Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Treason Digests
(c/o Anit. Cantos. Damasing. Dela Cruz. Hipolito. Regalado. Santos)
Facts:
• Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an officer of the
United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his surrender in April 1901 when
in fact, he was aware of the existence and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of
the United States Philippine Commission states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath
before any military officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such
official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the
affiant is substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the
passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or
provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both."
• Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty if
the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. The denying of the whereabouts of
the rifles can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the
United States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be
held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under
another name.
• Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act
as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
certain enumerated objects of a political character.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of “treason and
sedition.”
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
• The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act
No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the amnesty
proclamation of July 4, 1902.
• The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection, conspiracy
to commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and
libels, the formation of secret political societies, and violation of oaths of allegiance. When the
framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the purely political
offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without specially enumerating the
political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under the terms “treason and
sedition.”
Ruling: The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and upon filing in
the court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he be
discharged.
People v. Adriano
GR#477 – Jun 30, 1947
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 1
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
En Banc
Ponente: Tuason, J.
FACTS: Appeal from decision of the People’s Court sentencing Apolinario Adriano to life
imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000 plus costs. Adriano was charged with treason for being a
Makapili and for bearing arms and assisting the Japanese Army in its operations in the Gapan-San
Leonardo Area from Jan.-Apr. 1945. The People’s Court established that: Adriano was a Makapili; he
performed sentry duties in the Japanese garrison in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; he carried a rifle in drills led
by Japanese commanders; he surrendered to the Americans with rifle in hand.
ISSUE: W/N Adriano is guilty of treason
HELD/RATIO: No. The Philippine law on treason follows the two-witness test derived from the Anglo-
American law on treason. This test requires the concurrence of two witnesses to an overt act of
treason. In this case, each of the overt acts imputed to Adriano failed the test. Although mere
membership in the Makapili organization is a treasonous act in itself (indicative of adherence and
giving aid and comfort to the enemy), such membership is an overt act which should be proven by at
least two witnesses. In this case, no two witnesses saw Adriano doing the same single act as a
Makapili.
Hilado, J. dissenting:
Membership being a continuous and indivisible act, it is not necessary that two witnesses have
ascertained that Adriano was a Makapili on the same day. The witnesses agree on the fact that
Adriano is a Makapili, hence he should be convicted.
Laurel v Misa
Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa
77 Phil 856, G.R. No. L-409
January 30, 1947
FACTS:
• This is a resolution of the decision of the SC denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed
by Laurel. Anastacio Laurel was arrested by the US Army and was interned under a commitment
order for collaborating with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation. He was turned over to
the Commonwealth Government and since then has been under the custody of the respondent
Director of Prisons. He filed an original action in the Supreme Court invoking the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
• He maintains that his arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights and that the
People’s Court Act 682 which suspends the application of the six-hour limitation on detention to
political prisoners is unconstitutional. The SC court in its decision, denied his petition and rejected
the petitioner’s contention mainly because no vested right was violated as the Act is not an ex-
post facto law. Although the RPC was in effect during his arrest, he could not have asked for
release after 6 hours as Gen. Douglas McArthur revived the laws of Commonwealth but held the
active collaborationists in restraint “for the duration of the war”.
• Laurel, not discouraged, filed a motion and contends that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason because a) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines, and
consequently, the allegiance of Filipino citizens was suspended; b) there was a change of
sovereignty over the Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic
ISSUES:
a) Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines is suspended upon
occupation
b) Whether the occupation by an enemy suspends the allegiance of Filipino citizens to the
sovereignty
HELD/RATIO:
a) No. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier but
remains with the legitimate government. It cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor
thereof. What is suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy which passes temporarily to the occupant.
b) No. A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his legitimate government and it
cannot be transferred to the occupant. Moreover, sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during enemy occupation so the allegiance to the sovereign subsists and therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
d) Yes. With the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government,
the authority to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant and political laws are suspended.
They are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant because they
exclusively bear relation to the legitimate government. Crimes against national security (of the
legitimate government) such as treason as penalized by the RPC are also deemed suspended against
the occupant because they cannot be committed against it.
e) No. Treason is applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during enemy occupation.
f) No. This is not necessary to control the inhabitants and it is tantamount to practically transfer
temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the sovereign. If an inhabitant is compelled illegally,
he can lawfully resist or submit without becoming a traitor.
g) No. There is no change of sovereignty so the crime of treason committed during the Japanese
occupation was committed against the same sovereign people and the same government.
Perfecto, concurring:
Treason is a war crime and cannot be committed during time of peace. Allegiance to the government
was not suspended during the enemy occupation. 4 kinds: Natural, Acquired, Legal, Local. The idea of
suspended sovereignty of suspended allegiance is incompatible with the Constitution which states
that “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Dissent:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the
land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines
wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the
acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed
sovereign.
US v. Dalmacio Lagnason
3 Phil. 495
G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904
Ponente: Justice Willard
Facts:
Defendant charged under Act292 with treason, sentenced to death. When Americans occupied
Negros Occidental, there were a band of men in arms against US government led by defendant. Their
aim was to establish an independent government. On October 29, 1902, defendant with band
attacked pueblo Murcia, driven off by Constabulary. Defendant captured. They carried no banners,
but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the cannon.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is guilty.
Held:
Yes. Acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government was levying war against the US, and therefore treason, regardless of number of men. No
distinction made between foreign enemy and rebel or insurgent so far as act of levying is concerned.
Levying of war had a definite meaning. That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a
"levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed,
can not be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion or
insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections can only be
reconciled in the manner employed in the case against Greathouse (a case mentioned), and that
decision should be followed. If rebellion and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be
convicted under section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by
confession in open court. If they are not treason he could be convicted upon the testimony required in
ordinary cases. The provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section
of the act of 1862. It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the overt act
of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide whether the omission
in section 3 of the phrase "owing allegiance to the United States," which is found in section 1 taken in
connection with section 17 of the act, makes a difference between the two sections in the case at bar
the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both by section 1 and section 3. In a
case, an accused has been acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved, and in another
there was acquittal because there were not two witnesses to the same overt act.
Facts:
• Count 1: Perez, with other Filipinos, recruited women girls and women against their will to satisfy
the lust of Colonel Mini. The victims included Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos. Eriberta Ramo testified that on June 15,
1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of
her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas;
that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told
her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that
a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini
wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but
a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was
brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed
in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
• Count 2: Perez, in company with some Japanese and Filipinos, took Eriberta Ramo and her sister
Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor
of Colonel Mini in order that Mini might select those who would later be taken to satisfy his lust. By
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sisters were brought to the
headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran.
• Count 4: On July 16, 1942, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes
in Corella, Bohol, by Perez and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the
Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his lust, but Perez and Bullecer raped the women first
before bringing them to Takibayas. Perez raped Eduarda and Bullecer raped Eutiquia Lamay.
Eduarda S. Daohog testified that while on the way to Tagbilaran, Perez through force and
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intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was
delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified
that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and
her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a
revolver if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while
they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer
took Eutiquia Lamay; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that the
accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was raped
by Takibayas and Eutiquia was raped by another Japanese.
• Count 5: On or about June 4, 1942, Perez commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
and that they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a
case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and upon arriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused
brought the two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini and by means of violence, threat and
intimidation, Mini abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that Perez followed in
having carnal knowledge with Flaviana; that two days later, Perez brought Feliciana Bonalos to a
secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by means of threat and violence had
carnal knowledge with her against her will.
• Count 6: Perez, together with his Filipino companion, apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora
Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a
dance and reception organized in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that on July 8, 1942, said nurses were
forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Japanese officers might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Perez in luring women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officials
constitute treason.
Held: No.
Ratio:
• As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be
directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. His "commandeering" of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor
was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and
materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State.
Ruling: Perez is guilty of four counts of rape and sentenced for each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal.
People v. Alunan
People’s Court Criminal Case No. 3461 – Feb. 27, 1947 - 43 OG 1288
Ponente: Leopoldo Rovira
(NOTE: The decision was rendered in Spanish . Apparently the People’s Court was the post-war
court set up to try collaborators with the Japanese. Rafael Alunan served in the puppet Japanese
government in the Philippines.)
FACTS: Rafael R. Alunan was charged with treason before the People’s Court for accepting and
discharging official duties in the Philippine Executive Commission (the puppet government). Among
these functions were: accepting and serving in the ff. positions: Minister of Agriculture and
Commerce; Member of the Executive Council; Member of the Preparatory Commission on Philippine
Independence which drafted the 1943 Constitution; Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
participating in a gratitude mission to Tokyo; voting in favor of declaration of war against the Allied
Powers; conferring with the Japanese emperor; and helping draft and circulate a “Letter of Response”
which promised cooperation with the Japanese, among others. Alunan pleaded not guilty…
ISSUE: W/N Alunan is guilty of treason
HELD: No. Motion to dismiss granted.
RATIO:
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Although the witnesses have been able to prove Alunan’s participation in the puppet government, his
acts were duties of a public position held under abnormal circumstances. Such acts cannot be
considered as giving aid or comfort to the enemy. Mere acceptance of public office and performance
of the duties of such offices under the Japanese puppet government do not constitute treason per se.
Granting arguendo that Alunan’s acts did constitute giving aid or comfort to the enemy, he cannot be
punished because his adherence to the enemy cause was not proven.
Diaz, J. concurring: (I put this in KASI ETO LANG YUNG ENGLISH ^^)
3 elements of treason: 1) allegiance of the accused; 2) treasonable adherence to the enemy 3)
commission by the accused of an overt act giving OR at least tending aid and comfort to the enemy
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (Sychangco, Formoso, Silayan, and Javalera) do not
establish intent on Alunan’s part to adhere to the enemy. They only establish certain overt acts
committed by Alunan. For treasonous intent to be inferred from overt acts, there must be absolutely
nothing in the proof of such overt acts which may negate the element of adherence. The same
records which showed that Alunan indeed served in the puppet government also showed that Alunan
was serving only out of necessity, and was more sympathetic to the Allied cause.
(POSTSCRIPT: Almost none of the other high-ranking officials of the Japanese puppet govt were
convicted.)
People v Abad
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO)
G.R. No. L-430
July 30, 1947
PERFECTO, J.
FACTS:
Accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with homicide and
sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias Salvador in the amount
of P2,000, and to pay costs.
1. December 24, 1943: as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, join participate in a raid
conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra,
apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of possession of a revolver which had been
previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that Magno Ibarra still had the revolver.
2. March 11, 1944, caused the arrest and incarceration for more than two months, of one Mr.
Francisco, for having remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines
had already been retaken.
3. September 28, 1944: forced, coerced, and compelled Osias Salvador and his two brothers to go to
the Japanese garrison where in accused’s presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although
Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias Salvador
was unable to do so and died.
4. November 12, 1844: handed over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and
kicked the said Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said
accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
ISSUES:
· Whether or not the accused is guilty of the first count. Defense maintains that only one witness
testified to the overt act alleged therein.
o HELD: Not guilty.
o RATIO: Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and
his wife, Isabel. Appellant's going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver (testimony of Isabel),
· Whether or not the arrest and incarceration of Francisco was caused by accused. Defense
maintains that there could be other spies who heard Francisco’s remarks.
o HELD: Guilty.
o RATIO: The fact that appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by
pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother
Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and of
giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes.
· Whether or not the accused caused the arrest of Salvador brothers. Defense maintains that it
was improbable for Liberato Salvador to have seen the accused making signs to Japs to arrest the
Salvador brothers.
o HELD: Guilty.
o RATIO: It is satisfactorily explained by Liberato that "because a man wanted to by the
Japanese begins to observe everything," he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs"
· In relation to the above, whether or not accused is responsible for the death of Osias Salvador.
o HELD: Not responsible.
o RATIO: It was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged
the Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as
his brothers to escape. If his brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would
have been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two and a half
months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no
evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias Salvador.
· Whether or not the court erred in admitting evidence of supposed treasonable acts not
specifically alleged in the information (referring to the gathering of info on the whereabouts of
guerrilla army members and the shooting of Domingo)
o HELD: Yes, the court erred. Not guilty.
o RATIO: The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the
description is a conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically
alleged in the four counts. Also, the lower court erred in finding the facts proven when the testimony
of has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason
cases.
· Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused as informer based on mere assertions of
witnesses on charges not alleged in the information
o HELD: Yes, the trial court erred. Not guilty.
o The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo,
and Agustin de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the
information, and their testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as
required by the two-witness rule.
· Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating 2 mitigating circumstances: the fact that the
Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and
Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused, and, appellant's age.
o HELD: First circumstance not appreciated. Age is appreciated.
o RATIO: The killing of the father and brother of accused is not considered to mitigate appellant's
guilt as they are not of a similar nature or analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code.Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he
committed the acts alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not
yet 20 years old. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with a mitigating
circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
· Faustino Flores, Leon Gutierrez, Felipe Reyes: charged with several counts of treason (2,2 and
5, respectively). Case concerns the second count, as they are acquitted of their other counts due to
lack of proof.
· Dec 1 1944, Barrio Tipas, Taguig, Rizal: Accused lead Japanese troops into a “zonification”
(rounding up the men suspected of being guerillas into an area, having makapilis point guerillas out,
and torture or abduct them), arrest 276 men in the process, search houses in the area for supplies to
gicve to the Japanese troops, load the 267 men into trucks which drove them to Pasig, from which
they were never heard of again.
· People’s Court finds the three guilty of treason.
Issue:
· Whether or not the accused are guilty of the second account of treason.
· Whether or not the “Zoning” of Tipas constitutes one act of treason for the purposes of the rule
that there should be testimonies from at least two witnesses.
Held/Ratio:
· No. Witnesses’ testimonies for each of the accused fail to disclose that they refer to the same
act, therefore these are uncorroborated. This is a violation of the two-witness rule.
· No. Each of the acts of the accused must be supported by at least two witnesses, or each
witness must testify to the whole act, in order for the rule to be complied with.
DOCTRINE: “No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of 2 witnesses at least
to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.” The 2-witness rule is severely
restrictive. Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act.
FACTS:
• This is an appeal from a judgement of the People’s Court.
• March 11 1944: Japanese patrol with 17 men and 1 officer were ambushed and liquidated by
guerillas in Bibito, Lopez, Tayabas (now Quezon)
• Residents of Bibito and neighboring barrios were arrested and others were ordered to report at
the poblacion which included Antonio Conducto, a guerilla and former USAFFE, his wife, parents
and relatives
Witnesses:
• Sinforosa Mortero (Antonio’s mother): On March 18, 1944, at about 5PM, she and her family went
to the poblacion from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto’s house,
Escleto told them to stop and took down their names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia
Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto
conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they were questioned by some whose
name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not
know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go home with many others, but Antonio
Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-examination she said
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that when Escleto took down their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would
happen to him and his family, and Escleto answered, “Nothing will happen to you because I am to
accompany you in going to town.”
• Patricia Araya (Antonio’s wife): Filemon Escleto stopped them and took down their names; that
after taking their names Escleto and the Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC
garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
said “nothing” and assured Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home;
that Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, “This is Antonio Conducto
who has firearm;” that afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to
her husband.
• Filemon Escleto was charged in the People’s Court with 3 counts of treason for:
o going out with Japanese military in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and
of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing
arms against the American men and guerrilla forces and mounting guard and performing
guard duty for the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in Lopez, Tayabas (now
Quezon)
o going out in patrols in search of guerillas
o treasonably arrested or caused arrest of Antonio Conducto as a guerilla and turned him
over to the Japanese authorities on Mar. 18, 1944 who has not been seen since then
• The People’s Court dismissed the first 2 counts because no true overt act was established and
there was no 2 witnesses to corroborate. However, the 3rd count was deemed fully substantiated.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Filemon Escleto is guilty of treason
2) Whether Escleto’s making note of persons who went to the poblacion is evidence of an overt act of
treason
3) Whether Patricia Araya’s testimony is availing as proof of an overt act of treason
HELD:
1) NO. He is acquitted of the crime of treason.
2) NO. The only point of agreement between the 2 witnesses’ testimonies is that the accused took
down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses and came along with them to the town. This does
not show betrayal of Conducto because he may be merely doing his duties as lieutenant of the barrio.
Also, it is not necessary to write down Conducto’s name because Escleto can merely report him
secretly. That there were spies with masks during the registration and that others were released
further support the theory that Escleto was merely following orders in ordering them to write their
names.
3) NO. The only damaging evidence is Araya’s testimony that the accused told a Philippine
Constabulary Soldier that the deceased has a firearm. However, the testimony was not shown to have
been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. In addition, this was
not corroborated by another witness.
*People vs. Adriano : The authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from
which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely made it “severely restrictive” and
conviction for treason difficult.
*Wigmore: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must
be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
*Learned Hand: It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be
possible to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths;.
*Cramer: The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that
it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused
actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.
Espionage
Santos vs. Misa
G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946
76 Phil 415
Ponente: Bengzon=, J.
Facts:
• Santos is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of
the United States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and
since then detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. He was detained due to active
collaboration with the Japanese.
• Santos claims that the detention is illegal because he has not been charged before, nor convicted
by, the judge of a competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No. 682
because he does not owe allegiance to the US or the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
• The Solicitor-General declared that Santos may be charged for espionage, a crime against national
security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under
Commonwealth Act No. 682
Issue: Whether or not Santos is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 682. (With regard to detention of
political prisoners)
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 682:
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of
the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of
Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the
Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said
political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as
possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political
prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court, but
the period of suspension shall not be than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political
prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to
the Commonwealth Government.
Santos may be prosecuted for espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender
and considered as an offense against national security.
Piracy
People v. Lol-lo and Saraw
GR#17958 – Feb. 27, 1922
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
FACTS: Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) on Jun. 30, 1920, two boats
carrying 12 Dutch nationals (1 person in one boat, 11 men, women and children in another) were
boarded by 24 armed Moros (including the accused Lol-lo and Saraw) at around 7:00 PM. The Moros
took all the cargo from the Dutch. They also raped and abducted the two women on board. The Moros
poked holes in the boat and left the rest of the Dutch in it (they were later rescued). The two women
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 14
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
were able to escape once the Moros docked in the island of Maruro (also a Dutch possession). Lol-lo
and Saraw were arrested after returning to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. They were charged
w/ Piracy before the Sulu CFI and were found guilty, with punishment of life imprisonment; and to
return the stolen 39 sacks of copra plus 924 rupees in damages, plus costs.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the Sulu CFI has jurisdiction over the crime 2) W/N the defendants are guilty
HELD: 1) Yes 2) Yes
RATIO:
1) Piracy is a crime against all mankind. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits, pirates
being hostes humani generis (enemies of mankind). Piracy may be prosecuted in any court where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
2) The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy (Arts. 153-154) remained in force after the
American takeover, by virtue of Pres. McKinley’s Instructions. Art. 154 specified that piracy with rape
shall be punished by cadena perpetua to death. Lol-lo, who was proven to have taken part in the rape
of the two women, should therefore be put to death - the crime being aggravated by cruelty,
ignominy, and abuse of superior strength (rape of the women, abandonment of the other victims, 24
armed men vs. 12 men, women & children) with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed with respect to Saraw, modified with respect to Lol-lo.
People v Siyoh
G.R. No. L-57292
February 18, 1986
The People Of The Philippines
vs.
Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam Kiram, Namli Indanan & Andaw Jamahali,
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Siyoh, Kiram, Indanan and Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder. On July 14, 1979, accused fired their guns into the air and stopped the pumpboat wherein de
Castro, Hiloen and 2 de Guzmans were riding, boarded the said pumpboat and took, stole and carried
away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal belongings
amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency, ordered them to jump into the
water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of de Castro
and one de Guzman while wounding the other de Guzman. It appears that Siyoh and Kiram were with
the victims, also selling their goods, before the incident happened.
Lower court decision: Sentenced to DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are
members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is recommended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Siyoh and Kiram are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, considering the credibility of the
witness
HELD:
Yes, they are guilty BRD.
RATIO:
Appellants contentions are unconvincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on
any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while
at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from
prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this
assertion.
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and
Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed
Illegal Detention
Lino v Fugoso
CECILIO M. LINO
vs.
Milo v Salanga
c/o A2015 Crim Digests
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan(Branch
IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR
[G.R. No.L-37007. July 20, 1987.]
GANCAYCO, J
Doctrine:
Arbitrary detention is commited by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The
elements of this crime are: 1) That the officer is a PUBLIC OFFICER or EMPLOYEE, 2) That he DETAINS
a person, and 3) That detention is without legal grounds
Facts:
1.) 12 Oct. 1972 – Information for Arbitrary Detention filed against Juan Tuvera Sr., Tomas Mendoza
and Rodolfo Mangsat in CFI of Pangasinan stating:
a. 21 April 1973 – Juan Tuvera, Sr. (barrio captain) et al. MALTREATED Armando Valdez, hitting
the latter w/ butts of guns and fist blows
b. Tuvera w/o legal grounds and w/ members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiring, confedenrating and helping one another (JRB: I put this for good
measure) LODGED and LOCKED Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan
for about 11 hours.
2.) 4 April 1973 – Tuvera filed motion to quash the Info bec. Acc. To him:
a. Facts do not constitute an offense (i.e., barrio captain =/= public official)
b. Proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information
c. TUVERA’s ARGUMENTS:
i. He didn’t have authority to make an arrest nor jail and detain Valdez (bec. Barrio
capt. Only)
ii. He is neither a peace officer or policeman
iii. He was not a public official
iv. He had nothing to do with the detention of Valdez (cops did it)
v. He is not directly or indirectly connected in the admin. Of the Manaoag Police Force
vi. Barrio capts on 21 April 1972 were not yet “Persons in Authority” and it was only
through PD 299 that they became such.
vii. Proper charge was ILLEGAL detention, and not ARBITRARY DETENTION
d. Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition to the motion
3.) 25 April 1973 – Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash; found that Tuvera, Sr. was NOT a
Public Officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention (see QuickGuide for requisites of Arbit.
Det.)
ISSUES:
1.) Whether Tuvera, Sr. committed the crime of Arbitrary Detention against Armando
Valdez (By god, YES!)
RULING: Petition for Certiorari granted. The questioned order (granting motion to quash) is set
aside. CASE REMANDED to appropriate trial court for further proceedings.
RATIO:
2.) A public officer or employee who DETAINS a person w/o LEGAL GROUNDS is guilty of
ARBITRARY DETENTION.
HOWEVER, a person so detained WILL NOT BE RELEASED if afterwards he is detained under a valid
information.
People v Bringas
Detention v Kidnapping for Ransom
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y GARCIA, BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA, JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y CRUZ,
ERICKSON PAJARILLO y BASER (deceased), and EDEN SY CHUNG
[G.R. No. 189093. April 23, 2010.]
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 18
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
VELASCO, JR
US v Cabanag
Detention v Slavery
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
TOMAS CABANAG
[G.R. No.L-3241. March 16, 1907.]
TRACEY, J
US v Vallejo
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL.,
[G.R. No. 4367. September 3, 1908.]
TRACEY, J
Rebellion
People v Hernandez
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,
99 Phil. 515.
Facts:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954,
and renewed on December 22, 1955. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and
has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment. On the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not
be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The amended Information contained the allegation that on or about March 15, 1945, and for some
time before the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as
with the 31 other defendants, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with
the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization
(CLO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause,
direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (“Huks”) to
rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such
armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance
to the government and laws thereof, as in fact the said Huks have risen publicly and taken arms to
attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means
to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
Ratio:
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense,
and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
"engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the
prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to
arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty,
damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that
war leaves in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it
involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness
seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life
and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime — that of rebellion plain and
simple. Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as
may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a
crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said
offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the
crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar: If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present,
but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words,
in theabsence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
People vs Geronimo
100 Phil. 90
G.R. No. L-8936
October 23, 1956
Facts:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony,
alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus
Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias
NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias
Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie,
Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres
Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo,
alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias
Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and
John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of, or
otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of
said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to commit
the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves with
all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue:
Held:
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case was
called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the court to substitute his
original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty,
the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his
voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on the
other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the
reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural
consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered
only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as
listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of
However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-
complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of
murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico
Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000,
(without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; and, as
above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs
of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
FACTS:
- The said accused, being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HUK), have all come
together and agreed to commit the crime of rebellion (i.e. rising publicly and taking up arms against
the Government of the Republic of the Phiippines by making armed raids, sorties, ambushes, and
attacks against Phil Constabulary, Civilian Guards, Police, Army patrols, as well as civilians). In
furtherance thereof, they have committed the acts of murders, pillages lootings, plunders, arsons,
and planned destructions of private and public property to create disorder
- March 20, 1951; 830 AM: Benito Cruz, and other Huk members, entered the house of John Hardie,
with violence and intimidation, then took and carried away therefrom personal properties of material
values consisting of a typewriter, a radio, several pieces of jewelry, books, clothings and other articles
belonging to the latter amounting to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) After ransacking the place, the
raiders tied the hands of John D. Hardie and his foreman Donald Capuano and shot them to death,
together with Mrs. Hardie. Late the month, a combat patrol led by Capt. Conrado M. Cabagui of the
14th BCT, with the assistance of one Tomas Timbresa, as guide, located a Huk camp in the Sierra
Madre Mountains.
- March 21, 1951: Some 70 armed members of FC #32 of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" led
by Comdr. Robert, fought the members of Co "D" of the 14th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines
under Capt. Conrado Cabague.
- April 21, 1951: Accused Fermin Tolentino, as the Commanding Officer of FC 25 of the 'Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan', leading some 70 armed members of the said organization, attacked, fired at
and engaged into a fight the officers and men of a detachment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
- November 15, 1952: Accused Domingo dela Torre and about 12 other armed men, all members of
Huk, in support of and/or in furtherance of the movement of the said organization to overthrow the
established government of the Phil, while soliciting food from civilians thereat, fought elements of the
7th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Civilian Commando Unit of Montalban, Rizal.
- April 5, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with 50 Huks under commander Silang at Sitio
Malabayas, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the death of one (1) Huk, two (2) EM and wounding of
another enlisted man.
- December 11, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with about fourteen (14) armed Huks
under Commander Aladdin at Sitio Kaulanog, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the wounding of one (1)
enlisted man.
- April 28, 1949: An undetermined number of Huks jointly led by Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupo
and Mulong, treacherously ambushed, assaulted, attacked and fire upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A.
Quezon and her PC escort, whom they considered as their enemies, resulting in the death of Mrs.
Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Maj. P. San Agustin, Lt. Lasam,
Philip Buencamino III and several soldiers, and injuries to General Jalandoni and Capt. Manalang.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of rebellion.
HELD:
Yes. As stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion,
inasmuch as the information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed to them were
performed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk
Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino fall under the first paragraph of Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000, whereas appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the second paragraph of said
article, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty
meted out to appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each a fine of P10,000, and
appellant Paterno Cruz should be sentenced to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the proportionate part of the
costs against said appellants.
Carino v People
FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
April 30, 1963 En Banc Labrador, J.
DOCTRINE: In rebellion or insurrection, the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public
uprising and the taking up of arms. The act of giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion unlike
in treason.
FACTS:
- Accused was charged with rebellion for allegedly being in conspiracy with the other members of the
Communist Party, between the period from May 6, 1946 to September 12, 1950 for acts committed:
1) The ambush on May 6, 1946 of the 10th MPC Company in Barrio Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija;
resulting in the death of 10 enlisted men; 2) The raid on August 6, 1946 of the Municipal Building of
Majayjay, Laguna; 3) The ambush on April 10, 1947 of 14 enlisted men in Barrio San Miguel na Munti,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija, during which Lt. Pablo Cruz and Pvt. Santiago Mercado were killed; 4) The raid
on the poblacion of Laur, Nueva Ecija of May 9, 1947; 5) The ambush on August 19, 1947 of a
detachment of the 155th Company, in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers thereof; 6) The raid on
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija of June 1946; 7) The ambush on April 25, 1947 of Mrs. Aurora Aragon
Quezon and party at Barrio Salubsob, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, resulting in the death of said Mrs.
Quezon and other members of her party; 8) The raid on Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac, on August
25, 1950; 9) The raid on Sta. Cruz, Laguna, of August 26, 1950; 10) The raid on Arayat, Pampanga,
of August 25, 1950; 11) The seizure of September 12, 1950 of an army scout car in Barrio Mapalad,
Arayat, Pampanga and the murder of two TPs on the said occasion; 12) The attack on the
headquarters of a PC detachment of March 28, 1950, at Montalban, Rizal; and 13) The raid on San
INFORMATION: Crime of rebellion with murders, arson, robberies and kidnappings, for
having, as a high ranking officer and/or member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy
with 31 other who were charged with the same crime in other criminal cases then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and disrupting its
activities.
CFI Manila: Guilty as accomplice in the crime of rebellion, and sentencing him to suffer two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay a fine in the sum of P2,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
CA: Affirmed CFI decision and convicted the accused of the crime of rebellion as the acts done by him
constitute acts of cooperation with the communists in their primordial purpose of overthrowing the
government and such acts naturally have contributed to some extent in the advancement and
promotion of their purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts committed by the petitioner were enough to render him guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of rebellion
HELD: No.
● There are two elements required in order that a person may be considered an accomplice to a
criminal act, namely; 1) that he take part in the execution of the crime by previous and
simultaneous acts and; 2) that he intend by said acts to commit or take part in the execution
of the crime. The acts of the appellant do not prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in
committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. Good faith is presumed, and there is no
presumption of criminal intent or aiding the communists in their unlawful designs to overthrow
the Government.
● Even if he had intent, he is still not liable as his assistance was not efficacious enough to help
in the success of the crime so as to make him an accomplice. Appellant's acts did not
constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing the government.
Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap organization. He did not take up arms against
Original Decision: Military Commission - Buscayno convicted of subversion, death by firing squad
SC Decision: No illegal detention. No bail. No double jeopardy.
Buscayno’s cases
-Buscayno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. charged before Mil. Comm. 2 with subversion
-staged NPA-sponsored demonstration in Manila
-Aquino gave Buscayno several .45 caliber pistols, two armored vests and walkie-talkies, and
ammunition.
-Aquino provided shelter and medical treatment for members of the HMB and NPA
Sison cases
-charged with rebellion before Special Mil Comm 1
-charged with subversion before Mil. Comm. 6
-alleged that accused became and have remained officers of CPP and NPA
-engaged in indoctrination, promotion of communist pattern of subversion
Rebellion case
-Sison and Buscayno assailed jurisdiction of the military tribunal to try civilians like them
-filed petition for habeas corpus, prohibition, mandamus. denied
Issue: W/N they are legally detained. No, not illegally detained and no justification for their release
Held:
Proclamation No. 2045 sanctions continued confinement: persons under detention for rebellion and
subversion cannot enjoy the privilege of the write of habeas corpus
Petitioners were all charged with rebellion. Only Buscayno’s subversion case was decided but the
decision is subject to review. No case against petitioners has been terminated thus, the rule on
double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
Petitioners were accused of rebellion for having undertaken a public uprising to overthrow the
government. As for having been accused of subversion, they were allegedly officers and ranking
members of the Communist party. Overt acts of resisting armed forces were incidental to the main
charge of being leaders of subversive organizations.
Rebellion may be committed by noncommunists without collaborating with the agents of an alien
power. On the other hand subversion came into existence when the communists sought to dominate
the world in order to establish a new political order.
Enrile v Salazar
In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus, Juan Ponce Enrile v. RTC QC Judge Jaime
Salazar
G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990
186 SCRA 216
Ponente: Justice Narvasa
Facts:
In the afternoon of 2/27/1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader JPE, and spouses Panlilio, was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by
respondent judge earlier that day, for rebellion and multiple murder during the period of the failed
coup attempt from 11/29 to 12/10/1990. JPE was taken and held overnight at the NBI headquarters in
Taft Avenue, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
warrant. The following morning, he was brought to Camp Karingal in QC. That day, JPE, through
counsel, filed a petitione for habeas corpus, alleging he was deprived of his constitutional rights in
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 26
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
being held to answer for a criminal offense nonexistent in statute books and charged with a crime in
an information for which no complaint was initially filed or no preliminary investigation was conducted
(thus no due process), granted. The Solicitor General argued that petitioners’ case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common
crimes as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion. The court granted JPE and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty on bail.
Petitioners pray for the abandonment of the Hernandez ruling, rule that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes and that Hernandez applies only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means, to commit rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character.
Issue:
Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder.
Held:
No. Hernandez stands. Murder is absorbed in rebellion. If murder were punished separately from
rebellion, and the two crimes were separately punished, then 2 penalties would be imposed, and so
the extreme penalty could not be imposed, which would be unfavorable. The purpose of RPC48 is to
favor the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if
the several acts performed by him were punished separately. If one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of
said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. When two
or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he
commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one,
on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Also, since the information does not charge
an offense, and disregarding phrasing that rebellion be complexed, indictment is to be read as
charging only simple rebellion. Hence, entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
People V Lava
23 SCRA 72
Zaldivar J.; May 16, 1969
FACTS:
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz y Adriano, Rosario C.
Viuda de Santos, Angel Baking, Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Sr., Esteban Gonzales y la Torre,
Marcos Medina, Cesario Torres, Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Arturo Baking y Calma, Simeon Gutierrez y
Rodriguez, Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Victorina Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Marciano de Leon, Honofre D.
Mangila, Cenon Bungay y Bagtas, Magno Pontillera Bueno, Nicanor Capalad, Rosalina Quizon, Pedro
Vicencio, Julia Mesina, Felipe Engreso, Elpidio Acuño Adime, Josefina Adelan y Abusejo, Conrado
Domingo, Aurora Garcia, and Naty Cruz were all arrested and charged with the complex crime of
rebellion with murders and arsons under an identical information that:
- On May 6, 1946, these people intended to overthrow the seat of the Gov’t of the Philippine
Republic in the City of Manila.
- And the accused, being high officials of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), of which the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) is its armed forces, decided to commit rebellion and did so by
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments and committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of
private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism.
Issues:
§ Whether or not the accused are guilty of rebellion.
§ Whether or not a person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion complexed
with murder, arson, robbery and/or other common crimes.
Held:
§ Nicanor Razon, Sr. and Felipe Engreso were acquitted.
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking,
Cesario Torres, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are found guilty as
principals in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion.
§ Rosario C. Vda. de Santos, Lamberto Magboo and Arturo Baking, Marciano de Leon and Pedro T.
Vicencio is found guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion.
§ Marcos Medina is found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion
§ NO!!
§ Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Decision is MODIFIED.
Ratio:
§ Nicanor Razon, Sr.: No sufficient evidence to show that he had performed any act, which would
constitute a cooperation in promoting the rebellion jointly undertaken by the CPP and the HMB. He is
only a member of the CCP, as secretary and treasurer.
§ Felipe Engreso: Was simply a houseboy of Federico Maclang. He did not know that he was dealing
with communists and was only following orders of his master.
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking,
Cesario Torres, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are ALL high ranking
officers of either CPP and HMB. They all performed their duties and role in fulfilling the goals of the
organization and sought for rebellion against the Philippine gov’t. They were all LEADERS of the
rebellion.
§ Rosario C. Vda. de Santos: only a staff member of the National Courier (or Communication) Division
of the CPP, and that she checked and made reports on the arrival and dispatch of couriers. She was
merely executing the orders or commands of others who are superior to her in the organizational set-
up of the CPP. And since all this she did while CPP went underground and HMB was already doing
armed operations, she is still liable as a participant.
§ Lamberto Magboo: He is only a courier from the headquarters of the National Courier Division of
the CPP in Manila and was actually working and cooperating with the armed operations to overthrow
the government. So still liable as a participant.
§ Arturo Baking: He is a confirmed communist, and was in full sympathy with the armed struggle
being promoted by the leaders of the CPP and the HMB in order to overthrow the existing government
of the Philippines. BUT he was only the assistant of appellant Cesario Torres, who was entrusted with
the publication and distribution of the official organs of the CPP and the HMB, as well as of the
printing and distribution of the documents of these two organizations. Being an assistant of appellant
Cesario Tores who is a principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and not proven to have
committed acts of rebellion himself, he is only a participant.
IMPORTANT RE Rebellion
Rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes.
§ The crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes
expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the
first paragraph of Article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one
crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
US v Ravidas
DOCTRINE: No crime of misprision of rebellion” (US vs. Ravidas) *Misprision is only to treason
RAPE DIGESTS
c/o Hipolito
1. PEOPLE vs RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN
G.R. No. 188560 December 15, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
• Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which
read:
o From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, have carnal
knowledge with one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent
o From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting a flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old
woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
• Pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Prosecution’s Version:
• Oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3
James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang.
• In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with
her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden.
• On April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac,
Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote.
• April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and
her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed.
• In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the
walls of the shack directly illuminating her face.
• She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off.
After a few minutes, the light was switched on again.
• Thereafter, a male voice shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo
iti bala!" ("You better come out if you will not come out I will riddle you with bullets.")
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 29
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
• AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan
bilangan ka, maysa, duwa…" ("You better get out or else I will count, one, two…")
• AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just then, the male voice said, "Pabitaken kayo iti bala." ("I will
explode the bullet."). AAA cried out of fear.
• Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp placed on top of
the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the door opened, she saw
accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight.
• AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was covering his
face.
• She invited him to come inside the shack, but the latter immediately held her hair and ordered
her to walk uphill.
• Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.
• Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop.
• Thereafter, accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove
her clothes.
• When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she also
attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA
was again ordered to walk uphill.
• Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant ordered AAA
to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant
then bent down and spread open AAA’s legs.
• After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAA’s naked body, accused-appellant removed his
pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
• Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves. Accused-appellant also held AAA’s breast,
as well as the other parts of her body. He shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he
moved his buttocks up and down.
• AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant stood up and directed
the beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied.
• Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis into her
vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood up
and lit a cigarette.
• Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis in the latter’s
vagina. His penis, however, has already softened.
• Frustrated, accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his
fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in
diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant removed the twig
and inserted the flashlight in her vagina.
• After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAA’s vagina, he went on top of her again,
pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs. Subsequently,
accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the authorities.
Immediately after, he left her at the scene.
• Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up and went
back to the shack where she immediately woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. She also went to Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet the following day to report the incident to the police authorities.
• MEDICAL EXAMINATION: AAA had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple
head injuries, which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object
hitting the eye. There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her
left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the waist, and
medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also multiple linear abrasions,
or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms and legs caused by sharp objects with
rough surface.
1.b. As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the
latter is superior
• Material inconsistencies in the testimonies and affidavits: (1) whether accused-appellant’s penis
was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were
already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.
• AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several
times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened. On the other hand, AAA stated
in her affidavit that "the suspect ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started
to light and view my whole naked body while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis
[sic] on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not erect [sic]."
• There is no inconsistency between AAA’s testimony and her affidavit. The only
difference is that she failed to state in her affidavit that before accused-appellant
unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into AAA’s vagina, he had already succeeded
twice in penetrating her private organ.
• There is likewise no incompatibility between AAA’s affidavit stating that she came to know of
accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his
face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the shack, AAA was
"not then sure" but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant "because of his hair."
In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit while they were
still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight
illuminated his face while they were on the mountain.
• Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits,
being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
2. The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
• The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case,
does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to
pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay PhP 30,000
as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAA’s testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
HELD:
1. No. The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the
country during the alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve
even the slightest consideration from this Court.
o It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the
room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. There have been too many
instances when rape was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room
full of family members sleeping side by side. There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in
seclusion.
o As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement that the
former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically
stated during her testimony that she was raped. In her testimony, she stated that “He
forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina” and “he repeated his acts”.
o As to inconsistency that she was merely wearing a towel and then she stated that she wore a T-
shirt and shorts, these were not inconsistent as there was a lapse of time between the first and
the second rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she was
referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing her, appellant untied her hands and
left only to return to rape her once more. There was enough time for AAA to dress up.
o Inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA
nor erase the fact that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a
victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since
these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she
might even be struggling to forget. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers,
face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer
would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her
testimony. However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience, ample margin of error
and understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
o In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
o first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
o second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense;
o third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal;
o fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and,
o fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
2. Yes, crime is not attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness as defined in RPC as elements are
absent.
• Attempted rape requires that:
o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance
• Appellant’s act of removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and
kissing and touching her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to
have carnal knowledge on AAA on that particular date.
• In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made:
o an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person, though innocent, to disprove;
o n view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
o evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
o Nonetheless, it also bears stressing that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation
or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of
forced coitus.
• Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of rape is committed by a
man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
o through force, threat or intimidation;
o when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
o by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
o when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present
• People v. Orillosa: Incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed
where the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice. Thus, in order for the accused
to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this jurisdiction, only two (2) elements must
concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below
twelve (12) years old.
• AGE ESTABLISHED: AAA, was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy
of AAA’s birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution,
indicating that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994. Concomitantly, AAA was only seven (7)
years old when the crime of rape was first committed against her in 2001, and was only nine (9)
years old when the accused once again succeeded in committing the same crime in 2003.
• RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED: Also, it is undisputed that accused-appellant is the father of AAA, as
stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference and as also indicated in AAA’s birth
certificate.
• CARNAL KNOWLEDGE ESTABLISHED: When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a
detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if
not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct. As aptly observed by the CA, “[AAA] was able to
describe in detail how her father carried her through the window, laid her down the floor, tied her
mouth, removed her clothes and inserted his penis inside her vagina. She even described that she
felt pain while her father was performing the carnal act against her
• Pertinently, “it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and
credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.”
• Moreover, the fact that AAA’s testimony was able to withstand scrutiny during cross-examination
bolsters her credibility and makes her statements more credible. Further, it should be noted that
the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Simangan corroborate the testimony of AAA. In this
regard, while a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the
prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for its successful
prosecution, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are
veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAA’s testimony.
• In addition, this Court is not convinced that a child of a tender age would concoct a story as sordid
as in the instant case due to her mother’s alleged ill motive. In People v. Padilla, We held that
accused-appellant’s imputation of ill motive on the victim’s mother for being jealous of another
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 40
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
woman is clearly unmeritorious, for no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her
child with the stigma that follows the crime of rape only because she is consumed with hatred and
revenge
Award of Damages. The CA decision as to the damages awarded must be modified. In rape cases,
when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse
of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. However, with the enactment of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC.
• Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is “the penalty provided by law
or imposable for the off se because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on
the offender.”
• When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of
death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP
75,000, racionating that “[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”
• Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted without need of
pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim’s injury is concomitant
with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.
• Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack
of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction
for the public good.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03173 finding accused-appellant Juanito Apattad guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape,
PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages.
CA: Convicted the appellant of simple rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, but reduced to P50,000.00 the civil indemnity to AAA
• AAA’s minority cannot be appreciated as the prosecution failed to present the certificate of live
birth or any other authentic document to prove the age of AAA at the time of the commission of
the offense.
• It noted further that the appellant did not expressly admit AAA’s age. Instead, the appellate court
appreciated force and intimidation, noting that the appellant’s relationship to AAA had been
proven by his own admission. It stressed that in incestuous rape, the moral ascendancy of the
accused over the victim takes the place of force and intimidation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether statutory rape or simple rape because of lack of document to prove age (simple rape)
2. What is the applicable law? (RPC Art. 335 and not RPC 266-A)
HELD: CONVICTION AFFIRMED
1. CA properly convicted the appellant for simple rape whose penalty is reclusion perpetua.
• An appellant can justifiably be convicted of rape based solely on the credible testimony of the
victim. Nothing in the records indicates to us that the RTC and the CA overlooked or failed to
appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
• Agree with the CA that the appellant cannot be held liable for qualified, much less statutory, rape;
the prosecution failed to prove by independent evidence the age of AAA, much less the allegation
that she was under the age of 12 when she was raped.
• The appellate court properly appreciated force and intimidation. In rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation
2. Art 335 of RPC on simple rape must be applied. The CA held that the appellant was guilty of
simple rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the crime was committed
in 1991, i.e., prior to the passage of the law imposing the death penalty for rape cases
(Republic Act No. 7659: 1993) and prior to the new rape law (Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997: 1997). The law then in place – Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code – should
apply. Under this law, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. To conform with existing
jurisprudence, we reduce the amount of exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the September 10, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 03023 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Sixto Padua y Felomina is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
FACTS:
Nature: Automatic review of RTC Bataan decision
• Jan. 3, 1995: while 3-yr old Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was defecating at their neighbor’s backyard,
a certain Manuel “Boy” Pruna called him & placed her on his lap. Boy was then under the bridge,
sniffing rugby & drinking alcohol w/some friends. Boy later on brought her to a grassy area &
raped her. Boy was later on arrested.
• Boy’s counsel filed a motion to put him under psychiatric/mental exam claiming that he couldn’t
get a coherent answer from the accused. But the Nat’l Center for Mental Health issued a
certification that he was in fair condition.
Prosecution witnesses:
• Jacqueline Gonzales – Lizette’s mom who claims that she was fetching water from the artesian
well when incident happened. She claims she saw Lizette crying & the girl then narrated to her
what happened & pulled her to Boy’s house however accused was not home.
• Lizette testified that she knew the accused & that he inserted his penis into her vagina as she was
laid down in a grassy area. She likewise testified that she knew that it was sin to tell a lie.
• Dr. Emelita Quiroz – OG-Gyne who examined Lizette testified that girl’s vagina was positive for
sperm cells w/c signified that sexual intercourse took place.
• Teresita Magtanob, med tech, corroborated Quiroz’ findings re sperm cells
• SPO2 Romeo Bunsoy, PNP member on duty when Lizette reported incident. He conducted an
ocular inspection of the alleged place of incident & discovered that grasses were flattened. People
in nearby areas likewise testified that they saw Boy bring Lizette in that area.
Defense witnesses:
• Carlito Bondoc – testified that Boy was at home during the time the incident occurred because he
& Carlito were having coffee.
• Boy – denied having raped the girl. Alibi: he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito.
RTC: convicted of qualified rape sentenced to death, thus automatic review.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Lizette is a competent & credible witness considering that she was only 3 when raped & 5
during trial (YES)
• Gen rule: when a witness takes a stand is to presume that he’s competent.
• Burden: upon party objecting to competency to establish ground of incompetency.
• Sec. 21, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence (ROE): kids whose mental maturity renders them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting w/c they’re examined & relating them truthfully are disqualified
to be witnesses. No precise minimum age is fixed.
• Test of competency: Intelligence not age. As long as child can perceive & make known his
perception to other & that he’s capable of relating truthfully facts for w/c he’s examined. Consider
child’s capacity : to receive correct impressions during incident; to comprehend obligation of an
oath; relate to those facts truthfully to the court at the time he’s offered as a witness. Kid should
understand the punishment w/c may result fr false swearing.
• Determined by sound discretion of the court & such is respected unless found erroneous. In this
case, Boy failed to discharge burden of proving Lizette’s mental immaturity. RTC held that kid had
capacity of observation, recollection & communication & that she could discern the consequence
of telling a lie. Two years lapse since time of incident is immaterial considering that it’s a most
nat. reaction for victims of crim’l violence to have a lasting impression of how crime was
committed & identity of aggressor.
2. WON Jacqueline’s testimony is hearsay? (NO)
• Not covered by hearsay rule, Sec. 36, Rule 130, ROE w/c provides that a witness can testify only
to those facts w/c he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided by the ROC.
• Hearsay: evidence not founded upon personal knowledge of witness but rather on facts learned
from a 3rd person not sworn as a witness to those facts, w/c testimony is inadmissible. Excluded
FACTS:
• The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was
seven (7) months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she
could only read and write her name including that of her friends
• On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their
house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She
was suddenly awakened when Abello … mashed her breast.
• Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under
the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to
recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which illuminated the house.
• Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth
of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed
“Aray” forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The
victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
• Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of
denial. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on
his way to his room after retiring home..
3 INFORMATIONS:
• on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her
consent.
• That on or about the 30th day of June 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic)
years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
• That on or about the 2nd day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) 21
years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
RTC: 1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article
226-A, Republic Act [No.] 8353 (Anti Rape Law) and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Seven (7) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Thirteen (13) Years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum
2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act [No.] 7610 (Child Abuse Act) and hereby sentences him in each of the two cases to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years of prision correctional (sic), as minimum, to Twelve
(12) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as maximum.
CA: affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed.
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1.In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; Appellant is further ordered to pay complainant, AAA, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the two cases
Issue: Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime.
Held: We note that both the RTC and CA found AAAs testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical,
while the RTC found the defenses version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human
experience. A material point we noted is that Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him.
The substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of motivation are critical points for us
since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim deserves credence if no ill
motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against the accused. Our consideration of Abello’s
defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons:
First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended party’s positive
testimony and the denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of one’s
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.
Second, we flatly reject Abello’s argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the
crimes charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the relationship
between the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the
crime against chastity.
Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be
preposterous. In the normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks unless she is
certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the perpetrator. Based on these
considerations and in the absence of clear indications of errors in giving credence to AAAs testimony,
we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA
Rape by sexual assault
• Both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance between the allegations in the Information
for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense. The Information
alleges “force and intimidation” as the mode of commission, while AAA testified during the trial
that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abello’s male organ inside
her mouth.
• This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, we
ruled that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he
fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what
was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing
that the crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the
Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the
Information.
• R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997 introduced into the Philippine legal system
the concept of rape by sexual assault. This amendment not only reclassified rape as a crime
against persons, but also expanded the definition of rape from the traditional concept of a sexual
intercourse committed by a man against an unwilling woman.
• The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended defines rape by sexual assault as
committed by any person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 … shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
• The elements of rape by sexual assault are:
(1)That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2)That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
• Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:
• The essential elements of this provision are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
• Paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610 (implementing
rules) defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with
the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, among others.
• FIRST ELEMENT: Records show that AAA duly established this element when she positively
testified that Abello fondled her breasts on two separate occasions while she slept.
• SECOND ELEMENT ABSENT: Not a child. The second element requires that the lascivious
conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as defined under R.A. No. 7610.
• In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the phrase, “other sexual abuse” in the above
provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious
conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended party’s will.
• In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion
attended Abello’s sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time
these crimes happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled.
• Hence, she could have not resisted Abello’s advances as she was unconscious at the time it
happened. In the same manner, there was also no evidence showing that Abello compelled her, or
cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after being roused from sleep. Neither is there
evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of consent or resistance to Abello’s
assault.
• More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The
implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a “child” as one who is below 18
years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist
or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a
physical or mental disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.
• While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the
corresponding Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability that rendered
her incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the
prosecution’s compliance with the implementing rules. Specifically, the prosecution did not
present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding
from a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAA’s physical condition
rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.
Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7610.
• We cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him liable for
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.
• In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law
violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the
RPC whose elements are:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
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a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented
• The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed, albeit in
the consideration of a charge under R.A. No. 7610. The prosecution established these elements
through AAA’s testimony that her breasts were fondled while she was asleep.
• While she did not actually see Abello fondling her (as the fondling was done while she was asleep
and stopped when she awakened), she related that she identified Abello because she saw him
enter her mother’s room immediately after she felt her breasts fondled and after he stepped with
his knees on her hand
• AAA also testified that Abello was illuminated by a light coming from outside their house. Further,
the perpetrator could only be Abello as the only other occupants of the house at the time were her
mother, her sister-in-law and her young nephew who were all asleep. The third element was
proven by her testimony that, on two occasions, Abello mashed her breasts while she was
sleeping.
• As we discussed above, the Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the
mode of committing the sexual abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the
trial that AAA was asleep on the two occasions when the offenses were committed.
The Penalty
• The three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and
Abello. Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC, as amended,
and is an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity and in rape.
• This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due to the
prosecution’s failure to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother. If the
fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an admission by Abello of his marriage
to AAA’s mother.
• This admission, however, is inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage to AAA’s mother as the
marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage stricter
requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the
imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
• Rape by sexual assault is penalized by prision mayor which has a range of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one degree lower than
prision mayor, in this case, prision correccional which has a range of penalty from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken within the medium period of prision
mayor, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
• Hence, Abello may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, as maximum, for the crime of rape.
• The imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended,
is prision correccional. Under Scale No. 1 of Article 71 of this law, one degree lower from prision
correccional is arresto mayor which has a range of penalty from one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the case, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months.
• Accordingly, Abello may be meted an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count of acts of lasciviousness.
FACTS:
• On March 27, 2000, an Information for rape was filed against appellant which reads as follows: 6 th
day of January 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, have carnal knowledge of one [AAA],
five (5) years of age and his grandniece by affinity thus sexual abuse prejudicial to the child’s
development
• On June 20, 2000, both parties stipulated during pre-trial that the victim AAA was a minor, being
born on June 22, 1994
• In the afternoon of January 6, 2000, AAA, then five (5) years old, was playing with her friends on
the street outside their house in Sto. Rosario Street, Mandaluyong City.
• Appellant called AAA and brought her to his house, which was right next to AAA’s house. At the
time, the house was unoccupied. They went up to the second floor where appellant’s room is
located. Inside his room, appellant began removing AAA’s dress, shorts and panty. Appellant
then removed his own clothes. He told AAA to lie on the bed, and wasting no time, inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain, but she was unable to cry for help because appellant warned
her not to tell anyone. Thereafter, appellant told AAA to dress up and go home
• Around 6:00 p.m. of the same day, BBB, the grandmother of AAA, was preparing to take a bath
when the latter arrived. AAA asked her grandmother to give her a bath, but when BBB was about
to wash AAA’s genital area, she refused. BBB noticed that her granddaughter was trembling and
covering her private part with her hands. BBB became suspicious and asked her to explain what
happened. AAA replied that it was painful because it was pierced by a stick. They went upstairs
and BBB told her granddaughter to lie down. BBB looked at AAA’s vagina and saw that it was
swollen and reddish. Hence, she suspected that AAA had been abuse
• The following day, January 7, 2000, BBB brought AAA to the house of her sister-in-law, CCC, in
Makati City, to inform her of AAA’s condition. AAA requested BBB to go out of the room because
she was embarrassed. It was on this occasion that AAA revealed to CCC that it was appellant,
whom she calls “Lolo Boyet,” who abused her in the afternoon of January 6, 2000. BBB explained
that AAA is appellant’s grandniece because his wife, DDD, is her sister
• Consequently, BBB reported the incident to the PNP Mandaluyong City Police Station. The case
was referred to PO1 Josefina L. Abenojar of the Women and Children’s Desk for investigation. PO1
Abenojar prepared the sworn statements executed by BBB and AAA relative to the incident
HELD: YES.
• He contends that the trial court hastily disregarded his defense of denial, which was sufficient to
absolve him in light of the evidence on record. He emphasizes that the medico-legal officer
testified that there were no signs of swelling on the victim’s vagina when she was examined.
CA: On automatic review, Affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
Penalty of death imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua
to conform to and in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua
are ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of
the victims.
ISSUES:
HELD:
• After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act
No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:
• Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
o 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
o 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
o 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
o 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
• This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime'
of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
• Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be
punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659.
• A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex crime.
• As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
• It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct
relation, and intimate connection” between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy,
rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component
offense forming part of the herein special complex crime
• "Where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267."
The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer
be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a
special complex crime.
• At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in the
imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal
detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty
of death shall be imposed.
• In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and detained him,
thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
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victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the dispositive portion,
merely stated that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping, however, its mention of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on
accused Norva and Montanir, clearly refers to the crime committed as that of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
• The appellants, therefore, were correctly punished under the last paragraph of Article 267
as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly proves that the
death of Rafael Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the
kidnapping.
• BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with
arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered
• Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge
acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by
appellate courts
Inconsistencies
• Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
that he was the one who whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to another room so
that the latter would have no idea that Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard
testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to a different room.
• Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he resided in
Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that
same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in her testimony, Rosalina
declared that she was with four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to
Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own testimony, stated that there were four of them
including Rosalina seated at the back of the car.
• A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer
only to minor details and collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and weight
of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency
of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.
• Testimonies in court are given more weight than affidavits, thus: Affidavits are not entirely
reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have
attended their formulationIn general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves
but by another person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the
statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that
usually attend the preparation of such affidavits.
• An affidavit, “being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and
inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject
• affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open
court
• Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the
minor discrepancies in his testimony by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald that
Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was appellant Ronald who instructed him
to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus: “A: The two are true, ma'am, because
when I whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he gave me
instruction to transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.”
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• The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig,
thus: “The truth is 1997”
• Prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the commission of the crime
because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela,
when the kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald
asserts that there was no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will point
to his clear participation in the crime because he was just the driver of the car
that brought the victims to the place where the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also
insists that he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information.
Basically, the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.
Conspiracy exists
• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.
• Verily, when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the
commission of the felony
• Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally
in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even
though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended
• Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging
in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in
contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result
• Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit
• As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck “when a conspirator embarks upon a
criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so
be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.”
• EVIDENCE: The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had knowledge of
the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses’ positive identification of him.
• As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more
credible than his testimony applying the same principle that evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from a mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the
common experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable under the
circumstances.
• Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande
because he was a house boy of accused Chua after he admitted the circumstances under which
he has to live there a few days before the victims were brought there.
• To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua
because he was looking for a permanent job is hardly credible because he himself admitted that
when he was brought by accused Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was
the understanding that it would be accused Uy who would be paying his salary. Why would
accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house boy of accused Chua?
Evidently, the only plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused Montanir is
because he was actually working for the former and only posted in the house of accused Chua at
Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is
bolstered by accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all
those times that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as in fact, he took orders from accused
Uy.
• Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to
the house of accused Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 59
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Ciudad Grande when precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy
was on vacation.
• The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his
exact participation in the execution of the crime, by the witnesses for the prosecution, thus:
WITNESS JONARD: I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza. WITNESS
ROSALINA: While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy
removing the things of Mr. Mendoza. Who was there? Dima Montanir.
• In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not
outweigh the testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying him as one of the culprits, thus:
WITNESS JONARD Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you
referring to? A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie
Herrera.
• Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you
say so that he was one of your bosses? A Because they were the ones planning how
they could get Mr. Mendoza.
• Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness? A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy,
Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
• Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness? A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy,
Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
• It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring
of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.
• It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were
brought was owned by appellant Eduardo.
• The trial court was also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely lent
his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so
accommodating to him and had facilitated his loan, thus: Regarding the criminal liability of
accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of
the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the
conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle used in
abducting the victims and the house where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
• It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he
would spend it in going to Davao with his daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous
plan whatsoever and suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that one
of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the kidnapping.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming
with modification the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela
City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein
are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
RTC: GUILTY of the crime of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the
costs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether tHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WAS FORCIBLY TAKEN AND DEPRIVED OF HIS
LIBERTY UNDER RESTRAINT AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND CONSENT.
3. Whether COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ALLEGATION OF
MINORITY OF THE VICTIM.
o Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the crime
charged. In particular, the defense contends that there is no evidence to show that the victim was
deprived of his liberty.
o The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) are:
FIRST: The presence of the first element is not in issue as there is no dispute that appellant is a
private individual.
SECOND: As to the second element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC
means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time.
o It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or
is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child, it also includes the intention
of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. In other words, the essence of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
o In the present case, Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange and
unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back
home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil's parents of
his custody is also indicated by appellant's actual taking of the child without the permission or
knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling up the victim’s mother to inform her that the
child is in his custody and of threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to
show his wife to him.
o Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not
confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil
sustained any injury, cannot hold water.
o The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender
kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping
case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the
victim.
DISPOSITVE: CA Decision AFFIRMED finding Baluya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention
ISSUES:
For Lando
1. Whether CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE
CRIME.
2. Whether accused should be convicted of homicide instead of murder
3. Whether the penalty of death should be imposed for THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
For AI
1. Whether there was conspiracy
2. Whether death should be applied as he did not participate in aggravating RAPE
Circumstantial Evidence
o The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the
early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
o Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
o A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.]
o Testimony of witnesses. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA
heard Fred utter “Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan.” (Our agreement is
that whoever comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde
testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his
companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the
house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond.
o Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy
conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several
holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the
cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of
cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another
cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
o In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the
Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 66
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Conspiracy EXISTS
o Prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan
and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes
their way will be eliminated
o Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task
of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella
compound and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the
Estrellas through that opening
o After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA
and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that
place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty.
o These circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the
malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the
Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their
conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of a
deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
o Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to
participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened
to be killed. NO IRRESISTIBLE FORCE NOR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF EQUAL OR GREATER
INJURY. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of
an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough.
o There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed
to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m of
the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field.
o Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer
subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the
house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours and thereafter returned to the landing field where
the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas’ house.
o When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his
companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to
Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA
o Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither
did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the
Estrellas during the period he was stationed there.
o Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself
from criminal
LANDO.
o He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family.
On the other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6)
malefactors who forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of
May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible.
o As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at
the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible
for Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 67
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accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
o Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant
was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to
be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail. During the trial of the case, Lando
testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of
Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less
than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.
o Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it
impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical
TREACHERY EXISTS:
o There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted
o In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and
blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out
of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities,
the autopsy report indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and
tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim.
There is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and
blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed while
tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in
the commission of the crime.
o Means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to
afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of the
victims.
o The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated
because it is absorbed by treachery.
o EVIDENT PREMEDITATION EXISTS: The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof
showing: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act
o The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment
o From the time the group met at the landing field at around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and
discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took
Sulpacio away from the Estrellas’ house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00
a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to.
Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious
plan.
In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Damages
MURDER:
Civil indemnity: Award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime.Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because
it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense.
Moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,
the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
Exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime. The Court awards the
amount of P30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter
Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses
in the amount of P57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts
KIDNAPPING:
Civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the
finding of rape. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code without the necessity of additional
pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's
injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. Such award is separate and distinct from
the civil indemnity. However, the amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to
P75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence
Exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000 is hereby reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.
As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual
and not collective. Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he
is jointly and severally liable only to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious
illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity is in the amount of P50,000.00, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the
amount of P50,000.00. Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety
and fright when she was detained for almost one (1) month
(a) MURDER:, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias “Lando” and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara
alias “Al” are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P57,122.30 as actual damages.
(b) LANDO: Special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay the
offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Al: Crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez alias “Lando,” the victim AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
HELD: Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention
with rape.
o Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened
almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled
in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed
ironically to separation mainly because of AAA’s intentional abortion of their first child to be – a
betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
o In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal and her
flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
o Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.
o The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.
o An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties as embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
o SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
o The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,
he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open
to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Alejandro v Bernas
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, CARMINA A. ABBAS and MA. ELENA GO
FRANCISCO
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR, EDUARDO AGUILAR,
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE
[G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011.]
PERALTA, J p:
FACTS:
• Alejandro is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery
Center Condominium in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase with the
lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI).
• On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas
(Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be
used as a law office.
• However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments
until the problem is fixed by the management.
• Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, against Alejandro for the latter's failure to pay
rentals.
• Alejandro, for his part, interposed the defense of justified suspension of payments.
• In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation (DCCC) was organized to
administer the Discovery Center Condominium independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando Amor
(Amor) was appointed as the Property Manager of DCCC.
• During the pendency of the ejectment case, or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through
respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked.
• In an Order 8 dated June 11, 2004, the MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit
and discontinue the inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro.
• However, on August 11, 2004, at 8:00 in the evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose
Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. The padlocking was allegedly executed by Amor, as property
manager, and respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with
security officers John Doe and Peter Doe.
• Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities on August 16,
2004.
• On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro
and against OPI. The court found Alejandro's suspension of payment justified.
• The decision was, however, reversed and set aside by the Regional Trial Court, whose
decision was in turn affirmed by the CA.
• On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig.
o Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious and
unlawful which prevented them from entering the premises.
o Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had
unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave coercion.
• In their Counter-Affidavit, Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the elements of grave coercion were
not alleged and proven by petitioners. They also claimed that nowhere in petitioners' complaint
was it alleged that respondents employed violence which is an essential element of grave
coercion.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH INTIMIDATION ALONE BY MERE
PRESENCE WITHOUT VIOLENCE? NO. BUT UNJUST VEXATION
HELD:
• For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
• Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for
which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office.
• At the time of the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 82
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
determination of the rights and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending
before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock.
Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar had no right to do so.
• NO VIOLENCE. The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners' Joint
Affidavit-Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of
facilities to prevent the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these
acts is sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were
effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly alleged that they were
intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
• We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause
intimidation to the petitioners.
• There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
• Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the
mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
• In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the
presence of security guardsIt was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to
intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and
that they produced fear on the part of petitioners.
• To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.
• Here, the petitioners, who were allegedly intimidated by the guards, are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners
to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they
insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for
which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of
respondents
• In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men, armed with hammers, ropes, axes,
crowbars and other tools, arrived at the complainants' residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition
team, complainants were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were
compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the
demolition, while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus
found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was
probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.
• Barbasa v. Tuquero applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several
armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees
because of the latter's failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held that there was no violence,
force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon the lessees' employees
when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was
done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any
untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor's right under the contract.
• In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended
party is an essential ingredient.
• Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.
• UNJUST VEXATION.
o The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides
for the penalty of unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.
o Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may
only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the
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elements of the crime may be thoroughly passed upon
• The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to the determination of whether the assailed
executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
• Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
• [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is
so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
• Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge
HELD: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Barbasa v Tuquero
ROBERTO BARBASA
vs.
HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, DOJ Sec, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG
[G.R. No. 163898. December 23, 2008.]
FACTS:
• Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial
stalls CS-PL 05, 19 and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties,
• On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a
notice of disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and
Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding
obligations for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
• Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted
by private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to pay the back rentals.
• July 1, 1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and
Victor Callueng, TPI head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the
electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
• Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its
officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
• The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in
petitioner's stalls "in a violent and intimidating manner" and by unnecessarily employing
"several armed guards to intimidate and frighten" petitioner and his employees and
agents.
• Defense: that the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully;
o that it was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties,
and in accordance with the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously
executed between petitioner and TPI;
o that petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed;
o petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and
water bills, unpaid interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the
amount of P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-Penalty
Reports 8 duly sent to him.
o Petitioner was likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times
wherein it was stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut. 9
Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the
third notice.
o Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the power cut-off, but only after sending
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a "Notice of Disconnection of Utilities" to petitioner's stalls informing him of the
impending act.
o Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has
outstanding accountabilities with respect to "Priority Premium Fees" in the amount
of P5,907,013.10.
o They likewise stressed that their Agreement with petitioner contains the following
stipulations:
PRIORITY PREMIUM : P 2,367,750.00
RENT PER MONTH : P 378.00 per sq. m
Plus P 37.80 10% VAT)
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE TO THE LESSEE:
(CUSA) CHARGES: Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo.
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service
In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given month is not
sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for said period, the order of priority
in the application of the payments made is as follows:
• Penalties, Interests, Insurance, CUSA Charges, Rent, Priority Premium
PENALTY CLAUSE: It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to
pay at any time the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and
other utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses,
penalty and interest is made,
• Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit:
o Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not personally present at
the scene at the time, were to be held liable as the authors of the criminal design
since they were the ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner's electricity.
o Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, much more aimed
or fired it, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment
of his business and his person.
o He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the amount and extent of his
unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were paid;
o Ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of rentals and for reformation of the lease
agreements.
• Prosecutor: Dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and
Art Brondial but found probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor
Sangalang and Victor Callueng.
• On January 13, 2000, an Information for grave coercion was filed in court, but proceedings
therein were deferred when the private respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
• On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution, as
follows: Move for the dismissal
• Petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit. The
appellate court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether private respondents' act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner's
stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion? (NO)
HELD: NO.
o The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will
of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.
o The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
Sy v Secretary of Justice
ALFREDO SY for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of GONZALO SY, VERONICA SY, ROSARIO SY, MANUEL
SY and JOSE SEE
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, LEON MARIA MAGSAYSAY and ENG'R. EMMANUEL LALIN
[G.R. No. 166315. December 14, 2006.]
FACTS:
• 1985, Dolores F. Posadas, through respondent, Leon Maria F. Magsaysay, as her attorney-in-fact,
filed an ejectment case against them to recover a parcel of land in Paco, Manila consisting of
approximately 8,295 sq.m.
• Several structures stand on the land including their post-war built building which has served as
their family residence with a small sari-sari store. The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of
Dolores F. Posadas.
• On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the trial court's decision. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint.
• However, during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, respondent Leon Maria F.
Magsaysay obtained from the office of the Building Official of Manila a Notice of Condemnation
ISSUES: Whether there is probable cause for the filing of an information against respondents
Magsaysay and Lalin for the offense of grave coercion? YES.
HELD:
• The elements of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1) that
a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of
another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of
law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
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• It is undisputed that on August 28, 1998, respondents, together with several men armed with
hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the petitioners' residence and ordered
them to vacate the building because they were going to demolish it.
• Petitioners tried to stop respondents from proceeding with the demolition but their
pleas went unheeded. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, petitioners were
prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their
will.
• Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while petitioners watched
helplessly as their building was torn down.
• From the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as the evidence presented in support thereof,
there is prima facie showing that respondents did not act under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.
• Respondent Magsaysay claimed that the demolition was carried out by the Office of the Building
Official, which is tasked to implement the National Building Code.
• We note, however, that respondent Lalin admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was hired by
Magsaysay to implement the Demolition Order. The building officials made
manifestations before the trial court in Civil Case No. 98-87513 that they were not
aware of the demolition and that respondent Lalin is not connected with their office.
They also denied conspiring with respondent Magsaysay in effecting the demolition.
• Likewise, the Office of the Building Official issued an Order 13 dated August 28, 1998 directing
respondent Magsaysay to desist from proceeding with the demolition. On the same date, it
also issued a Notice advising respondent Lalin to stop the demolition for failing to
comply with the 5-day prior notice requirement and considering that the demolition was
being effected within the 15-day reglementary period for appeal.
• In another Order dated September 10, 1998, the Office of the Building Official declared that the
demolition was hastily done and in contravention of the terms and conditions of the Demolition
Order.
• Indeed, while respondents claim to have acted under authority of law in compelling
petitioners to vacate the subject property and effecting the demolition, the documentary
evidence show otherwise.
• From the records, it is clear that a prima facie case for grave coercion exists and that there is
sufficient ground to sustain a finding of probable cause which needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused.
• Nevertheless, respondents may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may only be
determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime may be thoroughly passed upon.
• Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that
a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause;" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
• While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are
nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the
same was rendered without or in excess of authority.
ESTAFA DIGESTS
FACTS:
• The appellants Galicano Alon (alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales (alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala,
Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa.
• A week prior to February 19, 1932, 'Grego' (Alon) and 'Maning' (Cabrales) in company with another person whom they
called 'Pepe' offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell
them for P10 a tin.
• For profit, Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600
lot. Delivery of 1,000 tins would take place at 5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz.
• February 19, 1932: Abordo went to the place indicated with the money, and there waited for them. Alon arrived alone in
an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the 1,000 tins of opium were kept.
• Trusting Alon, who always called Abordo 'brother' because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went
with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel.
• It was already twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning (Cabrales), who, in company with
others, was waiting for Abordo in another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared
Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the tins of opium.
• Pepe got from a lot nearby, the can, the top of which was opened by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the 6 tins of
opium contained in a wooden box which Abordo saw when the top of said can was opened.
• Finding that said tins really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of
tins of opium. He handed the P600 to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile
where his companions were waiting.
• At the same time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can.
• While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension, Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales was following in his
automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which
Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Alon told Abordo that those in the other automobile were
constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can.
• Cabrales, whom Abordo was able to recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able
to identify because it was already dark, approached his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo
that he was under arrest.
• Knowing that they were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get possession of the can, Abordo drew
his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed.
• Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo
somewhere before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his
house. There he opened the can and inside he found the wooden box, but the rest of the contents of the can was sand.
He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it only contained molasses.
• Defense (Testimony of accused and Miguel Rosales-> convicted 12x for estafa):
o Abordo engaged Cabrales, through the intervention of Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling
tins of opium, and that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment, Abordo refused to deliver the money
because purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make
the payment
o Before arriving in Pasay, Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the
money, at the same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000
tins of molasses asked for by Abordo.
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• Information: In the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles from the city
limits, the said accused conspiring together defraud Perfecto Abordo:
o by means of false and fraudulent representations to Abordo that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of
opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to him upon paying them P600 in advance
o and by means of other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he
gave and delivered to them, the said sum of P600,
o in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can which they represented to contain the 600 tins
of opium, when in truth, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans
containing a black substance which was not opium,
o Tomas Manansala and Galicano Alon have each once been convicted of the crime of estafa
o Habitual Delinquents: Ricardo Cabrales (1x convicted for robbery, theft 1x, 3x for estafa, last sentence: Feb. 4,
1927) and Isidro Mendoza (1x estafa and 1x robbery, last sentence: October 30, 1922)
• Information was dismissed as to Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for lack of evidence
• RTC: Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354. No. 2, of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244
o PENALTY: four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties + indemnify P600
ISSUES: Whether or not estafa was committed even though there was illegal consideration? Yes.
HELD:
• Estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that any person who shall
defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of
anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be
based on an immoral or illegal consideration.
• PENALTY: The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.
• ALON: Recidivist as he had already been convicted of estafa -> PENALTY: maximum period (one year, eight months,
and one day of prision correccional)
• CABRALES: Habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions cannot be taken into consideration also as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty. PENALTY: medium (one year and one day of prision
correccional + additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor bec. Habitual
delinquent)
• SolGen mistaken that medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods based upon the idea that
only the prior convictions of this appellant for estafa are to be taken into account.
• All prior convictions of any of the crimes of theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a
person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being a habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be
twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be a habitual delinquent.
FACTS:
• Information: Charged with the crime of estafa:
o December 10, 1910, in Cavite
o Accused entered the bicycle renting establishment, named 'Ligaya," located in Plaza Soledad in Cavite,
pretended that his name was Jose de los Santos and that he lived at No. 111 Calle Paseo, and rented from
the proprietor of said establishment, named Leoncio Pangilinan, an Iver Johnson bicycle, No. 169787, with
the private marks No. 10 and the initials L. P.,
HELD:
1. Yes. Mere omission of an allegation of the specific value of the bicycle mentioned in the information did not render it
fatally defective, because the facts alleged in the complaint, when proven, establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the
bicycle had some value.
o It is true that a conviction of the crime of estafa cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the subject matter of
the fraud perpetrated by the accused had some value, and while in good practice a complaint or information charging
the commission of the crime of estafa should specifically allege the monetary value of the subject matter of the fraud
where that is possible. However, specific value is not necessary, it is necessary that the facts allege that it has
some value.
o Estafa: Bicycle was personal property of some value is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the provisions of
subsection 1 of article 534, which prescribes the penalty to be imposed where the value of the subject matter of
the fraud is not shown to be in excess of 250 pesetas
o Bicycle in question had some value (agreed to rent it for 50 cents/hr)
o It was the personal property of the complaining witness (in use in Pangilinan’s bicycle renting establishment)
o Bicycle had been converted or misappropriated by the defendant
o U.S. vs. De la Cruz: Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery of a watch, the specific value of which was not set
out expressly in the complaint.
o "Since the crime of robbery is complete when all the other requisites set out in the definition of the code concur,
if the property taken has even the smallest value, we think we would be justified in holding that the watch taken
had sufficient value to sustain a conviction of robbery, unless it affirmatively appeared that it was absolutely
worthless, for without testimony to the contrary a watch, which the owner valued enough to carry, may fairly
be presumed to have some value, however insignificant that value may be."
2. Yes. Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more
than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.
o Information does not charge that the value of the property taken was more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas
although its allegations amount to a charge that a bicycle of some value was taken. No case can a conviction be
sustained for a higher offense than that charged in the information, nor for a different offense, unless it is necessarily
Facts:
• February 20, 1920: three Igorots named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of
a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy the
precious metal.
• They accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused herein, who
apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested them to hand it to her so that she might take it to a
silversmith and have it examined, stating that she would return within a short time to report the result.
• The Igorot Pepe, who was the owner of the bar of gold, handed it to her, together with P200 in bank notes which he
requested to her to have changed into silver coins as they were more desirable in the Mountain Province.
• The woman then left the house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the woman did not
return. They waited in vain for hours for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of them should remain on watch while
the other two went to the Meisic police station to report the matter.
• The police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case, soon
identified the woman who had taken away the bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had given him, and at a
few minutes after 11 o'clock he already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the accused as to the
whereabouts of the bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots.
• As the woman gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for assistance from the office of the police, and
shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr. Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the woman to the house at No.
541 Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzales and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three pieces was
found wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. The accused requested one
Mamerta de la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman.
• A certificate issued by the Bureau of Science show that the bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed 559.7
grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police
weighed only 416 grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the
accused, she returned only P150.
• Information:
o Nieves de Vera and John Doe (the latter name is fictitious, his true name being unknown) of the crime of theft
committed as follows:
Facts:
• Estafa by means of falsification of mercantile documents -> Information included 3 other persons, Teodorico
Angeles, Abelardo Crisologo, and Ricardo Paredes, who were named as codefendants with this accused; but a
severance was had, and the trial of the present appellant occurred at a different time than that of his co-accused, so
considered here is Miguel Concepcion’s alone
• Teodorico Angeles was manager of a Aparri branch of PNB, in Cagayan. At the same time Miguel Concepcion is a
resident and representative of Cagayan in the Philippine Assembly and was manager of a limited partnership engaged
in the business of buying and selling tobacco in the Cagayan Valley, known as "Puno y Concepcion."
o The mercantile operations of this firm were for a time carried on upon an extensive scale, and Miguel
Concepcion was naturally therefore frequently brought into contact with Teodorico Angeles as manager of
Aparri branch of the PNB.
o Moreover, it appears that Miguel Concepcion is a son of Venancio Concepcion at that time president of PNB
Manila; and by reason of both his social and business relations Miguel Concepcion evidently acquired an
undue influence over Teodorico Angeles, with the result that the latter in a great measure surrendered his
discretion as manager of the bank to the will of the former.
• October, 1919: Miguel Concepcion had need of funds, which could only be had from PNB and as he apparently had no
bankable security available, recourse was had to the expedient of getting the money upon loans from the bank upon
fictitious warehouse receipts (quedans), with the knowledge and connivance of Teodorico Angeles.
• Testimony by Abelardo Crisologo and Ricardo Paredes of how loans were obtained (Paredes is Crisologo’s father-in-
law)
o Charged in the information as joint principals in the offense of estafa by means of falsification of
mercantile documents but who, as we believe, were rather victims of the artifices of their coaccused than
designing participants in crime.
o Abelardo Crisologo had long been an intimate friend of Miguel G. Concepcion; and, as Crisologo lived in
Tuguegarao, it had been the custom of Concepcion on visits to that place in the past to stay in Crisologo's
hospitable home. Paredes was the father-in-law of Crisologo and at the same time an employee of the firm of
"Puno y Concepcion," though prior to September, 1919, he had been employed by the branch of the Philippine
National Bank in Aparri as an inspector.
• October 1919: Teodorico Angeles and Miguel G. Concepcion were in Tuguegarao, and they were invited to dine at the
house of Crisologo, Paredes being also present.
• After the meals was over, and the appropriate time had arrived for the exchange of confidences, the subject of the
tobacco trade was broached, and Miguel G. Concepcion, directing himself to Angeles, said: "Manager, I have three
thousand quintals of tobacco in the pueblos of Enrile, Peñablanca, and Baggao, and I should like to pledge them to
the bank but I should not like for my name to appear on the documents. I mean that I should not like to make the pledge
myself."
• To this Teodorico Angeles replied: "Whose name then would you like to have appear?"
• Thereupon Concepcion indicated Crisologo as a person who would perhaps be obliging enough to figure as borrower
in the loan. To this Crisologo at first hesitated to give his assent, but the matter was managed with such diplomatic skill
by the two principal interlocutors that Crisologo yielded, not before Concepcion, however, had pointed out that in
making the pledge Crisologo would not have to appear as owner of the tobacco but merely as depositary.
• Explanation given to Crisologo by Concepcion for the necessity of the intervention of someone else than himself was, in
effect, that Concepcion wanted to use the money for the purchase of tobacco in competition with the firm of
"Puno y Concepcion," of which Concepcion was manager, and he thought it would look ugly for his name to appear
in connection with the loan.
HELD:
1. Concepcion, guilty of the complex offense of estafa by means of the falsification of mercantile documents.
o The estafa here involved consists in the fact that Teodorico Angeles, as manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and as such having charge of the funds of said institution, converted, misappropriated, and misapplied
the sum of about P55,000 of the bank's money, upon security that was known to him to be wholly fictitious, for the
benefits of the appellant Concepcion and to the prejudice of the bank
o Induced the falsification of two warehouse receipts as a necessary requisite to accomplish estafa the was a necessary
prerequisite; and is also the mechanical author of at least the first receipt, having himself reduced the document to
proper from upon his own typewriting machine at the dictation of Teodorico Angeles.
o This appellant is therefore subject to punishment under article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended, in relation with
article 89 of the same Code. The trial judge was therefore not in error in sentencing him to imprisonment for a period
within the limits of maximum degree of prision correccional; but a precise estimate of the penalty to be imposed shows
that the period fixed by his Honor falls short of the true legal requirement by one day.
o Information charges an estafa founded upon deceit by means of false representation (estafa subsection 1) but it is
actually, estafa under subsection 5 or fraudulent misapplication of the funds of the bank by its manager as Angeles, the
manager of the bank, who let the money out, knew that the tobacco was non-existent, the estafa committed cannot be
considered to have been of the precise form alleged.
2. Miguel G. Concepcion and Teodorico Angeles are principals of this crime, while Ricardo Paredes and Abelardo Crisologo
were rather victims of the articles of the two than designing participants in crime
o PAREDES:
o No complicity on part of Ricardo Paredes in the original estafa and falsification. His intervention in behalf of
Crisologo, in doing certain acts as attorney in fact of the latter, is explainable by the fact that Crisologo was his
son-in-law and lived in Tuguegarao, while the acts which Paredes did in behalf of Crisologo were done at the
bank in Aparri upon occasions when Crisologo was at home in Tuguegarao and was not or could not
conveniently be present.
o What he did later by executing a pledge done at the instance of the bank can assume the fact that he knew that
the tobacco referred to in the pledge and quedans was non-existing, but no estafa was then committed and
the only offense charged in the present information has reference to the original estafa and falsification
committed when the money was obtained.
o CRISOLOGO: No criminal intent and no misrepresentation to anyone
o He signed the promissory notes and the quedans for the tobacco which supposedly justified the loan. In signing
these notes Crisologo was, civilly speaking, substantially in the position of an accommodation maker; and he
of course made himself personally liable to the bank upon those notes for the benefit of Conception.
o The act of affixing his signature to the quedans was done in a spirit of blind complaisance explainable only in
the light of his friendly personal relations with Conception and his deference to the joint wishes of Conception
and the bank’s manager.
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o It must be remembered also that this act was done in response to the representation of Teodorico Angeles that
Conception had the tobacco and that the signing of the quedans by Crisologo was all a matter of mere
formality. Crisologo therefore misrepresented nothing to anyone; and we are of the opinion that criminal
responsibility cannot be predicated of his acts, for want of the essential element of criminal intent. He
was a mere tool in the hands of others and is sufficiently punished by the ruin that must follow from making
himself civilly liable for so large a sum of money.
Dispositive as to Miguel Concepcion: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by adding one day to the penalty within the
maximum of the maximum degree of prision correcional
Dispositive as to Paredes and Crisologo: ACQUITTED.
Facts:
Prosecution's version
• 1994: Lateo and Elca proposed that Lucero finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa
allegedly owned by Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred to Elca's name
because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. Elca offered to assign to Lucero 70
hectares of said land. She was then introduced to Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
• Lucero released to petitioners about P4.7 million in staggered amounts.
• Elca told Lucero that certain portions of the property will first be put in the name of Lateo and would later be assigned to
her. Lucero was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. Elca likewise executed an irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Lucero.
• Later, she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the
name of Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the Muntinlupa Estate, situated in
Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa.
• December 1994: Lucero verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the aforesaid titles of the
property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
• Lucero confronted petitioners and demanded from them return of the money. She was told that they did not have any
money to return. They instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441
located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however, demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer
of title. Through a letter, he said that the current valuation of the property is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the
property will be more than sufficient to cover obligates
• As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over the Bacoor
property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares. Elca's application was
later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga).
• Lucero verified this with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a pending application
for the sales patent over a four 4-hectare area of the subject land. These misrepresentations prompted her to file a
complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila.
• April 26, 1995: the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant. Petitioners were apprehended in
possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment
prepared by Lucero for their transaction.
Petitioners' version
• 1994: Lucero, Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the proposal of Lucero to finance the titling of
Elca's land.
• June 28, 1994: in a meeting called by Lucero, she laid down the terms and conditions regarding her plans to finance the
titling of Elca's land.
Petitioners’ Arguments:
• Transaction involving the Bacoor property do not show that it was an attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero
• Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was aware that the Bacoor property is not yet titled
in the name of Elca; and that they went to Furosato restaurant upon Lucero's invitation and on Lucero's representation
that she would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to facilitate the issuance of title in Elca's name.
• Assail the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous. OSG asks for modification of penalty to six (6) months of
arresto mayor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was attempted estafa not consummated? YES. ATTEMPTED ESTAFA (not consummated because as
yet no damage to Lucero)
2. What penalty to impose?
HELD:
• Elements of estafa Art. 315 (2) (a): 2.By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
PENALTY
o The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded.
o IF CONSUMMATED: Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. Hence, the applicable penalty
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first
P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
o BEC. ATTEMPTED: Two degrees lower than that of consummated pursuant to Article 51. Accordingly, the imposable
penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period, or an imprisonment
term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded
P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
IDESTH
o However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years to
the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not
consummated estafa.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome
Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) months of arresto mayor.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
o Only Lo recruited private complainants and promised to deploy them abroad.
o They deny having collected placement fees, but ironically admitted that the amount collected was for medical
examination, visa and passport fees.
o Not guilty of estafa through false pretenses because they did not commit any act of deceit as it was only accused Lo
who promised to deploy private complainants to Italy for a fee.
ISSUE: Whether they are guilty of estafa and illegal recruitment despite Lo being the only one who promised them for a
fee? (YES)
HELD:
ESTAFA: The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence their conviction for
estafa was proper.
o Accused-appellants' acts of deliberately misrepresenting themselves to private complainants as having the necessary
authority or license to recruit applicants for overseas employment, and collecting money from them allegedly for
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processing fees and travel documents, but failing to deploy them and to return the money they had collected despite
several demands clearly amount to estafa.
o Guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code: 2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
o There are three ways of committing estafa:
o (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits.
o Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of accused-
appellants' false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at least simultaneously
with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the
complainant to part with the thing of value.
o Accused-appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal qualifications
to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private complainants parted with their hard-earned
money and suffered damage by reason of accused-appellants' deceitful and illegal acts.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
o Calimon committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale because by her conduct, Calimon successfully gave
private complainants the impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad although she did not in fact have
the authority to do so. She was also able to induce private complainants to tender payment for fees. Since there were
three (3) workers involved in the transaction, she committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
o Comila committed the crime of simple illegal recruitment because there is clear and convincing evidence that she
conspired with Calimon. However, conspiracy was not alleged in the Information. Hence, Comila can only be
convicted for simple illegal recruitment, not for illegal recruitment in large scale in conspiracy with Calimon.
o The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state:
o SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged.
o Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
o Sec. 7. Penalties. —
o (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
o (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority.
o In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3) elements must concur:
o (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers;
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o (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art.
13, par. (b), of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code
(now Sec. 6, RA 8042); and,
o (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
o Corollarily, Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and
placement: (b) 'Recruitment and placement' refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
o ELEMENTS PROVEN: Here, we are convinced that the three elements of Recruitment in Large Scale were sufficiently
proved beyond reasonable doubt for Calimon while 3 rd element not proven for Comila so Simple Illegal Recruitment
only.
o First, accused-appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for overseas work. This is
substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to this effect and the testimony of an
employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal.
o Second, accused-appellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee.
Magnaye and Agramon also corroborated the testimony of Devanadera. Their narration undoubtedly
established that accused-appellants promised them employment in Italy as factory workers and they (accused-
appellants) asked money from them (private complainants) to allegedly process their papers and visas. Private
complainants were deceived as they relied on accused-appellants' misrepresentation and scheme that caused
them to entrust their money to them in exchange of what they later discovered was a vain hope of obtaining
employment abroad
o Third, accused-appellant Calimon committed illegal recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e.,
the three private complainants herein. On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she
was properly convicted of simple illegal recruitment only.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
Facts:
o May 17, 1996, 1:00 PM: Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house
at Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes, San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10) Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos.
0002284, 0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated
June 17, 1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of P50,000.00. They were all signed by her.
o Accused represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully funded.
o October 4, 1996: When private complainant deposited the checks for encashment at Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.
However, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed".
o Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that they placed the mark "account
closed" on the ten (10) checks issued in the account of accused Montaner considering that at the time the
same were presented to them, the account of accused Montaner was already closed.
o Witness Pajarito further testified that as per their records, the account of accused Montaner, account no.
00099-000050-4 was closed on July 11, 1996. The checks were returned on for the reason account closed.
o October 13, 1996: Private complainant verbally and thereafter, thru demand letter formally demanded that accused
settle her accounts. It was received by her husband.
o Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private
complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the instant complaint for estafa.
o Information 3 dated April 21, 1998:
HELD:
o Paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (d) By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
o The elements of estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are:
o (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued;
o (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
o (3) damage to the payee.
o In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under
paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis's clear and categorical testimony, appellant
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issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his
house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
o Direct Examination: Representation about them? To deposit those checks on their due date, ma'am.
o It was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10
Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his
cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was
already closed.
o Solis wrote appellant a demand letter but she did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of
deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the
second sentence of paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
o Claims to have entrusted Garope is incredulous and defies ordinary common sense and human experience. Moreover,
it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As aptly
noted by the trial court, appellant's failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision AFFIRMED.
Facts:
• Nenit Musni who does business under the name Bombom Jewelries, buys pieces of jewelry from pawnshops for
resale.
• In 1991, in the course of her business operation, she was introduced to Cardenas to whom she had since been selling
gold. Their usual practice was to weigh the gold and agree on the price, after which appellant would issue checks
covering the value thereof.
• Nenit and appellant’s transactions were regular until...
• October 15, 1994 when appellant issued 2 checks - Check No. 001247A for P401,000 and Check No. 001248A for the
same amount covering payment of gold, which checks were dishonored. Nenit informed appellant of the dishonor, but
she denied owing anything to her.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
o accused has a checking account with the PCIB, Vigan
o due to such receipt of jewelries, the accused delivered to the complainant PCIB Vigan Branch Check No.
001247A covering the amount of P401,000.00 dated November 15, 1994 and Check No. 001248A in the
amount of P401,000.00 dated December 15, 1994
o (2) checks aforestated were presented for payment but dishonored.
• November 2, 1994: Cardenas again issued three checks drawn against PCIB Vigan Branch representing payment of
gold: Check No. 001231A for P318,000, Check No. 001232A for P779,000, and Check No. 001233A for P1,093,000.
Again the checks were dishonored.
o accused received jewelries from the complaining witness at Laoag City;
o due to the receipt of the jewelries, the accused delivered three (3) postdated checks to the complainant PCIB
Vigan Branch Check No. 001231A dated February 20, 1995 in the amount of P318,000.00; Check No. 001232A
dated December 25, 1994 in the amount of P779,000.00 and Check No. 001233A in the amount of
P1,093,000.00 dated January 15, 1995;
o 3 checks aforementioned were presented for payment but dishonored because the signatures differ from the
signature on file.
Defense of Cardenas:
• Appellant claimed that, except for Check No. 1260A, (one of the two checks subject of the fourth case) all the checks
subject of the cases were unsigned as they were issued as a "secondary collateral."
• Whenever Nenit entrusted to her jewelry for resale, she was required to and did sign receipts and did issue the
unsigned checks; that failing to resell the jewelry, she would return them and ask Nenit to return to her the receipts she
signed and the unsigned checks, but Nenit would merely claim that she would tear them;
• With respect to Check No. 1260A, for P458,000, she having sold the jewelry covered thereby, she affixed her signature
thereon, but she did not cause the check to be honored because she and Nenit agreed to offset the against the
amount which Nenit and her son owed her for jewelry they had borrowed from her.
• Appellant thus claimed that the signatures attributed to her on all the checks, except Check No. 1260A for
P458,000, were forged, in support of which she presented National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Senior Documents
Examiner Adela Cruz-Demantillo (Adela) who examined the signatures on the questioned checks and concluded that
the signature on Check No. 1260A and those on other checks were not made by one and the same person.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Cardenas is guilty of the 3 rd and 4th charges because of insufficiency of funds or by reason that checks were
dishonored due to “account closed” despite evidence of forged signature? NO
2. Whether Cardenas is guilty of estafa for Check 001264A despite lack of fraud as the issuance of the check was not the
means to attain the jewelry? NO.
HELD:
1. Checks subject thereof were dishonored due to "payment stopped" or "account closed. However, only photocopies of
the checks bearing "payment stopped" or "account closed" stamped thereon form part of the records and while they
were not objected to, the photocopies of the checks still may not be appreciated as they were not formally offered in
evidence.
• Relevant stipulations of the prosecution and defense during pre-trial were that the checks, except Check No.
001260A which is one of the two checks subject of the fourth case, were dishonored because the signatures therein
were different from appellant’s signature on file.
• Forged handwriting. The prosecution contends, however, that appellant intentionally altered her own signature on
the checks. In light, however, of the findings of the handwriting expert and, indeed, from the naked eye, a
comparison of the questioned signatures with the standard signature of appellant the possibility that appellant’s
signature on the checks in question was forged is not ruled out.
DISPOSITIVE: Elizabeth Cardenas, is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 8742-13. Appellant is likewise ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case No. 8743-13. She is, however, declared civilly liable to the private complainant, Nenette a.k.a. Nenit
Musni, insofar as the case involves Check No. 001260A, and is ORDERED to pay her its face value of P458,000.00.
Facts:
o February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994: Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray for possible employment abroad and collected a
total of P14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to
leave as promised and only saw Abordo again when she was already in jail.
o September 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cariño in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to
persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be neighbors in San Blas,
Villasis, Pangasinan. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of P15,000 as placement fee. Despite
this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad.
o December 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez in Caramitan, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused
told Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of the placement
fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash and other valuables amounting
to P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for
abroad.
o December 1994: the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza in San Blas, Villasis, Pangasinan to convince
him to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee.
Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo
cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to P39,000. Despite several promises from Abordo, Mendoza was unable to
leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he demanded from the accused the return of his money and pieces of jewelry, but to no
avail.
o Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of DOLE, issued certifications dated 29 September 1993 and 3 August 1993
stating that the accused were not included in the POEA list of those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan.
o The Informations against the accused read as follows: (Abordo: Estafa –4, Illegal Recruitment - 4 ; Cabanlong: Estafa
– 3, Illegal Recruitment - 3)
o Criminal Case No. V-0654 (Estafa): February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994, at Villasis, Pangasinan, Abordo by
means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting herself to be capable of causing the employment of
laborers abroad, knowing fully well that she is not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Jesus Rayray y Bascos
the sum of P14,000.00, with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter, despite
repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused
to return the said amount of P14,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for her own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Jesus Rayray y Bascos in the said amount.
o Criminal Case No. V-0655 (Illegal Recruitment): February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994 at Villasis, Pangasinan,
Abordo, feloniously recruit Jesus Rayray y Bascos for employment abroad, without first securing the
requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0767 (Estafa): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong,
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and there feloniously demand and receive from Jaime Fernandez the sum of
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P45,000.00, Philippine currency with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter,
despite repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and
refused to return the said amount
o Criminal Case No. V-0768 (Illegal Recruitment): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring, one another, did then feloniously recruit Jaime Fernandez y Simon for employment
abroad, without first securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0769 (Estafa): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and feloniously demand and receive from Exequiel Mendoza the sum of
P45,000.00, with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated
demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused to return
the said amount of P45,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for their own use and benefit to
o Criminal Case No. V-0770 (Illegal Recruitment): December, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring, feloniously recruit Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar for employment abroad, without first
securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0771 (Illegal Recruitment): September, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and
Cabanlong conspiring and feloniously recruit Esmenia Cariño for employment abroad, without first securing
the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
o Criminal Case No. V-0772 (Estafa): September, 1994 at San Blas, Villasis, accused Abordo and Cabanlong
conspiring, by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting themselves to be capable of causing the
employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers
for employment abroad, did then and there feloniously demand and receive from Esmenia Cariño the sum of
P15,000.00, with the undertaking of working for her employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated
demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant's employment abroad, failed and refused to return
the said amount of P15,000.00,
RTC:
• Abordo and Cabanlong GUILTY of Illegal Recruitment in large scale in Crim. Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-0770 and V-
0771, defined and penalized under Art. 38, par. (a) in relation to Art. 39, par. (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by P.D. 2018
o Penalty of life imprisonment and to pay, jointly and severally, fine of 100,000.00
• Abordo GUILTY of Estafa in Crim. Case No. V-0654, as provided under Art. 315, par. 2(a),
o Penalty indeterminate penalty of SIX MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, as the minimum, to FOUR YEARS, TWO MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Jesus Rayray
the amount of P14,000.00
• Abordo and Cabanlong are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of estafa
o Crim. Case No. V-0767: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in it minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum to 10 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime Fernandez
the amount of P45,000.00;
o Crim. Case No. V-0769: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum, to 9 YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel Mendoza
the amount of P39,000.00
o Crim. Case No. V-0772: 6 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as
the minimum to 4 YEARS, 2 MONTHS and 1 DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Esmenia Carino the amount of P15,000.00
CA: Guilty with modification for penalties and crime Simple Illegal Recruitment per count and not Illegal
Recruitment in a Large Scale
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article 315, 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
PENALTIES
• Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punished by "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty . . . shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. .
• The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three, periods. In such a case, Article 65 of the Revised
Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions. Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed
are:
o Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
o Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
o Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years 25
FACTS:
• Ganasi is owner of 2 parcels of land in La Trinidad Benguet
o Parcel 1 (1,468 sqm): NE, provincial road, SW, public land, NW, subdivision plan -> greater value than the
other due to its even terrain and location
o Parcel 2 (1,472 sqm): Bounded on NE by property, on E, La trinidad road, on SE and SW, public land -> has
uneven and hilly terrain
• September 1956: Ganasi incurred a P3,500 debt from complainant Dacanay and so he pointed to Parcel 1 to the
complainant, offering it as security or mortgage. He showed them the land, together with the lawyers for an ocular
inspection.
• Finding the land suitable for his business of a carpentry shop, Dacanay delivered the money as a loan and the accused
executed a Deed of Mortgage.
• Unable to pay on due date, the accused sold the same property to the complainant to settle his obligation.
• When Dacanay went to the Register of Deeds to have his ownership over Parcel 1 registered, he was informed that
what he was sold was not Parcel 1 but Parcel 2.
• It turned out that the accused had switched lots in the execution of the Deeds of Mortgage and sale; what the accused
had mortgaged and sold was not the land represented by him to the complainant as the security for the loan but another
lot which was worthless for the use intended by the Dacanay.
• He immediately went to Ganasi to confront him about it but Ganasi refused to do anything about it so Dacanay decided
to bring the case to court.
Defense
• Borrowed for Hawaii fare
• No misrepresentation in the legal sense because the complainant was in a position to detect the misrepresentation,
assuming that there was misrepresentation.
o 2 lawyers
• The accused contends that there is no law that covers his case, while the Solicitor General maintains that the accused
is guilty of estafa, under paragraph 1 (a) , Article 315, RPC.
ARSON
c/o HIPOLITO
FACTS:
• Eulogio Quilates is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union.
• Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates; another sister Alicia
Manlupig; and nephew Herminio Manlupig.
• Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house.
• At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his cousin
Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya in front of their house.
• Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was
confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going
inside the house to get a bolo.
• When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter
managed to escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.
• Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later,
he saw smoke coming from the room of appellant.
• As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried
to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.
• Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped
through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and
boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the house to save his personal
belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia, bloodied.
• Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of
appellant’s room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She
sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able
to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to the hospital.
• Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the house. When Eulogio
went down, he already saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. He then saw Felicidad near
the comfort room located outside the house and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was about
to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was then holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away.
• Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife. However, Herminio and
Ricky were able to pin appellant down. Before they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived
at the scene. As a result, eight (8) houses were razed.
• Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw four (4) houses were
already burned. After putting out the fire, he and the arson investigator conducted an ocular
investigation and invited witnesses to the police station to submit their sworn statements.
• SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National Police Bauang Police Station, was
told by witnesses that appellant intentionally set the boxes on fire inside the house.
• Information dated 6 April 2004: crime of arson
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, accused, motivated by some evil motive,
feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by
one FELICIDAD M. QUILATES burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well
as burning and damaging 9 other neighboring houses in the process, to the damage of
said house-owners in the amount of P3M as well as to the damage of her heirs
o The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.
• Also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, Philippines, accused, with intent to kill,
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 118
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason
of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered
to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.
• Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the merits
ensued.
• Eulogio estimated the value of his house at P250,000.00, while another sister of Felicidad, Pacita
Quilates, presented a receipt covering the burial expenses for Felicidad, amounting to P10,000.00.
• An autopsy was performed on Felicidad, and it was disclosed that she died from “cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to third degree burns involving 90% of body surface to include
underlying tissues and organs.”
DEFENSE:
• He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a
glass of water. He followed her and gave her water.
• He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He
got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head.
• He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back
outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him.
• Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed
him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost
consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the back.
• Appellant denied setting the house on fire.
• Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the credibility of some
witnesses and specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio in testifying against him,
especially after their fight.
• Appellant submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent whole,
did not prove the identity of the perpetrator.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the crime of arson can be proven beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial
evidence? (YES)
2. Whether he is guilty of Destructive Arson or Simple Arson? (Simple Arson)
3. Whether penalty was proper? (Modified)
2. SIMPLE ARSON because according to a close examination of the records, as well as description of
the crime as stated in the information, the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the
burned properties are residential houses.
• There are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree
No. 1316.
• Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property
burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.
• Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
• Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.
3. PENALTY:
• Penalty for simple arson resulting to death, under Section 5 of PD 1613, is reclusion perpetua to
death so correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua with repeal of death penalty
• MODIFY award of damages:
o Heirs of Felicidad: Temperate damages from P10,000.00 to P 25,000.00, and delete the
amount of actual damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva because when
actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the
award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount.
o Eulogio: Actual damages awarded to amounting to P250,000.00, as indemnification for the
burned house, not awarded as amount representing the value of the burned house was
merely given by Eulogio as an estimate. It was not substantiated by any document or
receipt. For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.
Award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, providing
that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proven with certainty. It is thus reasonable to expect that the value
of the house burned down amounted to at least P200,000.00.
DEFENSE:
• Denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his mother Rosalinda’s request, went
to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and stayed there until February
1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellant’s alibi.
RTC: GUILTY of complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code
o PENALTY: DEATH
o Pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages
o Pay and the heirs of Alvin Savariz, 50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P16,500.00
as actual damages; and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: AFFIRMED but MODIFIED penalty from death to reclusion perpetua bec. of RA 9346 and
additionally awarding exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin),
and temperate damages to Joshua representing his “hospitalization and recuperation.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether the identity of the malefactor was sufficiently established to find him guilty? (YES)
2. Whether the crime is Double Murder with Frustated Murder? (NO, simple arson)
3. Whether he can be convicted of Simple Arson despite different crime charged in Information? (YES)
3. Whether penalty is correct? (Yes with modification on damages)
HELD:
1. YES. Prosecution witnesses Felicitas’ and Jovelyn’s positive identification of their neighbor-herein
appellant as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, among other things, the
illumination generated by the fire.
• Appellant’s contention that Felicitas’ claim was to be doubted that she saw appellant fleeing away
from the burning house, it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark is without merit. Also, that
she failed to ask him to stop putting dried hay around the house if indeed her claim were true is
unmerited.
• FIRE was already up so cannot be dark.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 122
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
• TESTIMONY OF FELICITAS:
o Portion of the house which was on fire when you saw Balentong for the first time was at the
rear portion going up, sir.
o Balentong was just infront of the house, sir.
o He was about two (2) meters away from the burning portion of the house (not front portion)
• TESTIMONY OF JOVELYN:
o The fire was already considerable size when she saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong
o The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, very visible.
2. SIMPLE ARSON.
• People v. Malngan: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it
is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor
o (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed;
o (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only
o (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are
two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson.
• Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, “Amending the Law on Arson,” reads: Section 3. Other Cases
of Arson. ─ The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
• No showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the
fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
• Felicitas’ affidavit stated that what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a
house near Celerina’s, to move out. How Felicitas acquired such “knowledge” was not probed into,
however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon.
• Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,
appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true
with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill
her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house,
Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning
house to save her grandsons.
3. YES. Even if Information charged appellant with “Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,” appellant
may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248
(3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
• As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.
• When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense
proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
4. PENALTY: Penalty reclusion perpetua.
• DAMAGES: No compensatory damages to heirs of Celerina because entitlement thereto was
not proven.
• Compensatory damages and actual damages for heirs of Alvin are the same. Since the trial
court awarded the duly proven actual damages of P16,500.00 representing burial expenses,
the award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 does not lie.
4. PEOPLE vs. CARLITO DE LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO “AKA” NELIO CABILDO and
FILOTEO DE LEON
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 180762 March 4, 2009
FACTS:
• At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint and her sister Leonisa
Mercado, together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., were inside a hut owned by their father
Rafael Mercado located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija.
• The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and
saw five men approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein
appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood
nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.
• From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut and set to fire the cogon roofing.
• While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at
the group in order to see them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio
ordered the others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises.
• By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.
• On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado conducted an investigation at the scene of the
crime and saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut.
• Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some
beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire. They also testified
that prior to the incident, appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence
and a hut which was first built therein.
• Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued threats that if he would not
give up his claim on the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father
Rafael filed several cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries
against appellants.
• June 14, 1989, an Information was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de
Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson.
DEFENSE:
• Appellants denied the charge against them.
• Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had
been staying for a year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of
the tumana contrary to Rafael’s claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal
therein until 1975 when he took over upon the latter’s request; and that when Gaudencio passed
away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands.
• Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafael’s
attempt to build a hut was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio. On cross-examination
however, he admitted that on March 12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by
Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed
that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No. 1985 filed against him by
Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Peñaranda.
• Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and
could not have gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted
in the pictures presented by the prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to
charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the pictures were materials brought by
Rafael into the landholding during the latter’s unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on the tumana.
• Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants’
desire to grab the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he
has been living in Rizal, Nueva Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Peñaranda.
• For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made by his co-appellants
RTC: GUILTY for the crime of arson, and they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rafael Mercado
the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut.
CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC Decision as to penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
• Special aggravating circumstance of being committed by a syndicate
ISSUES: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that penalty is reclusion perpertua by virtue of
aggravating circumstance of crime being committed by a syndicate
HELD: (YES)
• Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 amending the law on arson provides: Sec. 3. Other
Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
• Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if
it is planned or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed
in its maximum period.
• Under the following provision, the elements of arson are:
o (a) there is intentional burning; and,
o (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
• The appellate court correctly found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of the two essential elements of the offense.
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
c/o HIPOLITO
01 People v Collado
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO (alias NINOY), defendant-appellant.
September 14, 1934
Diaz, J
FACTS:
● Accused Marcelino Collado, between 3 and 4 in the afternoon of July 31, 1933 went to the house of
Paula Bautista, who only had 3-yr old asleep child with her on the house (situated in the eastern
part of the town of Bacnotan of the Province of La Union), on the pretext of asking for a glass of
water, stealthily approached her and, without giving her an opportunity to defend herself,
embraced and kissed her and caught hold of her breasts.
● When she recovered from the shock, in spite of the fact that the accused threatened to kill her
with a dagger, she defended herself and bit him on the right side of the chest thereby forcing him
to release her instantly.
● She cried for help and, picking up a bolo nearby, tried to strike him (SO BRAVE!!). However, the
accused, who is stronger and more agile than she, succeeded in holding her by the arms and they
were found in this position by her cousin Crispulo Ariola who was the first to come to her aid.
● Surprised, he did not go down the stairs but jumped from the house to the ground, fleeing from
the scene of the crime with the utmost speed.
● witnesses for prosec: her cousin Ariola and Luis Cariaso, who also came to her aid
● witness for the defense: Paulino Palaroan and Laureano Nebrija
● RTC: acts of lasciviousness: two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months
and one day of prision correccional
● defense:
○ he knew her cousin Ariola and his witness Palaroan were just 6 meters away and
conversing; and that his witness Nebrija was inside the house -> would have been foolish of
him to commit such
○ his version was that Bautista reproached him because she had heard, that he had been
spreading false reports that she was his mistress or that the two were maintaining illicit
relations
ISSUE: WoN accused is guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness defined in article 336 (YES!)
HELD: GUILTY, RTC modified: six months of arresto mayor to four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional
RATIO:
● on his defense: His knowledge that Ariola & Palaroan were near does not make it improbable for
him to have committed the crime cause she was alone in the house (her husband has gone to
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Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Manila about a month ago to work as an agent) & accused showed her a dagger and threatened to
kill her if she did not accede to his desires. He must have believed that she would neither offer
any resistance nor give a cry of alarm. Moreover he might have thought that said two witnesses
would not continue conversing at the same place after he had left them.
● SC doesn’t believe Nebrija’s testimony that he was inside house because aside from his testimony
and that of the appellant, nothing in the record to prove the contrary
○ Ariola and Palaroan did not testify that they had seen said witness come out of house even
if they were only 6 meters away
● Cariaso testified that when they went up into the house they found only Bautista and her small
child, not mentioning the appellant
● Palaroan admitted that after he had arrived at his boarding house which is about 25 meters from
Bautista's house and also after Ariola had gone up into the latter house, he saw the appellant
walking rapidly. This shows that the appellant actually came out of said house with the utmost
speed and that Palaroan left Ariola when the appellant went to the offended party's house to ask
for a glass of water.
● on the alleged reproaching, his version of the story: what really happened, according to the
evidence, is that the appellant upon seeing that the offended party, whom he had courted before
her marriage, although in vain because she paid no attention to him, was alone, he was led into
temptation, thus again proving the old adage that "opportunity makes the thief".
● no doubt but that the offended party cried for help notwithstanding the witness Palaroan's
testimony that he heard no such cry -> because Palaroan himself testified that he heard Agaton
Ariola (whose house was 25 meters away) tell his son Crispulo to go and find out what was
happening at the offended party's house
● US v Campo: “although a complaint or information contains no allegation that generic aggravating
circumstances of any kind were present in the commission of the crime, said circumstances may
be proven at the trial and, if proven, must be taken into consideration in imposing the
corresponding penalty”
○ aggravating circ of dwelling had been proven at the trial, although it was not alleged in
the information; should have been taken into consideration by the trial court!
02 People vs Buenafe
May 30, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BUENAFE Y CALUPAS, defendant-appellant.
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Victim’s Version:
● While Dominga Reyes (the offended party) was walking near the corner of Algeciras and
Espana streets, she saw the accused alight from a taxicab.
● He then approached, grabbed and lifted her into the vehicle.
● Inside, the accused embraced and kissed her and touched her private parts.
● While she was struggling against the accused to free herself, she succeeded in opening the door
of the taxi and at the same time she leaped out and fell in a canal.
● The accused went after her but she managed to escape until she reached the house of Sims at No.
1103 Washington Street.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing acts of lasciviousness (NO)
RATIO:
● Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code any act of lasciviousness committed upon a
person of either sex, is punished by prision correccional if any of the circumstances mentioned in
Article 335 is present, among which is the use of force and intimidation.
● In the case at bar, although the trial court concluded that the appellant embraced and kissed, and
took liberties with the person of, the offended party against her strong resistance, it did not
expressly find that said appellant was prompted by lust or lewd designs.
● Considering that the incident took place in a taxicab while passing along a public thoroughfare
and at about noon time, it is difficult to believe that the appellant could have desired more than
the ordinary outbursts of one in love.
● Even as regards the resistance put up by the offended party, the trial court observed that she
struggled against appellant because of her disappointment in not receiving the P50 promised by
him— implying that she resisted not because she did not welcome appellant's caresses but
because she expected him first to comply with his commitment.
● To sustain the charge of abusos deshonestos, something more must appear than that, with or
without her consent, an ardent lover kissed and embraced for a moment a young woman of whom
he was enamored, (U. S. vs. Gomez, 30 Phil., 22).
FACTS:
• 18-year old AAA, a college student at the Benguet State University, was at the house owned by
Tibong’s parents at Betag, La Trinidad, Benguet where she was boarding
• She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom basement
• One of the rooms was occupied by Tibong and his wife; 3rd room was unoccupied
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• Tibong and AAA are first cousins (AAA’s father and Tibong’s mother are siblings)
• Before the incident, Tibong’s wife left the house after a misunderstanding with him
• Before midnight of Apr. 17, 2006, Tibong arrived and repaired to the sofa at the basement’s living
room
• AAA thereafter fell asleep but was awakened at about midnight as she felt someone was
undressing her
• She saw Tibong wearing only briefs and crouching over her, on top of her bed, and pulling down
her pajamas and panties
• She asked Tibong why he was doing that
• He replied that they will have sexual intercourse and keep it a secret
• She asked if he was not sickened about it; he replied that she need not be bothered about their
being cousins
• She resisted and pulled up her pajamas and panties but Tibong pulled them down to her knees
and mashed her breasts
• He soon told her that they should watch a “bold” movie and apply what they watched
• She struggled to free herself but he forced her to lie down
• She tried to shout for help; he covered her mouth
• He thereafter went towards the CD player which was in fron of the door of her room to insert/play
a CD
• Finding the opportunity to escape, she grabbed her cell phone and bag and ran out of the house
after he failed to restrain her
• She headed towards the highway, took a taxi and proceeded to her elder brother’s house (BBB) in
Bahong, La Trinidad
• Tibong claims that from the afternoon of Apr. 17 up to 1 am of the next day, he was drinking
liquor with his friend Benny Malao in 3 places---first at Tibong’s father’s house, then at Maryland,
and finally at Malao’s boarding house, all in La Trinidad
• On returning home drunk, he immediately went to sleep in the living room
Information:
• Attempted rape
• With lewd designs...try and attempt to rape AAA... while sleeping and unconscious
• Did not perform all the acts by reason that the offended party was awakened, defended herself
and escaped
• Not because of spontaneous desistance
RTC of La Trinidad:
• Guilty of attempted rape
• Indeterminate penalty of 3 years and 4 months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 8
years and 6 months of prision mayor medium, as maximum
• Ordered to pay AAA P25K as moral damages + costs
CA: affirmed his conviction
Tibong’s arguments:
- Tibong, citing Perez vs. CA, contends that there was no attempted rape as he did not commence
to insert his penis into her vagina
- He says that he merely told AAA that they will have sexual intercourse
- That this is not equivalent to carnal knowledge or even an attempt
- He contends that this could just be acts of lasciviousness
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed is attempted rape OR only acts of lasciviousness (ATTEMPTED
RAPE)
RATIO:
• Art. 6, RPC: attempt: when the offender commences commission of felony directly by overt acts
but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
• While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision of October 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31644 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
04 People v Bon
January 28, 2003.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
NEMESIO BON
FACTS:
● Maricris Bonode: 6 years of age and living with her family at 128 Bearbrand Alley, Pangako St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
● Bon (uncle): Also staying in their house and is the eldest brother of Violeta Bonode, the victim's
mother
● Aug 19, 1997, 3PM: victim was playing on the upper level of their house while Violeta was
downstairs washing their clothes. After Violeta finished her laundry, she went upstairs and saw
Bon lying on top of the victim. They were fully clothed when she saw them. He had his pants on
while Maricris was wearing "sando and shorts". Upon seeing Violeta, accused-appellant
immediately stood up and ran downstairs. Maricris also ran downstairs crying. Violeta asked her
daughter about the incident but the latter refused to answer and just cried.
● Following morning: Violeta learned from her youngest daughter that Bon sexually abused Maricris.
When confronted, the victim told her that Bon poked (sinundot) her private part.
● Violeta feared Bon so she chose not to confront him about the incident. Instead, she transferred to
Atimonan, Quezon with her family.
● Jan 1998: Violeta learned that he was in jail for acts of lasciviousness committed on the daughter
of her sister-in-law. Emboldened by his arrest, Violeta revealed to her husband that Bon molested
their daughter. Thus, a complaint for rape was filed against him.
● Jan 21, 1998, Dr. Tomas D. Suguitan, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Lab
○ an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed laceration at 5 o'clock position.
○ Subject is in non-virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any
form of violence.
● Defense: Bon denied the accusation against him and claimed that Violeta filed the rape case
against him because she was influenced by her sister-in-law who filed a case for acts of
lasciviousness against him. He narrated that he lived with the family of Maricris and that she and
her 2 other sisters were close to him. At 2pm on Aug 19, 1997, when he went upstairs to sleep,
the victim and her sisters followed and lay beside him. Later, the 3 children went downstairs.
Maricris came back and lay on top of him with her face pressed to his chest. He heard a noise
from the stairs, so he got up and lay Maricris on her back. It turned out that the noise came from
Violeta, who looked angrily at him. Violeta must have thought that he abused her daughter
because she saw him in the act of laying the victim on her back.
● TC: guilty of rape on a child below 7 years of age; penalty of death (by lethal injection), pursuant
to Art 335 of the RPC as amended by RA No. 7659. P50,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00
as civil indemnity
● In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before us on automatic review,
pursuant to Art 47 of the RPC, as amended.
RATIO:
● Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the law in
force at the time of the commission of the offense on August 19, 1997, rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.
● Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with a woman.
● People v. Campuhan: touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
● The general rule is that factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of
the case.
● However, a careful review of the evidence on record of the case compels us to take exception to
the aforesaid rule. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of rape. Specifically, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution does not conclusively establish the element of
carnal knowledge. As testified to by the victim, accused-appellant removed her underwear,
inserted his finger into and licked her vagina. It is therefore clear from the foregoing
testimony that accused-appellant did not have sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with the victim. Absent direct proof of carnal knowledge, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted of rape.
● It appears that in the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of the victim, she never claimed that accused-
appellant's penis grazed or touched her private parts. According to her, he committed the
following acts: "Sinundot-sundot ang pekpek ko, dinilaan ang pekpek ko."
● The presence of a deep healed laceration on the hymen of the victim does not
conclusively prove carnal knowledge. As testified to by Dr. Suguitan, the laceration could
have been caused by introduction of any of the following objects into the victim's vagina: (1)
finger; (2) erect penis; or (3) any other blunt instrument that can be inserted in the vagina.
Standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not
prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that
rape may be deemed to have been established.
● Likewise, the testimony of Violeta failed to establish the element of carnal knowledge.
Violeta saw that accused-appellant was lying on top of the victim; and that accused-appellant and
the victim were fully clothed. Note that she never witnessed any sexual act.
● Verily, from the testimony of Violeta, it is easy to speculate that the victim was raped. But in
criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter how strong, must not
sway judgment.
● Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353 (or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997), and interpreted
in People v. Soriano, 23 insertion of one's finger into the genital of another constitutes "rape
through sexual assault." This law, however, finds no application in the case at bar,
considering that the governing law at the time of the commission of the crime on
August 19, 1997 was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, where insertion of one's finger into the genitals of another does not amount to
rape.
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAA’s testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
HELD:
1. No. The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the
country during the alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve
even the slightest consideration from this Court.
o It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the
room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. There have been too many
instances when rape was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room
full of family members sleeping side by side. There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in
seclusion.
o As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement that the
former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically
stated during her testimony that she was raped. In her testimony, she stated that “He
forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina” and “he repeated his acts”.
o As to inconsistency that she was merely wearing a towel and then she stated that she wore a T-
shirt and shorts, these were not inconsistent as there was a lapse of time between the first and
the second rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she was
referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing her, appellant untied her hands and
left only to return to rape her once more. There was enough time for AAA to dress up.
o Inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA
nor erase the fact that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a
victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since
these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she
might even be struggling to forget. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers,
face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer
would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her
testimony. However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience, ample margin of error
and understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
o In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
o first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
o second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense;
o third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal;
o fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and,
o fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
2. Yes, crime is not attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness as defined in RPC as elements are
absent.
• Attempted rape requires that:
o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance
• Appellant’s act of removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and
kissing and touching her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to
have carnal knowledge on AAA on that particular date.
06 US v De Vivar
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRAULIO DE VIVAR, defendant-appellant.
February 11, 1915
Araullo, J.
FACTS:
● Teodora Bondoc, unmarried woman 22 years 8 months and 17 days of age on date of the
commission of the crime, daughter of railroad station agent in Magalang, Province of Pampanga,
living at said station with her father and was being courted by Benigno Indiongco (living in
Manila), an employee of the same railroad company
● defendant Braulio de Vivar, company's train conductor on the line between Manila and Magalang,
served as an intermediary between the lovers
● early morning of December 30, 1911: Bondoc left her house and accompanied by defendant who
was waiting for her outside went to a spot near a growth of sugar cane, short distance from the
station in the said pueblo, in the belief that her lover, Indiongco, was awaiting her there for the
purpose of joining her and eloping with her, an elopement which defendant made her believe
had been planned the night before.
● when defendant and young woman arrived, she inquired about her lover since she didn’t see him,
defendant replied that before delivering her to him she should be for defendant
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Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● she attempted to return home, but defendant caught her by the hand, gave her a slap and
dragged her into the midst of the sugar cane, threatening her with a dagger he had in
his hand, he overcame her resistance and succeeded in lying with her (NOTE - RAPE, shy pa ang
ponente LOL)
● defendant kept Teodora Bondoc among the sugar cane until nighttime, when he took her, also by
force, in a cart through the fields to the house of a relative of his in the vicinity of a wood in
the municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac. There he remained with her alone for three days
and, taking advantage of her helplessness and by intimidating her, lay with her several times
during that period, until, as a result of the search and inquiries made by her father and brother,
she was found in the said house and freed from defendant's control.
● CFI Pampanga: guilty of abduction, fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify Teodora Bondoc in the sum of
P500
ISSUE: WoN accused guilty of abduction given woman’s of legal age (YES)
HELD: CFI affirmed but wont suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency bec of indemnity of
P500 he was sentenced
RATIO:
● Article 445 of the Penal Code punishes by reclusion temporal the abduction of a woman
against her will and with lewd designs; elements:
(1) The person kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she be a widow, a
married woman, or a virgin, for all three classes are comprised within the generic term of
"woman"
(2) The crime must be committed against her will
(3) It must be committed with unchaste designs — that is, with the intention of lying with the woman
● It is unquestionable that Teodora Bondoc, who had freely gone to the place where she believed
she would find her fiancee, lost her liberty from the moment defendant opposed her
returning home, and that, consequently, it was against her will that she was taken by
defendant into the sugar cane ->this was the commencement of the abduction of the
young woman, committed by defendant with violence and against her will. When he got her
into the cane field, he abused her by means of force and intimidation.
● If defendant had then left her free, the crime committed by him might perhaps have been
classified as rape, because then the deprivation of her liberty would have been but brief and
only for the purpose of his lying with her. But, considering that defendant retained her among
the sugar cane until night, continued to retain her in Capas for three days longer in his
company and against her will, and that he also enjoyed her carnally there; and considering the
deprivation of liberty of the aggrieved party during all of that time, in connection with the
unchaste designs which defendant entertained toward her and which were the motive of his
abducting her against her will, the acts committed by this defendant, and which were proved
at the trial, constitute the crime of abduction
● Abduction: kidnapping of a woman by removing her from her home, or from whatever place
she may be, to take her to some other, for the purpose of her abductor's marrying her or
corrupting her.
○ Defendant deceived Teodora Bondoc by telling her that her fiancee, Indiongco, was
awaiting her outside of her house
○ Briefly, he stole Teodora Bondoc in the one place and took her to the other and kept her
in his power for three days for the purpose of corrupting her. It matters not whether the
kidnapping of the young woman was effected after she had voluntarily left her house,
deceived, as she was, by the defendant, or whether it took place in the house itself; nor
does it matter whether the offended party was or was not then of legal age, because
the acts performed by defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty,
honor and public order. These are offenses which the law punishes in the crime
of abduction with force, and those same acts contain the elements that go to
make such crime, and not that of abduction with consent to which article 446
of the Penal Code refers.
● could have been abduction with consent if:
07 US vs Ramirez
March 8, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO RAMIREZ,. VICTORIANO CORPUS and PLACIDO DE OCAMPO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
● Rufino Ramirez was, prior to October 13, 1916, an unsuccessful lover of a young lady
named Regina Tolentino.
● In view of his disappointment, Ramirez sought the aid of Victoriano Corpus and Placido de
Ocampo for the purpose of abducting the girl.
● October 13, 1916: The three defendants hired an automobile, it then being nightfall, and
proceeded toward the district of Santa Mesa, Manila, stopping at the Rotonda.
● Regina Tolentino, accompanied by a male companion, Francisco Malabunga, and a female
companion, Marcelina Tolentino, while walking in Calle Santa Mesa, was suddenly grasped
by Placido de Ocampo. Marcelina Tolentino and Regina Tolentino, amidst screams, struggled
against Placido de Ocampo but without success.
● Regina was forcibly taken to the automobile where Rufino Ramirez waited for her.
● Victoriano Corpus, during this occurrence held Francisco Malabunga.
● To prevent Regina Tolentino from screaming any further, De Ocampo and Ramirez placed a
handkerchief over her mouth. While in the automobile, Regina fainted.
● The senseless girl was then taken by the accused in the automobile to a place near the
cemetery of Balic-balic.
● Upon reaching this place, the chauffeur because of his suspicions deliberately ran the
automobile into the mud, telling the accused that the automobile could not go any further.
● The two defendants thereupon, together with Rufino Ramirez, left the car and took Regina to
the rice paddies.
● The girl who had just come to her senses renewed her screaming. The neighboring people
responded promptly to the outcries for help, and the accused, upon seeing that many people
were coming to the aid of the girl, fled.
Information: Rufino Ramirez, Victoriano Corpus, and Placido de Ocampo were charged in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with force.
● The trial proceeded as to the defendants Corpus and De Ocampo, the other accused Ramirez
not yet having been arrested.
TC: Found the two defendants guilty as principals of the crime of frustrated abduction, with the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
● Appellant's assignments of error divide into three main issues: (1) The refusal of the trial court
to continue the case; (2) the presence of the essential elements that go to constitute the crime
of abduction with force; and (3) the degree of the offense.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the trial court erred in not continuing the case (NO)
2 Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of abduction with force were present (YES)
3 Whether or not the crime was consummated (YES)
HELD: GUILTY OF ABDUCTION WITH FORCE. There being present in the commission of the crime
one aggravating circumstance not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, the penalty
provided by article 445 must be imposed in the maximum degree. Judgment is reversed and each
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Compiled by: HIPOLITO
defendant and appellant is sentenced to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, together with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one third of the costs in
the first instance and one half of the costs in this instance.
RATIO:
1. CONTINUANCES.
● The attorney for the appellants contends that the court erred in refusing to grant a further
continuance with a view to giving the defense an opportunity to look for their material witness,
who in the case at bar was also one of the accused.
● It is claimed by counsel that "It is the right of every accused to be able to present as a witness any
person whom he believes to be necessary for his defense," and that to deprive him of said right
would be tantamount to denying him one of the means allowed by law for his defense.
● Between the day when the information was presented and the day of the trial about sixteen
months had elapsed, during which time the defendants had obtained seven continuances.
● This was the situation when the case was called, and counsel for the defense asked for further
time to find the co-accused Ramirez.
● Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Where the
court conceives it to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power
upon the motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a crime has no
natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
● Other jurisdictions have held that three things are necessary to put off a trial on account of
the absence of a witness:
1 First, that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so;
2 Second, that the party who applies has been guilty of no neglect;
3 And third, that the witness can be had at the time to which the trial has been deferred, and
incidentally, that no similar evidence could be obtained.
● There must be, in order to sustain the motion, facts from which the court can infer that there is
a reasonable prospect that the attendance of the witness, or his testimony, can be
procured at a future day.
● Rufino Ramirez, the coaccused, is admitted to be a fugitive from justice. Counsel, after seven
continuances had been granted in the lower court, nowhere purposes to have said witness
before the court at a specified time. At the trial the attorney upon being asked by the court to
state whether or not he could make certain the attendance of the witness replied as follows: "I
cannot bind myself to find him for the reason that we do not know his
whereabouts."
● If continuances could be procured on the ground of the absence of one of the material
witnesses without stating that the witness can be brought before the court at a reasonable
time in the future, the delays in the administration of justice would soon become intolerable.
● Whilst great liberality should be extended to persons charged with crime in preparing their
defense and particularly in procuring the attendance of witnesses, the rule must not be relaxed
so as to defeat the ends of justice.
2. ABDUCTION OF ARTICLE 445 OF THE PENAL CODE ANALYZED. ― Article 445 of the Penal
Code reads:
"The abduction of a woman against her will and with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion
temporal.
"The same penalty shall be imposed in every case if the female abducted be under twelve years of
age."
● Both the civil and the common law authorities agree in the conclusion that the crime of
abduction is one "sumamente grave y odioso" (highly serious and detestable.)
● The penal law regarding abduction, says the supreme court of Spain, was intended to punish
the offense against public morality and the insult to the family of the abducted girl.
● The three elements in the crime punished by article 445 of the Penal Code are:
08 People vs. Crisostomo (Feb. 17, 1923) NOT ABDUCTION BUT ILLEGAL DETENTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, a plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS:
• After 8 or 9 am of Dec. 26, 1920, in Bacoor, Cavite: While Macaria Gabriel (30 years old), Macaria,
and her aunt Candida Acuña were walking in the direction of their houses from that of Gregoria
Acuña (to whom Macaria had paid the sum of P30) the accused met them on the way
• Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde dragged Macaria along and took her
against her will to a rice field
• Macaria was not able to prevent it by her cries and strife and insults
• The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of
Candida (her aunt) thus preventing her from helping Macaria
• Gregoria, attracted by the cries of Candida, went to the place and attacked with a club those
holding Macaria until they released her
• As soon as Candida was released by her aggressors, she went to Macaria’s house and reported
the incident to Macaria’s brother, Constantino
• Constantino ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her,
which they did upon seeing him
• Prosecution contends that Macaria was abducted by Crisostomo against her will
ISSUE:
1) W/N the accused are guilty of ABDUCTION (No)
2) W/N the accused are guilty of ILLEGAL DETENTION (YES)
3) W/N the accused are guilty of ATTEMPTED COERCION (No)
HELD:
1) ABDUCTION
• Earmarks of veracity prevail in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses (as found and given
credence by the trial judge)
• In addition, the manner of the eloping alleged by the defense is improbable in the case of
a woman like Macaria who, by reason of her 30 years' age, must be presumed more reflexive
and cautions in carrying out a preconceived plan than a young woman
• If it were true that it was Macaria's object to escape, she would not have done so in the daytime,
nor would she have gone in company with Candida, nor would she have, so childishly and in the
presence of several persons, taken advantage of the circumstances of her companion entering the
house of Gregoria to speak with the latter for some minutes.
• It does not appear that Macaria was under the vigilance of her relatives and, in view of her age,
she would have naturally enjoyed a certain degree of liberty such as to go, as she did, to the
barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, from her residence in Palicot, Imus; with which liberty she could have
planned and carried into effect with full success her escape from the parental house.
• Crisostomo also admitted to a Constabulary officer that they deemed it better to abduct Macaria
as she firmly answered in the negative to his previous proposal
• On another occasion, he requested Macaria’s another brother Epifaniol to intervene in his favour
• The record as whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away
Macaria Gabriel against her will
• But in order that this fact may constitute abduction, it is necessary that the other
element thereof should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs.
• Crisostomo testified that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married with her in
Bacoor
• While it was not proven that Macaria consented to such an elopement, the violent taking away is
not incompatible with such intention to marry her
• Does this intention to marry constitute unchaste designs? – SC: NO.
• In this case: both Macaria and Crisostomo had the required age for consenting to
marriage, and it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it
• As a general proposition the intention to marry may sometime constitute unchaste designs not by
itself but by the concurring circumstances which may vitiate such an intention (e.g in the case of
abduction of a minor where the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and
2) ILLEGAL DETENTION
• The accused deprived Macaria of her liberty even without placing her in an inclosure
• llegal detentions consists not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or depriving
her in any manner of her liberty.
o ART. 481. Any private individual who shall lock up or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.
• Neither is it an argument against this finding in the present case that the information
by which this prosecution was initiated is for another crime, for it is alleged therein that
the "defendants conspiring and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and
criminally and with unchaste designs" (the latter were not proven) and "through force kidnap
Macaria Gabriel...
• As may be seen, it is alleged in this information that the defendants, in the manner aforesaid
deprived Macaria of her liberty
3) ATTEMPTED COERCION (in so far as the defendants attempted through force to compel Macaria
to marry Crisostomo)
• It is not proven that they did in fact attempt to compel Macaria to contract marriage.
• It can be supposed that they merely tried to take Macaria away from the environment of the
family, in the hope that she might be persuaded without force or violence whatsoever to marry
Crisostomo
• The mere fact of taking away Macaria might as well have been for the purpose of injuring or
affronting her, or of compelling her through force to marry Crisostomo
On conspiracy:
• It is true that no witness testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire or confederate
• But in view of their simultaneous acts — three seizing Macaria Gabriel and the other three getting
hold of her companion: joint act and tends to the same end: that of illegally depriving Macaria of
her liberty
• It cannot be conceived that there was no agreement between the defendants
• Said act constitutes in itself evident and sufficient proof of the conspiracy and confederacy
DISPOSITIVE:
• The judgment appealed from is reversed
• appellants found guilty of illegal detention
• principals: eight years and one day of prision mayor
• accomplices: two years, four months and one day of prision correccional
• each to pay proportionate part of the costs
• the endowment that the lower court awarded to Macaria is deleted because they were found
guilty of illegal detention and not abduction
09 People v Garcia
February 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
● Cleopatra Changlapon: 19 y.o., sophomore student of B.S. Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central
University.
● July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was
crossing Bonifacio St, Baguio City, she saw a white van approaching so she stopped to let it pass.
Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The rear door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled by the
arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped away. Something was
sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and feel dizzy. She shouted, then felt a fist blow
on her stomach and fell unconscious.
● When Cleopatra came to (her senses), she was inside a room totally undressed lying flat on her
back on a bed with four men in the room. One of them, who had Bombay features, was also totally
naked while the other 3 were in briefs smoking cigarettes.
● (1st rape) The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her
left arm. Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey
Garcia, burned her right chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but Garcia held her
right arm. While Garcia was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to kick him and close her legs, but 2 men
held her feet, boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.
● (2nd rape) After the Bombay-looking man finished, Garcia took his turn and went on top of her.
One of the men sat on her right leg and pinned it down, while another held her left leg. Cleopatra
tried to punch Garcia with her right hand, but the Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Garcia
then had sexual intercourse with her while holding her left arm.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 145
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● (3rd rape) The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The
Bombay-looking man was still holding her right arm, while the man on top of her held her left arm.
She tried to close her legs but someone hit her right thigh, which forced her to keep her legs
apart. The third man with pimples succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
● (4th rape) The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless
and was too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw
the Bombay-looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and
heard the men laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up.
● She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but
Garcia hit her on the abdomen.One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatra's face
which made her vision blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked
out.
● When she regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere bet Tam-awan and
Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and was
unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi, she
boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house.
● Her aunt, Rufina Angog, saw Cleopatra alight the taxi crying. She also noticed that Cleopatra's
clothes were inverted and she smelled bad. She woke up Cleopatra's brothers and cousins. They
asked her what happened. Cleopatra just kept crying and was unable to talk. After some time,
when she was able to regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men.
● The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police Station. After
giving her statement to the police, she was brought to the Crime Laboratory of the Baguio City
Police, where she was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor.
● Garcia was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with another rape charge against
him by a certain Gilda Mangyo.
● The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers Bulalit and
Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects bore a striking resemblance to
accused-appellant, who was in their custody. On Jul 26, 1998, Cleopatra was summoned to the
police station to identify accused-appellant. Cleopatra recognized accused-appellant among those
watching the basketball game from the upper floor of the police building. When she saw accused-
appellant face to face, she started to tremble and cry. Then she tried to attack him but she was
restrained by the police officers. On the same day, Cleopatra gave a supplemental statement to
the police, confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.
● Defense: He spent the whole day of July 14, 1998 at the boarding house where his brother-in-law
lived, located at No. 36 Torres Bugallon Street, Aurora Hills, Baguio City. His brother-in-law asked
him to go there to take care of his nephew. That evening, while he was in the said house watching
television, some of his friends came over to visit him. They brought a bottle of gin and began to
have a drinking session. Garcia did not join them because his stomach was upset. Garcia's
brother-in-law arrived a little before midnight, after which his guests left. When asked about the
charges of rape against him, he denied the same.
● Other witnesses(Catherine Faith Madella and Joy Tabinas) testified visiting Garcia
● TC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of forcible abduction with rape and three counts
of rape; P146,125.75 as actual damages; P50,000 moral damages
ISSUE/S:
• W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING GARCIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE AND FOR THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY WITH THREE (3) OTHERS? (NO)
• W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE THEORY OF THE
DEFENSE THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY IS ONLY A LOOK-ALIKE
OF THE REAL CULPRIT? (NO)
• W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON HAD POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY AS ONE OF THOSE WHO ABDUCTED AND RAPED HER? (NO)
HELD: RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Death for the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and Reclusion Perpetua for
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 146
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
each of the three counts of rape; P146,125.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
RATIO:
● Based on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither
influenced nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her
molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left to freely
study the faces of the thirty or more inmates on the basketball court below to see whether she
recognized any of them. There was no suggestion from the police to point to the new detainee,
who had just been arrested on another rape charge.
● Owing to the gravity of the crime and penalty involved, we have meticulously studied the
testimony of complainant Cleopatra Changlapon and find it to be clear, straightforward and
categorical. The details of her narration are consistent on all material points. Her actions
throughout her ordeal correspond to normal human behavior. We take particular note of her
natural and spontaneous reaction of crying and attacking her molester when brought before her
face to face. The records also eloquently exhibit that she repeatedly cried throughout her
testimony. All of these actuations bear the ring of truth and deserve full faith and credit.
● More importantly, complainant's narration of the events is well substantiated by the
physical evidence. The second degree burns found on her face, chest and thighs prove that she
was indeed burned with lighted cigarettes whenever she attempted to fight her assailants. The
medico-legal officer confirmed that they were consistent with cigarette burns. Furthermore, the
contusions found on her body were said to be caused by a blunt instrument like a closed fist. This
confirms her testimony that she was repeatedly hit to stop her from struggling. The medico-legal
officer placed the time of infliction of the external physical injuries on complainant within the last
twenty-four hours. The findings on her genitals — namely the gaping labia majora, the congested
and abraded labia minora, and the lacerations — all suggest the entry of a foreign object, such as
a fully erect male organ. Finally, the presence of spermatozoa further confirms that complainant
recently had sexual intercourse.
● In the face of complainant's positive and categorical declarations that accused-appellant was one
of her rapists, accused-appellant's alibi must fail.
● It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
● Furthermore, in order that the defense of alibi may prosper, accused-appellant must establish not
only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. In the
case at bar, the place of commission of the rapes — somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong
— and the boarding house where accused-appellant alleged he was in the evening of July 14,
1998, are both situated within Baguio City. The distance between Tam-awan and Aurora Hills,
especially at dawn, can be traversed in just a matter of minutes.
● Indeed, as pointed out by the trial court, accused-appellant's witnesses failed to account for his
whereabouts after 12:00 midnight. At the time of the rape, complainant distinctly heard one of her
molesters state the time as 1:30. Since it was still dark when complainant was dropped off on the
side of the road, it can safely be assumed that the crimes were committed at dawn.
● The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in
Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with
lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there
is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using
force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
● In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible
abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her will and with lewd design. It was
likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired,
FACTS:
● At dusk on the evening of June 26, 1910:
○ Lorenza Cornejo, a girl of about 15 years of age, unmarried, left her house to return some
flags which she had borrowed
○ while returning home she was approached by Francisco Reyes, who for some time past had
been courting her, making her promises of marriage, and who had arranged with her to
accompany him to this city for the purpose of getting married.
○ Reyes insisted on Lorenza's going away with him, and accordingly advised her to go alone
to the street-car station, saying that he would follow her, so that no one might see them
traveling together;
○ They took a car for this city and went to the house of Jose Torno, situated on Calle
Cervantes, and there they remained and lived together conjugally. They had carnal
intercourse about ten times. whenever the abducted girl demanded of her abductor that he
fulfill his promise of marriage, he would reply that his mother was looking for some
influential person who might speak to Lorenza's mother; and that the girl afterwards
learned from her own mother that the defendant was married
○ After more than fifteen days, they were found by the girl's mother, Cirila Escobar, and a
policeman. Reyes was wearing a Chinese camisa, and the girl a chemisette tucked under
her skirt.
● charged Francisco Reyes with the crime of consented abduction
● CFI: guilty- two years eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, to pay an
indemnity of P3,000 to the offended party, Lorenza Cornejo, and, in case of insolvency, to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, in conformity with article 50, rule 1, of the Penal Code, to
pay the costs, and to suffer the other penalties specified in the said judgment.
ISSUE: WON guilty of consented abduction- yes
Dispositive:
judgment is hereby affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant, Francisco Reyes. shall be
sentenced to the penalty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional,
to the accessories of article 61, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the offended party, Lorenza Cornejo,
and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-
third of the principal penalty, to support the offspring, should there be any, and to pay the costs.
SUMMARY: Appellants induced and helped the offended party to leave her home to elope to Ligao,
Albay in order to marry Pedro Amante, one of the accused; however she was persuaded to go to San
Juan and they ended up at Josefa Sto. Domingo’s house. She was persuaded to go to the coconut
grove and on the way, she was forcibly violated (raped) 4 times: (1) Eligio Amante away from the
house into the road to the coconut grove -> alone (2) Francisco Sanchez raped her as he held her by
the hands and threatened her with a knife with Eligio pinning her to the coconut tree and held her by
the feet, (3) Vicente Sanchez, threw her to the ground covered her mouth with a handkerchief and
violated her, while Pedro Amante held her feet and looked on, (4) Pedro Amante, took hold of her
hands, and succeeded in violating her.
EVIDENCE:
• Josefa Sto. Domingo saw that the blanket which she had used was stained with blood, which could
not be removed by the first washing.
• Medical examination on August 12, 1926: Hymen ruptured and a large amount of a mucous like
secretion in the vaginal canal due to a slight inflammation of the vagina, which might have been
caused by a sexual intercourse.
DEFENSE:
• Vicente Sanchez claims that on July 21,1925 he went to Naga, a distance of 30 kilometers from
Baao, to order a silk shirt from his old sewing woman Esperanza Margallo, living in his aunt Pilar
Sanchez' house until the following day, when he returned to Baao, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
• The accused Francisco Sanchez attempted to prove that on July 15, 1925, at the request of his
sister Pilar, he went to Naga to supervise the repairs on her house and did not return to Baao until the
4th of the following August.
• The accused Pedro and Eligio Amante tried to prove that during the day in question, they were
working on the construction of Mariquita Motos' house in Baao, and that they had not left the place.
• Josefa Sto. Domingo’s testimony that she did not see any of the accused in her house, and that
Patrocinio had been in her house accompanied by two unknown men different from the accused. She
testified in the preliminary investigation because of threat by Juan Botardo, who told her that if she
did not testify as he wanted her to, her husband would not be excluded from the complaint and would
not be released. DENIED by Juan Botardo
CFI of Camarines Sur: Eligio Amante, Francisco Sanchez, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez
GUILTY of the complex crime of abduction with consent, with rape (or consented abduction with rape)
• PENALTY: Brothers Amante and F. Sanchez sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
reclusion temporal, Vicente Sanchez, on account of being under 18 years of age to 12 years
prision mayor, Indemnify the offended party Patrocinio Botardo in the sum of P500, and each
to pay one-fourth of the costs of the action.
ISSUES:
2. Whether the relations, which, according to the prosecution existed between the offended party
Patrocinio Botardo and Pedro Amante, were against the will of the former and were brought by the
use of force? (Not specifically answered but still YES)
HELD:
1. Yes. Testimony CREDIBLE. Far from destroying the probative force of said testimony they
strengthen the same, as seen that neither could there have been a conspiracy nor a preconceived
plan as to what they were to testify to. Considering the varied points of view of persons and their
perceptive ability, it is but natural that they should differ in the narration of their observations. It is
psychologically impossible that they should agree in all details. Hence, when the testimony of
two witnesses agrees even in its minute details, it ceases to be an accurate statement of
the subjective truth.
MAIDEN CREDIBILITY: The offended party is a young girl fifteen years of against whom there cannot
be the least doubt as to her chastity and honor.
• Like all maidens of her race, the loss of her virginity made her so ashamed that at first she did not
want to return to her town where two of those who had outraged her lived. A girl who has hardly
begun to know the ways of the world, and who has such a high and delicate regard for purity, is
not capable of fabricating such a bestial and shameful act of which she was a victim; her
own sentiment of purity would rebel against such an idea, inasmuch as she would be exposed to the
scorn and disrespect of honest people.
• This is shown by the fact that she was ashamed to tell even those who had violated her that
she had been violated, and in accusing those who first had sexual intercourse with her, she only
said to those who succeeded them that they wanted to violate her.
2. YES. The contention of the defense that Patrocinio’s confidence in Amante’s promise after she was
violated disproves her testimony of the outrage she suffered is without merit. If the position in which
she found herself and the loss of what all reputable women consider as their most precious
possession are taken into consideration, it is not strange that in order to save herself from
dishonor she should still continue believing him, as a drowning man who clings to the smallest
floating object to save himself from drowning.
FACTS:
• April 16, 1931: Criminal case (Rape committed to girl of 12 yrs. old) was commenced on, by a
complaint signed and filed by the chief of police of the municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan,
before the justice of the peace, in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 1773
• After a finding of probable cause, the case was sent to the CFI Pangasinan
• June 11, 1931: the provincial fiscal signed and filed an information against the accused for the said
crime of rape, again pursuant to Act No. 1773
• June 29, 1931: the petitioner was duly arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty
• November 17, 1931: the trial began with the testimony of the alleged offended party. The trial was
continued and set for hearing on January 13, 1932.
• January 1, 1932: Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) took effect.
• January 13, 1932: Trial resumed; the accused through his counsel moved that the court dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction, invoking article 22 in connection with articles 344, paragraph 2, 336 and
367 of the Revised Penal Code.
• February 9, 1932: Court denied said motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
• LAWS:
o RPC 22: "Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”
o RPC 344, paragraph 2: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
o Section 1 of Act No. 1773, which took effect October 11, 1907, provides: "Hereafter the
crimes of adultery, estupro (rape of minor), abduction, rape, calumny (slander), and libel, as
defined by the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, shall be deemed to be public crimes and
shall be prosecuted in the same manner as are all other crimes defined by said Penal Code or
by the Acts of the Philippine Commission.
o Act No. 1773 was expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, saving,
however, the cases covered by article 366 which reads as follows: "Application of laws
enacted prior to this Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of
this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their
commission.
PETITIONER:
o Complaint was not signed or filed by the aggrieved party (in this case a girl of 12 years), or
her parents, grand-parents or guardian, the court is now without jurisdiction to proceed with
prosecution.
o Since January 1, 1932, the RPC 344, paragraph 2, prosecution for rape requires that the complaint
shall be made by the offended party or her parents, grand- parents or guardian as the case may be.
o This is a jurisdictional requirement and the requirement favors the petitioner; and under RPC 22,
said requirement must be given a retroactive effect and relate back to the complaint filed in this
case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the requirement of article 344, paragraph 2, that the complaint must be made by the
aggrieved party or her relatives favor persons charged with the crimes there mentioned? In other
words, should it be given retroactive effect? (NO)
a. Whether by virtue of the enactment of RPC, the offense is now a private offense out of what
was under the previous code a public offense? (NO)
HELD:
1. NO. Article 344, paragraph 2 cannot have retroactive effect as it was not made favorable to the
accused. Article 22 makes the penal laws retroactive "favor the persons guilty of felony". Their
appellants’ major premise, that article 344, paragraph 2, is favorable to persons charged with the
crimes there indicated fails. There can be no reasonable doubt that CFI Pangasinan in this case
should proceed to final judgment in accordance with article 366 of the Revised Penal Code UNLESS
article 22 stands in the way.
• Article 22 is not to be applied in this case (as provision not enacted to favor the accused);
Article 366 applies insofar as it applies the law at the time of the commission of the offense.
• PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 344: Moreover, it is patent that the provision requiring that the
proceedings must be initiated upon complaint filed by the offended party or her relatives, was
enacted out of consideration for the offended party and her family who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public
trial.
• It would be an insult to the Legislature to hold that article 344, paragraph 2 was enacted with
the intention of favoring seducers and rapists.
• Citing People of the Philippine Islands vs. Dionisio Candido, Article 344, paragraph 2:
o In this case, it was argued that the court had no jurisdiction upon the absence of a
signature in the complaint of the offended party as required by Article 344,
paragraph 2. Defendant charged with the crime of abduction with consent upon an
information signed and filed by the provincial fiscal was convicted and sentenced, and
an appeal was filed in the SC. The motion for reconsideration was denied and the
judgment of conviction affirmed by the First Division.
• COMPARE WITH: Clemente Laceste vs. the Director of Prisons, Article 344, paragraph 3:
o Criminal liability of the offender which is extinguished upon marriage with offended
party benefits co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
abovementioned crimes." It is not to be overlooked that article 344 provides that
marriage "shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him." It is obvious that the provision for the remission of all penalty upon marriage
is favorable both to the principal and the accessory.
1a. No, this is a mere verbal distinction, for it is the government in both cases that conducts the
prosecution and punishes the offender. Nor is it clear that a complaint is any less likely to be filed or
any less likely to be vigorously prosecuted in the one case than in the other. It is not apparent that it
can make any real difference to the accused whether he is tried on a complaint filed by the offended
party or on one filed by the fiscal.
● Indeed, it is conceivable that the offended party might insist upon the filing and trial of a
complaint which an experienced and impartial fiscal would be unwilling to file for technical
reasons or for lack of sufficient evidence that would lead to conviction. A private individual
might file a complaint out of malice or other improper motive, which would not ordinarily be
imputable to the government or its officials.
2. NOT DOCTRINAL but People vs. Tolentino held that "it does not appear from the Revised Penal
Code that it was the intention of the law to divest Courts of First Instance of jurisdiction over crimes
already acquired; the contrary is clearly implied."
• Penal laws that relate to mere matters of form or procedure are colorless when examined to
ascertain whether or not they favor the accused. They are all designed to secure to the defendant a
speedy and impartial trial in accordance with law, without advantage either to the prosecution or to
the defense.
• Viewed in this light, changes in procedure introduced by the Revised Penal Code are not to
be given retroactive effect in the sense that all proceedings prior to January 1, 1932, which
conform to the law in force at the time, must be overturned and new proceedings begun. Article 366
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for writ of prohibition is denied with costs against the petitioner.
Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment
of a legitimate child. — The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall be
punished by prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate
child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties of his profession or office,
shall cooperate in the execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs, shall suffer the penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.
COMPARE WITH: Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any one who shall abandon a child under seven years of
age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.
When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been
in danger only, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions contained in the two preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the imposition of the
penalty provided for the act committed, when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.
FACTS:
• Information: Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga charged with Crime of exposing a
legitimate child to lose his civil status
• August 12, 1913: in Manila, Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did feloniously expose a child, 1 month old,
the legitimate son of the accused Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to
lose his civil status
• Saturnino Capillo, with intent to cause his legitimate child to lose his civil status and in
cooperation with the defendant Petrona Paduga, took the said without the permission of his
mother Vicenta Umanbang or the authority of the courts of this city and agreed with one Chua
Pue Tee to deliver to him the said child and never to claim it again
• Asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same time to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the
expenses incurred by the defendant Saturnino Capillo during the last sickness and death of
his wife Vicente Umanbang
• Received from said Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106 of which P50 corresponded to the
defendant Saturnino Capillo and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga.
• That the living of said child under such circumstances in the possession of said Chua Pue
Tee and His wife Sio Suat King exposes said child to lose his civil status, to wit, that of the
legitimate son of the said defendant Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to that
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of an unknown and nameless child or at the most to that of the child of one Chua Pue Tee
and his wife.
• Aggravating circumstance of price should be taken into consideration.
• August 21, 1913: Defendants pleaded not guilty
• September 1, 1913: the defendant’s counsel filed a motion, in the nature of a demurrer and
argument
• That the case be DISMISSED, basing his contention upon the fact that the information fails
to show facts of sufficient weight to constitute a cause of action, that is, that the facts
stated do not constitute a crime.
o Article 468 of the Penal Code in force, paragraph 2 of which is mentioned by the
prosecuting attorney, does not define as a crime the acts attributed to defendants. Nor
is it inferred from the historical precedents that the facts which gave rise to this case
constitute a crime.
o The hypothesis of the legislator as to meaning of said paragraph 2 is the fact of
concealing or exposing a legitimate child with intent to cause such a child to lose his
civil status, when this act is done by the person to whom the child is entrusted
for its nursing or for some other lawful purpose.
o This crime is rather applicable to Spain only, where nursing children are usually
given to wet nurses, living out in the country, who are not able to move their residence
to the city where the child’s parents live.
o In the Philippines the children are usually nursed by their own mother, and, if they are
given to a wet nurse, the latter goes to live at the house of the child’s parents.
CFI Manila: Considered it a demurrer to the information and plea of not guilty considered withdrawn;
Granted Motion and Dismissed the case
• Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged.
• United States APPEALED
ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 468 of Penal Code penalizes abandonment of a child with the intent to lose its civil
status and not merely an exposure or danger to the loss of civil status or simple abandonment? (YES)
2. Whether the CFI properly dismissed the case for lack of cause of action? (YES)
HELD: (YES)
2. The contentions of the parties on this appeal turn upon the meaning which should be given to
the word “expusiere” as found in the original Spanish version.
o The verb “exponer” is given various meaning in “El Diccionario de la LenguaCastellanapor
la Real Academia Española,” 12th edition. Among others “arriesgar, aventurar,
ponerunacosa en contingencia de perderse” (to risk, to adventure, to put a thing in danger
of being lost); and also “dejar a un niñoreciennacido a la puerta de unaiglesia o casa o en
otroparajepublico, por no tener con quecriarlosus padres o porque no se sepaquienes son”
(to leave a recently born baby at the door of a church, or a house or other public place, the
parents not having means to support it, or the paents being unknown).
o Having in mind the qualifying phrase which provides that the offense is committed when
the child is exposed “con animo de hacerleperdersuestado civil” (with intent to expose it to
lose its civil status), the word must be held to have been used by the authors of the code in
the sense of to “abandon,” in some such manner as is indicated in the last of the above
cited meaning given the word in the “Diccionario”; that being the clear, definite and well
understood signification of the word when used by the Spanish authors of the code with
relation to infants or children, as it manifestly is in this article.
o The contention of the prosecution is that the true meaning of the language of the statute is
that the prescribed penalties are to be imposed upon “one who conceals, or exposes or
subjects to danger of loss of civil status, a legitimate child, with intent to cause it to lose its
civil status.”
o But without the addition of the qualifying phrase “with intent to cause it (the infant) to lose
its civil status,” the transitive verbs “ocultare” and “expusiere” convey no thought of loss of
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civil status, and in construing the verb “exponer” to mean “to expose or subject to danger
of loss of civil status,” the prosecution gives to it a meaning which is not found in any
dictionary.
o It is worthy of observation, furthermore, that the transitive verb “expusiere” (shall expose)
is joined in grammatical construction with the verb “ocultare” (shall conceal) and, like it,
has for its sole object the word “child” (hijo), and sound principles of grammatical
construction forbid the attempt to import into one of these verbs a meaning from the
common qualifying phrase which it is manifestly impossible to give to the other.
• The practice of abandoning new-born infants and very young children at the door of hospitals,
churches and other religious institutions was formerly so well known in Spain that, as will be seen
from the definition above cited from the dictionary of the “Real Academia,” it gave rise to the use
of the verb “exponer” (to expose) in a peculiar and special sense with reference to this practice,
when the grammatical object of the verb is an infant or small child. We are well satisfied that it is
in this sense that the word is used in the article of the code under consideration, and that in this
connection it may and should be construed in both Spanish and English by its substantial
equivalent to “abandon.”
“Expusiere” (shall expose) = ABANDONMENT
• Groizard: “the exposition which is caused by abandoning a new-born child in place where it cannot
be easily assisted, intending that it should perish and save the honor of the mother, is a crime
against life. The exposition of a child and the abandonment thereof in a place where it may not
be in danger may be a crime against the safety of persons. Only that which has for its
purpose the deprivation of the new-born child’s civil status is what constitutes the present
crime.
o It is necessary that the acts committed by the guilty party plainly show his intent.
o The fact that one abandons, in the midst of a lonely forest, an unfortunate child that needs
all kinds of assistance during the first moments of coming into the world cannot be
admitted as intent to destroy its civil status, but as an attempt against its life.
o On the contrary, he who places at the door of a charitable person, a new-born child which is
in condition to stand the first in clemencies of the weather, is supposed to do it in order
that it may be taken up and protected, and therefore the legal presumption must be that
he does not act with any other purpose than to cause the loss of any trace as to the filiation
of the child.”
• Viada: “Child must be understood a fully developed and living being, as the child born not
capable of living has no status, nor can he transmit any rights whatever. It is, therefore, an
essential condition of this crime, that crime, that the child who has been exposed or concealed
shall have been born alive, and therefore, the clandestine burial of a child who was born dead is
not included within the provisions of the last paragraph of this article, although it may be included
within the provisions of article 349 of this Code.
o Exposition or concealment must be of a legitimate child and done with the intention of
making him lose his civil status, that is, his inherent rights as a legitimate child
o Were he illegitimate, or, were the intentions of the one who concealed or exposed the
child different, the act may constitute a crime against liberty and security, but certainly
not an attempt against the civil status of the child.”
2. Case properly dismissed. It is manifest from the information itself, and from the argument of
counsel on the demurrer, that the real object sought to be attained by the prosecution is to penalize,
under the provisions of article 468 of the code, the conduct of the father in turning over his new-born
child to the Chinaman and his wife, with a promise not to reclaim it, taking from the Chinaman for so
doing money by way of loan or otherwise. But it is very clear that it was not the intention of the
authors of the coded to penalize such conduct by the provisions of the article relied upon by the
prosecution.
• It is urged that the transaction set forth in the information was in truth and effect a heartless sale
of his own flesh and blood by the accused for one hundred and odd pesos, and that he should not
be permitted to go unpunished.
• It is not necessary for us to consider and decide, at this time, under what circumstances, if any, a
father, left with a motherless child, may turn it over to others with or without an agreement to
BIGAMY
c/o Hipolito
RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
FACTS:
• November 26, 1992: Cenon Teves and Thelma Jaime-Teves married at the MTC of Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila.
• After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations.
• While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a
certain Edita Calderon.
• To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the
Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10
December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
• February 13, 2006: Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy.
• May 4, 2006: Before the filing of information for the criminal case of bigamy, the RTC Caloocan
rendered a decision dated declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY).
• June 8, 2006: Teves was charged with bigamy under RPC 349 in an Information:
o December 10, 2001 up to the present: Meycauayan, Bulacan, Cenon R. Teves being
previously united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and
without the said marriage having legally dissolved, unlawfully contract a second marriage
with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon
R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence thereof, unlawfully cooperate in the
execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence
of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
• June 27, 2006: Decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality
• RTC: TEVES GUILTY; Penalty: ISL 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
• Teves appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that:
o His criminal action or liability had already been extinguished (marriage declared VOID)
o Defective Information filed by the prosecution
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• CA: AFFIRMED RTC
• MOR filed but was DENIED.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
o Since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”
o Differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and
posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second
marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
o Ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case
the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed. In petitioner’s case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the
bigamy case was filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether husband cannot be guilty of the crime of bigamy if the marriage was declared null and void
before the filing of the bigamy case in court? (NO, still GUILTY)
HELD: GUILTY of Bigamy; His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit.
• Elements of BIGAMY:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
• 2nd MARRIAGE:
o Element 1: Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
o Element 2&3: At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with
Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision
declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006
or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita.
o Element 4: Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita
has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the
validity of such subsequent marriage.
• Family Code: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
• The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
• PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION: It is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
• A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
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• If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.
• We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can
still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of the Information in court.
• Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon
the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained
reading of the law is against its simple letter.
• Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him
until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription.
• The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he
contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact
to the date of the bigamous marriage.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision
dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
FACTS:
• April 6, 1999: First marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on
at [IE]MELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony.
• December 8, 2001: Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena Gerldino at
Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila. Rev. Honorato D.
Santos officiated the ceremony.
• P. Geraldino on in Quezon City (admitted in a counter-affidavit by both parties, Certificate of
Marriage)
• August 24, 2004: Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P. Geraldino for the crime
of Bigamy.:
o December 8, 2001: ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA
PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting,
did then and there unlawfully contract a subsequent or second marriage with his co-
accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to
her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.”
• Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by
the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned
Prosecution:
Defense:
Atilano’s testimony
• “Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with
private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed
that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first
marriage with the private complainant. As a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry
four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief
• PROOF OF MUSLIM FAITH:
o Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (
o Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
• He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage
because he told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second
marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino.
• He further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private
complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he
does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
• He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a
‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In
his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to
keep said first marriage a secret
Geraldino’s testimony
• Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and
only came to know her when this case was filed.
• She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to
the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. contracted a first
marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
marriage.
• Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded
that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after
she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.
• She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she
and Atilano O. Nollora Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
• She also belied the allegations of the private complainant about their confrontation and alleged
that she came only to know private complainant at the filing of the case.
RTC: Nollora guilty of bigamy under RPC 349. Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Penalty: prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
o Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, and
did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare
that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his
converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just
marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant.
o What is clear, therefore, is that a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody
the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is,
he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required
since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this
authority.
o In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that
has already been violated.
o NO LIABILITY FOR GERALDINO: No sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena
P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation
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that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient, being open to several interpretations.
o Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s
house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and
heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married.
o This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena
P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
axiomatic that “(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into
account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment”
CA: DISMISSED appeal and affirmed TC
o The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an.
o The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the
prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws. Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
o Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.
o Denied MOR
Issue: Whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Held: YES.
• Only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 of the Family Code, or Executive
Order No. 209, and Article 180 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083.
o Art. 41. Absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. Disappearance where there is danger of death
for two years shall be sufficient.
o Art. 180. Law applicable. — The provisions of the Revised Penal Code relative to
the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married in accordance with the
provisions of this Code or, before its effectivity, under Muslim law.
• Petitioner invokes his faith as a defense for the crime. For the defense of his Muslim faith to apply,
the marriage must be solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or Code.
• Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
o Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
o Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
o Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
o Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
DOCTRINE: Bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is
contracted before the judicial declaration of its nullity). Subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
• April 10, 1990: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
• Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, solemnized at Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a
Minister of the Gospel.
• Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
• Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes
DEFENSE:
• During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom
he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
• He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.
• He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage
• November 10, 1997: the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, GUILTY of bigamy
o PENALTY: 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
• CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit.
Defense:
He (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and
He (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.
Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the non-existence, as alleged, of the first
marriage? (Guilty, inexistence not proven)
2. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the declaration of nullity of 2nd marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity? (YES)
• Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in
the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration
of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more,
would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy.
• The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the
marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered
into it.
*Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being
void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
FACTS:
• March 20, 1969: Nepomuceno married Dolores Desiderio on, in Balagtas, Bulacan,
• August 16, 1969: Five months later, he again married Norma Jimenez in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
• Information dated December 8, 1969 reads as follows:
o August 16, 1969, in Norzagaray, Bulacan, accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr., being then
previously united in lawful marriage with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Norma Jimenez.
• Upon arraignment on February 4, 1970, accused pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded
accordingly. After the prosecution had presented one witness, the accused, on August 11, 1970,
withdrew his plea of not guilty and changed it into one of guilty. The case however
proceeded for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect.
• December 9, 1970: Motion to quash was filed on the ground that the information is defective as it
charged only the accused for bigamy without including the second wife and such
failure, according to accused, conferred no jurisdiction on the lower court to try and decide
the case.
• Said motion was denied on February 22, 1971. On April 28, 1971, private prosecutor orally
withdrew the claim for damages, which the lower court granted.
• RTC: GUILTY of Bigamy; PENALTY: ISL 6 Months and l Day of Prision Correccional as minimum, to
6 Years and 4 Months of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with costs.
• On appeal to the Court of Appeals, accused cited as a single error the lower court's failure to
quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting completion of the records the
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 172
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
private prosecutor filed a motion to forward the case to the Supreme Court on the ground
that the appeal involves a pure question of law. Two other motions of the same nature were
subsequently filed.
• CA: In its resolution of May 11, 1973, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals resolved to give
due course to the appeal, to consider it submitted for decision, the same to be raffled immediately
and to refer the motions to certify the case to the Supreme Court to the Division to which the case
may be raffled.
• The case was eventually assigned to the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five Justices which
promulgated the resolution of April 14, 1975, by a four to one vote ruled that only a question of
law is involved in the appeal, and decision on the case is not dependent on factual findings to
be made so as to bring the case within the competence of the appellate court. SO submitted to SC
for Decision.
o The dissenting opinion holds that there is no question of law involved as what is to be
decided is the question of whether or not the information filed was defective for not
including the second wife as an accused and, hence, the Court of Appeals could have
decided it on the merits by affirming the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
o Whether the lower court erred in not quashing the information because it was defective for not
including the second wife (not because of lack of jurisdiction) (NO)
o Whether he is guilty of BIGAMY? (YES)
HELD:
o RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proceedings.
o The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
judicially declared as presumptively dead. Accused undeniably contracted two marriages in the
short span of five months, which he categorically admitted when he pleaded guilty.
o Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other, while the previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is
completely devoid of merit.
o Even a cursory scrutiny of RPC 349 will disclose that the crime of bigamy can be committed
by one person who contracts a subsequent marriage while, the former marriage is
valid and subsisting.
o Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein the law specifically
requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should be prosecuted or included in the information.
o In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information
as a co-accused.
o Bigamy is a public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are
private offenses and are crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the
offended party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in bigamy. It is, therefore, clear
that bigamy is not similar to adultery or concubinage.
o No reason to include Norma Jimenez in the information as there was no showing in the recitation
of facts in the information to the effect that Norma Jimenez, the second wife, had knowledge of
the first marriage,and despite said knowledge she contracted the second marriage with the
accused; nor is there any showing that Norma Jimenez had had a previous marriage of her of her
own.
o Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez, should be included in the information is a
question of fact that was determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation in
PREMATURE MARRIAGES
c/o Hipolito
FACTS:
• May 1904: Pascual Dulay, of about 23 years of age, began courting Gregoria Pimentel a girl of 16,
residing in the pueblo of Aringay, San Fernando, La Union.
• Their relations became every day more intimate, on account of the promises of marriage made by
the accused Dulay, and the girl was seduced.
• The defendant accomplished his desire for the first time on a certain night in the latter part of
December, 1905. The act was repeated on various occasions from that time until the 28th of
April 1906.
• April 29, 1906: Accused, besides the promise previously given to the injured girl, informed her
parents of his intention to marry her, and following the advice of the parents the marriage was
postponed until the time when the accused was to complete his studies.
• However, in the month of June following, in view of the fact that his fiancee was pregnant, the
defendant disregarded his promise of marriage, and denied being the author of the girl’s
pregnancy.
• The latter positively asserted that she never had sexual intercourse with any other man, and that
during his courtship he sent to her several letters, cards, photographs of himself, handkerchiefs,
and a ring, all of which were exhibited at the trial and recognized by him.
• He confessed that he had maintained friendly relations with her, but denied that he had ever had
any sexual intercourse with her, or that he was the father of the child born on the 20th of
October, 1906, which was produced at the trial.
• Among the letters exhibited, written in the dialect of the province, one appears at folio 44 of the
record, the English translation of which taken from the Spanish translation is as follows:
o GOYANG: I can not stand my heart’s grief because if I could help it I would not part from
you; but, what can I do? I must leave for important reasons; however, although I am going
away, some one will make arrangements for my return in the month of June; may Heaven
grant this. Oh! my Gregoria, I feel uneasy; I don’t know what to do; you do as I have told
you to do; do it because I think it is more advisable that you should tell the old man
(grandfather) the sin we have committed in the eyes of God, for if somebody else does it,
or, if you wait until he notices the consequences thereof, it will be worse for you. Do it, do
not fail to comply with what I am asking of you so that the old man may not become too
angry.
Do go and hear mass tomorrow, and I will wait for you because I have a very important
thing to ask you to do; hear mass without fail so that you may know what you ought to do; I
will do the same so that our intentions may not have bad results
Your brother [among Ilocanos, this word is used when the parties are very intimate, or
when they are lovers], PASCUAL.
Defense:
• The defendant alleges that from the latter part of December, 1905, to the 25 th of April, 1906, he
had not returned to his pueblo where the injured girl resided
ISSUES:
1. Whether he is guilty of seduction? (YES)
2. Whether the child is not his and is not responsible for his welfare as he was born more than 9
months old after alleged intercourse? (NO, it’s his child)
HELD:
1. The above facts are duly proven in this case, and constitute the crime of estupro (seduction),
defined and punished by article 443 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code
• By reason of the intimate relations between the accused and the injured party, the latter was
seduced by his repeated promises of marriage, and she permitted him to lie with her on various
occasions from the latter part of December, 1905, to the last days of April, 1906;
• Without any just reason the accused has refused to comply with the promise of marriage made to
Gregoria Pimentel after being pregnant and it is therefore clear that he acted deceitfully when
making the promise solely with the unlawful purpose of inducing her to yield to his desire, and
upon pretext of her pregnancy he wrote to her parents stating that he declined to carry out his
promise of marriage.
• A promise of marriage given to a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, with the evil intent of
committing an unlawful act and voluntarily abandoned without just cause, constitutes the
deceit referred to in article 458 of the Code of Spain, equivalent to article 443 of that
of the Philippines, according to the doctrine established by the supreme court of Spain, among
other decisions in that of October 7, 1864.
• The culpability of the accused as the only author of the crime cannot be denied, inasmuch as he
acknowledged that he had maintained intimate relations with the aforenamed Gregoria Pimentel
from May 1904 to the same month in 1906.
• No evidence is offered that would even indicate that the girl had maintained any such relations
with any man other than the accused, and in view of her affirmation that Pascual Dulay was the
only man who did lie with her on the several occasions.
• It is unquestionable that the accused is responsible for the crime and that he has incurred the
penalty that the law imposes, because he managed to have intercourse with the injured girl on
several occasions by means of deceit and committed the seduction under promise of
marriage.
• The translation of the letter without date, hereinbefore inserted, shows that the accused
addressed it to the injured girl while he was still in the pueblo of Aringay, and before coming to
this city; that he wrote the same after he had had sexual intercourse with the girl, and at a time
when he was aware that she had conceived and was pregnant; it was for this reason that he
compelled her to inform her father of the offense that they had committed.
2. Data that child is more than 9 months old and therefore is not his child does not hold merit as it is
not shown that the accused is not the author of the pregnancy of the girl, who states positively that
from December, 1905, to April, 1906, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with
her.
PREMATURE MARRIAGES:
• REASON FOR FIXING 301 (10 months) DAYS: If the ordinary average duration of the pregnancy of
women is nine months and some days, a tardy birth is not an impossibility or an unusual to have a
delayed or retarded conception, one of the inexplicable mysteries of nature, since the opinions of
physicians upon the matter are conflicting; for this reason the Penal Code, by article 476, imposes
punishment upon a widow who marries before three hundred and one days have elapsed from the
death of her husband, a prohibition which is in accordance with other legal provisions
DISPOSITIVE: AFFIRMED Decision. Penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to recognize and
maintain the offspring, to indemnify the injured party, Gregoria Pimentel, in the sum of P1,000 and, in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment which shall not exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the costs, should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant; provided,
however, that the amount to be paid to the injured party for the subsistence of her child until the
same shall reach his majority, shall be P15 monthly.
FACTS:
• Information was originally filed against the spouses, the two witnesses to the marriage, and the
minister performing the ceremony.
• At the request of the prosecuting attorney the case was dismissed with respect to the defendant
Antonio de la Llana, one of the witnesses to the marriage, in order that he might be used as a
witness for the Government, under the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• With respect to the defendants, Florencio San Miguel and Eulogia Dizon, the spouses, and Teofilo
San Miguel, the other witness to the marriage, the case was also dismissed, under paragraph 2 of
article 475 of the Penal Code, for the reason that Esteban Dizon, the father of Eulogia Dizon, the
bride, having, subsequent to the ceremony, given his consent to the marriage.
• The only defendant remaining, therefore, is Domingo San Juan, the minister who performed the
ceremony.
CFI: GUILTY of performing a marriage ceremony where one of the contracting parties was under the
age of consent; PENALTY: Four years of suspension for practicing his profession as a minister of the
National Evangelical Church of the Philippines, to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas and one-fifth of the
costs.
ISSUES:
Whether the defendant minister not guilty if there was no intent, in other words, whether the person
solemnizing the marriage may plead similar good faith in defense to an action brought against him
under article 479.? (YES)
HELD:
o It is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist without
intent. It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one cannot be convicted
under article 475 when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the
intention to commit the crime.
• Citing United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902 (1
Phil. Rep., 109),
o Neither of the spouses can be convicted for a violation of article 475 if he acted in good
faith and without the knowledge that the other was under the age of consent.
o “A minor who marries without parental consent in the false belief that she if of age is not
criminally responsible,” and that, “it is not criminal negligence for a husband to
rely upon his wife’s statement of her age nor for the wife to rely upon that of her
father.”
o ART. 475. Any minor who shall marry without the consent of his or her parents, or
other person standing in loco parenties, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degrees.
o The offender shall be pardoned as soon as the parents or the persons referred to in the
next preceding paragraph shall approve the marriage.
o Article 1 of the Code does not contain the words “with malice” that are to be found in the Code of
1822; nevertheless Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are included in
the word “voluntary” and he states positively that crime cannot exist without intent.
o Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up
to a certain point.
o Groizard says: “Such is the general rule; so it is ordinarily.”
o Viada says that “in the majority of cases, in the absence of intent there has been no
crime; but that there can exist in some case the latter without the former.”
o Silvela says: “In effect it suffices to remember the first article, which states that where
there is no intent there is no crime, . . . in order to asset without fear of mistake that
in our Code the substance of a crime does not exists if there is not a deed, an act which
falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong
o The theory that the absence of the word “with malice” in the prevailing Code has this effect is
supported by the provisions of article 568 which says: “He who by reckless negligence commits an
act which would constitute a grave crime if malice were present shall be punished,” etc.
o The supreme court in several successive sentences has the same doctrine: “It is
indispensable that this (action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it all the
malice which the violation and intention to cause the evil which may be the object of
the said crime suppose.”
o In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married “before the
municipal judge of the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple
manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of the woman Leonor with whom
he married before said municipal judge
o Relying upon that, on account of his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27 th of
June, 1882, and the 5th of April, 1884, in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he
registered as legitimate children his sons, Jose and Emilio, the offspring of the illicit
union of the defendant and Leonor Gonzales.”
o For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal Audiencia of
Albuñol condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four months and one day
of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence “considering that
whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his three sons
entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial Registers, it cannot partake
o Falsification of trademarks
o In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Tioco and against Don Guillermo Partier,
in the court of Quiapo, for falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber of the
Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two years and some months of
presidio correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar imprisonment.
A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier.
o The Supreme Court annulled this sentence, “considering that the moral element of
the crime, or, in other words, existence or nonexistence of intent and malice
in the commission of an act designated and punished by the law as criminal is
essentially a question of fact for exclusive judgment and determination of the trial
court.”
o “Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having
printed in his lithographic establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette
packages of the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the owner of said
factory, to whose injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Tioco ordered him to do the
said fraudulent printing, cannot be considered (from the facts declared proved in the
final sentence of acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and
without any addition by the Appellate Court) as constituting intentional participation or
cooperation in deed of falsification and defraudation committed by the former, since it
does not appear in any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance with Sy-
Tioco nor that he had any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling
himself the representative of Señor Santa Marina, the owner of the La Insular factory,
gave him the order to print the trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were
to be used to hold cigarettes.”
o Citing United States vs. De los Reyes it was held that “a woman who marries a second time under
a bona fide belief that her former spouse is dead is not guilty of bigamy,” the court saying:
o One of the witnesses for the prosecution intimating that the accused was informed by
one of the contracting parties that the girl was under eighteen, and that he, instead of
refusing thereupon to go forward with the marriage, suggested to her that she declare
herself to be eighteen or over and that he would obtain witnesses to substantiate her
declaration.
o Evidence or testimony are not sufficient. The documents were proof of the parties’
attestation. They were duly signed and sworn to by those parties and witnesses.
Although the oath is not in the form prescribed by General Orders, No. 68, nevertheless
it contains all of the requisites essential to a valid declaration under that Act.
o It appearing clear to us that, even though it be admitted that the marriage complained of was
illegal and that the subsequent consent of the parent did not relive the defendant of liability for
the part he had taken therein, the accused acted in good faith without criminal intent, and that he
made the investigation required by law in a reasonably satisfactory manner, the conviction cannot
stand.
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted of the crime charged.
LIBEL
c/o Hipolito
8. DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs. PEOPLE and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR
DEL CASTILLO, J.: G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011
FACTS:
Prosecution:
• During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the
private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the
nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the private complainant "Bading."
• Early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private
respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space
before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase.
o Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz
Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and
wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete.
o Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating
that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added words
"BADING AND SAGAY."
o The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored
with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after
consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against
petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for
him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
• Jude Martin Jaropillo is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of Cadiz City. While on
a licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on the billboards. He wondered what fault
the person alluded therein has done as the message is so negative. He felt that the message is an
insult to the mayor since it creates a negative impression, as if he was being rejected by the
people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was giving his testimony voluntarily and he was not being
rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody.
• Nenita Bermeo, a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at Delilah’s Coffee Shop in the
morning of November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner shouting "Bading, Bading, Never,
Never." She and the tricycle drivers drinking coffee were told by petitioner "You watch out I will
add larger billboards."
o When she went around Cadiz City, she saw larger billboards with the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER," thus confirming what petitioner had said. With the
message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown the private respondent. According
to her, petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was not also forced
or rewarded in giving her testimony.
• Bernardita Villaceran also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an
honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message is an insult not only
to the person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City.
Defense
• Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things
happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the
many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of
referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay.
• He contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He
further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and
Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City.
Information
• On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003:
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 180
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
o November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
o With intent to impeach the integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor
the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with
malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz
City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows
"CADIZ FOREVER" "__________ NEVER"
o thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the
residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER".
o Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private
complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER" thus
making the billboard appear as follows "CADIZ FOREVER" "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
o For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the
readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on,
therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador G.
Escalante, Jr.,
o And hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were
read by thousands if not hundreds of thousands of persons, which caused damage and
prejudice to the offended party by way of moral damages in the amount of: P5,000,000.00
– as moral damages.
• Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not guilty."
RTC: Guilty of LIBEL defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant
• Penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as
the minimum to TWO YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium
as the maximum and a FINE of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
• The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P5,000,000.00 by
way of moral damages.
• The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the
accused, however the penalty of Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby ordered
deducted from the cash bond posted by the accused pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to the accused.
• The accused is hereby ordered immediately committed to the BJMP, Cadiz City for the service
of his sentence.
CA: Affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. GUILTY but reduced damages; Amount of
moral damages to P500,000.00.
• Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution dated April 7, 2006.
Petitioner’s Claims:
• Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity
and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City.
• He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on
the character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.
ISSUES:
1) Whether only question of law can be reviewed? (NO)
2) Whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous as it shows
the injurious nature of the imputations made against the private respondent and tends to induce
suspicion on his character, integrity and reputation as Mayor of Cadiz City?
3) Whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication? (NO)
2. NO. Phrase does not tend to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and
reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his
dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh
and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s integrity.
• Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary
sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and
reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded
as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our
considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private
respondent’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and
besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
• A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead."
• "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
a) it must be defamatory;
b) it must be malicious;
c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable."
* Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
• Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase
must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words
imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial.
• An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
• To determine "whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense."
• Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold
the person or persons up to public ridicule."
• OSG: "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which
ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt."
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
FACTS:
● Sept 20, 1957: Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus which collided with the Mabuhay
Bakery delivery panel driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal
● Dec 3, 1957: Chief of Police of Tanay, filed case with Municipal Judge, Slight and Serious
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence, alleging:
○ “causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and
operated to collide with the delivery truck of Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu, result
of which the right front side of the said truck was greatly damaged and the driver, Hipolito
Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely, Bonifacio Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias
Martin, suffered physical injuries on the different parts of the body which required medical
attention as follows:
■ Hipolito Vismonte— 5 days
■ Bonifacio Virtudazo—10 days
■ Sy Tian alias Martin—1 month
● Feb 6, 1958: petitioner found guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and sentenced "to suffer imprisonment from 1 month and 1 day to 2
months and to pay the cost of the suit
○ petitioner appealed to CFI which later affirmed and sentenced petitioner to suffer four
months of Arresto Mayor and to pay the costs
● In the meantime, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed case in CFI charging herein petitioner
with Damage to property through reckless imprudence. He filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of double jeopardy in that because he has been previously convicted of the offense
charged.
○ Opposition was filed by the Provincial Fiscal contending that the crime for which petitioner
was convicted was for less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, whereas
the second case was for damages to property through reckless imprudence which are
distinct offenses.
○ CFI denied motion to quash and, after trial, found petitioner guilty of the crime of
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
○ petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed CFI and sentenced herein petitioner "to pay a fine
of P4,387.00 which is double the amount of damages suffered by the delivery truck with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to indemnify the offended party, the owner
of the delivery truck in the amount of P2,193.50, representing the amount of damages
suffered by the said delivery truck, and to pay the costs"
● CA held no double jeopardy because:
ISSUE: WoN CA erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy (YES)
HELD: petitioner ACQUITTED; CA judgment set aside
RATIO:
● CA based its decision on SC ruling on pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940, which is no longer controlling
● People v Buan (March 29, 1968), SC thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that —
○ once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, accused
may not be prosecuted again for same act
○ essence of quasi offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365 lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
○ Then SolGen, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries, then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property—not death—and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."
FACTS:
● Oct 17, 1971: the incident leading to the charge happened; the accused/priv resp Gapay was the
truck driver; the victim was Diolito de la Cruz
● Oct 18, 1971: an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against the accused
● However, on the same day (Oct 18), the victim died
● Oct 20, 1972: accused was arraigned; pleaded guilty; sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor and commenced serving his sentence
● Oct 24, 1972: another information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against
accused
● Defense moved to dismiss
City Court of Manila (Nov 17, 1972):
● Dismissed the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy
RATIO:
● Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again
with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former.
● However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule of Identity does not apply when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
● Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with
the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot
be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense
● In this case: the victim died on the day the information was filed
● The accused was arraigned 2 days after
● Thus, when the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused was already in jeopardy
● The OSG said on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing
and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diolito
dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended."
○ SC: Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim died 1 day after the accident and the
arrest of the accused. And that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded
guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact
supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused.
FACTS:
● Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) –
case 1-for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) –case 2- for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
● petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Case1 and was meted out the penalty of public censure
● petitioner moved to quash the Information in Case 2 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence –MTC denied, finding no identity of
offenses in the 2 cases
● After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC, in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Case 2 including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question
● Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest
● Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal
of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the
motion.
● RTC: affirmed MeTC. dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803 due to petitioner's forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Case 2
● Hence this petition.
● Petitioner denies absconding and explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Case 2
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Case 2 (no)
2. if in the negative, WON petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Case 2 (yes)
RATIO:
On non-appearance
● Petitioners non appearance at the arraignment in case 1 did not divest him of standing
to maintain petition in the SCA 2803
● Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court
of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124
is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
On double jeopardy
● The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.
● It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Case 1 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Cases 1 and 2
involve the "same offense."
● Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."
● We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on
persons and property are material only to determine the penalty
● The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the RPC, Art 365, defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
● One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one
would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other (People v Diaz)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
● Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles
1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an
act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude . . . behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . ., a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences.
● Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. We DISMISS the Information in Case 2 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar on
the ground of double jeopardy.
FACTS:
· Since 1990, Lourdes Azarcon, a businesswoman, had been borrowing money from Marcosa
Gonzales, the latter being engaged in an informal money-lending business. Between Aug to Dec
1992, Azarcon issues several Premiere Bank checks payable to Marcosa, for amounts borrowed.
However, checks were, upon maturity, dishonored bec. “Account Closed”
· Dec 1 1993: Marcosa, through counsel, writes letter, demands the P749,000 due her bec.
checks were dishonored
· Dec 17 1993: Azarcon replies, asks for "reconciliation of her accountability since [she] has also
some receipt payments covering the checks she has issued" and says that she is willing to settle her
account
· Feb 15 1994: Manuel Azarcon, Lourdes’ husband, pays Marcosa P200,000 representing “initial
payment” with undertaking to settle balance within 1 year via monthly installments
· 2 ½ years pass without obligation being paid, prompting Marcosa to file complaint for violation
of BP 22 against Azarcon, involving 120 dishonored checks amounting to P746,250
· Azarcon’s defense: obligation to pay was novated when husband assumed liability
· TC: Azarcon guilty of 824 violations of BP 22, subtracted amounts which prosecution either
failed to offer in evidence or Marcosa failed to dispute
RATIO:
· Elements for BP 22 violation all present: (1) The accused makes, draws or issues any
check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
· re: prior demand: Marcosa’s Dec 1 1993 letter satisfies “notice of dishonor”
requirement to bring up the presumption that there was knowledge of insufficient funds
· re: novation defense: no express agreement to a novation, plus initial installment
payments were either paid by Azarcon herself, or received "the account of Mrs. Lourdes
Azarcon"
Facts:
Petitioner Cadiao-Palacios was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique from July
1998 to June 2001. During her administration, there were infrastructure projects that were initiated
during the incumbency of her predecessor, then Mayor Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid.
These included the Janlagasi Diversion Dam, San Luis Diversion Dam, Caridad-Bagacay Road, and San
Juan-Tumao Road, which were contracted by L.S. Gamotin Construction with a total project cost of P2
million. For the said projects, the municipality owed the contractor P791,047.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with Victor S. Venturanza, then the
Municipal Security Officer, was indicted in an Information which accused them of demanding money
from Grace Superficial of L.S. Gamotin Construction for in connection with the aforesaid contracts
concerning the infrastructure projects, wherein, as public officers in their official capacities, they had
to intervene under the law. The Information accused them of receiving P15,000.00 in cash and
P162,400 in LBP Check No. 3395274.
Both accused voluntarily surrendered and, upon motion, posted a reduced bail bond of P15,000 each.
They pleaded “Not Guilty” upon arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witness—the private complainant herself, Grace M.
Superficial (Superficial). Her testimony may be summarized as follows:
For and on behalf of L.S. Gamotin, she (Superficial) took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings
of the municipality. Prior to the full payment of the municipality’s obligation, petitioner demanded
On January 25, 1999, petitioner gave to Neil Superficial, then an incumbent councilor and the
husband of private complainant, 3 checks representing the final payment for the construction
projects.
On January 26, 1999, Venturanza picked up the check promised by Superficial as payment for the
10% “kickback.” In accordance with petitioner’s instruction, the check was made payable to
Venturanza in the amount of P162,400. The check was encashed by Venturanza at the Land Bank of
the Philippines, San Jose, Antique Branch, which is about 90km - 100km away from Culasi; and the
amount was received by Venturanza. It was Venturanza also who deposited the 3 checks,
representing the full payment of the project.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: 1) petitioner herself, 2)
Venturanza, 3) Engr. Armand Cadigal, 4) petitioner’s husband Emmanuel Palacios, 5) petitioner’s
Executive Assistant Eugene de Los Reyes, and 6) Atty. Rex Suiza Castillon. Their testimonies may be
summarized as follows:
Petitioner denied Superficial’s allegations. She insisted that she only dealt with the owner of
L.S. Gamotin, Engr. Leobardo S. Gamotin, relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she could have
made the demand directly from him and not from Superficial. It was Engr. Gamotin himself who
claimed payment through a demand letter addressed to petitioner.
She only met Superficial when the latter received the checks representing the final payment. She
further testified that she never entrusted any highly sensitive matter to Venturanza, since her trusted
employee was her chief of staff. She also averred that she was not the only person responsible for the
release of the checks, since the vouchers also required the signatures of the municipal treasurer, the
municipal budget officer, and the municipal accountant. As far as Venturanza was concerned, she
denied knowledge of such transaction. Lastly, she claimed that the filing of the case against her was
politically motivated.
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied having received P15,000.00 from Superficial. He claimed that he
was financially stable. He also claimed that the institution of the criminal case was ill-motivated as
Neil Superficial, in fact, initiated a complaint against him for frustrated murder
Venturanza admitted that he indeed received the check from Superficial, but denied that it was
“grease money.” He claimed that the P162,400 was received by him in the form of a loan. He
explained that he borrowed from Superficial P150,000 to finance his trip to Australia so that he could
attend the wedding of his nephew; and asked for an additional amount for his expenses in processing
his visa. Venturanza, however, failed to leave for Australia. Of the total amount of his loan, he
allegedly spent P15,000 in processing his visa. Venturanza stated that he was able to repay the
entire amount immediately because he obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Aklan, Pandan Branch,
to pay the amount he used in applying for his visa. He further testified that he was persuaded by the
Superficials to campaign against petitioner.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Venturanza separately appealed their conviction. The latter petition was
denied by the SC. The former, on the other hand, went before the SC again in herein petition, mainly
challenging the legal and factual bases of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Issue: WoN Linda Cadiao-Palacios was guilty of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated January 28, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27434 is AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the following elements:
1) the offender is a public officer;
2) Who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or
benefit;
3) On behalf of the offender or any other person;
At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Antique. As
mayor, her signature was necessary to effect payment to contractors (for government projects).
Since the case involved the collection by L.S. Gamotin of the municipality’s outstanding obligation to
the former, the right of petitioner to intervene in her official capacity is undisputed. Therefore,
elements 1, 4 and 5 of the offense are present.
Petitioner’s refutation of her conviction focuses on the evidence appreciated by the Sandiganbayan
establishing that she demanded and received “grease money” in connection with the
transaction/contract.
The Sandiganbayan found Superficial and her testimony worthy of credence, that petitioner
demanded “grease money” as a condition for the release of the final payment to L.S. Gamotin. Aside
from the demand made by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that, indeed, she
received the “grease money” through Venturanza. Therefore, petitioner was convicted both for
demanding and receiving “grease money.”
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon the SC save in
the following cases: 1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are
premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record; and 6) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. The instant case
does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
Petitioner contends that it was improbable for her to have demanded the “grease money” from
Superficial, when she could have talked directly to the contractor himself. She insists that Superficial
was never a party to the transaction and that Engr. Gamotin was the one who personally facilitated
the full payment of the municipality’s unpaid obligation.
As held in Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, it is irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded her percentage
share of the project cost. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Section 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019, and this element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Superficial.
Petitioner admitted that it was Superficial (or her husband) who received the 3 checks representing
full payment of the municipality’s obligation. Moreover, although the checks were issued to L.S.
Gamotin, the deposit slip showed that they were deposited by Venturanza to the account of
Superficial. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the evidence clearly shows that Superficial was
not a stranger to the transaction between the municipality and L.S. Gamotin, for she, in fact, played
an important role in the receipt of the final payment of the government’s obligation.
It was not, therefore, impossible for petitioner to have demanded the “grease money” from
Superficial. This was bolstered by the fact that the P162,400.00 check in the name of Venturanza was
encashed by him on the same day that he deposited the 3 checks. The only plausible explanation is
that the amount given to Venturanza was “grease money” taken from the proceeds of the checks
issued by the municipality.
FACTS:
● Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the NAIA IPT III under
a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant RA. 695 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).
● May 5, 2003 SC rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Phil. Int’l Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement (Agreement), the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts entered into bet the
Gov’t, through DOTC and the Manila Int’l Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO (collectively known
as the PIATCO contracts)
● The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified
bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the
PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being contrary to public policy considering that
the Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect
of converting it into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The provisions
under Secti 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Sec 1.06 of the Agreement and Sec 4.04(c) in relation to
Sec 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct gov’t guarantee expressly prohibited by, among
others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The
Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.
● Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
by Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC),
charging several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The AEDC was the original
proponent thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it failed to match the latter’s bid price.
● After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan the Info dated Jan 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Sec, and petr
Go, Chairman and Pres of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
● June 20, 2005: Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash.
● Go: Adopting the view advanced by Rivera, Go harped on the alleged "missing documents,"
including Pesayco’s amended affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned in the
resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera and
petitioner Go, but which were not allegedly in the records. Go maintained that, there was no
supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause. Go further alleged that he
could not be charged under Sect 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is
he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of
the important elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his
case.
● Sandiganbayan: issued Resolution denying Rivera’s Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-
Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash.
ISSUES:
RATIO:
● Section 3(g) of RA 3019
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
● elements of this offense
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
● Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of
RA 3019 as embodied in Sec 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle
that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
● As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court
had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and
private persons:
x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of
malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would
be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the
repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto.
● Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and
private persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
● Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to
both public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part
that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than
six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office,
and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained
wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
● The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public
officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go,
are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense
thereunder.
● The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Sec3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act
or which may lead thereto. (Ito yung impt, kebs na yung iba :)))
● Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information
is infirm as far as petitioner Go is concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his
participation in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy.
HELD:
petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED in toto.
FACTS:
● In its Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor argues, citing
Meneses v. People, Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, and Singian v.
Sandiganbayan, that private persons when conspiring with public officers may be held liable
for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
● In the instant case, the Information charges Vicente C. Rivera, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, with committing the offense under Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 "in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) x x x."
RATIO
● We maintain that to be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the
following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. However, if there is
an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public
officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which
is "to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
● "Pursuant to our ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, said allegation of conspiracy is sufficient,
thus: The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.
There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is
not the gravamen of the offense charged
● [I]t is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the
following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegation of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the ff. shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
Facts:
January 20, 1999 - DPWH enters into a contract for the proposed construction of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) Building (Phase I) with Royson and Co., Inc. (Royson),
approved by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. Construction ensues.
An excavation 60 meters deep was made on the area under the area of Proj. Dir. Engr. Arturo
Santos. Petitioner, thinking that its property, which was adjacent to the site, was under threat of
erosion, sent three letters to Royson asking that it hasten the construction of a retaining wall.
Construction of a provisional slope protection measure was started. But due to heavy rains
(typhoon Feria), a collapse of a portion of the slope protection resulted in a landslide. It was alleged
by petitioners that the landslide caused cracks in the house owned by it and prejudiced the structural
integrity of the house. This led to petitioner’s complaining against the project before the Office of the
Regional Director of the DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region (DPWH-CAR) and the Office of the
City Mayor (lol seriously, dami mong angal) which directed the Office of the City Engineer of Baguio
City to conduct an investigation.
Findings:
1 Construction being implemented by Royson is not covered by a building and excavation permit
2 That the personnel of Royson alleged that no death resulted in the accident.
3 That portion of the Jimenez’ garage allegedly encroached inside the propert of BGH
4 That the retaining wall is located approx. 7.5m to the nearest building line of complainant. This
building is a 2-storey structure.
5 That cracks on their driveway approx. 5.65m away from the edge of the complainant’s building
measuring approx. 6.00m is observed. The garage floor level is approx. 4.5m above the
partially completed 2nd level retaining wall.
Royson subsequently builds reinforced concrete slope protection, a grouted riprap, and a retaining
wall for the compound. But the retaining wall of the BGHMC Project collapse. So close.
Petitioner files an Affidavit-Complaint against the respondents before the Office of the
Ombudsman, asserting that its property was damaged. Claims that the damage to its property was
due to respondents’ gross negligence, incompetence and/or malicious conduct because they failed to
construct a perimeter fence in the excavations made for the expansion of the BGHMC despite the fact
that petitioner had written Royson about the possibility of an erosion. Petitioner charges the
respondents of causing undue injury to it in the discharge of their official and administrative functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence in the construction of the
expansion project of the BGHMC and its retaining wall.
Cammayo, Asst. Sec. of DPWH: he did all he could do to prevent damage to petitioner’s property. In
the original plans for the project, there was no provision for the construction of any reinforced slope
protection or retaining wall, thus there was no obligation to construct such permanent protection
measures. He initiated the construction of such measures. When the rains came, DPWH immediately
took action to prevent further erosion. They also discovered a previously undetected pre-war tunnel
which collapsed due to heavy rains. Asserts force majeure.
Ombudsman decision
Petitioner contends that Ombudsman acted w/o jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed resolution and order.
Thus, SC.
Issue: W/N Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint. (no)
Petitioner insists that the collapse of the retaining wall was due to the respondents’ gross inexcusable
negligence on their respective duties because they failed to ensure that the nec. bldg. and excavation
permits have been secured before the excavation commenced. Dapat walang force majeure. No
evidence that collapse was due to rains. Alleges that the effort to construct a retaining wall was done
only after two landslides.
Respondents allege that petitioners failed to establish that any of its assertions.
Determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the Ombudsman.
For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
After examination of the records, the Court concludes that the Ombudsman did not act with grave
abuse of discretion.
As noted by the Ombudsman, petitioner failed to point out specific evidence and concrete proof that
respondents demonstrated manifest partiality (mp) or evident bad faith (ebf) in the construction of
the BGHMC and its retaining wall, nor gross inexcusable negligence (gin).
MP - when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another
EBF - connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage; bad judgment and palpably and fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
GIN - essential to prove that the breach of duty borders on malice and is characterized by
flagrant, palpable and willful indifference to consequences insofar as other person may be affected
Petitioner has not shown that respondents were impelled by such motives in the
performance of their official duties and functions.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that it suffered damages when its property lost lateral
support by reason of the collapsed retaining wall. In Santos v People, the Court equated the concept
of “undue injury,” in the context of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, with the civil law concept of “actual
damage,” therefore must be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty. Bawal
speculative. Must depend on proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts which
could afford some basis for measuring actual damage. Here, Memorandum of the Office of the City
Engineer of Baguio City stated that main structure of complainant was outside the critical slip circle.
Not refuted. Absent controverting evidence, Ombudsman will not be faulted for relying on the said
memo.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Resolution dated February 5, 2002 and Order dated June 27, 2002 of the Ombudsman in
OMB Case No. 0-01-0400 are AFFIRMED.
Facts:
Petitioner was municipal mayor of Calintaan, MindoroOcc, from 1992-95, with Rigoberto de Jesus was
municipal treasurer. 1994, state auditor had a post-audit investigation, revealing that during P’s
incumbency, no public bidding done for a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119bags cement, an electric generator
set, constructions materials, 2tires, and a computer with accessories. There were irregularities
supporting their acquisitions. 1998, P and RJ (at large) indicted in 7separate informations for violation
of RA3019(3e). Trial ensued. State auditor lone prosecution witness. For defense, P called to stand,
admitted no public hearing conducted insofar as the purchases he was accused of were concerned.
When asked how purchases were made, said through personal canvass. When asked why that, said
no bidding could be done because all dealers were in Manila, so useless to invite them since nobody
would bid anyway. 2005, guilty, each Information with 6-10years. Appealed, saying not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not P was guilty.
Held:
Yes. Appeal dismissed. Local Government Code explicitly provides rule that acquisitions of supplies by
LGUs shall be through competitive bidding. Exception, among others, is personal canvass of
responsible merchants. Since such was used, LGC provides limitations when it is used as acquisition
method: supplies may be procured after personal canvass of at least 3responsible local suppliers by a
committee of 3, composed of local general services officer or municipal treasurer, local accountant,
and head of office/department for whose use the supplies are being procured. The award shall be
Law uses “shall.” Regarding car, personal canvass effected solely by P, without participation from
accountant or RJ. No showing that award was decided by committee. Only an abstract of canvass
supported the award, signed by P and RJ, without required signatures by accountant and budget
officer. P disregarded dual capacity protocol because in all purchases made, signed in a dual capacity
as chairman and member (head of office/department). Strictly prohibited. Prohibition meant to check
and prevent conflict of interest. Same flaws for cement, generator, construction materials, 2tires,
computer. Also spent more than P20K.
RA3019(3e) enumerates corrupt practices: “giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage, preference through manifest partiality.” To be guilty, elements must concur:
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial
functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
3rd element may be committed in 3ways, and proof of any is enough to convict under RA3019(3e)
Explaining what “partiality,” “bad faith” and “gross negligence” mean, we held:
“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which “excites a disposition to see and report matters as they
are wished for rather than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.”
“Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property.”
P grossly negligent in all purchases. Admission that canvass sheets sent out by RJ to suppliers already
contained his signatures because he pre-signed the forms proves utter disregard for actions.
Admitted knowing LGC on personal canvass, but did not follow saying he merely followed practice of
his predecessors. Mindless disregard for law in a tradition of illegality. He should have been first to
follow the law. 4th element present, for while no undue injury proved, P gave unwarranted benefit or
preference to private suppliers, no damage necessary. “Unwarranted” means lacking adequate or
official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage”
means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit
from some course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another.
Facts:
Petitioner appeals from 2006 CA conviction for RA3019(3e) and RPC171 violations. P was Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner, when 11Indian nationals, 3 facing drug trafficking
charges, left country in 1994 on the basis of a BID Self-Deportation Order, saying that since BID has
not received prior written request to hold their departure from any government agency nor from
private person, and no indication that they were subject of written complaints, Indians cleared for
self-deportation. Issuance resulted in information against them (P, Associate Commissioner Bayani
Subido, Jr., Associate Commissioner Manuel Roxas) for RPC171 violation. Also charged under
RA3019(3e). Indians were arrested and detained by NBI for making methaqualone, subjected to
preliminary investigation. NBI wrote P requesting they be furnished Indians’ files. Deportation was
requested by Indians’ counsel, saying prosecution would only be costly for government, indorsed and
recommended by NBI. However, public prosecutor filed charges against Indians. BID received
requests for self-deportation days before the deportation indorsement was received by prosecutor.
At trial before Sandiganbayan, Subido said that day when they signed the order, it was P’s birthday,
had lunch. Order was presented to him with P’s signature, and recalling DOJ Secretary assuring them
no pending charges against Indians, he signed. Roxas said he went to P’s office and saw DOJ
Secretary, then presented with Order, saying no pending case nor Hold Departure Orders against
Indians, so signed. P said same thing, no pending cases, and prosecutor never communicated with
him, P allegedly unaware that Indians were undergoing preliminary investigation. P’s staff said when
instructed to conduct record check, no criminal records found, but they knew Indians were being
apprehended for drugs. 2006, Roxas and Subido exonerated, but P found guilty, 6-12years, that P had
ample information about the case, but granting however that no pending cases were against the
Indians, the order should have mentioned that fact, instead of saying there were no written requests
for their departure to be held. Also, the statement that Indians were not subject to any written
complaints was false because P knew they were under preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not P is guilty.
Held:
Yes. Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, violation for which petitioner was charged, provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Elements are:
a) Public officer;
b) Takes advantage of his official position;
c) Knows that what he imputes is false;
d) Falsity involves a material fact;
e) There is a legal obligation for him to narrate the truth;
f) Such untruthful statements are not contained in an affidavit or a statement required by law to
be sworn in.
2offenses share 2common elements: public officer, and act related to public position. RESPECTING
THE CHARGE OF VIOLATING 3 (E) OF RA 3019, the elements which must be indubitably proved are
whether petitioner acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith, and whether such action
caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or gave any party unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Both elements are present in this case.
Manifest partiality and evident bad faith evident from P’s stance that he was never aware of a case
filed in court. Even if true, P was informed by the Undersecretary through the Indorsement. At witness
stand, P admitted knowing they were under preliminary investigation. The deporation benefitted
those who would have stood trial.
RESPECTING THE CHARGE FOR FALSIFICATION, P untruthfully stated that there is no indication from
the records that the Indians are the subject of any written complaints before any government agency
nor before any private person. For that statement is belied by documentary evidence — the July 5,
1994 letter of NBI to petitioner, the July 28, 1994 Indorsement of Undersecretary to petitioner (of NBI
recommendation for the deportation of the Indians) and P's own August 4, 1994 4th Indorsement to
prosecutor. P cannot hide behind his subordinates, since he failed to disclose to staff doing check the
information that Indians were undergoing preliminary investigation. Since the BID is an attached
agency of the DOJ, P could have easily requested information on the outcome of the preliminary
investigation, of which he was informed about, or if a case had already been filed in court against the
Indians.
Whether the Prosecutor moved to obtain a hold departure order is beside the point, what is material
being that there was a pending preliminary investigation against the Indians, contrary to the
statement in the Order that "there is no indication from the records that the [Indians] are the subject
of any written complaint . . .," which pending preliminary investigation called for the provisional
dismissal of the deportation case.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to observe the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt in convicting the Accused-Petitioner
2. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the legal intent of the BOT
project
RATIO:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be convicted under the said
provision, the following elements must be established:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Petitioner: He cannot be held liable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 since the Municipality of
Muñoz did not disburse any money and the buildings demolished on the site of construction have
been found to be a nuisance and declared structurally unsafe, as per notice issued by the Municipal
Building Official. He points out that in fact, a demolition permit has been issued upon his application
in behalf of the municipal government. API also paid P500,000.00 demolition/relocation fee.
SC: NO.
● The use of the disjunctive word "or" connotes that either act of (a) "causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government"; and (b) "giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference," qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
● The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same
time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.
● Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan: Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not essential. It is
sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantial enough
and not merely negligible.
● Under the second mode of the crime defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 therefore, damage
is not required. In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has
given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.
● The third element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
● Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.
● Damage or injury caused by petitioner's acts though alleged in the information, thus need not be
proven for as long as the act of giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference either through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
was satisfactorily established.
● R.A. No. 6957 as amended by R.A. No. 7718, requires that a BOT project be awarded to the bidder
who has satisfied the minimum requirements, and met the technical, financial, organizational and
legal standards provided in the BOT Law.
● SEC. 5. Public Bidding of Projects. — . . .
● In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, the contract shall be awarded to the
bidder who, having satisfied the minimum financial, technical, organizational and legal standards
required by this Act, has submitted the lowest bid and most favorable terms for the project, based
on the present value of its proposed tolls, fees, rentals and charges over a fixed term for the
facility to be constructed, rehabilitated, operated and maintained according to the prescribed
minimum design and performance standards, plans and specifications. . . .
● Foremost of these minimum legal standards is the license accreditation of a contractor
required under R.A. No. 4566 otherwise known as the Contractors' License Law.
Petitioner: Assails the Sandiganbayan for allegedly failing to appreciate the legal intent of the BOT
Law which allows contracts on a negotiated basis for unsolicited proposals like the Wag-Wag
Shopping Mall project. It asserts that the procedure and requirements for bidding have been complied
with when the Municipality of Muñoz caused the publication of the invitation to submit comparative
bids for the BOT project was published in Pinoy, a newspaper of general circulation for three
consecutive weeks. Since no comparative bid/proposal was received within sixty (60) days, the BOT
project was rightfully awarded to API, the original proponent.
SC: NO.
● Unsolicited proposals refer to project proposals submitted by the private sector to undertake
infrastructure or development projects which may be entered into by a government agency or
local government unit. Section 4-a of R.A. No. 6957 as amended by R.A. No. 7718 governs
unsolicited proposals.
● It was the SB which invited the API to provide information on the construction of a shopping mall
project under the BOT scheme. It cannot be said thus that the development project originated
from the proponent/contractor. Nonetheless, even if the proposal is deemed unsolicited, still the
requirements of the law have not been complied with.
● As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, API's proposal showed that it lacked the
requirements as it did not include a company profile and the basic contractual terms and
conditions on the obligations of the proponent/contractor and the government.
FACTS:
● AAA is a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was 7 months old. She could only read
and write her name including that of her friends because she was not able to study on account of
her difficulty in walking.
● (1st) June 30, 1998, 4 AM: AAA was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro
Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
mashed her breast.
● (2nd) July 2, 1999, 3 AM: Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same
previous situation while the latter was sleeping.
● In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from
outside which illuminated the house.
● (3rd) July 8, 1998, 2 AM: Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. She
was asleep but she awakened when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA
exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter the room he shares with AAA’s mother. He
was nevertheless seen by AAA. According to her testimony, when she awakened, his organ was in
her mouth. Her mouth was open and the penis was inside for one second. When asked if the penis
was soft or hard, she mentioned that she got hold of it to push it out of her mouth.
● The victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
● July 8, 1998: 3 Informations
○ Criminal Case No. 19623-MN: (RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT– RA 8353)
■ July 8, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim
AAA, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, feloniously
putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her
consent.
○ Criminal Case No. 19624-MN : (SEXUAL ABUSE – RA 7610)
■ June 30, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim
AAA, 21 years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and
intimidation, feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
○ Criminal Case No. 19625-MN (SEXUAL ABUSE – RA 7610)
■ July 2, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila,accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim
AAA, 21 years old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and
intimidation, feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent.
● Pleaded not guilty. The prosecution relied on testimony of the victim, AAA, who identified Abello
as the perpetrator of the rape and sexual abuses against her.
● DEFENSE: Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, his defense is
confined to his denial of the accusations. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely
stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room after retiring home.
RTC: GUILTY under the three Informations: Rape, 2 counts of Sexual Abuse
ISSUES:
1. Whether the victim’s testimony should be given credence in light of the ff:
a. AAA was not alone during these alleged incidents (YES)
b. defendant is AAA’s stepfather who has a healthy sexual relationship with her mother
(YES)
c. AAA admitted that she was asleep when these incidents happened making it likely that
she could have just dreamed of them? (YES)
2. Whether he is guilty of rape by sexual assault under RA 8353 even if the mode of committing the
offense proven during trial was different from that alleged in the information? (YES)
3. Whether he is guilty of sexual abuse/acts of lasciviousness committed to a child under Sec. 5,
Article III of RA 7610 when the victim is not a child and there was no force or compulsion? (NO, but
still guilty under RPC 336 for acts of lasciviousness)
4. Whether he can be held guilty under RPC 336 even if the Informations wrongly designated R.A. No.
7610 as the law violated? (YES, proven during trial)
5. Whether the aggravating circumstance of relationship (stepfather) should be appreciated? (NO)
HELD: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION; Rape by sexual assault and 2 counts of Acts of lasciviousness
under RPC 336 and not RA 7610
1. AAA’s testimony credible. Surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence, and common
human experience are relied upon when there is difficulty in ascertaining as to who between the 2
parties present at the time of commission of the crime should be given credence.
● Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him. The substance and tenor of the
testimony and the element of motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward,
categorical and candid narration by the victim deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown
driving her to falsely testify against the accused.
a. Mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of
the offended party. AAA categorically and unmistakably identified Abello as her rapist and sexual
abuser; the identification was positive because the scene was illuminated by a light coming from
outside the parties’ house at the time of the incidents so she also saw him retreating to her mother’s
room.
● He had the opportunity and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his location and
close proximity to AAA who, together with her companions, were then sleeping. Abello
admitted that in the wee hours of the mornings of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998, he passed
by the sala of their house where AAA and her companions were sleeping.
b. His relationship with AAA does not insulate him from the crimes charged. The relationship between
the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the crime
against chastity. Studies show that 98.8% of the victims are women; an estimated 26.7% of these
cases involve sexual abuse, while 33% involve incest committed against children. In these cases, the
male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male relatives, have been identified as frequent
abusers.
3. NOT Acts of lasciviousness committed against a child or sexual abuse under RA 7610 but acts of
lasciviousness under RPC 336. (1) NOT A CHILD (21 years old) AND CAN TAKE CARE OF SELF, (2) NO
FORCE OR COMPULSION (merely awakened)
● Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child: Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse; (b) Those
who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
● The essential elements of this provision are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
5. NO. Relationship was not duly proven for failure to present the marriage contract between Abello
and AAA’s mother. Abello’s admission of his marriage is inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage
to AAA’s mother, as the marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact
of marriage.
NATURE: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision which affirmed the Decision of the RTC convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of the
crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603
● Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987.
Sometime in 1997: FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a
(MOA) entered into by FFF with the Heirs of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo.
● After the MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife decided to discontinue the lease because
they did not understand the management and accounting of FFF.
● They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond but FFF refused, asking
for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico.
● To solve the problem, appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the
fishpond, providing him with fingerlings, fertilizers and all necessary expenses.
● FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7AM after
pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed
accounting because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000.
● MMM, however, retorted, saying that they would no longer make any accounting, as Benny
Ronquillo, brother of appellant's wife, would finance the next cropping.
● Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the
fishpond. FFF's family resented this demand and a commotion ensued.
● BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter was able to parry the blow. Appellant
got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke.
● Intending not to hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV
appeared, got hold of the said piece of wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder.
● Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for
allegedly beating her. Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was
fabricated and was being used as a means to extort money from him.
● Ronald Lauren (witness): Testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but
appellant was able to parry the blow; that appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when
● RTC: Found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Cabahug admitted
that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that, at the
time VVV was hit, appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not
favor appellant because his demand for FFF's family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats
and punctuated with actual use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held
that the injuries sustained by VVV were distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and
that the force used was strong.
○ GUILTY of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610; ISL: 6
years prision correccional to 7 yrs and 4 months of prision mayor.,
● CA: The record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before the RTC belied
appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a
manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up
an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional.
● Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual
findings of the RTC.
● Information not defective since the allegations were explicit.
○ RTC decision UPHELD with modification as to the penalty.
ISSUES:
HELD: The Petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated February 20, 2007 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez issentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
RATIO:
Appellant’s Contentions:
● conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
● RTC erred when it shifted the burden of proof to him
● RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative defense when, all throughout
his testimony before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV
● VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him because of the pressure he exerted against
them to give up the fishpon
● VVV, in her testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back
of their house
● he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so earlier that
day
● if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination
● the Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts
complained of were covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
● The case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel and unusual
manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation.
● the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order
to subject him to a much heavier penalty.
SC:
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a
child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10 (a) of R.A. No.
7610.
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
● Araneta v. People: The provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty,
(c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from
one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. An accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he
commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse,
child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
● It is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things enumerated.
On appellant’s guilt
TOPIC: Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
INFORMATION: Information alleges that accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and knowingly sell Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, contained in a plastic
sachet, to a poseur-buyer, without authority of law, and one P500 peso bill was confiscated from the
accused to the damage and prejudice of the People of the Philippines.
Facts:
Civilian informant Iris Mae Cleofe came to Pasacao Police Station to report appellant’s alleged
drug trafficking activities. Task Force Ubash, a unit charged with monitoring drug trafficking in the
area, acted on this information and was directed to go with Iris and conduct surveillance upon
appellant.
After their surveillance yielded positive results, Task Force Ubash coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of the buy-bust operation which will take
place that same night at the ouse of one Edgar Saar. Solero, Commander of Ubash, briefed the team
on what do do. They were instructed to synchronize their watches because at exactly 7:30pm they
will enter the place immediately after Iris says, “Uya na and bayad ko. (Here is my payment.)” as a
signal that the transaction has been perfected.
At around 7pm, the team arrives and hides behind plants (yeah. awesome), which offered a
good view of the well-lit porch of Saar’s house. Iris arrives. She enters the house. She proceeds with
the transaction and handed over a marked P500 bill to appellant. She utters the signal, “O, uya na an
bayad ko kaiyan ha, baad kun wara-waraon mo iyan, uya na an bayad ko ha. (This is my payment,
you might misplace it.),” her deliberately loud for the team to hear. Appellant hands over a plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance. At this point, he was arrested and handcuffed. Ubash
brings him to the police station where he was detained. The sachet was personally submitted by
Bearis to the Provincial Crime Lab, where it was tested by Nobleza.
Test showed that the substance was Shabu. It was then submitted to the PNP Regional Crime
Lab office for confirmatory testing by Clemen, a forensic chemist. Again, positive for Shabu.
Defense version:
Appellant was in Pasacao for a job, and while there he stayed with his friend Saar. Around 7pm
that day, he saw Iris enter the yard and go into Saar’s house. Then she comes out so appellant asks
RTC Judgment:
Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentencing him to
life imprisonment.
CA affirms with Modification (added a fine of P500,000)
Issue:
W/N the procedure in the seizure and custody of illegal drugs was strictly complied with. (No)
Ratio:
Elements to be proven by the prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Sec. 5 of
RA 9165
1 identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration
2 the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor
These require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed. There is also a need to comply strictly with procedure in the illegal drug’s
procedure in its seizure and custody.
Evident from the record however, is the fact that the members of the buy-bust team did not
comply with the procedure laid down in Sec. 21. Looking at Solero’s testimony, there is no showing
that the procedure was complied with, as well as his admitting that he had not seen the inventory of
the confiscated drugs allegedly prepared by the police officers and that he only read a little of RA
9165.
Nonetheless, People v Pringas teaches that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Sec. 21
is not necessarily fatal. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court recognizes that strict compliance may not always be
possible given the circumstances, that the police operate under varied conditions and cannot at all
times attend to the niceties of the procedure in the handling of confiscated evidence.
For the clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. It must be shown that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen
seized from the accused. This function is performed by the chain of custody requirement.
In this case, there was no compliance with the inventory and photographing of the drug and
marked money. Every link must be accounted for.
Sabi ni Solero:
Solero ---> some desk officer whose name he can’t remember, which he promised to find out
but never did. Also, from the office ---> provincial crime lab, but can’t remember who brought it there
Sabi ni Bearis:
Solero ---> Bearis ---> provincial crime lab
He identified in court that it was the same specimen he brought since it had the marking
“MES,” the initials of Solero. No evidence however showing that Solero made said marking in the
presence of Bearis. It is thus unclear whether after Solero, the next person who came into possession
of the specimen was the desk officer or Bearis.
Sabi ni Nobleza:
Bearis ---> Nobleza (initial test) ---> SPO3 Basagre
Sabi ni Clemen (the chemist):
Insp Lopez ---> Clemen
Here we see that the prosecution failed to present evidence to show how the specimen was
transferred from Basagre to Lopez.
The obvious gaps in the chain of custody created a reasonable doubt as to whether the
specimen seized from appellant was the same specimen brought to the crime labs and eventually
offered in court as evidence. No proof of corpus delicti. Therefore the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot be used. The presumption obtains only where nothing in the
records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct
of official duty as provided for in the law.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the November 22, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620. Appellant JAY LORENA y LABAG is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any
other lawful cause/s.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision with deliberate
dispatch and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
ISSUE: W/N Gatlabayan is guilty “despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the chain of custody of
the alleged seized illegal drugs, in violation of Secs. 21 and 86 of R.A. NO. 9165.)
HELD: NO
RATIO:
● According to the Court, the core issue in this case was “whether or not sufficient evidence exists
to support the conviction of the accused for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.”. In
resolving this issue, the Court opted to review the factual findings of the lower court on the basis
of a misapprehension of facts.
● In establishing guilt for the offense of sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and seller were identified. All three elements must be
duly proven.
● Chain of custody - “means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.” (RA 9165 IRR, sec. 1(b)).
● On the corpus delicti - the very substance which was the subject of the buy-bust transaction
must be the same substance which was offered as evidence to the court.
● Malillin v. People - “As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.”
● What “links” in the chain of custody need to be proven, People v. Kamad - “First, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
Facts:
Alcuizar was charged with violating Sections 5 (Illegal Sale), 6 (Maintaining a drug den), 11
(Illegal possession), and 12 (Illegal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia) of R.A. No. 9165 in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-66343 - CBU-66346. He was tried on 2 separate criminal proceedings. The
instant appeal involved the joint trial of Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-66345 and CBU-66346 before RTC
Branch 17 of Cebu City. The Information relating to the criminal case appealed from pertains to illegal
possession of shabu in violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the genuineness, authenticity, and truthfulness
of the Forensic Chemistry Report. Both parties then agreed to dispense with the forensic chemist’s
testimony.
SP01 Agadier, P03 Rolando Gantuangco, SPO1 Roland Navales, who were all assigned at the
Municipality of Carcar Police Station in Cebu City, secured a search warrant from the court to search
the house of appellant on the suspicion that the latter is selling and in possession of shabu. On 15
June 2003, they conducted a buy-bust operation in Sitio Awayan, with the subject being the appellant:
SPO1 Agadier was standing in a store across the house of appellant. He witnessed the poseur buyer
hand the marked money to appellant in exchange for 1 deck of shabu. SPO1 Agadier then pursued
appellant, who ran to his parents' house, where he was eventually caught. After the arrest, SPO1
Agadier and his team went back to the house of appellant to conduct a search. The items recovered
inside appellant's house were:
· 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic pack with white crystalline substance, believed to be
shabu
· 2 packs containing 13 decks each of suspected shabu
· 3 disposable lighters
· 1 tooter
· 1 tin foil with traces of shabu residue
· 1 improvised lamp
SPO1 Agadier related that appellant, appellant's sister-in-law, 1 barangay captain, 1 barangay tanod,
and several photographers were present during the implementation of the search warrant. The
barangay captain, barangay tanod, and 2 photographers were asked to sign the receipt of the seized
items.
The seized items were initially in the custody of SPO1 Navales. Upon reaching the police station, SPO1
Navales turned them over to SPO1 Agadier for marking. SPO1 Agadier prepared the request for
laboratory examination before turning them over back to SPO1 Navales, who then delivered the items
and the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A Forensic Chemistry Report was issued, confirming
that the specimen submitted was positive for shabu.
RTC Branch 15 of Cebu City acquitted appellant of the charge of illegal sale of shabu and
maintaining a drug den in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU-66343 and CBU-66344.
Issue: WoN the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for
illegal possession of shabu
WHEREFORE, the 4 December 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00716
affirming the conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-
66345 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant ALBERTO BACUS ALCUIZAR is declared ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
Ratio:
The dangerous drug itself (the shabu) constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense, and in
sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. Evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant. Otherwise,
the prosecution for possession under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the
presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. In Lopez v. People,
citing Catuiran v. People, the Court held that:
“It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same….”
Appellant cites the failure of the police officer to mark the evidence immediately after purportedly
taking it from him, thus rendering the chain of custody dubious.
SPO1 Agadier admitted that he only marked the seized items at the police station. While the rule
allows marking of evidence to be done in the nearest police station, this applies to warrantless
searches and seizures. In this case, the police officers were able to secure a search warrant prior to
their operation. SPO1 Agadier did not offer an explanation or a justification on why he did not
immediately mark the plastic packs of shabu seized inside appellant's house. They were given
sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. Thus, failure to comply with the
marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes a 1 st gap in the chain of custody.
Appellant also points out the failure of the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory
receipt upon the accused or any of his family members pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.”
Under Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the prescribed
procedures does not necessarily result in the conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has
been compromised so that an acquittal should follow, as long as the prosecution can demonstrate
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.
SPO1 Agadier narrated that a certain photographer took pictures of the items seized from the house
of appellant. However, the photographs do not appear on the records, nor were they offered by the
prosecution as evidence. Thus, the requirement of taking a photograph was not clearly proven. While
the inventory receipt was prepared and appeared on records, the police officers failed to provide
appellant a copy. Appellant construed this omission as fatal.
This omission alone is not necessarily fatal to the cause of the prosecution. However, the Court stated
that the barangay tanod's testimony pertaining to the inventory receipt created a doubt that affected
the integrity of the corpus delicti in general: He and the barangay captain arrived later than the police
officers. When they reached appellant's house, the alleged confiscated shabu were already on top of
a table. He was merely asked to sign the inventory receipt, which he did without hesitation.
The barangay tanod did not witness how the police officers conducted their search and how they
were able to discover the packets of shabu inside appellant's house. Aside from the barangay tanod,
no other signatories in the receipt were presented by the prosecution to authenticate the document.
The 1st gap in the chain of custody was compounded by the vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier
regarding the transfer of custody of the shabu. The 2 nd gap in the chain of custody was evident in
SPO1 Agadier's statements: It was not indicated who had initial control and custody of the plastic
packs of shabu upon their confiscation. SPO1 Agadier merely claimed that he turned them over to
SPO1 Navales without specifying whether the latter received it while they were still inside the
appellant's house or at the police station. It is also not clear who was in possession of the plastic
packs of shabu while in transit. SPO1 Navales also did not testify to confirm the statement of SPO1
Agadier.
The failure of the police officers to mark the dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure and the
vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier concerning the custody of the drugs from the residence of
appellant up to the time it was submitted to the crime laboratory constitute a huge and significant
gap in the chain of custody, which substantially affects the identity of the corpus delicti.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
The Court entertained serious doubts as to whether the prohibited drugs were indeed found in
appellant's house, considering that there were no other witnesses presented to prove it. By the same
doubt, the Court had to acquit the appellant.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
● On the basis of a series of reports received by DAPCO-DEU, Muntinlupa City, from concerned
citizens concerning the illegal drug trade of alias Ricky in Quezon Street, Purok 7, Poblacion,
Muntinlupa City, the police operatives of the aforesaid office conducted a surveillance and
monitoring operation on 23 June 2003
● The surveillance and monitoring operation confirmed that alias Ricky was, indeed, engaged in the
sale of illegal drugs which usually took place late at night until dawn.
● June 24, 2003: at around 8:00 p.m., P/Insp. Arsenio Silungan, Chief of DAPCO-DEU formed a buy-
bust team to conduct a buy-bust operation against alias Ricky.
● The team was composed of various police operatives
○ PO1 Forastero: poseur-buyer
○ PO1 Medina: arresting officer
○ Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Zosimo Goce: team leader
○ SPO1 Joel Vega
○ SPO3 Hector Macalla
○ SPO3 Madriaga
○ PO1 Ronald Natuel
○ PO1 Reynold Aguirre
○ PO1 Gunayon
○ PO1 Respicio
○ PO1 Tan
○ PO1 Joseph Tedd Leonor
○ two civilian agents, namely
○ Dalton Ibañez
○ Charlie Isla
● The buy-bust team, thereafter, prepared the buy-bust money consisting of two P100 bills (Serial
Nos. JX 392195 and DY 711514)
● PO1 Aguirre signed the buy-bust money at the bottom thereof
● also photocopied and recorded in the police blotter (police record)
● A Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet was similarly prepared and transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) via facsimile
● After all the necessary documentary requirements had been completed, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the target area (Quezon Street, Purok 7, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City) on board two
vehicles(Toyota Revo and Anfra Van)
● PO1 Forastero, PO1 Medina, SPO1 Goce, SPO3 Macalla, SPO3 Madriaga and the two civilian agents
boarded the Toyota Revo while the rest of the buy-bust team boarded the Anfra Van
● Upon reaching the area of operation at around 9:30 p.m., the team strategically parked the two
vehicles 50 meters away from each other
● While inside the Revo, PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina saw their confidential informant some 40
meters away waiting for them. They nevertheless stayed inside the Revo as they were still waiting
for a text message coming from another asset who would confirm alias Ricky's presence at
the target area.
● After an hour, the aforesaid asset texted SPO3 Macalla saying that alias Ricky was already at the
target area.
● PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina then alighted from the vehicle. Upon seeing them, the confidential
informant promptly approached and accompanied them to alias Ricky's place.
2 separate informations
1 Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals)
2 Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs)
ISSUE: W/N appellant is guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(YES)
● We rely on the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that
certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied.
● For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the
following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
○ What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
○ Clearly, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like
shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the
police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by
appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is
already consummated.
○ Prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drugs sale beyond moral certainty.
○ The testimony of PO1 Forastero explicitly described how the sale transaction of shabu
between him and appellant occurred (i.e. the narration of facts by the prosecution) The
exchange of the buy-bust money and the small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
white crystalline substance later confirmed as shabu already consummated the sale
○ PO1 Forastero positively identified appellant to be the same person who sold to him one
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of shabu for P200.00. When the small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet of shabu was presented in court, he also identified it to be
the same object sold to him by appellant because of the markings "RU" representing
appellant's initials, which PO1 Forastero himself has written thereon. He also identified in
court the recovered buy-bust money with the signature of PO1 Aguirre at the bottom; their
serial numbers matched the photocopy thereof
● As to illegal possession of shabu it must be shown that (elements): (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. These
are all present in this case.
○ Incident to appellant's lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, 20 more sachets
of shabu were recovered in his possession by PO1 Medina
○ In court, both PO1 Medina and PO1 Forastero identified them to be the same objects
recovered from appellant while he was being frisked during his arrest for illegally selling
HELD: CA affirmed.
FACTS:
· Feb 26 2004: 2 members of the Galas Police Station, P/Insp Armenta and PO2 Zamora receive a
report from an informant that a certain alias “Idol” was selling drugs in Brgy. San Isidro, QC. Report is
brought before Col. Robert Razon
· Razon forms a buy-bust team; Armenta designated as poseur-buyer, given a P100 bill which he
marked with his initials JA; Armenta also prepares report to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA)
· Armenta and informant meet with “Idol” (who turns out to be Arnold Castro) in Brgy. San Isidro:
Castro asked P/Insp. Armenta how much, to which the latter responded "piso", which meant
Php100.00. 18 P/Insp. Armenta then handed the one hundred peso buy-bust money to Castro. 19 The
latter, in turn, gave him a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that he
pulled out from his pocket. Afterwards, P/Insp. Armenta scratched his head to signal to his team
members that the transaction was already consummated. 21 Accordingly, the buy-bust team
immediately closed in and arrested Castro. PO2 Zamora informed Castro of his violation, frisked him
and recovered from his pocket 2 more transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline substance, as
well as the marked money. P/Insp. Armenta took custody of the transparent plastic sachet that Castro
sold to him, while PO2 Zamora kept the marked money and the two (2) other plastic sachets which he
recovered.
· 3 sachets are confirmed positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (AKA SHABU)
ISSUE/HELD:
· W/N Castro is guilty of the offenses charged (YES)
RATIO:
· Re: chain of custody (passing of the drugs) not proved conclusively: Admittedly, testimony
about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain. Nonetheless, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items… Concomitantly, it is Castro who
bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with
to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers, as
well as a presumption that said public officers properly discharged their duties.
· In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
Significantly, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance
seized as evidence.
· As the poseur-buyer, P/Insp. Armenta positively identified Castro during trial as the
seller of the illegal drugs. He also testified that, using the marked money, he paid for the
object of the crime, i.e., the shabu that was handed to him by Castro. Notably, the
testimony of P/Insp. Armenta was substantially corroborated by PO2 Zamora.
R.A. No. 9262 (The Violence Against Women and Their Children Act)"