THE CUSTOMS AND RIVER BRIDGES ACT AND THE EXPANDED ANTI-EUPHORIA

ACT ARE ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY TO RESTHEL’S INTERNATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1941 PELLEGRINO CONCORDAT
Resthel is bound by the Pellegrino Concordat.
The Resthelian government signed the Concordat.
The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the consent of all the participating States. The
text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive by signature. The signature of the
parties also shows their consent to be bound by such treaty.
The signing of the Pellegrino Concordat by both Resthel and Arrepy shows their consent to the
provisions of the Concordat, hence, both countries are bound by it.
Principal Assent is not necessary in order for the Pellegrino Concordat to be binding upon
Resthel.
Once a State has signed a treaty, no government official of such State may claim that the intent
was any less than an international agreement.
Resthel’s contention that the Pellegrino Concordat is not binding upon them because it has ‘not
received Principal Assent’ is not a hindrance for the Concordat to be binding upon them. Art. 37
of the Pellegrino Concordat states that “The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this
Concordat. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of this Concordat.” Such Article is to the effect that the Concordat creates legal
obligations upon the parties upon signing including the obligation to ensure that the Concordat
will be given effect.
The long-standing practice of Resthel in allowing the free movement of goods and persons has
given rise to an obligation to continue allowing such free movement
The practice of free passage through one country, when continued over an extensive period,
shows that the practice has been accepted as law as between the States exercising such practice,
thus giving rise to a right and a correlative obligation to ensure the continuity of such practice.
There is no requirement regarding a specific duration over which the practice was allowed, as
long as there is consistency and generality. There was a constant and uniform practice allowing
free passage of goods and free movement of persons between Arrepy and Resthel, evidenced by
the fact that ever since the signing of the Concordat in the 1940s, visa-free travel for Arrepyan
pilgrims and non-subjecting of goods between the states to customs declaration have been
practiced consistently.
The failures of the Arrepyan political system in the 70s and 80s as argued by the Resthelian
Prime Minister is not a fundamental change of circumstance which may be invoked as a ground
for the termination of the Concordat.
Resthel’s contention that fundamental changes in circumstance have effectively terminated the
Concordat is untenable.
Change in circumstances as a ground for termination of treaties requires that the change be with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by
the parties. The existence of the changed circumstances must also have constituted an essential
basis of consent of the parties to be bound, and the change radically transforms the extent of
obligations under the treaty. In addition, the changes must have increased the burden of the
obligations to be executed.

The Customs and River Bridges (CURB) Act and The Expanded Anti-Euphoria Act (EAEA) are
in violation of the 1941 Pellegrino Concordat
The EAEA violates Art. 7 of the Concordat.
Art. 7 of the Concordat prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and exports including
measures having similar effects, between the Contracting Parties. Contrary to this provision, the
EAEA imposed a strict quota on opium poppy imports, causing a 60% decline in opium poppy
imports from Arrepy, resulting in an economic shock. The Arrepyan economy also entered into a
Depression, and thousands of Arrepyan poppy farmers and traders lost their sources of income.
The CURB Act violates Art. 21 of the Concordat.
Art. 21 of the Pellegrino Concordat states that “Freedom of movement of persons shall be
secured between the respective territories of the Contracting Parties without prejudice to any
exception justified on the grounds of public morality; public policy or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants and of the environment; the protection
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property.” Because of the CURB Act customs screening was
intensified on all 8 bridges along the El Caiman River and the Juril International Airport, as well
as in the suspension of the operation of the El Caiman River Ferry. Such suspension greatly
affects the movement of Arrepyans into Resthelian Border since only the ferry, bridges,
commercial air travel and overland routes are the ways to cross the border between the two
countries. With the CURB Act, all modes of transportation became a difficulty for the
Arrepyans. It is shown by the decline in number of the Lathan Pilgrims being able to attend the
pilgrimage.
Moreover, The Drug Intelligence Board recommended that a special joint task force of customs
and police officers be set up specifically to search Lathan pilgrims which shows that even if the
customs restriction was based on reasonable grounds as above mentioned, it is in violation of the
exception provided in the succeeding paragraph of the same Article which states that “such
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on travel between the territories of the Contracting Parties.”
THE OFFICIAL ACTS OF RESTHELIAN CUSTOMS AND POLICE AGENTS AGAINST
ARREPYAN NATIONALS WHO ARE PRACTITIONERS OF THE LATHAN FAITH
VIOLATE THEIR RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION, FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT
The Resthelian officials violated the Lathan pilgrims’ right to free exercise of their religion
The officials violated the pilgrims’ right to manifest their religion contrary to Art. 18(1) of the
ICCPR
Focus on inability to worship their gods through the El Diente Festival and/or the Sacred
Pilgrimage of Cleansing

The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which

-
includes the freedom to hold beliefs) in article 18.1 is far-reaching and
profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal
conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested
individually or in community with others. (General Comment 22)
- Freedom of religion is a principle that supports the
freedom of an individual or community, in public or private, to
manifest religion orbelief in teaching, practice, worship, and
observance. It also includes the freedom to change one's
religion or beliefs.
- Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. The
freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised “either
individually or in community with others and in public or private”. The
freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship
extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief,
as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building
of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display
of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest. In the case
of Arrepy, it is the conduct of the rituals and festivals such as the Sacred
Pilgrimage and the El Diente Sagrado.
 - The right of Arrepyans to freely exercise their religion is
encumbered by the act of officers to detain Lathan practitioners in the
conduct of their faith when they were subjected to humiliating bodily
searches and the interception of Vicarios and other participants of the
pilgrim (par. 34 & 35 of facts).
- They were unable to exercise their freedom of religion because of
the acts of the customs officials in searching all those crossing the
bridges which resulted in an egregious drop in the number of attendees.
As well as the fact that they may no longer conduct the El Diente
Festival because of the confiscation of the Diente Sagrado. They were
only able to continue with the Sacred Pilgrimage by wielding an image
of their icon which is a manifestation of their inability to freely exercise
the right to freedom of religion and violative of the ICCPR.
- However, under article 18(3), the freedom to manifest
religion or beliefs may be limited as prescribed by law and when
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
- BHINDER v. CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY
COMPANY For example, the Committee has upheld a legal
requirement for railway workers to wear protective headgear for safety
purposes, even where that requirement precluded the wearing of a
turban by a Sikh. However, under article 18(3), the freedom to
manifest religion or beliefs may be limited as prescribed by law and
when necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The grounds for
permissible limitations do not include national security expressly,
although of course this may be an aspect covered of/covered by other
express limitations. The Human Rights Committee has stated that
limitations must be necessary to achieve the desired purpose, and
must be proportionate to the need on which the limitation is
predicated. (General Comment 22)
The officials committed religious discrimination in violation of Art. 26 of the ICCPR
Focus on the fact that only Lathans are targeted

In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States

-
parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed
under the Covenant, including the right to equality and non-
discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26.
Limitations imposed must be established by law and must not be applied
in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18.
- Religious discrimination is an offshoot of a violation of Article
18 that is embodied in Art. 26. While these conventions deal only with cases of
discrimination on specific grounds, the Committee believes that the term “discrimination” as
used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an
equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. Thus as a general rule the possibility for pilgrims to
journey to sacred places as acts of devotion prescribed by their religion or belief — whether
inside or outside their own country — should be assured

- The fact that a religion is recognized as a State religion or that it

is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the
majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18
and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or
non-believers.
- If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions,
statutes, proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this
shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or
any other rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any
discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or
who oppose it.
 - The right of Arrepyans to freely exercise their religion is
encumbered by the creation of a Special Task force directed specifically
to search Lathan pilgrims under DIBA and the fact that Resthelians kept
tweeting "#PlantingHappiness" as well as when Princess passed the
EAEA and CURB (par. 33&34 of facts). These is are manifestation of
religious discrimination.

A. The Resthelian officials violated the Lathan pilgrims’ right to freedom of

movement
1) Being lawfully within the country, the Lathan pilgrims are entitled
to liberty of movement as provided in Art. 12 of the ICCPR

ARTICLE 9 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and

security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of
the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him.

3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or
to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be

entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order
his release if the detention is not lawful.
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions

except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own

country

2) The incommunicado detention of the Lathan pilgrims by the

Resthelian officials violate the Lathan pilgrims’ right to freedom of movement
and the right to security of a person.
⁃ Freedom of movement includes the right to liberty and
security of a person.
⁃ For instance, while emphasizing the need for a case-by-
case approach, the European Court of Human Rights has in this regard
stated that in delineating the scope of Freedom of movement, “the
starting-point must be [the person’s] concrete situation and account
must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration,
effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.
Additionally, the difference between deprivation of and restriction upon
liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not of nature or substance”
(Austin and Others v United Kingdom, Application No. 39692/09,
40713/09 and 41008/09, para 57)
⁃ The right to security of person protects individuals
against intentional infliction of bodily or mental injury, regardless of
whether the victim is detained or non-detained. For example,
officials of States parties violate the right to personal security when
they unjustifiably inflict bodily injury. Par. 34 of the facts shows the
conduct of humiliating unreasonable searches and seizure among the
Lathan Pilgrims (General Comment 35, par 9, 24,25,26 refer to
clarification 8-10).
⁃ Par. 2 of Article 9 of the ICCPR mposes two
requirements for the benefit of persons who are deprived of liberty.
First, they shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for
the arrest. Second, they shall be promptly informed of any charges
against them. The first requirement applies broadly to the reasons for
any deprivation of liberty. The second, additional requirement
applies only to information regarding criminal charges.76 If a person
already detained on one criminal charge is also ordered detained to
face an unrelated criminal charge, prompt information must be
provided regarding the unrelated charge.
⁃ Paragraph 3 Article 9 requires, firstly, that any person
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power. That requirement applies in all cases without exception and
does not depend on the choice or ability of the detainee to assert it.89
The requirement applies even before formal charges have been
asserted, so long as the person is arrested or detained on suspicion of
criminal activity.90 The right is intended to bring the detention of a
person in a criminal investigation or prosecution under judicial
control. Prompt delivery to judicial officials is absent in the facts
obtained as was shown in Par. 7 and 8 of the clarification of facts.
(General Comment 35, par. 32)
⁃ Paragraph 34 of General Comment 35 enunciates a
violation of paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the ICCPR whenever a person is
not brought under the judicial power of a judge. This violation is exhibited
in Paragraph 10 of Clarifications.
⁃ The liberty of movement protected by article 12 of the
Covenant and the liberty of person protected by article 9
complement each other. Detention is a particularly severe form of
restriction of liberty of movement, but in some circumstances both
articles may come into play together.170 Detention in the course of
transporting a migrant involuntarily, is often used as a means of
enforcing restrictions on freedom of movement. Article 9 addresses
such uses of detention in the implementation of expulsion,
deportation or extradition. (General Comment 35 par 60)
 ⁃ Alternative non-custodial measures should always be
considered first and given preference before resorting to detention. Any
restrictions on the rights to liberty or to freedom of movement for
immigration control purposes should be considered only to prevent
irregular migrants or asylum-seekers from absconding, to verify their
identity, or ensure their compliance with a removal order. Detention of
irregular migrants and asylumseekers will therefore only be lawful when
the authorities can demonstrate in each individual case that alternatives
will not be effective, and that it is necessary and proportionate to achieve
one of these three objectives (General Comment 35, par. 18). This is
expressly manifested in paragraph 35 of the facts showing that the
Resthelian Customs Officers intercepted Lathan pilgrims in the course of
their travel to Resthel followed by their detention in Paragraoh 36.

⁃ Lawful detention, however, affects more

specifically the right to personal liberty and is covered
by article 9 of the Covenant. In some circumstances,
(General
articles 12 and 9 may come into play together.
Comment 27)

⁃ The permissible limitations which may be

imposed on the rights protected under article 12 must
not nullify the principle of liberty of movement, and are
governed by the requirement of necessity provided for
in article 12, paragraph 3, and by the need for
consistency with the other rights recognized in the
Covenant. (General Comment 27, par 3)
⁃ Once a person is lawfully within a State, any
restrictions on his or her rights guaranteed by article 12,
paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as any treatment different
from that accorded to nationals, have to be justified
3
under the rules provided for by article 12, paragraph 3.
It is, therefore, important that States parties indicate in
their reports the circumstances in which they treat
aliens differently from their nationals in this regard and
how they justify this difference in treatment. This was
 shown in Par. 34 of the facts involving the conduct of
unreasonable searches and seizures towards Lathan
pilgrims.

⁃ Subject to the provisions of article 12,

paragraph 3, the right to reside in a place of one’s
choice within the territory includes protection against
all forms of forced internal displacement. It also
precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons in a
defined part of the territory. This is manifested in
paragraphs 28 and 35 of the facts.
⁃ Due to the interception of the Resthelian customs officials
on the bridges, Lathan practitioners were subjected to humiliating searches
and seizures and were placed under detention by the Resthelian officials
after having found poppy with them during the impending conduct of the
next Sacred Pilgrimage which not only violated the Arrepyans' right to
freedom of movement but also their right to security.

RESTHEL MUST IMMEDIATELY RETURN THE DIENTE SAGRADO TO ARREPY, ITS

LAWFUL OWNER
1ast argue: Arrepy is the lawful owner of the Diente Sagrado.
1st point: Under cultural internationalism, the Diente Sagrado belongs to Arrepy.
cultural property internationalism "is shorthand for the proposition that everyone has an
interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property, wherever it is situated, from
whatever cultural or geographic source it derives." "views cultural property as belonging to the
world's peoples and not limited to the citizens of the state where the property is located. ' cultural
property internationalism views cultural heritage as the provenance of a global community,
rather than the provenance of the territorially limited nation-state
Cultural Nationalism: cultural nationalism argue that sovereignty and possession remain
with the state for the following reasons: (1) because cultural property is an expression of a
civilization that existed or is currently existing within a state, its citizens thus have a stronger
claim based on identification and national pride; (2) retention of sovereignty provides the context
of cultural property; and (3) cultural property usually has utilitarian qualities, including market
value, that may be harnessed by the state and its people. In sum, cultural property nationalism
aligns the significance of an artifact with the people and within the territory in which the artifact
resides.
The requirement that nation-states sign the World Heritage Convention before they are
eligible to nominate sites within their sovereign territory assures that any nationstate who
receives the benefits of listing has pledged to protect their natural and cultural property.
OWNERSHIP: This is expressed for example by the fact that the time limitation given to
the owner to claim the object – 3 years in the United States of America – does not start on the
day of theft, but on the day when the owner is able to identify the acquirer. Having all the
elements, the owner can bring its claim for return.
.
2nd argument: Resthel has an obligation to return the Diente Sagrado.
1st png: The Diente Sagrado is a stolen cultural object as defined in the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
We can briefly mention two international organisations currently involved in projects
leading to uniform law for the protection of cultural heritage at a regional level: the Council of
Europe and the European Union
In Beyeler v. Italy (2000), the court had to decide whether the Italian authorities in charge of the
protection of national treasures violated human rights (right to be heard, right to hold property
and to be compensated if taken) when they qualified Vincent van Gogh’s painting “Portrait of a
Young Peasant“ as an Italian national treasure to be retained on Italian territory.

However according to Court’s case-law, a fair balance has to be

achieved between the legitimate public aim and the interference.
Having analyzed the conditions in which the pre-emption was
exercised (as summarized above), the Court held that the Italian State,
representing the Ministry, did not respect the principle of fair balance
and therefore violated
According to these national implementations, Member States may ask the competent
courts of any other Member State to return cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory
of the requesting Member State. In so doing, the requested Member State enforces foreign public
law prohibiting the removal of national cultural objects. Taking the English case Kingdom of
Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. (1986), the plaintiff (Kingdom of Spain) could today
ask for the return of the unlawfully removed Goya painting under the British statutory instrument
implementing the Directive and would not be restricted to ask only for a declaratory judgment
that the painting was unlawfully removed from Spanish territory. The Directive and
implementing national legislation only apply between Member States of the European Union and
the EEA. Return proceedings brought by a nonMember State, as in the British case Attorney
General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, are not governed by the Directive and the implementing
national legislation of the requested State. The general rules still apply and it is very likely that
today the Ortiz-case would be decided with the same result as in 1984. It is up to every Member
State of the European Union to extend the European policy to their

2nd pt: Resthel is a possessor of a stolen cultural object in possession of Resthel

ART 3 (4), CHAPTER 3, 1995 UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN OR
ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS. However, a claim for restitution of
a cultural object forming an integral part of an identified monument or
archaeological site, or belonging to a public collection, shall not be subject to time
limitations other than a period of three years from the time when the claimant
knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor.

((1) The possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it.

(2) For the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object which has been unlawfully

excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen,

when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place.

(3) Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a period of three years from the
time

when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its
possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the time of the
theft.))

First, there are States which mainly provide for the law of the location of the object on
the day of the claim. It’s a first system (ex. 1966 Stroganoff-Sherbatov case and 1968, Koerfer v.
Goldschmidt case). This link to the location of the object on the day when the claim is brought
has been strongly criticised because, it was said, the sole transfer of an object from one country
to another should not lead to a change of owner. This would in fact be too easy. It was said that
as long as an object has been regularly acquired in a country, this right must subsist and must be
recognised when the object is transferred in another country.
This judgment gives me the conclusion of this first part, that is to say that common law
does not give a satisfactory and uniform solution to the problem of the international return of
cultural objects, whether the return is asked by the dispossessed owner or a State on the ground
of the protection of its cultural heritage. International conventions must therefore take over
from common law. (Regional Meeting on “Prevention of illicit traffic and other illegal actions
related to cultural properties” Research officer, Marina Schneider, UNIDROIT, UN
RESOLUTION)
 BINDING BA? Resolutions and decisions are formal expressions of the
opinion or will of UN organs. Many types of resolutions on a broad range of
topics have been adopted by the principal organs and their subsidiaries
since the establishment of the organization in 1945. In general, resolutions
adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. (“The
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”)