CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: EXPLAINING TRANSFORMATIONS OF

NATIONALISM

WRITING SAMPLE FROM DISSERTATION:

“CONTESTED INCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

TH
IN 20 CENTURY MEXICO, ARGENTINA, AND PERU”

September 7, 2006

Matthias vom Hau

Department of Sociology
Brown University
Box 1916, Maxcy Hall
Providence, RI 02912
INTRODUCTION: EXPLAINING TRANSFORMATIONS OF NATIONALISM

During the course of the twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru

experienced major transformations of nationalism. In the late nineteenth century the

three countries exhibited liberal nationalism as a dominant state ideology. These national

discourses adopted a political-territorial understanding of the nation, imagined national

unity as realized in the advancement of “civilization.” It also conceived of national history

as driven by enlightened leaders and envisioned a small state and an export-oriented

economy as the proper institutional structure to secure national progress. During well-

defined periods in each of these countries, subordinate movements and excluded elites

advanced popular nationalism to challenge the reigning liberal nationalism. These

alternative national discourses promoted a cultural understanding of the nation and

depicted national unity as achieved through a homogeneous national identity. In these

national discourses popular classes appeared as protagonists of national history and a

corporate state and inward-oriented economy as ideal underpinnings of national

organization.

Yet the extent to which popular nationalism replaced liberal nationalism varied

among the three countries. Mexico under the government of Cárdenas (1934-1940) was

characterized by a comprehensive transformation of nationalism. Alliances between state

elites and subordinate sectors led to the appropriation of popular national narratives by

official ideology. This discursive change unfolded simultaneously with the expansion of

state ideological infrastructure, facilitating the institutionalization of popular nationalism.

By contrast, Argentina under Perón (1946-1955) represented a contained transformation

of nationalism, in which state authorities did not manage to turn popular national

1
discourses into hegemonic cultural scripts in the context of an already established cultural

machinery. Finally, for most of the twentieth century Peru epitomized a blocked

transformation of nationalism, marked by the continued exclusion of popular national

narratives from dominant state ideology. Only under Velasco (1968-1975), with the

emergence of new ruling coalitions, did popular nationalism become an official national

discourse.

This dissertation explains these striking similarities and variations in the

transformation of nationalism in twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru: why did

popular nationalism emerge as an official state ideology; why did the timing of this

discursive change vary; and why did these countries differ in the extent to which popular

national ideologies gained prominence as an everyday frame of reference. To answer these

questions it is necessary to conceptualize how continuities and changes of nationalism

unfold more generally and what the key causal processes and configurations involved in

these historical processes are.

To explain why transformations of nationalism occur this study advances a

state-focused approach.1 Such an approach builds on key insights from the literature,

that nationalism constitutes a powerful discursive tool for both the legitimization and

the contestation of state power (e.g., Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997; Chatterjee 1993;

Hobsbawn 1990), and that patterns of state institutional development are critical for

the dissemination of nationalism (e.g., Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Mann 1993). I

analyze changes in official national ideologies as driven by conflicts and alignments

between state elites and subordinate movements, and by the timing of state making.

1
See Yashar (2005) for a similar approach to explain indigenous mobilization in contemporary Latin
America.

2
The label “state-focused” seeks to avoid confusion with the state-centered literature

(e.g., Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), and its emphasis on states as

institutional actors and its lack of attention to the agency of social movements.

In developing these theoretical arguments, this dissertation speaks to several major

theoretical issues. Many classical works (e.g., Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1982; Gellner

1983; Hobsbawn 1990; Smith 1986; Tilly 1994) have developed a sophisticated set

of arguments about the origins of nationalism. Yet they remain silent when it comes

to explaining how ideas about national membership—the question of who is a

member and who can claim rights—evolve over time. The study of popular

nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru sets the stage for theorizing

transformations of nationalism—as opposed to its emergence.

The focus on these three Latin American cases also addresses another

shortcoming in the literature, the relative absence of comparative works on nationalism in

the region. Most theories of nationalism are grounded in European countries and probe

their theoretical claims in light of empirics from these cases (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn

1990; Smith 1986; Tilly 1994).2 A comparative approach to nationalism in Latin America

affords the opportunity to develop an analytical framework that confronts existing

theories of nationalism with evidence from outside their context of construction.

Analogously, many excellent monographs and historical studies have focused on

nationalism in the region. Yet, this growing literature (e.g., de la Cadena 2000; Gutierrez

2
One of the few notable exceptions is Benedict Anderson’s highly acclaimed Imagined Communities
(1991), which argues that early nineteenth century “Creole pioneers” invented nations in the struggle
for Independence from Spain, thereby establishing a “blueprint” for nationalism around the globe.
Yet, Anderson’s argument about the Latin American origins of nationalism did not work out: Ideas
about popular sovereignty and citizenship employed by insurgent creoles originated in Western
Europe (Greenfeld 1992; Guibernau 1996), and Anderson’s elite-centered argument ignored the
agency of subaltern actors in the construction of national imagined communities (Lomnitz 2001,
Guardino 1996; Mallon 1995; Thurner 1997).

3
1999; Quijada 1994; 2000; Shumway 1991; Thurner 1997) remains—with a few

exceptions3—largely confined to one particular country. Without a comparative

perspective, however, these studies often lack the necessary tools to identify the causal

sequences of nationalism. The study of nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru

facilitates the synthesis of this important literature into a comparative framework for

explaining this kind of ideological transformations.

Patterns of nationalism had tremendous consequences for lived experiences.

Official national discourses were highly consequential for policy decisions in the

three countries. Ideas about national identity and history informed citizenship

regimes and redistributive policies (e.g., Collier and Collier 1991; Yashar 2005).

Boundaries of national belonging shaped the political, civil, and social rights granted

to that particular imagined community. At the same time, criteria of national

membership often established hierarchies of belonging, thereby configuring the

practical exercise of these rights. For instance, in the three countries, social welfare

provisions were more limited for those segments of the population that did not fit

into corporatist categories established and legitimized by popular nationalism and its

class-based understanding of the nation (e.g., Hamilton 1982; Plotkin 2002; Stepan

1978).

Moreover, studying the historical formation of nationalism provides a matrix

for the analysis of contemporary contestations to official ideologies. In Mexico and

Peru indigenous movements gained prominence throughout the last decades, while

Argentina witnessed the increasing mobilization of its indigenous people and recent

3
Comparative approaches to nationalism include Brading (1991), Quijada (1994; 2000), and Bouchard
(1998). Yet these works are largely descriptive and not grounded in a theoretically motivated explanatory
framework.

4
immigrants from the Andean countries. These movements advanced alternative

national narratives that challenged the homogeneizing and hierarchical aspects of

popular nationalism (e.g., de la Cadena 2000; García 2005; Gutierrez 1999; Stephen

2002; Yashar 2005). Their struggle illustrates once more a central contention of this

study: the inherently contested and changing character of nationalism.

Transformations of Nationalism: A Conceptual Framework

Like with most other concepts in the social sciences scholars engage in heated

debates about the meaning of nationalism and advance competing definitions.

Nationalism has been used to describe movements, regimes, policies, ideologies,

rhetorical styles, and collective emotions. Discussions about the appropriate

conceptualization overlap with polemics over whether nationalism is modern or ancient

(e.g., Armstrong 1982; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1999; Gorski 2000; Smith 1999),

subjective or objective (e.g., Bauman 1992; Calhoun 1997; Tamir 1993), alive and well

or destined to disappear in the dustbin of history (e.g., Hobsbawn 1977; Kedouri 1960;

Nairn 1977). Despite the overall conceptual dispersion the literature can be roughly

divided into three distinct approaches that emphasize different aspects of nationalism.

One group of scholars stresses collective action and views nationalism as a set of political

behaviors. In this perspective nationalism refers to social movements or state policies that

advance the interests of collectivities framed as nations (e.g., Beissinger 2002; Breuilly

1982; Hechter 2000; Tilly 1990). A second group highlights emotions and depicts

nationalism as a collective sentiment. This “emotional” approach defines nationalism as a

form of social solidarity infusing with passion ties to the national community and

5
establishing a sense of belonging (e.g., Guibernau 1996; James 1996; Marx 2003). A

final position views nationalism as a primarily cognitive and normative phenomenon

(e.g., Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986). In this perspective

nationalism is often portrayed as a set of classification schemata, normative orientations,

and categories that help to constitute nations as imagined communities.

For conceptualizing nationalism this study draws on the latter two approaches. I

refer to nationalism as a particular form of discourse, a way of speaking and thinking

about collectivities in terms of nations and national identities (Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli

2005). Its basic underpinning is the idea that a political unit is congruent with an

imagined cultural community of nationals.4 Nationalism charges certain normative

principles, cognitive schemata, symbols, myths, and rituals with emotions and collective

meaning and fuses them into specific reference points for the construction of national

inclusion. These boundary markers are historical fabrications, but they may be

experienced as primordial elements of collective life (Billig 1995; Eisenstadt 1998;

Finlayson 1998).

The emphasis on cognitions, evaluations, and emotions situates the concept at the

interface between politics and culture and avoids the overemphasis of the political

dimension inherent in the behavioral approach. A focus on the collective action of

movements and state policies ignores a key feature of nationalism, its peculiar power to

bring the political and the cultural together. Moreover, this definition avoids conflating

explanans and explanandum, because it includes neither the actions producing particular

4
This definition provides a basis for distinguishing between nationalism and other forms of discourse
involved in the legitimation or challenge of state power. For instance, agrarianism is distinct from
nationalism because it evokes an imagined community of peasants rather than nationals.

6
understandings of national identity nor the political behaviors these national discourses

might inspire.

Nationalism as a discourse constitutes a powerful orientation for both the

legitimization and contestation of state power. In framing collectivities as sovereign,

equal and inherently limited nations, and a state as their political embodiment,

nationalism is a critical source of legitimacy for state authority. Analogously,

nationalism also forms a grid for the challenge of state power. The idea of a sovereign

political community with the potential right to self-determination establishes an important

ideological underpinning for contentious mobilization.

This study identifies three distinct but interrelated discursive formations of

nationalism. The main distinction is based on the major social actors that advance and/or

embrace a particular form of national discourse. First, nationalism is a highly explicit

and consciously articulated state ideology. States draw upon national discourses to

legitimate authority and achieve social control (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn 1990; Smith

1991). This form of nationalism is reflected in presidential speeches, school textbooks,

monuments, and public ceremonies. Second, nationalism is a consciously articulated

alternative narrative. Social movements employ nationalism in order to mobilize

political support and challenge state authority. Stark empirical examples are the vignettes

about the nation by leaders of the Zapatista movement in Mexico. Third and finally,

nationalism is a cultural script with almost self-evident plausibility that provides a lens

through which social reality is framed in daily habits and routines (Anderson 1991; Billig

1995; Brubaker 1996). This form of nationalism is reflected in the cheering for one’s

7
national soccer team during the World Cup, or taking the national framing of news for

granted.

In a temporal perspective, state ideologies, cultural scripts, and alternative

narratives are connected to each other in a dynamic process. As illustrated in Figure 1, I

propose the following conceptual model for tracing transformations of nationalism. State

ideologies aim to become gradually translated into hegemonic cultural scripts.5 These

implicit frames of reference help to propel the pervasiveness of states in the life-world of

their resident populations (Eley and Suny 1996; Verdery 1993). At the same time,

cultural scripts enjoy relative autonomy from state control and therefore provide

subordinate groups with a frame of reference for constructing alternative narratives in

order to challenge state ideologies (Chatterjee 1993; Mallon 1995). On the basis of this

conceptual model, I argue that transformations of nationalism entail the reorganization of

official ideas about the nation. A transformation of nationalism is associated with (1) the

production of alternative narratives, which refers to the “framing work” of social

movements; (2) the selective incorporation of alternative narratives into state ideologies,

and (3) the institutionalization of state ideologies into cultural scripts.6

---------------------------------
Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------

5
National discourses are hegemonic if they have achieved the status of broadly diffused reference points.
In this definition, hegemony is not equated with citizens’ acceptance of official national ideologies, but
refers to the use of these discourses in daily life (see Gramsci 1971).
6
This model is inspired by Robert Wuthnow’s (1989) “social-structural” approach to ideological change. In
his empirical work he discusses the production, selection, and institutionalization of the Reformation, the
Enlightment, and socialism as ideological forms.

8
 Movements usually do not “invent” alternative national narratives from scratch,

but draw on cultural scripts to construct contending visions of national history and

identity that achieve broader resonance across public spheres. Movement organizations

and their networks with cultural producers—the agents involved in the creation and

articulation of ideological forms, such as intellectuals, artists, or political leaders—

constitute the institutional context of these framing activities. Alternative national

narratives often exist parallel to state-sponsored national discourses. At certain critical

turning points, however, alternative narratives replace established state ideologies or

become partially incorporated into official national discourses. This adoption of

alternative narratives by state elites tends to involve the cooptation of contentious cultural

producers and/or the appropriation of movement facilities engaged in ideological

production. State authorities seek to institutionalize these transformed national ideologies

as regular products of state organizations, with the aim to translate these discourses into

hegemonic cultural scripts. Key in this process are the institutional domains of education,

mass communication, social policy, and public rituals.

Explanatory Framework: A State-focused Approach

This study advances a state-focused approach for explaining transformations of

nationalism. Building on the idea that nationalism is involved in both the legitimation and

contestation of state power, this perspective focuses on the institutional underpinning of

state action and the contestation and alliance structures between state elites and social

movements. The empirical point of departure for developing such an explanatory

framework is that during the early and mid-20th century in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru

9
the central state consolidated and expanded its reach, and that these three countries were

increasingly incorporated into the global capitalist economy, entailing the spread of

market relations into rural areas and incipient forms of industrialization. Political

centralization and economic expansion set the stage for the emergence of new social

actors: Movements of subordinate classes, middle sectors, and excluded local elites

gained momentum and mobilized for their political and symbolic inclusion.

Social Movements and the Framing of Alternative National Narratives

Initiated by changes in the economic, political, demographic and cultural context,

periods of intensified mobilization are marked by the formation of new collective actors,

and an increase in contentious activities. Movements engage in a variety of strategies to

obtain broader support and advance their demands, reaching from coalitions and

bargaining over mass demonstrations, strikes and public ceremonies, to rebellions and the

strategic use of violence. A critical dimension of all these mobilization processes is the

“framing work” of contentious actors. Movements construct interpretative schemata in an

effort to legitimate their claims, produce a sense of collective identity among claimants,

and transform existing meaning structures in accordance with their political projects.

Intensified social mobilization enhances the production of alternative national

narratives. Nationalism constitutes a compelling discursive tool-kit for the “framing

work” of social movements. National symbols or myths provide movement leaders and

affiliated cultural producers with a device to orient participants and dignify political

demands within a broader frame of reference (see Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford

1988). Movements also create alternative national narratives in order to represent their

10
political demands as the “national interest,” and to portray the claims of contending social

actors as antagonistic to national well-being (see Gamson 1988). Moreover, especially

for movements of subordinate actors, the identity of “national” provides a power resource

in the struggle for the extension of social and political rights (Kastoryano 2002). Thus,

movements draw on nationalism especially by orienting the appeal to “national interests,”

facilitating the mobilization of support, and fashioning a power resource.

At the same time, not every movement automatically manages to formulate

appealing alternative narratives and make this vision heard in the public sphere. Both the

ideological tactics and the organizational forms of movements are crucial for explaining

when and under what conditions the alternative narrative production of movements

reaches beyond the boundaries of contentious networks themselves and achieves broader

resonance.

National narratives are more likely to achieve public attention if they refurbish

already broadly diffused myths and symbols and manage to infuse them with a different

political meaning. For instance, alternative narratives may appropriate commonly

recognized figures by emphasizing different character traits and political legacies and

downplaying established interpretations (Jansen forthcoming). Analogously, movements

may reinterpret the main historical events and periods from official history to embed their

critique of the dominant political order. Thus, movement-based narrative production

tends to be more effective when framing strategies draw on state-sponsored national

ideologies and use the common language of cultural scripts to construct coherent

alternative visions about national identity and history.

11
 An effective framing strategy alone, however, does not guarantee success (see

Gamson 1990). Mobilizing structures—the meso-level bases of collective action

(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)—are critical for advancing alternative narratives.

These organizational forms constitute the institutional backdrop for the production and

diffusion of movement-sponsored national discourses. Both formal movement

organizations and informal networks generate resources necessary for the financial

support and collective coordination of ideological projects (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

For instance, movement organizations may recruit and finance the work of cultural

producers engaged in the formulation of national narratives and protect them from direct

state repression. Moreover, these collective vehicles facilitate access to larger audiences

and provide the means for the public circulation of ideological products. Movements

tend to be more successful in alternative narrative production when they feature formal

organization and membership networks beyond the local or regional level, when they are

organized around relatively stable interests and collective identities, and when they

display ties to cultural producers.

State Alliances and the Selective Incorporation of Alternative Narratives

Alternative national narratives often exist parallel to official ideologies articulated

by state authorities. At certain critical junctures, however, state-sponsored national

discourses may change dramatically and incorporate alternative narratives (or key

elements thereof) into official national discourse. For instance, presidential speeches may

depict certain episodes of national history in a way previously found only in coffeehouse

publications of subordinate intellectuals. Thus, an additional social force needs to be

12
taken into account for explaining transformations of nationalism: the state. States are

potentially autonomous actors endowed with certain capacities to pursue political,

socioeconomic, and also ideological and cultural projects (Gorski 2003; Loveman 2005).

At the same time, states are embedded in a series of relationships with other social actors,

and these ties are marked by varying degrees of cooperation and conflict (Evans 1995;

Migdal 1988; 1994; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).

This study builds on insights from the political development literature, which

argues that state action is fundamentally shaped by the type of alliance structures upon

which states base their power (e.g., Collier and Collier 1991; Huber and Stephens 2001;

Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Luebbert 1991; Waldner 1999). Translated into the domain of

ideology and discourse, such an analytical perspective suggests that changing political

alignments and confrontations set the stage for transformations of state-sponsored

national ideology. As nationalism contributes to the legitimation of state authority, shifts

in the balance of power between state elites and social actors may create an incentive to

adopt a different form of official national discourse.

This study emphasizes two likely paths through which changing political

configurations motivate state elites to incorporate alternative national narratives into

official state ideology. In an elite-initiated trajectory the decay of accomodationist

alliances between state authorities and entrenched economic elites sets off the

refashioning of official national discourses. Such a context, usually marked by high levels

of social mobilization, intra-elite conflict, and the emergence of new political leaders,

induces executive authorities to adopt new strategies for attaining and consolidating state

power. By drawing on alternative forms of nationalism state elites seek to represent

13
themselves as distinct from the old regime and to differentiate their political and

ideological projects from other elite factions.

By contrast, in a mobilization-based trajectory alliances between states and

movements representing subordinate classes such as labor and the peasantry motivate the

incorporation popular narratives into official ideology. With these alliances, subordinate

movements acquire new political weight, enabling them to pressure more effectively for

the redefinition of state-sponsored national discourses. In turn, state elites are bound to

consider alternative narratives for maintaining these new ruling coalitions and

consolidating state power. Thus, in both paths, changing alliance configurations between

state authorities and collective actors constitute a likely context for the incorporation of

alternative nationalisms into state-sponsored national discourses.

Meso-level organizational and institutional mechanisms establish important

linkages between state alliances and ideological outcomes. The incorporation of

alternative national narratives into official ideologies is grounded in state regulation of

various social and material goods (e.g., prestige, access to audiences) valuable to

subordinate movements and associated cultural producers. One incorporation strategy is

the cooptation of alternative cultural producers into public knowledge-producing

facilities. For instance, state authorities may offer alternative intellectuals a career in

state-sponsored universities or in the ministry of education, thereby providing them with

a more effective forum for their visions of the nation, and at the same time loosening

their financial and organizational dependence on a movement. Another incorporation

strategy is the appropriation of social movement organizations and their ideological

products (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 44). For instance, states may embrace

14
organizations involved in the reinterpretation of national history by selectively funding

their activities or providing them with a logistical framework for diffusion. This process

may even entail the eventual absorption of social movement organizations into state

agencies of cultural production and consumption (Gorski 2003: 166-168). Thus, the

incorporation of alternative national narratives into state ideologies is associated with

changing ties between cultural producers, movement organizations, and state agencies.

It bears emphasis, however, that states usually do not act as monolithic entities.

From a more microscopic perspective, states each encompass a variety of organizations.

Of particular importance for the study of nationalism is the relationship between cultural

and ideological organizations on the one hand, and the executive branch of the state on

the other. These different state agencies potentially marshal distinct interests and

identities, and their relationship might be marked by conflict and contradicting activities,

rather than by cooperation and coordinated information flows. For instance, the ministry

of education might oppose the coalition-building efforts of the government. Thus, the

scope of state alliances may vary, depending on whether new alliance structures become

“sticky” and extend beyond executive authorities to include state organizations engaged

in ideological production and diffusion. A limited scope is expected to constrain the

incorporation efforts of state authorities.

Ideological Infrastructure and the Institutionalization of National Ideology

States cannot simply adopt alternative narratives as state ideologies and turn them

automatically into cultural scripts. For a comprehensive transformation of nationalism to

take place, new forms of national ideology need to become a regular product of state

15
organizations, and need to be embedded in professional roles and collective rituals (see

Wuthnow 1989). For tracking variations in the ability of state organizations to

institutionalize new national discourses, I build on the concept of state “infrastructural

power,” which refers to the institutional capacity of states to permeate society and

implement their projects throughout the territories that they claim to govern (Mann 1984;

1993). This form of state power enables central state organizations to shape and regulate,

both normatively and by force, the social relations within their territorial boundaries.

Infrastructurally more powerful states exhibit the logistical techniques necessary to name,

register, tax, police, conscript, and educate their subjects, and they do so both in the

capital and the farthest points of their territories. Thus, key sources of state infrastructural

power include transportation and communication networks, bureaucracy, monopoly over

force, and tax collection (see Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Goodwin 2001;

Kiser and Linton 2001).

Yet, roads, police officers, and tax offices alone do not win over citizens’ hearts

and minds. Cultural and educational state organizations therefore require analytical

attention in their own right (Gorski 2003; Loveman 2005). This study centers on the

“ideological infrastructure” or cultural machinery of states for demarcating the specific

sources of state power necessary to fashion discursive transformations. State ideological

infrastructure includes the organizational facilities, resources, communicative networks,

and rituals dedicated to regulating the production and diffusion of ideological products,

and controlling cultural producers and their organizations (Berezin 1991; Wuthnow

1989). Thus, the concept seeks to trace the “third dimension” of state power (see Lukes

16
1974), the capacity of state organizations to pursue their projects on the basis of

persuasion, rather than coercion.

As a strategy to assess the power of state ideological infrastructure this paper

focuses on different institutional domains engaged in the production and diffusion of

ideological forms (e.g., public education), corresponding state organizations (e.g.,

schools), and principal actors in such a domain (e.g., educational authorities and

teachers). While public schooling is certainly of critical importance, other relevant arenas

for examining the ideological work of states include mass communication, art and

entertainment, public ceremonies and rituals, and social policy. State ideological

infrastructure varies with respect to the reach of state organizations in these institutional

domains. For instance, an extensive network of public primary schools facilitates the

broader circulation of state-sponsored ideological products. Another important factor is

the amount of resources dedicated to an institutional domain of the cultural machinery.

For example, monetary patronage and subsidies for national history institutes facilitate

control over these organizations and their intellectual production. And finally, the cultural

machinery of states varies in their bureaucratic capacity to engage in the regulation of

ideological products. For instance, state authorities issue detailed guidelines defining the

content of school textbooks or engage in the explicit promotion or censorship of art

works or literature.

Networks of cultural producers constitute another defining feature of state

ideological infrastructure. The relationship between executive authorities and these actors

is of critical importance for the institutionalization of state ideologies. Even with

resources and regulations in place, strained relations may foster the opposition of cultural

17
producers and thereby inhibit the production and diffusion of ideological forms from

“within the state.” For instance, public school teachers may resist the ideological

orientation of the official curriculum designed and implemented by educational officials

and employ a variety of strategies to subvert its content in the classroom. Thus, state

ideological power is not exclusively a function of geographical reach, resources, and

regulatory capacities of state organizations, it is also based on the training and outlook of

cultural producers and their alignments and contestations with executive elites.

Ideas about timing and historical sequence are useful for assessing the impact of

state ideological infrastructure (Ertman 1997; Rueschemeyer 1973; see also Pierson

2004). I argue that an already established cultural machinery makes it more difficult for

state elites to convert a new national ideology into a regular product of state

organizations. By contrast, the diffusion of hegemonic cultural scripts is facilitated when

the institutional development of state ideological infrastructure is temporally congruent

with discursive transformations. An established cultural machinery is marked by an

already routinized production and diffusion of ideological forms, marshals a substantial

geographical reach, and maintains cultural producers who were trained under the

previous ideological regime. As such, an established cultural machinery is usually

invested in the professional identity of these cultural producers, which in turn enhances

their capacity to resist ideological changes proposed by executive authorities.

Comprehensive, Contained, and Blocked Transformations of Nationalism

The question remains how social mobilization, state alliances, and state

institutional development interact to shape distinct trajectories of nationalism. The

18
subsequent section brings the conceptualization of nationalism and the explanatory

framework outlined above together.

To recapitulate, transformations of nationalism involve nationalism as (1) an

alternative narrative advanced by social movements, (2) an official ideology put

forward by the state, and (3) a cultural script with almost self-evident plausibility.

This study distinguishes three major trajectories of nationalism. A comprehensive

transformation of nationalism includes the incorporation of alternative national

narratives previously articulated by public intellectuals or contentious movement

organizations into official national discourses advanced by state elites. These

transformed state ideologies gradually achieve status as hegemonic cultural scripts.

By contrast, in a contained transformation state ideologies incorporate elements of

alternative national narratives, yet these refurbished official discourses do not

achieve broader resonance. Finally, a blocked transformation of nationalism is

marked by the exclusion of new alternative narratives from state ideologies, with the

result that these narratives remain confined to social forces without access to state

power.

The central explanatory argument advanced in this dissertation suggests that a

particular trajectory of nationalism depends on the presence or absence of three key

processes: (1) the formation of movements that successfully advance alternative ideas

about the nation, (2) the change of alliance structures between state authorities, oligarchic

elites, and subordinate movements, which provide an incentive for the incorporation of

these alternative narratives into state ideologies, and (3) the congruence between

discursive changes and the expansion of state ideological infrastructure, facilitating the

19
institutionalization of these new official ideologies. When all three processes are present,

then a comprehensive transformation of nationalism unfolds. By contrast, an already

established cultural machinery impedes the institutionalization of a new national

ideology, leading to a contained transformation of nationalism marked by the persistent

instability and contestation among discursive formations. Finally, the continued

grounding of state power in accomodationist alliances with oligarchic elites prevents the

incorporation of alternative national narratives, ultimately inhibiting a transformation of

state-sponsored national ideology.

A Typology: Liberal, Romantic, and Popular Nationalism

To evaluate this theoretical framework through the close inspection of actual

cases requires a clear understanding of what kind of national discourses were present in

each case at a given point in time. In other words, we first need a device for tracing cross-

sectional variation of nationalism and within-case transformation from a comparative

vantage point. This section develops an inductive typology for identifying differences and

similarities among national discourses found in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru.

A major typology well entrenched in the literature on nationalism–the distinction

between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism– tracks whether inclusion into the national

community is based on political or cultural criteria (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992;

Hobsbawn 1990). Civic nationalism portrays the nation as a political community that is

constituted by its territorial and political frame. By contrast, ethnic nationalism

conceives the nation as an ethnocultural community that is neither causally nor

conceptually dependent on political territory.

20
 At a first glance, this typology provides certain comparative insights for Mexico,

Argentina, and Peru. During the late nineteenth century national discourses in all three

countries exhibited key elements of civic nationalism. Promoting a political

understanding of the nation, official state ideologies emphasized the public institutions of

state and civil society, most importantly the Constitution, as major identity markers.

Attachment to the nation was based on the commitment to a shared set of political

practices and values and had to be reinforced by carefully calibrated civic rituals.

Analogously, national discourses in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru also showed important

traits of ethnic nationalism. During the twentieth century alternative national narratives

advanced by contentious actors and, later on, official national ideologies propagated by

state elites articulated a cultural understanding of the national community grounded in a

common language, religion, and tradition. Cultural sameness, and not shared rights,

constituted the main underpinning of national belonging.

Yet the analytical leverage provided by the distinction between civic and ethnic

nationalism ultimately is limited, ignoring critical aspects of national discourses in the

three countries. This dissertation illustrates that late nineteenth century national

ideologies not only evoked Enlightment ideas of popular sovereignty and individual

citizenship, they were also deeply infused with Comtean political positivism and adopted

late nineteenth century racial thinking with its emphasis on biology, eugenics, and social

darwinianism. Achieving “order and progress” appeared as the most promising recipe to

secure the nation’s wellbeing. Official national discourses depicted enlightened and

benevolent elites as the natural leaders of these states and portrayed them as the

protagonists of national history. Their actions were critical to propel the respective

21
national community from “barbarism” to “civilization”—a category associated with

economic modernization, urban and cosmopolitan European culture, and ideas about

biologically determined racial hierarchies. A small state and an export-oriented economy

constituted the ideal underpinning for a society favoring natural selection and the

domination of “the fittest.” Excluded were those who did not match the image of a

“civilized nation.” As a matter of fact, official national ideologies in these three countries

recreated the ethnoracial hierarchies from the colonial period and conceived of only small

segments of the population, wealthy, white, and literate, as fully included nationals. Thus,

late nineteenth century nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru fused civic ideals

with highly elitist imageries of national belonging.

Also the concept of ethnic nationalism does not capture important dimensions of

twentieth century alternative national narratives and state ideologies. This study shows

that these forms of nationalism highlighted the cultural bases of national identity in

Mexico, Argentina, and Peru, yet they did not employ imageries of shared ethnic decent

or common blood ties. Even when imagined as cultural communities, assimilation into

these nations remained a possibility. In other words, these national discourses recognized

the diverse racial or ethnic origins of the nation, but intended to blend those differences

into a homogeneous national present. This cultural-assimilationist vision for achieving

national unity was complemented by an emphasis on “the people” as the “true” carriers of

Mexican, Argentinean, and Peruvian identity and protagonists of national history. The

main cleavage was between the “masses” and the “oligarchy,” the latter marked as not

fully belonging to the national community. Representing oligarchic influence as closely

intertwined with foreign interests, these national discourses often took a strong anti-

22
imperialist stance and envisioned a strong state and an inward-oriented economy as the

ideal institutional order of the nation. A strong state was also deemed necessary to

channel mass mobilization and organize popular inclusion in terms of corporatist

categories, rather than in terms of equal individual citizenship. Thus, in all three cases

twentieth century nationalisms combined a cultural understanding of the nation with

popular and corporatist ideas about national membership.

Based on these patterns I argue that a different typology is more suitable for

tracing the similarities and differences among national discourses in Mexico, Argentina,

and Peru: the distinction between liberal and popular nationalism. As summarized in

Table 1, this typology traces these forms of nationalism along four dimensions:

membership criteria—tracking what the defining features of the national community are;

modes of incorporation—distinguishing projections about how to achieve national unity;

symbolic universe—pinpointing the key actors and main cleavages within the imagined

community; and political vision—detecting imageries about the ideal institutional order

for the nation. Based on this distinction it is possible to identify two main variations

among national discourses. Liberal nationalism conceives of the nation as a community

grounded in its political and economic institutions, and its territorial boundaries. This

political conception is complemented by the idea that national unity can only be

accomplished through the move from “barbarism” to “civilization” and the creation of a

“civilized” nation. By contrast, popular national discourses emphasize criteria like

language, religion or shared traditions as key identity markers. Becoming a

“homogeneous” nation is realized in the assimilation of the resident population into a

peculiar national culture. Liberal nationalism advances an elitist image of the nation

23
organized around the agency of enlightened leaders, while popular nationalism

emphasizes that subordinate sectors embody the authentic national community and

therefore are legitimate historical agents. Finally, the two forms of national diverge in

their representations of the proper institutional order, liberal national discourses

representing a “night watchman” state and an export-oriented economy, and popular

nationalism viewing a more interventionist state and inward-oriented economy as

essential ingredients for securing national wellbeing.

---------------------------------
Table 1 about here
---------------------------------

I employ the label “liberal” because in the context of Latin American

historiography, the term is widely used to describe the dominant political and ideological

project in the region during the mid- to late nineteenth century (e.g., Brading 1973;

Gootenberg 1993; Hale 1968; Halperín Donghi 1987a). Distinct from the contemporary

use of the word in the United States, and also distinct from the classical liberalism

associated with theorists such as Adam Smith, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, the

form of liberalism present in nineteenth century Latin America was strongly influenced

by the philosophical positivism of Auguste Comte (e.g., Mahoney 2001; Eastwood 2004).

As such, this ideology was marked by the tension between individual rights and

freedoms, and the inherent value assigned to natural social hierarchies. Latin American

liberalism supported the idea that all people are equally capable of reason and progress,

while also embracing Darwin’s theory of natural selection and depicting lower classes as

24
biologically incapable of governing themselves. The term “popular” is also grounded in

common characterizations of modern Latin American history. This type of nationalism

occurred in the context of broader economic and sociopolitical change during the early

and mid twentieth century, precisely when previously marginalized sectors mobilized for

their political and symbolic inclusion, and when both fascism and communism gained

increasing prominence as global ideological models. Scholars often describe this epoch as

“populism” or “populist period” (e.g., Cotler 2005; Stein 1980), defined by political and

ideological projects evoking the idea of a national people in opposition to an elite (e.g.,

de Ipola 1979; Zabaleta 1997).

The distinction between liberal and popular nationalism leaves room for an

intermediary, yet qualitatively different type: romantic nationalism. This form of national

discourse shares with popular nationalism the cultural-assimilationist orientation. At the

same time, romantic nationalism resembles liberal national ideology in its elitist image of

the national community, and its hierarchical projections about the proper institutional

order of the nation. The label “romantic” points to its grounding in nineteenth century

German Romanticism, an intellectual and artistic movement that arose in reaction to the

Enlightment. Its most prominent advocate, Johann Gottfried von Herder, countered the

voluntary aspects of civic nationalism with the idea of the nation as an a-historical entity

grounded in a shared language and culture and guided by an enlightened intellectual

class. In early twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru romantic nationalism

could be first identified in alternative national narratives articulated by middle sectors and

excluded elites. Later on, it found its way into official state ideologies in the context of

major social and demographic change or revolutionary state breakdown.

25
Why Mexico, Argentina, and Peru?

The theoretical argument about transformations of nationalism is explored and

assessed against evidence from Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. This case selection is

driven by theoretically and methodologically relevant similarities and differences among

these countries, which facilitates the matching and contrasting of cases integral to any

comparative analysis. I combine two strategies of comparison, a most similar and a most

different systems design (Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Teune 1970) for

explaining transformations of nationalism across these cases. While exhibiting broad

historical similarities Mexico and Peru embarked on very different trajectories of

nationalism. The comprehensive transformation in postrevolutionary Mexico contrasted

sharply with the persistence of liberal nationalism in Peru. At the same time, countries as

distinct as Argentina and Peru experienced similar transformative episodes. Finally, each

of these cases constitutes a stark empirical example of one of the ideal typical

transformations of nationalism. As such, these three cases constitute extreme points on a

continuum, with other countries in Latin America likely to follow these trajectories or

combinations of them.

Mexico and Peru exhibit important similarities with respect to colonial history,

economic history, and demographic composition. The Audiencia of Mexico and the

Audiencia of Lima, roughly corresponding to the areas of modern Mexico and Peru, were

the political, economic, and sociocultural centers of Spanish colonialism. Attracted by

complex precolonial societies and their large indigenous populations (Newson 1985;

Sánchez-Albornoz 1984), Spanish colonizers implemented an extensive set of

26
administrative and coercive state organizations in these territories, which remained the

bureaucratic cores of the empire throughout the colonial period (Guardino and Walker

1992; Mahoney and vom Hau 2005). In both Mexico and Peru economic activities were

predominantly oriented towards the extraction of precious metals and the exploitation of

indigenous labor (Andrien 2001; Brading 1971; Cole 1985; Stern 1993). The creation of

mercantile actors and ethnoracial stratification systems during the colonial period had

large implications for subsequent national development and continues to shape the

institutional set-up and lived experience in these two countries today (Mahoney 2003a).

Argentina is included because this case illustrates how transformations of

nationalism played themselves out in a completely different context, a settler society with

massive European migration and a booming export economy. The region corresponding

to modern Argentina lacked a dense indigenous population, and during much of the

colonial period played only a marginal role for economic production and political

administration in the Spanish colonial system (Halperín Donghi 1993). In fact, state

formation in Argentina only gained momentum in the late colonial period (Rock 1987;

2002). As a former colonial backwater, Argentina was spared from the most delirious

effects of entrenched mercantilist institutions and high degrees of ethnoracial polarization

found in postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Klarén 2000; Knight 1992; Mahoney 2003a;

Mahoney and vom Hau 2005). Instead, extensive economic expansion was accompanied

by the massive inflow of European immigrants (Devoto 2003; Halperín Donghi 1987b).

Thus, the choice of comparing Mexico and Peru to Argentina follows a most

different systems design. During the twentieth century these countries exhibited a key

similarity: all three witnessed a transition from liberal to popular nationalism in a context

27
characterized by state expansion, incorporation into the global capitalist economy,

urbanization, and agrarian development. The exact dates when this discursive change

unfolded differed for each country, though they roughly fall in between 1910 and 1950—

with the exception of Peru, where a comparable discursive change only occurred much

later, during the 1960s and 1970s. The profound historical differences between Mexico

and Peru on the one hand, and Argentina on the other, provide a stronger basis for

inferring that transformations of nationalism were driven by conflicts between states and

contentious social movements and by the timing of state making.

Selecting Mexico, Argentina, and Peru also sets the stage for explaining contrasts

and similarities through pairs of comparison. The comparison between Mexico and Peru

follows a most similar systems design. Exhibiting important historical similarities, these

two countries experienced contrasting trajectories of nationalism. Mexico came closest to

a comprehensive transformation. After the revolution, new state elites ascended, and

under Cárdenas (1934-1940) popular forms of nationalism grounded in mestizaje

obtained hegemony. By contrast, Peru provides an example of a blocked transformation

of nationalism. During the 1930s and 1940s subordinate forces repeatedly advanced

alternative national narratives based on indigenismo, but these discourses remained

excluded from state ideology. The comparison between Argentina under Perón and Peru

under Velasco follows a most different systems logic. Both resemble a contained

transformation. Peronist state elites emphasized a class-based understanding of national

belonging, portraying the “masses” as the carriers of national identity. Analogously,

during the military government in the 1970s popular nationalism gained prominence as

official national discourse in Peru. Yet, in both cases state elites did not manage to

28
translate this popular national ideology into more implicit cultural scripts. Thus, the

selection of Mexico, Argentina, and Peru is both theoretically and methodologically

motivated, seeking to maximize the set of comparisons for explaining transformations of

nationalism and their variation across cases and over time.

Methodology

This dissertation draws on comparative historical methods for evaluating the

state-focused approach outlined in this chapter. Comparative-historical analysis, as it is

understood here, is a mode of social scientific inquiry that moves back and forth between

history and theory in effort to develop and refine concepts, and identity and assess causal

arguments (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Drawing on recent methodological

developments this dissertation employs two major forms comparison. Cross-case

comparisons are used to contrast theoretically important aspects of the different cases

with one another. These comparisons are predominantly informed by “nominal”

strategies of causal assessment (Mahoney 1999). For instance, I argue that the presence

of alliances with subordinate actors is a necessary condition for the emergence of popular

nationalism as an official national ideology, while its absence propels the continued

dominance of liberal or romantic nationalism.

Within-case analysis constitutes a complementary strategy and moves beyond the

highly aggregated level of cross-case comparisons. This method helps to assess causal

arguments by confronting insights from cross-case analysis with observations from

within specific cases. Of particular importance for this mode of analysis are “process

tracing” and analytical narrative. The former explores whether there is a causal

29
association between explanatory factors and the outcome of interest by detecting whether

the within-case dynamics follow the hypothesized causal path (George and Bennett

2005). In other words, this methodological tool involves the identification of causal

mechanisms—or the continuous processes and events that unfold from effect to outcome

(Hedström and Swedberg 1998)—and their assessment against fine-grained historical

evidence. This dissertation also uses analytical narrative (Mahoney 2003b; Stryker 1996).

This informal technique is focused disaggregating explanatory factors and outcomes into

smaller event processes with the aim to do justice to causal complexity. It is especially

useful for tracing configurations of causal factors and their interplay and making causal

inferences through the comparison of particular event sequences. Organized around the

overarching theoretical framework, the treatment of historical cases in analytical

narrative is necessarily selective, informed by the key concepts and explanatory

arguments.

For the analysis of nationalism this dissertation is centrally concerned with the

reconstruction of historical discourses about national identity and history. Its main focus

is to unearth patterns and variations of nationalism across institutional contexts, social

groupings, and temporal periods. In doing so, this study employs a variety of historical

sources, combining primary evidence with secondary sources on the three countries. For

analyzing nationalism as consciously articulated state ideology, I draw on original

material, most importantly school textbooks on national history, literature, and civic

education. I use textbooks because public schools are arguably the major nationalizing

institution of the state during the 20th century. State authorities put major efforts into

establishing an official curriculum and regulating the content of these texts, for instance

30
through special approval commissions. The relatively wide circulation of textbooks

grants them a significant advantage over other plausible sources. For instance, writings

of political elites or intellectuals were much more limited in their diffusion, and therefore

do not provide an adequate source for reconstructing broadly disseminated state

ideologies. Moreover, textbooks provide a window at the long-term ideological

orientations of states. In comparison, other plausible sources, for instance radio

broadcasts of presidential speeches, were more subject to short-term political

calculations, such as winning the next election. Finally, a comparative study of textbooks

from the three countries affords the opportunity to develop an analytical framework that

helps to synthesize the already existing country-specific literature on textbooks and

nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru (e.g., Cucuzza and Somoza 2001; Heise and

Degregori 1973; Plotkin 2002; Portocarrero and Oliart 1989; Vaughan 1982; Vázquez

1970).

My textbook analysis starts with the implementation of obligatory public

schooling during the late 19th century, a period that witnessed the prevalence of liberal

nationalism. I end with the comprehensive (or contained) institutionalization of popular

nationalism. Thus, this dissertation traces trajectories of nationalism as state ideology

over substantial periods of time, from 1884 to 1955 in Argentina, from 1888 to 1960 in

Mexico, and from 1905 to 1978 in Peru. In each country I reviewed between 50 and 70

textbooks for these periods, collecting at least five publications per decade. For the

selection of textbooks I employed three main criteria. First, I focused on primary school

textbooks because only a small segment of the population attended secondary schools

during the time of interest. Second, I selected those textbooks that were published or

31
approved by national educational authorities. Third and finally, among the approved

textbooks I preferred those that were reprinted in several editions, indicating their actual

use. For contextualizing this textbook analysis I also collected information on the

regulation of textbook production and circulation. I tracked guidelines for editorials and

textbook writers, commission reports on the approbation of textbooks, and resources

available for textbook distribution. Moreover, I gathered secondary literature on national

discourse aired in radiobroadcasts, shown in movies, or employed in public celebrations

to crosscheck with my findings from textbook analysis.

Studying the institutionalization of official national ideologies as cultural scripts

touches upon one of the most difficult tasks in historical research: the reception of

ideological forms among common people. Especially in past societies with low literacy

rates the historical record of nationalism as an implicit frame of reference is notoriously

small. Historians interested in reconstructing the broader resonance of state-sponsored

discourses face substantial methodological challenges. As a result, the appropriateness of

different sources and modes of inquiry are highly contested (e.g., Knight 1994; Mallon

1995; Thurner 1997). In this study I draw on interviews with teachers and periodicals

from independent teacher associations for tracing the institutionalization of new

ideological forms. For exploring teachers’ role in this process I zoomed in on the

activities and outlooks of primary school teachers during the main transformative

periods: the transitions towards popular nationalism under Cárdenas in Mexico (1934-

1940), Perón in Argentina (1946-1955), and the military government of Velasco in Peru

(1968-1975). For Mexico I relied primarily on detailed interviews with teachers already

active during the 1930s found the Archivo de la Palabra, an oral history archive that

32
consists of several hundred biographical interviews with individuals involved in Mexican

Revolution. I also consulted El Maestro Rural, a journal that mostly published articles

written by teachers for teachers. In Argentina I combined semi-structured interviews with

teachers already active during historical Peronism with an analysis of La Obra as a

periodical written by teachers for teachers. I screened this journal for outlooks on national

identity and history by sampling those issues that were published around the major

national holidays. In Peru I relied exclusively on semi-structured interviews with public

and private school teachers already active during the Velasco regime.

In contrast to other plausible sources, for instance legal records, this focus on

teachers affords the opportunity to continue to focus on the domain of education and to

complement the textbook analysis with sources from the same organizational context. As

producers and consumers of national ideology teachers play a double role in the

institutionalization of nationalism. They are the first to be exposed to the ideological

products advanced by state authorities and constitute the initial transmission belt in the

translation of nationalism. At the same time, teachers exhibit a distinct professional

identity and marshal a certain degree of autonomy to interpret, package, and rework state

ideologies in the classroom. Thus, a focus on teachers provides a window for exploring

both the contestations of nationalism among different state organizations and the

negotiation of official national discourses within larger society. The exclusive focus on

teachers over another highly plausible source within the domain of education, students’

reactions to textbooks, has largely pragmatic and empirical reasons. With the exception

of Argentina I was unable to gather comparable evidence on student reception. And as

Gvirtz’ (1999) study of student notebooks from the Peronist period indicates, these

33
lecture notes were highly dependent on the topics and textbook sections emphasized by

teachers.

Only for the analysis of alternative national narratives this study departs from an

exclusive focus on education. For reconstructing state-challenging nationalisms I

combined secondary literature with the analysis of periodicals that showed a close

affinity to the movements of interest. For instance, I consulted daily newspapers and

weekly magazines that were either published by an oppositional organization, such as

APRA’s La Tribuna in Peru during the 1930s, or that were known as an important

ideological voice of a movement, such as the political Catholics’ Criterio in Argentina

during the 1940s. The review of periodicals built on my findings from the textbook

analysis and predominantly concentrated on the ten year period before a major

ideological transformation took place or was theoretically expected to unfold. The main

rationale behind this collection strategy was to identify the alternative national narratives

that were immediately available to (new) state elites in a context of changing political

configurations. The selection of actual articles was selective. As a rule of thumb I focused

again on sampling texts from issues published around major national holidays, such as

the Dia de la Independencia (“grito”) on the 16th of September in Mexico. Moreover, I

reviewed the relevant periodicals more extensively during certain years with special

events, such as the 400th anniversary of the foundation of Lima in 1935. My final sample

included those journal and newspaper articles that explicitly dealt with themes related to

national history and identity.

These distinct historical sources provided the textual corpus for reconstructing

nationalism as alternative national narratives, cultural scripts, and state ideologies in each

34
case. For tracing their continuities and variations over time I screened the selected texts

according to several major themes. With respect to national history I explored founding

myths, dominant periodizations of national history, normative judgments of major

historical epochs, and the main forces “driving” national history. When focusing on

national identity I traced statements organized around archetypes of national character as

well as representations of external others and major enemies. I was also interested in

ideas about hierarchies found within the national imagined community and therefore

tracked the imageries associated with immigrants or indigenous populations. Finally, I

searched for depictions of the most important national heroes, symbols such as flags and

maps, and national holidays and the reasons given to celebrate them. In the case of

textbooks I supplemented the textual analysis with a focus on their iconography. Across

all historical sources, this analytical grid provided the backdrop to identify distinct

patterns of nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru from a comparative vantage

point.

Historical Argument

This section elaborates on the previous discussion and introduces the cases

examined throughout this study in more detail. While acknowledging the peculiarities of

each case the following discussion explores trajectories of nationalism in Mexico,

Argentina, and Peru through the optic of a state-focused approach and seeks to the broad

similarities and variations among these cases.

Liberal Nationalism

35
 During the late nineteenth century, often described as period of “oligarchic

domination” (O’Donnell 1977: 66), Mexico, Argentina, and Peru left the vicious circle of

political turmoil and economic stagnation behind that characterized the immediate

postcolonial era. Central states consolidated, expanding their power vis-à-vis local

caudillo rule. Political centralization was closely intertwined with economic expansion,

largely driven by foreign investment, the production of agrarian exports, and incipient

industries.7 The rural economy was dominated by large estates, the main beneficiaries of

the commercialization of agriculture. In the three countries oligarchic regimes grounded

their political power in an alliance with a narrow elite of large landowners and

industrialists, the main beneficiaries of the export boom. The majority of political offices

went to members of these elites who ruled through a combination of clientilism, electoral

manipulations, and repression.

Mexican, Argentinean, and Peruvian state elites advanced liberal nationalism with

the aim to legitimate the reigning oligarchic order. The respective national Constitution

appeared as the centerpiece of a “civic religion” built around carefully calibrated rituals

and ceremonies, and only enlightened leaders were capable of achieving greater degrees

of “civilization,” while the indigenous population constituted the main obstacle to

national progress. The broad-based institutionalization of liberal national ideologies as

cultural scripts, however, faced substantial limitations. In all three countries the reach of

state ideological infrastructure was limited. In Mexico and Peru, the development of

public schooling and the regulation of mass communication and cultural politics

remained at an embryonic stage. And even in Argentina, endowed with more

7
In Argentina this economic bonanza was accompanied by the equally dramatic demographic
reorganization of society based on massive European immigration.

36
consolidated cultural and pedagogical organizations, the reach of the state’s cultural

machinery remained modest at best.

Liberal nationalism was contested. The three countries witnessed the growth and

politicization of middle sectors and working classes that mobilized for their political and

symbolic inclusion; regional elites felt threatened by the rising power of the central state;

and the expanding “ideological work” of state organizations upset the established balance

of church and state. Representatives of these social forces often employed contending

national narratives. These movements, even though they varied in their framing

strategies, organizational strength, and constituencies, reframed the established notions

about national history and identity found in the reigning liberal nationalism and infused

them with a different political meaning.

Middle sectors and excluded elites advanced variations of romantic nationalism.

In Mexico oppositional groups depicted the cultural essence of Mexican identity as

grounded in mestizaje and idealized representations of the Aztec Empire. In Argentina,

artistic and political movements, worried about the consequence of European mass

migration, emphasized the Hispanic roots of the nation and imagined the gaucho as the

most authentic representative of such a national identity. In Peru, indigenismo, a

movement largely composed of regional elites from the Andes, portrayed the Inca Empire

as the origin of a peculiar national culture. By contrast, anarchists, the main political

force among organized labor during this period, depicted nationalism as a bourgeois

invention and rejected the nation as a category of mobilization.

37
State-initiated Transitions towards Romantic Nationalism

Transformations of nationalism only began to unfold in contexts of changing

political configurations. Both Mexico and Argentina witnessed transitions from liberal to

romantic nationalism, set off by state elites responding to substantial subordinate

mobilization and intra-elite conflict. During the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution

(1910-1920) intra-elite conflicts and popular rebellions toppled the old oligarchic regime

and led to the temporary collapse of the central state. Both the peasantry and urban labor

became important political powers, mobilizing in various alliances with different

revolutionary leaders.

The revolutionary struggles ended with the military defeat of these popular forces

and the ascendance of a new postrevolutionary state elite, composed of provincial elites

and middle sectors. Confronted with a highly mobilized society and recurrent conflicts

among the “revolutionary family” itself, state power became grounded in alliances with

urban labor and, to a lesser degree, with peasants. During the 1920s these alliances took

the form of paternalistic ties between political caudillos and subordinate leaders, and

were therefore highly volatile and subject to change. Eager to distinguish themselves

from the Porfirian era the new state elites adopted romantic projections about national

identity and history. Official national ideology envisioned a transcendental “cosmic race”

of mestizos as the basis of a genuine national identity and celebrated the Aztec past as the

critical epoch of national history, while maintaining an elitist and hierarchical

understanding of the national community. The institutionalization of romantic

nationalism remained limited. Throughout the 1920s the state cultural machinery

38
continued to lack the reach necessary for the translation of the official national discourses

into hegemonic cultural scripts.

In Argentina, romantic nationalism gained prominence as an official ideology

without revolutionary transformation. Yet again, this discursive change developed on the

background of intensified subordinate mobilization and declining oligarchic power, and

the almost complete demographic reorganization of the country. Between 1890 and 1910

European mass immigration accelerated to unprecedented levels, and immigrants

predominantly sought to maintain their distinct identities and rejected naturalization. A

powerful labor movement emerged among a rapidly expanding urban proletariat, and the

Radical Party became an increasingly influential vehicle of oppositional mobilization

among middle sectors and dissidents within the oligarchic elite. State authorities

responded to this multifaceted opposition with a mixture of heavy-handed repression

against labor, a more rigorous project of “nationalizing” the immigrant population, and an

attempt at a controlled political opening from above. It was in this context that romantic

nationalism emerged as official national discourse.

This romantic state ideology depicted Argentina as a crisol de razas (“fusion of

races,” the local version of the melting pot) and celebrated the gaucho as the most

authentic representative of a Hispanic national culture, the endpoint of this assimilative

process. The idea of the nation as an organic and self-regulating cultural community

appeared to be in no need of an interventionist state. When the conservative elite’s

strategy of controlled political opening backfired, and the Radical Party won the election

in 1916 and established itself as the dominant political force for the subsequent decade,

the new state authorities continued to advance romantic nationalism as an official

39
national ideology. In contrast to postrevolutionary Mexico, Argentina witnessed the

dramatic expansion of state ideological infrastructure. State authorities systematically

expanded the reach of “mass socializing” institutions such as public schooling and

patriotic rituals and invested heavily in cultural politics. The temporal congruence

facilitated the institutionalization of romantic nationalism as hegemonic cultural scripts.

When compared to Mexico and Argentina, Peru did not experience a similar

transition toward romantic nationalism during the early twentieth century. The 1910s and

1920s witnessed heightened labor protest, and indigenous movements in the Andes

launched a series of rebellions to oppose the encroachment on communal lands.

Subordinate mobilization was accompanied by intensified intra-elite conflict. Augusto

Leguía, an outsider candidate for the presidency, won the 1919 elections and staged a

coup when defeated candidates contested the election results. In the face of substantial

opposition from the oligarchic establishment Leguía tried to base his political rule on the

support from urban middle classes, and engaged in some—largely symbolic—gestures

toward popular sectors. His speeches resonated with romantic nationalism, celebrating

the Inca Empire as the cradle of the Peruvian nation government. Leguía, however, soon

abandoned these postures. State power remained grounded in an oligarchic alliance of

coastal and highland elites, romantic nationalism did not find its way into the state’s

organized ideological production, and liberal nationalism ultimately prevailed as an

official national ideology in Peru.

Thus, during this initial transformative phase the three countries embarked on

distinct trajectories of nationalism. In early twentieth century Mexico and Argentina

romantic nationalism gained prominence as state-sponsored ideology, while in Peru the

40
reigning liberal nationalism managed to persist. Based on a state-focused approach this

study shows that changing political configurations were key in shaping these divergent

ideological outcomes. In both postrevolutionary Mexico and Argentina, episodes marked

by very different structural contexts, state elites initiated a discursive change in response

to increased subordinate mobilization and the decline of oligarchic power. By contrast, in

Peru under Leguía subordinate mobilization and intra-elite conflict did not entail a similar

reorganization of political alliance structures. Moreover, the analysis of the temporal

order of state-making reveals that in Argentina the simultaneous expansion of the cultural

machinery facilitated the translation of romantic nationalism into hegemonic cultural

scripts, while in Mexico state ideological infrastructure remained limited. These different

patterns had important consequences for subsequent transformative periods.

Mobilization--based Transitions towards Popular Nationalism

In Mexico, Argentina, and Peru transitions toward popular nationalism were again

shaped by changing political configurations. In contrast to a state-led path, these

transformations of nationalism involved more direct agency of contentious movements

vis-à-vis state elites. Changes in official national ideology were not only motivated by the

decay of accomodationist alliances, they also included the active formation of new

coalition structures between popular sectors and state authorities. In this mobilization-

based path, the incorporation of popular nationalism as official ideology was grounded in

populist alliances and the increased political weight of subordinate forces. State

authorities tended to include subordinate forces and popular national narratives in their

calculations to consolidate and legitimate state power.

41
 In Mexico, the revolutionary struggles had left behind highly mobilized

subordinate sectors that remained a powerful oppositional force throughout subsequent

decades. Urban workers, even though numerically smaller than the various peasant

movements, exhibited a greater ideological presence. The Confederación Regional

Obrera Mexicana (CROM) and the Communist Party subscribed to a class-based

understanding of the nation and depicted peasants and workers as the protagonists of

national history. In Argentina an already well-established labor movement with a long

history of militancy expanded its political influence during the 1930s. Socialists and

communists, the main representatives of organized labor, marshaled considerable

ideological reach. Their alternative national narratives reworked official story lines,

portraying Spanish colonialism as the onset of imperial exploitation and depicting the

gaucho as a wage laborer and symbol of subaltern revolutionary spirit. In Peru the

Socialist Party under the leadership of José Carlos Mariátegui and Alianza Popular

Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), a multi-class populist party, fused an emphasis on

“the people” as the “true” national subjects in opposition to the “oligarchy” with the

revalorization of indigenous culture and the Inca Empire as key markers of Peruvian

identity.

The three countries also witnessed the emergence of political Catholics. These

multi-class movements of Catholic lay organizations opposed state involvement in the

domains of social provisions and education, spheres traditionally dominated by the

Church, and sought to limit socialist and communist influence among popular sectors. In

Mexico, catholic mobilization probably took the most radical form. Once

postrevolutionary state elites started to enforce the anticlerical articles of the 1917

42
constitution, already prevalent tensions escalated into a three year-long civil war, the so-

called Cristero Rebellion. In Argentina and Peru the boundaries between state and church

were somewhat more blurred than in Mexico, and political Catholics resorted to less

confrontational tactics. The Acción Católica emerged as the most important platform for

catholic lay organizations. These catholic movements advanced alternative national

narratives that envisioned a “catholic nation,” portrayed Spanish colonizers and

missionaries as major national heroes, and envisioned a corporatist state to secure

economic independence and class harmony.8

This intensified social mobilization and alternative narrative production

constituted a necessary backdrop for transitions towards popular nationalism. Variations

in the timing of this ideological change were to an important extent driven by political

alliances between state elites and subordinate sectors.

Under Lazaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) popular nationalism replaced romantic

nationalism as official national ideology in Mexico. This ideological change took off

when the coalition between organized labor, peasants, and postrevolutionary state elites

consolidated. Even though popular sectors were subjected to increased state control, they

obtained more political weight and substantial material concessions, and executive

authorities made subordinate interests an integral part of their political calculations and

nation-building strategies. This shift in the domestic balance of power was accompanied

by change in language about the political community. Postrevolutionary state elites

8
A peculiarity of political Catholics in Argentina was their close affiliation with factions of the nationalist
movement. This oppositional force fused the celebrations of Argentina’s Hispanic origins with a strong
anti-imperialist stance and drew on fascism as a model for the corporatist organization of society. Catholic
militants were often nationalists and vice versa, and both often resorted to the same organizational
infrastructure in their mobilization efforts.

43
selectively adopted themes and discursive patterns previously found in alternative

popular narratives articulated by labor and peasant representatives. This reworked

national ideology combined a cultural understanding of national identity with a focus on

class. Popular nationalism also reinterpreted the mestizo nation as composed of peasants,

workers, and smallholders and depicted these subordinate sectors as protagonists of

national history. Their resistance reverberated throughout Mexican history and

culminated in the Revolution, setting the stage for a more egalitarian, industrialized, and

economically independent society. By contrast, ideas about Mexico as a “catholic nation”

did not gain entrance into state-sponsored national discourses.

A comparable ideological transformation unfolded in Peronist Argentina (1946-

1955). During this period Juán Domingo Perón built a highly personalistic political

movement grounded in a coalition with organized labor. Similar to Mexico under

Cárdenas, this alliance entailed both the domestication of subordinate mobilization and

far-reaching material and symbolic concessions. In contrast to Mexico, these transformed

alliances also included political Catholics, at least during the initial phase of Peronism.

Official versions of national history assigned subordinate classes a critical role in shaping

national destiny, contrasting the actions of the dispossessed “masses” with the ones of the

“oligarchy.” Perón and his wife Evita appeared as the embodiment of the nation, equating

the political constituencies of the Peronist movement with the national community. While

popular nationalism depicted Argentina as a crisol de razas of immigrants (the local

version of the “melting pot”), it emphasized the Hispanic and Catholic roots of the nation.

Peru during the 1930s 1940s stands in sharp contrast to Mexico and Argentina:

Popular nationalism remained confined to the domain of alternative narratives and did not

44
gain prominence as official national ideology. From 1945 to 1948, under the presidency

of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, the country experienced a brief democratic opening.

Accomodationist alliances with oligarchic elites crumbled, and state authorities sought to

build a multi-class coalition that included APRA and communists, and that enjoyed tacit

support from political Catholics. Yet, these new alliance structures, suffering from

massive internal conflicts, proved to be highly volatile and ultimately too short-lived for

initiating the incorporation of popular narratives into state-sponsored national discourses.

A military coup ended this democratic experiment and state power continued to be based

on accomodationist alliances. These political configurations help to explain why during a

comparable period of social mobilization liberal nationalism managed to persist in Peru.

It was only during the 1970s, under the military government Juán Alvarado

Velasco that state elites embraced popular nationalism as a state-sponsored national

discourse. Similar to Mexico and Argentina, this ideological transformation was driven

by changing alliance structures. More than any previous government in modern Peruvian

history the Velasco government marshaled full autonomy from traditional oligarchic

elites. Moreover, the military established new mechanisms to incorporate subordinate

forces. Yet, these new political alliances with popular sectors remained volatile and

contested, and did not achieve the same degree of institutionalization as in the other two

cases. Nonetheless, state elites adopted a focus on class and precolonial indigenous roots

found in communist alternative narratives and a focus on subordinate socioeconomic

integration found in catholic national discourses. As a matter of fact, popular nationalism

in Peru under Velasco portrayed peasants and workers as protagonists of national history

45
and celebrated Túpac Amaru, the leader of an indigenous uprising during the 1780s, as

the initiator of national independence.

From a comparative vantage point, popular nationalism eventually replaced

liberal nationalism as official national ideology in all three countries. Yet the extent of

this discursive transformation varied dramatically, depending on the timing of state

making. In Mexico, the institutionalization of popular nationalism was facilitated by the

relative absence of a well established state ideological infrastructure in 1934. The

dramatic expansion of cultural and pedagogical state organizations only began with

Cárdenas. State authorities extended the reach of public schooling, increasingly

intervened in the control of radio broadcasting, and enhanced the regulation of cultural

politics. This temporal congruence between state making and ideological change

furthered the translation of popular nationalism into cultural scripts. By contrast, in

Argentina under Perón and Peru under Velasco, state making was disjointed from

transformations of nationalism. In both cases, state elites confronted an already

established cultural machinery. Well-trained and organized cultural producers exhibited

the capacity to resist the institutionalization of popular nationalism. Thus, state

institutional development before the adoption of a different national ideology impeded

the translation of popular nationalism into cultural scripts.

These contrasting trajectories of nationalism left important legacies in the three

countries. In Mexico the comprehensive transformation under Cárdenas resulted in the

installation of popular nationalism as hegemonic reference points in daily life. As such,

popular national discourses became “uncoupled” from immediate political conflicts.

During the subsequent decades, when the postrevolutionary regime was increasingly

46
characterized by political authoritarianism towards subordinate sectors, popular

nationalism retained its hegemonic status as national ideology. By contrast, the contained

transformations of nationalism in Argentina under Perón and Peru under Velasco did not

entail the hegemony of popular nationalism. Instead, popular national discourses

remained fiercely contested and existed in a stalemate with the previously dominant

liberal and romantic nationalism. In Argentina after 1955, both Peronists and the anti-

Peronists represented themselves as the embodiment of the nation, translating conflicts

over policy and office into contestations over national belonging and identity. In Peru,

the removal of popular nationalism from state ideology after Velasco’s ousting fueled its

rapid appropriation by subordinate actors, while Peruvian politics continued to be marked

by conflicts over national inclusion.

Other Explanations—Competing or Complementary?

A state-focused approach is certainly not the only way of analyzing

transformations of nationalism in early 20th century Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. The

subsequent section explores other perspectives that emphasize different explanatory

factors and might even locate the transformation of nationalism in a different historical

time period. It is found that these approaches point to certain complementary factors, yet

that they ultimately fall short of the explanatory power of a state-focused framework.

Modernization

A major competing explanation is grounded in modernization theory. The central

question of this theoretical tradition is how the transformation from traditional to modern

47
society plays itself out in different countries (see Eisenstadt 1970; Inkeles and Smith

1974; Parsons 1951). Modernization theory provides some of the major theories of

nationalism with a macrostructural grounding. Scholars have long argued that the

increased political relevance of nationalism is closely intertwined with economic

progress, industrialization, the expansion of state structures, and the diffusion of new

cultural institutions (e.g., Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983). Thus,

nationalism forms an ideological backbone for the creation of greater cultural

inclusiveness, for instance reflected in the standardization of languages and the diffusion

of a culture of literacy, both crucial ingredients for the functioning of industrialized

societies.

Translating these arguments into an explanation for the transformation of

nationalism establishes the basis for the following proposition: The formation of

relatively integrated economies and the rise of high-capacity states motivated transitions

towards popular nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. The assimilationist and

homogenizing orientation of popular nationalism provided a feasible ideological

grounding for the legitimation of state-led socialization projects. Thus, when compared

to the explanatory framework outlined above, modernization theory emphasizes the same

starting point, major socioeconomic and political change during the 1880-1950 period,

for explaining distinct trajectories of nationalism in the three countries. And indeed, as

this dissertation will illustrate, state consolidation and economic development provided

an important backdrop for the effective articulation of both official national ideologies

and alternative narratives.

48
 Yet, this competing approach ultimately has far less explanatory power than the

state-focused approach. Modernization arguments assume a relatively linear process of

social-structural change leading to changes of nationalism. By contrast, this dissertation

shows that transformations of nationalism cannot be read off modernizing trends. For

instance, dramatic economic growth and state expansion in Argentina during the 1880s

and then again during the 1910s did not automatically translate into the adoption of

popular nationalism as official state ideology. Instead, the trajectory of nationalism in

Argentina requires a focus on politics; the transition towards popular nationalism is better

explained by contestations and alliances between states and social movements. Thus,

compared to a state-focused approach a modernization perspective falls short because it

does not help to identify when transformations of nationalism occur.

World-Cultural Models

In a slightly modified version modernization theory also informs a competing

explanation based on ideas about the massive diffusion of world-wide cultural and

institutional models. This “world society” approach emphasizes the formation of a

“global culture,” that involves ontological assumptions, cognitive scripts and

prescriptions for action with a worldwide reach (Boli 1987; Meyer 1980). In this

perspective nationalism refers to world-cultural models that provide a standard form for

the construction of nations. These models define and legitimate the national discourses

advanced by states and movements. Local actors draw on world-approved norms about

the sovereignty of the people and adopt highly stylized forms for the depiction of national

culture and history. The diffusion and availability of these global models of nationalism

49
accelerated dramatically during the early twentieth century and has become especially

important in the postwar era (Meyer et al. 1997).

In a “world-society” perspective transformations of nationalism are a function of

changes in global cultural and institutional forces. The diffusion of distinct templates for

the constructions of nations stimulates imitation and copying. Thus, an increased

international presence of popular nationalism motivated its incorporation into state-

sponsored national ideologies in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. As such, this perspective

points to important complementary factors that shaped changes of nationalism in these

countries. Especially during the 1930s and 1940s popular nationalism thrived as a global

model. A variety of political projects, ranging from Roosevelt’s New Deal, the

emergence of fascism and transformations in international communism, focused

international attention on national discourses that envisioned the masses as protagonists

of national history and emphasized a distinct cultural identity as key ingredients to

national wellbeing. Thus, these schemata constituted important reference points for both

state authorities and movements and their respective national projects.

At the same time, a “world society” perspective has significant limitations. By

downplaying domestic factors such an approach cannot account for the contrasting

trajectories of nationalism found in the three countries during the 1930s and 1940s. As

this dissertation will show, a focus on global models cannot explain why popular

nationalism gained prominence as official national ideology in Mexico and Argentina,

and remained excluded from state-sponsored discourses in Peru, even though it was

embraced by subordinate movements. By contrast, a state-focused approach and its

50
emphasis on political alliance structures can account for these distinct trajectories of

nationalism.

War Making

Scholars have emphasized the connection between nationalism and international

wars (e.g., Centeno 2002; Comaroff and Stern 1994; Mann 1993; Smith 1981). Military

conflict fosters the use and dissemination of national ideology. State authorities employ

nationalism as an ideological matrix to justify the mobilization of people and resources,

and armies and military experience contribute to the propagation of nationalist symbols

and the creation of a sense of nationhood. Military conflict also contributes to the

articulation of alternative national projects. States in war often trade material and

symbolic concessions for conscription, increased taxation, economic damage, and

potential loss of life among the resident population. Thus, wars can facilitate ideological

change and the diffusion of alternative ideas about national identity and history.

In the “war making” perspective international struggles play a critical role for

explaining transformations of nationalism. Military conflict provides state authorities

with an incentive to incorporate alternative narratives into state-sponsored national

discourses. During wars subordinate sectors gain prominence as potential defenders of

the national territory. This approach therefore suggests that episodes of international war

initiated a transition towards popular nationalism in Mexico, Peru, and Argentina. As

such, this approach also points to a possible alternative episode of change, located

roughly between 1850 and 1890. This is because major international wars that involved

the mobilization of substantial parts of the population were the US-Mexican War (1846-

51
1848) and the French Invasion (1861-1866) for Mexico, the War of the Pacific (1879-

1884) between Peru and Chile, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) between

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on the one hand, and Paraguay on the other.

Florencia Mallon’s Peasant and Nation (1995) is probably the best-known

example of a war-centered perspective on nationalism in Mexico and Peru. Her

remarkable analysis precisely emphasizes the 1850-1890 period for explaining the

distinct trajectories of nationalism in these countries. She argues that in Peru the War of

the Pacific enhanced the articulation of popular narratives, yet state authorities continued

to exclude these alternative forms of nationalism from official discourse. In Mexico

prolonged foreign intervention made subordinate movements more combative in

advancing popular nationalism and state authorities more responsive to these alternative

discourses. As a result, the Mexican state incorporated parts of these popular national

discourses (pp. 17-20, 310-318).

While Mallon’s study certainly gives important clues about the historical

differences in subordinate mobilization and popular narrative production between Mexico

and Peru, it does not provide an exhausting explanation of the distinct trajectories of

nationalism followed by these countries. As this study will illustrate, during the late

nineteenth century and thus after the critical juncture highlighted by Mallon, nationalism

exhibited striking similarities across the two cases: both Mexico and Peru marshaled

liberal nationalism as official national ideology. These findings point to a general

limitation of the “war making” perspective for the puzzle explored in this dissertation.

This approach ultimately cannot account for the dramatic changes of nationalism that

unfolded in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru after 1930.

52
 In sum, modernization processes, global models of nationalism, and international

wars have certainly affected trajectories of nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru.

Economic expansion and political centralization facilitated the production and

institutionalization of official national discourses and set the stage for subordinate

mobilization of popular narratives. Globally available templates of popular nationalism

provided both state authorities and movement actors with a discursive backdrop for

projections about national identity. Likewise, international wars opened spaces for

subordinate actors to articulate popular national narratives. Yet, to fully understand

transformations of nationalism in the three countries it is necessary to move beyond these

explanatory approaches and focus on domestic political factors. A state-focused approach

does precisely that. In this study I suggest that domestic alliance configurations between

state authorities and movements and the institutional development of states were crucial

in mediating modernization trends and shaping how international models translated into

local forms of nationalism. Moreover, such an emphasis on domestic politics helps to

explain the vast differences found among transformations of nationalism in Mexico,

Argentina, and Peru.

The Analysis to Come

The analysis that follows will explore trajectories of nationalism in Mexico,

Argentina, and Peru through the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter. Chapter

Two argues that from a comparative vantage point the three countries exhibited liberal

nationalism as a dominant state ideology during the first decades of the 20th century. The

53
chapter also examines the three countries along critical dimensions of the explanatory

framework. Mexico, Argentina, and Peru were marked by the relative absence of

powerful oppositional movements. State power was largely based on accommodationist

alliances with dominant economic elites, and the reach of state ideological infrastructure

was limited. Chapter Three compares Postrevolutionary Mexico during the 1920s to

Radical Argentina. Both cases represent state-initiated transformations of nationalism

where state elites adopted romantic national narratives in contexts of substantial social

mobilization, changing political alliance structures and the decline of oligarchic power.

By contrast, intra-elite conflict in Peru under Leguia did not entail the decay of

accomodationist alliances, and liberal nationalism remained the dominant national

ideology.

The subsequent four chapters develop more detailed country-specific analyses of

transformations of nationalism. Chapter Four argues that Mexico experienced a

comprehensive transformation of nationalism. Under Cárdenas (1934-1940), the new

postrevolutionary state authorities established alliances with subordinate sectors, leading

to the appropriation of popular national narratives by official discourse. The

simultaneous expansion of state ideological infrastructure facilitated the broad-based

dissemination of popular nationalism. Chapter Five examines historical Peronism in

Argentina (1946-1955) as representing a contained transformation of nationalism. With

the forging of alliances between Peronist state elites and organized labor, official national

discourse became infused with popular nationalism. Yet, state authorities confronted

substantial resistance from cultural producers situated within an already well-established

54
cultural machinery, and did not manage to turn popular national narratives into

hegemonic cultural scripts.

The next two substantive chapters focus on Peru. Chapter Six suggests that during

the 1930s and 1940s Peru epitomized a blocked transformation of nationalism. Popular

national narratives remained confined to subordinate movements and APRA a multi-class

populist party, and did not succeed in replacing liberal nationalism as dominant state

ideology. Chapter Seven shows that under the military government of Velasco (1968-

1975) popular nationalism was fully embraced by state elites. However, as an official

ideology, popular nationalism was contested from within the state apparatus and—similar

to Peronist Argentina—did not gain hegemony as a project of national inclusion.

The concluding chapter highlights the major communalities and differences

among these transformations of nationalism. I also link these comparisons to a more

general discussion of the insights and limitations of a state-focused framework when

extended beyond the empirical cases of this dissertation. In particular, this chapter

focuses on the implications of my dissertation for the analysis of nationalism in the

context of Latin America. The chapter also speculates about the legacies of distinct

trajectories of nationalism in the three countries. In contemporary Mexico, Argentina,

and Peru, popular nationalism itself has been challenged by sectors excluded from its

homogenizing narrative, thereby illustrating a central claim of this dissertation, that

nationalism is inherently contested and changing.

55
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Figure 1. A State-focused Framework of Transformations of Nationalism

Official National Ideology

- highly articulated discourse
- instrumental for legitimizing state
authority

(2) Selective Incorporation

Alternative National Narratives

-articulated discourse (3) Institutionalization
- instrumental for challenging state
ideologies

(1) Framing Work

Cultural Scripts
- implicit frame of reference
- dual quality: grid for both states
and subordinate actors

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Table 1: Types of Nationalism in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru

Liberal Romantic Popular

Nationalism Nationalism Nationalism

Membership Political institutions; Culture Culture

Criteria Territory
(What is the basis of
national identity?)

Modes of “Civilization” Assimilation Assimilation

Incorporation
(How to achieve
national unity?)

Symbolic Universe Elite subject; Elite subject; Popular Subject;

(Who are the main Civilization vs. Civilization vs. Masses vs.
actors/ What are the Barbarie Barbarie Oligarchy
main internal
divisions within
imagined
community?)

Political Vision Liberal-oligarchic Liberal-oligarchic Mass-based

(What is the proper regime; regime; corporate regime;
institutional structure Export-oriented Export economy Inward-oriented
of the nation?) economy economy

Argentina 1884-1910; Argentina 1910-46; Argentina 1946-55;

Mexico 1888-1920; Mexico 1925-34; Mexico 1934-68;
Peru 1906-1960 Peru 1960-68 Peru 1968-75

63