Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Bel-Air Village Association development and planning, 2) transport and traffic management, 3)solid
t and traffic management, 3)solid waste
GR No. 135962; March 27, 2000
Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the regulation of use of roads
and/or thoroughfares for safe and convenient movement of persons. Respondent BAVA is a
homeowner's corporation and is the registered owner of Neptune St., a road inside the private
residential subdivision Bel Air Village. MMDA requested and actually opened to public
vehicular traffic Neptune St. and cause the demolition of the perimeter wall separating the
village from Kalayaan Ave., a national road.
RTC Ruling: Case for injunction by BAVA was denied after due hearing and ocular inspection.
CA Ruling: MMDA has no authority to do the assailed acts. The authority is lodged in the City
of Makati by ordinance. Thus, permanent injunction is granted in favor of BAVA.
Issue: Whether or not MMDA has the authority, as an agent of the State, to open Neptune St
pursuant to the State's police power
Held: None. MMDA is a national agency and not an LGU or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. All its functions are administrative in nature. It has no power to enact
ordinances or resolutions for the welfare of the community. The powers of MMDA under RA
7924 is limited to formulation, coordination, implementation, regulation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
Nothing in said law that granted to MMDA the police power, let alone legislative power. Even
the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. It is the LGU, acting
through the legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power to order the
opening of the street. In the case at bar, the City of Makati did not pass of any ordinance or
resolution ordering such.
Notes:
– Local Government1 is a body politic and corporate – one endowed with the powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of the territory.
– Delagation of police power to the LGU through their respective legislative bodies found
in the General Welfare Clause under Sec. 16
– RA 7924 declared Manila as a special development and administrative region placed
under a development authority referred to as MMDA
– Metro Wide Services trascend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units comprising Metro Manila; these are 1)
1 Local Government Code of 1991
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disposal and management, 4) flood control and sewerage management, 5) urban
renewal, zoning, and shelter services, 6) health and sanitation, urban protection
and pollution control, and 7) public safety.
Funa vs Manila Economic and Cultural Office and the COA
GR No. 193462; February 4, 2014
Facts: MECO is a nonstock, nonprofit corporation under the Corporation Code with the
purpose of, among others, establishing and developing the commercial and industrial interests
of Filipino nationals here and abroad and to assisst the promotion and maintainance of trade
relation between the PH and other foreign countries like Taiwan. Moreover, MECO is
authorizes to perform consular and other unofficial functions that relates to its purpose.
Petitioner seeks for the auditing of MECO by COA on the ground that MECO is a GOCC
without an original charter or atleast a government instrumentality, the funds of which partakes
the nature of public funds.
Issue: Whether or not MECO is a GOCC without an original charter or atleast a government
intstrumentality
Held: No. MECO is a sui generis. It is a private entity of its own class.
It is not a GOCC. To be a GOCC, the following attributes must be present: a) organization as
stock or non-stock, b) public character of its function, and c) government ownership. MECO
lacks the third requisite. MECO, being incorporated under the Corporation Code, the matters
relating to the election of its officers as well as admission of members are governed by the
Corporation Code, its Articles of Incorporation, and By-Laws and NOT by the “desire letters”
recommended by the President. The letters are mere recommendatory, not binding. The officer
are elected by the Board of Directors which are elected also by its members. These members are
only admitted by resolution. Moreover, none of MECO's original incorporators are government
officials.
It is not a government instrumentality. The other forms of government instrumentality are
created by law. MECO is not created by law but incorporated only in a general law. Thus, it
cannot fall into any of the remaining forms of gov instrumentality.
Notes:
– Government Instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that by reason
of some special function or jursdiction they perform or exercise, are allotted
 operational autonomy and are not integrated within the department framework. These
are:
(1) regulatory agencies
(2) chartered institution
(3) government corporate entity (GCE) or GICP
(4) government owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCC)
– GOCCs are stock or nonstock corporations vested with functions relation to public
needs that are owned by the government directly or through its instrumentalities.
– Determining OWNERSHIP OR CONTROLLING INTEREST of the government over
GOCCs
➔ If NONSTOCK – atleast majority of the members are government officials
holding such membership by appointment or deisgnation or substantial
participation of the government in the selection of corporation's governing
board
➔ If STOCK – atleast 51% of corporate capital stocks owned by government
– The mutation MECO is caused by the One China Policy. The Philippines chose
between RPOC or ROC as to which would be the official government of China. Phil
chose RPOC but in order to maintain commercial relations with Taiwan created
MECO.
Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M. Viari vs Richard Gordon
GR No. 175352; July 15, 2009
Facts: Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Croos Chapter while
respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During Gordon's incumbency as Senator in, he was elected as the Chairman of the PNRC.
Petitioners allege that by such, Gordon ceased to be a Senator as provided for in Sec. 13 2, Art.6
of the Constitution. Respondent claimed that there is no violation of the prohibition because
PNRC is not a GOCC and that volunteer service to PNRC is neither an office nor an
employment.
Issue: Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art 6 of the Constitution
Held: No. PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organizationm, thus positions under such cannot be deemed as government office for purposes
2 No senator or member of the HOR may hold any other office or employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentalty thereof, including GOCCS or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat.
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of the constitutional prohibition.
A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of stock corporation,
atleast a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-
stock corporation, atleast majority of the members must be government officials holding such
membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, the
government does not own PNRC for the following reasons:
1. PNRC is privately owned. Membership thereto is open to anyone, even foreigners, who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC. Thus, its members are mostly
private individuals.
2. PNRC is privately run. It is based on neutralism, autonomy, and independence in
accordance with the Fundamental Principles as a member of the National Society of
the Movement. PNRC Chairmanship is a private office. He is not appointed by the
President or his alter egos nor he is an official of the judiciary or legislative. Rather, he
is elected by the PNRC Board of Directors. The PNRC is controlled by private sector
individuals and any decision or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the
President. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse, modify the decisions of the
PNRC Chair.
3. PNRC is privately funded. It is financed primarily by the contributions from private
individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns.
Sultan Osop B. Camid vs Office of the President, et al
GR No. 161414; January 17, 2005
Facts: Then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued numerous executive orders creating
municipalities, one of which is EO 107 creating the municipality of Andong in Lanao del Sur.
Because of a special civil action for a writ of prohibition filed by then VP Emmanuel Pelaez, Eo
107 and the other EOs were declared null and void resulting to the judicial nullity of the
municipality of Andong. In 2003, the DILG issued a Certification enumerating therein the
regular existing municipalities as per their records and databases. Andong was not included
therein despite the inclusion of 18 municipalities previously annulled by the Pelaez case. This
present petition assails the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of Andong because
said municipality has already became a full blown municipality with complete set of officials
and 17 constituent barangays and with funds for public services. Camid based his validity of
Andong as a municipality under Sec 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 3.
3Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and

Issue: Whether a municipality (like the case of Andong) whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute
Held: No.
The President has no power to create municipalities, however the Pelaez case limited its
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court,
which includes Andong.The promulgation of the Local Government Code of 1991 made a
curative or reimplenting effect over the validity of the existence of the municipalities created by
the presidential decrees. However, this effect lifted the legal cloud only over the municipalities
similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. It did not include those
municipalities judicially annulled by the Pelaez case including Andong.
Andong did not meet the requisites of Sec 442(d) of the LGC which requires a respective set of
elective municipal offficial holding office at the time of the LGC's effectivity. Camit admitted
that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all lest has been apportioned by the
government with funds to address the conduct of election. Andong's legal defects to its title was
never cured by Sec 442(d) of the LGC nor there was an enactment of any organic law as done
with the 18 municipalities certified by the DILG which could have revived its legal personality
as a municipality.
Notes:
• Municipal corporations by prescription – the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and
without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.
These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without
objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is
presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had
been lost.
◦ What is essential is the factual demonstration of the continuous exercise of the
corporate powers by the municipal corporation as well as acquiescence by the state.
In this case, Camid did not make an initial demonstration of such. He should have
exhausted administrative remedies first before going to the Supreme Court to try
the facts of the case.
• The DILG Certification does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a
municipality. Thus, annulment of such does not serve Camid's purpose to recognize
Andong as a regular existing municipality.
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
(the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
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• Salient points of the Pelaez Case and subsequent cases:
◦ The President has no power to create municipalities, limited its nullificatory
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court.
However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal
cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not
judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia
and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these
municipalities had labored under.
• Factual difference between Andong and the municipalities recognized by the SC:
◦ With respect to the annulment of the Executive Order creating it: Andong's was
annulled in 1965, the others' were not
◦ With respect to subsequent enactment of organic laws creating them: Andong has
none, the others have
◦ With respect to Sec 442(d) scope: Andong not covered, the others yes
▪ Conclusion: The legal personality of the municipalities recognized by the SC
as then de facto and now de jure municipalities derives from Sec. 442 or the
organic laws enacted to create them and not the initial presidential decree
• Interpretation of Sec 442(d) of the LGC:
◦ The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress
did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws,
which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights.
Armita B. Rufino, Zenaida R. Tantoco, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao Jr. and Freddie
Garcia vs Baltazar N. Endriga, et al; 382 Phil. 131; July 21, 2006
Facts: The petitioners referred to as the Rufino group were the newly appointed of trustees of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines Board of Trustees by then President Joseph Estrada. The
Rufino group replaced herein respondents Endriga group. When Pres. Estrada appointed the
Rufino group, there were still incumbent trustees of the Board. Thus, the Endriga group
assailed, thru a quo warranto proceeding, the validity of the appointment of the Rufino group
by Pres. Estrada. Endriga anchored his claim on Sec 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, the charter of CCP.
Said section provided the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board and that is by election
by a vote of the majority of the trustees themselves and that only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies. Endriga also rejected
that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President.
 • Interpreting Sec 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: (it granted the quo warranto proceeding filed by the Endriga ◦ The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in
group) the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should
It held the validity of Section 6(b) 0f PD 15 providing that it is the remaining trustees who only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting
should fill by election the vacancies in the CCP Board and only in case of entire vacancy of the in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become
Board should the President exercise his power to appoint in view of the legislation's aim to be entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines
free from influence of politics. Moreover, it ruled that the President's constitutional/statutory acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the
power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-
application of the CCP Charter. year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to
reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.
Issues: Whether or not Sec. 16(b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional • Appointing Power of the President as a Delegated Power by the Legislature
◦ Sec. 16, Article 7 of the Constitution: Possible appointees of the President
Held: YES, the provisions are unconstitutional for two reasons: a) it infringes the President's 1. heads of the executive dept, bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers
constitutionally vested power to appoint under Sec. 16, Art. 7 and b) it runs afoul with the and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
President's power of control under Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution. captain and other officers whose apppointments are vested in the
President by the constitution – with consent of COA
Under Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution, the Congress may vest by law to the heads of 2. to whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint – without
departments, agencies, commissions and boards, the power to appoint officers of lower rank. consent of COA
The Constitution is clear that the appointee must be of lower rank than the appointing 3. all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
authority. In the present case, Sec 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 authorized the trustees of the CCP provided by law – without consent of COA; this may be the basis of the
Board to elect or appoint their co-trustees who are of equal rank with them. This kind of appointing power of President in case Sec 16(b) and (c) are declared
appointment is unconstitutional. Being such, the proper appointing authority is the President unconstitutional
because no other law provided the manner of filling up vacancies or appointment of the CCP 4. lower ranked officers whose appointments congress may by law vest in the
Board. Allowing otherwise would encroach the President's power to appoint officers. heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards – this is where
the present case falls
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by law or order
creating them under any specific department falls under the Office of the President. The CCP is
neither judicial nor legislative nor it is a quasi-judicial body. Thus, CCP is part of the executive
The Angat River Irrigation System and Vicente Cruz vs Angat River Workers' Union and
branch. Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and
the CIR; GR Nos. L-10943-44; December 28, 1957
offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP. The Legislature cannot validly
enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the
Facts: Respondents filed an unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations
President. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of
against petitioner ARIS and also a petition for certification election calling for urgent
the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power
certification due to the refusal if ARIS to bargain collectively. ARIS filed a Motion to Dismiss
of control over all the executive offices. No law can cut off the Presidents control over the CCP
arguing that it being an entity under the Bureau of Public Works which is an instrumentality of
in the guise of insulating the CCP from the Presidents influence. By stating that the President
the government, it cannot be drawn into that proceeding by virtue of the principle that the
shall have control of all the executive offices, the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not
State cannot be sued by private persons without its consent.
only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants on the
premise that ARIS is a government instrumentality
Notes:

Omorog/PubCorp Casepool 1
Held: No.
in the cases at bar the petitioner Angat River Irrigation System (respondent in the lower Court)
as an entity under the Bureau of Public Works, has no personality to sue or be sued. And this is
also true with regard to the Bureau of Public Works which is merely a part of the machinery of
the Government. In lieu of said entity and Bureau it is the Republic of the Philippines, if at all,
that should have been sued, because these cases affect the policy of the Government towards its
employees as expressed in Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act. Consequently, the action of the
respondent Union should have been directed against the State.

On the other hand, it is a basic and fundamental principle of the law that the
Government cannot be sued before courts of justice without its consent, a principle that springs
from the theory that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on
which that right depends. Just like any other privilege or right, this immunity may be waived
and the Government can be brought in as a party defendant only in thoses cases wherein it
expressly consents to be sued, as in the case of moneyed claim arising from contract which
could be the basis of civil action between private parties.
There can be no argument on the point that although not the Government itself, this
privilege of non-suability of the Government extends to the Angat River Irrigation System, it
being an entity of the former. And this is logical, because any suit, action or proceeding against
an agency of the government would in practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Government itself, of which said agency is a mere office.

As only natural or juridical persons may be parties in an action and as the Angat River
Irrigation System, as an agency of the Government, cannot be sued without its consent much
less overits objection, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of herein petitioners and thus devoidcognizance of the cases at
bar.

Consolidated Cases of Manapat vs CA and NHA

GR No. 110478; October 15, 2007

Facts:

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