Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984

FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Morlando J. Gonzaga for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition to review by certiorari the order dated December 21, 1981 of
respondent Pacito G. Mutia, 1 then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court (now
Municipal Trial Court) of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, which imposed as a condition in
granting probation to petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon that she refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.

Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by
the then Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words
against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) and the appellate
court, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact that the crime was
committed in the office of the complainant in the public school building of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties during office hours, increased the penalty imposed by respondent judge and
sentenced petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On the same date petitioner
applied for probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting
of petitioner's probation for a period of three (3) years.

On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's

probation, but modified the Probation Officer's recommendation by increasing the
period of probation to five (5) years and by imposing the following
conditions: têñ.£îhqwâ£

(a) To present herself to the jprobation officer designated to undertake her

supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within seventy-
two hours from receipt of said order;

(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place designated by

the Probation Officer at least once a month in person;

(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer and not
change her residence without prior written approval;

(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and place of work or
an authorized Social Worker;

(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;

(f) To pay the cost;

(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the

defendant and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her
freedom of conscience; and

(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession.

Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition was rejected by respondent judge.
Hence, the petition at bar alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the
said condition that petitioner should "refrain from continuing her teaching profession."
The petitioner submits that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her
rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the
probation law and prays that the said condition be deleted from the order granting her
probation. On petitioner's motion, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.

The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into
general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions,
enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a)
present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those additional
conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may
additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside
of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in
character 2 and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as
the probationer's constitutional rights are not jeopardized. 3 There are innumerable
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed
in their specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special
or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual
Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case
should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and
capacity of the probationer. 4 The very liberality of the probation should not be made a
tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she knows and as such she
possesses special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as District
Guidance Coordinator and always designated as District-in-Charge whenever the
District Supervisor is out of town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study
and Development. It also appears that she is an outstanding member of the Misamis
Occidental Girl Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field
Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of
the Distinct Federated Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource person
in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments and re-elected Board Member of
the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from
teaching would deprive the students and the school in general the benefits that may be
derived from her training and expertise. While it is true that probation is a mere
privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. 5 Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest
must be observed. 6 In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and
profession of petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and
occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would
practically prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation.

Respondents contend that petitioner's final conviction carries with it the accessory
penalties in addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment; and since petitioner was
sentenced to arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, she must likewise suffer the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner,
however, because she was granted probation. The imposition of her sentence of
imprisonment was thereby suspended and necessarily, the imposition of the accessory
penalties was likewise thereby suspended.

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a

suspension of the imposition of sentence. 7 It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. 8

In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the petition and hereby orders that
paragraph (h) of the questioned order granting probation which requires that petitioner
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession be deleted. The temporary
restraining order is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 He has since been appointed as and is now the incumbent City Fiscal of Oroquieta City.
2 Balleta, Jr. vs. Judge Leviste, 92 SCRA 719; Santos To vs. Pano, 120 SCRA 8; Yusi vs.
Morales, 121 SCRA 853.
3 Charles Newman, Sourcebook on Probation, Parole and Pardons, Third Edition, p. 129.
4 Sergio F. Go, The Period and Conditions of Probation, p. 43, (1977 Probation Seminar).
5 Tolentino vs. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92.
6 Ibid.
7 Commonwealth ex rel. Paige vs. Smith, 198 A. 812, 813, 815, l30 Pa. Super. 536.
8 Ibid.
 EN BANC
URBANO M. MORENO, G.R. No. 168550
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TINGA,
and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents. GARCIA, and
VELASCO, J., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 10, 2006

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition[1] dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
Resolution[2] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming
the Resolution[3] of the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn,
disqualified him from running for the elective office
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

The following are the undisputed facts:

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running

for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28
of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayonv. Mutia,[4] the imposition
of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby
suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law),
the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of
the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him
all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for
in the July 15, 2002 elections.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended
that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.

The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to
the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.[5] Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years
thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did
not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because
it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications
of elective local officials.

In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
 In its Comment[6] dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec[7]definitively settled a similar
controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

Moreno filed a Reply to Comment[8] dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly
warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a
conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered
by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that
case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his
conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.

In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period
specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result.Hence, the disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.

The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within
two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....

We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary
Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude
falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary
Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification
because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed resolutions,
is his alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from
his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense
punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides,
a determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of
this case, the crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
 In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement
therein that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which
petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this
case. At any rate, the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should have been
interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in
the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code.

The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not
even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which,
however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a
relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible,
did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. [9]

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and commonsense, means the confinement
of a convicted

person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. [10] This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the
law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
probation.

Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he
did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the
trial court.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that
petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period[11] imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office
is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service
of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation,[12] the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.[13]

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this
case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his
application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.

The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by
reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the
two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even
begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted. Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for
public office.

Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
which gives room for judicial interpretation,[14] our conclusion will remain the same.

It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as
to the intended meaning of the phrase service of sentence, i.e., whether the legislature also meant
to disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this
seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government
Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are
qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be
extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been
convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on
probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
the Probation Law became applicable.[16]

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers
a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered
by the disqualification.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in
1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved
the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed
to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayonv. Mutia on the effect of probation on the
disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is
a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that
a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. [17]

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope
of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we
here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his
conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from
the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation
calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief
[18]
Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec where he said that it would be far better to
err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on

Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15,
2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-19.
[2]
Id. at 20-26; Penned by Commissioner F.A. Tuason, Jr.
[3]
Id. at 27-31; Penned by Commissioner R.Z. Borra.
[4]
No. L-59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148.
[5]
Comelec Resolution No. 4801, otherwise known as the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy in Connection
with the Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, has a similar provision in Sec. 3(a) thereof.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 37-47.
[7]
327 Phil. 1144 (1996).
[8]
Rollo, pp. 60-70.
[9]
Lagrosa v. People, G.R. No. 152044, July 3, 2003, 405 SCRA 357.
[10]
Art. 86 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor,
prison correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the
Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.
[11]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 43.
[12]
Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended, Probation Law of 1976. Sec. 14. The period of probation of a defendant
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one (1) year shall not exceed two (2) years, and in all other cases, said period
shall not exceed six (6) years.
[13]
Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended, Probation Law of 1976. Sec. 10.
[14]
Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 120721, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 162.
[15]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 642, 652 (1999).
[16]
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, Probation Law of 1976, Sec. 9.
[17]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647,
April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 414.
[18]
327 Phil. 521 (1996).