Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
197788, 29 enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
February 2012.
18
APR
[SERENO, J.]
FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza
invited the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the
said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was
uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket.
Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it.
Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife.
Upon seeing the said container, he asked Luz to open it.
After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his
instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there
was no lawful search and seizure because there was no
lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based
on traffic violation under the city ordinance, and such arrest
lead to a valid search and seizure?
HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application
of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason
they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it
was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part
of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to
take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to
have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates
the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was
there a valid warrantless search and seizure that can still
produce conviction?
HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under the
assumption that Luz was deemed arrested upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest
were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement they might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only
after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject items seized
during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused
Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, October 16,
1996
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with hijacking a Delivery Truck of the
Bureau of Post along MacArthur Highway in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, together with ten others, in that on May 3, 1982, the
accused, two of whom were armed with guns, stopped the
Delivery Truck at gunpoint, and then robbed and carried
away the truck with them, including Social Security System
Medicare Checks and Vouchers, Social Security System
Pension Checks and Vouchers Treasury Warrants, and
several Mail Matters from abroad worth P253,728.29
belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS
Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private
Individuals.
Based on a signed confession, the Sandiganbayan, on June
18, 1987, convicted petitioner and his cohorts as co-
principals for the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to
Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, or Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether a petition can be treated alternatively as filed
under either Rule 45 or Rule 65 – YES
2. Whether an extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, is admissible in
evidence against him – YES
3. Whether statements of accused obtained through torture,
duress, maltreatment and intimidation are illegal and
inadmissible – NO
4. Whether warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and
proper – YES
5. Whether the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to
prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt – YES
6. Whether the crime committed was Brigandage or Robbery
– ROBBERY
RATIO:
1. The petition was erroneously filed under Rule 65 when it
should be filed under Rule 45. In any case, the Court
brushed aside this procedural defect because of the
important issues the petition raised.
The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition by treating it as
having been erroneously filed under Rule 65 when the
proper remedy is Rule 45.
The petition submitted alternatively under either rule 45 or
rule 65 gave the Supreme Court the prerogative to decide
how to treat said petition, and may dismiss the petition on
the grounds that it is unqualified for the rule that the court
decided the petition falls under. The petition was considered
as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as in Jariol, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan, because under P.D. No. 1486, amended
by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan,
specified that decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on certiorari by the
Supreme Court, ruling out a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 because certiorari may be invoked only where there is no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
This petition could have been dismissed on these grounds
but due to the importance of the issues raised, the Court
assumed jurisdiction.
2. Extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without
the presence of his lawyer, are admissible in evidence
against the petitioner under the 1973 Constitution, but is no
longer the case in the 1987 constitution.
The petitioner’s extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, is admissible in
evidence against the petitioner because it falls under Article
IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, which did not contain
the right against an uncounseled waiver of the right to
counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution as it had been obtained
before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if
presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not
been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date. The
latter provision cannot be applied retroactively because while
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what
is being construed here is a constitutional provision
specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is not a
penal statute.
Nor is the petitioner protected by the Morales and Galit
rulings, that the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel, because he executed his extrajudicial confession
and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982 unlike
in People vs. Sison where the extrajudicial confession was
executed after April 26, 1983 . It is in accordance with Article
8 of the Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines,” and Article 4 of the same Code,
“laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided.”
The petitioner’s affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was
made voluntarily and intelligently, categorically and
definitively, and rested on clear evidence. Sgt. Arsenio
Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he told the
petitioner of his right to counsel, even in waiving that right.
The petitioner did not even inform Sgt. Carlos that his father-
in-law was a lawyer nor did he invoke his right to counsel.
The petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as
an accused because he was a fourth year criminology
student and a topnotch student in the police basic course as
well as having been in the police force since 1978, with stints
at the investigation division or the detective bureau, so he
was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial
confessions.
3. Accused’s extrajudicial confession was admissible
because there was no proof of torture, duress, maltreatment
and intimidation.
There was no evidence of physical injuries upon his person,
according to the medical report. When he was presented
before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in
Meycauayan, he waived his right to present evidence instead
of challenging his confession on account of the torture
allegedly inflicted upon him. An examination of his signatures
in the different documents on record bearing the same
discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his
penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification,
extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Therefore,
his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been
voluntarily made, as there was no conclusive evidence
showing that petitioner’s consent had been vitiated.
The question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to
torture or maltreatment is a factual question addressed
primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on
the Supreme Court whose function is principally to review
only of questions of law as in section 2 of rule 45. The
respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the
evidence.
4. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest is valid.
On the petitioner’s arrest, that the arresting officers “invited”
him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp
Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a
month after the commission of the crime. As he did not
question his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not
guilty and by participating in the trial, any irregularity in his
arrest, if any, was cured as explained in People vs. Lopez,
Jr., because it is well-settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea. The illegal arrest of an accused is
also not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
5. Prosecution proved accused’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
The petitioner’s culpability has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt and his alibi has been correctly considered
by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. Having
already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner’s confession,
the Supreme Court holds that the full force of the totality of
the prosecution’s evidence proves his guilt well beyond
reasonable doubt. Added to that is the well-settled doctrine
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that findings of facts of
the the Sandiganbayan itself, is binding upon this Court,
absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error because
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
6. The crime committed was Robbery because there was no
proof that the group was formed for multiple indiscriminate
instances of robbery.
The Court believes that the question of which law was
violated by the accused should be discussed and passed
upon even if it was not raised as an issue and not argued by
the parties in their pleadings as it may have reduced the
petitioner’s penalty.

That P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and

Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, assumed to have been
the statute violated, because the robbery was perpetrated on
a national highway (McArthur Highway), has been debunked
by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Isabelo
Puno, where it was ruled in that it takes more than the site of
the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. The
Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers that were purposely organized for several
indiscriminate commissions of robbery. It would not be
necessary to show that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven
when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to
be such as are contemplated by art. 306. But, if robbery is
committed by a band, the crime would be only robbery.

There had been no evidence presented that the accused

were a band of outlaws organized for such purpose as well
as of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the
accused to show the “indiscriminate” commission thereof.
Instead the evidence proved that robbery was committed as
defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art.
244, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code that personal
property belonging to another were unlawfully taken by the
accused with intent to gain with intimidation against three
persons (Art. 293) in an uninhabited place, or by an band, or
by attacking a moving motor vehicle on a highway; and the
intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295).