EDUC 525: THE LAW ASSIGNMENT 1

Learning Task #1: The Law Assignment

University of Calgary

Dr. J. K. Donlevy

EDUC 525-01

Oct 25th, 2018

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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
The Law Assignment: Student Drivers

Before demonstrating the negligence of Lindsay Waterman, Amanda Ballard, and Prim

Irwin, it is important to establish certain assumptions arising from the hypothetical, namely: (i)

the fact that Lindsay Waterman dismissed her class at 3:00 p.m. does not negate the fact that the

time of the accident (3:05 p.m.) occurred during official school hours, which ordinarily ends at

3:30 p.m. and (ii) the physical education activity at Marabelle Resort Golf Course was a school-

sponsored activity.

Lindsay Waterman, the supervising teacher for the school-sponsored activity, acted in a

negligent manner and this caused the damages to the plaintiff. The duty of care of a teacher to

their students is laid out in Section 18(f) of the School Act, which states that a teacher providing

instruction or supervision must “maintain, under the direction of the principal, order and

discipline among the students while they are in the school or on the school grounds and while

they are attending or participating in activities sponsored or approved by the board” (School Act,

2000, p. 26). The principle of in loco parentis also plays a role as Waterman held the

responsibilities of an unofficial guardian of the plaintiff. Waterman’s actions were negligent as

she had a direct duty of care to her student, Prim Irwin.

The second element of negligence is the standard of care provided. A careful and diligent

person would have upheld the School District Policy, which states that a student cannot transport

another student in a private vehicle to school-sponsored activities during school hours.

Waterman should not have let Ballard drive another student from the facility and should have

ensured all students had safe transportation to the off-campus facility and back to the school.

Waterman failed to uphold the standard of care that a reasonable and prudent parent would

provide and this contributes to her negligence.

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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
The third element of negligence is foreseeability. In allowing Ballard to break policy and

drive another student from a school-sponsored activity, Waterman could have foreseen an

accident occurring. Driving is widely perceived as a dangerous activity, especially for younger

and inexperienced motorists, and Waterman could have foreseen the inherent risks. It is probable

that Waterman could have anticipated a motor vehicle accident happening as her students drove

back to the school. As established by Bain V. Calgary Board of Education (1993), a teacher can

be found negligent even when students are not being directly supervised at the time of an

accident.

The fourth element of negligence is causation. But for the teacher’s action of allowing the

students to break district policy regarding driving other students to and from events, outside of

the city, the damages to the plaintiff would not have occurred. A reasonable person would have

ensured all students had safe transportation back to the school, and not permitted students to

break district policy. As established by Hoar V. Nanaimo (1984), a teacher can be found

negligent for injuries caused by students utilising dangerous machinery unsafely. An automobile

certainly fulfils the requirements to be considered dangerous machinery, and Waterman failed to

ensure proper safety features were operational in the vehicle.

The final element necessary for negligence to be proven is establishment of damages. The

damages resulting from this accident were both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. The injuries were

catastrophic, leaving Irwin quadriplegic, which would not only cause pain and suffering,

physical impairments, emotional and mental distress and the like, but also adversely affects

Irwin’s prospects for employment, education and pursuits that may have physical, emotional and

mental demands. The injury that was sustained by the plaintiff, Irwin, lead to her becoming a

quadriplegic as a direct result of the accident. The injuries sustained by the plaintiff can be
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
described as catastrophic as she is now paralyzed; lacking motor function in all four of her limbs.

The principle status quo ante, dictates that objective must be to return Irwin to the state she

enjoyed before the accident. As this is medically impossible, and damages paid must reflect the

enormous impact the accident has had and will continue to have on her life.

In terms of defences Waterman may invoke, Volenti non fit injuria does not apply. As a

minor, it is impossible for the plaintiff to willingly cede her right to bring claim against a

negligent party. Irwin could not have voluntarily assumed risk as she is a minor and therefore

unable to process and assess risk in the same manner as an adult. Additionally, as a minor, Irwin

does not have a limitation period with regards to seeking remedial action through tort. Therefore,

Waterman is unable to utilise the Limitation of Action defence. Waterman does have access to

the defence of contributory negligence, as both Ballard and Irwin played a role in the negligent

causation of injury. Each of their contributions will now briefly be explored.

Ballard, as the operator of the vehicle, contributed to the causation of injury. Ballard

possessed a duty of care towards her passenger, the plaintiff Irwin. As laid out in the Traffic

Safety Act Vehicle Equipment Regulation (2009) section 82(3), a person shall not drive a vehicle

that has a seat belt in the passenger seat unless the passenger in that seat is wearing the complete

seat belt assembly and is over 6 years of age and younger than 16 years. Ballard was directly

responsible for her passenger’s safety. Additionally, the standard of care provided by Ballard as

driver of the vehicle was insufficient. A reasonable person would not allow a passenger to sit in a

seat with an inoperative seat belt while driving a vehicle. Ballard failed to uphold the standard of

care to keep all occupants inside her vehicle safe, allowing her passenger to ride without an

operational seatbelt as well as through her careless driving. A reasonable person would also have

abided by School District and School policy which forbade students driving other students to or
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
from school-sponsored events. In breaking this rule, Ballard failed further to uphold the standard

of care owed to the plaintiff. With regards to foreseeability, Ballard could have foreseen an

accident happening as driving is inherently dangerous. Additionally, knowing she lacked a

functioning seatbelt in the front passenger side, Ballard could have foreseen greater risks to her

passenger. In assuming the role of driver, Ballard accepted vicarious liability for any injuries to

Irwin that may have resulted from her driving. Ballard’s actions caused the injuries to Irwin, but

for Ballard’s action of violating district and school policy (driving another student) and driving

carelessly, the damages to Irwin would not have occurred. Additionally, but for Ballard’s action

of permitting the plaintiff to utilise a car seat with a faulty seatbelt, the damages would likely not

have been so catastrophic. As established above, the damages to Irwin were severe and life-

changing.

Irwin, as all individuals do, possessed a duty of care towards herself. The standard of this

care, such as a reasonable person would hold by not placing oneself into dangerous situations

and wilfully neglecting proper use of functioning safety equipment. Irwin had overheard a

conversation regarding the faulty seatbelt, and furthermore an accident reconstruction expert

found no evidence of the seatbelt being used by Irwin. Although a minor, Irwin nevertheless

could have foreseen the risks due to failure to wearing a seatbelt. It cannot be proven that Irwin

caused the accident itself, but she did contribute to the extent of the damages through negligence.

Irwin’s action of opening the sunroof during the return trip to the school further contributed to

her injuries as she was later ejected from the vehicle through this egress.But for Irwin’s decisions

to fail to use a functioning seatbelt, and to open the vehicle’s sunroof, her injuries would not

have been so severe.

We conclude upon the evidence presented in the case that negligence on the part of
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
Waterman, with contributory negligence from Ballard and Irwin, caused the damages to the

plaintiff. We back this conclusion based on the foreseen damages clause in which that we believe

the teacher, the victim, and the student driver had the opportunity to assess the situation and

anticipate the lead up to the accident to have occurred.

Waterman is liable for the plaintiff's injuries due to her failure to uphold a proper

standard of care, through failure to follow district and school policy. Waterman did not diligently

assess the situation (such as inspecting Ballard’s vehicle), as a reasonable and prudent parent

would have. She could have foreseen the inherent danger in allowing Ballard to drive another

student back to the school. In addition to failing to uphold her duty of care to the standard of a

reasonable person, Waterman directly caused the damages to the plaintiff by allowing a violation

of the student driver policy. Ballard is contributorily liable for the damages to Irwin as she

violated the student driver policy, in addition to driving carelessly. Ballard knowingly allowed

her passenger to sit in a seat without properly functioning safety equipment. The plaintiff is also

contributorily liable as she failed to uphold her duty of care to herself by entering a dangerous

situation without a seat belt, and could have foreseen the dangers of failing to utilise a

functioning seat belt. While the school principal’s decision to allow teachers to dismiss students

early when activities at off-site locations conclude may have minorly contributed to the accident,

the principal nevertheless cannot be found negligent or liable for this accident. The principal

could not have foreseen the accident as they were unaware that students were breaking the

School Division Policy regarding students transporting other students. Additionally the principal

lacked the same duty of care as Waterman, the supervising teacher, held to these students.
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EDUC 525: The Law Assignment
Reference:

Bain v. Calgary Board of Education, 1993 CanLII 7301, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

(1993). Retrieved from

http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/1993/1993canlii7301/1993canlii7301.html

Hoar v. Nanaimo School District 68, 1984 CarswellBC 756, British Columbia Court of

Appeal. (1984).

School Act. (2000). Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter S-3. Retrieved from

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/acts/s03.pdf.

Traffic Safety Act Vehicle Equipment Regulation (2009). Alberta Regulation 122/2009.

Retrieved from http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Regs/2009_122.pdf.