G.R. No.

202664, November 20, 2015

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH LAND, INC.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK
KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review on certiorari,1 from the Orders dated April 17,
20122 and July 9, 20123 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (Branch 276)
dismissing Civil Case No. 11-077 for lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales4 and Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a
Complaint5 for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day
Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against respondents GJH
Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and
Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II6 (respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J.
Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially,
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the books
of S.J. Land, Inc.,7 but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's
stockholders,8 hence, their plea for injunction.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special
Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order,9 and later, in an
Order10 dated August 24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

After filing their respective answers11 to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss12 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-corporate
dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.13

The RTC Ruling

In an Order14 dated April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found
that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
(Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276
had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the matter, including the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.15 Accordingly, it dismissed the case.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,16 arguing that they filed the case with the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle.17 As
the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong
assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of P235,825.00 that would be
for naught if the dismissal is upheld.18 They further maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes under Republic Act No. (RA) 8799,19 but since the Court selected specific branches to
hear and decide such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper branch.20

In an Order21 dated July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that it has no
authority or power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial Court, citing Calleja v.
Panday22 (Calleja); hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City
erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a
commercial case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute,23 considering that it relates to petitioners'
averred rights over the shares of stock offered for sale to other stockholders, having paid the same in full.
Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly
rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative
rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of
the corporation,24 hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial
Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of
RA 8799.
The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case - such
as the instant intra-corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a
regular branch of that station.

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's
subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided
by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the
Court.26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an
issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.

Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 528 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A29 was transferred from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general jurisdiction. Item 5.2, Section 5 of
RA 8799 provides: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

SEC. 5. Powers and Functionsof the Commission. - x x x

xxxx

5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final
resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission
shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000
until finally disposed. (Emphasis supplied) c ralawlaw lib rary

The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction stems from Section 19
(6), Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980": chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: chanRo blesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

xxxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; x x x x
cralawlawl ibra ry

As enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:31 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the
jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court,
fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.32
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary

To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to
particularize the fact that the phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the phrase "the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated
under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or,
otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts. This interpretation is supported by San Miguel Corp.
v. Municipal Council,33 wherein the Court held that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

[T]he word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same
significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or
expository of the preceding word.34 cra lawlawlib rary

Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of the Congressional deliberations: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

Senator [Raul S.] Roco: x x x.

xxxx

x x x. The first major departure is as regards the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has been authorized under this proposal to reorganize itself. As an administrative
agency, we strengthened it and at the same time we take away the quasi-judicial functions. The quasi-
judicial functions are now given back to the courts of general jurisdiction - the Regional Trial
Court, except for two categories of cases.

In the case of corporate disputes, only those that are now submitted for final determination of the SEC will
remain with the SEC. So, all those cases, both memos of the plaintiff and the defendant, that have been
submitted for resolution will continue. At the same time, cases involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy,
suspension of payments and receiverships that were filed before June 30, 2000 will continue with the SEC.
in other words, we are avoiding the possibility, upon approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the SEC,
in manner of speaking, to select their court.35

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) cralaw l awlibra ry

Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only in favor of
particular RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general.

Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first
implemented, they were transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle between or among its
different branches, unless a specific branch has been designated as a Special Commercial Court, in
which instance, the cases were transmitted to said branch.36 It was only on November 21, 2000 that
the Court designated certain RTC branches to try and decide said SEC cases37 without, however, providing
for the transfer of the cases already distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on
January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC Administrative Circular No. 08-200138 directing the transfer of said
cases to the designated courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M.
No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property courts39 in one RTC
branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure
and to promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC branch so designated was mandated to try and
decide SEC cases, as well as those involving violations of intellectual property rights, which were, thereupon,
required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Courts, to wit: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated
21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002 all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC;
(b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in
A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try
and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction
and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlibra ry

xxxx

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with
respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in
the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;41

x x x x (Underscoring supplied) cra lawlawlib ra ry

It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special Commercial Courts was made in line with
its constitutional authority to supervise the administration of all courts as provided under Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. cralawlawl ibra ry

The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to promote expediency and efficiency
in the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such
designation has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since
in the first place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given
that the power to define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of
legislative prerogative.42 Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: c hanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.

xxxx
cralawlawl ibra ry

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court,
in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of
Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch
276, instead of being assigned44to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e.,
"Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"45 which, however,
contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-
corporate dispute: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

16. To the surprise of MLCG and FMDG, however, in two identical letters both dated 13 May 2011, under the
letterhead of GJH Land, Inc., Yap, now acting as its President, Jang and Kim demanded payment of
supposed unpaid subscriptions of MLCG and FMDG amounting to P10,899,854.30 and P2,625,249.41,
respectively.
16.1 Copies of the letters dated 13 May 2011 are attached hereto and made integral parts hereof as
Annexes "J" and "K", repectively.
17. On 29 July 2011, MLCG and FMDG received an Offer Letter addressed to stockholders of GJH Land, Inc.
from Yap informing all stockholders that GJH Land, Inc. is now offering for sale the unpaid shares of stock of
MLCG and FMDG. The same letter states that the offers to purchase these shares will be opened on 10
August 2011 with payments to be arranged by deposit to the depository bank of GJH Land, Inc.
17.1 A copy of the undated Offer Letter is attached hereto and made and made an integral part hereof as
Annex "L".
18. The letter of GJH Land, Inc. through Yap, is totally without legal and factual basis because as evidenced
by the Deeds of Assignment signed and certified by Yap herself, all the S.J. Land, Inc. shares acquired by
MLCG and FMDG have been fully paid in the books of S.J. Land, Inc.

19. With the impending sale of the alleged unpaid subscriptions on 10 August 2011, there is now a clear
danger that MLCG and FMDG would be deprived of these shares without legal and factual basis.

20. Furthermore, if they are deprived of these shares through the scheduled sale, both MLCG and FMDG
would suffer grave and irreparable damage incapable of pecuniary estimation.

21. For this reason, plaintiffs now come to the Honorable Court for injunctive relief so that after trial on the
merits, a permanent injunction should be issued against the defendants preventing them from selling the
shares of the plaintiffs, there being no basis for such sale.46 cralaw lawlib rary

According to jurisprudence, "it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may be legally
characterized."47 However, so as to avert any future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all
initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and the body, which parameters are defined
in the dispositive portion of this Decision.

Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch
instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be
dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to
the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e.,Branch 256.

Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple
special commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same
as a commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.

Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within
the judicial region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a
commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as
Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.

In all the above-mentioned scenarios, any difference regarding the applicable docket fees should be duly
accounted for. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess,
refunded.

At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the RTC mistakenly relied on the Calleja case to
support its ruling. In Calleja, an intra-corporate dispute49 among officers of a private corporation with
principal address at Goa, Camarines Sur, was filed with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58
instead of the RTC of Naga City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for
Camarines Sur. Consequently, the Court set aside the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur's order to transfer
the case to the RTC of Naga City and dismissed the complaint considering that it was filed before a court
which, having no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, had no jurisdiction over those
kinds of actions, i.e., intra-corporate disputes. Calleja involved two different RTCs, i.e., the RTC of San
Jose, Camarines Sur and the RTC of Naga City, whereas the instant case only involves one RTC, i.e., the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, albeit involving two different branches of the same court, i.e.,Branches 256 and
276. Hence, owing to the variance in the facts attending, it was then improper for the RTC to rely on the
Calleja ruling.

Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of
jurisdiction had been clearly blurred in Calleja. Harkening back to the statute that had conferred subject
matter jurisdiction, two things are apparently clear: (a) that the SEC's subject matter jurisdiction over
intra-corporate cases under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A was transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction, i.e., the appropriate Regional Trial Courts; and (b) the designated branches of the
Regional Trial Court, as per the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, shall exercise jurisdiction over
such cases. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 provides: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - x x x

xxxx
5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases, x x x. cralawlawlib rary

In contrast, the appropriate jurisprudential reference to this case would be Tan v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.,50which involves a criminal complaint for violation of intellectual property rights filed before the RTC of
Cebu City but was raffled to a regular branch thereof (Branch 21), and not to a Special Commercial Court.
As it turned out, the regular branch subsequently denied the private complainant's motion to transfer the
case to the designated special court of the same RTC, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed
the regular branch and, consequently, ordered the transfer of the case to the designated special court at
that time (Branch 9). The Court, affirming the CA, declared that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter. In view, however, of the designation of another court as the Special Commercial Court in the
interim (Branch 11 of the same Cebu City RTC), the Court accordingly ordered the transfer of the case and
the transmittal of the records to said Special Commercial Court instead.51Similarly, the transfer of the
present intra-corporate dispute from Branch 276 to Branch 256 of the same RTC of Muntinlupa
City, subject to the parameters above-discussed is proper and will further the purposes stated in
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC of attaining a speedy and efficient administration of justice.

For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the inverse
situation of ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should then be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then order the raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC,
subject to limitations under existing internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in
case of any difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil
case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a particular branch which has been
designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil
cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.52To restate, the
designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the
resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not
made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules
governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts
and the personnel thereof.53 Certainly, an internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the
commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to
stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct
from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil
cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.

In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer of said case to Branch
256, the designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, under the parameters
above-explained, is hereby ordered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 17, 2012 and July 9, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11-077 is REFERRED to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City for re-
docketing as a commercial case. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall ASSIGNsaid case to Branch 256, the
sole designated Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is ORDERED to resolve the
case with reasonable dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC shall DETERMINE the
appropriate amount of docket fees and, in so doing, ORDER the payment of any difference or, on the other
hand, refund any excess.

Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper
courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to the sole
special branch;

1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off among
those special branches; and

1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region.
Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re- docket the case as a commercial case,
and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case
to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial
Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an
ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated
special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular
branches), as provided for under existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any
difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.

4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's
nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the
court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural
rule is prospective in application.

5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded. cra lawlawlib rary

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the result. I subscribe to the ruling in the Calleja case that the misfiling
of a commercial case with a court not duly designated Special Commercial Court is an error of
jurisdiction. However the Supreme Court has constitutional and legal basis [RA 8799] to promulgated the
guidelines here for future cases.
Brion, and Mendoza, JJ., on leave.
Perez, J., I submitted a dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J., see concurring opinion.