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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE CA: affirmed with modification; even on the assumption that LOI
No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is
Similarities and Differences still unconstitutional because it did not promote public
welfare; the levy was NOT for the benefit, as alleged, of
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. VS. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION Planters Foundation, Inc. (on the strength of the Letter of
(PONENTE: REYES) Understanding (LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar
Doctrine/s: Virata on 18 April 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice
(1) If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, in an Opinion dated 12 October 1987.(PPI filed a M.R. -> denied)
one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is
properly called a tax. Issue/s:
(2) The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit (1) Whether the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State
in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for a of its taxation power.
public purpose. (2) Whether LOI 1465 constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to
the exercise of taxation.
Facts: (3) Whether LOI 1465 constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private the exercise of police power.
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and Held:
agricultural chemicals. (1) Yes;
The imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation
On 3 June 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his power. While it is true that the power of taxation can be used as an
legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among implement of police power,the primary purpose of the levy is revenue
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is,
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the
Philippines. The LOI provides: exaction is properly called a tax.

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, it was held that the imposition of a
include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State of its police power,
contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. but of its taxation power, thus:
This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth
contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic Act 123 and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and Traffic
sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. (Underscoring Code that the legislative intent and purpose behind the law
supplied) requiring owners of vehicles to pay for their registration
is mainly to raise funds for the construction and maintenance
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the
sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide operating expenses of the administering agency. x xx Fees
Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the may be properly regarded as taxes even though they
Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of also serve as an instrument of regulation.
PPI.Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24,
1986 Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police
power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). If the purpose is
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a
demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees. The
No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land
Transportation Code. It is patent therefrom that the
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damagesagainst legislators had in mind a regulatory tax as the law refers to
FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the the imposition on the registration, operation or ownership of
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, a motor vehicle as a "tax or fee." x xx Simply put, if the
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a regulatory fee,
of due process of law.Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored the imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an "additional"
PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other "fees" such as the
maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry. special permit fees for certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10)
and additional fees for change of registration (Sec. 11). These
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that are not to be understood as taxes because such fees
the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police are very minimal to be revenue-raising. Thus, they are
power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer not mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as taxes like the motor
industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain vehicle registration fee and chauffeurs’ license fee. Such fees
any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on are to go into the expenditures of the Land Transportation
the ultimate consumer, not the seller. Commission as provided for in the last proviso of Sec. 61.
(Underscoring supplied)
RTC: the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the
State’s inherent power of taxation; invalidated the levy for The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a
violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the
public purpose. (PPI filed a M.R. -> denied; In a separate but related seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer
proceeding, SC allowed appeal but remanded to CA) by as much as five percent. A plain reading of the LOI also supports
the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The
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LOI expressly provided that the levy was imposed "until FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI)
adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable." challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series
of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
The levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI. WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically,
the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that
An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police
private persons. The reason for this is simple. The power to tax power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the
limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII,
of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and
The term "public purpose" is not defined. It is an elastic concept that decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
can be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in
states that "public purpose" should be given a broad the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation
interpretation. It does not only pertain to those purposes which of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further
such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also enforced.
includes those purposes designed to promote social justice.
Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. police power is valid under the Constitution?

While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
continually expanding in light of the expansion of government functions,
the inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of
public purpose still stands. Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically
When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public stands.
when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a
private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
"public purpose." measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order
No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
Indications that it is not for the public purpose make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
1. The LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
PPI, a private company. Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
2. The LOI provides that the imposition of the P10 levy was provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to
"viable." existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
3. The levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and class.
deposited by FPA to Far East Bank and Trust Company, the
depositary bank of PPI which proves that PPI benefitted from The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female
the LOI labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
4. The levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
(3) No; victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the Government's efforts.
State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test
of "lawful subjects" and "lawful means." Jurisprudence states the The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place,
test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men
from those of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Suffice it to
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this
case is justified.
For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it
did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the
advantage to a private corporation. purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective
of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the
of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED. terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is
DRILON clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and
G.R. NO. L-81958 legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."),
JUNE 30, 1988 meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed
with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 or Sugar Adjustment Act is
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban constitutional and for public purpose.
on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is
evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated. HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that
the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6, will
impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for
requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power.
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one
may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position
itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of
powers in the enforcement whereof. laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's
wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a
must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement,
of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent
restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the
been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its
police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to
on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.
is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary
sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the
regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature
citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its
its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in
section 6 of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
WALTER LUTZ VS. ANTONIO ARANETA oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike
G.R. NO. L-7859 constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes
DECEMBER 22, 1955 to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be
made the implement of the state's police power.
FACTS: This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves
No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the
tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the
Promulgated in 1940, the due to the threat to our industry by the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling
the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
"to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry constitutional limitation".
by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry
so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the
in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question, should be
exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very
In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each in need of similar protection; that the legislature is not required by the
picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or persons Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or none." As ruled in Minnesota
in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the law
others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise a tax equivalent to the presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
difference between the money value of the rental or consideration because there are other instances to which it might have been applied;"
collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed and that "the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need
value of such land. not embrace all the evils within its reach".

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the

Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECREATARY
Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as OF AGRARIAN REFORM
taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949- G.R. NO. L-78742
1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for JULY 14, 1989
the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which involve constitutional
levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, questions as to the validity of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988.
section 17).


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"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance
in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and
Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
from the bondage of the soil." the power of eminent domain.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent
sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the
Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere due process and equal protection clauses.
provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal
program: protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention classification have been violated.
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other
the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
for voluntary land-sharing. requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members
Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
landowners. different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that
not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
providing the mechanics for its implementation. discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained
Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
ISSUE: Whether or not Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is constitutional goal.
unconstitutional and violates individual rights to equal protection clause
and due process. This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

HELD: The court in upholding the constitutionality of the Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 discussed the issues. forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of
Page 4 of 11
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare
to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.
power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros
authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the
welfare of the people is the supreme law. coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found
in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. constitutional.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in
exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No.
79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and
pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by Domain.
the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all
agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP
agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
showing that it has been abused. imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
political departments when they decide what is known as the political favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.
longer and more thoughtful examination.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for G.R. NO. L-63419 146 SCRA 323
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. DECEMBER 18, 1986

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for
contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved
under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to
the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under
the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional?
color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by
these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us. the state because of the injury it causes to the public interests.

Asso. Of Small Landowners Vs. Sec. Of DAR Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it
175 SCRA 343 G.R. No. L-78742 July 14, 1989 offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
(2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection
Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers;


Page 5 of 11
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to society and the public interest. As aptly stated:
examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the
failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and “The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he
issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of
of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is
unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its shield and not a sword.”
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in imprisonment for debt.
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state
offense against property, but an offense against public order. to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the
police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional
insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional
is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to
inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and it.
imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary against imprisonment for debt.
measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind
sanctions. that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore
sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of
the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question
prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes
of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee
when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
50 million to 80 million pesos a day. without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of
the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause
to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and unreasonable or arbitrary.
partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against
which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation
presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by
assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of
reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment
trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument
perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power."
financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make
confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit. Any offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch
practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime
for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to
circles and the banking community. the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be
construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches enforcement to the offended party is far fetched.
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only
a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
Page 6 of 11
MEASUREMENT,petitioners, vs.ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as those better prepared.
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, respondents. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection
clause is not well-taken. There would be unequal protection if some
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
FACTS: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a protection requires is equality among equals.
person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again. COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT.
After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
the NMAT for the fourth time. from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated
by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that “the carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos”.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained
rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
equal protection.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us
ISSUE: Whether or not MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 is
in this petition for review on certiorari.
unconstitutional and violative of the constitution rights to academic
freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection? ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional
due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue
HELD: In reversing the decision of the RTC Judge and affirming the delegation of legislative power?
constitutionality of the MECS Order No. 12, the court cited that the power
is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
oppressive upon individuals. is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. individuals.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty
common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
equitable admission and academic requirements.” escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.


Page 7 of 11
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G.
could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant
dead meat. G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be FACTS: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out
and void.
by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case,
the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
granted by the Constitution.
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior
not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area
down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to application.
every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does
vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended paupers burial.
as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
the ancient rudiments of fair play. S-64 would be enforced

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First
hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc.
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the Administrative Code.
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a
for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further
not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only protection of property therein."
after trial and conviction of the accused.
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of beneficial use of his property.
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright
Page 8 of 11
under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-
the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE
valid exercise of police power? POMPEYA, defendant-appellee
G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915
HELD: We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the
decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with FACTS: A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo
approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which
of the questioned city ordinance. is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between
the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question
except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving
be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The
fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for
established or practised in the City.' such service, and who refuse to render the same.
o A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with violation of the said
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The
ordinance for failing to render service on patrol duty required
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said under the same
ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine  Defendant argued that the municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is
and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the
operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public ISSUE:
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is Whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general
welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government HELD: Yes
for injury sustained in consequence thereof.  The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309
falls within the police power of the state and the state was fully
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty
of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said
or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to rights of the persons affected thereby
destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an → Police power has been defined as the power of the government,
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited. The power
vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 be for the good of the state and its subjects. The power to govern
of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs,
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation. health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all
property within the state. The authority to establish such rules
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial conducive to the public interest.
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
→ Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws,
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal defines police power as "the defenses, regulations, and domestic
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their
general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood,
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the inoffensive in their respective stations."
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city
and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions → The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole
of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the
that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with
such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it citizen, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood,
simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has
to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is
been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the rights
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring of others. The police power of the state includes not only
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, the public health and safety, but also the public welfare,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers protection against impositions, and generally the public's best
of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and best interest. It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
Page 9 of 11
refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes
specific case on its merits of liquidation.

 It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
the municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain conditions as resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
prerequisites: (1) The person called upon to render such services must
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
between the ages of 18 and 55[50], and (3) certain conditions must city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
exist requiring the services of such persons attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
→ It will not contended that a non-resident of the municipality property without due process of law.
would be liable for his refusal to obey the call of the president;
neither can it be logically contended that one under the age of 18 ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws
or over the age of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by and due process?
his refusal to obey the command of the president. Moreover, the
persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the
called upon at the mere whim or caprice of the president. There constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the
must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient in equal protection of laws and due process.
the mind of a reasonable man, before the president can call upon
We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
the the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of
does not apply to all persons. The law does not apply to every the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
condition. The law applies to special persons and special control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
conditions power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future.
→ A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from
objection under a demurrer, must show that the person charged The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers
of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on
belongs to the class of persons to which the law is applicable
occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country
isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
 Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
the court would be unable to impose the punishment provided for by distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big
law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
was not under 18years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions
his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.
case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever
forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, officio. . . .
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public,
a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
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and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen
unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate
and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on
legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or
(Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July
6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
AGUSTIN vs. EDU Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after
88 SCRA 195 G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979 July 8, 1963.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is

Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of
early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source Held: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
depending on the owner’s choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot
of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted
Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon.
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law. local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice
that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit. Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
Held: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of regulation.
police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure
and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity,
the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court
foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines adopts factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specifications provided by law. Petitioner’s allegation against the
manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the
said law immediately executory.

Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Association Vs.

Mayor Of Manila
20 SCRA 849 G.R. No.L-24693 July 31, 1967

Facts: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association

with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president
and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for
prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of
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