) is typically detected using a combination of
the open status indication from the CB, no current and no voltage. Following a set delay after
de-energization, instantaneous three-phase tripping is permitted if either a manual closing
command (CBCloseCd) is detected (i.e. in advance of the actual energization), or the
conditions for de-energization (DeadLineCntr) are lost, as per Figure 5.15. The
instantaneous tripping permission expires following a set delay after energization.

DeadLineCntr

>1 0
CBCloseCd t InstTrip
&
DeadLineCntr

Figure 5.15 - SOTF Protection

The distance protection zone used with the SOTF function should extend to cover (i.e.
overreach) the entire line. If an overcurrent element is used, then the setting should be
sufficiently sensitive to overcome weak infeed from behind the protection location or high
resistance faults on the line. Typically, remote end CB closing should be blocked, via a
communications channel, for a SOTF detection at the end being initially closed.
When using quadrilateral (polygonal) distance protection characteristics, non-directional
zones are always available for use with the SOTF function. However, when using inherently
directional Mho distance characteristics, a non-directional offset Mho zone would be
required. In such a case, IEDs may use a UI level detector to initiate tripping in place of the
non-directional zone. The UI level detector works in such a way that if the current reaches a
set level and the voltage does not reach its set level within a certain settable duration after
closing the CB, the detector output is active to permit instantaneous tripping.
The SOTF can be activated by the following external and/or internal means:
• Manual close command to the CB.
• CB N/C contacts.
• Internal dead line detection (DLD).
• Autoreclose command.
For single breaker installations like Single or Double Busbar substations, the manual close
command is a recommended external activation. The use of CB N/C contacts is only
recommended as a supervisory condition for the manual close command in control schemes
where the close command is given through auxiliary relays which may remain picked up and
therefore would not accurately simulate a close command from timing perspectives. The

59
internal dead line detection is always a recommended choice irrespective of external
activation provided that the VT is on the line side of the CB.
Activation of SOTF by an AR close command, where three-phase DLD is not available (e.g.
at a line-end where the AR operates in synchrocheck (SC) mode), permits rapid tripping for
permanent faults near that end of a line, as per Figure 5.16. In such cases, AR at the other
line-end would operate in a voltage check (VC) mode.

SC VC

Ph-Ph

Figure 5.16 – AR (in synchro

synchro and voltage check modes) activation of SOTF

If SOTF activation by internal single-phase DLD is not available, and where AR with zone
extension is used, then activation by the AR close command permits rapid tripping for
permanent ground faults near one end of the line, as per Figure 5.17.

Zone Ext. On

Ph-E

Figure 5.17 – AR (with zone extension) activation of SOTF

AR close command activation of SOTF may also reduce the CT sizing requirements by
accelerating tripping for a reclose onto a permanent fault that had caused CT saturation due
to DC offset and remanence at the first fault occurrence. The reduced current due to
saturation would cause the distance protection function to underreach for fault on the line,
but an overreaching non-directional zone would likely trip. A zone with longer reach would
certainly be more useful but it would also increase SOTF coverage into adjacent lines.
Alternatively, a slightly overreaching zone (e.g. zone 2) would still trip but perhaps somewhat
delayed until the CT could produce the necessary current.
In two-breaker installations such as breaker-and-a-half or ring-busbars, external activation is
not recommended because intricate logics and extensive wiring is necessary to have a fool-
proof scheme. The problem can be visualised by assuming a line already in service in a
breaker-and-a-half diameter. If the second line of the diameter is to be energized with the
common CB; switching onto a fault would also trip the healthy line due to the non-directional
zone. Hence, manual close commands and CB contacts must be carefully configured to
prevent maloperation. Internal DLD activation is the recommended choice and it works
correctly irrespective of whether the VT is on the Line or Stub side. This is because the CBs
for a line must be opened before the line isolator is closed thereby rendering the line dead
and activating the SOTF feature. AR close command activation is always recommended
provided that three-phase and single-phase DLD are not available for internal activation. In
such installations, the distance protection should be blocked by the line isolator open status
indication because the distance protection would be prone to maloperate for SOTF for an
external fault when the VT is on the line side.
When SOTF is active in AR schemes with Zone Extension, care should be taken to ensure
that the SOTF trip does not issue upon reclosing onto a permanent fault on the adjacent line
within the coverage of the overreaching zone.
In Figure 5.18, both CBs C and A would trip for a phase fault on an adjacent line. At end A,
the SOTF sees a three-phase DLD. Upon reclosing onto permanent fault, CB A trips again.
This may also arise in radial feeder installations. Therefore, the reach of the SOTF must be

60
reduced upon reclosing. Special logics may be applied to release tripping by Zone 1 non-
directional rather than the usual Zone 2. However, if Zone 2 non-directional persists after a
settable time, then it should trip as backup protection for faults on the adjacent line.

VC SC

A B C
Ph-Ph

Open

Figure 5.18 –SOTF and faults on adjacent lines

5.6 TELEPROTECTION FUNCTIONS

5.6.1 GENERAL
Distance or overcurrent protection elements must be time-graded with other downstream
protection in order to achieve selective clearance of faults. Where stand-alone protection is
applied; the contribution to a line-end fault will tend to be cleared without delay by the
protection at the faulted end, however, the protection at the opposite end will clear the
contribution from that end, necessarily, with a coordinating time delay. Where a fault can be
unambiguously classified by the protection as internal to the line; non-delayed tripping by the
protection may take place for faults throughout the line. Furthermore, on interconnected
transmission networks, it is preferable that such non-delayed tripping should take place
simultaneously at both ends of the faulted line.
A variety of telecommunication assisted protection schemes have been developed which, in
their simplest forms, are invariably based on the exchange of a single bit of logical data
between the ends of a transmission line. This supplements the locally available data,
confirming that a fault detected by at least one end, is in fact internal to the line, such that
otherwise time-delayed operation may be accelerated.
Traditional teleprotection schemes were developed for use with, what may now be
considered ‘legacy’, power line carrier (PLC) equipment. This technology, which uses the
50/60 Hz voltage on the primary phase conductor as a signal carrier, has very limited
bandwidth and can be prone to low reliability due to interference and the necessity to ‘punch
through’ a fault on the carrier phase; a problem which is somewhat mitigated by the use of a
redundant path on a second phase conductor or via an independent feeder. The two main
categories of teleprotection scheme are “Blocking” and “Permissive” each of which is linked
with particular PLC technologies; namely direct-keyed (On/Off) amplitude modulated
channels or frequency-shift keyed audio tone frequency channels respectively (the latter with
a normally transmitted guard signal). “Unblocking” schemes are fundamentally “Permissive”
in nature, but include supplementary aspects of “Blocking” schemes. The chief consideration
when deciding which category of teleprotection to use is normally the preference or need of
the particular utility for either secure or dependable operation.
Where networks are robust with surplus interconnectivity, dependable “Blocking” schemes
will tend to dominate.
On networks with limited capacity, and where security against over-operation by the
protection is preferred; “Permissive” schemes will tend to be used. The general trend
worldwide towards maximised usage of network capacity is resulting in a general migration
towards permissive schemes.

61
The increasing availability of high speed, high security and high bandwidth media (e.g. direct
end-to-end fibre optic links or multiplexed SDH networks) offering the possibility of exchange
of comprehensive real-time measurement and status information between line ends, whilst
increasing the general use of transmission line differential protection, is also resulting in more
elaborate telecommunications assisted (rather than dependent) schemes. In the context of
modern digital communications, PLC technology related issues are no longer critical to the
decision as to which type of scheme to apply.
The teleprotection schemes applied to transmission lines typically supplement time graded
distance and ground fault overcurrent protection. Whereas the schemes described in the
following sections may also be applied more generally to phase overcurrent applications,
only their application to distance and ground fault overcurrent shall be presented.

5.6.2 PERMISSIVE TELEPROTECTION

Permissive schemes operate on the basis that the protection shall either operate in a normal
time graded manner, or not at all, unless supplementary information from the opposite line
end confirms that the fault is internal to the line, “permitting” accelerated tripping. Thus the
operation of such schemes may be described as characteristically “secure”.
Dependable communications channels are critical for such schemes and, as such, they are
not suited to use on “direct keyed” amplitude modulated PLC.
Permissive schemes are characterised by both an initial send criterion and an additional
tripping release criterion at the receiving end before accelerated tripping is permitted.
The principal permissive schemes are permissive underreach transfer tripping (PUTT); basic
directional comparison; permissive overreach transfer tripping (POTT); and directional
comparison unblocking (DCUB).

5.6.2.1 PERMISSIVE UNDERREACHING TRANSFER TRIPPING

A fault detected within a non-delayed underreaching (compared to the line length) distance
protection zone set “forwards” into the line, is definitively internal to the line; and the CB, local
to the protection, may be tripped without delay. PUTT uses fault detection of this
underreaching zone as the transmit criterion “permitting” the remote ends to trip.
If the protection at any of the remote ends receives the permissive transfer tripping command
and has also detected the fault, but within a time-delayed overreaching zone (set non-
directional or “forwards” into the line); then accelerated tripping is permitted at that end.
Thus, the maximum difference between tripping times at each end with a detectable fault
contribution, is the transmission delay from the sending to the receiving ends.
In the case of faults detected by the protection at only one end, but beyond the reach of the
underreaching zone; as may arise for faults at an open line-end, or an end with weak infeed;
no permissive transfer tripping command will be sent and the fault will only be cleared by a
time-graded overreaching zone.
Non-delayed tripping at the sending-end may prematurely terminate the permissive
command to the remote end prior to that end being released, due to slower or delayed
pickup of the function at that end due to weak infeeding or legacy technology. Therefore the
permissive command may be prolonged by a set delay.
The most significant modern refinement to this scheme is the ability to produce phase-
segregated permissive commands, for use with single pole tripping and auto-reclosing
schemes. The use of integrated telecommunications channels is ideally suited to cope with
the resulting increased data exchange; as compared with traditionally wired schemes where
the numbers of binary inputs, outputs, and dedicated communications channels required for
such a scheme would otherwise have been considered prohibitive.

62
 ZOR

t OR
pu T 0
ZOR ├──┤
≥1

ZUR &
Rx
t UR
pu T 0
ZUR ├──┤

Tx

t UR
Tx
pu T 0
ZUR ├──┤

ZUR Rx &
t OR
pu T 0 ≥1
ZOR ├──┤

ZOR

Figure 5.19 – Permissive Underreach Transfer Tripping

5.6.2.2 DIRECTIONAL COMPARISON

These schemes require that a forward directional (into the line) element be set at each end of
the line. When the devices at each end of the line see the fault as forward, it must therefore
be internal to the line, and non-delayed tripping may take place.
Dir

fwd
Dir

&
Rx
t P r ol
0 T &
├──┤
≥1 Tx

t P r ol ≥1 Tx
0 T
├──┤ &
Rx
&
Dir fwd

Dir

Figure 5.20 – Directional Comparison

63
There is a general preference, in distance protection IEDs, for applying this scheme using
directional overreaching zones, as per POTT and DCUB, rather than using a basic
directional fault detection element. This is chiefly because, in the case of communications
failure, the distance protection zones will default to operation after a suitable time delay,
whereas a basic directional element will not.
A typical application of basic directional comparison to transmission lines, is for protection
against high impedance ground faults which may arise on unshielded lines or where
particularly high tower footing resistances may be experienced. In such cases, distance
protection may not be sufficiently sensitive, and low-set directional ground fault overcurrent
protection is used.
It is presumed that the minimum operating quantities of the directional element, whether fixed
in the device or parameterised, will be sufficiently sensitive to permit fault detection along the
full length of the line.
Fault detection by the directional element is transmitted to each end. When all ends confirm
that the fault has been seen in the direction of the line, non-delayed tripping can take place.
Where only one end detects the fault, accelerated tripping will not take place unless
supplementary “echo” or “weak-end infeed” logic are applied, which may eliminate external
faults.
Non-delayed tripping at the sending-end by other protection functions may prematurely
terminate the directional command transmitted to the remote end prior to that end detecting
the fault, either due to slower or delayed pickup of the function at that end. Therefore, in the
event of a trip, the command may be prolonged by a set delay.
Phase selective tripping may be achieved by supplementing the function with faulted phase
selection logic which may be dedicated to the function or shared with other functions in the
device.

5.6.2.3 PERMISSIVE OVERREACH TRANSFER TRIPPING

This scheme requires that a forward directional (into the line) overreaching element,
necessarily time-delayed, be set at each end of the line. When the devices at all ends of the
line see the fault as forward, it must therefore be internal to the line and accelerated tripping
of the overreaching element may take place.
ZOR

t OR
pu T 0
ZOR ├──┤
≥1
&
Rx

Tx

Tx
Rx
&
t OR
T 0 ≥1
ZOR pu ├──┤

ZOR

Figure 5.21 – Permissive Overreach Transfer Tripping

64
Thus, when not otherwise supplemented by “echo” or “weak-end infeed” logic, accelerated
tripping requires that the forward overreaching elements at each end of the line must have
detected the fault.
IEDs can provide phase-segregated POTT schemes, for additional security where single-
pole tripping is required. Furthermore, supplementary logic, to account for conditions where
the overreaching elements at the receiving-ends may not have detected the fault but which
can otherwise confirm that the fault is internal by effectively eliminating external faults. This
logic is described below under “echo and weak-end infeed”.

5.6.2.4 DIRECTIONAL COMPARISON UNBLOCKING

This scheme was originally applied to frequency shift keyed PLC in circumstances where a
fault on the carrier phase can cause significant attenuation of the PLC signal. The scheme is
basically a POTT scheme supplemented with monitoring of the PLC guard channel, such that
a fault detection by the overreaching element, coincident with the absence of either a receive
signal or of the guard tone; is a sufficient condition to consider the fault to be internal to the
line, permitting accelerated tripping.
ZOR

t OR
pu T 0
ZOR ├──┤
≥1

Rx &
≥1
Comm s
Fa il Tx

Comm s
Fa il Tx
≥1
Rx &
t OR
T 0 ≥1
ZOR pu ├──┤

ZOR

Figure 5.22 – Directional Comparison Unblocking

5.6.2.5 ECHO AND WEAK-END-INFEED LOGIC

Basic overreaching schemes such as DC, POTT and DCUB will not, of themselves, achieve
accelerated fault clearance if the fault is not detected at one of the ends, either due to the CB
at that end being open; or due to there being little no fault contribution into that end.
If the CB status indication is monitored, a received permissive command may be “echoed”
back to the sending end without delay if the CB is open. This “echo” will then be seen as a
received permissive command at the original sending end, permitting accelerated tripping at
that end. Operation is delayed only by the transmission time delays along the outward and
return communications paths.
Network topology can result in significant differences between the fault contributions from
either end of the line for an internal fault on the line. Whereas this can result in failure to
detect the fault at that end, the definitively internal nature of the fault can nonetheless be
confirmed by eliminating the possibility that the fault is external. This requires the use of a
reverse directional element looking back through the busbar into the adjacent lines and
covering no less of those lines than the extent of overreach into those lines by the

65
overreaching protection function at the opposite end of the protected line. Thus, the received
permissive command from the strong infeeding end can be “echoed” back if there is no fault
detection by the reverse stage, or indeed by the forward overreaching stage, at the weak
end. The weak end would then otherwise have to wait until the strong end had tripped before
fault detection; however, an option of “echo and trip” at the weak end may be employed.
There is a risk with “echo and trip”, in particular with traditionally electrically wired
teleprotection schemes, that a spurious permissive receive command at one end would
cause it to echo and trip because of the lack of a fault detection in the reverse direction. The
“echoed” command would then result in an “echo and trip” at the other end. Therefore, the
“echo and trip” will normally be secured by an undervoltage supervision stage.
ZRev
ZOR

t OR
pu T 0
ZOR ├──┤
≥1
&
C B Ope n e c ho
& ≥1 Tx
pu
ZRev T 0 e c ho
"e c ho & trip"
& ├──┤
Rx

Rx T 0 e c ho
"e c ho & trip"
pu & ├──┤
ZRev
e c ho
& ≥1 Tx
C B Ope n

&
pu T 0 ≥1
ZOR ├──┤

ZOR

ZRev

Figure 5.23 – POTT with “echo” and “weak-

“weak-end infeed” logic

5.6.2.6 PERMISSIVE SCHEME CURRENT REVERSAL FUNCTIONALITY

When a fault occurs on one of a pair of parallel lines, the unfaulted line will see a through
fault contribution from the side with the stronger infeed. With one end seeing the fault in the
forward overreaching stage and the other end seeing the fault in the reverse stage; no
accelerated tripping will take place. If the CB at the weaker end of the faulted line is tripped
first (e.g. due to fault proximity to that end), during the time before the CB at the stronger
infeed side operates, a current reversal will be experienced on the unfaulted feeder. This will
be detected by the forward overreaching zone at the end which had previously seen the fault
in the reverse direction, which combined with basic prolongation of the original received
permissive command would result in an incorrect trip at that end. This scenario is prevented
by using a “transient block” for approximately 100 ms for the case of current reversal.

66
5.6.3 BLOCKING TELEPROTECTION
Blocking schemes operate on the basis that a fault detected by a time-delayed, but not time-
graded, overreaching zone set directional into the line; is assumed to be internal to the line
unless otherwise blocked by the device at the opposite end. The transmitted blocking
condition is that a fault external to the fault has been detected (i.e. by a reverse directional
stage extending further into the adjacent line than the forward overreaching zone from the
opposite end). The overreaching zone time delay is set only long enough to permit a blocking
signal to be generated at the remote end and transmitted. Whereas the blocking command is
used to prevent tripping, it is critical that the communications channel should be fast and
dependable.
ZRev

ZOR

t OR
T 0
ZOR ├──┤ &

Rx

ZRev Tx

ZRev Tx

Rx
t OR
T 0 &
ZOR ├──┤

ZOR

ZRev

Figure 5.24 – Directional Blocking

5.7 NON-COMMUNICATIONS BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES FOR PARALLEL LINES

Line differential protection remains the most selective form of protection for multiple circuit
line protection as it is immune to phenomena such as mutual coupling. Communications
requirements may be cost prohibitive and a solution with similar advantages as line
differential protection but without the communications requirements are advantageous. The
cross-differential scheme principle is illustrated below in Figure 5.25.

Figure 5.25 – Cross-

Cross-differential protection on double circuit line

67
The basic principle of the cross differential directional element is based on the calculation of
the amplitude of the differential current between the two lines to determine whether a fault is
internal or external and to select the faulted line.
As can be seen from Figure 5.26 under load conditions (and similarly for external fault
conditions) the difference between the currents in both circuits will be minimal; however, after
a fault occurs on one of the lines there will be a difference between the currents in the faulted
and the healthy circuit.
This technique offers a considerable benefit because, in most cases, it allows fast clearance
for faults on either of the lines. The instantaneous tripping zone covers a large section of
protected line with the remainder of the line covered by sequential tripping which is faster
than the Zone 2 distance operation.

Figure 5.26 - Operation of cross-

cross-differential protection for a fault in the middle of the line

When the difference between the sources at the two ends of the lines is very large, the
current amplitudes of both lines on the weak source end are similar, and cross differential
protection can not operate to clear the fault. In order to solve this problem, a method based
on superimposed currents is used.
When a fault occurs, a superimposed current will be produced, which can be defined as the
difference between the short circuit current and the pre-fault load current.
The top diagram in Figure 5.26 shows the currents of the two lines. The solid curve is the
phase current of the faulted line and the dashed curve is the phase current of the healthy
line. The middle and bottom diagrams in Figure 5.26 show the differential currents of the
double lines.
The middle and bottom traces in Figure 5.27 show the superimposed differential currents of
the two lines. The solid curve is the differential current and the dashed curve is the bias
current. The device will operate when the amplitude of the differential current is higher than
that of the bias current.

68
 Figure 5.27 - Operation of superimposed cross-
cross-differential protection for a mid-
mid-line fault

5.8 EFFECT OF INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMER TRANSIENTS ON PROTECTION FUNCTIONS

Current and voltage transducers provide instrument level signals to protective devices. The
accuracy and performance of a protective device is directly related to the steady-state and
transient performance of the instrument transformers. Protective devices are designed to
operate in a shorter time period than that of the transient disturbance during a system fault.
Large instrument transformer transient errors may delay or prevent protection operation. In
this section the effect of conventional instrument transformer transients on distance
protection elements, in particular, is discussed.

5.8.1 CURRENT TRANSFORMER (CT) TRANSIENTS

CTs use iron cores that can saturate symmetrically due to large symmetrical fault currents or
due to the prolonged presence of a DC component in the primary fault current. During
saturation, the CT operates in the nonlinear region of its excitation characteristic [9] and the
CT instantaneous current delivered to the protection device deviates in both magnitude and
shape from the current that actually flows in the power system. Operation in this region is
typically initiated by the following:
• Large, asymmetrical primary fault currents with a decaying DC component.
• Large, connected burden combined with high magnitudes of primary fault currents.
• Residual magnetism left in the core from an earlier asymmetrical fault or field-testing
if the CT has not been properly demagnetized.
The DC component can cause CT saturation in the first few cycles of the fault, and a long DC
time constant can cause CTs to saturate many cycles after a fault. The fidelity of the CT
transformation is reasonably good until saturation takes place. High-speed distance
protection IEDs may operate before CT saturation occurs. Figure 5.28 shows a simplified CT
equivalent circuit that can be used for a simplified transient analysis.
1:n

ip(t) + is(t) ib(t) +

ES Lm VS Rb
– im(t) –

Figure 5.28 - Simplified CT-

CT-equivalent circuit

69
Equation 5.16 gives the instantaneous CT secondary current, is(t), as the sum of the
instantaneous burden, ib(t), and the magnetizing currents, im(t).
i s (t ) = i m (t ) + i b (t ) (5.16)
The CT steady-state magnetizing current is very small while the CT operates in its linear
region. If the exciting current is assumed to be negligible, then the burden current, ib(t), is a
replica of the primary current adjusted by the CT ratio. When the CT is forced to operate in
its nonlinear region, the magnetizing current can be very large due to a significant reduction
of the value of the saturable magnetizing inductance. The magnetizing current, which can be
considered as an error current, subtracts from is(t) and drastically affects the current seen by
the connected burden on the CT secondary winding.

5.8.2 EFFECT OF CT SATURATION ON DISTANCE PROTECTION ELEMENTS

Numerical mho-type distance elements operating and polarizing vector quantities have been
implemented as discussed in [10].
SOP = r • Z1 • I R − VR (5.17)

S POL = VPOL
VR and IR are the voltage and current corresponding to a particular impedance loop, Z1 is
the positive sequence line impedance, r is the per-unit mho element reach (e.g. 0.8 or 80%
of the line), and VPOL is the polarizing voltage, consisting of the memorized positive
sequence phasor [10]. A fault is detected inside the mho element with reach r when the
scalar product between the two vectors is positive (i.e. the angle difference between SOP and
SPOL is less than 90°), as in (5.18):
(
real (r • Z1 • I R − VR ) • VPOL ∗ ≥ 0 ) (5.18)
For a forward fault, this is equivalent to the reach r being greater than a distance m, as in
(5.19):
(
real VR • VPOL
∗
)
r≥m=
(
real Z1 • I R • VPOL
∗
) (5.19)

If CT saturation occurs in one of the currents involved in the impedance loop, the magnitude
of IR reduces, and m has a higher value than ideal. From this, it can be inferred that a mho
element will underreach during CT saturation.
Consider an A-phase fault on a 500 kV line (Z1 = 75 ∠ 86° and Z0 = 300 ∠ 75° Ω). The fault
occurs at 0.1 s at a distance 33% along the line from the protection. As shown in Figure 5.30,
m corresponding to a normal fault current settles to 0.33, as expected. For a saturated A-
phase current (solid line in Figure 5.29), the calculated distance m value crosses the unity
line with a half-cycle delay and settles around 0.45 because the current remains in a
saturated state.
5
Saturated
Calculated m

2.5

0
Nonsaturated
–2.5

–5
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Time (s)

Figure 5.29 - Saturated and normal currents

70
 1

0.75
Saturated

Calculated m
0.5

0.25
Nonsaturated

0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Time (s)

Figure 5.30 - Calculated distance m values with normal and saturated currents

Figure 5.31 shows another method of visualizing distance protection underreach due to CT
saturation. Figure 5.31 shows the phasor diagram of the operating and polarizing vector
quantities for a fault on the boundary of a self-polarizing mho distance element with reach r.
As the CT saturates, the magnitude of IR decreases and its angle advances (this effect is
shown as dashed lines in Figure 5.31). This causes the dV phasor to rotate
counterclockwise, resulting in underreach.

r • Z1 • IR dV = r • Z1 • IR – VR

Theta

VR = VPOL

IR = Relay Current
Z1 = Replica Line Impedance
VR = Relay Voltage
VPOL = Polarizing Voltage
IR Theta = Angle Between VPOL and dV

Figure 5.31 - Mho element phasor diagram showing how CT saturation causes underreach

The possible impact of CT saturation on distance elements is a minor delay of the

corresponding Zone 1 element (assuming the CT does not remain in saturation). The
likelihood of Zone 1 underreach increases as fault locations near the zone reach. However,
with moderate length lines, as the fault location approaches the zone reach, the fault current
magnitude decreases and reduces the chances of CT saturation. For larger reach Zone 2 or
Zone 3 elements, particularly in communications-assisted schemes (POTT, DCUB, etc.), CT
saturation has a limited impact on the final result, aside from a slight tripping delay.

5.8.3 EFFECT OF CT SATURATION ON LINE DIFFERENTIAL ELEMENTS

Figure 5.32 shows the results of two different, yet secure, line differential protection schemes
for an out-of-section fault with CT saturation [11]. The complex plane shown is called the
Alpha Plane. The cluster of points connected by a solid line represents the calculated ratio of
IR/IL progressing in time with IR being heavily saturated (IR = remote device current, IL = local
device current).

71
 Figure 5.32 - Alpha Plane (IR/IL) plots of Alpha Plane and conventional differential characteristics

Both of the currents used are from 16 samples-per-cycle cosine filters. Without CT saturation
the locus of the calculated ratio of IR/IL would be at the –1 point on the Alpha Plane,
assuming negligible line-charging current. The circular characteristic shown is the
representation of a slope characteristic on the Alpha Plane, corresponding to the
conventional biased differential criterion (5.20).(Figure 5.10)
IL + IR > K • ( IL + IR ) (5.20)

The slope value in the conventional differential protection is selected such that the operating
characteristic encloses all of the cluster of points where the difference current is above the
minimum value. It should be noted that the Alpha Plane Differential element restraint region
covers less area along the negative real axis than the conventional slope methodology, yet
both methods achieve the same security for CT saturation. The Alpha Plane Differential can
sustain a very high level of external CT saturation by increasing both the radius, R, value and
the angle, a, (up to 180º) [11].

5.8.4 EFFECT OF CT SUBSIDENCE CURRENT ON CB FAILURE PROTECTION ELEMENTS

Whereas CB failure (CBF) operations affect many CBs, the speed with which a CBF device
or scheme operates must be balanced with the need for secure CB failure declarations. This
balance is particularly important in EHV lines where stability of the power system is critical.
Therefore, CBF overcurrent elements must display fast pickup and dropout times.
When the CB interrupts the primary fault current, i.e. the CB poles open, the CT secondary
current output does not immediately go to zero. Trapped magnetic energy in the CT
excitation branch produces a unipolar decaying current with a long time constant, known as
subsidence current, which flows through the CT burden (Figure 5.33).
Subsidence current can have a detrimental impact on CBF protection which requires rapid
dropout of its overcurrent element to reset. The effect of this current may be to create
artificial phasor magnitudes that are large enough to prevent proper detection of the ac
primary current interruption. This may delay the dropout of the CBF overcurrent element by
some fraction of a cycle, necessitating longer coordination intervals in the CBF logic to
preserve scheme security.

72
 100

80

ratio current
ratio current
60

40

Current
CT
CT secondary
secondary current
current
20
breaker
breakerpole
poleopens
opens
0

subsidence
-20

-40
0 1 2 3 4 5
Time

Figure 5.33 - Subsidence current from a CT output after the CB poles open

Figure 5.34 compares the dropout time of a half-cycle cosine filter CBF overcurrent element
(50FT) with that of an enhanced subsidence detection CBF protection element (OPHA). The
OPHA element asserts approximately 7 ms before the already rapid dropout 50FT element.
CBF overcurrent elements must cope with CT subsidence current. IEDs employ logic to
detect the CT subsidence current, thereby speeding up the detection of overcurrent element
dropout as shown by logic point OPHA in Figure 5.34.

OPHA

TIME

50FT

TIME

Figure 5.34 - Half-

Half-cycle cosine filter (50BF) dropout and subsidence detection CBF element (OPHA)

5.8.5 CAPACITOR VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER TRANSIENTS

Capacitor voltage transformers (CVTs) are widely used in HV power systems. Figure 5.35
shows a typical circuit diagram of a CVT. Capacitors C1 and C2 are used as a voltage divider
to step down the line voltage before it is applied to a wound step-down voltage transformer
(SDT) via a tuning reactor, LTR.
Ferroresonance is possible in any system composed of capacitors and iron-core
inductances. In a CVT, the interaction of the source capacitance with the tuning reactor
inductance and the SDT magnetizing inductance may lead to a ferroresonant oscillation.

73
 Line Voltage

C1 Gap RR

LTR
CF LF B
Gap Step-Down u
C2 Voltage r
d
Transformer e
CA RA RF n
n:1

Figure 5.35 - CVT circuit

CVT manufacturers use ferroresonance-suppression circuits (FSCs) to reduce or eliminate

ferroresonance. One such FSC device is shown connected at the secondary winding of the
SDT in Figure 5.35. The capacitor CF in parallel with LF forms a high-impedance parallel
resonant circuit tuned at the fundamental frequency. At harmonic or sub-harmonic
frequencies, the FSC impedance drops off sharply, leaving only the damping resistor, RF, in
the circuit. This is an active type of FSC.
A passive FSC design uses passive elements to suppress the ferroresonant oscillations. The
passive FSC design has a permanently connected resistor, RF, in series with a saturable
inductor, LF, and an air-gap loading resistor, R. Under normal operating conditions, the
secondary voltage is not sufficient high to flash across the air gap, and the loading resistor
has no effect on the CVT output.
Many CVT components and system conditions affect the CVT transient performance.
• High or extra-high capacitance CVTs, higher STD ratios, and CVTs with passive
FSCs display better transient response.
• Small resistive burden, found in IEDs, further improves the CVT transient response.
• A higher SIR results in more severe CVT transients for faults at the same location.
• Fault initiation angle influences the shape of CVT transients. The CVT transient is
more severe for faults at a voltage zero crossing.

5.8.6 EFFECT OF CVT TRANSIENTS ON DISTANCE PROTECTION ELEMENTS

CVT transients reduce the fundamental component of the fault voltage and cause distance
protection devices to calculate a smaller than actual apparent impedance to the fault. Figure
5.36 shows the fundamental frequency magnitude of a CVT secondary voltage as compared
with the ideal ratio voltage. Figure 5.37 shows two apparent impedance loci of an end-of-line
fault calculated from the ideal ratio voltage and the CVT secondary voltage.

74
 60
CVT Transient
40

20

Wave
0

–20
Ratio Voltage
–40

–60

–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

10

Ratio Voltage
8
Magnitude

2
CVT Output
0
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Time (cycle)

Figure 5.36 - CVT transients

transients reduce the fundamental voltage magnitude

2.5

2
Apparent Impedance From
Ratio Voltage

1.5
X-Ohm

Apparent Impedance
From CVT Output
0.5

Relay Protection Region

0
–0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
R-Ohm

Figure 5.37 - Overreach due to CVT transients

5.8.7 BUSHING POTENTIAL DEVICE TRANSIENTS

Bushing potential devices (BPD) are another voltage input source for protective devices. The
BPD uses the capacitance coupling of a specially constructed bushing of a CB or a
transformer to reduce the primary system voltage to a medium voltage level, e.g. 4 kV, which
is applied to a SDT to produce the secondary voltages that are applied to protective devices.
BPDs produce a similar transient response to that of a CVT during a system fault. However,
the BPD transient response is more dependent on the secondary connected burden because
BPDs employ a low SDT ratio. A high inductive burden significantly increases the amount
and duration of the transient error [12].

75
The parameters that affect the BPD transient response are:
• Burden – inductive burdens result in worst transient performance.
• Transformer ratio – a low step-down transformer ratio results in a larger burden effect
and produces greater transient error.
• Power factor adjustment – compensating for any lagging power factor burden
improves the transient performance.
• Busbar voltage dip – the transient error is proportional to the change in busbar
voltage caused by a fault. Therefore, high SIRs result in large voltage changes and
transient error at distance Zone 1 boundary faults.
BPD transient response may cause distance protection underreaching or overreaching
depending on the connected burden. Figure 5.38 and Figure 5.39 illustrate an underreaching
effect when the connected BPD burden consists of both electromechanical and numerical
devices (10 Ω at 65% power factor). The protected line is 65km long with an SIR ratio of 5.8
with a ground fault 64% along the line from the protection location. The large and slow
decaying transient causes distance protection to underreach as shown in Figure 5.39 [12].
C-Phase Voltage and Current
100

50
Voltage

–50

–100
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

10

5
Current

–5

–10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Cycle

Figure 5.38 - Voltage and current for a C-

C-phase fault at 64% of line length

C-Phase Apparent Impedance

18

16

14

12

10
Im-Ohm

–4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Re-Ohm

Figure 5.39 - Apparent impedance seen by the distance protection for the fault at 64%
64% along the
the line

76
5.8.8 MITIGATION OF CVT AND BPD SUBSIDENCE TRANSIENT
CVT and BPD subsidence transients result in a reduction of the fundamental voltage for a
few cycles. This reduction will result in a distance protection Zone 1 overreach for remote
terminal faults. The preferred mitigation depends on the fault clearing requirements of the
transmission system. If the system can tolerate a few cycles for fault detection, then the Zone
1 output should be time-delayed by up to two cycles. However, for systems with stringent
fault clearing times, the Zone 1 relay reach should be reduced based on the chart shown in
Figure 5.40, which is obtained using typical passive and active CVTs with a resistive burden,
representative of the load of modern IEDs and meters.
1

0.9
Passive
CCVT
0.8
Max. Zone 1 Reach Setting (pu)

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3
Active
CCVT
0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
SIR

Figure 5.40 - Distance protection performance as a function of SIR

5.8.9 CVT TRANSIENT DETECTION METHODS

Protection device manufacturers have invented many solutions to cope with the CVT
transient problem. These solutions include narrow band-pass filtering of the voltage (which
effectively adds a delay), reducing distance zone reach, and directly delaying the distance
protection tripping decision when a CVT transient condition is detected. All of these solutions
have their inherent disadvantages.
Reference [11] describes a solution that prevents distance relay CVT transient overreach.
The SIR is estimated from the fault voltage and current, and when this value is high, which
may cause a distance Zone 1 to overreach, a time delay is added to the instantaneous
tripping distance elements. The smoothness of the apparent fault impedance is then closely
monitored to detect any CVT transient signatures. Therefore, on the detection of a high SIR,
the relay applies the Zone 1 delay and monitors the voltage transient. If the transient
signature is small and does not indicate overreach, the time delay is quickly removed to allow
a quicker operation of the elements. The logic adapts to the quality of the CVT used and only
adds time delay when necessary.
Figure 5.41 shows an end-of-line BC phase-to-phase fault. A non-delayed Zone 1 protection
element is set at 85% of line length. The digital element plot shows that the Zone 1 element
would pick up because of the CVT transients; however, the CVT transient detection logic
successfully detects the overreach condition and blocks the Zone 1 element. This logic
overcomes the undesirable delay aspect by detecting when the CVT transient is complete
and removes the Zone 1 element block.

77
 100
50

Voltage
0
–50
–100
4 6 8 10 12 14 16

10
5
Current

0
–5
–10
4 6 8 10 12 14 16

6
Digital Element

Zone 2 Pickup
4
Zone 1 Pickup
2

CVT Transient
0
4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Time (Cycle)

Figure 5.41 - CVT transient

transient detection logic prevents distance protection Zone 1 from overreaching

5.8.10 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, distance protection Zone 1 elements exhibit a minor tripping delay and a
potential underreach for faults near the zone reach point due to CT saturation. In general,
faults near the reach point display a reduced current magnitude if the CT saturates.
However, the likelihood of CT saturation near the reach point is much smaller than for faults
occurring near the protection location. CT saturation has a limited impact, aside from a slight
tripping delay, on longer set Zone 2 and Zone 3 distance elements. However, Zone 2
distance protection settings may have to be adjusted for this potential underreach.
CVT and BPD transients reduce the fundamental component of fault voltage and can cause
overreach of Zone 1 distance protection elements. High BPD electromechanical relay
burdens can cause large magnitude and slow decaying BPD transients that result in distance
zone underreaching. Elements fitted with CVT transient detection logic may introduce a slight
(but necessary) tripping delay; however, they exhibit greater security for faults near the
protection reach point.

5.9 REFERENCES
[1] D. Hou, A. Guzmán, and J. B. Roberts, “Innovative Solutions Improve Transmission
Line Protection,” in 1997 24th Western Protective Relay Conference Proceedings.
[2] CIGRÉ SC 34 WG-04 “Application guide on protection of complex network
configurations”, 1992.
[3] K. Faye-Hansen and G. Harlow, Merz-Price Protective Gear, IEE Proceedings, 1911.
[4] J. Roberts, D. A. Tziouvaras, G. Benmouyal, and H. Altuve, “The Effect of
Multiprinciple Line Protection on Dependability and Security,” 54th Annual
Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, Texas A&M University, College Station,
Texas, USA, April 2001.
[5] T. Kase and G. Baber, “Advanced Techniques for Current Differential Feeder
Protection”, CIGRÉ SC B5 Colloquium, Madrid, Spain, October 2007.
[6] H. Altuve, G. Benmouyal, J. Roberts, and D. A. Tziouvaras, “Transmission Line
Differential Protection with an Enhanced Characteristic,” 8th International Conference

78
 on Developments in Power System Protection, IEE Conference Publication 500, Vol.
2, April 2004, pp 414 – 419.
[7] Ernst, L. J., Hinman, W. L., Quam, D. H., and Thorp, J. S., “Charge Comparison
Protection of Transmission Lines – Relaying Concepts,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery, Vol. 7, No 4, October 1992, pp. 1834-1852.
[8] D. L. Mills, “Internet Time Synchronization: The Network Time Protocol,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, vol. 39, no. 10, pp.1482-1492, Oct. 1991.
[9] IEEE PSRC Report, “Transient Response of Current Transformers,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 96, No. 6, 1977, pp. 1809–
1814.
[10] E. O. Schweitzer III and J. Roberts, “Distance Relay Element Design,” Paper
presented at 19th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, 1992.
[11] D. Tziouvaras et al., “The Effect of Conventional Instrument Transformer Transients
on Numerical Relay Elements,” Paper presented at 28th Annual Western Protective
Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, 2001.
[12] D. Angell and D. Hou, “Input Source Error Concerns for Protective Relays,” Paper
presented at 33rd Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA,
2006.

79
6 CONTROL FUNCTIONS

6.1 AUTOMATIC RECLOSING

6.1.1 INTRODUCTION
Automatic reclosing (AR) systems are intended to re-energize and restore the faulted section
of the transmission system once the fault is extinguished (providing it is a transient fault). For
certain transmission systems, reclosing is used to improve system stability by restoring
critical transmission paths as soon as possible [1].Fault statistics indicate about 4-10 faults
per 100 km per year for EHV (220-400 kV) overhead lines, of which 85-95% of them are
transient and the line can be re-energized.Tripping for transient faults on transmission lines,
caused by lightning or temporary contact with foreign objects, may be followed by re-
energization of the line after a short interruption period, known as the dead time. The dead
time should be long enough to allow the arc to fully extinguish, in order to prevent re-striking
on re-energization; but not so long that system stability or synchronism would be
jeopardized.
A typical example of an AR cycle for a transient fault is given in Figure 6.1.

Successful re-close
Protection reset
Protection trip
Fault instant

Closed
CB
Open
AR close command
Arc extinguished

CB closed

AR ready
CB open
Start AR

Fault duration Dead time

t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t10 t
AR function AR dead time setting Reclaim time

Figure 6.1 – AR single shot cycle for a transient fault

Permanent faults must be located and repaired before the line can be returned to service.
Common permanent faults include broken conductors contacting the ground; foreign objects
accidentally placed between the live phases; and faults on underground cable sections of the
transmission line.

80
A typical example of an AR cycle for a permanent fault is given in Figure 6.2.

Re-close onto fault

Protection reset

Protection reset
Protection trip

Protection trip
Fault instant

Closed
CB
Open

CB open, arc extinguished

AR close command
Arc extinguished

CB closed

AR ready
CB open
Start AR

Fault duration Dead time Fault duration

t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t
AR function AR dead time setting Reclaim time

Figure 6.2 - AR single shot cycle for a permanent fault

From the above figures some important auto-reclosing scheme parameters can be identified,
namely the fault duration, the dead time for the system or for the AR function, the de-
ionisation time, the arcing time, the opening time and the reclaim time and number of shots.

6.1.2 BASIC PARAMETERS OF AN AUTO-RECLOSING SCHEME

The fault duration

Fault duration (t3-t0 in the Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2) is the time delay between the fault
instant and the moment when the CB is opened and arcing is extinguished. It consists of the
operating time delay of the protection function (t1-t0), the CB opening time until the contacts
separate (t2-t0), and the arcing time (t3-t2). It should be noted that the protection function may
reset some time latter (t4-t3).

Dead Times
The system dead time is the time delay between the moment when the arc is extinguished
and the moment when the CB contacts are again closed (t6-t3).
The AR dead time is the time delay between the moment when the AR function is started
and the moment when the IED closes its output contacts and energises the closing coil of the
CB (t5-t1). The point at which the AR is considered to start will vary between manufacturers,
and may start at the instant the original trip command is issued or when the CB auxiliary
contacts provide an open status indication. However, for modern CBs and high-speed AR

81
(i.e. dead times within one second); the AR dead time is approximately the same as the
system dead time.
The dead time setting depends on the voltage level and should allow for complete de-
ionisation of the arc to prevent re-striking of the arc on closing. Furthermore, the tripping
mode, whether single-pole or three-pole will also influence the dead time. Usually the dead
time for single-pole tripping is greater than that for three-pole tripping to cope with the mutual
coupling with the remaining energised phases and also because loss of synchronism is less
likely during single-pole tripping.
In the case of three-pole AR, there are separate requirements for high-speed AR and slow or
delayed AR. Whereas high-speed AR is often applied without synchrocheck; slow AR is only
permitted if synchrocheck conditions are fulfilled. Accordingly, IEDs have different dead time
settings for these two applications. Furthermore, a separate start input may be used to permit
three-pole high speed AR without applying synchrocheck conditions.
During an additional timer after the dead time, the synchronism conditions, as appropriate,
are checked. Failure to meet the conditions results in blocking of the AR cycle. This timer
helps to maintain uniform dead time settings at either end of a line, irrespective of the end
being subject to dead-line or synchrocheck conditions. The timer setting must be long
enough to overcome a possible power swing on reclosing at one end after a line fault.

The Reclaim Time

The reclaim time is the time delay following the moment when the AR function issues the re-
closing command and the moment when the AR function resets, ready for a new cycle
(t10-t5). The reclaim time should be sufficiently long to allow the CB operating mechanism to
reset and to prepare for another reclosing cycle.

The Number of Shots

Whereas an AR operating sequence that provides only one reclosing command is referred to
as “single-shot”; “multi-shot” AR refers to a sequence of reclosing commands.
Single-shot AR is normally applied to transmission lines. Thus it prevents repeated reclosing
onto faults with relatively high current levels that may endanger system stability.
Furthermore, there is a low probability of successful reclosure after more than one attempt in
such cases. In the case of permanent faults with single-shot AR, the sequence is trip,
automatic reclose and final three-pole trip.
In some systems, a two-shot AR is used where the first shot has a short dead time followed
by a second shot with a longer dead time. On sub-transmission and distribution lines, multi-
shot AR is more common due to the lower probability of losing system stability.
Limiting the number of reclosing attempts also reduces the number of voltage dips which
customers are subjected to, thereby improving quality of supply.

Closing pulse duration

The closing command pulse duration allows the CB to properly energise its internal relays
and execute the command. Common settings are 0.1 to 0.2 s. Other devices maintain the
closing pulse until the auxiliary contacts of the CB confirm the close position.
In CBs without an anti-pumping feature, features exist to cut the pulse duration upon receipt
of a new trip command after reclosing.

82
6.1.3 AR OPERATING MODE
It is a common requirement that the AR function shall provide single-pole and three-pole AR
and a mode selector. In systems where two pole tripping is permitted, two-pole AR is also
required.
When the single-pole (only) mode is selected, single-phase-to-ground faults result in tripping
of only the faulted phase, followed by AR. Multi-phase faults result in final three-pole trips
without AR.
Selecting the three-pole (only) mode results in a three-pole trip for any fault type and a three-
pole AR which may, as appropriate, be subject to synchrocheck conditions.
In the combined single and three-pole mode, a single-phase-to-ground fault results a single-
pole trip and AR without any control condition; and a multi-phase fault results a three-pole
trip and three-pole AR which may, as appropriate, be subject to synchrocheck conditions.
Operating requirements may limit the number of shots for certain types of faults to one, while
allowing multiple shots for other types of faults. An example is the combined single and
three-pole mode where multiple single-pole shots may be allowed, but with only one shot
allowed for a three-phase fault.

6.1.3.1 SINGLE-POLE AUTO-RECLOSING

Single-phase tripping is the least damaging to the power system and the most common. The
advantages are related to the fact that this type of tripping allows power transfer over the two
remaining phases and has a lower impact on stability.
One of the disadvantages is that more complex protection is required in order to distinguish
between single-phase-to-ground and multiphase faults. IEDs can generally deal with this
problem without additional hardware. Furthermore, during the open pole period, unbalanced
currents appear, so that preventative measures must be taken to avoid maloperation of
functions based on zero or negative sequence currents.
Single-phase-to-ground faults are identified using phase selector functions. Some such
functions are based on an angle check between the zero or positive sequence (without load)
currents and the negative-sequence current. The protection needs to detect multiphase-
faults during the open pole period. Therefore, it is common practice that the output of the
fault selector is cancelled during the open pole condition or that its performance be modified.
IEDs may also include other algorithms to avoid overreaching by the leading phase-to-
ground loop for some phase-phase-to-ground faults.
IEDs permit not only the selection of the protection functions that are going to start AR, but
also to predefine the behaviour of the AR functions depending on the type of fault. Taking
advantage of this capability and knowing that the majority of extinguishable faults are single-
phase-to-ground faults, the users can improve the selectivity of the AR scheme and
minimizing the damage to the system for closing onto permanent faults.
In single-pole (only) operating mode, AR is allowed only for single-phase-to-ground faults,
and multi-phase faults result in a final three-pole trip. Thus, both ends of the transmission line
remain connected by two phases improving system stability. However, the induced voltage
from the other two energised phases and certain environmental conditions could lead to a
continued secondary arc, resulting in a failure of the AR cycle. Hence, setting of single-pole
dead times on long transmission lines requires some attention to manage such conditions.
An example of a single-pole AR is shown in Figure 6.3. The tripping command is single-pole
and after the dead time expires the reclosing command is performed without any additional
conditions. It is common to use the same dead time setting for both line-ends, e.g. 1 s as in
this example.

83
 AR dead time

Figure 6.3 - Example of a single-

single-pole AR

6.1.3.2 THREE-POLE AUTO-RECLOSING

In this operating mode, any fault type results in a three-pole trip, which is then followed by
AR which may be either rapid AR (RAR) without any check conditions, or delayed AR (DAR)
which may be subject to dead-line or synchrocheck conditions.
Where AR with synchrocheck is applied, one end of the line must first reclose either rapidly
without any check condition, or subject to a dead-line condition. With the line voltage re-
established, the remaining line-ends may be reclosed with synchrocheck. This may require
staggered dead-time settings between ends; however, where a separate synchronisation
timer is available, uniform dead-time settings may be applied.
An example of a synchrocheck supervised three-pole AR is shown in Figure 6.4.

AR dead time

Figure 6.4 - Example of a three-

three-pole AR

84
6.1.3.3 PREPARE THREE POLE TRIP
In single or two-pole tripping applications, it may be necessary, in certain circumstances, to
trip three-pole. Some examples include when the AR function is disabled or blocked, or if a
new trip issues after the last programmed shot. The “prepare three pole trip” condition forces
all trips to issue as three-pole trips. For permanent faults, the time of release of the condition
is, in some AR functions, simultaneous with the close command of the last programmed shot.
If the device tripping function does not have a facility to trip three-pole for evolving faults,
then the AR function can help by releasing the condition for a short while after the protection
trip gets reset.

6.1.3.4 EVOLVING FAULTS

For the single-pole (only) AR mode, during the dead time it is possible to develop a second
fault on one of the healthy phases. The particular protection function issues a final three-pole
trip and a blocking condition for the AR function. If the combined single-pole and/or three-
pole mode is enabled, then the second fault is tripped three-pole, the three-pole dead time is
started and AR is permitted subject to synchrocheck conditions, as appropriate.
The response to an evolving fault during the single-pole dead time may be supervised by a
separate timer, such that if the second fault occurs before this timer elapses, three-pole
tripping and AR take place; however, if the fault occurs after the timer elapses, a final three-
pole trip issues.

6.1.4 CONTROL OF THE AR FUNCTION

6.1.4.1 AR START
AR is intended for the local line where a fault can be identified and tripped almost
simultaneously at the both line-ends. The types of protection functions that normally start AR
are Zone 1 and Carrier aided distance protection trips; weak-end infeed with echo logic trips;
and differential protection trips. Sometimes, directional ground fault and instantaneous phase
overcurrent protection are also required to activate AR. Proper phase selection is necessary
for single-pole reclosing.
When using instantaneous phase overcurrent protection to start AR, care should be taken to
ensure that the settings result in selective tripping. Upon loss of communications, it is
possible to automatically increase the dead time. This becomes necessary to allow the arc to
extinguish for a fault beyond Zone 1 from either end.
There are two basic methods to start AR. One is to start only for the protection functions
indicated above; the other is to start with a general fault detection and at the same time
ensure that only the intended type of trip actually starts the AR cycle. In the first case, AR is
started by the trip commands from the specific functions and the dead time starts
immediately. In the second case, if during a set time after the general start, no trip command
is registered, then the AR cycle is discontinued. This ensures that delayed trips do not start
AR. In either case, separate start commands are necessary to discriminate between using
single, two or three-pole dead times.
It should be noted that, whereas SOTF for a manual close should not start the AR cycle; a
SOTF trip upon a reclosing attempt should continue the AR cycle in multi-shot applications.
Hence in the first method, AR functions are provided with an input to start AR for a SOTF trip
but the input is only valid from the second AR shot and upwards. In the second method, an
additional input for SOTF trip is provided which conditionally blocks the cycle if the cycle has
not yet started. Upon manual close, a SOTF trip, being fast, will appear before the timer
elapses and blocks AR cycle which would have otherwise have appeared at the trip input.
Similarly for multi-shot AR, there is no problem since the cycle had already started.
As a precaution, all trips which should not be followed by AR should “inhibit” the function.

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6.1.4.2 AR BLOCKING
It may be necessary to block the AR cycle for internal or external conditions. Common
external conditions include blocking AR for a manual close command, or for trips from the
Busbar Protection or CB Failure Protection functions.
Internal AR blocking conditions include trips from time-delayed protection functions, SOTF
trips, and evolving faults following a single-pole trip.

6.1.4.3 CB READY PROCESSING

The AR function requires a fast open-close-open (O-C-O) operating cycle of the CB and
therefore the operating mechanism must be ready for such a duty. In the event of the
mechanism not being ready, the AR cycle should be blocked and protection functions should
issue final three-pole trip commands because an AR cycle cannot be completed. The “CB
ready” condition is dependent on the operating mechanism and could indicate a pressure
within the limits for a hydraulic mechanism, or a charged close-spring for a spring operating
mechanism. Normally, the “CB ready” condition is interrogated by the AR function at the
beginning of the AR cycle but, in some applications, also at the end of the cycle. Some AR
functions check both before and after. The two conditions of the CB are O-C-O and C-O.
Whereas the O-C-O condition must be fulfilled for the AR cycle to start; the C-O condition
must be fulfilled after the dead time.
An example of a CB duty cycle is O - 0.3 s – CO - 3 min - CO.
The AR shot 1 and shot 2 dead times must then be set > 0.3 s and > 3 min respectively.
Where only single-shot AR is required, the AR reclaim time must be > 3 min.
It should be noted that the “CB ready” condition may also influence the behaviour of the
distance protection zone extension because if the AR function is blocked, zone extension
must reset to the normal value to prevent inselective trips that can not be fixed through AR.

6.1.4.4 PROCESSING OF CB’S AUXILIARY CONTACTS

The position of the CB contacts is critical for the operating logic of the AR function. The CB
position indication is given by the CB’s auxiliary contacts and in many applications it is used
to block AR or to start the AR dead time. If the three poles of the CB are opened for more
than a certain time then, usually, the AR function is blocked and the CB is deemed to be out-
of-service to avoid an unwanted AR close command. In this case, the discrimination time
should avoid AR blocking during the three-pole dead time for three-pole AR. Some IEDs use
the three-poles-closed indication to enable the AR cycle rather than using the three-poles-
open indication. In the case of single-pole (only) AR, if the CB opens more than one pole,
then a three-pole trip is forced and the AR cycle is blocked, based on the position of the CB.
For the combined single and three-pole operation mode, a second trip command during the
dead time, meaning an evolving fault, switches over the single-pole dead time to the three-
pole dead time. Some applications require that, for evolving faults with the single-pole (only)
mode selected, the second trip command should be a final three-pole trip without AR.

6.1.4.5 HANDLING PERMANENT FAULTS

When re-closing the last programmed shot after an AR cycle onto a fault, or if a second fault
takes place during the reclaim time, this should result in a final three-pole trip and the
blocking of the AR function.

6.1.4.6 LOCKOUT STATUS.

If the reclose attempt is unsuccessful or blocked for some reason, then the AR function
switches over to the lockout status in some IEDs. The device may be reset from this state
either directly as an external operator command, or automatically by the manual close
command.

86
It is also possible to monitor an unsuccessful reclose attempt by checking the CB contacts
within a certain time after reclosing command is issued.

6.1.5 PROTECTION SCHEMES AND AUTO-RECLOSING

Internal (e.g. SOTF) or external (e.g. busbar and CB failure) protection functions may
influence the behaviour of the AR function.
Busbar faults are severe and dangerous faults that can influence system stability. In order to
rapidly and securely trip such faults, a busbar protection (BBP) device or scheme is used.
Trips issued from BBP should block all AR functions on all transmission lines connected to
the faulted busbar to avoid reclosing due to a subsequent fault in the grid. Usually the tripped
CBs are put into a lock-out position and a manual reset is required before they are allowed to
be closed.
Trip or current interruption failure of a CB is another dangerous fault that can affect system
stability. The CB failure protection is normally used as local backup for such faults. Tripping
by CBF protection should similarly block all AR functions on all transmission lines connected
to the busbar. If the AR close is routed through this close circuit interlock, then a block of AR
by BBP or CBF protections is only for additional safety.
It is desirable that the manual close command blocks the AR function to prevent an
unwanted reclose following a switch onto a fault. This is automatically inbuilt since the cycle
is blocked until the CB remains closed for a certain minimum time (typically 5 s). SOTF
tripping is also used to block AR depending on when it was issued as explained in the
section “AR Start” above. For additional safety, the manual close command may directly
block the AR function. Whilst blocked, tripping by any external or internal protection function
should be three-pole final tripping without AR.

6.1.6 SEQUENTIAL AUTO-RECLOSING FEATURES

In situations where two CBs at a local end are tripped and reclosed (e.g. breaker-and-a-half),
the CBs are typically reclosed in sequence to reduce the wear and tear on the second CB for
reclosing onto permanent faults (in particular where this is the common CB on a breaker-
and-a-half diameter). This requires an additional feature which delays the reclosing of the
second CB until the first CB has closed. This is done using an output “Delay Follower” or a
“Wait from Master” condition which picks up at the start of AR cycle of first CB and resets
after a set time delay after the closing command is issued to the first CB. This time delay is to
ascertain whether AR was successful or not. If the fault persists, the “AR Unsuccessful”
signal blocks the AR cycle of second CB. If the fault was transient, the second CB issues its
close command either immediately after release from the first CB or after its own set dead
time, in accordance with the design of the AR function itself.

6.1.7 ADAPTIVE AUTO-RECLOSING

Adaptive protection is defined “as a protection philosophy that permits and seeks to make
adjustments to various protection functions in order to make them more attune to prevailing
power system conditions” [2].
An adaptive relay (sic) is “a relay that can change its setting and/or relaying logic upon the
occurrence of some external signal or event” [1].
Examples of adaptive schemes are given in [3] and [4].
The powerful protection platforms of IEDs permit users to modify, by means of internal logics,
the predefined AR schemes in a reasonably easy way.
One approach is to use the status of external inputs or internal logic signals to control the
internal signals belonging to the AR function, modifying the behaviour of this algorithm. E.g.

87
some of these internal inputs may block the AR when active; block the reclaim timer when
active; enable three-pole or single-pole AR when active, etc.
The use of user-defined logics or other similar approaches permits the implementation of a
significant amount of adaptive schemes, some of which are described below:
• Block AR when a CB failure or trip circuit monitor alarm occurs.
• Block AR for multi-phase faults (IEDs typically include this feature).
• Change of setting group depending on the service history of the CB (e.g. inhibiting
AR if the CB has been used over an extended period of time.
• Change of setting group depending on the substation or network configuration (e.g.
automatic changeover of the AR “leader-follower” logic).
• General blocking of AR by any external condition.
More complicated algorithms have been proposed to improve the performance of AR as
follows:

Algorithms to distinguish between instant and permanent faults

One of these algorithms [5] uses voltage relationships during single-phase-to-ground faults to
decide if the fault is permanent. The AR function bases its decision on the output of this
algorithm. Some developments may be expected in this area to improve the selectivity of AR.

Detection of Fault Arc Status

IEDs perform the reclosing of the faulted phase within a set time delay after the faulted
phase is identified and opened from both sides by CBs with individual phase control. The
value of the time delay is set to guarantee secondary arc extinction before the faulted phase
is closed. If AR is successful, the line remains in service. If not, all three phases of the line
will be opened.
If the delay is significantly longer than the duration of arc self-extinction, the stability of the
power system may be affected. If the delay is shorter than the arc duration, the transmission
line undergoes a second fault with the additional negative impact on utility equipment and
power system stability.
One of the algorithms proposed to analyze the status of the secondary arc [6], specifically for
series compensated lines, is based on the measurement of voltage phase shift induced on
the faulted phase after the fault is cleared when there is no reactor on line compared with the
voltage characteristics when the line is compensated.

6.1.8 SYNCHRONISM CHECK

Synchronizing is the act of matching the magnitude and frequency of two systems and
bringing the two voltages into phase alignment. Failure to properly synchronize before
closing a CB can result in electrical and mechanical transients that can damage generators
adjacent to the OHL; the prime mover; the step-up transformer; and severely perturb the
power system.
The synchrocheck function provides a back-up protective function during both manual and
automatic synchronizing. It prevents any closure that is potentially damaging to the protected
object or the switching device. This function usually operates together with the integrated AR,
manual close, and CB control functions of the IED. It is also possible to employ an external
AR system. In such cases, signal exchange between the devices is accomplished via binary
inputs and outputs. When closing via the integrated control function, the configured
interlocking conditions must be verified before checking the synchronism conditions.

88
IEDs support algorithms which monitor the voltage and frequency conditions pertinent to safe
synchronization. The most important of these is the direct slip calculation. The following are
synchrocheck features offered by various IED manufacturers:
• Phase angle supervision.
• Slip frequency limitation (angle-time limit, minimum/maximum slip frequency limits,
i.e. direct slip measurement).
• Anticipatory close initiation.
• Minimum and maximum voltage limits.
• Maximum difference between voltages.
• Voltage (generator) priority check.
• VT phase angle compensation, voltage magnitude compensation and built-in dead
bus logic.
The synchrocheck function should be set within the limits recommended by the turbine-
generator manufacturer, by the relevant grid-code or in accordance with control centre
instructions. A typical recommendation might be for a maximum closing angle of ±10-30o, a
maximum voltage difference of 0 to +5% and a maximum slip of 0.067 Hz. In order to
optimize settings, minimum settings should be applied. Setting a 1.0º closure angle with a
max slip of 0.001 Hz would guarantee a failed synchronizing. The synchronizing conditions
are subject of a stability study. In order to facilitate closing at locations which are distant from
generation, many TSOs permit angle differences up to 60º.
The synchronism and voltage check function uses the feeder voltage (Uline) and the busbar
voltage (Ubus) for comparison purposes. The latter may be any convenient phase-to-earth or
phase-to-phase voltage derived from busbar VTs (Figure 6.5). If a power transformer is
located between the feeder VTs and the busbar VTs, its vector group can be compensated
for by the IED, so that no external matching transformers are necessary.
Voltages sup.
Bus Voltages sup.

Position, O-C-O
Bus Isolator status
B2, U nm

B1, U nm

Bkr. status
Close
Trip

Figure 6.5 – Synchronism check with alternative voltage sources

sources

89
The closing check procedure can be selected from the following operating modes:
• Release at synchronism, i.e. when the critical values of voltage, voltage difference,
frequency different and phase angle difference lie within the set points.
• Release for energized busbar and de-energized line.
• Release for de-energized busbar and energized line.
• Release for de-energized busbar and de-energized line.
• Release without any check.
There are two techniques to verify that a static or rotating phase angle is within a specified
limit. The phase angle/time comparison technique introduces an additional time delay but the
phase angle/slip technique does not. This latter technique takes into account the slip
frequency across the CB in order to optimise the timing of the close command (i.e. 0º). The
function continuously estimates the angle difference some ms later (i.e. to account for the CB
closing time) and tries to give the close permission when the estimation is near 0º (Figure
6.6).
U ma
x

U min

Figure 6.6 – Synchronism check operation

The release conditions can be configured separately for AR, manual closing, and closing via
control commands. E.g. manual and control closing can be allowed in cases of synchronism
or dead line, while, the AR can be subject to dead-line checking at one end before the AR
attempt and following a successful reclose at that end, synchrocheck at the other end.
IEDs incorporate synchronism units aimed at supervising the closing of the CBs in the
protected area. The integration of synchrocheck in the IED avoids the use of external wiring,
including digital inputs and outputs and analog signals from VTs.
IEDs can manage simultaneous synchronism between several voltage sources and the line
voltage, cooperating with complex AR schemes. When several CBs are operated by the AR
function (e.g. breaker-and-a-half or ring arrangements), it is necessary to have one
synchronism unit per CB, which may be integrated into a common IED.
Where alternative synchronising voltage sources are available, the IED may be programmed
to select the most convenient voltage source. Both the primary and alternative voltage
sources are necessarily wired to the device and, depending on an internal logic, the device
uses one of them to decide the close permission.
It is possible to use line and busbar voltages from different phases, compensating the
angular difference by means of device settings. Different VT ratios can similarly be
compensated for.

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6.2 POWER SWING BLOCKING AND OUT-OF-STEP FUNCTIONS

6.2.1 INTRODUCTION
Power swing is a variation in three phase power flow which occurs when the generator rotor
angles are advancing or retarding relative to each other in response to changes in load
magnitude and direction, line switching, loss of generation, faults, and other system
disturbances [7]. A power swing is considered stable if the generators, during a system
disturbance, do not slip poles and the system reaches a new state of equilibrium, i.e. an
acceptable operating condition. A power swing is considered unstable if a generator or a
group of generators slip poles for which some corrective action is necessary. Power swings
can considerably reduce the voltage at the line terminals, considerably increase line currents,
and slightly change frequency as measured. As a result power swings can pose both security
and dependability problems for many of the line protection functions.
During power swings, elevated currents and depressed voltages can resemble fault
conditions and therefore can jeopardize security of distance, undervoltage, and overcurrent
functions. Changes in frequency can reduce accuracy of polarization and directional methods
that rely on memorized values of the polarizing quantities. The performance of protective
relays that monitor power flows, voltages, and currents may respond to variations in system
voltages and currents and cause tripping of additional equipment, thereby weakening the
system and possibly leading to cascading outages and the shutdown of major portions of the
power system [8]. Protective relays prone to respond to power swings and may cause
undesired tripping of lines or other power system elements include overcurrent, directional
overcurrent, undervoltage, distance, and directional comparison systems. During power
swings many line protection functions could also experience decrease in their dependability
as compared with no-swing conditions. Security of some of the protection methods, such as
line current differential, is not affected by power swings.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the impedance trajectory during an unstable power swing. When the
impedance locus intersects the total system impedance line (in the R-X plane) the equivalent
source system voltages are 180º apart. This point in the network is called the electrical
centre of oscillation (ECO) of the system.

Figure 6.7 – Impedance trajectories during an unstable power swing

The philosophy of out-of-step (OOS) relaying is simple and straightforward: avoid tripping of
any power system element during stable swings and protect the power system during
unstable swings or OOS conditions. When two areas of a power system, or two
interconnected systems, lose synchronism, the areas must be separated from each other
quickly and automatically in order to avoid equipment damage and shutdown of major

91
portions of the power system [9]. Uncontrolled tripping of circuit breakers during an OOS
condition could cause equipment damage and pose a safety concern for utility personnel.
Therefore, a controlled tripping of certain power system elements is necessary in order to
prevent equipment damage, and widespread power outages, and minimize the effects of the
disturbance [8][9].

6.2.2 POWER SWING DETECTION

Traditional power swing detection methods respond to the rate of change of the apparent
impedance [7][8][9]. Faults result in sudden changes of the impedance while swings change
the apparent impedance at a relatively lower rate. Often, only the positive-sequence
apparent impedance is monitored by the power swing elements. The rate of impedance
change can be monitored by measuring the amount of time the impedance spends in pre-
defined areas of the impedance plane. These areas can be shaped as circular, rectangular
or resistive blinders [7]. In any case the most outer region used for swing detection should
not overlap with the load area, and the most inner region should safely encompass the
operating zone of the protection functions that use the power swing block signal for security.
For this reason the concentric shapes suit better applications with mho distance functions
and the rectangular shapes allow better coordination with quadrilateral distance functions.
The resistive blinder method does not limit the swing detection regions along the reactance
axis and for this reason it may be considered easier to apply.
The methods based on the pre-defined areas of the impedance plane can operate in two or
three steps. A two-step method declares a swing when the apparent impedance enters the
area between the outer and inner shapes and stays there for a pre-defined period of time (a
single-timer method). A three-step method increases security of power swing detection by
requiring the impedance to enter and stay in the area between the outer and middle shapes,
and subsequently move and stay between the middle and inner shapes (a two-timer
method). In this way a more accurate detection of the persistent and slow movement of the
apparent impedance is accomplished.
Classical power swing detection methods based on the pre-defined areas on the impedance
plane are affected by system impedances while the power swing phenomenon itself reflects
only interactions of the generator rotors. This dependence complicates settings of the power
swing elements. Proper application of the power swing elements requires dynamic system
models with properly selected contingencies in order to determine possible trajectories of the
apparent impedance during swings so that the impedance shapes can be set, and
determining the rate of change of the impedance so that the element’s timers can be set [7].
Another method uses superimposed components for the detection of power swings. This
approach is based on the fact that a power-swing results in a continuous change of current
that is seen as continuous output from the superimposed current elements, rather than a
step-change as in case of fault inceptions. Figure 6.8 illustrates the operation of the
superimposed component PSD method.

Figure 6.8 - Superimposed component element assertion during a power swing

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A newer method uses a continually updated dZ/dt measurement of the rate of change of
impedance [10]. This replaces the simplistic monitoring of the rate of change via timing in the
pre-defined areas of the impedance plane. The dZ/dt values between the minimum and
maximum thresholds indicate a swing. High values of dZ/dt point to switching events such as
faults, and low values of dZ/dt point to existing yet not cleared faults. Figure 6.9 illustrates the
power-swing detection using a continuous impedance calculation.

X
Stable power swing
impedance trajectory

Load
DZ3 DZ2 DZ1

Figure 6.9 – Power swing detection with continuous impedance calculation

A delta impedance setting is not required anymore, because the algorithm automatically
considers any delta impedance that is measured between two consecutive calculations and
sets the delta impedance for the next calculation automatically in relation to the previous
calculation. This leads to a dynamic calculation of the delta impedance and an automatic
adaptation to the change of the power swing impedance. Also the delta time setting is not
required anymore because it is determined by the calculation cycles of the algorithm. This
method is less dependent on the location of the impedance trajectory during swings and less
prone to false operation during system faults.
Another new method uses a swing centre voltage (SCV) to detect power swings [11]. SCV is
defined as the voltage at the location of a two-source equivalent system where the voltage
magnitude is zero when the angles between the two equivalent system sources are 180
degrees apart. Voltages and currents at a line terminal allow a relatively precise estimation of
a quantity proportional to the voltage at the swing centre. The rate of change of the SCV
magnitude is a good approximation of the rate of change of the relative angle between the
systems. The method responds to a continually updated dSCV/dt measurement. Figure 6.10
illustrates the phasor diagram of an inductive two-source system, with the SCV shown as the
phasor from origin o to the point o'. An approximation of the SCV is obtained through the use
of locally available quantities where Vcosφ is a projection of local voltage VS onto local
current I.

93
 Figure 6.10 – Phasor diagram of a two source inductive system

A simplified relation between the SCV and the phase-angle difference δ of two-source
voltage phasors is given by (6.1).
δ
SCV1 = E1 ⋅ cos  (6.1)
 2
In (6.1) SCV1 represents the positive-sequence swing-centre voltage. The absolute value of
the SCV is at its maximum when the angle between the two sources is zero, and this value is
at its minimum (or zero) when the angle is 180°. This property has been exploited so one can
detect a power swing by looking at the rate of change of the swing-centre voltage. The time
derivative of SCV1 is given by (6.2) and provides the relation between the rate of change of
the SCV1 and the two-machine system slip frequency, dδ/dt. Note that the derivative of
SCV1 is independent from the network impedances and that it reaches its maximum when
the angle between the two machines is 180°.
d (SCV1) E1  δ  dδ
= – sin   (6.2)
dt 2  2  dt
The SCV is independent of the system source and line impedances [7][11][12]. On the
contrary, other quantities, such as the resistance and its rate of change, the real power and
its rate of change depend on the line and system-source impedances and other system
parameters. The SCV is bounded with a lower limit of zero and an upper limit of one per unit,
regardless of system impedance parameters. This is in contrast to other electrical quantities,
such as impedance, currents, and active or reactive powers, whose limits depend on a
variety of system parameters.
The superimposed component, the dZ/dt, and dSCV/dt methods allow relatively reliable
detection of faults occurring during power swing conditions (power swing unblocking).

6.2.3 POWER SWING BLOCKING

Power swing blocking (PSB) is applied to avoid random operation of protection elements due
to power swings and allow enough time for system protection to rectify the abnormal system
condition [13].
Current-only functions such as current differential and phase comparison are relatively
secure during power swings because during a swing the currents at all line terminals sum up
to zero (neglecting charging currents, CT errors and similar effects).

94
Directional comparison schemes are typically jeopardized unless they use current only
elements (current polarized ground directional overcurrent, for example) or elements less
immune to swings (negative-sequence directional overcurrent, for example).
Overcurrent and voltage functions may be jeopardized depending on their pickup and time
delay settings. Generally, more margins in the pickup thresholds compared with load and
longer time delays make these functions less prone to misoperation during power swings.
Negative-sequence and zero-sequence overcurrent protection functions are secure during
power swings, unless an open pole condition in the protected line or in the vicinity, or an
external fault, cause considerable current unbalance. This unbalanced current is subjected to
a power swing the same way a positive-sequence current is, and therefore may result in
misoperation of the negative-sequence or zero-sequence based functions.
Distance functions are affected through a combination of lower apparent impedance and
memory polarization, if applied. Instantaneous underreaching directly tripping zones may be
affected. Instantaneous overreaching zones and reverse looking blocking zones working in
directional comparison schemes may be affected as well. Time delayed distance functions
may be immune to swings if their time delay is long enough to ride through the period of time
when the apparent impedance stays inside their operating characteristics.
Application of PSB increases the integrity of the power system. In order to avoid disrupting
such large integral systems under major power system disturbances beyond their design
limits, it is beneficial to apply proper system protection including controlled separation via the
out-of-step tripping (OST).

6.2.4 PROTECTION DEPENDABILITY DURING POWER SWINGS

Power swings decrease dependability of many protection functions even if these functions
are left operational, or if blocked, become unblocked upon detecting a fault during a power
swing. This is particularly true during severe or unstable swings. When, during a line fault,
the equivalent systems are considerably out of phase they will feed currents toward an
internal fault that are out of phase. This current flow pattern can impact dependability of
many protection functions.
In general the following issues impact dependability during power swings:
• Directional elements may not perform well during swings. For example, during an
unstable power swing it is extremely challenging to detect direction of a three phase
fault. Negative-sequence directional elements will be affected if there is a pre-existing
system unbalance (e.g. open pole).
• Line terminal currents due to power swings may reach a value of few times CT
nominal and may flow considerably out of phase creating similar effects as the load
current during no-swing conditions. This includes for example an infeed/outfeed effect
for distance functions or extra restraint for differential functions.
• Memory polarization or usage of incremental protection quantities may cause
problems – the memorized values reflect positions of the equivalent sources from the
past while the protected system swings changing its angular position.
Increased dependability during power swings can be achieved through the combination of
[13]:
• Cancelling the block from the power system blocking element upon detecting a fault
during a power swing.
• Relying on negative-sequence elements to detect unbalanced faults.
• Relying on phase distance elements with time delay to detect three-phase balanced
faults. These elements can be quadrilateral with narrow blinders to allow better time
coordination for a swing entering the characteristic.

95
• Relying on non-directional distance elements with time delay to ensure detection of
close-in faults, particularly three-phase faults during unstable swings.
Application of the above measures to re-gain dependability during power swings may result
in decreased security and unintended operation for external faults.
In many instances the decrease in dependability is temporary. When the stable swing
subsides, or when the unstable swing reaches a point of the sources being in phase many
protection functions will operate within their specifications.

6.2.5 OUT-OF-STEP TRIPPING

Out-of-step tripping is applied for controlled separation of an unstable power system with the
intent to minimize the loss of load or generation and retain as much service as possible
within the separated portions of the system.
Out-of-step tripping is initiated for unstable swings. When the two systems slip a pole, the
apparent impedance crosses the reactive axis. Typical detection methods declare a swing
unstable when the swinging apparent impedance moves close to the reactive axis, beyond
the system recovery point, or when it crosses the reactive axis.
Out-of-step tripping can be initiated when the system moves beyond the recovery point, on
the first pole slip, or upon a second or third pole slip (for increased security). During a pole
slip condition there could be two distinct situations, one when the ECO is located on the
protected line, and second when it is located somewhere beyond the remote line-end.
Furthermore, network stability studies could point out that although the oscillations are
unstable, after two or even more oscillations the system could reach a stable operating
condition (a very low probability scenario). This means that tripping could be issued not
during the first pole slip, but rather after a certain number of pole slips. Usually, the pole slip
frequency increases after the first unstable oscillation. To cope with these conditions, the
detection and tripping characteristics can include two zones. The first fast-tripping zone
detects unstable oscillations with the ECO on the protected line while the second delayed-
tripping zone detects unstable oscillations with the ECO located beyond the remote line-end.
It is common to use different timers for the apparent impedance derivative estimation to also
detect the subsequent oscillations with higher pole slip frequency. Figure 6.11 illustrates the
positive-sequence impedance trajectory during a pole slip condition [14].

Positive-Sequence Impedance (Z1) Locus

27 29 31 33 35
4 37 39
41
Im(Z1) ohm

2 43

0 45

25
-2

-4
23

-6 21
19
-8
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Re(Z1) ohm

Figure 6.11 – Positive sequence impedance trajectory during a pole slip

96
An example of pole slip protection tripping is shown in Figure 6.12.

Figure 6.12 - Pole slip trip disturbance record

Opening a breaker when the two systems are out of phase exposes the breaker to up to
twice the system voltage, and therefore may cause transient recovery voltage (TRV) issues
for the breaker. Tripping during this condition imposes high stresses on the breaker and can
cause re-strikes and breaker damage. In some applications, the trip command is issued past
the pole slip (on the way out) when the two systems are almost in phase to minimize the TRV
effects. Another important aspect is to block line reclosing after OST initiation.

6.2.6 APPLICATION OF PSB AND OST FUNCTIONS

While the OOS relaying philosophy is simple, it is often difficult to implement it in a large
power system because of the complexity of the system and the different operating conditions
that must be studied. The selection of network locations for placement of OST systems can
best be obtained through transient stability studies covering many possible operating
conditions. The maximum rate of slip is typically estimated from angular change versus time
plots from stability studies. With the above information at hand, reasonable settings can be
calculated for well designed OST relaying schemes.
The recommended approach for OOS relaying application is summarized below [8]:
• Perform system transient stability studies to identify system stability constraints based
on critical operating conditions and stressed system operating scenarios. The stability
studies help identify the parts of the power system that impose limits to angular
stability, generators that are prone to go OOS during system disturbances and those
that remain stable, and groups of generators that tend to behave similarly during a
disturbance. The results of stability studies are also used to identify the optimal
location placement of OST and PSB protection functions because the apparent
impedance measured is a function of the MW and MVAr flows in the transmission
lines.
• Determine the locations of the swing loci during various system conditions and
identify the optimal locations to implement the OST protection function. The optimal
location for the detection of the OOS condition is near the electrical centre of the
power system. However, we must determine that the behaviour of the impedance
locus near the electrical centre facilitates the successful detection of OOS.
• Determine the optimal location for system separation during an OOS condition. This
will typically depend on the impedance between islands, the potential to attain a good

97
 load/generation balance, and the ability to establish stable operating areas after
separation. In some systems, it may be necessary to separate the network at a
location other than the one where the OST function is installed. This is accomplished
with the application of a transfer tripping type of scheme and tripping must be
supervised to avoid breaker opening when the angle between systems is near 180°.
To limit the amount of generation and load shed in a particular island, it is essential
that each island have reasonable generation capacity to balance the load demand.
High impedance paths between system areas typically represent appropriate
locations for network separation.
• Establish the maximum rate of slip between systems for OOS timer setting
requirements as well as the minimum forward and reverse reach settings required for
successful detection of OOS conditions. The swing frequency of a particular power
system area or group of generators relative to another power system area or group of
generators does not remain constant. The dynamic response of generator control
systems, such as automatic voltage regulators, and the dynamic behaviour of loads
or other power system devices, such as SVCs and FACTS, can influence the rate of
change of the impedance measured by OOS protection devices.
The relay settings of conventional PSB and OST functions are difficult to calculate and
require extensive stability studies in most applications. One of the reasons for extensive
stability studies stems from the fact that the quantities used in many PS and OOS detection
methods depend on system source and line impedances. Modern power-swing functions with
a few or no-setting requirements utilize quantities that are less dependent or independent
from system source and line impedances, take advantage of well-regulated power system
quantities, and do not require any stability studies for setting the PSD function and the OST
function if one chooses to trip on the way out [11].

6.3 ZERO VOLTAGE TRIPPING

During a major voltage collapse or a local loss of voltage, the restoration of service may need
to be conducted in a controlled manner, in order to avoid further voltage collapses or damage
to network equipment.
Many utilities adopt black start plans following a wide area voltage collapse, which may have
specific voltage propagation procedures. Whereas overvoltage protection techniques may be
applied to avoid overvoltage conditions when energizing certain network equipment in the
course of a black start plan, such as transmission lines; there is a risk that propagating the
voltage into wide areas of unloaded network may result in temporary overvoltages, with the
undesirable effect of tripping the very circuits necessary to re-establishment service.
A “Zero Voltage Tripping” (ZVT) function may be used to detect loss of voltage and perform
the necessary tripping commands, leaving the network in its discrete open condition (i.e. all
CBs opened). It is the network operator (either manually or using a pre-programmed
automatic system) who has the responsibility to decide which network equipment should be
first energized and proceed with a certain sequence to propagate voltage to the rest of the
network without jeopardizing the efficiency of the restoration.

Function Principle and Design

As a control function which may be required to operate for a singular and low probability
event, this function should incorporate a particular emphasis on security against unwanted
tripping rather than dependability. The basic operation of ZVT is as a time delayed
undervoltage function which may be integrated into any IED (the decision to implement this
function as centralised or de-centralised, depending on the level of discrimination required, is
a matter for the particular utility). A de-centralised implementation, with the function applied
per cubicle, will be considered here.

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Whereas the ZVT function is intended to operate for loss of voltage or voltage collapse,
rather than temporary voltage dips, the undervoltage threshold will typically be set very low
and the time delay set longer than the maximum fault clearance time or any other temporary
undervoltage condition duration (e.g. AR dead time). This will ensure tripping only for
significant and sustained undervoltage conditions.
The inputs and outputs of the simplified ZVT function block are presented in Figure 6.13.

Enable
ZVT Trip
Block
Isolators
CB
U and/or I

Figure 6.13 - Zero Voltage Tripping Main Function Block Diagram

A possible implementation of the zero voltage tripping function would include the monitoring
of the corresponding phase-to-phase voltages on either side of the CB, such that a sustained
undervoltage below the setting threshold of both voltages (“zero voltage”) would result in a
trip command to the CB. The function should be blocked in the case of secondary voltage
failure of either voltage, therefore voltage measurement supervision, such as fuse-failure, VT
MCB status monitoring, dV/dI monitoring, etc. for both voltages is critical. Furthermore, the
function may be supervised using topological information such as CB or isolator position,
depending on the degree of functional security required.
More complex algorithms may be applied using the three-phase-to-ground voltages and
three phase currents of one side only of the CB. It should be noted that the use of measured
signals from one side only, while avoiding extra reference voltage wiring (for traditional
SASs), will demand extra security measures and may not facilitate the opening of all of the
necessary CBs, especially on breaker-and-a-half arrangements. The trend to minimize
hardwiring and at the same time maintain the levels of security and performance of this
function may be achieved with an SAS based on IEC61850.
There is no special trend regarding the use or the architecture for this technique. Whilst the
simplest approach of comparing between the voltages on both sides of a certain CB
demands careful hardwiring and some complexity to feed the IED in which the algorithm is
preformed, it is to be expected that, with the IEC61850 based capability of transmitting
sampled values, the easiest way to implement the ZVT will be using the above mentioned
algorithm with same security conditions and to treat the function as a user defined logical
node, subscribing status information and sampled values.

6.4 REFERENCES
[1] IEEE Std C37.113-1999 “IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to
Transmission Lines”.
[2] CIGRÉ SC 34 WG-01 “Reliable fault clearance and back-up protection”, 1998.
[3] W.J. Laycock, “Adapting reclosure of HV circuits to system conditions”, South African
Power System Protection Conference, 8-9 November 1994.

99
[4] A. Guzman, J. Mooney, G. Benmouyal and N. Fischer, “Transmission Line Protection
System for Increasing Power System Requirements”, Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories, Inc. TP 6122, 2002.
[5] Xiangning Lin and Pei Liu, “Method of distinguishing between instant and Permanent
Faults of Transmission Lines based on Fuzzy Decision”, Proceedings of the
International Conference on EMPD '98, 1998.
[6] M. I. Khoroshev and V. Faybisovich, “Analysis of Adaptive Single Phase
Autoreclosing for High Voltage Transmission Lines with Various Compensation
Levels”, Power Systems Conference and Exposition 2004, IEEE PES 10-13 Oct.
2004.
[7] “Power Swing and Out-of-Step Considerations on Transmission Lines”, Report to the
Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society, WG D6,
2005.
[8] D. A. Tziouvaras and D. Hou, “Out-of-Step Protection Fundamentals and
Advancements,” in 2003 30th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference
Proceedings.
[9] Elmore, W. A., “The Fundamentals of Out-of-Step Relaying,” in 1981 34th Annual
Conference for Protective Relay Engineers Proceedings.
[10] J. Holbach, “New Out-of-Step Blocking Algorithm for Detecting Fast Power Swing
Frequencies,” in 2003 30th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference
Proceedings.
[11] G. Benmouyal, D. Hou, and D. Tziouvaras, "Zero-setting Power-Swing Blocking
Protection ", in 2004 31st Annual Western Protective Relay Conference Proceedings.
[12] F. Ilar, “Innovations in the Detection of Power Swings in Electrical Networks,” Brown
Boveri Publication CH-ES 35-30.10E, 1997.
[13] “Performance of Relaying during Wide-Area Stressed Conditions”, Report to the
Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society, WG
C12, 2008.
[14] D. Tziouvaras, “Relay Performance During Major System Disturbances,” in 2006 33rd
Annual Western Protective Relay Conference Proceedings.

100
7 TRANSMISSION LINE AND PROTECTION SYSTEM
MONITORING FUNCTIONS

7.1 TRANSMISSION LINE MONITORING

7.1.1 FAULT RECORDER

The fault recorder (FREC) function, as presented in this section, is intended for the analysis
of protection function behaviour and power system faults; and should not be understood as a
universal technique for any power system phenomena, such as those foreseen by Power
Quality legal systems. Furthermore, only the fault recorder function as commonly available in
protective IEDs will be discussed, rather than dedicated fault recorder systems and/or
architecture.

Storage capacity
Although not the main purpose of the protection system, FREC features are available within
any new IED for post disturbance analysis. The memory available to store relevant data is
still limited even for many newer IEDs. This “limitation” may be mitigated if the IED is connect
to a Central Unit, with higher storage capacity, via a LAN (or even WAN) in which an
application, event driven or pre-defined scheduler, will extract the data of every new record.

Sampling frequency
For Power Quality purposes, a high sampling frequency may be required; however, for
protection system behaviour analysis and most fault events, the 1 – 2 kHz sampling
frequency available within most IEDs is generally sufficient. Some IEDs provide higher
sampling frequencies for stored analog data (e.g. 8 kHz). It should be noted that the analog
data stored within IEDs for use by protection functions are of no use for the analysis of higher
frequency phenomena above half of the sampling frequency, as would occur for any given
IED that converts analog quantities to digital sampled data.

Analog and binary signals

Previously, dedicated fault recorders had physical limitations (either imposed by the device
itself or by the limitation of hardwiring and output contact availability for signalling). These
issues are lessened for the present technology. New IEDs can record binary signals, both
internally derived Boolean quantities and external signals collected via binary inputs (up to 40
or more) and at the same time all analog inputs may be sampled and stored. The typical
configuration of 8 analog and 16 binary channels is easily accomplished by modern IEDs.

Common formats exporting capability for post-fault analysis

The data within IEDs may be stored using a proprietary format of the manufacturer.
However, the extracting software application usually provides a conversion to a common
format such as COMTRADE. This capability is critical for the merging for comparison of
records from different IEDs, possible from other feeders or substations, which may then be
analysed by a different software application.

Output examples
The sampled data stored within any IED may be manually or automatically uploaded to a
Central Unit (normally an industrial PC with or without high storage capacity), either remotely
(via a telephone link or ethernet access) or locally to any PC for post fault analysis. Whilst
the internally stored format and manufacturer application are proprietary, usually a

101
COMTRADE format is available and delivered by any vendor application for further fault
analysis and/or protection system behaviour monitoring.
Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 present output examples (instantaneous, RMS and
phasors, respectively) retrieved by a vendor application which could be easily re-played by
any other application capable of handling COMTRADE files.

Figure 7.1 – Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (instantaneous time signals)

Figure 7.2 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (RMS computed values)

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 Figure 7.3 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (pre-
(pre-fault and fault phasors)

A further insight and more protection behaviour oriented analysis could be performed (e.g.
for distance protection) if the power system current and voltage values could be correlated
with the zone reach settings stored in the IED at the time of the fault. As an example (Figure
7.4), an estimated locus presentation could be viewed in order to have an immediate view of
which zones (if any) the static apparent impedance, as “seen” by the protection, had entered.

Figure 7.4 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (apparent impedances locus)

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7.1.2 DISTURBANCE RECORDER
The disturbance recorder (DR) function is mainly used to analyse the quality of the system
protection operation.
The DR function continuously collects protection system data such as analog signals and the
input and output states of the various functions. Once triggered by a fault, the DR stores the
data records for the fault duration, including settable periods of pre- and post-fault data.
Difference levels of DR report are available:
• General disturbance information (date, time, fault type, etc.).
• Indications (fault type, protection function operation, fault location, etc.).
• Event recording (time stamped events).
• Complete disturbance recording (instantaneous values for each analog input signal,
at each sampling moment and the status of the binary inputs and binary outputs).
The DR function is usually combined with an appropriate software tool. The main facilities of
the software are the following:
• Graphical presentation of all analog inputs versus time and display of instantaneous
values.
• Graphical display of RMS values and phase angle of all analog inputs.
• Calculation and display of phase and ground impedances, based on line parameters.
• Calculation and display of voltage and current sequence values.
• Phasor (vector) diagrams for voltages and currents.
• Harmonics analysis for all analog inputs.
• Fault location.
• COMTRADE format export data capability.

7.1.3 FAULT LOCATION

Whilst Fault Location is not the immediate task and concern that a Protection System has to
perform, for many utilities it has become a significant factor for operational decisions. The on-
going market environment is pushing networks towards their operational limits and there is
increasing pressure to maintain higher levels of transmission line availability. Therefore, in
addition to rapidly and selectively clearing the fault; fast and accurate determination of the
fault location is also desirable, for more efficient dispatching of the line crews, especially for
permanent faults. (Whereas there is no need for immediate action for temporary faults,
collation of fault location data would facilitate prioritization and scheduling of maintenance on
a particular line).
There may be regulations or statutes requiring that a line inspection should be conducted
before there is any attempt to restore a line after a fault event or a certain number of
unsuccessful reclosing attempts. Therefore, regardless of the operational importance of the
line to the network, operators may be prevented from attempting to restore the line more than
a specified numbers of times.
There are two issues of concern:

The fault location estimation technique:

• Single sided vs. two-sided methods.
• Methods based on the fundamental U and I quantities (impedance based).
• Methods based on travelling waves.
• Pre- and post-fault quantities.

104
• Series compensated lines.
• Mutual coupling effects.
• Underground cables.
• Sources of errors affecting fault location accuracy, depending on the method used
(line parameters, pre-fault load, fault resistance, etc.).
• Should the IED performing the protection function also be responsible for fault
location estimation? Or, a central system collect synchronized post-processed fault
records from the IEDs to perform fault location estimation? Or, both?

How is the location estimation to be communicated to the end users?

• Location is automatically sent to the SCADA system.
• Location is automatically printed out or displayed on the LCD of the IED or SAS
display monitor.
• SMS.
• On request basis via remote access.
For the same fault presented above, Figure 7.5 shows an estimated location based on the
same vender application. The estimated location is not the one calculated by the IED that
has generated the fault record data, instead it is the one obtained by a post analysis
application for which line data such as length, positive and zero sequence impedance and
capacitance per unit length, etc., have to be introduced.

Figure 7.5 - Ground fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (fault location estimation, single-
single-ended)

Figure 7.6 presents the event log, for the same fault, in which the distance to fault calculated
by the IED is displayed.
The difference between the two estimates of 16.1 km in Figure 7.5 and 15.8 km in Figure 7.6,
is of no significance for the 145 km line in question, and results mainly from the different
precision of values and the extra information that was introduced in the post analysis
application.

105
 Figure 7.6 - Earth fault (phase B) on a 145 km 400 kV line (fault location estimated by the IED)

7.1.4 BROKEN CONDUCTOR

The broken conductor monitoring is based on a continuous current asymmetry check on the
protected line. This could be a negative sequence time delayed overcurrent protection that
issues an alarm when the negative sequence current is higher than a certain threshold. This
feature is important in applications that involve lines known to have problems.

7.1.4.1 FUZZY LOGIC BASED OPEN LINE DETECTION

The Open Line Detection Problem

Power systems are operated to withstand normal contingencies and standard protection
relays are designed to handle these usual events. On the other hand, severe or extreme
contingencies involving cascaded events such as multiple line outages will require system
level protection actions to preserve stability or to avoid damage on expensive transmission
equipment. In general, such contingencies will result in significant topology changes and
affect the power system equilibrium. Remedial actions such as generator rejection and/or
load shedding are often required to bring the system back to a new equilibrium.
In such a context, monitoring of the network topology is a strategic function to consider in the
design of modern defence plans. To be efficient, it needs to be fast, reliable and secure. Its
effectiveness will be decisive to avoid system wide power failures under extreme
contingencies.
Figure 7.7 shows the configuration of a line in a substation with its VT and CTs (for CBs and
shunt reactor) connected to the analog inputs of an open line detector (DLO). The DLO
detects the status (open or closed) of a transmission line (with no mid-tap), and must comply
with a series of security, reliability and speed requirements as discussed below.

106
 Figure 7.7 - Configuration of a line in a substation

Principle of Operation
The Open Line Detector algorithm is made up of five major building blocks as shown in
Figure 7.8.
• Acquisition unit, which incorporates an anti-alias filter with a 400 Hz cut-off frequency.
Its nominal sampling rate is 32 samples per cycle.
• Kalman-filter based phasor estimation unit.
• Pre-processor unit which computes and extracts the features to be used in the fuzzy-
logic decision.
• Fuzzy-logic algorithm.
• Logical unit which processes the output signal to lock the decision.

Figure 7.8 - DLO algorithm functional block

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The vectors from the acquisition unit are fed into the Kalman filter which uses a state based
predictor corrector algorithm which filters the vectors to provide the required data for the
processing unit.
Whereas there is much to advocate the use of Kalman filtering in general, its superiority, in
this application, over the Discrete Fourier Transform (or similarly, any full-cycle phasor
measurement scheme) is its capability to provide signal components at spectral frequencies
other than the fundamental and its harmonics. The filter then becomes an effective built-in
self-diagnosis tool, taking advantage of both negative sequence components at fundamental
and at resonance that may transiently appear when a line is opened at both ends while its
shunt reactors are connected.
The Kalman filter has the following elements, whose interactions are shown in Figure 7.9:
• Start-up state.
• Predictor state.
• Corrector state.

Figure 7.9 - Kalman filter elements

The data captured has a resolution of 16 bits, four voltage input channels, six current input
channels and three channels used as voltage rail checks. Next, a Clarke Transform [1] is
performed on the three phasors to convert them into orthogonal vectors.
The Kalman filter matrices were evaluated using a Matlab model of the system, with a
constant sampling rate and are used for all system conditions. The filter generates a number
of phasors, such as the positive sequence voltage and currents, and from which the active
and reactive power is derived.
The pre-processor performs various FIR filtering, peak detection and averaging functions,
slope detection and delta detection algorithms to produce the inputs required by the fuzzy
logic algorithm.
A fuzzy logic approach was used in the design of the DLO because of its flexibility for solving
inherent conflicts found in the detection of a line status based on voltages and currents only.
For instance, during line energization at no-load, CVT induced electromagnetic transients
may suggest that the active power is not zero (line closed) when the line is actually open.
Experience has demonstrated that such conflicts can be more easily resolved using a multi-
criteria fuzzy logic based approach [2], which results in the following interesting properties:
• Tripping decision is based on several criteria with adaptable weighting factors.
• Uncertainty with respect to signals and settings is modelled quantitatively.
• Delay of tripping initiation depends on the amount or inflow of information related to
protection signals, and through them, to the disturbance analyzed by the device.
The general structure of the fuzzy decision system consists of three main steps:
• “Fuzzyfication” of 10 selected decisions features from the pre-processor.
• Fuzzy logic inference on these features, using twelve rules or criteria.
• Crisp decision sent to the output.

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Fuzzyfication is a necessary step prior to a fuzzy-logic based reasoning system. It transforms
the crisp variables provided by the pre-processor in Figure 7.8 into categories easily
described by common language terms such as “Normal”, “Small”, “Large”, “Very Large”, etc.
Figure 7.10 illustrates this fuzzyfication process for two typical variables, the active Power
and its rate of change DeltaP. The first one is defined as "SMALL" when its crisp value is
below a given threshold (θL) while the DeltaP feature is defined as "BIG" for crisp values
higher that (θS). Examples of typical rule elements are:
• A security rule: if (ActivePower is not SMALL) LINE is CLOSED.
• A reliability rule: if (DeltaP is BIG) LINE is OPEN.

Figure 7.10 – Fuzzyfication of Active Power and DeltaP

7.2 PROTECTION SYSTEM MONITORING

These functions are related not only to line protection issues but to any other system which
has to perform some actions based on a collection of data. Although they do not correspond
to any particular technique, they are important for maintaining some degree of confidence
that the main core of the protective relaying entities may rely on the information that is being
used and the commands that are to be issued succeed, at least, to reach their destination.
Self-supervision is one of the most powerful facilities of protection IEDs. This allows for fast
and reliable supervision of analog quantities and binary signals, and for continuous
supervision of the hardware and software resources of the device. The degree of complexity
of the self-supervision function is manufacturer dependent, however, what is critical is the
ability to detect and annunciate alarms for internal hardware or software malfunction, and for
interruptions to, or corruption of, the analog measurements.

7.2.1 INTERNAL SELF SUPERVISION

Protective IEDs use a microprocessor, an analog signal data acquisition system, memory
components containing the protection and other algorithms, opto-coupler binary inputs to
control the device, and output contacts to control other equipment. The algorithms and
settings contained in the relay memory define the protection characteristics.
Protective IEDs perform automatic self-tests to determine that its sub-systems and critical
components are functioning correctly. As a minimum, these self-tests supervise the memory
chips, ADC, power supply, and microprocessor. Whereas self-tests are cyclically executed in
the IED, they detect component failures soon after they occur. If a self-test detects an
abnormal or out-of-tolerance condition, the device may take the following corrective actions:

109
• Disable the protection elements and trip/close logic.
• De-energize all output contacts.
• Generate an automatic status report at the serial port for warnings and failures.
• Display failure messages on the device LCD.
• Generate an alarm signal from the N/C contact of the HEALTHY state output relay
(now de-energised).
Self-test effectiveness is defined by the proportion of all relay failures that can be detected by
the device self-test functions. Field data shows that a practical value of self-test effectiveness
is 90%. Whereas it may be possible to devise relay hardware and software that could be fully
supervised, it is likely that cost of such a device would be prohibitive. Therefore, it is
important that manufacturers devise reliable hardware, and incorporate simple tests that
detect as many failures as possible.
The goal of self-testing is to maximize the availability of the protection and minimize risk of
maloperation. In order to benefit from relay self-test operation, the utility should monitor the
self-test alarm contact outputs of all IEDs.
It is convenient to divide the IED into three sections for the purposes of self-testing:
• Analog inputs.
• Contact input/output circuitry.
• Processing.

Hardware Supervision
The analog input section consists of the analog signal connections, isolation transformers,
low-pass filters, one or more multiplexers, and an ADC. Automatic self-tests only partially
monitor the analog input section, therefore, maintenance practices should verify the analog
input components.

Condition ALARM
Protection
Warning (W) Output
Self-Test Disabled Description
or Pulsed* (P) or
(Y/N)
Failure (F) Latched (L)
Input W N P Measures the DC offset at each of the
Channels input channels
Input F Selectable L Measures imbalance between input
Channel channels by zero sequence and
Imbalance negative sequence monitoring
Master W N P Measures the DC offset at the A/D
Offset F Y L
A/D F Y L Applies a stable reference voltage to
Accuracy a prescribed A/D channel and
Check monitors the conversion result.
Power W N P Measures the power supply rail(s)
supply F Y L voltage
rails
TEMP W N P Measures the temperature at the A/D
F Y L voltage reference
A/D F Y L Validates proper number of
conversions per processing cycle
* “Pulsed” here indicates that the signal follows the alarm state

Table 7.1 – Hardware self-

self-tests typically performed by protection IEDs

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The contact input/output circuitry is also only partially covered by automatic testing. It is
possible to design output hardware that is fully redundant and verifiable through self-tests.
Whereas the existing hardware is reliable, the additional cost of more complex hardware is
not justified. However, alarms indicating the failure of each input/output board are available
to the extent they are supervised. Routine verification of the output contacts and binary
inputs is appropriate when the equipment does not operate regularly in response to faults.
In some instances, the analog signals to the ADCs is internally distributed to two different
converters, with different amplification factors thus making it possible to supervise the signals
which should be identical under normal conditions in addition to improving the dynamic
performance of the A/D conversion.

Software Supervision
The digital processing section, typically a microprocessor, is the interface between the
analog input section and the contact input/output section. Self-tests monitor the processor
and associated memory components. Since the analog and contact input/output sections
cannot function without the processing section, normal service also verifies the relay
processing section.

ALARM
Condition
Protection Output
Warning (W)
Self-Test Disabled Pulsed* (P) Description
or
(Y/N) or
Failure (F)
Latched (L)
RAM F Y L Performs a read/write test on system
RAM
ROM F Y L Performs a checksum test on the
relay program memory
CR_RAM F Y L Performs a checksum test on the
active copy of the device settings
EEPROM F Y L Performs a checksum test on the non-
volatile copy of the device settings
µP Crystal F Y L The device monitors continuously the
microprocessor crystal
µP F Y L The µP examines continuously each
program instruction, memory access,
and interrupt.
* “Pulsed” here indicates that the signal follows the alarm state

Table 7.2 – Software self-

self-tests typically performed by protection IEDs

7.2.2 MEASUREMENT SUPERVISION

The performance of a protection system may be jeopardized if incorrect voltages and/or
currents are being used by protection functions to determine whether or not to trip.
Some degree of supervision may be achieved by internal monitoring functions based on
quantity comparison techniques as follows:
• Zero-sequence current biased differential method (between the residual current
calculated from the phase CT cores used by the Main1 device and the neutral return
current of the CT cores used by the Main2 device, or another CT measuring the same
currents).
• dV/dt and dI/dt discrepancies.
• Discrepancies in voltage and current sequence quantities.

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Also, the tripping of VT secondary circuit MCBs can be directly monitored as a voltage failure
condition and acted upon (e.g. blocking the distance protection function, activating an
emergency overcurrent function and issue a voltage failure alarm).
Some measurement supervision techniques may issue erroneous measurement failure
alarms during fault events and single pole tripping conditions. These functions may be used
to control (i.e. enable or block) protection functions or just to issue alarm signals.

7.2.2.1 CURRENT MEASUREMENT SUPERVISION

Current measurement supervision is intended to issue an alarm in the case of CT or
secondary circuit damage. It is based on the principle of monitoring currents supplied to the
device from two independent sets of CT cores by comparing the residual current calculated
from the three phase currents of one set of cores with the neutral return current of the
second set of cores.

7.2.2.2 VOLTAGE MEASUREMENT SUPERVISION

Many of the protection functions included in IEDs measure voltages supplied from VTs
protected by fuses and/or MCBs. These protection functions protection, may operate
unnecessarily if a fault occurs in the secondary circuits between the VTs and the IED.
Therefore, voltage measurement supervision is a critical feature of line protection IEDs.
Typically this function operates on the basis of either external binary signals from the MCB;
or the zero or negative sequence voltage and current. If there is zero sequence voltage
exceeding a certain threshold and the zero sequence current is under a certain threshold,
this is indicative of a failure in the circuits between the VT and the IED. In the case of ground
faults, a large amount of zero sequence current coincides with the zero sequence voltage so
that the failure condition is not fulfilled. Detection of failure in the voltage circuits should block
all voltage-dependant protection functions; in particular all distance protection zones. When
distance protection is blocked in this way, a separate time delayed or instantaneous non-
directional overcurrent protection function is commonly released.
Comparison of the zero sequence quantities is normally used in solidly or low impedance
grounded networks, where zero sequence quantities are available; while negative sequence
comparison is used on isolated neutral or high impedance grounded networks. Under fault
conditions, the sequence currents can be expected to be much higher than the reference
values:
Zero sequence comparison: U0 > Uref and I0 < Iref.
Negative sequence comparison: U2 > Uref and I2 < Iref.
Monitoring of the rates of change of voltage and current (dV/dt and dI/dt) as a
supplementary feature to the main principle above may also be available in the IED. This
feature is of particular benefit where busbar voltages are used for the line protection and
switching from one busbar to another results in temporary loss of all three phases. The
algorithm works on the basis of a negative change in voltage accompanied by no noticeable
change in current.
It is possible in IEDs to have a combination of the above methods to suit requirements as
follows:
• Parallel operation (“OR”) of zero and negative sequence comparisons for reliability.
• Series operation (“AND”) of zero and negative sequence comparisons for security
• Adaptive (either/or) use of methods depending on the relative magnitude of zero and
negative sequence currents for optimum security.

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VT MCB Monitoring
When all three phases are not available, the sequence comparisons cannot be used. Hence,
the line VT MCB “b” (N/C) contacts are used. The two conditions on the operation of the “b”
contact are as follows:
1. “Fast” operation to permit blocking of distance protection before operates.
2. “Late-break” contact, so that the contact shall remain closed, maintaining the block,
while the main MCB contacts are closing.

R R
Y Y
B B
+ + INV

Figure 7.11 – VT MCB Contact utilisation

There are two ways of achieving the binary input activation of the voltage measurement
supervision function, namely using one three-pole MCB, or three single-pole MCBs as below:
• Condition 2 is possible by a drop off timer inside the relay.
• Condition 1 can only be guaranteed by special three-pole MCB.
Hence, it is good practice to use the “b” contacts of three, single-pole MCBs, and invert the
sense of the signal at device binary input (i.e. active without voltage).

7.2.3 TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION

Trip circuit integrity is a determining factor in allowing the protection system to complete its
major goal; namely to open the corresponding CB(s) in order to clear the fault. A trip circuit
failure may result in a local CB failure action or remote CB openings due to backup
protection operation, which may produce blackouts or other severe consequences for the
equipment or power system integrity.
Monitoring the integrity of the trip circuit provides a way of possible preventive remedial
actions, when associated with a locally or remotely acknowledged alarm system. Whilst this
supervision may be done by independent and dedicated equipment, this feature may be
performed by an IED, for one or both circuit breaker states, either by monitoring the tripping
contact of the IED directly, or using one or two binary inputs of the IED itself, per coil, to
monitor the polarity returned by the corresponding coil of the CB. (When using one binary
input only, for both closed and opened position supervision, a resistor or a set of resistors
may have to be integrated for the open position monitoring, with a suitable resistance value
to maintain the supervision function operational, whilst avoiding any dangerous current to be
sustained or incorrectly applied to the CB coil for longer than the coil’s thermal capacity.)
Although the previous paragraph refers to an analog-type trip circuit, and the integrity of this
circuit does not assures an 100% effective CB opening for fault clearance; the aim of the trip
circuit supervision may still be useful when considering applications where a interposing
communication system is used, as for remote tripping, or more specifically, a local
communication network would be used, regardless of what protocol or standard is
considered, to send the trip command of the protection function to the CB(s). The reasoning
is that some kind of supervision is relevant and may be used either for predictive
maintenance policies, or even to dynamically inhibit closing a CB for which there is a
suspicion that the trip circuit is not intact.

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7.3 REFERENCES
[1] Edith Clarke, “Circuit analysis if AC power systems”, Vol 1&2, pub: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York ,NY, 1950.
[2] B. Kirby et al., “Fast Topology Detection based on Open Line Detection – A Strategic
Function in Power System Protection”, in Western Protection Relay Conference
Proceedings 2005.

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8 AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS

8.1 EVENT RECORDER

The ability of protection IEDs to record and display event reports has provided protection
engineers with a powerful tool for analyzing the nature of power system disturbances and
faults, and the related performance of the protection and interrupting devices. Previously,
there was a reliance on the information received from dedicated fault and “sequence-of-
events” recorders, which due to their relatively high cost were only installed in vital HV
substations or on certain feeders. The same data is now available at every location on the
power system where an IED is applied.
An event report is a stored record of what the device saw and how it responded during a
system fault or other type of event. During such events, fixed or settable triggers within the
device initiate recording of, typically, the state of selected elements and programmable logic,
the status of binary inputs and outputs, sampled analog currents and voltages and the
related settings that are currently active in the device.
IEDs may record and time tag up to some decades of events and store them in non-volatile
memory. This facilitates the determination of the sequence of events that occurred within the
device following a particular power system condition, switching sequence, etc. When the
memory buffer is full, the oldest event is automatically overwritten by the new one. The
internal clock of the IED provides the time tag for each event; typically to a resolution of
1 ms. The event records may be available for viewing either via the front plate LCD and/or
remotely via the communication ports.
Depending on the device type, the usual menu-driven HMI of the IED may allow the user to
select an event, a fault record (fault flags, protection starts, protection trips, fault location,
measurements etc. associated with the fault), or, where available, a maintenance report.
Typical events may be:
• A change of state of an input since the last time that the protection algorithm ran.
• A change of state of one or more output relay contacts.
• Function alarm conditions (battery fail, field voltage fail, protection disabled,
frequency out of range, VTS alarm, etc.).
• Protection elements starts and trips.
In some cases, the large amount of available events may distract the fault analysis. The user
may have the facility to select which event to go to the event list, i.e. to filter the display and
hence, to be more effective in understanding the information. Device-independent software
platforms may be used for elaborating generic IED fault and event files (e.g. COMTRADE),
which may also facilitate this task.
Event reports are typically formatted as ASCII files that can be read vertically. The data are
displayed in columns with each row representing a point in time. The time intervals depend
on the sampling rate, which typically can vary from 4 to 20 samples per cycle, i.e. one value
every 5 or 1 ms. The user can select the parameters that will be selected at each rate
according their importance, e.g. 16 or 20 samples per cycle are selected to view detailed
oscillography. Such records are limited in length because of memory storage restrictions.
This length is continuously improving in newer IEDs. A portion of record duration can also be
assigned to provide prefault and post fault information.
Fault reports normally display analog values, and many IED types also allow observation of
harmonics and DC offset.
It may be possible to view the event reports from certain IEDs as text files on a PC; however,
many manufacturers provide specialized software for viewing event report data. Such tools
may have automated facilities for reading data, displaying waveforms along with the status of

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digital elements and displaying calculated phasor magnitudes, phase angles and
symmetrical components values. They may also permit manipulation of scales, the addition
of notes and labels, and export of data to other files.
IEDs can also generate a variety of abbreviated tailored reports; historical reports, automatic
summary messages and sequence-of-events reports.
Sequence-of events reports are also created by IEDs. The elements monitored usually can
be selectable by the user rather than pre-set. Flexibility is remarkable since, for some cases,
when any selected element changes state, the device time-tags the change and records the
change in the report. The sequence-of-events report allows the timing of sequence of
operations within the device to be viewed and analyzed which is highly valuable when
analysing power system disturbance.
Scanning a history report allows a brief summary of all the events that happened at that
location, and this information can be filtered for further review, due to a current need or
generally for assessing protection performance. For each event the history report will usually
display the date, time, phases involved and the distance to fault.
Automatic summary messages are sent to the communication ports of the IED whenever
they are generated. The messages can be sent to a master station as it is analyzed in the
following chapter. This removes the need to poll the individual devices to check for new
event data, since this can be performed centrally. It is also possible to extract pertinent
operational information such as fault location and the phase involved in the fault; and to send
them to operators over the SCADA or a Protection Data Retrieval system.

8.2 REMOTE ACCESS

Remote access generally refers to data exchange between the IED and a remote location.
IEDs offer a variety of remote access capabilities. They can be configured for remote access
via their rear RS485 port(s) by serial configuration procedures; via their rear Ethernet port by
Ethernet Communication transactions.
The main dimensions that are considered in this section are remote on-line management of
the IEDs for protection analysis and evaluation purposes and teleprotection applications.
By exploiting the remote accessibility of IEDs, the relevant engineer can automatically and
rapidly obtain sufficient protection and automation data from any repository to characterize
and adequately respond to a particular fault before it grows out of control. Such a capacity
dramatically lowers the cost and time to take corrective action and maintain reliable power
delivery. As the technologies for remote on-line management mature, new solutions that
merge the value of controlled access and use of protection and automation data are
becoming ubiquitous.
Disturbance analysis, fault or event statistics preparation and power quality monitoring can
be facilitated by installing a protection data collection and evaluation system (PDCS) [1][2].
Such systems can be designed according to a three tier architecture as follows:
• Data Tier: Collection, validation and storage of protection, disturbance and power
quality data.
• Application Tier: Data processing and calculation for the preparation of fault and
disturbance analysis, statistics, etc.
• Presentation Tier: Presentation of the original disturbance data and the analysis
results via a powerful HMI.
The master station equipment and software is typically installed at the utility’s analysis
centre. The system is sized and equipped with the necessary communication devices for
connection to the desired outstations and must be expandable for future substations.

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Appropriate PCs or gateways together with the necessary software for retrieving the data
from the substations are consequently installed. Power quality recorders may be provided
and installed at specific substations. The substation devices can communicate with the
master station via the utility’s corporate fiber optic network, where such a network is
available, while the rest will be accessed via public network in dial-up mode.
Some typical arrangements for the remote access of IEDs are presented in Figure 8.1 and
Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.1 – Protection data collection

collection and evaluation system

Figure 8.2 – Remote access media options

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Where a digital communications channel is available between the IEDs at each line-end
other data, in addition to the protection data, can be transmitted thus be made available at
the line-ends. This data includes synchronization and topology data, as well as remote trip
signals, remote annunciation of signals and measured values. The topology of the protection
communication system is constituted by the allocation of devices to the ends of the protected
line and by allocation of the communication paths to the protection data interfaces of the
devices.
IEDs allow the transmission of a sufficient number of binary information items (e.g. 28) of any
type from one device to the other via the communication links provided for protection tasks. A
specific number of them (e.g. 4) may be transmitted as protection signals with high priority
(i.e. very fast), and consequently are suitable for the transmission of protection and trip
signals which are generated outside of the IED. The other signals are transmitted in the
background and give information on the events taking place in one substation which may
also be useful in another substation, to the system master station, to local DSCS or SCADA
as well.
The information is injected into the device via binary inputs and can be output at the other
ends again via binary outputs. The integrated user-defined logic in most IEDs allows logical
operation to be performed on the signals and other information from the protection and
monitoring functions of the devices on both the transmitting and the receiving side. The
binary inputs and outputs must be allocated appropriately during the configuration of the
input and output functions. If the remote signals are to be used for direct remote tripping,
they must be allocated at the send side with the function that is to perform the transfer trip at
the opposite side.
For the transmission of binary information no settings are required. Each device sends the
injected information to all other device(s) at the ends of the protected object. Where
differentiation is necessary, it will have to be carried out by appropriate allocation and, if
necessary, by a link at the receiving side. Even devices that have logged out functionally can
send and receive remote signals and commands. Specific annunciations are issued if a
specific device is actively involved in the communication topology and this state is stable.
Once a fault has been detected in the communication of the protection data interface the
appropriate setting address is started for resetting the remote signals.
Any signal from an external protection or monitoring device can be coupled into the signal
processing of the device by means of a binary input. This signal can be delayed, alarmed, or
routed to one or several output relays for external direct and remote tripping purposes. Fibre
optic connections or voice frequency modulated high frequency channels via pilot cables,
PLC or microwave radio links can be used for remote tripping of the CB at the opposite line-
end. If the trip command is to be transmitted the best way is to use the integrated
teleprotection function. Any of the commands can of course be used to trigger the transmitter
to initiate the send signal.

8.3 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION

In electric utilities, oscillographic data or, more generally, sampled data from around the
entire network need to obtained simultaneously. IEDs have inbuilt sampling clocks that must
be synchronized. The most common method is to use the transmissions of the GPS, that is
available free of charge, and consists of 24 sub-synchronous satellites. At any point on earth
at least four of them are visible; although, one is sufficient for time keeping purposes.
Protection devices which are to be used in wide area protection systems or remote protection
data acquisition systems require that the timing with which the electrical quantities are
sampled be synchronised across all substations [3][4]. In the timing synchronous control
systems used until recently, general purpose telecommunication systems could not be used
in the protection system, and time synchronization between numbers of points spread across

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a wide area was difficult. A timing synchronous signal (time signal) is usually supplied by an
external timing synchronous system (or IED), independent of the ordinary
telecommunications network. These systems can provide the µs-precise time signals
required for the protection system, and a time signal distribution system using a suitable
terrestrial (digital) network.
For the system’s telecommunication network, it may be used an asynchronous transfer Mode
transmission and switching, as this facilitates the unified handling of a diverse range of
information and the integration of telecommunication devices, as well as improving
telecommunication circuit operational reliability. This system also allows simple adjustment of
telecommunication circuit connections e.g. in the event that electrical power system is to be
restructured.
In a protection IED with a time synchronization function, the sampling timing which is
specified is based on reference timing transmitted from a time signal generator to a time
synchronization unit, with a determination value. The time synchronization unit includes a
reception circuit that receives a discrimination code and time data transmitted from the time
signal generator, a code discrimination circuit that discriminates the reference timing on
condition that the received discrimination code coincides with a desired code, a time
calculation circuit that calculates the sampling timing on the basis of the discriminated
reference timing and the time data, and a sampling synchronization circuit that specifies the
sampling timing of a digital quantity of electricity on the basis of the calculated sampling
timing.
Substation automation demands precise time synchronization for a variety of IEDs. There are
different possible approaches to achieve the required accuracy. Time synchronization for
transmission substation integrated protection, system control and data acquisition require a
target architecture that distributes the synchronized time in several ways. Different solutions
are possible and can be realized using timing equipment.
The application of time synchronization in electrical systems can also be applied in the
following cases: SCADA, for protocolization and registration; in communications equipment
for communication processors; protocol translators; in fault recorders for post fault analysis
responsibility, liability; in billing meters AMR for tariff-switching; load analysis; in IEDs; RTUs;
SOE; sensors for protocolization and registration; in Servers, Routers, Switches for IT
security, in frequency deviation for system stability; in security monitoring for physical
security and in digital voice and video recording for civil responsibility, Law, Insurance
companies.

Synchronization of Equipment
The direct synchronization is realized using a GPS Antenna and dedicated synchronization
clocks, as illustrated in Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3 – Direct synchroni

synchroniz
chronization

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The resolution and precision achieved is: 1 ms for events and faults synchronized using PPS
(Pulse per second as a hardware Gong); kPPs with 250 ns precision for synchrophasor
devices (Resolution of ±5 µs). The interface may be electrical or optical, the connection of
such systems and the compatibility is with protection IEDs, protocols (e.g. IRIG AB, Afnor,
DCF) and pulses (PPS-PPM, 1 kPPs, PPH) and the applications besides protection are
control, billing, metering, SOE and fault recording, frequency deviation (∆f, ∆T).

Synchronization over LAN

The resolution and precision depends on traffic on the network, on distance and
communication media and is in the range of 5-20 ms. Synchronization over LAN has the
following characteristics: External networks are getting bigger in control and protection
environments through:
LAN, WAN, MAN, redundant LANs , switches, routers, firewalls, severs and clients, or
because of the communication over Internet and Intranets and combining different
medias.
The advantage is transmission of secure data on insecure channels that results in
confidentiality, integrity and authentication.
The tools used are encrypted tunnels and VPN.
The usual synchronization equipment are clocks appropriate for protection IEDs, SCADA,
RTUs, PLCs, and automation.

8.4 CIRCUIT BREAKER CONDITION MONITORING

An operator at a remote location requires a reliable indication of the state of the switchgear.
IEDs include many monitoring functions that allow them to detect a failure of primary or
secondary components of the overall protection system. Timely detection of problems can be
used for event-driven maintenance that prevents the failure of the protection system when it
is required to operate, while at the same time minimizes the need for scheduled
maintenance.
CB state monitoring supervises normally closed and normally open auxiliary contacts of the
CB, so that failed auxiliary contacts and defective wiring may be detected.
Periodic maintenance of CBs is necessary to ensure that the trip circuit and the mechanism
operate correctly and also that the interrupting capability has not been compromised due to
previous fault interruptions. Generally, such maintenance is based on a fixed time interval, or
a fixed number of fault interruptions. These methods of monitoring CB condition give a rough
guide only and can lead to excessive maintenance. Now the various CB monitoring and
analysis functions in the IED can detect different problems with the CB and, based on user
defined criteria, can “predict” the need for maintenance.
For each CB following statistics may be taken:
CB operations; CB A operations; CB B operations; CB C operations; total IA broken; total IB
broken; total IC broken.
Examples of such features for monitoring the set up of the current broken facility are cited
hereafter and they may raise an alarm or a CB lockout: Broken I^; I^ Maintenance; I^
Lockout; no. CB Ops Maintenance; no. CB Ops Lockout; CB time Maintenance; CB Time
Lockout; fault frequency lock; fault frequency counter; fault frequency time.
Information regarding the CB is required by various protection and supplementary functions
to ensure their optimal functionality. E.g. The echo function in conjunction with the distance
protection based teleprotection; the echo function in conjunction with directional ground fault
comparison scheme; weak infeed tripping; high current instantaneous tripping; CB failure
protection; verification of the dropout condition for the trip command; for AR and CB test.

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The following options for control of a single CB for operational purposes are foreseen:
• Local tripping and closing, via the device HMI menu.
• Local tripping and closing via device binary inputs.
• A manual trip will be permitted provided that the CB is initially closed. Likewise a
close command can only be issued if the CB is initially open.
• Where the check synchronism function is set this can be enabled to supervise
manual CB close commands. A CB close output will only be issued if the
synchrocheck criteria are satisfied.
CB auxiliary contact monitoring, calculation and integration of the CB interrupted current to
the power of a settable parameter, as well as the use of fault and trip operation counters
allows the IEDs to accurately predict the need and type of required CB maintenance. Trip
circuit supervision based on single or two binary inputs is used to detect problems in the
breaker trip circuits.
All of the above shows that the availability of advanced real time monitoring functions gives
the user valuable tools for improving the efficiency and reducing the cost of maintenance in
the electric power system.
Where OHL are prone to frequent faults and are protected by oil CBs, oil changes account
for a large proportion of the life-cycle cost of the switchgear. Generally, oil changes are
performed at a fixed interval of CB fault operations. However, this may result in premature
maintenance where fault current tends to be low, and hence oil degradation is slower than
expected. The IEDs have available a Σ Ι^power counter that monitors the cumulative severity of
the duty placed on the interrupter allowing a more accurate assessment of the CB condition
to be made.
The dielectric withstand of oil generally decreases as a function of Σ I2t , where I is the
broken current and t is the arcing time within the interrupting tank. As the arcing time cannot
be monitored accurately, the sum of the broken I2 is supervised and recorded. For other CBs
an exponent of 2 is inappropriate and for others 1.4 or 1.5 is more suitable.
Slow CB operation is also a cause for CB maintenance. Therefore alarm and lockout
thresholds are provided.
A CB may be rated to break fault current a set number of times before maintenance.
However successive CB operations in a short period of time may result in increased
maintenance.
The IEDs record various statistics related to each CB trip operation, allowing a more
accurate assessment of the CB condition to be determined.

8.5 POLE DISCREPANCY

High voltage CBs are three-phase apparatus. They contain at least one contact per phase,
and in some cases, multiple contacts in series per phase (e.g. up to 12 per phase for certain
air blast CBs at 765 kV). It is critical for the correct operation of the CB and of the network
that the time discrepancy between the contacts of each phase operating be limited.
Pole discordance will cause asymmetrical currents in the power system which results in
negative sequence current stresses on rotating machinery and zero sequence currents that
can cause unwanted operation of sensitive residual protection functions. The traditional
practice of monitoring the auxiliary contacts of the CB is now supplemented in IEDs by a
current asymmetry level monitor which checks the difference between the lowest and highest
phase current against a settable percentage of highest phase current. It is also possible to
activate this feature only at the time of closing or opening the CB.

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8.5.1 CONTACT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN POLES

On Trip:
According to IEC 56 (para 3.3.1), the phase is considered open when the first contact of the
pole is open. The biggest discrepancy measured should not exceed a maximum value set by
the designer, the user, or by an agreement between them.
If not conforming: a pole's contact separation has to be simultaneous to prevent HV
transients, otherwise it would attain double the rated value on the first parting pole. The
maximum discrepancy allowed is 1/6th of a cycle.

On Close:
According to IEC 56 (para 3.3.2), the phase is considered closed when the last contact of the
pole is closed. The biggest discrepancy measured should not exceed a maximum value set
by the designer, the user or by an agreement between them.
If not conforming: The sudden energizing of circuits is always followed by a moderate voltage
increase, with the exception of long, unloaded transmission lines, where the voltage rise can
be critically dangerous. When a line is connected to an energized network, a voltage wave is
forced on the line. This wave is reflected back at the end of an open line, and returns with
double the amplitude.
Even higher voltages may be encountered when the line has a load before being
reenergized, and if the CB closes at the moment that the polarity of the network is opposite
to that which was present on the line.
The voltage may then be three times the network voltage, after reflection of the wave. This
situation may be produced with a rapid reclosing of a line.
Still higher voltages may be encountered on three-phase lines, when the three poles of the
CB do not close simultaneously. A wave on one phase will produce induced waves in the
other phases and, under unfavourable conditions, will increase the voltage on another phase.
Higher transition voltage rises can be encountered if the discrepancy on closing is too high.
On networks, where the nominal voltage is 500 kV and higher, the isolation of the lines is
determined by the operation-voltage spikes.

8.5.2 DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CONTACTS OF THE SAME POLE

For multiple-contact-per-pole CBs, grading capacitors are installed in parallel with each
contact to equalize the voltage when the contacts part.
In general, the fastest contact has the longest arc duration and higher contact wear.
In the case of excessive discrepancy, the fastest contact on close and slowest on trip would
cause higher voltage shocks to their grading capacitors, thus reducing their life expectancy
and that of the contacts.
Single-pole dead times can be detected and reported via the open pole detector. The
corresponding protection and monitoring functions can respond.
During single-pole dead time the load current flowing in the two healthy phases forces a
current flow via ground which may cause undesired protection pick-up. The temporary
neutral voltage displacement may also prompt undesired responses of the protection
functions.

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8.6 MEASUREMENT
A series of measured and derived values is available from the IED for onsite retrieval or for
data transfer. It is a precondition for a correct display of primary and percentage values that
the nominal values of the instrument transformers and power system be complete and
correctly entered.
Depending on the specific device and the method of connection to the instrument
transformers, some or all of the listed operational measured values may be available: Phase
currents; sensitive ground current (e.g. core balance CT); measured ground current (e.g.
Holmgreen connected phase CTs); calculated positive, negative and zero sequence
currents; measured transformer neutral current; measured ground current of the parallel line;
phase-to-ground voltages; phase-tο-phase voltages; measured neutral voltage displacement
(e.g. neutral VT or open-delta connected phase VTs); calculated positive, negative and zero
sequence voltages; operational resistance and reactance of all impedance measuring loops;
apparent, active and reactive power; frequency; power factor; thermal value of each phase,
referred to the tripping value; thermal resultant value, referred to the tripping value; line
voltage; busbar voltage; and voltage difference between line and busbar voltage (e.g. for
synchrocheck); phase angle deference between line and busbar voltage; active and reactive
components of the ground current.
When the IED has a digital communications link, data from the other ends of the line may
also be available. The currents and voltages from each end and the phase shifts between the
local and transferred measured quantities can be displayed. This may be useful for checking
the correct and consistent phasing and polarity at all ends. Furthermore, the device
addresses of the other IEDs are transmitted. The following listed are some examples of
transferred values: Device address of the remote IED; remote end phase currents; angle
difference between the phase currents of the local and remote IEDs, remote end voltages;
angle difference between the phase voltages of the local and remote IEDs, etc.
Long-term average values of ILi, I1, P, Q, S are calculated over a set period, with Min/max
measurements set-up according to user’s practise. In order to recognize abnormal operating
(but not necessarily fault) conditions, warning level measurement thresholds can be
programmed. When a programmed limit value is exceeded, a message is generated that can
allocated to output signal relays or LEDS. In contrast to the actual protection functions the
measuring function operates in the background; therefore it may not operate if the measured
values change spontaneously as in the event of a fault, or if protection functions is pick up.
Also, the measuring function is not likely to respond to fault conditions because the alarm set
point must exceeded for a sustained period.
Set points can be set to monitor values exceeding preset maximum for average phase
currents; average positive sequence current; average active, reactive or apparent power.
Similarly for dropping below preset minima, such as power factor.
The accuracy of the measured value depends on the accuracy class of the CTs and VTs,
which are normally protection class, and the measuring tolerances of the device (e.g. 0.5%
for currents and voltages, 1% for power, 10 mHz or 0.2% for frequency, etc.). The measuring
function is, therefore, not suited for tariff purposes.
An important convenience during the device commissioning is the capability to compare
between the measured values and the injected values during the secondary injection of the
device.

8.7 CONCLUSIONS
As is the case for many other fields, so too for protection, a reorientation and re-engineering
must always be considered. Frontiers between studies and site, between protection and
control, protection and operation now do not exist. Engineers must collaborate, designing

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intelligent systems and with synergy, achieving better results, saving money, time and
respecting the environment as well! They must consider integrated solutions, where
protection, SCADA, oscillograph or data logger, telecommunication, RTU, metering, control,
PLC and maintenance systems and algorithms are combined, and finally which can be
executed by common devices. In order to reduce the dependence on one device, two
systems, based in different algorithms and principles may be installed assuring redundancy,
flexibility, extensibility, security, high speed, fast reactions hence less possibilities for energy
shortages or black outs, stability, economy, optimization, friendship to environment, saving
room, capitals and manpower. Moreover, the analysed auxiliary functions of the IEDs offer
usually tools for executing power system appraisal and system operation benchmarking, in
the new de-or re-regulated competitive environment, approaching finally the system (total)
quality. Therefore the new term for the protection relays as IEDs or smart system units is
more successful, as has been realised from the preceded analysis that the so-called non-
protective or auxiliary functions of the IEDs are as much as the conventional ones and at
least of the same importance and usefulness.

8.8 REFERENCES
[1] A. Apostolov, “On-Line Equipment Monitoring Functions in Multifunctional IEDs”, 2005
Western Power Delivery Automation Conference, Spokane, WA, may 10-12,2005.
[2] “Remote On-line Management for protection and automation”, CIGRÉ WG B5-09
Technical Brochure, October 2006.
[3] M. Kezunovic, Eugene E. Webb (Professor, Texas A&M University), “The Smart Grid
Solution for Monitoring, Control and Protection in the Transmission Grid”, Lecture
presented in NTU Athens, 31 October, 2008.
[4] M. Kezunovic et al., “Atomated Monitoring of Substation Eqquipment Performance and
Maintenance Needs Using Synchronized Sampling”, EPRI, 2006.

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9 INTEGRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT
Transmission Line Protection Functions
A transmission line protection IED should provide a highly selective protection system that is
immune to changes in the surrounding power system. Applications to two and three terminal
lines, cables and transformer feeders should also be supported. The device must provide
adequate protection with or without a communications channel to the remote end of the
transmission line. The integration of many functions allows application to a wide range of
electrical power systems, providing both local and remote backup protection.
Protection IEDs often perform as universal metering, control and recording devices. They
provide multiple communications interfaces which allow them to become the servers in an
integrated substation automation system over a substation LAN.
One of the main goals in today's extremely competitive utility environment is to switch from
scheduled to event driven maintenance. A universal protection IED can significantly help in
achieving this goal, by providing tools which monitor the substation primary equipment and
indicate, as necessary, the requirement for specific maintenance actions.
All of the above listed requirements are taken into consideration in the concept of a Universal
Transmission Line Protection IED.

Universal Transmission Line Protection IED

A universal transmission line protection IED should be designed for the protection of a wide
range of overhead lines and underground cables and for both sub-transmission and
transmission voltage levels. It should also include a comprehensive range of non-protection
features to meet the requirements for substation and power system integration and aid the
user with power system diagnosis and fault analysis facilities. All these features should be
accessible locally, through the substation LAN or remotely through one of the IED’s serial
communications ports.

9.1 PROTECTION FEATURES

A transmission line protection IED must support many different protection elements in order
to meet the requirements for primary and backup applications. The following is a list of
essential protection features available in state-of-the-art protection IEDs:
• Phase current differential protection – Phase segregated restrained differential
protection acts the main protection element for the device and provides high speed,
discriminative protection for all fault types.
• Distance protection – Multiple zones of distance protection provide back-up to the
current differential protection.
• Phase overcurrent protection – Multiple stages of directional/non-directional backup
protection.
• Ground Fault Protection – Multiple stages of directional backup protection.
• Sensitive ground fault protection – Multiple stages of directional/non-directional
backup protection. Suitable also for ground fault protection on Peterson coil grounded
systems.
• Multiple setting groups – Independent setting groups to adapt for alternative power
system arrangements or customer specific applications.
• Thermal protection – Multiple stages of thermal protection for transmission lines and
cables.
• Broken conductor protection – To detect open circuit faults.

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• Stub bus protection: Applied for breaker-and-a-half and ring busbar arrangements.
• CB failure protection – Two-stage CB fail protection.
• Direct/permissive inter-trip – Independent inter-tripping facility using the device’s
protection communications channels.
• Dual redundant communications – Option for dual communications channels to
provide a high degree of security.
• Protection communications supervision – To detect failure of protection
communications and enable remedial action to be taken, i.e. switch-in communication
independent back-up protections.
• Voltage transformer supervision – To prevent maloperation of voltage dependent
protection elements upon loss of a VT input signal.
• Current transformer supervision – To prevent maloperation of ground overcurrent or
other elements in case of failure of one or more phases of a CT.
• Programmable scheme logic – Allowing user-defined protection and control logic to
suit particular customer applications.

9.2 NON-PROTECTION FEATURES

Whereas protection IEDs typically operate as protection devices for less than a 1 s/year, their
processing power should be used normally for non-protection functions that can improve the
efficiency of operations and result in the integration of different types of devices into
complete substation automation systems.
Below is a summary of common non-protection features available in IEDs:
• Autoreclosing facility: Integral three phase or single/three phase multi-shot
autoreclose.
• Check synchronism facility – To provide a synchronism check function for manual or
automatic reclosure of CBs.
• Local/remote measurements – Various measurement values from the local and
remote line ends available for display on the device or accessed from the serial
communications.
• Fault/event/disturbance records – Available through serial or LAN communications or
on the device display (Fault and event records only).
• Fault locator.
• Synchro-phasor measurements.
• Real time clock/time synchronization through IRIG-B input.
• CB state monitoring – Provides indication of discrepancy between CB auxiliary
contacts.
• CB control - Control of the CB can be achieved either locally via the user interface or
remotely.
• CB condition monitoring – Provides records and alarms regarding the number of CB
operations, the cumulative interrupted current and the CB operating time.
• Commissioning test facilities.
• Remote serial communications – To allow remote access to the devices.
• Continuous self-monitoring – Power on diagnostics and self checking routines to
provide maximum device reliability and availability.

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9.3 PROTECTION APPLICATIONS
Reduction in relay operating times is one trend in recently developed transmission line IEDs.
A number of new techniques allow for secure sub-cycle tripping. The concept of the dual-
filter scheme was developed, based on the principle of multiple data-window filters. This
scheme combines voltage and current data from half-cycle and one-cycle data windows to
obtain Zone 1 distance element detection and to achieve fast tripping times.

One-Cycle One-Cycle _
V, I
Filter Mho Calc.
Zone 1 +
Reach
Zone 1
Half-Cycle Half-Cycle _ Detection
Filter Mho Calc.
Reduced +
Zone 1
Reach

Figure 9.1 – Zone 1 Distance Element Using a Dual-

Dual-Filter Scheme

The mho distance element calculations in Figure 9.1 are discussed. Two sets of filtering
systems compute the line voltage and current phasors to achieve fast fault detection: one
fast filter using a half-cycle data window; and one conventional filter using a one-cycle data
window. This principle is applied for Zone 1 fault detection and for Zones 2 and 3 used in
communications-assisted schemes. In the case of Zone 1, the half-cycle detector has a
shorter reach than that of the one-cycle detector. For Zones 2 and 3, the reach remains the
same.

High-Speed Directional and Fault Type Selection

Mho-type detectors are inherently directional but are not useful for fault type selection
because multiple elements may pick up for single-phase-to-ground faults. Furthermore,
phasors derived from the half-cycle data window are less stable than those derived from the
one-cycle data window. Therefore, in order to achieve security for high-speed tripping, the
fast mho-type fault detectors are supplemented with the HSD-FTS algorithm. This algorithm
uses the sign of the torques in Equation 9.1 to establish direction and their relative values to
select the fault type.

[
∆TAB = Re al ∆VAB ⋅ (1∠θ L1 ⋅ ∆I AB )
*
]
∆TBC = Re al [∆V ⋅ (1∠θ L1 ⋅ ∆I BC )]
*
BC (9.1)
∆TCA = Re al [∆V ⋅ (1∠θ L1 ⋅ ∆I CA )]
*
CA

Where
∆VAB = two-cycle window A-phase-to-B-phase incremental voltage
∆IAB = two-cycle window A-phase-to-B-phase incremental current
The high-speed directional element provides a combined directional and fault type selection
signal for a total of seven outputs in each direction. Figure 9.2 shows the logic for the A-
phase-to-ground impedance loop, using signals from the one-cycle and half-cycle data-
window fault detectors to get the final loop logic signal.

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 One-Cycle Directional Element

A-Phase One-Cycle
Fault Selection

A-Phase-to-Ground A-Phase-to-Ground
One-Cycle Mho Element
Fault Detector-MAG

High-Speed Directional
HSD-AGF
A-Phase-to-Ground
Half-Cycle Mho Element

Figure 9.2 – A-Phase Impedance Loop Half-

Half- and One-
One-Cycle Combination
Combination Logic

High-Speed Distance Element Performance

Figure 9.3 shows the two calculations for a distance m along a long line in a 50 Hz system.
An A phase-to-ground fault occurs at 0.1 s within the Zone 2 reach, in a system with a SIR =
0.2. The half-cycle element detects the fault at 0.111 s, 12 ms faster than the one-cycle
element which detects the fault at 0.123 s.

2
m one-cycle
m half-cycle detection
detection
1.5
m calculation (pu)

1
Zone 2 reach = r

0.5

Fault
inception
0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Time (Seconds)

Figure 9.3 – m Calculations for a Zone 2 A-

A-Phase-
Phase-to-
to-Ground Fault

Device-to-Device Communications
Digital communications techniques and modern communications channels provide many
opportunities to advance the speed, security, dependability, and sensitivity of protection.
Direct digital communications integrated in distance protection or other IEDs provide multiple
bits in each direction that lead to simpler, more flexible, and economical protection design
schemes. Sharing digital information directly from one device to another adds new
possibilities for pilot protection, adaptive relaying, monitoring, and CB failure, among others.
Modern fibre optic networks or other types of communications links are excellent channels to
consider for direct device-to-device applications.

Single-Phase Tripping and Auto-Reclosing

In a single-phase tripping scheme, only the faulted phase of the transmission line is
interrupted for single line-to-ground faults. This improves both the reliability of power
transmission and the stability of the system against power swings.

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 Relay Relay

L1 AG R1

Relay Relay

BG
L2 R2
L R

Figure 9.4 – Cross-

Cross-Country Fault

In a simple pilot scheme, the fault depicted in Figure 9.4 may result in correct single-phase
tripping by the relays at R1 and R2, but incorrect three-phase tripping by the relays at L1 and
L2. This is because the pilot channel information has only two states: either the relays see a
fault or they do not. The faulted phase selection is performed by the local relays. In this
example, the relays at L1 and L2 select an ABG fault resulting in a three-phase trip for a
single-line-to-ground fault. In distance protection IEDs, integrated digital device-to-device
communications channel can be used to transmit multiple bits of the actual faulted phase
selection, in addition to the permissive signal.
The device at the remote substation checks both the received phase selection information
and its own logic, and then trips the proper faulted phase. The inclusion of a DTT bit and a
reclose blocking bit in the same digital message improves the CB failure function and
prevents reclosing into a faulted CB. The pilot digital communications channel provides
superior performance when compared to traditional communications channels regarding
security, availability, and speed. Unavailability can be improved more than 20% by adding a
simple digital device-to-device communications channel in existing installations that use PLC
to key permissive trips.

Additional Applications of Device-to-Device Communications

The following applications of device-to-device communications are only some of many other
examples which include:
• Automated relay setting group changes that adjust distance protection reach setting
to better handle the mutual coupling effect of parallel lines in the event of one circuit
being taken out of service for maintenance, and safety grounds having been applied
at both line ends.
• Setting group changes to adjust distance protection reach settings in the event of a
CB being opened for maintenance on a three-terminal line protection application that
removes the infeed from that terminal.
• Automatic substation restoration schemes that can be implemented using the ability
to exchange multiple bits of information between devices without the need to utilize
additional equipment such as programmable logic controllers.

Synchronized Phasor Measurements applications

Line protection IEDs are available with synchronized phasor measurement capabilities.
These devices can provide synchronized phasor measurements that eliminate the need to
have different devices for protection, control, and electric power system analysis for system-
wide applications and traditional protection applications. Whereas these relays are applied
widely, especially on EHV systems, the phasor measurement function will proliferate, and it
will no longer be necessary to justify separate phasor measurement devices since

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synchronized phasor measurement capabilities will come functionally integrated, at no
additional cost, within the line protection IED.
The addition of synchrophasor measurement in line protection IEDs results in increased
power system reliability and provides easier disturbance analysis, protection, and control
capabilities compared with approaches using different information sources.
Synchronized phasor measurements can be used additionally for the following power system
applications:
• Transient and dynamic instability prediction.
• Special protection schemes.
• Disturbance analysis and power system monitoring.
• Adaptive direct and under-frequency load shedding.
• Wide area protection and control.
• Adaptive relaying.
The list of applications above is by no means complete. It is only included to generate
interest in the application of Synchrophasor measurements.

9.4 CONTROL APPLICATIONS

Many integrated protection and control applications are presently applied in IEDs. However,
more advanced control applications require adequate knowledge of the power system state
at remote locations. The availability and use of synchronized phasor measurements will
permit advanced power system protection and control strategies.

Power Swing Blocking (PSB)

(See also section 6.2) Electrical disturbances (disconnection of lines, faults, auto-reclosing,
etc.) force generators to adjust to the new load condition. The adjustment will not take place
immediately but as an oscillation, known as a Power Swing. Normally, it will be a damped
oscillation and generators will be able to return to a normal state. However, in some cases,
the swing will be so large that the generators lose synchronism and run out-of-step
Transmission line protection systems that depend on a phase comparison or differential
protection techniques will not notice the swings crossing the protected line. Out-of-step
tripping protection may be used to supplement differential or phase comparison protection,
where line opening during an out-of-step condition is required.
During power swings, distance protection registers large transient currents and, especially at
the electrical centre, small voltages. Small voltages with simultaneous large currents imply
small impedances, which could lead again to tripping by the distance protection.
Due to the effect of a power swing on distance protection, some of the protective functions
must be blocked during the power swing. Selective blocking of the various zones of
protection is possible with IEDs, improving the flexibility and optimization of applications. The
duration of the blocking can be changed by setting, as well as the configuration of the
impedance limits, so as to avoid the effects of charge.
The powerful computation ability of IEDs has permitted the improvement and sometimes
replacement of conventional PSB algorithms based on the speed of the impedance locus,
with new algorithms, some even with no settings.
The continuous impedance measurement method which inspects the trajectory of the
impedance locus; the estimation of swing-centre voltage method; synchrophasor techniques;
or the superimposed components method (power swing will result in continuous change to
superimposed currents, rather than a step change as in the case of fault inceptions) are
some of the new methods developed in recent years.

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Blocking is required to be removed if a fault is subsequently detected. The occurrence of a
system fault will take priority over the power swing blocking. In this case, a three-pole trip
command (without AR) is preferred.

Out-of-Step Tripping
Sometimes, an out-of-step (OOS) tripping can be desirable on transmission lines to separate
the unstable grid into sub-grids with the aim of trying to reach stability in these sub-grids.
Ideally, the systems should be separated at such points so as to maintain a balance between
load and generation in each of the separated areas.
In these cases, upon detection of an out-of step condition, the out-of-step tripping system
issues trip command signals to pre-determined CBs to separate the system into two or
several islands.

Auto-Reclosing
Auto-reclosing (AR) is one of the functions integrated into line protection IEDs. AR manages
the automatic closing of the CB after the trip, once the dead time is expired. During this time,
the fault (providing it is a transient fault) is expected to be extinguished.
Whereas most faults on HV overhead lines are transient, the use of AR in order to improve
the system stability is justified.
Single-phase tripping (followed by AR) is often used due to its low impact on the stability.
One common practice is to give an initial single pole trip followed by a three pole trip if the
fault remains after the autoreclosing. Thus, according to the type of trip (1 pole or 3 pole), the
AR behaviour must be different (timers, blockings, etc), i.e. when a three pole tripping takes
place, it is common to use different dead time settings at the line ends in order to allow one
CB to close with the dead line condition, while the other CB is allowed to close with
synchrocheck.
In the case of protection and AR redundancy (i.e. 2x21+2x79), coordination between the two
devices requires an exchange of information signals (AR in progress, AR 1 Pole mode, AR 3
Pole forced, AR Close Command, etc). The use of communications channels to send this
information reduces and simplifies the physical wiring.
When the managing of 2 CBs is necessary (Breaker-and-a-half arrangement, ring-bus
arrangement, etc.) two IEDs with AR can be used working in “master-slave” mode, by means
of logic that uses the information received from the other device.
Some devices include the AR functionality for two CBs; thus, no additional devices are
necessary for this function, resulting in simplified wiring.

Synchrocheck Function
IEDs incorporate synchronism units to supervise the closing of the CBs in the protected area.
The integration of synchrocheck in the IED avoids the use of external wiring, including digital
inputs and outputs and analog signals from VTs.
IEDs can manage the synchronism between several voltage sources and the line voltage,
cooperating with complex autoreclosing schemes. When several CBs are going to be
automatically closed (i.e. breaker-and-a-half or ring-bus arrangements), it is necessary to
have one synchronism unit per CB.
As an alternative to using one device per CB, it is possible to use one dedicated IED,
allowing multiple synchronism voltage sources in order to sort out the full scheme.
Furthermore, if alternative voltage sources can be used in the absence of the original one,
these devices with multiple synchronism voltage inputs can be programmed to select the
most appropriate voltage source. Both the primary and the alternative voltage sources are

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wired to the device and, depending on internal logic, the devices use one of them to decide
the close permission.
It is now possible to use line and busbar voltages from different phases, compensating the
angular difference by means of numerical settings. The same occurs with voltage inputs
coming from VTs with different ratios.
There are two techniques to verify that a static phase angle or a rotating phase angle is
within a specified limit. The phase angle/time comparison technique introduces a time delay
that can be important and the phase angle/slip technique that does not introduce extra time
into the decision. This technique takes into account the frequency slip across the CB in order
to give the close command at the best moment (0º). The device continuously estimates the
angular difference some ms after the current moment (the CB closing time) and tries to give
the close permission when the estimation is near 0º.

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10 IEC 61850 IMPACT ON TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION
IEC 61850 is a new approved international standard for substation communications that has
already had a significant impact on the development of different devices and systems used in
the substation. All major substation protection and control equipment manufacturers have
products that implement different forms of IEC 61850 communications to simplify integration
into substation automation systems and improve the functionality of the system, while
reducing the overall system cost. New protection solutions are being developed in order to
take full advantage of the functionality supported in the standard.
Maturity of the standard has been proven through successful interoperability demonstrations
in events like IEEE Transmission & Distribution expositions and CIGRÉ meetings.
IEC 61850 supports the functional hierarchy of a substation protection and control system
based on the Substation and Process Bus definitions in the standard. Distributed function
definitions related to various protection functions and schemes affect the development and
implementation of transmission line protection systems.
Distributed protection applications are based on Station Bus high-speed peer-to-peer
communications using GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) or Process Bus
sampled analog values.
The object models of transmission line protection functions allow the standardization of the
configuration of protection IEDs and are another important element of IEC 61850 that
supports self-description.
The Substation Configuration Language (SCL) is another differentiating component of the
standard that allows the development of standard engineering tools which can be used for
transmission line protection applications.
Transmission line protection IEDs are integrated in substation protection and automation
systems that consist of many other IEDs. They exchange signals over the Process or Station
bus in high-speed peer-to-peer communications. Testing of such systems requires detailed
understanding of the modelling, communications architecture and functional specification of
the system. The different components of the system have to meet the interoperability and
performance requirements of the standard in order to execute the multiple distributed
applications they are designed for. Testing of these applications is needed to demonstrate
their advantages through comparison of the performance of legacy hardwired systems with
that of communications based schemes.

10.1 IEC 61850 BASED SUBSTATION ARCHITECTURE

The development of different transmission line protection functions in the substation
protection system is possible only when there is good understanding of both the problem
domain and the IEC 61850 standard. A function in an IEC 61850 based integrated protection
and control system can be local to a specific primary device (in this case a transmission line)
or distributed and based on communications between two or more IEDs over the substation
local area network. Some examples are the implementation of CB failure protection or
autoreclosing.
IEC 61850 defines several ways for data exchange between IEDs that can be used for
different forms of distributed protection applications. It introduces a new concept that requires
a different approach and technology in order to define the individual components of the
system, as well as the overall distributed applications.
Existing protection schemes are based on hardwired interfaces between the primary
substation equipment (transformers, CBs, instrument transformers, etc.) and the secondary
protection and control devices.

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Redundancy of protection functions in conventional protection systems requires the
installation of numerous primary and backup protection devices which are wired to the
substation equipment that they interface with, and for these to be tested and maintained.
The interface requirements of the transmission line protection devices are quite different from
those of metering devices. As a result they need their own instrument transformers that allow
accurate metering of the energy or other system parameters.
A significant improvement in functionality and reduction of the cost of integrated transmission
line protection systems can be achieved based on the IEC 61850 based solutions as
described below.
Non-conventional instrument transformers with digital interfaces based on IEC 61850-9-2 [1]
(Process Bus) eliminate some of the issues related to the conflicting requirements of
protection and metering IEDs.
The interface of the instrument transformers (both conventional and non-conventional) with
different types of transmission line protection equipment is through a device called a Merging
Unit (MU). This is defined in IEC 61850-9-1 as:
“Merging unit: interface unit that accepts multiple analog CT/VT and binary inputs and
produces multiple time synchronized serial unidirectional multi-drop digital point to point
outputs to provide data communication via the logical interfaces 4 and 5”.
Existing MUs have the following functionality:
• Signal processing of all sensors – conventional or non-conventional.
• Synchronization of all measurements – 3 currents and 3 voltages.
• Analog interface – high and low level signals.
• Digital interface – IEC 60044-8 or IEC 61850-9-2.
It is important to be able to interface with both conventional and non-conventional sensors in
order to allow the implementation of the system in existing or new substations.
A simplified diagram of the communications architecture of an IEC 61850 based substation
protection system is shown in Figure 10.1.

Substation Substation
HMI Computer

Router WAN

Ethernet Switch Substation Bus

IED IED IED IED SCADA Master

Ethernet Switch Process Bus

MU IOU IOU MU

Figure 10.
10.1 – Simplified communications architecture

The MUs multicast sets of measured sampled values to multiple IEDs in the substation over
the substation local area network. In some cases this is called the “process bus”. Status
information for CBs and switches is available through an input/output unit (IOU). The MU and
the IOU can be combined in a single device.
The transmission line protection devices receiving the sampled analog values then process
the data, make decisions regarding fault detection, faulted phase selection and protection

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operation and take action based on their functionality – typically to operate their relay outputs
or to send a high-speed peer-to-peer communication message to other IEDs in order to trip a
CB or initiate some other protection or control function – for example CB failure protection or
autoreclosing.
One of the main objectives in the development of any new technology is to improve the
overall performance of the system compared with existing technology.
Conventional protection IEDs (Figure 10.2) have an analog input module and a DSP that will
process the signal and provide the data to its various protection functions. It also has a
binary (opto) input module that provides status information to the applications. Once a
decision is reached by the protection and control module, the IED will operate its relay
outputs to trip a CB, or do whatever else it is programmed to do to control the process.
Figure 10.2 shows a very simplified block diagram of a conventional protection IED and a
time diagram of the overall duration of an event (e.g. for a short circuit fault) based on the
block diagram.
Process

Analog Sensor Function Outputs Process

Sensor Module Module Module Control

Process
Status Input Multifunctional
Sensor Module IED

Process

Event Start Event End

tSM tFM tOM tPC

tEVT

Figure 10.
10.2 – Conventional IED analog interface

The overall event time tEVT is a function of the time required by each of the modules in the
IED to process the signals, make and execute the decision, plus the time for the substation
device (process control), in this case a CB, to operate and clear the fault.
The individual times in the diagram are as follows:
tSM – sensor (analog or binary input) module time
tFM – protection module time
tOM – output (relay contacts) module time
tPC – process control (e.g. CB trip) time
The times shown in Figure 10.2 are not proportional to the actual or expected times of the
individual components and may vary from one device to another.

10.2 PROCESS-BUS BASED SOLUTIONS

IEC 61850 communications based distributed applications involve several different devices
connected to a substation LAN as shown in the simplified block diagram in Figure 10.3.
An MU will process the sensor inputs, generate the sampled values for the 3 phase currents
and voltages, format a communications message and multicast it on the substation LAN.

135
An IOU will process the status inputs, generate status data, format a communications
message and multicast it on the substation LAN.
Any IED may then receive sampled values messages and binary status messages, process
the data (including re-sampling in most of the cases), make a decision and operate its
outputs that interface with the process control.
The system in Figure 10.3 is a partial implementation of a communications based protection
system. It is partial, because only the input part is based on analog data and status data
messages. The process control, e.g. tripping of a CB, is directly executed through the contact
outputs of the protection IED.

Figure 10.
10.3 – Distributed application interface (partial implementation)

it can be seen from Figure 10.3 that there are a few more steps in the process that may
result in similar or possibly worse performance compared to the conventional protection IED
in Figure 10.2.
The individual times in the diagram are as follows:
tSM – sensor (analog or binary input) module time
tIM1 – MU interface module time
tLAN – LAN time
tIM2 –IED interface module time
tFM – function module time
tOM – output (relay contacts) module time
tPC – process control (e.g. CB trip) time
It is clear from the time diagrams in Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3 that the sensor module,
function module and output module times have to be shorter than in the conventional IED in
order to compensate for the addition of the two interface module times and the transmission
time over the substation LAN (in order to achieve similar performance).
In the case of the complete implementation of a communications based transmission line
protection and control system (Figure 10.4), the process control commands (e.g. CB trip) are
executed by a device close to the substation process (in this example the CB). The IED must
send a message to the IOU that is processed and will result in the operation of output
contacts that will trip the CB.
The number of steps required for the detection of the fault condition and tripping of the CB
further increases as can be seen from the time diagram in Figure 10.4.

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 Figure 10.
10.4 – Distributed application interface (complete implementation)

The individual times in the diagram are as follows:

tSM – sensor (analog or binary input) module time
tIM1 – MU interface module time
tLAN1 – LAN time (MU to IED)
tIM2 –IED interface module time
tPM – protection module time
tIM3 – protection IED interface module time
tLAN2 – LAN time (protection IED to control interface unit)
tIM4 – control interface unit interface module time
tOM – output (relay contacts) module time
tPC – process control (e.g. CB trip) time
The sensor module, protection module and output module times have to be further
decreased to compensate for the addition of two more interface module times and a second
transmission time over the substation LAN in order to keep the overall distributed application
performance within the required range.
Whereas there is an increase in the number of elements that apparently affect the overall
performance of IEC 61850 based protection solutions, the times listed above are in reality
very short and will not result in deterioration of the overall performance of the protection
function. This performance has to meet the requirements of the application and the
definitions in the standard for protection.

10.3 ADVANTAGES OF PROCESS-BUS BASED SOLUTIONS

Process bus based applications offer some important advantages over conventional hard
wired analog circuits. One such advantage is the reduction in the cost of the system due to
the replacement of multiple copper cables with a small number of fibre optic cables.
Another benefit is the practical elimination of CT saturation because of the elimination of the
current leads resistance. It is well known that the CT knee-point voltage is a function of the
resistance of the different components of the current circuit:
VK = f (RCT, RL, RRP) (10.1)

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Where:
VK = Required CT knee-point voltage (V)
RCT = Resistance of the CT secondary winding (Ω)
RL = Resistance of a single lead from the device to the CT (Ω)
RRP = Impedance of a device phase current input (Ω)
In some cases RL is multiplied by 2 and plays a key role in determining the CT requirements.
If the CT secondary is connected to the phase current input of the MU, RL is practically equal
to zero and will be only dependent on:
VK = f (RCT, RRP) (10.2)
In this case the impedance of the MU current inputs RRP is very small, effectively resulting in
the elimination of CT saturation and all protection issues associated with it.
This approach improves substation safety by eliminating the risk of an open current circuit
condition. If this occurs while the primary winding is energized, the induced secondary e.m.f.
under these circumstances can be high enough to present a hazard to human safety and
equipment insulation.
The process bus also improves the flexibility of the protection system. Whereas current
circuits cannot be switched easily due to open circuit concerns, the application of
conventional transmission line protection, as well as some backup protection schemes
becomes more complicated. This not an issue with process bus, because any changes will
only require modifications in the subscription of the protection IEDs receiving the sampled
analog values over IEC 61850-9-2.

10.4 PROTECTION PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Different distributed functions impose a variety of performance requirements which must be
considered in the design process of substation protection, control, monitoring and recording
systems.

Figure 10.
10.5 – Transfer time definition

IEC 61850 defines performance requirements for the more typical substation functions. The
transfer time definition [2] is based on Figure 10.5, where:
ta - time from the moment the sending IED (PD[n]) puts the data content on top of its
transmission stack until the message is sent on the network.
tb - the time over the network.
tc - the time from the moment the receiving IED (PD[m]) gets the message from the
network until the moment it extracts the data from its transmission stack.

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There are two independent groups of performance classes:
• for control and protection
• for metering and power quality applications
Whereas the performance classes are defined according to the required functionality; they
are independent from the size of the substation.
The requirements for control and protection are higher, because of the effect of the fault
clearing time on the stability of the system or on sensitive loads. IEC 61850 defines three
Performance Classes for such applications:
• P1 - applies typically to the distribution level of the substation or in cases where lower
performance requirements can be accepted.
• P2 - applies typically to the transmission level; or when not otherwise specified by the
user.
• P3 - applies typically to transmission level applications with high requirements, such
as busbar protection.
The overall performance requirements also depend on the message type, of which seven are
defined in IEC 61850. Only those related to protection are discussed here.
Type 1 is defined in the standard as a “Fast Message”.

Type 1A - Fast Messages

A trip command (Type 1A) is the most important “fast message” in the substation, and
therefore has more demanding requirements compared to all other fast messages. The same
performance may be requested for interlocking, intertripping and logic discrimination between
protection functions.
The total transmission time for Performance Class P1 shall be in the order of half a cycle.
Therefore, 10 ms is defined.
The total transmission time for Performance Classes P2 and P3 shall be below a quarter of a
cycle. Therefore, 3 ms (based on a 60 Hz system) is defined.

Type 1A - Fast Messages

All other “fast messages” are defined as Type 1B. These are important for the interaction of
the automation system with the process but have less demanding requirements compared to
the trip.
Whereas the total transmission time for type 1A messages with performance class P1 shall
be less than or equal to 100 ms; the total transmission time for performance class P2 and P3
shall be of the order of one cycle.- 16.6 ms (60 Hz systems) or 20 ms (50 Hz systems).

Type 4 - Raw Data Messages

These messages include the output data from digitizing transducers and digital instrument
transformers independent from the transducer technology (magnetic, optic, etc.).
The data consists of continuous streams of synchronized data from each IED, interleaved
with data from other IED. These messages are typical for the Process Bus applications.
The transmission time for P1 is specified as 10 ms, while for P2 and P3 it should be 3 ms.

Type 5 – Large Data Files

These messages are used for the transfer of large files of data for recording, information
purposes, settings, etc. The substation network is used for the transmission of all of the other
types of data listed above; therefore, the transferred file data must be split into blocks of

139
limited length, to allow for other communication network activities. Typically, the bit lengths of
the file type messages greater than or equal to 512 bits.
The transfer times for type 5 messages are not critical therefore there are no specific limits.
Typically, the time requirements are greater than or equal to 1 s.

Type 6 - Time synchronization messages

These messages are used to synchronize the internal clocks of the various IEDs in the
substation automation system. The requirements for time synchronization accuracy may be
very different, depending on the application. Therefore, different communications will be used
as well.
Depending on the purpose (time tagging of events or sampling accuracy of raw data)
different classes of time synchronizing accuracy are required.

10.5 ADVANTAGES OF GOOSE BASED SOLUTIONS

Conventional protection systems rely on hard wiring of the binary outputs of one device to
the binary inputs of another in order to implement different protection schemes. The
acceptance of distributed protection functions based on high-speed peer-to-peer
communications, as defined in IEC 61850, will be only possible when protection engineers
are convinced that there is no deterioration in reliability and performance as a result of
switching to the new technology.
The analysis of design considerations and test results shows that in reality there are
significant improvements in many aspects of the protection functionality, as demonstrated by
the following examples.
One of the key criteria in the design and implementation of different substation protection
schemes, especially in larger substations with multiple distribution feeders connected to the
same medium voltage busbar, is the number of available binary inputs and binary outputs in
the protection IEDs. The required numbers can be large and restrict the implementation of
schemes such as CB failure protection.
Figure 10.6 shows the case of the latter protection scheme, but with a sample number (due
to lack of space) of transmission lines shown.

Figure 10.
10.6 – IEC 61850 GSE based CB failure protection scheme

In case of a fault on a transmission line connected to a bus with multiple lines and
transformers, the relay protecting the faulted line will have to initiate the CB failure function in
all relays protecting equipment connected to that bus. The number of binary inputs, relay

140
outputs and interconnections, if for example there are 10 transmission lines connected to the
busbar, can only be imagined. In contrast, such a scheme is fairly straight forward to
implement in a substation using IEC 61850 communications.
The IED that detects the transmission line fault sends a GOOSE message to all other IEDs
connected to the transmission bus indicating that it has issued a Trip signal to clear the fault.
This can be considered as a CB failure initiate signal for all other IEDs on the bus. The only
requirement for the scheme implementation will be that all IEDs connected to equipment on
the same bus will have to subscribe to receive GOOSE messages from all other IEDs
connected to the same transmission bus.
The reliability of GOOSE based schemes is achieved through the repetition of the messages
with increased time intervals until a user defined time is reached. The latest state is then
repeated until a new change of state result in sending of a new GOOSE message.
The repetition mechanism not only ensures that the initial signal is not going to be missed by
a subscribing relay, but also provides a means for the continuous monitoring of the virtual
wiring between the different IEDs participating in a distributed protection application. Any
problems in an IED or in the communications will be immediately (within the limits of the
maximum repetition time interval) detected and alarm or other action will be taken to resolve
the problem. This is not possible in conventional hard wired schemes where problems in the
wiring or in device inputs and outputs can only be detected through scheduled maintenance.
One of the key requirements for the application of distributed protection functions using
GOOSE messages is that the total scheme operating time is similar to the time of a hard
wired conventional scheme. If the different factors which determine the operating time of a
critical protection scheme such as CB failure protection are analysed, it will be realised that it
requires a device to initiate the CB failure protection through a relay output wired into a
binary input on another device. The relay output typically has an operating time of 3-4 ms
and it is not unusual that the binary input may include some filtering in order to prevent an
undesired initiation of this critical function. As a result, if this simple hard wired interface is
considered to be the transmission time between the two functions in Figure 10.5; the time
between the two functions in the conventional scheme will be between 0.5 and 0.75 cycles –
longer than the required 0.25 cycles defined for critical protection applications in IEC 61850
based systems.
This is not just theoretical analysis, but has been proven in test directly comparing the
operation of hardwired versus communications based schemes as shown in Figure 10.7
below.

Figure 10.
10.7 – Comparison test setup

141
The test shows 2 IEDs with IEC 61850 communications that are programmed to loop-back a
hardwired or GOOSE signal. The first device is directly wired to a standard test set
programmed to operate a relay output that initiates the relays operating sequence.
On sensing the closing of the test device contact, the first IED operates a relay output and
sends a GOOSE message. The receiving IED immediately sends back a GOOSE message
and closes a relay output wired into an input of the first IED, which is configured to close one
contact for the hardwired and another for the GOOSE message.
Figure 10.8 shows the result from the test. The difference between the operation of the two
relay outputs that are being compared shows that the hardwired scheme is about 14 ms
slower (with binary input filtering enabled).

Figure 10.
10.8 – Results from comparison test

10.6 REFERENCES
[1] International Standard IEC 61850, Communication networks and systems in
substations – Part 9-2: Specific Communication System Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled
values over ISO/IEC 8802-3, First edition 2003-05.
[2] International Standard IEC 61850, Communication networks and systems in
Substations – Part 5: Communication requirements for functions and device models,
First edition 2003-07.

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11 APPLICATION EXAMPLES

11.1 BENEFITS OF INCREASED NUMBERS OF DISTANCE PROTECTION ZONES

In prescribing the number of zones ideally necessary, it is important to differentiate between
non-communication dependent and communication dependent zones. This is needed to
avoid setting conflicts, especially in parallel line applications. Two methods are commonly
adopted in the IED; either automatic zero sequence mutual compensation, or switching
parameter setting groups depending on line configuration. Zero sequence mutual
compensation is sometimes not available in the distance function, or may not be considered
necessary. In either method, the accuracy of the parallel line data is crucial to the reliability
and security of the protection scheme.
For example, in a POTT scheme, if a common zone (say Zone 2) is used for both, back-up
tripping as well as communications; it’s setting would sometimes have to meet two different,
and possibly contradictory, requirements. By using an additional zone, purely for
communication, the restriction on the setting for back-up tripping is eliminated. Furthermore,
the setting for the communication zone does not have a strict limiting boundary and this
obviates the need to have accurate parallel line data, and makes engineering easier since
line configuration information need not be considered. In short, introducing an additional
zone removes the need to have automatic mutual compensation or pre-calculated settings in
different setting groups.
The following zone allocation is possible in distance protection IEDs.

The non-communication dependent zones are as follows:

• Zone 1: Under-reaching forward, undelayed, 0.8 (max. 0.85 if electro-magnetic VT).
In the case of very short lines with overreaching schemes, or to prevent unwanted
overreach due to measuring tolerances, or not sufficiently well known impedance
values like in cable feeders; this zone may be disabled.
• Zone 2: Overreaching, selectable forward or reverse, normally forward overreaching
the opposite bus, 1.18 times minimum overreach.
• Zone 3: Overreaching, selectable forward or reverse, if forward, to cover full line and
opposite bus even in case of double lines, without mutual compensation (Zone 3
approx. 1.8 times), preferably back-up to adjacent lines.
• Zone 4: Non-directional covering local and remote busbars, forward adjacent lines,
forward and reverse reach separately settable

The communication dependent zones are as follows:

• Overreaching forward zone (independent of Zones 2 and 3): Undelayed, for POTT.
• Reverse zone: Undelayed, for Blocking overreach schemes and/or current reversal
logic.
Where only five zones are available; Zones 3 and 4 may be combined into one zone.
Alternatively, one of the communication dependent zones may not be necessary, depending
on the type of communication scheme employed, and if there are no parallel lines.
In principle, sub-transmission applications use more zones than transmission applications
because there is no redundancy for the line, and upstream backup protection must operate
for a local protection failure. In transmission applications, when there are redundant Busbar
and breaker fail protections as a minimum, one underreaching Zone 1 and the
communication dependent zones are sufficient; otherwise Zones 1, 2, 3 and the
communication dependent zones are required.

143
11.2 FAULT LOCATION IN TRANSMISSION LINE IEDS
Accurate fault location information helps operators and other utility personnel to expedite
service restoration and reduce outage time, operating costs, and customer complaints. Fault
location has been quite successful using phasor measurement data from one end of a
transmission line and is implemented in most transmission line IEDs. However, this method
has some accuracy limitations due to load flow, mutual coupling, fault resistance, and system
non-homogeneity. Multi-ended methods have been developed to improve the fault location
estimate [1]-[5]. A number of these methods typically require processing of the fault data off
line using multi-ended fault location algorithms.
Two-ended impedance-based fault locating methods can improve upon the accuracy of
single-ended methods. Schweitzer [1] introduced a two-ended method, which did not require
or assume external system parameter values. The method in [1] did not require time
synchronization of the data; however, it required knowledge of pre-fault load flow information
for phase alignment. Most of the two-ended methods require the phase alignment of data
sets captured at both ends of a monitored line using pre-fault load flow information, iterative
methods, and communication of a significant amount of data between protection terminals
[2]-[4]. Some of the two-ended methods have one or more limitations, such as a requirement
for data alignment, knowledge of pre-fault load flow information, the need to perform
iterations, and communication of large amounts of data between terminals. Furthermore, a
number of multi-terminal methods may not be applicable to overhead lines with zero-
sequence mutual coupling.
Distance protection IEDs have integrated digital communications channels with the ability to
exchange analog data information between devices as well as logic-based status
information. Furthermore, distance protection IEDs include expanded logic control equation
programming with math and comparison functions. The functional integration of digital
communications with analog data transmission and math functionality can provide more
accurate fault location to operators in almost real time.
Reference [5] describes a two-ended fault location algorithm that is suitable for inclusion in a
line protection IED, where remote transmission line IEDs communicate over a digital
communications channel. Advances of this algorithm include the following: the data required
for fault location estimation do not rely on pre-fault load flow information, do not need to be
synchronized, and the volume of data communicated between devices is sufficiently small to
be easily transmitted using a digital protection channel. In addition, the multi-ended fault
location algorithm is not iterative, does not require phase selection information for
unbalanced faults, and is very accurate. Finally, the algorithm described in [5] is not affected
by pre-fault load flow and its direction, zero-sequence mutual coupling, fault resistance,
power system non-homogeneity, or current infeed from other line terminals or tapped loads.
Figure 11.1 and Figure 11.2 show the results of single-ended and a two-ended fault location
algorithm for a line-to-ground fault located 25% from one line-end in a parallel two-circuit
500 kV line configuration. In addition, the fault location algorithm can calculate the fault
resistance in secondary Ohms.

144
 (DASHED:SINGLE-ENDED, SOLID:DOUBLE-ENDED)

34

32

DISTANCE TO FAULT IN %
30

28

26

24

22

20

18

16
0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
Time (S)

Figure 11.
11.1 – Fault Location from Device 1 (Ideal=25)

(DASHED:SINGLE-ENDED, SOLID:DOUBLE-ENDED)
100

95
DISTANCE TO FAULT IN %

90

85

80

75

70

65

60
0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
Time (S)

Figure 11.
11.2 – Fault Location from Device 2 (Ideal=75)
(Ideal=75)

11.3 SYNCHROPHASOR-BASED TRANSMISSION LINE BACKUP PROTECTION

To date, synchronized phasor measurements have been used mainly for power system
model validation, post event analysis, real-time display, and other similar activities. However,
synchrophasors have a greater potential than monitoring and visualization. Synchrophasors
will increasingly contribute to the reliable and economical operation of power systems as
real-time control and protection schemes become more widely used [6].
IEDs that combine time-synchronized measurements and programmable logic control
facilities can use synchrophasor measurements from both ends of a two-terminal
transmission line to provide backup protection (see Figure 11.3). Line protection IEDs
calculate synchrophasors at specific rates (e.g. 60 times per second). Communications
channels make local and remote time-stamped currents available to local and remote IEDs.
These IEDs time align the local and remote currents on a per-phase basis, calculate the
sequence components, and make this information available to faulted-phase identification
(FPI) logic and protection elements, such as negative-sequence (87LQ) and zero-sequence
(87LG) current differential elements. The FPI logic makes these synchrophasor-based
elements suitable for single-pole tripping applications.
Synchrophasor-based backup protection elements can detect faults with fault resistance (RF)
greater than 300 Ω within 160 ms. This RF coverage is similar to that of negative-sequence
voltage-polarized directional elements (67Q).

145
This section describes two applications that use synchrophasors for ground fault backup
transmission line protection.

GPS Rcvr GPS Rcvr

Synchrophasors
Relay 1 Relay 2

A B

Local
Line
Synchrophasors
Protection Trip
Time
Alignment Power Swing Alarm
Remote Detection
Synchrophasors
(Relay 1 Partial)

Figure 11.
11.3 - Relays exchange synchrophasors for backup line protection in a two
two--terminal line
application

11.3.1 FAULTED PHASE IDENTIFICATION

The synchrophasor-based protection element includes FPI logic [7] that uses the total zero-
sequence and total negative-sequence fault currents [8]. The total currents are the sum of
the local and remote currents. The FPI logic calculates the angle difference between the total
negative and zero-sequence fault currents, and compares the relative magnitudes of the total
T T T
phase-to-phase currents ( IAB , IBC , and ICA ) with the maximum phase-to-phase current to
identify the faulted phase. This logic in Figure 11.4 asserts bit FSA for A-phase faults, bit
FSB for B-phase faults, and bit FSC for C-phase faults:
Where:
T
I0 is the total zero-sequence current phasor

T
I2 is the total negative-sequence current phasor
T
IAB is the total A-phase minus B-phase current phasor
T
IBC is the total B-phase minus C-phase current phasor

T
ICA is the total C-phase minus A-phase current phasor

The IED uses the output of the FPI logic for tripping the faulted phase in single pole tripping
applications.

146
Figure 11.
11.4 - Faulted phase identification logic uses total negative
negative--sequence and zero-
zero-sequence fault
current

11.3.2 NEGATIVE-SEQUENCE CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL

The negative-sequence current differential, 87LQ, element characteristic uses operating
OP RT
( I 2
) and restraint ( I 2
) quantities [7] according to (11.1) and (11.2).

= I2 + I2
OP L R
I2 (11.1)

=
RT L R
I2 I2 – I2 (11.2)

The element operates when the following conditions are met:

> 87 _ Slope • I2
OP RT
I2 (11.3)

> 0.1 • INOM

OP
I2 (11.4)

Where 87_Slope is the slope of the 87LQ element characteristic.

The relay aligns the local and remote phasors according to their time stamps. Therefore, one
advantage of using time-stamped phasors is that channel asymmetry does not affect the
element operating and restraint quantities. The 87LG element operates similarly to 87LQ but
uses zero-sequence quantities.

11.3.3 NEGATIVE-SEQUENCE CURRENT DIRECTIONAL ELEMENT

L
The negative-sequence current directional element, 32IQ, compares the angle of I2 with
R
that of I2 and makes the trip decision according to (11.5). This element detects high-
impedance faults when the negative-sequence currents enter the transmission line at both
ends.

Re [I • (I ) ]> 0
L
2
R ∗
2
(11.5)

147
Where
L
I2 is the local negative-sequence current phasor
R
I2 is the remote negative-sequence current phasor

Figure 11.5 shows the basic logic for 32IQ. The Protection Enable bit, PREN, asserts when
L R L
I2 and I2 exceed the element sensitivity threshold, e.g., 0.1• INOM, and when I2 is
L L
greater than I1 , where I1 is the local positive-sequence current phasor. Communications
channel health, data integrity, and time synchronization also supervise this logic. The 32IQ
output asserts when all the previous conditions are valid.

IL2

IR2
[ ( ) ]> 0
Re IL2 • IR2
∗

Figure 11.
11.5 - Negative-
Negative-sequence current directional element, 32IQ, with current magnitude, channel
channel
health, data integrity, and time synchronization supervision.

11.3.4 PROTECTION ELEMENT PERFORMANCE

Figure 11.6 illustrates the RF coverage of the 67Q, 32IQ, and 87LQ elements for phase-to-
ground faults at different fault locations along the transmission line of the system in Figure
11.7. When element sensitivities are set to 0.1•INOM, the 32IQ and 87LQ RF coverage
matches the intersection of the local and remote 67Q coverage. In a permissive overreaching
transfer trip (POTT) scheme with forward and reverse elements, the scheme must coordinate
forward and reverse 67Q element sensitivities. The 32IQ and 87LQ elements do not have
this requirement, so one can set them more sensitive than 67Q elements. Figure 11.8 shows
the additional RF coverage of 32IQ and 87LQ with 0.05•INOM sensitivity.

Figure 11.
11.6 - Power system parameters and
and operating conditions to analyze RF coverage capabilities
of the 87LQ, and 67Q elements

148
 Figure 11.
11.7 - 32IQ, 87LQ, and 67Q element RF coverage for phase-
phase-to-
to-ground faults at different line
locations
locations

Figure 11.
11.8 - 32IQ and
and 87LQ RF coverage with 0.05•INOM and 0.1•INOM sensitivity

The operating time of the directional elements depends on the synchrophasor message rate,
the synchrophasor filtering process, and element sensitivity. Figure 11.9 shows 32IQ element
operating time for an A-phase-to-ground-fault with RF = 450 Ω located 30% from the local
end (left) for the system in Figure 11.6. The local and remote relays are set with a sensitivity
of 0.1•INOM and they operate in 165 ms and 158 ms, respectively. In this application, the
relays exchange synchrophasors at 20 messages per second, and the filtering system
attenuates harmonics according to C37.118 [9]. The relays exchange IA, IB, and IC
synchronized phasors along with their corresponding synchronized time stamps through the
use of peer-to-peer relay communications at 38.4 kbit/s. A faster message rate and faster
filtering process can reduce element operating time.

149
Figure 11.
11.9 - FPI, 32IQ, and 67Q operating times for an A-
A-phase-
phase-to-
to-ground fault located 30%
30% from the
local end

11.4 PARALLEL LINES

11.4.1 COMMUNICATIONS-AIDED PHASE SELECTION IN DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEMES

Today, many electric utilities are faced with the need to supply more reliable power without
the addition of new transmission lines. Increased use of transmission line single-phase
tripping and reclosing design is one of the means to achieve this goal. In a single-phase
tripping scheme, only the faulted phase of the transmission line is interrupted for single line-
to-ground faults. This allows power to be transmitted over the line on the remaining two
healthy phases while the fault is cleared. This improves both the reliability of power
transmission and the stability of the system against power swings.
The term cross-country fault is applied when multiple faults occur on the system at the same
time and at different locations. For example, an A-phase-to-ground fault may occur on the
protected line at the same time that a B-phase-to-ground fault occurs on an adjacent or
parallel line. A cross-country fault may have minimal effect on a three-phase tripping
application, but may present a major problem to a single-phase tripping application.

Relay Relay

L1 AG R1

Relay Relay

L2 BG R2
L R

Figure 11.
11.10 – Cross-
Cross-country fault
fault

Consider the system in Figure 11.10 with line-to-ground faults as shown near Bus R. The
relay at R1 correctly identifies the fault as an A-phase-to-ground fault, and the relay at R2

150
correctly identifies the fault as a B-phase-to-ground fault. Relays L1 and L2 sense the fault
as a double line-to-ground fault because the two single-phase-to-ground faults are at
essentially the same electrical point on the system. In a simple teleprotection scheme, the
fault depicted in Figure 11.10 may result in correct single-phase tripping by the relays at R1
and R2, but incorrect three-phase tripping by the relays at L1 and L2. This is because the
information exchanged over the communications channel is two-state only: either the relays
see a fault or they do not see a fault. The faulted phase selection is performed by the local
relays. In this example, the relays at L1 and L2 select an ABG fault type resulting in a three-
phase trip for a single-line-to-ground fault. Several approaches may be employed to avoid
this maloperation:
• The teleprotection tripping can be delayed sufficiently long to allow the Zone 1
elements at Bus R to initiate single-phase tripping. After the CBs at Bus R open the
proper faulted phases, the relays at L1 and L2 also select the correct phases to trip.
• Multiple two-state communications channels can be used to transmit phase
identification in addition to trip permission.
• A digital device-to-device communications channel can be used to transmit multiple
bits of the actual faulted phase selection, in addition to the permissive signal.
The first solution introduces a time delay and requires that the protection on the parallel line
operates to clear the fault on that line. The second solution improves upon the first; however,
the scheme requires multiple communications equipment and additional channel bandwidth,
which makes it very expensive and less reliable. The third solution requires the transmission
of faulted phase selection information and the permissive trip signal. The relay at the remote
station checks the received phase selection information against its own logic, and trips the
proper faulted phase. The inclusion of a DTT bit and a reclose blocking bit in the same digital
message improves the CB failure function and prevents reclosing into a faulted CB. The
digital communications channel provides superior performance when compared to traditional
communications channels regarding security, availability, and speed [10][11]. Unavailability
can be improved more than 20% by adding a simple digital device-to-device communications
channel in existing installations that use PLC equipment to key permissive trips [11].

11.4.2 BLOCKING OF HIGH-SPEED AR FOR CB FAILURE OR OUT-OF-SYNCH CONDITIONS

R S

S 1 L1 L2 6 S

Relay 1 Relay 6
2 5

Relay 2 Relay 5
T
3
Relay-to-Relay
T1 T2 Communications

G1

Figure 11.
11.11 – Applications
Applications of Device-
Device-to-
to-Device Communications

Consider Figure 11.11 in which a fault occurs inside Transformer T1, and CB2 fails to trip at
Station T. For this fault, CB1 at Station R must open due to the CB failure condition of CB2 at
Station T and not be allowed to reclose. In a traditional protection scheme, a separate direct
transfer trip is applied between Stations R and T to perform the above function. Device-to-
device communications capability between relays of L1 and L2 in conjunction with

151
programmable logic can be used to send a DTT from Station T to Stations R and S during
CB failure conditions at Station T and block reclosing at the remote stations [12].
Using the same network, consider a fault on L1 for which CB1 at Station R and CB2 at
Station T open to clear the line fault, and at the same time a maloperation occurs at Station
S, which opens CB6. If high-speed reclosing is applied on both CBs of L1 without any other
considerations, there is a possibility of reclosing out of synchronism with generator G1,
causing considerable damage to the generator. For this scenario, using device-to-device
communications and programmable logic, a protection scheme at Station T can be designed
to detect L2 tripping at the remote Terminal S; block high-speed AR of CB2 at Station T; and
transmit an AR blocking bit to block high-speed reclosing of CB1 at Station R in order to
prevent possible damage to Generator G1. Slow-speed reclosing from Station R, followed by
CB2 closing at Station T with synch-check and slip frequency supervision allows the two
systems to parallel and improves system reliability.

11.5 THREE-TERMINAL LINES

11.5.1 MAINTAINING HIGH-SPEED TRIPPING IN THE EVENT OF ONE-CHANNEL LOSS

In three-terminal line teleprotection applications where high-speed tripping is essential, loss
of a communications channel between any two of the three terminals renders the
teleprotection scheme inoperable. Consider the system in Figure 11.12 in which a permissive
overreaching transfer trip (POTT) scheme is applied using PLC communications equipment
with independent communications paths between Terminals R, S, and T. Tripping is
accelerated if the local device detects a fault, and a permissive trip signal is received from
each of the remote terminals. Loss of a communications channel between any two terminals
renders the overall teleprotection scheme inoperable, resulting in tripping by the time-
delayed Zone 2 elements.
R S

G G

G
Figure 11.
11.12 – Three-
Three-Terminal System with Independent Communications Paths

Device-to-device communications and programmable logic can maintain high-speed

protection, even in the event of one channel-loss between any two of the three line terminals.
The ability to send a direct transfer trip bit as part of the digital message allows the protection
system to rapidly clear internal faults, rather than in the Zone 2 backup time. For example, if
the communication is lost between Terminals S and T during an internal fault, Terminal R will
high-speed trip and send a direct transfer trip to Terminals S and T to clear the fault.
Echo logic is included in a POTT scheme at a weak terminal to allow high-speed tripping at a
strong terminal if forward tripping elements do not operate at the weak terminal for an
internal fault or as an alternative to an open CB keying signal. Echo logic will only repeat the
received permissive trip signal when the permissive trip (PT) bit is asserted. In a three-
terminal line application, the PT is asserted only if the local device receives a permissive trip
signal from both of the remote terminals, so that, at least two devices must see the fault in
order for the PT signal to be repeated. If there is only one weak terminal, the Echo logic will

152
function as desired. However, if there are two weak terminals, then the Echo logic will not
function if the overreaching permissive trip elements operate only at the strong terminal.
When there are two weak terminals on the line, programmable logic can be used to
implement Echo logic that also functions when only one permissive signal is received [13].

11.5.2 LOSS-OF-COMMUNICATION CHANNEL IN THREE-TERMINAL LINE DIFFERENTIAL

APPLICATIONS
In three-terminal line differential protection applications, where high-speed tripping is
essential, loss of a communication channel between any two of the three terminals could
render the high-speed line differential protection inoperable and tripping occurs by time-
delayed distance Zone 2 elements. Modern line differential protection incorporates special
algorithms, device-to-device digital communications, and logic to maintain high-speed
protection in the event of a communication channel failure between any two of the three
terminals.
Line differential IEDs exchange time-synchronized phase current samples between line
terminals. The line differential IEDs at each line terminal perform identical current differential
calculations in a peer-to-peer architecture to avoid transfer trip delays. The three terminal line
current differential elements are processed three times at each relay terminal using local
currents and currents received on its two communication channels from the remote
terminals. Thus each device can perform the differential algorithms in the event of a channel
loss between two terminals, or if the user provides only two communication channels instead
of three. Notice that if any of the three communications channels fails, the device connected
to the two healthy communications channels has all of the information necessary to perform
the line differential function for the three-terminal line. Detection of communication channel
loss in the other two devices automatically disables the line differential element and enables
direct transfer tripping over the same line differential channels.
Considering the system in Figure 11.12, if loss of communication channel is detected at
terminals R and S, then the devices at terminals R and S automatically disable the line
differential elements and enable direct transfer tripping from the device at terminal T. The
device at terminal T has all the information needed to perform the tree-terminal line
differential function. In the event of an internal line fault, terminal T causes a line differential
trip at its local terminal T and sends a DTT signal to terminals R and S to clear the fault.

11.6 BREAKER-AND-A-HALF BUSBAR ARRANGEMENT

Bus 1 Bus 2

Relay A Relay B

Line A Line B

Figure 11.
11.13 – Breaker and a half substation

The breaker-and-a-half busbar configuration (Figure 11.13) is popular in many countries,

having the advantage that a busbar fault can be disconnected without loss of supply to any of
the feeders, while requiring fewer CBs than a double-bus double-breaker configuration.

153
Breaker-and-a-half does, however, present a number of challenges for the line protection,
some of which can be addressed through the application of modern techniques.

11.6.1 CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION WITH INDEPENDENT CURRENT INPUTS FOR

THROUGH-FAULT STABILITY
Each line protection IED receives current information from two current transformers in the
breaker-and-a-half arrangement, the conventional method being to electrically summate the
CT outputs by parallel connection of their secondary circuits. One problem that can arise
from this method is that in the case of current differential protection, the restraining current
seen by the function may not be large enough to prevent unwanted operation under some
severe through-fault conditions.
As shown in Figure 11.14, if a close-up external fault occurs at Terminal A, a large fault
current IFA may flow through current transformers CT1 and CT2 while only a small fault
current IFB flows in at terminal B. In this case the electrical summation of CT1 and CT2 is
only equal to IFB because IFA is cancelled. Despite the large through-fault current, the
differential protection function calculates only a small restraining current. This large through-
fault current may also cause an erroneous differential current to be measured if the
characteristics of CT1 and CT2 are not identical. The combination of the small restraining
current and the relatively large erroneous differential current has the potential to cause
unwanted operation.

Relay A Relay B
CT2 CT1

IFA
IFA+IFB
Terminal A IFB Terminal B

Fault

Figure 11.
11.14 – Close-
Close-up external fault for breaker-
breaker-and-
and-a-half busbar configuration

In order to resolve this problem, Relay A can alternatively be fitted with separate current
measuring inputs for CT1 and CT2, so that both sets of currents can be used by the
protection algorithm and the appropriate amount of restraining current calculated.
In general, due to the limited capacity of the data transmission channel, Relay A is only able
to transmit current data equal to the summation of CT1 and CT2 to Relay B at the remote
end, and so Relay B still cannot calculate sufficient restraining current. Therefore, logic is
employed that allows the IEDs to trip only when both the local and remote functions operate.
In order to achieve this, it is necessary to transmit the status of the differential protection
elements of the local device to the remote end to allow the correct tripping decision to be
made. This is easily achievable through the use of IEDs.

11.6.2 STUB FAULT CONDITION

The ability of modern current differential protection to transmit status information between
terminals has enabled a solution to another problem associated with the breaker-and-a-half
configuration; namely that of the stub fault condition.
If a fault occurs when the line disconnector is open then the differential protection operates,
tripping the CBs at both terminals, although fault current is present only at one terminal. By
inputting the disconnector status to the local device, and transmitting that status to the
remote end, unnecessary tripping of the CBs at one of the terminals can be avoided.

154
11.7 CB AND STATION BYPASS

11.7.1 CB BYPASSING (SUBSTITUTION)

Different busbar arrangements are used in a power network depending on service reliability
requirements, economical considerations, switching flexibility, and equipment maintainability.
The main and transfer bus arrangement provides a low-cost solution for switching lines to a
transfer or auxiliary bus, usually to perform maintenance on the line CB. The transfer bus is
rated to feed only one serviced line at a time. It has been implemented mostly in North
America and it is preferred on sub-transmission applications for its practicality and low cost.
The double-bus single-CB configuration has two main buses that are equally rated. This
arrangement allows any circuit to be connected via isolator switches to either bus. A bus
parallel (coupler) CB connects the two buses together and sectionalizing CBs divide the bus
into sections. Each feeder CB is equipped with a bypass switch and isolator switches to
facilitate CB maintenance. The bus parallel (coupler) CB is used temporarily to protect any of
the feeder or transformer bank circuits when the actual feeder or bank CB is taken out for
maintenance. During the CB substitution, one bus becomes part of the feeder circuit with all
other circuits connected to the remaining bus, increasing power availability in case of bus
faults. This bus configuration delivers a good compromise between reliability and flexibility on
one hand and economical considerations on the other.
CB substitution is a switching operation which is used to isolate a CB for maintenance while
maintaining its circuit energized. The system in Figure 11.15 shows a simple double-bus
single-CB arrangement with a bus-tie (coupler) CB. Feeder 2 and Feeder 3 could be served
by either Bus 1 or Bus 2 depending on which isolator switches are closed.

Figure 11.
11.15 – Double-
Double-bus single-
single-CB configuration

In a double-bus single-CB or a main and transfer bus arrangements, the protection systems
installed on the bus-tie CB are used to protect a transmission line when the line CB is out-of-
service for maintenance. In such an arrangement, the performance of the protection is
degraded unless the communications channel used for high-speed line protection is rerouted
to the bus-tie CB protection system. This was almost impossible with earlier
electromechanical and static relay systems. IEDs with multiple settings and intelligent
communications channel fibre-optic transfer switches can be used to maintain high-speed
teleprotection and system stability and integrity during CB maintenance [16].

155
If CB3 is to be maintained while Feeder 3 is connected to Bus 1; the system operator will
switch all feeders to Bus 2 except Feeder 3 which will be connected to Bus 1. The bus-tie CB
and its isolators are closed connecting the two buses together. Just before the bypass switch
of CB3 is closed, the operator enables the distance and directional ground overcurrent
protections on the bus-tie CB, and takes the distance protection (21), line differential
protection (87L), and the protection communications channels of Feeder 3 out-of-service.
The distance (21) and directional ground overcurrent (67N) protection on the bus-tie CB are
now protecting Feeder 3 and Bus 1 which is now part of Feeder 3. The protection of Feeder
3 has now been compromised because high-speed communication-based protection is out-
of-service on Feeder 3 during the duration of CB3 maintenance that could last several days.
IEDs together with intelligent fibre-optic transfer switches can be applied to prevent the
above mentioned protection compromise while maintaining high-speed protection of Feeder
3 when CB CB3 is maintained. This is illustrated with Figure 11.16 and Figure 11.17 where a
normal system is shown with the communications channels of Feeder 2 and Feeder 3 routed
to the multiplexer via a fibre-optic transfer switch.

Figure 11.
11.16 – Feeder communications channels routed via a fiber-
fiber-optic switch

IEDs and intelligent fibre-optic transfer switches can be applied to:

• Maintain high-speed transmission line protection by communications assisted tripping
schemes (POTT, DCB, DCUB, 87L) during CB maintenance.
• Maintain Main 1 and Main 2 high-speed protection communications during CB
maintenance operations on double-bus or main-bus with transfer-bus single-CB
configurations.
• Automatically change group protection settings on the bus coupler IEDs to accurately
match the protection settings of the feeder with the bypassed CB.
• Quickly and cleanly reroute any communications protocol carried on the IEEE C37.94
fibre-optic interface standard without changing communications equipment
programming.
• Reroute current differential communications or any synchronous communications
converted to the IEEE C37.94 interface standard.
Figure 11.17 shows the switching of protection communications channels to the bus coupler
CB during maintenance of Feeder 3 CB CB3.

156
 BUS 1
CB1 – Coupler Breaker
CB2 and CB3 – Feeder Breakers
21 – Distance Relay
87L – Line Differential Relay 21

87L CB1
Fiber-Optic Transfer
Switch

BUS 2

Bypass Bypass
87L 21 CB2
21 87L CB3
Switch
Switch

Multiplexer

To Remote Feeder 3
Feeder 2
Terminals

Figure 11.
11.17 – CB3 bypassed while Feeder 3 is protected by the bus coupler CB (CB1)

11.7.2 STATION BYPASS

CB maintenance in looped substations presents protection challenges when the station
bypass switch is closed to facilitate maintenance operations. Figure 11.18 illustrates a looped
substation with typical line protection IEDs. When the station bypass switch is closed to
facilitate maintenance of one of the line CBs, the two-terminal line arrangement changes to a
three-terminal line configuration. The three-terminal line configuration necessitates new
protection settings at all three terminals with compromised transmission line protection.

Figure 11.
11.18 – Looped station configuration with isolators to facilitate line CB maintenance

Similar to CB bypassing discussed in section 11.7.1, the application of an intelligent fibre-

optic transfer switch at the looped station together with IEDs having multiple settings can
help maintain high-speed transmission line protection without compromising system
reliability. Figure 11.19 illustrates the application of IEDs with multiple settings and a fibre-
optic transfer switch in a looped substation to facilitate line CB maintenance and preserve
high-speed protection communications to protect the three-terminal transmission line.

157
 Figure 11.
11.19 – Looped station configuration with IEDs and a fiber-
fiber-optic transfer switch and station
bypass switch open (CB1 and CB2 normal)

Figure 11.20 illustrates the station configuration of Figure 11.19 with CB2 taken out of
service for maintenance with all isolator switches shown in their proper position. The
configuration in Figure 11.20 is now a tree-terminal line configuration. The intelligent fiber-
optic transfer switch transfers the line 2 differential protection communications channel (87L)
to Port 2 of Line 1 differential device and automatically initiates group settings to convert the
line differential protection to a three-terminal line differential system thus maintaining high-
speed protection for Line 1 and Line 2 in their new configuration.

Figure 11.
11.20 – Looped station configuration with IEDs and a fiber-
fiber-optic transfer switch and station
bypass switch closed (CB2 out of service)

158
11.8 AUTO-RECLOSING WITH SECONDARY ARC EXTINCTION RECOGNITION
A secondary arc extinction detector (SAED), in single-pole tripping applications, could
supervise the closing signal to the CB to prevent AR when the secondary arc is still present
and minimize the possibility of unsuccessful reclosing [14]. Complete reclosing supervision
requires three secondary arc extinction detectors, one per phase. These detectors measure
the angle, φ, between the phase-to-ground voltage of the faulted phase (Vγ) and the sum of
the phase-to-ground voltages of the sound phases (VΣ). For -β ≤ φ ≤ β, and |Vγ| > Vthre, the
detector determines the secondary arc extinction and asserts the SAED bit. Vthre and β
determine the region that detects the secondary arc extinction. Table 11.1 shows the Vγ and
VΣ voltages for A, B, and C-phase SAEDs.

Detector Vγ VΣ

A-phase VA VB + VC
B-phase VB VC + VA
C-phase VC VA + VB

Table 11.
11.1 - Vγ and VΣ Voltages for A, B, and C-
C-Phase SAEDS

Figure 11.21 and Figure 11.22 show that Vγ is inside the SAED region and the angle φ = 0°
during an A-phase single-pole open condition, after the secondary arc extinguishes. The A-
phase detector asserts the SAED bit for this condition, allowing the reclosing sequence to
continue.
Figure 11.23 shows the close supervision logic using secondary arc extinction detection
(SAED) for close supervision. The SAED can minimize the dead time by initiating the reclose
after the secondary arc extinguishes. The SAEDD time delay provides time for the air
formerly occupied by the arc to regain dielectric capabilities.
VC

Vγ = VA

VΣ = VB + VC

VB

Figure 11.
11.21 – Vγ is inside the SAED region after the arc extinguishes

159
 90
1.5
120 60

150 30

0.5

Secondary Arc
Extinguishes Secondary Arc
Present Prefault

180 0

Fault

210 330

240 300

270

Figure 11.
11.22 – A-phase voltage phasor enters the SAED region after the secondary arc extinguishes

SAEDD
Secondary Arc Reclosing
Extinction Detection Relay
(SAED) DO Supervision

SAED
Close
Enable

Figure 11.
11.23 – Reclosing relay close supervision using secondary arc extinction detection

11.9 MULTI-PHASE AUTO-RECLOSING

Multi-phase AR is a technique applied to double-circuit transmission lines, whereby system
stability is maintained during multi-phase fault conditions by continuing power transmission
through as many healthy phases as possible.
In single-phase AR schemes, only the faulted phase is tripped in the case of a single phase
to ground fault, allowing power transmission to continue through the healthy phases during
the dead-time and helping to maintain system stability. A multi-phase fault, however, results
in three-phase final tripping.
Three-phase AR schemes trip and re-close all three phases regardless of the type of fault.
Supply can thus be resumed following a multi-phase fault, and a shorter dead-time can be
used compared with single-phase AR. However, single-phase faults (which are the most
common type) result in an unnecessary interruption of supply, and synchronism and voltage
checking between the line and bus are required before re-closing.
Single-phase and three-phase AR can be combined to minimise the disadvantages of each
method, but this combination will still result in an interruption to the power supply in the case
of multi-phase faults on double-circuit transmission lines. The loss of both circuits of a major
transmission route is likely to have significant consequences in terms of supply disruption as
well as potential instability of the network.

160
Multi-phase AR combined with current differential protection is a modern technique by which
power supply can be maintained in the healthy phases even in the case of a multi-phase fault
on a double-circuit transmission line.
Multi-phase AR attempts to keep as many phases as possible connected in order to
maximise stability of power transmission, executing high-speed re-closing for multi-phase
faults without the need for synchronism or voltage check. Providing that the terminals of the
double-circuit line remain interconnected through at least two or three different healthy
phases, only the faulted phases are tripped and re-closed. If it is not possible to maintain the
interconnection condition, all phases are tripped and not re-closed. Current differential
protection is best suited for use in conjunction with multi-phase AR [15] because of its ability
to reliably identify the faulted phase, and also because its telecommunication channel can be
used to transfer CB contact status data between terminals in order to determine the
interconnection condition. Figure 11.24 illustrates the principle of multi-phase AR and
summarises the outcomes for the various combinations of faulted phases.

Fault phase Tripping and reclosing

No #1 line #2 line #2 line
#1 line
A B C A B C
1 × ― ― ― 1φT→R ABC ABC
2 × × ― ― ― 3φFT Line #1
3 × × × ― ― ― 3φFT
4 × 1φT→R
5 × × 1φT→R 1φT→R
6 × × 2φT→R
7 × × 1φT→R 1φT→R O→C O→C
8 × × × 2φT→R 1φT→R
9 × × × × 3φFT 3φFT
10 × × × 3φT→R
11 × × × 2φT→R 1φT→R
12 × × × × 2φT→R 2φT→R O→C Line #2 O→C
13 × × × × 3φT→R 1φT→R
14 × × × × × 3φFT 3φFT
15 × × × × × × 3φFT 3φFT
×:Fault
－:The line is out of service
1φT→R: single-phase tripping and reclosing
2φT→R: two-phase tripping and reclosing
3φT→R: three-phase tripping and reclosing
3φFT : three-phase final tripping

Figure 11.
11.24 – Multi-
Multi-phase auto-
auto-reclosing

11.10 SUBSTATION TOPOLOGY AND AUTO-RECLOSING

The substation layout has a large impact on the AR and associated synchrocheck functions.
Of the various busbar arrangements, the double busbar and breaker-and-a-half
arrangements are analyzed here.

11.10.1 DOUBLE BUSBAR ARRANGEMENT

A transmission line connected to a double busbar can use Main 1 and Main 2 protection
IEDs, with CB failure protection integrated into the busbar protection scheme, and the
teleprotection equipment normally providing two independent physical channels A and B.
The Main 1 protection is related to trip coil 1, and the Main 2 related to trip coil 2. For
reclosing purposes several philosophies could be applied such as common external AR
device started by both Main 1 and Main 2; or internal AR functions in both Main 1 and Main 2
devices. In case of the latter, “master-follower” logic could be used or the logic based on time
delay discrimination.

161
11.10.1.1 COMMON EXTERNAL AR
Common external AR is a standard arrangement where the AR function could be located in a
Bay Controller. Figure 11.25 illustrates the various functions starting AR. Both the Main 1 and
Main 2 devices work with the AR function. The Synchrocheck function is also implemented in
the same IED as the AR function. This arrangement results in optimum CB related signal
requirements besides the choice of Main 1 and Main 2 from different manufacturers.

B2,U nm
B1,Unm

Position, O-C-O
Trip 2-Lx
Trip 1-Lx

Close

Figure 11.
11.25 – Double busbar arrangement – Common external AR

11.10.1.2 AR FUNCTION IN MAIN 1 / MAIN 2

When there is no common IED housing the AR function, the function has to be duplicated in
the both of the Main protection IEDs. Otherwise, loss of the Main protection IED with the AR
function excludes the possibility of reclosing following tripping by the second Main protection
IED. At any one time, only one AR function should have the authority to issue the reclose
command in order to prevent mis-coordination between the different dead times of the two
functions and the possibility of reclosing before the fault has cleared, etc.
There are two different approaches. In the first approach, only one AR function is active while
the other AR is blocked (Main – Hot standby). In the second approach both AR functions are
active but only one is allowed to issue a reclose command (Redundant). These approaches
eliminate the need for AR functionality in a dedicated device. However, the basic
requirements, including binary inputs and outputs are doubled because there are two AR
functions.

Main – Hot Standby

If the AR in Main 1 IED is “Main”, then both Main 1 and Main 2 protections work with this AR
function. The AR in Main 2 terminal, as “Hot Standby” is kept blocked and is automatically
released when the Main 1 IED is out of service or in test mode, or if the synchrocheck
function is blocked due to a VT MCB failure. In such a situation, the AR function in Main 2
works with its own protection. The AR function in Main 2 working with Main 1 protection is an
option. Instead of a fallback approach, it is also possible to maintain flexibility in choice of AR
between Main 1 and Main 2 by keeping connections between the Main 1 protection and the
AR function in Main 2. This approach eliminates need for AR functionality in separate
hardware besides the choice of Main 1 and Main 2 from different manufacturers.

162
 B2,Unm
B1,Unm

B2,Unm
B1,Unm
Position, O-C-O
Trip 2-Lx
Trip 1-Lx

Close

Figure 11.
11.26 – Double busbar arrangement - Main AR with hot standby

Redundant, Master-Follower
Both Main 1 and Main 2 protection IEDs work with their respective AR functions. In order to
ensure that both AR functions choose the same type of dead time even upon contradictory
protection operation, the Main 2 signal “Trip three pole” is also connected to Main 1 AR
function. One AR is termed “Master” and the other “Follower”. If the Main 1 AR is Master,
upon occurrence of a fault, even if Main 2 operates faster, its AR function is on hold by the
Master AR. However, there has to be a co-ordination of reclose commands and only one AR
function shall issue the close command to CB.
The Follower AR is released only after a fixed time after Master AR issues a reclose
command. If the fault persists, the Master AR issues an “AR Unsuccessful” signal. If the fault
is transient, the Follower AR is released but then shall not issue any reclose signal. Hence
an additional signal comprising of the above two conditions, called “Inhibit Close” command,
is sent from the Master to the Follower AR and vice versa.
This approach is more suited for protection IEDs from the same manufacturer because of the
proprietary signals above.

Figure 11.
11.27 – Double busbar arrangement - Redundant AR, Master/Follower

163
Redundant Time Based Discrimination
This logic applies when both AR functions are started by their own permitted protection
functions and the first reclosing command blocks the other AR function, the discrimination
being time based. Thus one AR dead time is longer and is usually assigned to the Main-2
device. If the first AR function fails to operate, the second one from Main-2 may still operate
and reclose the CB. The first AR function to issue a close command to the CB will also issue
the “Inhibit Close” command to block the other AR function.
Each IED must be able to single-pole trip the CB and to reclose it. For multi-pole faults the
tripping should be three-pole.
Regardless of the method selected (master-follower, time based…), the two AR functions
included in each IED must exchange signals either using the communication features of the
devices or based on wired logic. These signals could carry the below mention meanings:
AR 3Pole Forced: The AR-1 function (inside Main 1) is not prepared for single-pole tripping
thus any trip will result in a final three-pole trip. The AR-2 function (inside Main 2) receives
this signal and will similarly force any trip to issue as a final three-pole trip, so that a single-
pole trip from Main-2 and unwanted reclosing is avoided. A similar signal must connect Main-
2 to Main-1. If both these signals are low a single-pole trip and as a result a single-pole
reclosing is permitted.
AR In Progress: This signal is intended to notify Main-2 that AR-1 is within the single-pole
AR cycle and thus the sensitive ground fault overcurrent protection function, which may trip
three-pole, has to be blocked to avoid unwanted tripping during this period of time. One
reason could be that Main-2 did not trip and is not notified about this pole discrepancy
condition. Besides monitoring of the CB position on all three-poles this signal can be used by
both Main-1 and Main-2 for the same purposes. A similar signal has to connect Main-2 to
Main-1.
AR Z1 Extension: The signal is intended to notify the other protection relay that the
teleprotection devices are out-of-service and extension of distance zone 1 should be allowed.
There are various modes to use this feature, one is to allow zone 1 extension only for single-
pole faults and only before AR and only if both physical teleprotection devices are out-of-
service or faulty. Other conditions to be fulfilled are the CB Ready condition and the AR On
condition.
AR 1Pole Mode: This signal is intended to notify that the single-pole AR mode was selected.
This signal can be neglected if no other AR mode is possible.
AR Close Command: The signal is intended to notify the other AR function about sending of
the reclosing command to the CB and to block the second reclosing command.
In addition, the CB Closed position, the CB Ready for AR, the teleprotection channel status
and the position of the hardware switch meaning “AR On” are to be supplied to both IEDs for
proper operation.

11.10.2 BREAKER-AND-A-HALF ARRANGEMENT

In general, the coordination of tripping and reclosing of multiple CBs in multi-CB busbar
arrangements requires particular attention. The breaker-and-a-half arrangement utilises three
CBs connected in series between two buses, as shown in Figure 11.28. A line is connected
between two of the CBs while a second line or transformer, generator, etc., is then
connected between the centre and third CB. The first CB (Q01 in Figure 11.28) is operated
by the protection system of the first line. Similarly Q02 is associated with the second line (or
autotransformer, transformer, generator, etc). The middle CB, Q03, is operated by the
protective systems of both lines. This configuration allows the removal of any one CB for any
reason without taking either circuit out of service.

164
 Figure 11.
11.28 – Breaker and a half arrangement – Line-
Line-line diameter – External AR

The line protection system consists of two IEDs per line (Main 1 and Main 2). Both Main 1
and Main 2 are connected to the sum of the currents from the adjacent sides of the line. For
the AR function (on Q01 and Q03) and for the BFP, two CB Management IEDs (CBM-1 and
CBM-2) are used and connected as shown. Thus, the AR function included in CBM-1 is used
for the Q01 CB, while the AR function included in CBM-2 relay is used for the Q03 CB. The
AR function included in the Main protection IEDs is not used in this example.
In order to apply synchrochecking to the manual close command, either the function included
in the Bay Control Unit (BCU), or that included in the corresponding CBM IED can be
selected. The other control and protection scheme may use the AR function from the BCU in
a similar way.
One possible AR sequence could be based on the time delay discrimination, i.e. to first
reclose Q01 and if it is successful then to reclose Q03. If Q01 is reclosing onto a fault, the
second trip is a final three-pole trip and Q03 does not reclose at all. The dead time for Q03
is, in this case, slightly longer than the Q01 dead time. Again it was assumed that the single-
shot and the single-pole AR mode had been selected.
In the case of master-follower logic, Q01 shall reclose first and, if successful, then Q03 shall
reclose. During the Q01 dead time, Q03 is put into a wait status until after Q01 successfully
recloses and is then allowed to continue the AR cycle. This logic has to deal with the Pole
Discrepancy Logic (PDL) not to trip during the dead time and thus the PDL of the CB
themselves may not be used. It was also assumed that the single-shot and the single-pole
AR mode had been selected.
When the Master is not ready for an AR cycle the Follower acts as the Master.
In many substations with diameters with only one line, it may be selected which CB will be
the master and which one the follower.
In a line-transformer diameter, there could be a choice whether the Bus or Centre CB will
be the master.
Although it is not advised to keep the centre CB as Master, the fault current flowing through
the transformer upon reclose may be low depending on current distribution. The transformer

165
should be able to withstand such stresses which would have arisen anyway the first time the
fault occurred. It should be noted that the fault current is limited by the transformer
impedance and would not exceed 10 to 12 times rated current. However, the centre CB can
be the Master if the bus CB is closed, since the major portion of the fault current would
normally be from the busbar.
The transformer protection trips shall block AR of CB Q03 if the AR Close command is not
supervised by trip/latch relays.
In a line-line diameter, the bus CBs are Masters and the centre CB the common Follower. If
a bus CB is not ready for an AR cycle, the centre CB is automatically the Master for the
corresponding line. The center CB may be programmed not to re-close or can be the follower
for both lines. Its AR-function can be programmed to be blocked if the dead time for one line
is running and there is a fault on the other line. Alternately, it can trip 3-pole and switch dead
times from 1-pole to 3-pole and close after 3-pole dead time provided both faults are
transient.
The main protection IEDs and the AR function included in each CB management IEDs have
to exchange some signals either based on wired logic or using the communication features
of the relays. Some of these signals are:
Trip pole A, B or C – to notify CBM-1 and CBM-2 in case of pole A, B or C trip.
General Pick-up – to notify CBM-1 and CBM-2 about protection pick-ups on at least one
phase. This signal is requested by some AR functions to allow AR only for instantaneous
trips. If there is a delayed trip and the time delay between protection pick-up and protection
trip is greater than a set delay, then and a final three-pole trip results.
AR 3Pole Forced – the AR function (inside CBM-1) is not prepared for single-pole tripping
thus any trip will result in a final three-pole trip only for the Q01 CB. The AR function (inside
CBM-2) is also connected to the distance protection IED to notify that it is not prepared for
single-pole tripping and thus any trip will result in a final three-pole trip only for the Q03 CB.
To achieve this operation mode some internal logic inside the distance protection IED has to
be implemented. If both these signals are low a single-pole trip and as a result a single-pole
reclosing is permitted for both Q01 and Q03.
AR Z1 Extension – signal intended to notify the distance protection IED that the AR function
is ready for a new cycle. Together with the out-of-service teleprotection device signal
extension of distance zone 1 is allowed. In this case zone 1 extension is allowed but only for
single-pole faults and only before the AR cycle.
Other conditions to be fulfilled are the CB Ready condition, the AR On condition and the CB
Closed position related to the corresponding CB. If at least one CB is ready for the AR cycle,
then this CB is tripped and reclosed single-pole while the other one receives a final three-
pole trip. If one CB is out-of-service, i.e. it was open at the AR start instant then this CB is not
reclosed. If one of the AR hardware switches is Off (for Q01 or Q03) then the corresponding
CB is issued a final three-pole trip and no reclosing will take place on this CB. If one of the
transformer protections (in case of line-transformer diameter) or the BBP or the CB failure
protection trips Q03 then the AR function on Q03 is blocked (signal not shown in Figure
11.28).
Some applications require that both Q01 and Q03 are tripped single-pole for any phase-to-
ground fault and reclosed by the AR function. Some other applications require that Q01 is
tripped single-pole for any phase-to-ground fault and then it is reclosed by the AR function,
while Q03 is tripped three-pole. Automatic reclosing of Q03 is allowed only if the reclose of
Q01 was successful and if the synchrocheck close conditions for Q03 are fulfilled. Selection
of which CB operates in the single-pole and which operates in the three-pole AR mode is
done either manual or automatically. If automatic selection is provided then an Out-of-
Service condition for one CB automatically switches this AR logic over the second CB. The

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same applies in case of CB Ready condition not fulfilled. Thus the line single-pole AR is
performed independent from one of the CB’s status.
It is possible to have one IED housing all three autoreclosing and synchrocheck functions of
a diameter. If necessary for redundancy, this IED could be duplicated and the whole setup
can be applied in a Main – Hot Standby mode.
Some IEDs include the AR function for two CBs, thus no additional devices are necessary, at
least for this function. Usually, the reclosing is done sequentially using a master-follower
logic. This logic permits the AR of the first CB and, if successful, then the second CB is
closed. It is common to select between single-pole tripping of both CBs followed by
sequential AR, or the leader trips single-pole and the follower trips three-pole followed by
sequential AR. However, it must be noted that the device has to be able to perform separate
tripping logic, i.e. single-pole logic for the first CB and three-pole logic for the second CB.
Adequate synchrocheck has to be available for AR in case of three-pole tripping.
The above mentioned arrangement (Figure 11.29), although not common for line-line
diameters in general, is adopted if a common dedicated IED for the CB is not available, and if
IEDs from the same platform are used as Main 1 and Main 2. It is possible, with additional
hardware and software logics, to configure AR and Synchrocheck for each of the three (3)
CBs in the Main 1 and Main 2 IEDs, in a line-line diameter. The functions of both relevant
CBs shall be placed in both Main 1 and Main 2. At any time, only one AR unit shall be in
service. Hence, the 'Relay Ready' or 'In Test' mode of Main 1 shall be wired to block the
functions in Main 2 for both the lines.

Figure 11.
11.29 – Breaker and a half arrangement. Line-
Line-Line diameter.
diameter. AR/SYN within Main 1 and Main 2

The AR functions in Main 1 and Main 2 would each work in conjunction with both Main 1 and
Main 2 protections. The AR function in Main 2 shall be released from its blocked state when
Main 1 has failed or is in the Test mode (fall back). Furthermore, co-ordination of the AR
function of the centre CB in two active IEDs shall be arranged for simultaneous faults. The
'Prepare 3-pole trip' signals of the ARs in Main 2 shall be supervised by the release signals
of Main 1 so as to prevent the CB from tripping three-pole for all faults. As additional security
against VT MCB failures, the VT MCB fail signal of the Main 1 synchrocheck shall also be
used to transfer the AR and Synchrocheck function from the Main 1 to Main 2 IED. Special

167
care must be taken to cater for the centre CB tripping 3-pole and remaining locked out for
simultaneous faults on both lines.

11.11 REFERENCES
[1] E.O. Schweitzer, III, “Evaluation and Development of Transmission Line Fault Locating
Techniques Which Use Sinusoidal Steady-State Information,” [9th Annual Western
Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 1982].
[2] M.S. Sachdev and R. Agarwal, “A Technique for Estimating Transmission Line Fault
Locations from Digital Impedance Relay Measurements,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 121-129.
[3] D. Novosel, D.G. Hart, E. Udren, J. Garity, “Unsychronized Two-Terminal Fault Location
Estimate,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 130-
138.
[4] A.A. Gigris, D.G. Hart, and W.L. Peterson, “A New Fault Location Technique for Two-
and Three-Terminal Lines,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, No. 1,
January 1992, pp. 98-107.
[5] D. Tziouvaras, J. Roberts, and G. Benmouyal, “New Multi-Ended Fault Location Design
for Two- or Three-Terminal Lines,” [Proceedings of the CIGRÉ SC34 Colloquium,
Florence, Italy, October 1999].
[6] E. O. Schweitzer, III and D. E. Whitehead, “Real Time Power System Control Using
Synchrophasors,” in 2007 34th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference
Proceedings.
[7] A. Guzmán, V. Mynam, G. Zweigle, “Backup Transmission Line Protection for Ground
Faults and Power Swing Detection Using Synchrophasors,” Proceedings of the 34th
Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2007.
[8] J. B. Roberts and D. Tziouvaras, “Fault Type Selection System for Identifying Faults in
an Electric Power System,” U.S. Patent 6 525 543, Feb. 25, 2003.
[9] IEEE Synchrophasors for Power Systems, IEEE Standard C37.118 2005.
[10] E.O. Schweitzer III, T. Lee, K. Behrendt, “Digital Communications for Power System
Protection: Security, Availability, and Speed,” [25th Annual Western Protective Relay
Conference, Spokane, Washington, October 1998].
[11] K. Behrendt, “Relay-to-Relay Digital Logic Communication for Line Protection,
Monitoring, and Control,” [23rd Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane,
Washington, October 1996].
[12] D. Tziouvaras et al., “Functional Integration in Modern distance Relays Improves the
Reliability of Power Systems,” [Proceedings of the CIGRÉ SCB5 Colloquium, Sydney,
Australia, 2003].
[13] G. Alexander, “Applying the SEL-311C Relay on Three-Terminal Lines,” SEL Application
Guide AG2000-12 located at www.selinc.com.
[14] Armando Guzmán, et al “Transmission Line Protection System for Increasing Power
System Requirements,” [29th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane,
Washington, October 2002].
[15] K. Kasuga, Y.Sonobe, “Multi-phase auto-reclose function installed in line differential
relay”, GeorgiaTech, 2007
[16] G. Ortega and E. Nelson, “Preserve High-Speed Protection during Bypass Operations,”
[33rd Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, Washington, October
2006].

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12 TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION TESTING

12.1 TESTING OF DISTANCE PROTECTION IEDS

Testing of protection devices and IEDs is one of the key requirements to ensure their correct
operation for short circuit faults during abnormal system conditions. Protection technology is
becoming more and more complex, with protective devices evolving to multifunctional IEDs
with integrated pre-programmed control logic and additional functions like metering, fault and
disturbance recording, programmable scheme logic, etc. Sensitive distribution system loads
require significant reduction in the fault clearing times that can be only achieved by using the
advanced logic schemes available in modern distribution protection devices.
The devices are also used as a front end to the substation automation system (SAS) and
provide different logging functions for analysis of their operation or different power system
events. Testing of such devices requires a comprehensive understanding of the available
protection and non-protection functions, as well as the operational logic of the different
schemes that require testing.
The widespread application of distance protection on transmission lines at different voltage
levels in the power system results in numerous cases in the everyday life of protection
design, commissioning or application engineers that require the testing of the relays.
Analysis of the functionality of distance protection elements in transmission line IEDs under
different fault and other abnormal system conditions is an important activity during the design
of new devices.
Testing of protection devices is used during commissioning to ensure that the device settings
and configuration have been properly calculated and downloaded into the device.
Analysis of protective device operation is very important in order to determine the causes of
unexpected behaviour. It can be used to identify problems with the settings or with the
implemented protection algorithm that may result in undesired operation and consequently
system disturbances.
The typical post-operation analysis process starts with the current and voltage waveforms
and the binary signals representing the operation of different protection elements which have
been recorded by the device. If the conclusion is that the device did not operate as expected,
the user may change the settings and test the device by replaying the recorded waveform
through a test device to determine if the device will perform correctly. This process may take
several iterations and requires specialized, usually expensive equipment, as well as a device
being available to perform the modifications and testing of the new configuration.
Whereas modern transmission line protection IEDs are multifunctional devices, they impose
different requirements for the testing of the different groups of functions. Several groups of
functions are identified:
• Basic fault protection.
• Advanced protection schemes.
• Abnormal system conditions protection.
• Load-shedding.
• Automation.
• Monitoring.
• Recording.
• Analysis.
The functions in the transmission line protection IED have a hierarchy that needs to be
considered for the testing of the device (see Figure 12.1). Firstly, the secondary currents and

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voltages that are applied to the IED are filtered and processed in the analog input module
and provide instantaneous sampled values to the internal digital data bus of the IED. These
sampled values can be logged when an abnormal system condition is detected or used to
calculate various measurements (e.g. current and voltage phasors) used by the different
protection functions.
The sampled values or the outputs of the measurement elements become inputs to
protection or other functional elements of the device. Each basic protection element operates
based on a specific measured value – phase or sequence current, voltage, impedance,
frequency, etc. Measurements of active, reactive and apparent power or power factor are
often available from the IEDs if required in by the SAS.
When a protection element detects an abnormal condition, it may operate and issue a trip
command to clear a fault. It may also interact with other protection elements in an advanced
transmission line protection scheme used for acceleration or adaptation of the relay to
changing configuration or system conditions. Some of the most common transmission line
protection logic schemes are:
• POTT.
• PUTT.
• Blocking.
• Directional comparison.
• CB failure protection.

Figure 12.
12.1 – Test system block diagram

12.2 IED TESTING

When the complexity of transmission line protection IEDs is analyzed, it is clear that their
testing requires the use of advanced test tools and software that can simulate the different
system conditions and status of primary substation equipment and other IEDs. The test
system should be able to replay COMTRADE files from disturbance recorders or produced
from electromagnetic transient analysis programs. It should be able to apply user defined
current and voltage signals with settable phase angles, as well as execute a sequence of
pre-defined pre-fault, fault and post-fault steps.

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The testing of the different IED elements should start from the bottom of the functional
hierarchy and end with the most complex logic schemes implemented in the device.
Protective IEDs with such schemes operate based on the state of multiple monitored signals
such as blocking signals, CB status signals, and device status signals. Time coordination of
these signals and synchronization with the pre-fault and fault analog signals is required in
order to perform adequate testing of these types of schemes.

Figure 12.
12.2 – Testing of transmission line protection IED

Figure 12.2 shows, in a simplified way, the need for the test device to be able to properly
simulate the transmission line protection environment, as well as to monitor the operation of
the device under the simulated conditions. As can be seen from Figure 12.2, the testing
should include any visible behaviour of the tested transmission line IED.

12.2.1 TESTING OF THE ANALOG SIGNAL PROCESSING

The analog signal processing is the first critical step in the testing of a transmission line IED
because if any problems are detected they will be reflected at any other step up the
functional hierarchy.
However, the data bus of the IED is not usually directly accessible or visible through the
communications or user interface of the device. Therefore, an indirect method is
recommended. If the testing software is configured to generate pure sinusoidal waveforms of
balanced currents and voltages with their nominal values and no phase shift (0º) between the
currents and voltages in the same phases (Figure 12.3); and the applied waveforms are
recorded by the device under test; the extraction and analysis of the records will allow the
analog signal processing to be evaluated.
Any COMTRADE viewer may be used to analyze the waveform record extracted from the
device. This will show if there are any deviations from the expected sine waveforms, such as
a phase shift or amplitude which is different from the expected value.
COMTRADE viewers are usually provided as part of the device application software or the
testing software itself. They also typically calculate and display the magnitude and phase
angles of the currents and voltages, so that problems with the analog signal processing of
the device under test can be easily identified by simple visual comparison between these
values and the expected nominal values and balanced phase angles.
This step does not need to be used every time because it is time consuming and also
requires the availability of COMTRADE viewer and communications with the device in order
to extract the recorded waveforms. An easier way of detecting potential problems in the

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analog signals processing is the testing of the measurements as described in the next
section.

Figure 12.
12.3 – Test configuration for analog signal processing and measurement functions tests

12.2.2 TESTING OF THE MEASUREMENT FUNCTIONS

Testing of the measurement functions of the device is the next step. It can use the same set
up as described in the previous section, at least as the initial measurements test condition.
This test does not require the use of device communications, since the device
measurements are normally available through the front panel user interface.
The measured phase currents and voltages in this case need to be as close as possible to
the nominal balanced values applied to the device by the test equipment (i.e. within the
accuracy range specified by the device manufacturer).
The positive sequence measurements should be within tolerance of the phase values.
Whereas the applied phase currents and voltages are balanced, the derived negative and
zero sequence values should be close to zero (again within the expected tolerance range).
The power factor should be close to 1 and the frequency close to the nominal frequency of
the applied signals to the device.
Depending on the measurements available in the device under test, it may be easy to
calculate the nominal balanced values and to determine if the measured values are within
the expected range and tolerance.
The accuracy of the device measurements at sub-nominal levels can be checked by
configuring the test software to apply 10% or 1% of the nominal values and following a
similar procedure to the one described above.

12.2.3 TESTING OF THE MAIN PROTECTION FUNCTIONS

As discussed earlier, the main protection functions of a transmission line protection IED are
the phase and ground distance or differential elements, as well as overcurrent and directional
elements.

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The testing of the instantaneous and time delayed elements is different and also should
follow a specific order.
During the conventional testing of individual protection elements it is important that they are
the only enabled protection function (particularly if other protection elements share the same
relay output). If the IED has multiple relay outputs and different protection elements are
mapped to different outputs, care should be taken to ensure that the test device is monitoring
the correct relay output during the test.
For a modern test system, such mappings shouldn’t be necessary. A good fault model will
correctly generate a system condition that the device should correctly distinguish, indicate,
and trip based on the enabled protection element characteristic.
If it is assumed (based on the measurement functions tests) that the device accurately
measures the applied current signals, then the testing of the instantaneous distance
protection elements should not provide any surprises from the accuracy point of view, but will
give an indication of the expected device operating time when the applied currents and
voltages define a fault inside the protection operating characteristic.
The test system should be configured to apply current just at the accuracy range of the
protection setting and should measure the time from the start of the test to the sensing of the
operation of the relay output (connected to a binary input of the test system). This time
should be less than the maximum operating time in the technical specification of the device
under test.
The testing of distance protection elements requires the definition and evaluation of the
device operation for multiple points on the selected characteristic. Figure 12.4 shows the
configuration for the testing of a device with multiple distance zones with quadrilateral
characteristics.

Figure 12.
12.4 – Distance characteristic test configuration

Depending on the tested element the user should be able to configure the type of fault as
single-phase-to-ground, phase-to-phase or three-phase and also select a negative or zero
sequence fault option.
Several points on the selected tested characteristic should be defined as a function of the
test being performed. If this is benchmark, or initial evaluation testing, the multiple points
along the complete characteristic should be tested. If it is a basic application test for a

173
specific transmission line, only a limited number of tests need to be performed in the
expected area of operation of the characteristic.
The overall distance characteristic test is then executed as a sequence of individual point
tests and the device’s operation is based on the comparison of each output relay operating
time compared with the expected operating time and its tolerance for the specific point inside
or outside of the characteristic.

12.3 TESTING OF TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION SCHEMES

The testing of transmission line protection schemes is the final step in the testing of a
transmission line IED and it is based on the assumption that all individual protection
elements have already been tested and proven to be operating correctly.
The conventional test process requires the programming of the test system to perform pre-
fault, fault and post-fault steps simulating the changing power system conditions to evaluate
the performance of the selected scheme logic.
There is a need for different options for testing of transmission line protection logic schemes
based on the purpose of the test. Three typical cases are:
• Complete evaluation: All logic schemes are selected and the test software
automatically executes a series of predefined tests, measures the device’s response,
analyses the results and prepares the test report.
• Testing of a specific logic scheme: The test software automatically executes all tests
required for the selected logic scheme, measures the device’s response, analyses
the results and prepares the test report.
• Testing of a specific logic scheme for a specific condition: The test software
automatically executes a single test required for the selected logic scheme, measures
the device’s response, analyses the results and prepares the test report.
Different control signals are required by the transmission line protection logic schemes and
must be considered in the test definition in order to verify the functionality and the correct
settings of such schemes. The simulation of the protection environment is also affected by
the location of the fault.

12.3.1 WHAT SHOULD BE TESTED

The testing of transmission line protection schemes is intended to evaluate their performance
under different fault, system and CB conditions.
Different tests are designed to monitor the device operation for fault conditions, such as:
• Faults on the protected transmission line (internal fault).
• Faults on an adjacent transmission line (external fault).
• Faults on a parallel transmission line.
• Busbar faults (reverse faults).
• No fault.

12.3.2 HOW IS THE TEST PERFORMED?

The fundamental requirement for advanced testing software in today’s utility environment is a
combination of efficiency and ease of use. The goal is to achieve maximum results with a
minimum effort. Therefore, the test configuration, execution efforts and analysis of the results
in most cases should be limited to a point-and-click action.

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The testing of transmission line protection logic schemes should be performed in a way that
matches real life power system conditions as closely as possible. The sequence of steps in a
test differs as a function of the requirements for the specific scheme and system condition.
For example, if the test is for a Permissive Overreaching Transfer Trip protection scheme
and the test condition is a Zone 2 fault, the sequence will include only three steps:
• Pre-fault: CB closed with nominal voltage and normal load current conditions.
• Zone 2 fault condition.
• Receive Permissive Signal from the remote end device.
• Post-trip condition: CB opened and no current.
If a more complex scheme (E.g. Current Reversal Logic or Autoreclosing) is tested, the
number of steps will increase accordingly. Figure 12.5 shows a single-phase-to-ground fault
and an unsuccessful reclosing test simulation as recorded by the tested device.

Figure 12.
12.5 – Unsuccessful reclosing simulation

The test system is used to simulate both the analog and the digital control signals received
by the device in the field. At the same time its inputs are used to monitor the operation of
different protection elements as required by the scheme under test.

12.3.3 TEST RESULTS ANALYSIS

The results from any transmission line protection test need to be analyzed in order to
determine if it has operated as expected. This can be done by the person performing the test
– a time consuming process that also can be affected by human errors. A better alternative is
when the test software automatically analyzes the results from each performed test case.
The analysis can be based on an expert system comparing the operating time of a
combination of monitored protection elements that operated during the test.
The expected operating time of the monitored protection elements is based on the protective
device’s technical specifications. The results are displayed in a graphical format in the user
interface and in detail in an automatically generated test report.

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12.4 CONVENTIONAL TESTING
The previous sections described what can be defined as “Conventional Testing” of distance
protection devices, which is similar regardless of the technology of the device –
electromechanical, solid-state, hybrid or microprocessor based. This is due to the fact that
the protection device is considered as a “black box” with current and voltage inputs and relay
outputs.
In the case of conventional distance protection testing the test device must simulate the
substation process through hard-wired interface between the analog and binary outputs of
the test device and the analog and binary inputs of the test object (Figure 12.1).
The test device must monitor the closing of relay outputs of the device under test in order to
detect the operation of the distance element and to analyze it to determine which zone
operated and if the performance meets the specification and the characteristic settings.
The testing can be based on two main methods:
• Simulation of a sequence of pre-fault, fault and post-fault steps defined by current
and voltage phasor settings with transitions from one step to the next based on pre-
defined time or operation of protection elements.
• Replay of COMTRADE files recorded by protection or other devices, or files
generated from electromagnetic transient programs.
The testing of distance protection devices in all the necessary cases will require the
availability of both the protection devices and advanced protection test equipment that can
implement both test methods described above. The problem is that this requires significant
investment by utilities and is very difficult to implement.
Hence, for several years, utilities have been asking for different forms of tools that may help
them with the protection setting process or with the analysis of distance protection operation.

12.5 VIRTUAL RELAY TESTING

Everything discussed in the previous section also needs to be taken into consideration in the
design of virtual relay testing tools. Figure 12.6 shows a simplified block diagram of a virtual
testing tool.

Figure 12.
12.6 – Virtual Testing Tool simplified block diagram

The virtual test system has several main blocks:

• Front end.
• Virtual Relay.
• Analysis and Visualization functions.

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12.5.1 FRONT END
The front end takes a COMTRADE file selected by the user and converts it to a set of data
corresponding to the data passed by the ADC to the real device data bus to be processed by
the protection and control software.
The virtual relay is actually a DLL (Dynamic Link Library) file that emulates the functionality of
the protection IED and is generated from the same code that is used to generate the
software executed in the device itself. This ensures that the results from the virtual testing
will adequately represent the behavior of a real device under the conditions recorded in the
COMTRADE file.
Whereas the COMTRADE file is the input to the virtual testing system, it is important to
consider the different factors that may affect the performance of the virtual relay.
One of the first issues to analyze is the source of the COMTRADE file. In many cases the
user may want to test the behavior of a protection IED based on a waveform record from
another device that may have a different sampling rate and analog and digital filters
compared to the IED being tested. This may lead to operation that was not expected and has
to be taken into consideration in the analysis.
The primary system currents and voltages go through several transformations, including
analog and digital filtering, before they are processed by a protection algorithm. Therefore, it
is preferable to perform the virtual testing using COMTRADE files with disturbance records
from a similar device to the one being tested. This will ensure that the samples processed by
the virtual relay are similar to the image of the primary system event seen by the IED.
If the sampling rate of the record is different from the sampling rate used in the tested device,
this will require re-sampling. When the sampling rate of the record is lower than the sampling
rate of the tested device, it is possible to miss some details in the actual primary waveform
that may affect the protection operation.
Another factor to be considered is frequency tracking. The protection algorithms are typically
based on a fixed number of samples/cycle and some disturbance recording devices have a
fixed sampling rate. This may also require re-sampling in order to provide the virtual relay
with the expected fixed number of samples for each cycle.
If the COMTRADE file is generated from an electromagnetic transient program simulation,
the model used in the simulation needs to be fully understood. If the model includes only the
primary system, CTs and VTs; the samples provided to the virtual relay will not reflect the
effect of the analog filtering in the IED emulated in the virtual testing tool. This may also
affect the behaviour of the tested device.

12.5.2 VIRTUAL RELAY

The Virtual Relay is an executable program module that runs under the virtual testing
software in the PC Windows operating system. The front end was written in C# and the
protection algorithms have been implemented in C. The virtual relay simulator performs one
or more of the functions at runtime. The functions included are:
• Settings Management.
• CT/VT ratio scaling.
• Digital filtering.
• Reading binary inputs.
• Protection algorithms.
• Faulted phase selection.
• Power swing detection.
• Delta directional function.

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• Directional ground fault.
• All distance zone phase and ground loops.

Settings Management
All the settings available in the device are available through dialog boxes. The settings
committed are used by the protection algorithms to act on the input data (e.g. COMTRADE).

Figure 12.
12.7 – Example settings dialog box

Work is underway to read the proprietary format settings file directly to avoid any mismatch.

CT/VT ratio scaling

The COMTRADE file could have been recorded in primary values. The relay simulator can
be used to scale the input in terms of secondary values.

Digital Filtering
A typical distance protection IED contains a myriad of filters for various protection functions.
The simulator can be used to produce individual filter outputs for diagnosis. This is
particularly useful for special applications; e.g. unusual amount of harmonics, switching noise
on long transmission lines, etc.

Reading Binary Inputs

A relay simulator cannot function exactly like an IED unless certain external system
information is passed on to the protection algorithms. It is important that input signals like CB
status are recorded for proper analysis of device behaviour and equally important for the
simulator to be able to pass that on to the protection functions. The virtual simulator can map
selected digital signals from the COMTRADE file to any of the defined binary inputs in the
device.

Protection Algorithms
The discussion of protection elements and in particular the distance elements is not in the
scope of this chapter but it is worth mentioning that the key to reproducing the behaviour of
the IED on a PC is that exactly the same software should be able to run in an embedded or
PC environment.
This involves some architectural decisions to be made at the time of device design that will
ensure that the real time behaviour of the virtual relay is not compromised in any way but at
the same time the software has cross-platform compatibility.

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12.5.3 ANALYSIS AND VISUALIZATION TOOLS
The operation of the virtual relay under test needs to be analyzed and made visible to the
user through the visualization tools available as part of the virtual testing system.
The analysis module receives information from the tested virtual relay on the operation of
different functional elements of the device represented in the logic by Digital Data Bus
signals. This is done at each step of protection function execution and depends on the
specific task it is related to. Most of the functions are executed 48 times per cycle, but some
may also be event-driven.
The analysis module then aligns the change of state of the monitored signals with the current
and voltage samples from the input COMTRADE file and makes them available to the
visualization module for display. Figure 12.8 shows a display of a fault during a system
power swing condition and the operation of different protection elements. Showing the start
and/or operation of different internal signals during the testing of a virtual relay under
complex system conditions such as the one shown in Figure 12.8 can help the protection
engineer better understand the functionality of the transmission line protection device.

Figure 12.
12.8 – Virtual Testing results

It is one thing to look at system conditions through standard post disturbance analysis
software to evaluate relay behaviour. But seeing the measurements through the “eyes” of the
device can give a much better idea of the behaviour of the relay. Figure 12.9 shows the
impedance locus during a power swing as seen by the device after digital filtering. The top
side of the figure represents the apparent impedance seen by the three phase distance
elements. The bottom part gives the impedance seen by the ground distance elements.

179
 Figure 12.
12.9 – Locus of Power swing

12.5.4 VIRTUAL TESTING APPLICATIONS

Virtual testing offers significant advantages and as a result has several key applications in
the development and application of distance protection IEDs.

Development of Distance Protection Relays

Virtual testing provides the protection design engineer with a tool to help quickly determine if
there is a need to modify an algorithm being implemented for specific protection function.
Figure 12.10 below shows a condition where the filtering was adapted using the virtual
simulator to provide an inhibit function for a system where the 3rd, 4th and 5th harmonics were
in unusual proportions. This was resulting in protection operation for external faults in a
weak-infeed system. Using the virtual relay testing it was possible to very quickly find a
solution by inhibiting Zone 1, Zone 2 and the directional ground fault elements of the device
based on a harmonic comparison.
The harmonic filter designed has a pass band as given below in Figure 12.10 and the inhibit
threshold is 150% of fundamental. The directional ground fault element is blocked anyway
but only the affected distance loops are reset.

Figure 12.
12.10 – Harmonic filter

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Analysis of Protection Operation
Short circuit faults and other abnormal system conditions may occur randomly. In order to put
a transmission line back into service to prevent weakening of the system or the development
of a wide area disturbance, a protection engineer may need to test a protection device to
determine the reason why it operated and if it was a correct operation or not. By downloading
the recorded waveform COMTRADE file from any remote location and replaying it on a local
computer, the user can enter the settings of the operated device that are stored in the
computer or also downloaded from the device itself and then test the virtual relay. This
results in significant savings in time and resources.

Protection Settings Verification

The settings for protective functions are typically done by the protection engineer based on
the known system parameters and using a steady-state analysis based protection
coordination tool. However, in many cases, especially when the function may experience
faults under dynamically changing system conditions such as power swings or current
reversals, it is impossible to determine if the selected settings will ensure correct operation
under all system conditions.
Without a real distance protection and test set, the user can test the virtual relay with settings
identical to the calculated ones and see how it will operate for recorded or generated by an
electromagnetic transients program waveforms.

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13 FUTURE TRENDS

13.1 INTRODUCTION
In this section about future trends, an attempt is made to cover the various aspects of
transmission line protection and monitoring IEDs.
The section is divided into two parts, the first looking at general aspects, and the second
focusing on the specific protection functions covered in the previous chapters.
The life of a protection device starts well before delivery, with the planning and engineering
work at the user’s side. Thereafter, the device must be installed and commissioned before
going into regular operation. During its service lifetime, failures and defects may occur and
appropriate action must be taken to minimise plant down-time. This means quick repair
and/or the availability of spare parts at the location where the device is installed. Finally, after
its useful life, the device should be disposed of in an environmentally friendly way.

13.2 GENERAL TRENDS

13.2.1 ENGINEERING
Due to labour intensive work in this field, scheme design and engineering costs make up a
significant portion of the total project cost. In particular, during these phases, the integration
of functions can achieve significant savings. The concept of two or more protection functions
in a single device will contribute significantly towards the optimising and reduction of
commissioning time. Due to the cost pressure, this development is likely to continue into the
future. An example is the combination of differential and distance protection functions into a
single IED. Another example is the inclusion of object-oriented protection functions into the
bay units of a decentralized busbar protection system.

13.2.2 PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

The basic protection principles used today have a long history and are based on well known
physical facts. During the course of time, a high level of refinement has been achieved. This
has been further helped by the introduction of numerical technologies.
In the future, further improvements can be expected in this area. Due to the availability of fast
wide-bandwidth communication links between substations, the exchange of complex
information will become an increasingly necessary feature for the main protection device.
Whereas the loss of communication to the remote end is always possible, the ability of the
protection device to make a local and possibly high-speed trip decision will remain critically
important.

13.2.3 SOFTWARE
The complexity of future protection devices will continue to grow significantly. Whereas all
protection functions are based on software algorithms, it will become increasingly difficult to
exhaustively test all possible combinations.
Fault simulations in the laboratory environment will be highly important for critical protection
devices and functions. This will increase costs and have a negative impact on total project
cost and execution schedule.

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13.2.4 HARDWARE

13.2.4.1 HARDWARE STANDARDIZATION

Already today, the physical design of protection IEDs for different protection applications is
very similar. This tendency will increase in the future, allowing manufacturers to keep costs
to a reasonable level.
For the end-user, this standardization will simplify the supply management for spare parts
and provide time and cost saving for the training of operation personnel.

13.2.4.2 HARDWARE INPUTS/OUTPUTS

Electrical binary input circuits are typically implemented used opto-couplers. The reaction
time is very short, i.e. in the range of a few ms, and an intentional delay to “deglitch” or
“debounce” the signal, is frequently added.
The reaction time for electro-mechanical output contacts is around 8-10 ms. The use of solid-
state components in parallel to these electro-mechanical contacts, can reduce the reaction
time for the closing action to a few ms.

13.2.4.3 HARDWARE AVAILABILITY

The availability figures of processors are, in general, very high. The tendency towards
increased functional integration into one device will increase. This will have a positive impact
on the cost of system engineering, cabling and testing.
Savings can be achieved currently by the application of modern numerical device technology
during the design stage for electrical substations. Modern protection devices contain a
number of protection functions so that, where redundancy or segregation policy permits, the
number of protection devices may be reduced to one per line, with this device operating from
a single set of CT cores. As a result of the reduced number of CT cores, and possibly
burden, it may be possible to install CTs with smaller electrical dimensions. Furthermore the
cost for producing the design documentation detailing the connections to the primary plant is
reduced because the circuits for CTs, commands, signals, etc. need only be provided once.
This also has a positive influence on the cabling and testing costs in the substation. Simple
and straight forward protection device application and connection reduces the possibilities for
wiring mistakes.
Subsequent hardware alterations are no longer required. Later changes of the configuration
are all done by modifying the parameter set-files.

13.2.4.4 HARDWARE SUPERVISION

Modern supervision methods cover about 90% of the hard- and software of a protection IED.
Although technically possible, it cannot be commercially justified in most cases to increase
this number to almost 100%.
The degree of supervision of external wiring and externally connected devices will also be
increased. However, some cases will remain, where it is impossible to distinguish between a
wiring defect and a genuine fault condition on the power system.

13.2.5 MAN MACHINE INTERFACE

Although a very desirable feature, it cannot be expected that protection devices from different
manufacturers can be configured with the same software.

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13.2.6 SETTING PROCEDURES
Due to the high level of functionality available in a single IED, many parameters need to be
set. The chance for errors is correspondingly high. It can be expected that more interactive
help functions will be integrated in the software used to load the parameter set files.
Adaptive measuring techniques will permit protection devices to dynamically adjust settings
for changing network conditions. E.g. automatic setting of a longitudinal line differential
protection characteristic by the IED itself.
Integrated commissioning aids, with graphical and browser-support on the PC, allow for fast
detection of setting and connection mistakes.

13.2.7 COMMISSIONING
Operating personnel need only be trained on one hardware platform and one operating
software. Furthermore the connection between test equipment and the device under test
need only be done once and the testing of the various protection functions then done with an
automatic test sequence. Modern test equipment can check the integrated protection
functions in a single device without additional effort or equipment. In general, a single
commissioning engineer is sufficient for completion of this task.

13.2.8 LIFECYCLE
The production cycle of today’s protection equipment is getting shorter. This is due to the use
of commercially available components and processing software. Such products only remain
in production while there is a reasonable demand on the market.
This means that protection device manufacturers must make careful planning and stocking
rules in order to guarantee the serviceability of the products for their expected operational
life-time of around 15-20 years.

13.3 COMMUNICATIONS

13.3.1 STATION TO STATION

By utilising various communication media, new protection principles may be applied to long
transmission lines. Devices can be remotely set and interrogated via a modem and the
integrated communications interface of the devices so that the need for operating personnel
to travel to the substation is significantly reduced. The protection data interface also transfers
remote operational measured values and freely assignable signals between the devices, so
that the status of each device is accessible from any device location. This also applies to the
condition of the protection data interfaces, which are automatically monitored and indicate
their status at all line ends.

13.3.2 STATION LEVEL

Apart from the other widely used communication protocols, there is a surprisingly wide
acceptance of the IEC61850 Standard. It can be expected that this protocol will play a major
role in all areas of communication used for protection devices.
As a communications medium the advantages of fibre optic cables will be generally accepted
and applied.

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13.4 SPARE PARTS
Compared to conventional relays in which the individual protection functions are
implemented with separate devices or, as in analog electronic relays, with different modules,
the advantage of reduced spare parts is immediately evident. Even auxiliary relays can be
eliminated by means of software implementation using the integrated programmable logic.
Additional flexibility is given by the option to optimise the scope of protection functions using
the same hardware with different optional functions at different locations.

13.5 TRAINING
In the context of a general skills shortage, the use of multifunction IEDs for a variety of
applications reduces the number of hardware devices upon which staff must be trained.

13.6 DEVICE CONFIGURATION

Much of the previously hardwired scheme engineering now resides as software configuration
in the IED, therefore a different approach by utilities is needed. In general, manufacturers
either provide standard configurations for the more common applications, or they assist the
utility in compiling a user- and application-specific configuration. This configuration exercise
is typically only done once and then replicated as a standard within the utility. It is critically
important to fully test this configuration as part of the device certification process.

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14 CONCLUSION

Transmission line IEDs offer a significant number of functional improvements over previous
generations and technologies. The state of the art of multifunctional protection systems
provides several advantages. Some of these are as follows:-
• An unprecedented flexibility in transmission line protection, control and monitoring.
• Improvements in line protection performance in fault discrimination.
• Faster relay operating times and ultimately, fault clearing times.
• Enhanced dependability and security.
• Ability to provide backup protection in addition to primary protection.
• Improvements in measurements via advanced algorithms.
• Improvements in directional discrimination.

Some IEDs include built-in auxiliary functions, such as CB condition monitoring, pole
discrepancy supervision, fault and event recording, electrical quantities measuring, remote
access, time synchronization, etc. The availability of these functions offers a wide variety of
applications in which an IED can either undertake the role, or can assist in implementing
those functions. This assures accuracy and observability. While this reduces the overall cost,
it makes the protection engineering more demanding. Moreover, the auxiliary functions of the
IEDs usually offer tools for executing power system appraisal and system operation
benchmarking in a very competitive environment for achieving the overall desired
performance of the system.
IEDs provide opportunities for implementing integrated solutions, in which algorithms are
combined with many systems, such as SCADA systems, data recording or data logger
systems, telecommunication systems, RTU systems, metering systems, control systems,
PLC systems and maintenance systems. Two systems using different algorithms and
principles can be installed assuring redundancy, flexibility, extensibility, security, high speed
and stability. This reduces the possibilities for energy shortages or black outs, saving
operating costs capital, and manpower needs.
While these enhancements are technical, they substantially reduce the costs of providing
protection systems, wiring those systems and of maintaining the systems in proper working
order. For example, the availability of functions, such as autoreclosing and synchrocheck
simplifies the physical wiring and its installation, and therefore its cost.

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15 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] CIGRÉ JWG 34/35.11, “Protection Using Telecommunications”, 2001
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[3] CIGRÉ SC34 WG01, “Reliable Fault Clearance and Back-up Protection”, 1997
[4] IEEE C37.114, “Guide for Determining Fault Location on AC Transmission and
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[5] IEEE PC37.114/D9, “Draft Guide for Determining Fault Location on AC Transmission
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[6] IEEE PSRC WGH2, “Using Spread Spectrum Radio Communications for Power System
Protection Relaying Applications”, 2005
[7] IEEE Std C37.94, “IEEE Standard for N Times 64 Kilobit Per Second Optical Fiber
Interfaces Between Teleprotection and Muliplexer Equipment”, 2002
[8] CIGRÉ SCB5 WG07, “The Automation of New and Existing Substations: Why and How”,
2004
[9] International Standard IEC 61850, Communication networks and systems in substations
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ISO/IEC 8802-3, First edition 2003-05.
[10] International Standard IEC 61850, Communication networks and systems in Substations
– Part 5: Communication requirements for functions and device models, First edition
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[12] IEC TC 57, 57/760/NP “Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations
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[13] CIGRÉ SC34 WG04, “Application guide on protection of complex network
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