Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process.

Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

Section I

I.3. In the decision-making process of the EU institution, European Parliament is the most
powerful institution. Why?

Word Count – 496 Words

Decision making could be regarded as the way to make a choice by knowing the decisions,
aggregating the information and evaluating the alternative resolutions. The European
Parliament (EP) could be regarded as the epitome of this process in the current European Union
(EU) structure. The reason I would assert that, underlining the EP’s participation in the
legislative process, its budgetary and control powers, its involvement in treaty revision and its
right to intervene before the European Court of Justice.1

Over the last three decades, the EP has gained substantial law-making and subsequently
decision -making powers. The EP's basic function was to be a definitive suggestive body in the
legislative decision-making process of the EU, giving aid to the Commission and the Council
of Ministers.2 But now The EP also indirectly strengthens the accountability link between
government representatives in the Council and their national Parliaments and electorates. 3 Even
under the consultation procedure, the Parliament’s view is being contemplated, significantly
even by the Commission.

The influence of the EP is compared across two legislative proposals in the field of transport,
which were matched on important characteristics to keep alternative explanatory factors
constant.4 The first case concerns a directive on minimum conditions for the implementation
of social legislation relating to road transport activities, which was only agreed in the
conciliation committee. 5 The second case regards the directive on driving licenses, which was
formally adopted by the Council in second reading after an informal agreement with the
Parliament had been reached. 6

1Steunenberg, Bernard. 1994. ‘Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the
European Community’. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150(4): 642–69.

2https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/125/12504.html
3Häge, Frank M. 2007a. ‘Committee Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union’. European Union
Politics, 8(3): 299–328.

4 http://aei.pitt.edu/7929/1/kaeding-m-09g.pdf

5 Ibid

6 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/council-parliament-agreement-in-second-reading-
transboundary-movements-of-gmos/177186.article

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

Since its introduction in 1993, the codecision procedure has steadily grown in relevance. With
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, the procedure was not only changed
to guarantee more EP influence7, but also its applicability was significantly widened. This is
reflected in the subsequent increase of the number of laws adopted according to this procedure. 8
Further, Parliament is now a fully-fledged co legislator, acting jointly and on an equal footing
with the Council on a large majority of Commission’s legislative proposals. 9 The number of
files adopted in areas already covered by co decision before the Treaty of Lisbon in the 7th
legislative term, from 454 files in 2004-2009 to 478 files in 2009-2014.10

The legislative influence of the Parliament should be higher if agreement is reached by

trialogue than if it is reached by conciliation negotiations. 11 The EP’s influence during
codecision was indeed found to be larger when agreement was reached at early stages in
informal trialogue negotiations than when agreement was reached through the formal
mechanism of conciliation. 12

It could be concluded that the Decision-making power of the EP has increased substantially in
the time period and it’s only going to be more influential in the future 13. The European
Parliament has grown in its influence in the recent years and with the time, in my opinion, it
has become the most powerful Institution in the EU surpassing the designated Council of EU
through its equivalent powers as of Council and in the present scenario, sometimes,
overpowering it. In the future too, this is going to increase further, making the People’s
institution, all the more decisive on the major issues.

7 European Parliament 2005, p. 10

8 http://aei.pitt.edu/7929/1/kaeding-m-09g.pdf

9 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/legislativeprocedure/default_en.htm
10 http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/859059d1-8a65-4f20-a17a-
6c2baa7984aa/activity_report_2009_2014_en.pdf
11http://aei.pitt.edu/7929/1/kaeding-m-09g.pdf
12Kasak, C. (2004). The Legislative Impact of the European Parliament under the Revised Co-Decision
Procedure. European Union Politics, 5(2), 241-260.

13
https://www.ukessays.com/essays/international-relations/european-union-decision-making-international-
relations-essay.php

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

Bibliography

• Codecision and the European Commission: A Study of Declining Influence? Journal of

European Public Policy, 11(1), 1-18. Corbett, R., Jacobs, F., & Shackleton, M. (2005).
• The European Parliament. London: John Harper Publishing. Crombez, C. (1996).
Legislative Procedures in the European Community. British Journal of Political
Science, 26, 199-228. Crombez, C. (1997).
• Interorganizational Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision
Making. Early Agreements 33 Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European
Parliament and Council. Comparative Political Studies, 37(10), 1184-1212. Garrett, G.,
Tsebelis, G., & Corbett, R. (2001).
• In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community.
International Organization, 53(4), 733-764. Häge, F. M. (2007).
• Composite Democracy in Europe: The Role of Transparency and Access to
Information. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(5), 814-833. Hix, S. (2005).
• Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaeding, M. (2004).
• ‘Codecision: Towards a Bicameral European Union’. European Union Politics, Vol. 1,
No. 3, pp. 363–8. Farrell, H. and Héritier, A. (2003).
• ‘Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-
Building in Europe’. Governance, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 577–600. Garrett, G. (1995)
• Scully, R.M. (1997) ‘The European Parliament and Co-decision: A Rejoinder to
Tsebelis and Garrett’.

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

Section II

II.1. “Lobbying in the EU is well regulated and effective” Do you agree? No.
Why not?

Word Count – 998 words

Lobbying is usually outlined because the strategies utilized by a private, cluster or assortment
of teams in making an attempt to influence call manufacturers, most notably elective officers
and senior civil servants, into supporting particular causes. Not amazingly, the largest movers
and shakers agitate for the largest industries with the foremost to realize and lose from
European legislation.

The scale of lobbying at the European level, has led to increase the opaqueness of European
Union governance and which makes it achievable to form a legislation which is absurd in
language and would might go against the will of the people and thereby against public interest.
Lobbyists can be not only e professional lobbyists (intermediaries of special interests) but also
private sector representatives dedicated to this work from in-house lobbyists, public relations
consultants, NGO representatives, and so on. 14

In October 2014, EU news website Euractiv reported that tobacco company Philip Morris
International spent €5.25m on lobbying the EU in 2013, more than any other company during
that year, according to data collected by Lobby Facts.15

Whilst lobbying in itself can be regarded as an old technique to get things done on representing
the Govt or the Non Govt organization, the extent to that corruption plays a part is open to
debate.16 It is argued that any type of felony, offers of special favours, all made up for
corruption, even though the meaning could differ from country to country.

As Ms Danuta Hübner(EPP, PL) commented on this that the European Parliament has always
been a leader in the debate on transparency. 17 Now is the time for all EU institutions to
demonstrate unity in their approach. We should enhance our joint Transparency Register and

14 Philip Morris tops NGOs‘ spending table‘, Euractiv, 1 Oct 2014. Available at:
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/public-affairs/philip-morris-tops-ngos-lobbying-spendingtable-308820
15 Looking back at the tobacco lobbying battle: Philip Morris' allies in the European Parliament, Corporate Europe

Observatory, 16 May 2014.

16 http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/Anthony-Chambers-EU-lobbying.pdf

17 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180108STO91215/transparency-register-

who-is-lobbying-the-eu-infographic

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

make it more comprehensive. All European institutions should demonstrate that they are open
and close to the citizens. 18

After the debates and publications by the different agencies, The European Union came up with
certain reforms to regulate and make the Lobby system particularly efficient. Two
distinguished things that have been brought by the Brussels, that of the commencement of the
Transparency Register and the Anti-Corruption Report. The purpose of the register is to
provide a record of activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly influencing
the formation or implementation of policy and the decision making processes of the EU
institutions‘. 19

In an endeavour to curb the revolving door phenomenon, the EU has introduced cooling off
periods for outgoing Commissioners and senior civil servants. 20 The rule needs people to vacate
their posts to wait 18 months or 12 months respectively before taking on employment in a
lobbying capacity. 21 Regulating lobbying could be a rather recent thought within the majority
of Member States. Currently, only seven Member States 22 have legislation on lobbying
activities, as well as a mandatory register of lobbyists. The European Parliament, The
Commission and The Council have agreed to start talks in early 2018 on setting up joint rules
that will bring more transparency to the activities of interest representatives at the EU level.

Looking at the draft final agreement between the European Parliament and Commission,
variety of those steps are taken on board to manoeuvre nearer to a quasi-mandatory register. 23
In particular, a set of "incentives" should make it more difficult for regular lobbyists and
interest groups not to register. Nevertheless, these incentives still fall short of making the
register quasi-mandatory.24

After analyzing the institutional framework of regulations governing lobbies at European level,
I can conclude that there is an increasing tendency to develop regulations quite similar to that
established in the United States. 25 This model can help introduce greater transparency and
formal integrity into the system. 26

18 Ibid
19 F. Zibold, Lobbying the EU Institutions Library Briefing Lobbying of the European Parliament, 18 Jun 2013, p.2.
20 http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/Anthony-Chambers-EU-lobbying.pdf
21 Ibid
22 (France, Ireland, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom)
23 A long way to go for effective EU lobby regulation,
https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vjheubb3wjyc?ctx=vhxoh7tozwrd
24 Ibid

25
https://www.theeconomyjournal.eu/texto-diario/mostrar/716918/transparencia-regulacion-lobby-europa-
espana
26 https://www.theeconomyjournal.eu/texto-diario/mostrar/716918/transparencia-regulacion-lobby-europa-

espana

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

It would be impossible to make lobbying at any level of European politics entirely transparent
due to the impracticality of encoding a definition of lobbying acceptable to all participants and
the attainable infringement of privacy for people consulting their elected representatives. 27
However by amending existing legislation and thru the adoption of innovative laws the EU
may build vital strides in developing transparency.28

The EU ought to reform the Transparency Register by creating it obligatory for EU lobbyists
to sign. In order to ensure a bigger picture of transparency and to bring a widerr picture of who
is involved in lobbying head figures and institutions, changing the current register is an
important reform. If the EU is to change current lobbying laws then the hold and supervision
ought to be undertaken by a non-biased agency and not by elected officials, EU bureaucrats or
lobbyists. This would surely be desirable to delivering these responsibilities to EU insiders or
officers performing on behalf of legislators.29

The solution to this issue could be to make a mandatory Transparency Register which would
require all EU lobbyists to sign-up and take pro-active transparency measures where The EU
decision-makers refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists and also publish online lists of all
meetings held with lobbyists. 30

While the task of reforming the lobbying culture within the EU in terms of its definition and
function may seem insurmountable, given the extensive requirements of vested interest
groups31, anything from a small charity to a multinational company, the current haphazard
system requires attention to address public concerns and need for visible democracy. The
creation of a obligatory Transparency Register accompanied by transcripts of the written
responses from EU officials to the queries and suggestions of lobbyists would need
enforcement by an independent body, possibly based on a Scandinavian model which
encourages openness and accountability.32

Establishing reforms designed to improve the transparency of EU institutions would necessitate

a body to monitor EU lobbying, thereby curbing the illness and making the Lobbying in the
EU efficient and highly regulated.

27 https://www.ebrary.net/3610/management/direct_lobbying_versus_indirect_lobbying
28 http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/Anthony-Chambers-EU-lobbying.pdf
29 Rules Against Legislators Lobbying State Government After They Leave Office‘, National Conference of State
Legislators ; http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-revolving-door-prohibitions.aspx
30 https://www.alter-eu.org/what-is-the-problem

31 http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/Anthony-Chambers-EU-lobbying.pdf
32 Ibid

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

Bibliography

• Corporate Europe Observatory, Brussels: The EU Quarter, (Sept. 2011), p. 3. , available

at: http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/ceolobbylow.pdf.
• What is Lobbying?‘, Association of Government Relations Professionals , available at:
http://grprofessionals.org/about-lobbying/what-is-lobbying/.
• P. Wilkinson, Cash for Access: Time to legislate for trading in influence‘, Transparency
International UK, 25 Feb 2015. Available at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/rss/12-
blog/1229-cash-for-access-time-to-legislate-for-trading-in-influence/1229-cash-for-
accesstime-to-legislate-for-trading-in-influence.
• S. Wolf, ‘Modernisation of the German Anti-Corruption Criminal Law by International
Legal Provisions‘, German Law Journal 7 (2006), p. 786.
• F. Zibold, Lobbying the EU Institutions Library Briefing - Lobbying of the European
Parliament, 18 Jun 2013, p. 2.
• Agribusiness is the biggest lobbyist on the EU-US trade deal, new research reveals‘,
Corporate Europe Observatory, 8 July 2014. Available at:
http://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2014/07/agribusiness-biggest-lobbyist-eu-us-
tradedeal-new-research-reveals.
• C. Holman & W. Luneberg, Lobbying and transparency: A comparative analysis of
regulatory reform‘, Interest Groups & Advocacy 1 (2012), p. 100.
• Joseph Jupille, Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the
European Union (2004), P. 84.
• Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on Fighting Corruption in the EU COM
(2011) 308, p. 5. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/news/intro/docs/110606/308/1_en_act_part1_v121.pdf.
• Héritier, Adrienne. (2003). Composite Democracy in Europe: The Role of
Transparency and Access To Information. Journal of European Public Policy. 10. 814-
833.

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Current EU Issues - EU Institutions and the EU Decision Making Process. Akash Bhatt
Prof. Christine Neuhold MAIS I

PLEDGE OF HONESTY

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in

good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Akash Bhatt
MAIS 1