Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Transportation Laws
Fe Bangoy
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND
SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-49407 19 August 1988
Facts:
National Development Company (NDC) appointed
Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) as its agent
to manage and operate its vessel, ‘Dona Nati’, for and in
behalf of its account. In 1964, while en route to Japan
from San Francisco, Dona Nati collided with a Japanese
vessel, ‘SS Yasushima Maru’, causing its cargo to be
damaged and lost. The private respondent, as insurer
to the consigners, paid almost Php400,000.00 for said
lost and damaged cargo. Hence, the private respondent
instituted an action to recover from NDC.
Issue:
Which laws govern the loss and destruction of goods
due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters?
Ruling:
In a previously decided case, it was held that the law of
the country to which the goods are to be transported
governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration pursuant to
Article 1753 of the Civil Code. It is immaterial that the
collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan.
It appears, however, that collision falls among matters
not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, hence, we
apply Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of
Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision of
vessels.
Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Case Digest
Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship
(31 Phil 1)
Facts: The complained alleges that plaintiff is a
stockholder in Yangco Steamship
Company, the owner of the large steam vessels, duly
licensed to engage in the coastwise trade of the
Philippine Island; that on or about June 10, 1912, the
directors of the company, adopted a resolution which
was thereafter ratified and affirmed by the stockholders
of the company “expressly declaring and providing that
the classes of merchandise to be carried by the company
in its business as common carrier do not include
dynamite, powder or other explosives, and expressly
prohibiting the officers, agents an d servants of the
company from offering to carry, accepting for carriage
or carrying said dynamite, powder or other explosives.”
Issue: Whether the refusal of the owner and officer of a
steam vessel, to accept for carriage dynamite, powder or
other explosives for carriage can be held to be a lawful
act?
Held: The traffic in dynamite gun powder and other
explosive is vitally essential to the material and general
welfare of the inhabitants of this islands and it these
products are to continue in general use throughout the
Philippines they must be transported from water to port
to port in various island which make up the
Archipelago.
It follows that a refusal by a particular vessel engage as
a common carrier of merchandise in coastwise trade in
the Philippine Island to accept such explosives for
carriage constitutes a violation.
The prohibition against discrimination penalized under
the statute, unless it can be shown that there is so Real
and substantial danger of disaster necessarily involved
in the courage of any or all of this article of merchandise
as to render such refusal a due or unnecessary or a
reasonable exercise or prudence and discreation on the
part of the ship owner.
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER,petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular
to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to allow provincial
bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15%
above or below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period.
This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the
transport sector which the government intends to
implement and to make progress towards greater
reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec.
that the Public Service Act requires publication and
notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec.
1990, Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the Phils.
Atty.
(PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare
rate increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992,
then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB
suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to
implement the Department Order & to lay down
deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline,
PBOAP, w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20%
fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move
and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c was denied.
Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent
prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted by the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial
buses to set a fare range above existing authorized fare
range is unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority
is unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas delegate
non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated) is applicable because a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate thru instrumentality of his own
judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate
mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give
provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will
result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators
who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it
pleases or when they deem it necessary.
De Guzman v. CA
Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He
buys scrap materials and brings those that he gathered
to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the
return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his
vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted
delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de
Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of
750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970,
respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were
delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the
boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner
commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being
a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent
denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could
not be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Transportation Laws
against the respondent, but such was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common
carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of
the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. It appears to the
Court that private respondent is properly characterized
as a common carrier even though he merely "back-
hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to
Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a
periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's
principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for
others. There is no dispute that private respondent
charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that
fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not
a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil
Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that
common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they
carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international
or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within
any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed
in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the
part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that
the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the
goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended
by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we
hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be
regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
necessary to recall that even common carriers are not
made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or
events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable,
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.
Erezo v. JepteFacts:
Defendant-
appellant is the registered owner of a six by six truck
bearing. On August, 9, 1949, while the same was bein
g driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia, itcollided with a t
axicab at the intersection of San Andres and Dakota S
treets,Manila. As the truck went off the street, it hit Er
nesto Erezo and another, and theformer suffered injuri
es, as a result of which he died.
The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckl
ess negligence. Theaccused pleaded guilty and was se
ntenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay theheirs of
Ernesto Erezo the sum of P3,000. As the amount of th
e judgment couldnot be enforced against him, plaintiff
brought this action against the registeredowner of the
truck, the defendant-appellant.
The defendant does not deny at the time of the fatal a
ccident the cargo truckdriven by Rodolfo Espino y Gar
cia was registered in his name. He, however,claims tha
t the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which
he was thebroker at the time of the accident. He explai
ned, and his explanation wascorroborated by Policarpi
o Franco, the manager of the corporation, that thetruc
ks of the corporation were registered in his name as a
convenientarrangement so as to enable the corporatio
n to pay the registration fee with hisbackpay as a pre-
war government employee. Franco, however, admitted
that thearrangement was not known to the Motor Vehi
cle Office.
The trial court held that as the defendant-
appellant represented himself to be theowner of the tr
uck and the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his repres
entation,registered the vehicles in his name, the Gover
nment and all persons affected bythe representation h
ad the right to rely on his declaration of ownership an
Atty. Fe Bangoy
dregistration. It, therefore, held that the defendant-
appellant is liable because hecannot be permitted to re
pudiate his own declaration.Issue:WoN Jepte should b
e liable to Erezo for the injuries occasioned to the latte
r because ofthe negligence of the driver even if he was
no longer the owner of the vehicle at the timeof the da
mage (because he had previously sold it to another)Hel
d:YES.
The registered owner, the defendant-
appellant herein, is primarily responsible forthe dama
ge caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-
appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or
actual owner of the amountthat he may be required to
pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-
appellant
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no vehic
le may be used oroperated upon any public highway u
nless the same is properly registered. Notonly are vehi
cles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to
be used oroperated without being properly registered f
or the current year, but that dealers in
motor vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office
a report showing the nameand address of each purcha
ser of motor vehicle during the previous month andthe
manufacturer's serial number and motor number.
Registration is required not to make said registration
the operative act by whichownership in vehicles is tra
nsferred, as in land registration cases, because thead
ministrative proceeding of registration does not bear a
ny essential relation tothe contract of sale between the
parties, but to permit the use and operation ofthe veh
icle upon any public
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identi
fy the owner so that if anyaccident happens, or that a
ny damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on thep
ublic highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed o
n a definite individual, theregistered owner.
A registered owner who has already sold or transferre
d a vehicle has therecourse to a third-
party complaint, in the same action brought against hi
m torecover for the damage or injury done, against the
vendee or transferee of thevehicle
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Transportation Laws
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
388 SCRA 445 (2002)
Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul
Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was
destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was
charged with and later convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office,
it was known that the registered owner of the tractor
was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin
Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul
Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable
Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for
damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been
sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in
possession and control thereof at the time of the
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee,
not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages
based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim
stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter
into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the
subject tractor was to be registered in the name of
petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully
paid by Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of
the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor was
executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented
by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered
with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries
complained of, because it was the registered owner of
the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a
motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the
tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
Atty. Fe Bangoy
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of Duavit vs. CA, Sarmiento & Catuar G.R. No. 82318 May
the driver. 18, 1989
Facts:
Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met
BA Finance Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 98275 November 13, an accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. This
1992 accident caused injuries to private respondents, thus
they filed a case for damages against driver Salbiniano
Facts: and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership
Amare, the driver of an Isuzu truck was involved in an of the jeep but contends that he should not be held
accident which caused the death of three persons. liable since Salbiniano is not his employee and that the
Amare was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of jeep was taken by Salbiniano without his (Duavit)
reckless imprudence. BA Finance was found liable for consent.
damages since the truck was registered in its name. BA Issue: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle
Finance contends that it should not be held liable since which figured in an accident can be held liable as an
it was not Amare’s employer at the time of the accident. employer when the said vehicle was neither driven by
It also contends that the Isuzu truck was in the an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent.
possession of Rock Component Phil, by virtue of a lease
agreement. Hence, BA Finance wants to prove who the Held: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for
actual/real owner is at the time of the accident, and in an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was
accordance with such proof, evade liability and lay the driven without his consent or knowledge and by a
same on the person actually owning the vehicle. person not employed by him.
Issues: To hold the petitioner liable for the accident caused by
1 WON BA Finance should be held liable. the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver
2 WON BA Finance can escape liability by proving the nor employee would be absurd as it would be like
actual/real owner of the truck. holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an
Held: accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.
1 Yes, BA Finance is liable.
The registered owner of a certificate of public
convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or
damages suffered by passengers or third persons
caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the
same had been transferred to a third person. Under the
same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even
if not used for a public service, should primarily be
responsible to the public or to the third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being
driven on the highways or streets.
2 No, the law does not allow him. The law, with its aim
and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the
responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as
an incident or consequence of registration. This may
appear harsh but nevertheless, a registered owner who
has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action
brought against him to recover for the damage or injury
done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.
While the registered owner is primarily responsible for
the damage caused, he has a right to be indemnified by
the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be
required to pay as damage for the injury caused.