Running head: Analysis of an Unfortunate Accident

EDUC 525 Learning Task #1 Option 1

An Unfortunate Accident

Jonathan Beckett, Kari Lee, Annette McCaffrey, Cathy Sandul, Susan Wilson

The University of Calgary

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ANALYSIS OF AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT
In the matter of the automobile accident causing catastrophic injury to Prim Irwin

(hereafter, Irwin), we find that Lindsay Waterman (hereafter, Waterman) and Amanda Ballard

(hereafter, Ballard) are several, concurrent tortfeasors (Sharing the Blame, 2017) in that their

separate, tortious acts or omissions to act resulted in Irwin’s injuries in the described car accident

on June 9th, 2001.

Due to the fact that the given information does not specify Irwin’s age at the time of the

accident, for the purposes of our response, we are assuming that Irwin was 15 years of age on the

day of the accident.

Liability with respect to Lindsay Waterman, Teacher:

Lindsay Waterman was negligent in allowing Ballard to drive fellow student, Irwin on the

highway, which resulted in a traffic accident where Irwin incurred catastrophic injury. Since

Waterman is an employee of Trudeau High School, the Okotoks School Board is vicariously

liable as per Section 54 (1) of the Education Act of Alberta. The vicarious liability of the board

via the teacher and principal is made especially clear due to both the actions and failure to act on

the part of the principal of Trudeau High School (the board representative in this case). Of the

three high schools in the district, Trudeau was the only one to follow the school district policy

and permit students to drive other students to school-sponsored activities within town limits

(Donlevy, 2018, p.1-2). Clearly, the other schools felt a total prohibition was safer and less

fraught with opportunities for students to be in danger. This was a school-level decision, and

thus the action of the principal, which created conditions in which mistakes like Waterman’s

could be made (see Waterman, section 2 below). The principal had an opportunity to act

positively to prevent the situation from arising when giving approval for the activity. Each field
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trip or off-site activity must be approved by a school principal, and so the principal should have

recognized the out-of-town location and prohibited students from driving. Clearly, this would

fall within the Standard of Care for a principal and would have prevented the accident conditions

from arising..

1. Duty of Care:

According to the Alberta School Act, Section 18 “a teacher, while providing instruction or

supervision must…maintain under the direction of the principal order and discipline among the

students while they are…attending or participating in activities sponsored or approved by the

board.” Since this was a school sponsored activity, Waterman had a duty of care for Ballard and

Irwin. (Also, in loco parentis.)Waterman, according to the previously stated school policy, cannot

give up Duty of Care through the dismissal of students to their own methods of transportation

outside of town limits. Indeed, that by itself is a breach of her standard of care as a teacher.

2. Standard of Care:

Waterman did perform a visual check of Ballard’s car before the girls drove away, but

failed to perform an interior inspection or confirm with Ballard that the car was in

optimal, safe condition. Further, the school division policy states “No secondary school

student, irrespective of age, may drive a private vehicle transporting other students to

school-sponsored activities during school hours or as school representatives, except to

use local facilities within the town or village boundaries for activities that are an integral

part of instruction” (Donlevy, 2018, p.2). Given that she was therefore responsible for

transportation, Waterman breached her standard of care towards her students by not

knowing that the Marabelle Resort Golf Course was located outside of the town limits of

Okotoks. Exactly.
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ANALYSIS OF AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT
3. Foreseeability:

The car accident that occurred and caused injury to Irwin could have reasonably been

foreseen by Waterman as Ballard, an inexperienced driver, had to drive on a highway

where the speed limit was 100 km/h to get back to the school. Highway speed accidents

that result in serious injury are not uncommon and are therefore foreseeable. Good.

4. Causality:

But for Waterman allowing Ballard to drive Irwin in her personal car from a school

sponsored event outside of the town limits of Okotoks on a highway, the car accident

which resulted in Irwin’s injuries would not have occurred. Good. In terms of

Waterman’s negligence, this was the proximate cause of the damage to Irwin’s person.

5. Damages

Irwin suffered catastrophic injuries as a result of the accident, leading to damages

including medical expenses, pain and suffering and future wage loss. Therefore, to return

Irwin to status quo ante should include ongoing medical expenses, home care costs,

potentially including loss of income to family caregivers, and future loss of Irwin’s own

income.

Lindsay Waterman has no justifiable defences to this tort of negligence.

1. Volenti non fit injuria does not apply because Irwin is a minor and so cannot give up the

right to sue with a parental permission form.

2. Even though the accident reconstruction expert did not find evidence that the seatbelt was

used, given the malfunctioning nature of the belt (Donlevy, 2018, p.2), it is possible that

it was used, but simply released. The fact sheet does not discuss the nature of the

malfunction, so we assume this is possible. We therefore find that it is not possible to

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establish contributory negligence on Irwin’s part, given the conflicting nature of the

seatbelt use statements from all parties, despite her knowledge that at some time in the

past, the belt was inoperative.

3. As stated above, there is clear evidence of all elements of negligence necessary in order

to proceed with the tort.

4. The statute bar is not a valid defense for Waterman as Irwin was a minor (Limitations

Act, 2000, 2018, s.5.2, p.9). In the absence of other information, we assume that action

was brought within two years of Irwin attaining the age of majority.

Liability with respect to Amanda Ballard, 16-year-old student.

We find that Ballard acted with concurrent negligence while driving Irwin back to school,

resulting in major injury to Irwin.

1) Duty of care:
It is clear that any driver of a motor vehicle owes a reasonable duty of care to passengers.

Ballard was the registered owner of the vehicle (Donlevy, 2018). The Alberta Traffic Safety Act

(2000, 2018, sec 115(2), p.131) requires drivers not to “drive a vehicle in a manner contrary to

the Rules of the Road or regulations governing the operation of vehicles.” In Galaske v.

O’Donnell (1994), 1 SCR, 670, justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Cory state that “A

driver of a motor vehicle owes a duty of care to his [sic] passengers to take reasonable steps to

prevent foreseeable injuries”. Therefore, Ballard owed Irwin a duty of care. Good!
2) Breach of the Duty of Care--Standard of care:
Given that a duty of care was owed, what is a reasonable standard of care, and was that standard

breached? The Alberta Traffic Safety Act: Vehicle Equipment Regulation, Sec 82(6), p.40,
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states that a driver cannot operate a vehicle if the seat belts are not fully functional, and section

82(3) states that a driver must ensure that all passengers over the age of 6 and under the age of

16 are securely restrained before driving (2009, 2018). These represent a standard of care with

respect to seat belts, and because Ballard was aware of the status of the seat belt (a repair

appointment was scheduled (Donlevy, 2018, p.2)), Ballard breached this standard by allowing a

15-year-old to ride with a defective seat belt or without one entirely. While it is true that a repair

appointment was scheduled, this shouldn’t mitigate the breach since the repair had been

outstanding since “earlier in the year” (Donlevy, 2018, p.1). A simple move to the back seat

would have solved the problem. Well said.

3) Foreseeability:
Driving a vehicle is an inherently dangerous activity, and so injuries are foreseeable. Moreover,

since Ballard knew that they would be driving on the highway and also that the seat belt was

broken, then injury in the case of accident was not only foreseeable, but quite obvious. Yes,

especially in that this was country road.

4) Causality:
But for Ballard’s decision to operate a motor vehicle with a poorly functioning passenger-side

seat belt and further to allow Irwin to sit in that seat, the accident would not have happened. In

terms of Ballard’s negligence, this was the most proximate cause of Irwin’s injuries. Indeed, the

fact that Ballard was charged with driving carelessly (Donlevy, 2018, p.1) indicates that her

decision making process as a driver was flawed. One might also note the fact that she was

charged.
5) Damages:
Please see section 5 under Waterman. The damages are the same.

The Defences to Negligence are not pertinent or applicable in the case against Amanda Ballard.

1. Volenti non fit injuria is inapplicable for two reasons: the age of Irwin, as well as the

nature of the activity she was partaking in at the time of the accident that caused her
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catastrophic injury. Irwin was only fifteen years old, thus the volenti defense cannot be

exercised in this case. Furthermore, Irwin was partaking in a normal, everyday activity

that was sanctioned by her teacher as well as the older driver of the car, who was familiar

with the operation of the vehicle. Irwin had no reason to assume there was an especially

elevated risk. Good.

2) Please see section 2 in the defences under Waterman for an analysis of Irwin’s lack of

negligence. The argument is the same.

3) Lack of an element to the tort is not a viable strategy for defending against the

negligence displayed by Ballard as all elements of the tort are met.

4) Please see section 4 in the defences under Waterman for an analysis of the statute bar.

The argument is the same.

As previously stated Lindsay Waterman and Amanda Ballard are viewed as several

concurrent tortfeasors. Given Waterman’s breach of Standard of Care for both girls through not

acquiring proper transportation to and from the site she is seen to be 70% responsible for the

damages that Irwin incurred. Given her minor status, her Duty of Care to a passenger in her

vehicle, and her knowledge of the broken seat belt we deem Amanda Ballard to be 30%

responsible.
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References

Donlevy, J. K. (2018). An Unfortunate Accident.

Education Act. S.A. (2012, 2017, E-0.3). Retrieved from

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/e00p3.pdf

Galaske v. O'Donnell, (1994). 1 S.C.R. 670. Retrieved from

https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1122/index.do

Limitations Act, R.S.A. (2000, 2017, c. L-12). Retrieved from

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ANALYSIS OF AN UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT
http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/acts/l12.pdf

School Act, R.S.A. (2000, 2018, c.S-3). Retrieved from:

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/s03.pdf

Tarnasky, H., Woodske, D. (2017). Sharing the blame: Joint and Several Liability. Retrieved

from: http://www.rmc-agr.com/sharing-the-blame-joint-and-several-liability/

Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A (2000, 2018, c. T-6). Retrieved from

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/t06.pdf

Traffic Safety Act: Vehicle Equipment Regulation. (2009, 2018). Retrieved from

http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Regs/2009_122.pdf