G.R. No.
L-7188 August 9, 1954 "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of
the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where
he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets
of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and
finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses
signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in
the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time
of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of
the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force,
which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out
the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal,
the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person
may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the
testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit
were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution
of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on
the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which
were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will
were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the
three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three
pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be
guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of
the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance
with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with
the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be
the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new
Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by
the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil
Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement
of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in
court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument
was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and
after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has
been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome
doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in
order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will
and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of
wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that
from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the
constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the
estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void
wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied
probate. With costs.
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of
Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will
and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think,
however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings,
was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First
Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance
of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42
Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on
November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the
Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands
are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced
to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point
is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate
that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of
that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as
the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will
reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West
Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony
of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine
Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal
administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an
unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached
to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the
was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L.
MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was
shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph
Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento
annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted
that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20,
1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal
administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no
attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the
allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine
Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward
Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.
Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division
(C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-
3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia
Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they
willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all
improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have
nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands
aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax
No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province
of Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was
submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and there being no
opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special
Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el documento Exhibit A como el testamento
y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna con derecho por parte du su viuda
superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio tiempo segun el Exhibit A de
gozar de los frutos de los terranos descritos en dicho documents; y habido
consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion sumaria de los
mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot previa prestacion
por parte de la misma de una fianza en la sum de P500.00 para responder de
cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe
de la Serna de los años desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado
Bernabe de la Serna) Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952,
another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned
was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same
Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and
her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was
dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of
the Will of Gervasia Rebaca).
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and
void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669,
Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the
testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the
testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the
making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned
by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one
such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a
Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give
effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case
of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to
the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint will
in question is valid."
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive
effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already
decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in
favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court
was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the
whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and
public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set
litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939
decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the
courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this
court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future
misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased
husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife,
Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties
the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in
issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during
the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu
that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our
decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs.
Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs
intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor
is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could
not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only
repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their
observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).

WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition
filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.