Contesting The Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary Through Infrapolitical Everyday Resistance Online

Contesting the Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary through Infrapolitical Everyday
Resistance Online
Katrina Gaber
Abstract
Based on unique narrative material collected during extensive fieldwork in Thailand,

this paper explores the possibilities to resist the Thai hyper-royalist nationalist
imaginary. The role of social media for mobilization of overt, collective, or organized
forms of resistance is well known. However, this paper explores the role of social
media for covert, individual, non-organized forms of resistance in repressive contexts.
Keywords: Khao Phra Wihan/Preah Vihear, nationalism, resistance, social media,

Thailand
Introduction
When a specific event has triggered a large-scale uprising or mobilization, a so-called critical
moment in resistance, the role of social media has been important in many contemporary
examples. The video of the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi, for example, which
started the uprisings in Tunisia that led to the Arab Spring, had the effect it had because of
the wide and quick spread of the video on social media. In Egypt the Facebook site ''We are
all Khaled Said" had an important role in spreading information and connecting the like-
minded before the uprisings (Alaimao 2015). In these examples mobilization was
foregrounded by years of suffering and grievances, but the online actions turned out to be
The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Fall 2018, Volume 3 Number 2 1
critical moments as they worked as effective tools of spreading information and mobilization
(see Fuchs 2012 for further discussion of social media as a tool of organization, for example
in the 2011 uprisings in Egypt).
However, the main focus of this paper is the role of social media in more subtle forms
of resistance. Based on research concerning everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1990, 1985;
Vinthagen and Johansson 2013; Lilja et al 2017) this paper concerns how respondents
describe the role of social media for everyday resistance against the official Thai
nationalizing program. Some forms of power that limit all types of overt forms of resistance
might still be resisted through low-profile, individual, non-organized forms of everyday
resistance. James Scott has offered the following famous description of everyday resistance:
Everyday forms of resistance make no headlines. Just as millions of
anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do thousands upon
thousands of individual acts of insubordination and evasion create a
political or economic barrier reef of their own. There is rarely any dramatic
confrontation, any moment that is particularly newsworthy. And whenever, to
pursue the simile, the ship of state runs aground on such a reef, attention is
typically directed to the shipwreck itself and not to the perpetrators of petty
acts that made it possible. (Scott 1985: 36)
This paper focuses on the role of social media as a site for individual acts of insubordination,
which might seem insignificant at first glance but could have the potential of creating a
"political barrier reef of their own." Even if power and resistance can be analyzed separately,
they are in practice often played out in close connection with each other (Sharp et al 2009).
As some forms of resistance are subtle, it becomes important to be very conscious about the
context and aware of the forms of power in place to be able to identify a certain act as

resistance.
The context of this paper is Thailand, where a specific form of Thai-ness, a hyper-
royalist nationalist imaginary1, has been promoted in order to govern a large territory, and to
legitimize a traditional hierarchical power structure. This official version of Thai-ness is
based on the religion, language, and culture of the largest group in Thailand and has been
repressive for smaller groups who have been subjected to homogenization practices by the
state (Phatharathananunth 2006; Kasetsiri 2015; McCargo 2010). Furthermore, this definition
of Thai-ness has been closely connected to the monarchy and to Buddhism, in what is often
described as the "three pillars" of Thai nationalism. The monarchy has a special status in
Thailand. The king is seen as the Thai nation personified and as a divine Dhammaraja, a
righteous king. The Thai monarchy is at the center of Thai nationalist discourse (see for
example Jackson 2010; Streckfuss 2010; Winichakul 1994; Sturm 2006: 40). However, to
discuss this position of the monarchy and the economic structure around the monarchy is
illegal. The lèse majesté law in Thailand refers to the crime of injury to royalty, defined by
Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, which states that defamatory, insulting or threatening
comments about the king, queen, heir apparent and regent are punishable by three to fifteen
years in prison. Yet there are no clear definitions of what it is to "defame" or "insult." It is a
law with the provision that anybody can bring charges against anybody, leading to its
frequent use in political as well as personal conflicts. Usually the police, prosecutor and judge
deny bail in lèse majesté cases out of fear of being charged by lèse majesté themselves
(Winichakul 2014: 91). Thailand has one of the strictest laws in the world restricting freedom
of expression and has received the status "not free" in freedom measurements (Freedom
House 2018).
The idea of the interconnectedness of the "three pillars" is a creation from the

beginning of 1900, but is a formulation of Thai-ness that is very much still alive today. The
leader of the military junta in power since 2014, General Prayut, states that the "three pillars"
is the most important value of Thai people today (National News Bureau of Thailand 2017),
and the junta see themselves as guardians of Thai-ness (Peel 2014). Therefore, the official
nationalizing program is still functioning as a form of power in Thailand, today promoted by
the military junta in connection with the network around the monarchy institution. As the
nationalizing project is promoted by such a powerful actor as the military, and protected by
the strict lèse majesté law, it becomes especially interesting to explore the agency of
individuals in relation to nationalizing, as the context is potentially repressive for
nonconformists. As a general trend in interviews respondents related how social media has
created a new opportunity to communicate and share information in the highly military-
controlled and restricted political environment in Thailand. This is intriguing as Thailand is
ranked highest in the world regarding time spent on the Internet per day, and fourth, after the
Philippines, Brazil and Indonesia, on time spent per day on social media (We are social and
Hootsuite 2018). If the online world matters for political agency, it could have a big influence
in a place with such high online activity as Thailand.
The analysis in this paper is based on narrative materials collected through
ethnographic methods in Thailand in 2014 and 2016. The time aspect is crucial in this paper.
The last interviews were conducted in April 2016; i.e., before the death of the king Rama IX
Bhumibol Adulyadej in October 2016. All references to the "monarchy" or "monarch" hence
refer to king Bhumibol. The interviews conducted for this research 2 were semi-structured and
centered on the territorial conflict regarding Khao Phra Wihan3. The conflict was described
by a respondent as “a case study of how Thai nationalism works,” 4 which is a good
explanation of why the interviews were structured around the conflict. Having the conflict as

a starting point provides a possibility for respondents to approach different aspects of
nationalism as much as they feel comfortable to do, as the status of the monarchy is such a
sensitive matter in Thailand. The data were collected in the borderland area towards
Cambodia on the Thai side (in Sisaket Province), and in Bangkok. All participants in
interviews were civil societal actors that have been involved in some way in the conflict over
Khao Phra Wihan. The respondents fit into one or several of the following categories:
resident in border area affected by the conflict, member of the Asoke group, media worker,
human rights activist, and/or academic writing on the conflict.5
In order to explore how the Thai nationalist imaginary is resisted this paper begins
with a presentation of Khao Phra Wihan conflict narratives, which will further explain the
context and the materials used. This is followed by a section titled "Social Media and
Repression" which displays how social media is seen as a threat to power, which is aligned
with how the conflict narratives describe social media as a site of infrapolitical resistance.
This section is followed by an exploration of how the Thai hyper-royalist nationalist
imaginary is contested. The paper ends with a concluding section on what can be learned
from this regarding the potential of social media for resistance.
Narratives of Khao Phra Wihan
Khao Phra Wihan are the ruins of a Hindu temple located in the borderland area between
Thailand and Cambodia. The border between the countries was decided upon in colonial
times and the temple ruins are located in Thailand and respectively in Cambodia depending
on different interpretations of the colonial agreements between Siam (the former name of
Thailand) and France, the then colonial power of what is Cambodia today. In 1962 the
International Court of Justice ruled the temple ruins to be on Cambodian territory, with a

clarification in 2014 of the same statement. In 2008 and 2011 there were border clashes
between the Thai and Cambodian militaries in the area (see for example Kasetsiri et al 2013;
Pawakapan 2013; or Strate 2015 for more on the temple conflict). However, many
respondents explain how the conflict is related to the internal political situation in Thailand,
rather than animosity between Thailand and Cambodia. One respondent explained the
background to the conflict in this way:
The war happened because of the political situation in Thailand. The
Yellow Shirts created the situation to discredit the Red Shirts. The
Yellow Shirts are right wing and the Red Shirts are left wing. The
Yellow Shirts are nationalists and the Preah Vihear was made an issue
in a way to question the Red Shirt government at the time when
Cambodia succeeded in making Preah Vihear a World Heritage Site.
This created the war – that the Yellow Shirts wanted to protest against
the government.6
In many ways the temple conflict is connected to the conflict between the so-called Yellow
and Red Shirts (Pawakapan 2013). And the color-coded conflict in turn concerns the
traditional power structure in Thailand, the Red Shirts’ struggle for electoral democracy and
the contentious position of the network monarchy in Thailand. One respondent described how
nationalism in Thailand is connected to royalism in this way:
Phra Wihan is just a preamble of the big problems. Because Phra
Wihan, or the territory, represents the King's pride. Losing Phra
Wihan is not just a zone, it is not just a land, but it is merely about the
reputation of the king. Phra Wihan is the pride, the reputation, of the
ancestors, which means the leader, which means the king.7

There are nationalists in Thailand who are critical of the monarchy, for example many in the
Red Shirts movement, but the junta-proposed official form of traditional nationalism is based
on the three interlinked pillars of the nation, religion and the monarchy (Farrelly 2016: 338).
Nationalism in Thailand is a contemporary controversial everyday issue, which is put in
context by a respondent like this:
R: When there is a problem… for example, last week there was a news
about a Thai movie star that had to be a soldier and people started to
talk again about why every Thai man have to pick in a lottery about
being a soldier. [They questioned] why don’teveryone want to be a
soldier?
K: Everyone should want to be a soldier?
R: Soldiers talked to the media, [and said] that if you are Thai you
should love nationalism, you should be willing to do things for your
country. I think nationalism is propaganda for the people; you have to
love the country. The real reason for the propaganda about nationalism
is that it is a way to control people for the soldiers and the monarchy.
To make it easy to control people. The "monarchy, nation and religion"
is propaganda to make it easy to control people.
K: Who is it that controls the people?
R: Those three: the monarchy, soldiers and the monks. But people
don’t believe like in the past, when you couldn’t criticize a monk. The
monarchy is difficult to criticize. Nationalism can be okay to criticize.
Religion has become easier since a lot of monks are so bad now.8
An alternative explanation could be that the behavior of the monks hasn’t changed but that
their behavior is monitored in a different way because of mobile phones and social media.
What the respondent refers to as "propaganda" is constantly repeated in different ways in the
Thai public with the Thai national flag, Buddha statues, and pictures of the king in all shops,
cars, homes, and work places et cetera. A person calling him-/herself a "Red Shirt academic"
describes the role of the monarchy in this way:
The nation and the territory does not belong to the people, it
belongs to the king. The people are not the owners of the territory: the
territory belongs to the king. When you reside in this territory you have
to respect the king. The king is the center of the three pillars in
Thailand. The 2006 and 2014 coups happened to protect the king and
the interests of the monarchy.9
Importantly, the reach of the monarchy in Thailand far extends the position of the monarch.
The agency promoting this specific type of nationalism is what Duncan McCargo labels the
"network monarchy" (2005) or Michael Connors the "Palace Power Block" (2003). What is
often described as "the monarchy" is a network of people with different motivations for an
interest in the dominance of monarchy as a social and political institution (Winichakul 2014:
82). One respondent described the “network monarchy” like this:
K: What are these three pillars?
R: It is complicated to explain and you should be careful about how
you write about it in your thesis. They are about protecting the power
of the king. You know, the king has a big family. When we say ‘royal
family’ we mean everyone who benefits from the royal system, they
are thousands.10

As respondents connect the conflict over Khao Phra Wihan with nationalism in the form of
the traditional power structure formed through the "three pillars," the conflict narratives
becomes a source to understand this power structure (as well as resistance to it).
Social Media and Repression
Social media is seen as a threat to power in many places. Several countries have serious
restrictions on access to Facebook and sporadic bans have been used, for example during the
uprising in Egypt in 2011. The whole Internet was closed down during protests in Cameroon
for almost 100 days (Essa 2017). While social media has been used in the organization of
protests it has also become a tool for surveillance by many states. It has been used to trace
down activists, and to detain activists based on online posts and "likes," place-monitoring,
and mapping movements and connections between activists through electronic trails (see for
example Trottier and Fuchs 2015 on how states use social media for surveillance). Social
media must therefore be understood as a site for both resistance as well as repression.
On 22 May 2014 the military seized power in Thailand through a military coup. The
junta in power since then has a special division called the Army Cyber Center. In Thailand
people can be persecuted up to 15 years per each case for defaming the monarchy. The Army
Cyber Center claims to have taken down around 400 websites committing lèse majesté in 7
months (since the king passed away in October 2016 and 7 months forward). Since it opened,
the center has closed many websites; many of them are sites on Facebook, but include other
venues such as YouTube and Twitter (Prachatai 2017). The junta asked Facebook to take
down 300 posts in the first half of 2017 (Tanakasempipat 2017). Many activists have been
detained based solely on "likes" on Facebook, and there is even one person imprisoned
because he was found guilty of defaming the king’s dog (Head 2015).

Contesting the Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary
As it is not possible to criticize the official Thai nationalizing program openly without risking
being jailed for years, resistance has largely taken the form of disguised, low-profile,
undeclared, everyday, informal, personal "hidden transcripts," which Scott describes as
“infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum” (1990: 183). One respondent gave an
example of a situation that is on a first look not in the "visible end of the spectrum":
K: Are there many who think like you?
R: Many, but we cannot say it out loud. But there are also some police
and some in the military. They are called ‘dengoo’ military – do you
know what it means?
K: Watermelon military?
R: Yes. On the outside they are green and look like they support but on
the inside they are red.
K: Support the monarchy or what do you mean?
R: Support the three pillars. The pillars have created a lot of problems.
We must change this kind of system. He is on list of the richest
people in the world and still many are poor in Thailand. The land
belongs to the monarchy; there are many things here that are not
fair…11
The excerpt above shows the culture of silence concerning the status of the monarchy in the
Thai society; it is a subject that cannot be talked about out loud. The expression "watermelon
military" indicates that even in the military there are Red Shirts, even if they don’t express

their political opinions openly. Another respondent also explained how far-reaching the
repression of expressed dissent regarding the monarchy is:
R: The monarchy could support democracy but in the recent years
many events have showed that the monarchy is not supporting
democracy. The monarchy supports the coup d’état, and the
suppression of Red Shirt people. The monarchy also allowed the use of
112. In the recent years, article 112 have become an important tool
for the Yellow Shirt movement, against democracy. Therefore,
most Red Shirt people don’t mind about the monarchy anymore. Me
myself have also had enough, I have supported them for a long time.
K: In what ways can you and other Red Shirts express this?
R: We cannot express it, it is forbidden by the law. After the latest
coup d'état, many Red shirt activists have left Thailand. Many Red
Shirts leave Thailand in order to be able to speak openly against the
monarchy. This is for the first time, this has never happened before,
even if we had many military coups before we never had so many
against the monarchy. 12
In an interview with a Thai academic I had the following conversation regarding Thai
nationalism and the possibilities to critique it:
K: What do you personally feel about the three pillars?
R: Pardon?
K: [Repeating question]
R: No, not any more. I am an academic, I can distance myself from the
disillusion of this belief.

K: You call it disillusion?
R: I have studied politics, I distance myself from disillusions. This is
power, the power of Thai nationalism.
K: And what about resistance? Is there any resistance against this
power?
R: You see the high number of people being charged through the lèse
majesté laws. That is resistance, it is challenging the institution.
Buddhism – the new generation makes fun of religion on social media
all the time. On Facebook. But there is no such as an organization, yet.
We see many comments about bad behavior of the monks, how
wealthy the Sangha [the Buddhist order] are.
K: Where are these discussions taking place?
R: Online social forums, social media. Whenever there are scandals
about monks it's on social media. There is no respect for monks
anymore. In the Red Shirts, a high number of them, don’t respect the
Sangha anymore, because the wealth they have accumulated is just
huge. We are talking about hundred millions of baht that each temple
earn each year.13
These interviews illustrate how social media in Thailand has become a site for
expressing what James Scott calls "hidden transcripts," discourse that takes place outside of
the sight of power holders (1990: 4). Without any organization it has become a place to voice
critique. Typical for "hidden transcripts" are that they are expressed openly but in a disguised
form; jokes and rumors can for example insinuate a critique of power while hiding behind
anonymity (Ibid: xiii). Another respondent explained how the younger generation in Thailand
has been affected by the social media in this way:

R: As you know, mobile phones and online social networks make them
freer. Unlike their parents, who had to rely on the official bureaucrat,
the bureaucratic system. But for now, they don’t care about the system
anymore. They think that if they have a good education they can go
and work in Laos or Singapore or anywhere else. They don’t care
about getting work in the Thai system. Because they know that even if
they get into the system they will not be able to get very far because of
their Khmer identity. It is better to ignore these three pillars and find
something new – internationally, globally. That is the answer for the
new kids. (……) The three pillars doesn’t give equality, doesn’t give
right to the people, doesn’t give people what they need. The three
pillars where very functional and effective during colonialism. Then it
was right to use the three pillars to unite the people of this country. But
the times changed and the three pillars doesn’t fit the new requirements
of the society. That is a problem now, they don’t know what is
happening. It is the same as during the French revolution, the French
bureaucrats couldn’t see it coming. It is the same in Thailand. The Thai
bureaucrats doesn’t see it coming. People know they have power. This
is a time of social networks, of information technology. You cannot
say that you know better than me or that I know better than you,
because the information is already in your hands14.
Another respondent explained the role of social media for discussing sensitive issues:
R: People who are awakened from the spell of royalism are “Ta
Sawaang” (Awakened). The concept of Ta Sawaang is to see the
nation, religion and monarchy as constructions. They are all

constructions. When you stop being nationalist you will also stop being
Buddhist. These are constructions that we learn in school, when we
learn about Thai history. It is repeated and repeated. We have to sing
the royal anthem every day and there are always documentaries on TV
about the greatness of the king. This is constructed and we repeat it
without thinking of why. Phibun used nationalism to defend the nation.
It is connected. When we are not blind by royalism anymore we are not
blind by nationalism either. (…)
K: Would you identify as one of the ‘Ta Sawaang’ people?
R: Yes… maybe (….) Even if it is not illegal for example to say that
you are not blind by the spell anymore, the spell of royalism, how do
we express it? They use social media to hold the monarchy accountable
K: Would you say it is mostly an online phenomenon?
R: Yes, I would say it’s mostly an online phenomenon. Many of them
are underground. Mainstream media cannot discuss this so where to do
it? It has to be online media.15
As online media provides a new platform to spread information it becomes a tool
against propaganda. It is no longer possible to control all information, even if the military
junta tries to do so (Rojanaphruk 2018). The everyday act of using Facebook, seeing pictures
that mock the morals of monks and make fun of the military and the monarchy, is disturbing
the carefully designed idea of the "three pillars" as being above politics and possibilities of
critique. When taking the step to "like" or share a post, the resistance is arguably not covert
or infrapolitical anymore (even if sources often are anonymous). During fieldwork I was
often shown posts on social media, even if respondents stressed that they didn’t dare to "like"
or share them. In this way social media is a site for everyday resistance, where, as James

Scott described, like "millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef,"
thousands of individual acts of insubordination create a political "barrier reef of their own"
(1985: 36). Through social media, the spread of information and the possibility of finding
like-minded individuals might create a coral reef of dissent. This is a work in progress at this
very moment and the eventual consequences of this "coral reef" are still to be seen.
Conclusion
Social media seem to play an important role in subtle forms of resistance, as it is a tool to
spread information, disturb propaganda and to see that dissent exists even if the repression to
express dissent out loud is massive. The official Thai nationalizing program is resisted
through contesting the hyper-royalist nationalist imaginary on social media. As social media
is literally in the hands of the majority of people in the world, even in highly authoritarian
contexts, it becomes a site at which to express both open resistance and the more subtle forms
of low-profile, individual and even covert forms of resistance. This paper is based on
narratives about social media in general terms; further research on actual social media is
needed in order to understand how it is used in a variety of resistance initiatives. This is
necessary in order to understand this growing arena for political activity and the myriad of
possibilities to show dissent, even in the most repressive contexts.
Acknowledgments
As freedom of expression is restricted in Thailand and the lèse majesté law used to silence
political dissidence, anyone talking to a researcher about sensitive issues takes a risk when
doing so. I would like to thank all the respondents for participating in interviews, and for all

the insights I have gained through informal conversations. Many people in Thailand have
shown me both wide generosity and true bravery. Thank you all.
Notes

1 The “nationalist imaginary” is refering to Benedict Andersson's (2006/1983) famous description of
nations as “imagined communities.” This does not mean that nations only exists as imaginations, but
rather that imagining is part of how they are constructed socially.
2 This paper is part of a larger research project exploring the nexus of power, resistance and
nationalism in Thailand.
3 In translations of names from Thai to English different spelling of the same names are common. In
the case of Khao Phra Wihan all the three parts of the name can be spelled differently as “Khao” or
“Kao”, “Phra” or “Pra”, and “Wiharn”, “Vihan” or “Wihan”. In English translations of Khmer the
temple is usually spelled Preah Vihear, which is also the most common way to name the temple in
English. As this project is focusing on Thailand, the Thai appellation has been used in the interviews
and in this paper. However, when respondents have used the name “Preah Vihear” it has been kept in
the quotations and interview excerpts.
4 Interview 3, middle-aged academic in Political Science, Bangkok, 2014-07-07.
5 In many interviews the identity categories of education, location and age are emphasized as important
in regards to attitudes towards the three pillars. The elite, Bangkok, and older age are often connected
to a support of the pillars, while uneducated, rural (especially Isaan) and/or younger age are connected
to a generally more critical approach towards the pillars. As these are categories used by the
respondents, rather than for example gender, and held important in this context, these are the identity
categories used in the references to respondents.
6 Interview 2, young media-worker in Bangkok, 2014-07-04.
7 Interview 29, young academic in Bangkok, with a background in the borderland, 2016-03- 22.
8 Interview 37, young media worker, Bangkok, 2016-03-28.
9 Interview 31, middle-aged “Red-Shirt” academic, Bangkok, 2016-03-24.
10 Interview 10, middle-aged human rights activist, Bhumisarol, 2016-03-05.
11 Interview 10, middle-aged human rights activist, Bhumisarol, 2016-03-05.

12 Interview 31, middle-aged “Red-Shirt” academic, Bangkok, 2016-03-24.
13 Interview 30, middle-aged academic in Political Science, Bangkok, 2016-03-23.
14
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Contesting The Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary Through Infrapolitical Everyday Resistance Online

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Contesting the Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary through Infrapolitical Everyday

Based on unique narrative material collected during extensive fieldwork in Thailand,

Keywords: Khao Phra Wihan/Preah Vihear, nationalism, resistance, social media,

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

in the 2011 uprisings in Egypt).

might still be resisted through low-profile, individual, non-organized forms of everyday

Everyday forms of resistance make no headlines. Just as millions of

anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do thousands upon

thousands of individual acts of insubordination and evasion create a

confrontation, any moment that is particularly newsworthy. And whenever, to

acts that made it possible. (Scott 1985: 36)

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

legitimize a traditional hierarchical power structure. This official version of Thai-ness is

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

nationalizing program is still functioning as a form of power in Thailand, today promoted by

individuals in relation to nationalizing, as the context is potentially repressive for

controlled and restricted political environment in Thailand. This is intriguing as Thailand is

in a place with such high online activity as Thailand.

The analysis in this paper is based on narrative materials collected through

by a respondent as “a case study of how Thai nationalism works,” 4 which is a good

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

human rights activist, and/or academic writing on the conflict.5

This section is followed by an exploration of how the Thai hyper-royalist nationalist

from this regarding the potential of social media for resistance.

Narratives of Khao Phra Wihan

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

background to the conflict in this way:

The war happened because of the political situation in Thailand. The

in a way to question the Red Shirt government at the time when

Cambodia succeeded in making Preah Vihear a World Heritage Site.

nationalism in Thailand is connected to royalism in this way:

Phra Wihan is just a preamble of the big problems. Because Phra

Wihan, or the territory, represents the King's pride. Losing Phra

ancestors, which means the leader, which means the king.7

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Nationalism in Thailand is a contemporary controversial everyday issue, which is put in

context by a respondent like this:

being a soldier. [They questioned] why don’teveryone want to be a

K: Everyone should want to be a soldier?

should love nationalism, you should be willing to do things for your

country. I think nationalism is propaganda for the people; you have to

To make it easy to control people. The "monarchy, nation and religion"

is propaganda to make it easy to control people.

K: Who is it that controls the people?

monarchy is difficult to criticize. Nationalism can be okay to criticize.

describes the role of the monarchy in this way:

the interests of the monarchy.9

82). One respondent described the “network monarchy” like this:

K: What are these three pillars?

R: It is complicated to explain and you should be careful about how

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

Social Media and Repression

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

undeclared, everyday, informal, personal "hidden transcripts," which Scott describes as

K: Are there many who think like you?

know what it means?

the inside they are red.

K: Support the monarchy or what do you mean?

We must change this kind of system. He is on list of the richest

The International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation

repression of expressed dissent regarding the monarchy is:

R: The monarchy could support democracy but in the recent years

many events have showed that the monarchy is not supporting

democracy. The monarchy supports the coup d’état, and the

for the Yellow Shirt movement, against democracy. Therefore,

R: We cannot express it, it is forbidden by the law. After the latest