VISVESVARAYA TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

Jnana Sangama, Belagavi – 590018

A SEMINAR REPORT

ON

FRACTIONAL FREQUENCY TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

MASTER OF TECHNOLOGY

IN

POWER SYSTEM ENGINEERING

Submitted by

SUEZA SAJJAN MALLIGWAD

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING

SDM COLLEGE OF ENGNIEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,

DHARWAD-580002

(An autonomous Institution affiliated to VTU, Belagavi.)

2018-19
Fractional Frequency Transmission System
 Sueza S Malligwad SDMCET Dharwad
M.Tech 1st SEM suejasueja164@gmail.com
Department of Electrical & Electronics
Engineering
 A. Abstract— The smart power grid enables exchange between the users and system operator. This
intelligent automation at all levels of power computer-network-like ICT structure achieves low
system opera- tion, from electricity generation at management cost, but also exposes the smart grid to
power plants to power usage in the home. The potential cyber attacks through the public information
key enabling factor of an efficient smart grid is access points. One common cyber attack in smart grids is
its built-in ICT, which monitors the real-time false-data injection, which distorts the measure- ments
system operating state and makes control collected by the system operator through either physical
decisions accordingly. As an important building device compromise or remote cyber-data injection. Being
block of the ICT system, power system state able to compro- mise the state estimation, an adversary
estimation is of critical impor- tance to maintain capable of false-data injection can have a large impact on
normal operation of the smart grid, which, the power system and beyond, such as earning lucra- tive
however, is under mounting threat from potential profits from electricity price manipulation in the power
cyber attacks. In this article, we introduce a market, or causing a regional blackout to induce chaos and
graph-based framework for perform- ing cyber- financial loss.
security analysis in power system state
estimation. Compared to conventional arithme- The state estimator commonly uses a bad data detection
tic-based security analysis, the graphical charac- (BDD) mechanism to filter faulty data, either caused by
terization of state estimation security provides random network error or mali- cious injection [1]. However,
intuitive visualization of some complex problem BDD is unable to detect some structured collaborating
structures and enables efficient graphical solu- injection attacks that are disguised as normal measure- ments
tion algorithms, which are useful for both [2]. One countermeasure is data-driven detection, which uses
defend- ing and attacking the ICT system of the the statistical features of the previously collected
smart grid. We also highlight several promising measurement data to iden- tify anomalous measurements [4].
future research directions on graph-based Nonetheless, it cannot fully eliminate the threat of injection
security analy- sis and its applications in smart attacks, and its performance highly depends on the accuracy
power grid. of the extracted statistical features. To fundamentally
mitigate false-data injection attacks, it is necessary to secure
B. Keywords—Frequency converter, Fractional frequency meter measure- ments themselves to evade malicious
Transmission System, Transmission System. injections by, for example, guards, video monitoring, or tam-
per-proof communication systems [6]. In a large power
II. INTRODUCTION network with hundreds of meter measure- ments, it is
tempting to devise a strategic protec- tion that achieves
The smart power grid is committed to providing
system security requirements with low cost, for example, a
stable, high-quality and inexpensive electricity sup-
small number of secured devices. Arithmetic and graphical
ply to meet the surging power demand of modern
methods are two pop- ular approaches for security analysis in
society through its intelligent energy management in
power sys- tem state estimation. Specifically, the arithmetic
power generation, transportation and distri- bution,
approach applies algebra and matrix theory to analyze the
and its introduced competitive market mechanisms.
solution space of state estimation
Essentially, the intelligence of smart grid is driven by
its embedded ICT infrastructure, especially the
EMS/SCADA (energy management Phas system and
Control and data acquisi- or tion) Gen
supervisory control erat system
B
flow Contr meas
[1]. As shown EMS in Fig.
ol State
1, the
S SCADA
uremMeter system
or u is
responsible for and collecting
center the measure-
ent
measure
Flow ments data
meter
Data flow
reported by distributed meters/sensors,
C which
L unitments Injectiis then
Load
fed to the state estimator located ato the control on center
curtailment/gener
estimato a
to derive the estimation
ation of
dispatch/…
other system
A state
d
variables,
meter for
r
example, bus voltage amplitudes and phases. Based
on the estimation, the EMS, Das well as other power
system applica- tions, then makes A control decisions,
applicati
ons flow, load curtailment, and elec-
for example, optimal power
tricity pricing, to adjust the physical aspects of the power
grid. Evidently, a secure and efficient power system requires
accurate state estimation that truthfully reflects the system
operating state.
The dependence of smart grid on its ICT infra-
structure makes cyber-attacks on state estimation a viable
approach to impact normal system oper- ation. In the
conventional power network, power devices are isolated
from the public network and under close control by the
industrial system oper- ator. In the smart grid, however,
many distributed smart meters are installed in households,
which often connect to the public Internet and run IP-based figure1. An illustration of the operation of the SCADA/EMS system for
communication protocols to facilitate two-way information a four-bus network.
 state variable with respect to the reference bus. For the
conve- nience of exposition, we consider in this article only
and thus the potential threats and countermea- sures of conventional power flow measurements. In fact, a PMU
injection attacks (e.g., [7, 8]). Despite its effectiveness in measurement can be equivalently converted to a flow
extensive applications, the arithmetic approach is found to measurement in security anal-ysis, which is discussed in
be inefficient in handling some complex problems, [9].
especially for those with combinatorial features, for
Given a subset of meter measurements M— ⊆M, we
example, involving selecting k out of K buses. Alternative-
can find correspondingly a subnetwork (and thus a
ly, the graph-based approach, which uses graph models to
subgraph) measured by M— , denoted by G( M— ) = (—
characterize security problems, can provide intuitive V, — E). That is, a flow meter measures the transmission
visualization of complex problem structures (e.g., [9–12]). line where it is installed and the two buses in both ends; an
Its useful insight can lead to efficient optimal or sub-optimal injection meter measures the bus that is installed, the
graphical solu- tion algorithms that are otherwise not transmission lines connected to the bus, and all the buses
achievable by arithmetic approaches. However, classic graph on the other end of the transmission lines.
algorithms often need significant modifications to solve
power system security problems of unique graphical
structures.
In this article, we provide an overview of graphical
methods for performing cyber-security analysis in power
system state estimation. Spe- cifically, we first describe the
method to model power network in a graph. Then, we
establish a graph-based characterization of state estimation
security, and introduce representative graphical algorithms
to solve security problems in state esti- mation. We also
suggest several future research directions on graph-based
security analysis and its applications in smart power grid.
Finally, we con- clude this article.
1 a 1 b
3 1 1
3
1 4 4
1 1 1
2 2 1 1
1 1 9
2. GRAPH MODELING OF POWER NETWORKS AND 2 9 0
1 0 1
MEASUREMENTS 6 6
5 7 2 5 7
3
4 3 4 1 4
4
1
As shown in Fig. 2a, a power network consists of a 5 5 8
number of buses, loads, power generators, and power I.
2
G8 RAPH
2
ALGORITHMS FOR
transmission lines that interconnect along the power lines 3 3
5 Bus pLine
ower sInjectio
ystem securIty
1 AnAlysIs
(e.g., meter 1) and the active power injections at the buses index flow Meter
n meterc d
(e.g., meter 2). In recent years, phasor measurement units 1 6
meter 1 index6
5 5
(PMUs) have emerged as an advanced metering technology 2 3 2
5
that can provide direct real-time volt- age phasor 4 4 4
4
1
5
measurements with high accuracy and reliability in
addition to the conventional meters. In practice, due to high 1 2 Injection-to-
edge mapping
PMU installation costs and the legacy power system in
operation, state estimation is often obtained from a mixture 2
of PMUs and power flow measurements.
For a power network with n + 1 buses, we regard one of
them as the reference bus, denoted by R, and estimate the
phase angles of the other n buses (state variables) from m
meter measurements, denoted by = ( 1, 2, .., n)’ and z = (z1,
z2, …, zm)’, respectively. Also, we denote the set of n
unknown buses as S, the set of all the buses V  R ∪ S, the
set of transmission lines as E, and the set of m
measurements as M.
As shown in Fig. 2b, a power network can also be
described in an undirected graph, where vertices and edges
represent buses and transmis-sion lines, respectively.
Without loss of generality,we regard bus 1 as the reference
throughout this article. Loosely speaking, a flow meter
reflects the difference between two state variables; an
injection meter reflects the sum of differences of a state
variable with respect to the subset of state variables in one-
hop distance; and a PMU meter reflects the difference of a
 reduced hence improving stability and performance
characteristics.
V. RESULT ANALYSIS The reduced length of the transmission line leads to
minimize the cost of transmission and improvement in the

Sr.No Normal Normal Fractional Fractional

frequency Power frequency Power
voltage. (W) voltage. (W)
a. Power transfer curves (V) (V)

1 300.5 287.43 316 953.55

300 2 301.5 290.35 318 965.66

250 3 303 292.24 322 990.11

200 general characteristics.

150

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
80

II. Efficiency curves

Efficiency curves of FFTS and conventional 5O Hz

line
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