Cornejo vs Provincial Board of Rizal

Due process is violated only if an office is considered property. However, a public office is not property within the
constitutional guaranties of due process. It is a public trust or agency. As public officers are mere agents and not rulers
of the people, no man has a proprietary or contractual right to an office. Every officer accepts office pursuant to law and
holds office as a trust for the people whom he represents.

Facts:

 Petitioner Cornejo was suspended Mayor of Pasay

 Respondent Gabriel, Provincial Governor, had received numerous complaints abut Cornejo hence imposed
temporary suspension and conduct an investigation regarding the matter

 Cornejo now sought to restrain respondent and reinstate him as Mayor

Cornejo’s Contention: He has been deprived of his office without the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.

Gabriel’s and Board’s Answer: Governor and the Board are just complying with the requirements of the law.

Issue: WON the suspension of petitioner by respondent violated his right to due process.

Held: NO

The Court ruled that as a Provincial Governor, he may take three course whenever he receives a complaint against a
Municipal President:

1. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender;

2. If maladministration is more serious, he may temporarily suspend the offender; and

3. Thereafter may file written charges against the offender with the provincial board.

The court mentioned that in ordinary cases, a public official should not be removed or suspended without notice,
charges, a trial and an opportunity for explanation. However, the court acknowledged that there are exceptions to the due
process of law rule, which the court considered applicable in this case.

The court said that the case at bar is an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding where both
are based on diff erent principles.

In judicial proceedings, due process is a matter of right while in administrative proceedings it is otherwise, hence in
administrative proceedings, the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law

For the petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an offi ce as
property, it however well settled that a public office is not a property within the sense of the constitutional
guarantees of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.

Article IV of Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code, provides:

"The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the
offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension
is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten days."

Aguirre vs Secretary of Justice

FACTS:

On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal Code
particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz,
Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of
respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral
vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre.
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated
or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a
vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation.
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law
sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in
any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and
medicine.
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did
not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition stating
that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in
the questioned resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation

RULING:

No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art.
262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation;
and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential
organ for reproduction.

According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical self.
NAMIL v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540 (October 28, 2003) EN BANC While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a
broad power to enforce all election laws, the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. Elected officials
cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process in the proceedings before COMELEC exercising
its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in
appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, COMELEC is without power to
partially.

Facts: On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as
winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners
as well. Private respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon
receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department, the Regional Election
Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them found the second
proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation of the private
respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already
taken their oath and have assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were
not accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process principle.

Issue: Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects thereof without notice
and hearing.

Held: No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and
validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office
without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and
hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any
motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo vs.
COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing.
 Arroyo vs DOJ

NATURE:

These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose
Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision 3
dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary
Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases

In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended
that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:

1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the
Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby
declared VALID.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:

1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint
Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved
by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the
court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the
amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one
office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-
filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
“extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate
ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time
to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government
must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This
is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local
state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of
the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution