The Rule of Law: Art. 2, Sec. 1 (sovereignity resides in the people); Art. 5 To add fuel to the fire, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they were only able to print
100,000 copies of the full text of the petition. Provided that each copy was attached to a
Lambino v. Commission on Elections signature sheet and it’s a fact that one signature sheet had space for 10 signatures, it can be
G.R. No. 174153 concluded that only 1,000,000 registered voters were able to read the full text and sign the
petition.
Date of Promulgation: October 25, 2006
Ponente: Carpio, J. The petition did not satisfy the basic requirement in conduction a petition initiated by the people
Petition: Petition to amend the 1987 Constitution as laid down by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Hence, it is void and unconstitutional.
Petitioners: Raul L. Lambino, Erico B. Aumentado w/ 6,327,952 registered voters
Respondents: Commission on Election Decision:
Petition denied.
Facts:
Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado together with other groups gathered signatures in favor of a
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution on February 15, 2006. On August 25, 2006, Lambino
and his group went to COMELEC to file a petition to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their petition
under Section5(b) and (c) of RA no. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The petition:
1. had the support of 6,327,952 individuals consisting at least 12% of all registered
voters
2. had signatures that were verified by the COMELEC election registrars
3. initiated changes in the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Section 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and
by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”.

On August 30, 2004, Lambino and his group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
because they modified the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The
following day, the COMELEC denied the petition for it lacked an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution.

Issues/Held:
WON the petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constituton – NO

Ratio:
In order for a petition to satisfy the aforementioned provision, it has to have two elements: 1) the
people must author and thus SIGN THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL and 2) THE PROPOSAL MUST
BE EMBODIED IN A PETITION. The people must sign on the petition containing the FULL
TEXT of the petition. These requirements are intended by the framers of the Constitution
because of the following:

1. to avoid misleading the people

2. to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate
the petition

Also, Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires the people to sign the petition as signatories.

Lambino and his group did not attach the copy of the paper the people have signed when they
gave the petition to the Court. Moreover, they were only able to provide signature sheets THAT
DID NOT EVEN CONTAIN THE FULL TEXT OF THE PETITION WITH THE VOTERS’
SIGNATURES.

This fact made the Court doubtful as to the constitutionality of the petition since:
1) not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the initiative petition is in the signature sheet
2) the signature sheet does not state that the petition was attached to it.

 

The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 183591
Date of Promulgation: October 14, 2008
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
Petition: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
Petitioners: Province of North Cotabato et al.
Respondents: The Government of the RP
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by
the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD, as the Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, briefly sums up, contains the commitment of the parties to pursue peace
negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and
pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.
However, aforementioned signing was unable to materialize upon several motions of petitioners,
lead by the Province of north Cotabato Gov. Jesus Sacdalan and/or Vice Gov. Emmanuel Piñol,
that were brought to this Court, seeking temporary injunction, compelling respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, invoking their right to
informations on matters of public concern. Furthermore, the petitioners seek to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon, assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the agreement.
Issues/Held:
1.) PROCEDURAL:
WON the constitutionality and legality of the MOA-AD is ripe for judicial review
a. Ripeness - YES
b. Locus Standi - YES
c. Mootness - NO
2.) SUBSTANTIVE:
a. WON there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) - YES
b. WON the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
-to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
- to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
-to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
Ratio:
1. PROCEDURAL – Ripeness ?- YES
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
review, reasoning that the MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further
negotiations, and that it remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations. Hence, there are no concrete acts that create the imminent
possibility of violating the petitioners’ rights.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The petitioners’ case is ripe for adjudication. The
failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing necessary changes to the
legal framework and amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
2. PROCEDURAL - Locus Standi? – YES
Legal standing is granted to a person who alleges to have personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. The petitioners are all granted locus standi. In view of the direct and substantial
injury that the representative of LGUs would suffer as their territories, whether In whole or in
part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE, their legal standing is beyond doubt.
The private petitioners, on the other hand, alleging their standing as taxpayers and invoking
the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, were also granted standing.
3. PROCEDURAL - Mootness? – NO
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of
all the reliefs prayed for by the petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive
Secretary that “no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not
sign the MOA.”
The court finds that contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD
and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the petitions
have not become moot and academic. The non-signing was due to the Court’s issuance of TRO.
The Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the “moot and academic”
principle in view of: (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional
character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. In relation to the MOA-AD, petitions are imbued with paramount
public interest involving significant part of the country’s territory and the wide-ranging political
modifications of affected LGUs. Also, the assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal
enactments provides impetus to the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public.
The petitions for mandamus, however, have become moot for respondents having furnished the
Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

4. SUBSTANTIVE - Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest including public consultation
under RA 7160?
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991). The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, which
directly affects the lives of the people at large. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society. Hence, PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to carry out the
pertinent consultations.
5. SUBSTANTIVE - Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will
eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.

 
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.

Decision:
Respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied. The main and intervening petitions are given
due course and hereby granted. The MOA-AD Aspect of GRP-MILF Tripolo Agreement on
Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to lar and the constitution.

 

B.
Dissenting Opinion of former Chief Justice Puno in Tolentino v Comelec, specifically his
discussion of the Constitutional History of Democracy and Republicanism in the
Philippines
A. The Case: Tolentino v. Comelec
1. Ponente: Justice Carpio
2. Date of Promulgation: January 21, 2004
3. Motion: Petition for prohibition (special civil action in the SC)
4. Facts:
• In Feb 2001, a Senate seat was vacated due to Sen Guingona’s
appointment as the Vice-President.
• The Senate, via Resolution No. 84, called on the COMELEC to fill
th
up such vacancy via special election. The 13 senator would
serve the unexpired term of Sen. Guingona.
• COMELEC did not give notice to the public that the special
elections would be held simultaneously with the regular elections
• On the election day, the List of Candidates did not indicate a
separate list of candidates for the special election.
5. Issue: Whether a special election for the single Senate seat with a three-
year term was validly held simultaneous with the regular elections, even
without notice to the public of 1) special elections, and 2) office or offices to
be voted for.
6. Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit
• The calling of special election and the giving of notice to the
electorate of necessary information are central to an informed
exercise of suffrage. COMELEC have erred by not giving notice,
BUT it does not invalidate the special senatorial election.
• This is because RA 6645 provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special elections shall be held simultaneously in the
next regular election. This law operated already as the call for
such election. THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO HOLD AN ELECTION
EMANATE FROM THE STATUTE, and not from any call for the
election by some authority.
• The court is of the view that COMELEC should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods of free,
orderly, and honest elections.
• Nevertheless, it reminds the COMELEC to comply strictly with all
the requirements of special elections in the future
7. Concur: Panganiban, QUisimbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo Sr, Azcuna
Dissent: Davide, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Tinga
On Constitutional History of Democracy and Republicanism in the Philippines
1. Roots of Democracy from Plato to Locke
• In the ancient times, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle
espoused ideals that deviate from democracy. Plato believed that
democracy would only result to the tyranny of majority. Aristotle, on the
other hand, preferred a rule of the upper class.
• In the middle ages, after the Industrial Revolution, thinkers of that time
bannered the idea of equality. And since all people are equal, no one
enjoyed moral right to govern another without the consent of the
governed.
• This led to the social contract theory i.g. the social contract is the act of
people exercising their sovereignty and creating gov’t to which they
consent.
• Following the Glorious Revolution which brought democracy to
England, John Locke, through the social contract theory, argued that
the government was legitimized the moment the people put their trust
in it to protect their lives and property. However, Locke believed that
the political power should be devolved to the middle class, and a
parliament who owned property shall govern the people.
• Thomas Jefferson espoused Locke’s theory on social contract, but he
had respect for the common people and participatory gov’t.
• In the United States at that time, a more conservative, less democratic,
and more paternalistic system of gov’t was originally adopted. After two
centuries, the Federal constitution was gradually democratized in light
of the passage of the Bill of Rights.
2. Democracy and Republicanism in the Philippines
• The Malolos Constitution which was promulgated in 1899 by the
revolutionary government declared the country as a Republic.
• The revolutionary gov’t collapsed as the American came to rule. They
gradually increased the autonomy of the country before granting
independence.
• In 1934, via the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the country was authorized to
draft its own constitution under the condition that it would be republican
in form.
o Republic – gov’t which derives all its power directly or
indirectly from the body of the people; powers of gov’t are
entrusted to elected representatives
• The 1973 and 1897 consti both adopted the provision relating to the
republic form of government.
• The 1987 Consti expanded democracy by giving people greater power
to exercise their sovereignty. They can exercise sovereignty through:
o Elections – people choose representatives to whom they will
entrust exercise of powers of the gov’t

o Plebescite – people ratify any amendment or revision of the
Consti
o Initiative – legal process whereby the registered voters of
local gov’t unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance through an election called for the purpose
o Recall – method of removing a local official from office
before the expiration of his term because of loss of
confidence
o Referendum – people can approve or reject a law or issue of
national importance
• The People Power in 1986 exhibited the people’s exercise of their
rights concerning recall, initiative, and referendum. Following this, the
framers of Consti enunciated the first principle in Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, which is the Philippines is not only a
republican, but also a democratic state.
3. Dissenting Opinion
• The ruling of the ponencia would constitute a fall in the nation’s rise of
democracy.
• Informing the electorate on the issues and conduct of an election is a
prerequisite to a “free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.”
• Court should not forfeit its role as gatekeeper of our democratic
government run by an informed majority.
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform: Article XIII, Sec 4-8
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
Date of Promulgation: July 14, 1989
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Petition: constitutionality, prohibition, mandamus
Petitioners: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines
Respondents: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts:
R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, was enacted by the
Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a
decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial
law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was then enacted.
G.R. 79777
The subjects of this petition are Nicolas Manaay and his wife with a nine-hectare (9) riceland
worked by four (4) tenants, and Agustin Hermano Jr. with a five-hectare (5) land worked by four
(4) tenants. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27. The Manaays and Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD 27
and E.O.s 228 and 229.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
Inocentes Pabico alleges that then DAR Secretary placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation.
Certificates of land transfer were issued to tenants, who refused to pay lease rentals to him. He
then protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under OLT and asked for the
recall and cancellation of the said Certificates of Land Transfer, which was denied without
hearing. Although he filed an motion for reconsideration, EO Nos. 228 and 229 were issued,
rendering his MR moot and academic because the said EOs directly affected the transfer of his
land to his farmer-tenants.
G.R. No. 78742
The Association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention
granted by P.D. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven (7) hectares as long as
they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the
statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
They petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the
Implementing Rules and Regulations required under P.D. No. 316, because they could not eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Issues/Held:
Substantial:
1. Constitutionality
- P.D. No. 27
- E.O. Nos. 228 and 229: violates Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution because it
they do not provide for retention limits; violates one subject requirement
- R.A. No. 6657
2. W/N promulgation of P.D. No.27 by President Marcos and promulgation of Proc. No 131,
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 by President Aquino violate Separation of Powers under the
Constitution
- P: The right to provide for an agrarian reform program rests on Congress, not the
President
3. W/N Right to Equal Protection was violated
- P: Small farmers have been denied equal protection because of the lack of
retention limits
- P: Sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers,
although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own (G.R. No.
79310)
- C: Sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and
should be differently treated
4. W/N President Aquino had the right to fun the Agrarian Reform Program

Ratio:
Substantial:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. For E.O. 229, the title does not have to be a catalogue of
its contents and the matters embodied in the text can already be inferred in the title.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should
be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article
XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide
for such limits now in Section 6 of the law. (See NOTES)
2. No. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no
reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Also, the
measures were issued by President Aquino before the Congress of the Philippines
was formally convened and are therefore valid.
3. No. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To
be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
a. it must be based on substantial distinctions;
b. it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. it must apply equally to all the members of the class
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here.
4. Yes, she had the power. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it
does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. It was
just incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Decision:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Notes:
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be
ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the
rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 6
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that
he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to
the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell
under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over
the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and
(2) just compensation.

 
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension of the US military bases,
which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security.

On July 18, 1997 the Philippines and the US exchanged notes and discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which led to a draft that
resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations finally culminating on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, ratified the VFA.

On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the
letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Art. 7, Sec. 21, of the 1987
Constitution.

On May 27, 1999, The necessary 2/3 concurring votes of the members of the Senate were
gathered and thus ratified the VFA under Resolution No. 18.

On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force.

Issues/Held:

1. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Art. 18, Sec. 25 of the Constitution
– YES

2. WON the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty – NO

a. WON the Philippine courts are deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try
offenses committed by US military personnel

b. WON the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher

3. WON the VFA violates the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Art. 2, Sec. 8
– NO
Independent Foreign Policy and a Nuclear-Free Philippines: Art. 2, Sec. 7-8; Art. 18, Sec. 4 &
25 (on foreign military bases)

Bayan, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, et. al. Ratio:

G.R. No. 138570
1. Art. 18, Sec. 25
Date of Promulgation: October 10, 2000
Ponente: Buena, J. P: VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines
Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Consolidated Case “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” shall not be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
Facts:
a. it must be under a treaty
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement. To further b. duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
strengthen their defense and security relationship, both countries entered into a Mutual Defense referendum held for that purpose when so required by congress
Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement c. recognized as a treaty by the Senate and other contracting state
both countries negotiated for its possible extension.

 

Therefore, Art. 18, Sec. 25 is applicable.
Art. 18, Sec. 25:
“After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the other
contracting state.”
R: VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement that involves merely the temporary visits
of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises. Art. 7, Sec. 21 is applicable. Art.
25, Sec. 25 is not controlling since there are no foreign military bases; only foreign troops and
facilities are involved in the VFA.
Art. 7, Sec. 21:
“No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate.”
C: The first provision applies to treaties that involve presence of foreign military bases, troops
and facilities in the Philippines.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21, which requires 2/3 votes.
The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show that
the US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As a member
of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations.
Beyond this, Art. 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good
faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not
invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty."
Equally important is Art. 26 of the convention, which provides that "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” (the principle of
pacta sunt servanda), which preserves the sanctity of treaties.
In contrast, the second provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in
general with a wide variety of subject matter.
The clause found in Sec. 25 does not refer to “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”
collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as evidenced by the use of
comma and the disjunctive word “or”. This interpretation which contemplates three different
situations – a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign
troops, or (c) foreign facilities – and any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage
of Sec. 25.
Moreover, the establishment of military bases within the territory of another state is no longer
viable because of the alternatives offered by the new weapons of warfare such as nuclear
weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for
months and years without returning to their home country.
Both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common
ground. They are both prohibitory in mandate and character and in both instances, the
concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid
and effective.
Art. 25, Sec. 25, which is a specific provision, should prevail over the general provision of
Art. 7, Sec. 21.
However, the provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21 will find applicability for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
2. Abdication of Philippine sovereignty
c. deprived of jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military
personnel
d. Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher
"WHEREAS, the VFA does not give unrestricted access or unhampered movement
to US Forces in the Philippines; in fact, it recognizes the Philippine government as
the sole authority to approve the conduct of any visit or activity in the country by US
Forces, hence the VFA is not a derogation of Philippine sovereignty”
"WHEREAS, the VFA is not a basing arrangement; neither does it pave way for the
restoration of the American bases and facilities in the Philippines, in contravention
of the prohibition against foreign bases and permanent stationing of foreign troops
under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution- because the agreement
envisions only temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military exercises
or other activities as may be approved by the Philippine Government;”
"WHEREAS, the VFA gives Philippine courts primary jurisdiction over offenses
that may be committed by US personnel within Philippine territory, with the
exception of those incurred solely against the security or property of the Us or
solely against the person or property of US personnel, and those committed in the
performance of official duty;”
3. Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Art. 2, Sec. 8
"WHEREAS, by virtue of Article II of the VFA, the United States commits to respect
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, including the Constitution, which
declares in Article II, Section 8 thereof, a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons consistent with the national interest;”
Decision:
No grave abuse of discretion, thus, Court is without power to conduct an incursion and meddle
with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. Petitions dismissed.

 
Date of Promulgation: December 2, 1940
Ponente: Laurel, J.
Petition: writ of prohibition
Petitioner/s: Maximo Calalang
Respondent/s: A. D. Williams (Chairman of the National Traffic Commission), Vicente Fragante
(Director of Public Works), Sergio Bayan (Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications),
Eulogio Rodriguez (Mayor of the City of Manila), Juan Dominguez (Acting Chief of Police of
Manila)

Facts:

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. and Rizal Ave. for certain periods of
time in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940 with
modification by the Director. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced the rules and regulations. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues/Held:

WON the rules and regulations infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice – NO

WON the rules and regulations:

1. constitute an undue delegation of legislative power – NO

2. constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO

3. infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social

justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people - NO

Ratio:

1. CA No. 548 does not confer legislative power upon the Director & Secretary. The
authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly. The delegated power is
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated, not the determination of what the law shall
be. To promulgate rules and regulations is an administrative function, which cannot
be directly discharged by the National Assembly, and must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom the duty of determining whether the
proper occasion exists for executing the law is confided.

The Promotion of Social Justice: Social Justice Defined
Maximo Calalang v. A. D. Williams, et. al.
G.R. No. 47800
2. The Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public, and was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with

 

business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the State. To these fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual
are subordinated.
3. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex (the
welfare of the individual yields to that of the community).
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
Decision:
Petition denied, with cost against petitioner.
The Priority of Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture & Sports: Art. 2, Sec. 17
DECS v. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572
Date of Promulgation: December 21, 1989
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Petition: Petition to review
Petitioners: Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and Director of Center for
Educational Measurement
Respondents: Roberto Rey C. San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong (in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172)
Facts:
The respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science
in Zoology, and claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times
and flunked it as many times (Upon investigation with DECS, he has already actually flunked
four times before and has failed for the fifth time). The NMAT is a requirement for admission to
any Medical School in the Philippines.
When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the “three-flunk-rule”.
The respondent then filed a petition before the RTC, on the ground of due process and equal
protection, also invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education and challenging the constitutionality of the order (Ministry of Education and
Culture Order No. 12, Series of 1972). This was then granted by the RTC on 13 January 1989.
Issue/Held:
WON the “three-flunk-rule” of NMAT (MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972) is valid and
constitutional. - YES
Ratio:
It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive.
The right to quality education is not absolute. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it
because of his preparation and promise.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A
law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable
to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted
and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
Decision:

 
Petition granted and decision of respondent court is reversed.

Opinions:

Concur:
Fernan, C.J. The Priority of Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture & Sports: Art. 2, Sec. 17
Narvasa Melencio-Herrera
Gutierrez, Jr. Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee – Loyola School of Theology
Paras G.R. No. L-40779
Feliciano
Gancayco Date of Promulgation: November 28, 1975
Padilla Ponente: Fernando, J.
Bidin Petition: Mandamus (Original Action)
Sarmiento Petitioners: Epicharis T. Garcia
Cortes Respondents: The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (represented by
Griño-Aquino Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, SJ)
Medialdea
Regalado, JJ.
Facts:
Notes:
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 Respondent admitted petitioner in the summer of 1975 for studies leading to MA in Theology.
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary in collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. University.
  Petitioner was denied re-admission by the respondent on 30 May 1975 on the reason of her
frequent questions and difficulties which slowed down the progress of the class. She was
then advised to enroll at the University of Santo Tomas Graduate School (UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties).

However, at UST, the petitioner will have to study for 4-5 more years (under Baccalaureate in
Philosophy leading to Theology), compared to 2 more years in Loyola School.

Petitioner then filed for writ of Mandamus to allow her to enroll at Loyola school of
Theology.

Issue/Held:

WON the Faculty Admission Committee had the authority to allow the petitioner to continue
studying or not. – YES

Ratio:

The respondent (seminary) has no clear duty to admit the petitioner, as it is a school for
priesthood and for men. The petitioner was granted to take some courses during summer of
1975 for credit and was not charged a single centavo.

Also, even if petitioner is assumed to be qualified to the seminary, the school clearly has the
discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations.

Factors also considered were academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and
the obvious nature of the Loyola School of Theology which is a seminary.

 
  

Decision:

Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Opinions:
Concur:
Makalintal, C.J.
Barredo
Antonio
Esguerra
Muñoz Palma Independent Foreign Policy and A Nuclear-Free Philippines: Art. 2, Sec. 2 (international law
Aquino and Philippine municipal law); Sec. 4 & 25 (on foreign military bases)
Concepcion, Jr.
Martin, JJ. Lim v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151445
Concurs in separate opinion:
Teehankee, J. Date of Promulgation: April 11, 2002
Ponente: J. De Leon, Jr.
Dissents in separate opinion: Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Makasiar, J. Petitioners: Arthur D. Lim and Paulino R. Ersando
Respondents: Honorable Executive Secretary as alter ego of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-
Took no part: Arroyo, and Honorable Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense
Castro, J.
Facts:

Notes:
Education Act of 1982 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 232)
Sec. 9. Right of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitation
prescribed by law and regulations, and student and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following
rights:
1. The right to receive, primarily through competent instruction, relevant quality education in line
with national goals and conducive to their full development as person with human dignity.
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations.
3. The right to school guidance and counseling services for decisions and selecting the
alternatives in fields of work suited to his potentialities.
4. The right of access to his own school records, the confidentiality of which the school shall
maintain and preserve.
5. The right to the issuance of official certificates, diplomas, transcript of records, grades,
transfer credentials and other similar documents within thirty days from request.
6. The right to publish a student newspaper and similar publications, as well as the right to invite
resource persons during assemblies, symposia and other activities of similar nature.
7. The right to free expression of opinions and suggestions, and to effective channels of
communication with appropriate academic channels and administrative bodies of the school or
institution.
8. The right to form, establish, join and participate in organizations and societies recognized by
the school to foster their intellectual, cultural, spiritual and physical growth and development, or
to form, establish, join and maintain organizations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.
9. The right to be free from involuntary contributions, except those approved by their own he
organizations or societies.
Personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao in
January 2002 to take part in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they
are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a
bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The
last "Balikatan" was held in 1995 and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was completed in
1999. Then on February 2002, a petition was filed for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise.
Issues/Held:
Procedural:
1. locus standi: no direct personal injury on the petitioners
2. premature: based only on speculation
Substantial:
5. W/N "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement
- YES.
6. W/N American troops can engage in combat in Philippine territory (main issue
based on syllabus)
- NO.
7. W/N it is a fit topic for an action for certiorari
- NO.
Ratio:
Substantial:
5. Yes. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the V FA support the

 
  
conclusion that combat related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one
subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
6. No, according to Article II Sections 7-8 and Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987
Constitution. There is a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general.
7. No, respondents in the case at bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Decision:

The petition and the petition-in-intervention are DISMISSED.

Notes:

Article II, SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with
other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, The Promotion of Social Justice: Urban Land Reform and Housing (Art. 13, Sec. 9-10)
national interest, and the right to self- determination.
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority
SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of G.R. No. 107921
freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.
Date of Promulgation: July 1, 1993
Article XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, Petition: Original petition
troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly Petitioners: Police Gen. Levy Macasiano (Ret.)
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the Respondents: National Housing Authority (NHA), Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a (HLURB), and National Mapping Resources Information Authority (NMRIA)
treaty by the other contracting state.
Facts:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of RA

7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).

Petitioner establishes his locus standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) regarding Operation for Removal of Obstructions and
Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain, and his being a taxpayer.

As DPWH consultant, the petitioner alleges that Sections 28 and 44 will eventually affect his
work in demolition of structures. Basically the said sections give “protection” and “rewards” to
interlopers/squatters; controls the “police power” of the state; and deprives rightful property
owners of “due process” and “compensation.”

As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully disbursed."

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition and maintains that, the
instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise
of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.

The SolGen argues that there is no actual case or controversy to begin with, and that the
petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act because he has no property "being squatted
upon" (therefore he is not directly affected by the RA), and that there is no showing that the
question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. (See Ratio)

 
  
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
The SolGen argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:

Issue:
WON petitioner has locus standi (legal standing). – NO
Ratio:
The courts will not determine the constitutionality of an act of the legislature unless question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented.
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented;
or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens,
the following shall be mandatory:

The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are:
(a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible
of judicial determination,
(b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property,
(c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and
(d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
For this case, (a) and (b) requisites are not complied. A proper party is one who has sustained
or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of. Petitioner is not proper party since he has no property being “squatted upon” and is
therefore not affected by the said RA (so there is also no actual controversy).
Also, the petitioner has not been actually prevented from performing his duties as a
DPWH consultant. His duty is merely to train DPWH personnel, advise the DPWH secretary, do
field inspection, create operational procedures/guidelines/standards/techniques and the like.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."
Decision:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives
of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be
relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays
and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line
of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National
Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days
from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be
executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period,
financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by
sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit
concerned.

Opinions: This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development
Concur: Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
Narvasa, C.J. above provision.
Cruz
Feliciano Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. — There shall be a moratorium on the eviction
Bidin of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of
Griño-Aquino three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply to
Regalado those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act and for cases
Romero enumerated in Section 28 hereof.
Nocon
Bellosillo
Melo
Quiason, JJ.

On Leave:
Padilla, J.

Notes:

 
  

The Promotion of Health and Ecology: Art. 2, Sec. 15-16; Art. 13, Sec. 11-13

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. No. 171947-48

Date of Promulgation: December 18, 2008

Ponente: Velasco, Jr. J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner/s: Solicitor General
Respondent/s: Antonio A. Oposa and Fortun, Narvasa and Salazar

Facts:

-January 29, 1999 respondents, Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
RTF in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies (petitioners) for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

-Complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below allowable
standards set by law, (PD 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code).

-Their individual cases of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of:
1) Respondents' constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology
2) Environment Code (PD 1152)
3) Pollution Control Law (PD 984)

 
  
4) Water Code (PD 1067)
5) Sanitation Code (PD 856) 2) MMDA duties to clean solid waste and other environmental responsibilities are expressed not
6) Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825) only in the Environment Code and RA 9003, but in it charter as well. Also the DENR is tasked
7) Marine Pollution Law (PD 979) under RA 9275 to manage and report water quality.
8) EO 192 -Tasks of clean up is not up for discretionary process which government must contemplate on. It
9) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (RA 6969) is a simple judgment of perform or not to perform. Thus it is a MINISTERIAL ACT and compelled
10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations by MANDAMUS.
11) Trust Doctrine and Principle of Guardianship
12) International Law Decision:

-Petitioners filed a petition for the order for respondents to clean the Manila Bay and submit to Petition is DENIED. Defendant-government agencies are ordered to cleanup, rehabilitate, and
the RTC a concrete plan of action for the purpose preserve the Manila Bay and make it fitting for contact recreation

September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents OPINIONS:
-ordering the defendant (government agencies) to jointly and solidarily, to clean up and concur: Puno (CJ), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes
forms of contact recreation. DENR is to act as lead agency.

Government agencies ordered to clean up Manila Bay: NOTES:

-MWSS -writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty
-LWUA -a ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment". It
-DENR
-PPA
is simple performance or non performance.
-MMDA
-DA Environment Code aka PD 1152
-DBM Sect 17.
-DPWH Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its
-DOH best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be
-DECS necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards
-PNP Maritime Group
-Philippine Coast Guard
Sect 20
It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean up water pollution
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA filed individual appeals to CA which was eventually consolidated as incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
CA-GR CV 76528 concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for
DENR, DPWH, MMDA, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, and five others filed a petition for review such pollution
under Rule 45 directly to SC
-The Court sent the petition to CA for consolidation with the appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA  
The Priority of Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture & Sports: Art. 2, Sec. 17
Petitioners argue:
-that the provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution Non v. Dames
incidents and do not cover general cleaning G.R. No. 89317
-Cleaning of Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus

CA Sustains ruling of RTC Date of Promulgation: May 20, 1990

Issues:
1) Whether Sect 17 and 20 (pertinent provisions of the Environment Code) under headings
Upgrading of Water Quality and Cleanup Operations, envisage a cleanup in general? – YES
2) Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
(whether cleanup is a ministerial act) – YES
1)
-Sect 17 does not state that the government agencies concern is solely when a specific pollution
incident occurs
-Sec 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
Ponente: Cortes, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner/s: ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE
DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY
MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES.
Respondent/s: HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the 5th
Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC.,
represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of Trustees,
JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
Facts:

 
-Petitioners: students of the Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, participated in a
mass demonstration against school.
-Students were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading the student mass actions against the school in the previous semester
-> petitioners filed a petition in court seeking for readmission to the school and to reverse the
doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v Philippine School of Business Administration, et al.
-Trial Court dismissed the petition Aug 8,1988 citing Alcuaz v. PSBA
-Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the trial court Feb 24, 1989.
-Petitioners displayed disruptive behavior during resumption of classes and coerce fellow
students to not attend classes
-"stated that the students waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form... specifically states:
-"Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory... students are required to behave in accord with Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline."
-Petitioners also duly signed pledges that bound them to conduct themselves in a manner as
deem appropriate by the college
-Court asserts that admission to the college is not a right but a privilege, and the respondent is
free to decide who to admit or readmit.
PETITION IS DENIED
Petitioners filed instant petition for certiorari
-Respondents justify school's actions they commented that 8 out of the 13 students have
incurred failing grades
-Petitioners responded that academic deficiencies does not warrant non-readmission, their
breach of discipline was not serious, and that 3 of the 13 will be graduating.
-It is obvious that denying readmission because of grades was a mere afterthought.
-Imposing such sanctions before readmission denies petitioners of due process
-The penalty is not proportionate to the offense.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED. Mabini College is ordered to readmit petitioners.
OPINIONS
concur:
Fernan (CJ), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea, and
Regalado
concurring opinion:
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino
NOTES:
In the Alcuaz v PSBA case it was ruled that the college enters a contract with students or
teachers for one semester and is not compelled to automatically enter into another contract with
said partners. The court has no power to make parties enter contracts.

Issues:
-Whether the school's denial of admission to students as a reaction to their participation of
protests impinges on their right to speech and assembly

Points to consider:
1) The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the school gate

2) Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school.

-Penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed as not to obstruct due process
3) Circumventing established doctrine

-Increases in student protests due to recent political events and increased tuition in recent times.
Schools responded with recent protests with refusing re-enrollment, instead of the usual
suspension.

4) The nature of the contract between a school and its students The Promotion of Health and Ecology: Art. 2, Sec. 15-16; Art. 13, Sec. 11-13

-Contract between school and students is not a normal contract because it is imbued in public Oposa v. Factoran
interest, considering the level of priority education is given in the Constitution. G.R. No. 101083
-Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, paragraph 137 does not support the "termination
contract" theory, it was only meant to ensure tuition is paid. Date of Promulgation: July 30, 1993
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
5) Academic Freedom is not a ground for denying students' rights Petition: special civil action for certiorari
Petitioner/s: all minor duly represented and joined by respective parents. Minors further assert
-The right of an institution to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against that they represent their generation and the generation not yet born.
students who exercise their rights to speech and assembly (as stated in Villar by the Court) Respondent/s: original defendant is Fulgencio Factoran, then Secretary of DENR; his sub in the
current petition was then Secretary Angel C. Alcala
6) The Instant case
Facts:

 
  
Separate Opinion: Feliciano, J
Petitioners brought issue to court that timber license agreements violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology as stated in Sect 16 Article II of the Constitution.
-focused on twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice"  
In original case they filed petition for:
1) cancellation of all existing timber license agreements in the country
2) cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements

Petitioners claim for cause of action includes:

-To ensure this generation and the next its right to a balanced and healthful ecology
-Defendant fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs causing serious damage to plaintiffs
-Continued failure to cancel violates Sect 16, Article II rights and brings damage to general
public.

Respondents replied that:

1) plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
2 )issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches

July 18, 1991 Judge issued an order granting motion to dismiss, favoring with respondent, also
adding that canceling contracts would result in impairment of contracts, which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs then filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask SC to rescind and set aside dismissal order on the ground that the Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Issues:

1) Whether cause of action (violation of right to balanced and healthful ecology) is adequate –
YES
2) Whether non-impairment of contracts clause prevents Court from authorizing cancellation of
TLAs contracts – NO

Ratio:

1) It is stated explicitly that citizens have said rights and that defendant can be seen impinging
on these rights
-Also EO 192, creating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for
environment
-> as such based on the Administrative Code of 1987 Title XIV, Book IV Section 1,
"State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and utilization...
consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance.
-The fact that policies to protect environment is already expressed in legislation ceases the
A self-reliant and independent economic order: National Economy and Patrimony
question to be purely political, allowing judicial power to protect established law.

2) When it is within public interest all licenses can be revoked by executive action
-Also TLAs are not contracts, the non-impairment clause does not apply
-Public interest shall always be prioritized over private interests/rights Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources v. COA

OPINION: G.R. No. 169815

Concur: Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason

 
  
Date of Promulgation: August 13, 2008

Ponente: Puno, CJ Issues:

Petition: Motion for reconsideration WON blocking of allowance is unconstitutional based on Article II Sect. 9 and 10 – NO

Petitioners: Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union, Regional SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
Office No. VII, Cebu City prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
Respondents: Commission on Audit improved quality of life for all.

SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development

Facts: WON Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture,
who is an alter-ego of the President. – NO
On October 18, 1999 the Bueau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union,
Reg. Office No. VII requested a Food Basket Allowance (Resolution No. 1, series of 1999). They
justified the allowance saying that the increase of cost of living (eg cost of petroleum, food,
clothing, and education) has made it hard to cope. They also relied on the Employees Ratio:
Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS) under Book V of EO 292*.
1) Social justice provisions in the Constitutions are not self-executing principles, and require
legislative enactment to take effect.

Regional (Reg. VII) Director Corazon M. Corrales approved of the allowance, amounting to a 2) DA Undersecretary has no authority to grant any allowance to the employees of BFAR.
rate of P10,000 to 130 employees in the region, a total of P1,322,682.

The Food Basket Allowance is not payment for fulfillment of official duty, instead it is a form of
Commission on Audit- Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LOA) of Region VII disallowed the financial assistance.
Food Basket Allowance. It ruled that it had no legal basis and it violated the following:

a) Sect. 15d of General Appropriations Act of 1999, prohibiting payment of honoraria, Decision:
allowances, and other forms of compensation except those authorized by law
Petition Denied
b) Paragraph 4.5 of Budget Circular 16 dated November 28, 1998, prohibiting the grant of
food, rice, gift checks, or other forms of allowance unless authorized via Admin Order by the
President
Opinions:
c) Sec. 12 of RA 6758, or the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, which include all
allowances in standardize salary rates. Concur: Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velcaso, Nachura, Reyes, Castro, Brion.

Feb 26, 2004, BFAR moved for reconsideration. It argued that the grant of Food Basket
Allowance would enhance welfare and productivity of employees. Also that it was approved by
Hon. Drilon, the Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock, who has the authority to release it.
Notes

Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, and approved by the
COA-LOA Region VII denied the motion. It was later appealed to the COA-LOA National Office Civil Service Commission on December 3, 1996.
in QC, but was denied again. The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives that will help employees overcome present
economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and dedication to public

 
  
service.

Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November 28, 1998 states:

-All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of
incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President.

Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law provides:

Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for representation

and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of
marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay;
allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM [Department of
Budget and Management], shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local
funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or
employee and shall be paid by the National Government.

 
  
– NO but Court will take cognizance because public interest so requires

Substantial:
• WON R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional – NO
A self-reliant and independent economic order: National Economy and Patrimony

Espina v. Zamora
G.R. No. 143855 Ratio:
Locus Standi:
Date of Promulgation: September 21, 2010 No clear showing that the implementation of the Act prejudices petitioners of inflicts
Ponente: Abad, J. damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question
Petition: to declare R.A. No. 8762 unconstitutional since the rule of standing can be relaxed when the public interest so requires or the matter is
Petitioner/s: Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Robert of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
Ace S. Barbers, Raul M. Gonzales, Prospero Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri, and Franklin Bautista interest.
Respondent/s: Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr. (Exercutive Secretary), Hon. Mar Roxas (Secretary of
Trade and Industry), Hon. Felipe Medalla (Secretary of National Economic and Development Unconstitutionality of R.A. 8762:
Authority), Gov. Rafael Buenaventura (BSP), and Hon. Lilia Bautista (Chairman, Securities and As explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Art. 2 of the Constitution are not self-
Exchange Commission) executing; legislative failure to pursue stated policies cannot give rise to a cause of action.

Facts: Yes, Art.12 requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
On March 7, 2000, Pres. Estrada signed into the R.A. 8762 (Retail Trade Liberation Act of effectively controlled by Filipinos, but it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly; it’s
2000), which expressly repealed the law prohibiting foreign nationals from engaging in retail objective is to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our policies and ensure that
trade (RA 1180). R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under 4 categories and also allows Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to
engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. While it mandates a bias, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The key is to strike a
Petitioners Respondents balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
1. R.A. 8762 violates Sec. 9, 19, and 1. No legal standing services.
20* of the Constitution x taxpayers – no disbursement of funds
x legislators – no claim that the law Sec. 10, Art. 12 gives Congress discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments
infringes upon the recommendation of NEDA and when national interest requires. Congress can
2. It would lead to alien control of the 2. No justiciable controversy because determine which and when depending on economic exigencies. In this case, Congress has
retail trade (+ alien control of other they don’t allege that the subject of decided to open areas of the retail trade business to foreigners; NEDA has not opposed.
areas = loss of effective Filipino the law violates the rights of the
control of the economy) vendors they are representing Control and regulation of trade in the interest of public welfare is an exercise of police power.
To the extent that the Act lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in
3. Foreign retailers would crush Filipino 3. Failed to overcome the an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’
retailers, destroy self- presumption of constitutionality; right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos still have the right to engage in the
employment, and bring about they could not specify how the new retail business to which the law has permitted the entry of foreigners.
more unemployment law violates the provisions they
cited. (self-executing provisions) It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of a law unless it violates the
4. World Bank-International Monetary 4. Constitution mandates the regulation Constitution. There is no showing that the law violates it. The Court is also not convinced that
Fund had improperly imposed the but not the prohibition of foreign it would lead to alien control of the retail trade business. The law itself has provided strict
passage of the act as a condition investments and directs Congress safeguards on foreign participation.
for the release of certain loans. to reserve to Filipinos areas of
investments (but up to Congress’ Decision:
5. Clear & present danger – promote discretion WON they would) upon Petition denied, with cost against petitioner.
monopolies the recommendation of the NEDA
and when national interest requires. Notes:
*Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
Issues/Held: adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
Procedural: quality of life for all.
• WON petitioners have locus standi/legal standing to challenge the Act’s constitutionality
 
  
*Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos. Subsequently, the respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, thus this ruling.

*Sec. 20. The State recognized the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private Issues/Held:
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
1. WON this present case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC to a Filipino-owned
company (Sagittarius Mines) and the transfer of FTAA from WMC to Sagittarius
Mines – YES

A self-reliant and independent economic order: Natural Resources 2. WON it is still proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the
Mining Law, DAO 96-40, and WMCP FTAA, assuming that the case is moot – YES
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882 3. WON The mining law is constitutional - YES

Date of Promulgation: December 1, 2004 ü What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Either Technical or Financial
Ponente: Panganiban,J. Assistance” contained in paragraph 4 of Sec 2 of Art 12 of the Constitution?
Petition: Prohibition and Mandamus
Petitioners: La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association Inc., and other environmental organizations Ratio:
Respondents: Victor Ramos (DENR secretary), Horacio Ramos (director of Mines and
Geoscience Bureau), Ruben Torres (Executive secretary) 1. The earlier ponencia declared that the case had not been rendered moot by the transfer
of the FTAA to a Filipino-owned mining corporation, and that the validity of the said
Facts: transfer remained in dispute and awaited final judicial determination. The nullity of the
FTAA was premised upon the contractor being a foreign corporation.
On January 27, 2004, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of: However, inasmuch as the FTAA is to be implemented NOW by a Filipino corporation, it
is no longer possible for the Court to declare it unconstitutional. The case
1. RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995) pending in the CA is a dispute between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and
2. Its IRR (DENR Administrative order No 96-40 or DAO 96-40) Lepanto), both claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMC. So,
3. The entire FTAA (Financial and Technical Assistance and Agreement) regardless of which side eventually wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands
of a qualified Filipino company. Considering that there is no longer any justiciable
The FTAA was executed between the government and Western Mining Corporation (WMC), controversy, the plea to nullify the Mining Law has become a virtual petition for
which was owned by an Australian mining company. declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Some provisions were declared unconstitutional insofar as they are mainly service contracts Arguments of the petitioners on why it has not become moot -- Court’s answer
prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. These are prohibited since they allow foreign control over
exploitation of our natural resources, which is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over ü The alleged invalidity of the transfer of WMCP shares to Sagittarius violates the fourth
1
our natural resources. This is grounded on Sec 2, Art 12 of the Constitution. paragraph of Sec 2, Art 12, which permits the government to enter FTAAs only with

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  foreign-owned corporation. – Court: Nowhere in the provision is there any
express limitation on Filipino ownership.
1
 Art 12, Sec 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. ü The FTAA was intended to apply solely to a foreign corporation based on a single
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and provision in FTAA. – Court: Said provision should be disregarded as a superfluity.
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least ü The sale of the shares is suspect and should be therefore the subject of a case in which
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not its validity may be properly litigated. – Court: No, it can be decided now.
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant. 2. Both the petitioners and respondents are in agreement that the Court has jurisdiction

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

 

to decide on the controversy, even if it is already moot.
While a case becomes moot and academic when “there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits,”
what is at issue in the case is not only the validity of the FTAA, but also the
constitutionality of RA 7942 and its IRR.
The Court recognizes the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a mining industry to put an end to
the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities and the
validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and the future FTAAs, and the need to
avert a multiplicity of suits.
Attesting to the climate of anxiety hanging over the mining industry is the fact that the
Chamber of Mines of the Philippines saw the urgent need to intervene in the case.
3. In determining the constitutionality of the mining law, the constitutional provision that
needs interpretation is paragraph 4, Sec 2, Art 12 of the Constitution. It states that:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The petitioners assert that the underlined phrase simply means technical or financial assistance,
nothing more or nothing else. What a foreign-owned corporation may enter into with the
government is merely an agreement for either financial or technical assistance only. Such
limitation excludes foreign management and operation of a mining enterprise, which the
Mining Law violates. This interpretation, petitioners believe, is in line with the general policy
enunciated by the Constitution reserving to Filipino citizens and corporations the use and
enjoyment of the country’s natural resources. They use the principle of Verba Legis
Interpretation, where the primary method of interpreting the language of the constitution is
to seek the ordinary meaning of the words used.
The Court, however, does not see how a verbal legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could lead to
the conclusions in the earlier ruling (that the mining law was unconstitutional since it allows
foreign corporations to manage exploration, development, and utilization (EDU) of
minerals and petroleum).
ü First, the drafter’s choice of words, especially the use of the term ‘involving,’ does not
indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. In contrast, the use of
‘involving’ signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities related to financial or technical assistance. (NOTE: The previous ruling has
been reversed.)
ü Second, the if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have
certainly been so unmistakeably restrictive and stringent.
ü Third, the Court does not see how a verbal legis approach leads to the conclusion that
the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the
primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the
Constitution sought to eradicate. Nowhere in the provision can be discerned the
objective to keep out of foreign hands the management or operation of mining
activities or service contracts.
ü Fourth, a literal and restrictive interpretation of paragraph 4 suffers from certain logical
inconsistencies (eg the rendition of technical assistance to the State has never been
restricted in favour of Filipino citizens having a certain minimum percentage of Filipino
equity. As a matter of fact, financial and even technical assistance, regardless of the
nationality of its source, would be welcome on account if the death of local capital.)
ü Fifth, it is argued that Sec 2, Art 12 authorizes nothing more than a rendition of technical
assistance by a foreign company. This implies that the State itself is the one directly
and solely undertaking the EDU, so it follows that the State must bear the liability and
cost of repaying the financing sourced from the foreign lender. However, it is of
common knowledge that the government has, for years, been financially strapped, to
the point that even the most essential services have suffered serous curtailments.
After reality check, one will have to admit the implausibility of a direct undertaking by
the State itself of large-scale EDU.
ü Sixth, the inclusion of the underlined phrase recognizes the fact that foreign business
entities and multinational corporations are the ones with the resources and technical
know-how to provide EDU. Foreign corporations usually require that they be given a
say in the management of joint venture, in order to ensure the success of the
enterprise. The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism to know that
these foreign entities will not enter into such agreements without requiring
arrangements for the protection of their investments. Thus, by specifying “agreements
involving assistance,” the drafters necessarily gave implied consent to everything
that these agreements entail, provided that Philippine sovereignty over natural
resources and full control over the enterprise undertaking the EDU activities
remain firmly in the State.
ü Seventh and final point regarding the plain-language approach, one of the practical
difficulties that results from it is the fact that there is nothing by way of transitory
provisions that would serve to confirm the theory that the omission of the term “service
contract” from the 1987 Constitution signalled the demise of service contracts (Note:
In the 1973 Constitution, service contracts were prohibited).
Closer look at the intent of the Framers (based on ConCom records)
ü The members were actually debating about the martial-law-era service contracts for
which they were crafting appropriate safeguards
ü The service contract concept underpinned the commissioner’s understanding of
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance
ü They were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts
Safeguards
ü The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country
ü The president shall be signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the president for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to the law and can withstand

 
public scrutiny Sec 3(aq) of Mining Act, which allows a While the constitution mandates the State to
ü Within 30 days of executed agreement, the president shall report it to Congress to give foreign contractor to apply for and hold exercise full control and supervision over the
that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose an exploration permit, is exploitation of mineral resources, nowhere
timely objections, if any unconstitutional since Sec 2, Art 12 does it require the government to hold all
does not allow foreign-owned exploration permits. In fact, there is no
corporations to undertake mining prohibition at all against foreign or local
But there remains to be a problem of collision of certain provisions in the Constitution. operations directly. They may act only corporations. This is because an exploration
On one hand, par 1, Sec 2, Art 12 explicitly mandates the State to exercise full as contractors of State under FTAA. permit merely grants to a qualified person
control and supervision over the EDU of natural resources. On the other hand, par 4, the right to conduct exploration for all
permits safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors. This can be solved minerals in specified areas. Such a permit
by the constitutional principle of Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat, every part of the does not amount to an authorization to
Constitution is to be given effect, and the Constitution is to be read and extract and carry off mineral resources that may
understood as a harmonious whole. Thus, “full control and supervision” by the be discovered. It only serves to protect the
State must be understood as one that does not preclude the legitimate interests and preserves the rights of the
exercise of management prerogatives by the foreign contractor. “Full control exploration permit grantee during the period of
and supervision” cannot be taken literally to mean that State controls everything time that it is heavily spending on exploration
involved, down to the minutest details. Such interpretation would discourage foreign works, without yet being able to earn revenue.
entry and result in the stagnation of the mining sector. Clause 8.2 which mandates DENR The provisions do now manifest a
secretary to approve/revise/reject work relinquishment of control. Clause 8.2 merely
The concept of control adopted in Sec 2, Art12 must be taken to mean less than programs in 60 days, amounts to a provides a mechanism for preventing the
dictatorial, all-encompassing control; but nevertheless sufficient to give the relinquishment of control by the State business or mining operations frim grinding a
State the power to direct, restrain, regulate, and govern the affairs of the since it cannot truly impose its own complete halt as a result of possibly over-long
extractive enterprises. The end view is that these enterprises contribute to the discretion in respect of the submitted and unjustified delays in government’s handling
economic development and general welfare of the country, conserve the work programs. and processing of approval of submitted work
environment, and uplift the well-being of the affected local communities. programs.
Clause 8.3 This clause seeks to provide a temporary, stop-
Regarding RA 7942, petitioners assert that the law makes it possible for FTAA contracts gap solution in case a disagreement between
to cede full control and management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign- the State and contractor should result in a
owned corporations, with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a deadlock or impasse, to avoid reasonably long
passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak review and delays in the performance of works
audit powers.
Clause 8.5 inasmuch as it allows the This clause merely provides the contractor a
However, a review of the law reveals that the requirements, regulations, restrictions and contractor to make changes to certain amount of flexibility to meet unexpected
limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor easily overturns the petitioner’s approved work programs and budgets situations, while still guaranteeing that the
contention. In fact, FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get without the prior approval of DENR approved work programs and budgets are not
away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to secretary, subject to certain limitations abandoned altogether.
stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the Clause 4.6 inasmuch as it gives full This clause doesn’t constitute abdication of
government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the discretion to the contractor to select the control. Rather, it is a mere acknowledgement
conduct of mining operations. parts of contract areas to be of the fact that the contractor will have
relinquished determined, after appropriate exploration
On all the phases of the FTAA, the government has supervision and control. works, which portions of the contract area do
not contain minerals in commercial quantities
ü Exploration and feasibility phase: contractor is mandated to submit a sufficient to justify developing the same and
series of work programs to the DENR for approval ought therefore to be relinquished.
ü Development phase: contractor must comply with requirements of the law Clause 10.2, which provides that the The provision does not call for the exercise of
and complete the development of the mine, including the construction of government agrees that the contractor the power of eminent domain. It only calls for a
production facilities etc shall have the right to require the qualified party to acquire surface rights on
ü Operating period: contractor is required to submit to the DENR for government at the contractor’s cost, to behalf of foreign-owned contractor. Rather than
approval, work programs covering each period of fiscal years purchase or acquire surface areas for having the foreign contractor act through a
and on behalf of the contractors, can dummy corporation, having the State to do the
compel the government to exercise its purchasing is a better alternative.
Sections/Clauses that petitioners Court’s answer power of eminent domain to acquire
contend inasmuch as they do not surface areas within the contract area
give full control of the EDU to the
State

 
  
Clause 10.2(k), which gives the The Court believes that it is not necessary for
contractor authority to change its equity the government to attempt to limit or restrict the Section 112 is disparaged for reverting FTAAs and all mineral agreements to the old
structure at any time, is unusual freedom of the shareholders in the contractor to “license, concession, or lease” system, because it allegedly effectively reduces
freely transfer their shareholdings. What is the government share in FTAAs to just 2% excise tax. However, Sec 112 may not
critical is that regardless of the identity, properly apply to FTTAs. The mining law obviously meant to treat FTAAs as a breed
nationality and percentage of ownership of apart from mineral agreements. While there is ground to believe that Sec 80, 84,
various shareholders, the foreign-owned and 112 are unconstitutional, they cannot be ruled upon here.
contractor is always in a position to render
services required under FTAA, under the Also, there is no concrete basis for the view that in FTAAs with a foreign contractor, the
discretion and control of the State. State must receive at least 60% of the after-tax income from the exploitation of its
mineral resources and that such share is equivalent of the constitutional requirement
of at least 60% capital, and hence 60% income, of mining companies should remain
2
The second paragraph of Sec 81 of RA 7942 has been denounced for allegedly limiting in Filipino hands. Even if the State is entitled to a 60% share from other mineral
the State’s hare in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just taxes, fees, and duties, and agreements, that would not create a parallel situation for FTAAs.
depriving the State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. However, the
inclusion of the phrase “among other things” clearly reveals the legislative intent to Invalid provisions of WMCP FTAA
have the State collect more than just the usual taxes. Thus, the DAO consists not
only of basic government share (taxes, duties, fees), but also additional ü Sec 7.9 clearly renders illusory the state’s 60% share of revenues. Under
government share, being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining sec 7.9, should WMCP’s foreign stockholders sell 60% or more of their
enterprise, so as to achieve a 50-50 sharing of net benefits. equity to a Filipino citizen or corp, the State loses its right to receive its
share in net mining revenues under sec 7.7 In fact, the sale by WMCP’s
The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet take into foreign stockholder in Jan 2001 of the entire equity to Sagittarius Mines can
account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining projects, which be deemed to have removed the State’s right to receive its 60% share. This
are real and actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people; if these are taken into is grossly disadvantageous to the government and must therefore be
account, total government share increases to 60% or higher. declared invalid.
3
The third paragraph of Sec 81 is slammed for deferring the payment of the government ü Sec 7.8(e) is likewise invalid since by allowing the sums spent by
share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall have recovered its pre-operating government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the
expenses. Allegedly, this rendered the State collection as uncertain, as there is no State’s share in net mining revenues, it results in benefitting the contractor
time limit for this grace period. But although RA 7942 did not limit grace period, twice over. This constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor,
the concerned agencies (DENR and MGB) in formulating the IRR provided that at the expense of the government.
the period of recovery shall not exceed 5 years.
Epilogue: The crux of the controversy is the amount of discretion to be accorded the Exec
Another critique is that RA 7942 allegedly does not require the government approval Department, particularly the President, in respect of negotiations over the terms of FTAAs,
for the pre-operating, exploration, and development expenses of the foreign particularly to the government’s share of financial benefits from FTAAs. The Court believes
contractors, it is feared that such expenses could be bloated to wipe out mining that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given
revenues anticipated for 10 years, with the result that the State’s share is zero for the the nature and complexity if such agreements.
first10 years. However, the argument is based on incorrect info because under Sec
23, the applicant for explo permit is required to submit a proposed work program, Decision: The court:
containing yearly budget, which the State may approve or not. If approved, the same ü Grants the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration
will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating expenses that the contractor will ü Reverses and sets aside the Court’s Jan 2004 decision
have to recoup over the grace period. ü Dismisses the petition
ü Issues this new judgment declaring constitutional RA 7942, DAO 96-40, FTAA, except
Section 80 allegedly limits the State’s share in a mineral production-sharing for Sec 7.8 and 7.9 (for being contrary to public policy and for being grossly
agreement (MPSA) to just excise tax on the mineral product (2% of market value). disadvantageous to the government)
However, this pertains only to MPSA and has no application to FTAAs.
                                                                                                               
2
“The government share in a financial or technical assistance agreement shall consist, among
other things, the contractor’s corporate income tax, excise tax, special allowance, withholding
tax due from the contractor’s foreign stockholders arising from dividend or interest payments to
the said foreign stockholder in case of a foreign national, and al such other taxes, duties, and
fees as provided for under existing laws.”
3
“The collection of government share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall
commence after the financial or technical assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered
its pre-operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive.”
 
  
Constitution, but GSIS refused to accept.

MPH then filed for TRO, which RB then assailed, arguing that:

a.) Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is
merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
b.) Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.

Issues/Held:
WON sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. - YES
WON Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. - YES

Ratio:
Article II of the Constitution is generally not self-executing. But if a provision is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of an enabling law or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, then it is self-
executing.

The legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such “self-executing” provisions. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.

The Constitution should be considered self-executing.

Sec 10 par 2 Art XII of the Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement.

A self-reliant and independent economic order: National Economy and Patrimony In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
G.R. No. 12256 to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Date of Promulgation: February 3, 1997 Philippine heritage.
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Petition: Prohibition and Mandamus Decision:
Petitioner/s: Manila Prince Hotel The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Respondent/s: Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corp., Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from
Privatization, and Office of the Gov’t Corporate Counsel selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per share.
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
(MPH) Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad (RB), a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to
be declared so. Pending declaration for RB, the MPH matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987

 

A self-reliant and independent economic order: Private lands (Citizenship Requirement)
Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez
G.R. No. L- 27952
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 1982
Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
Petition: review
Petitioners: Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez, Maria Luisa Palacios, Administratix
Respondents: Marcelle D. Vda. De Ramirez, et al., oppositors, Jorge and Roberto Ramirez,
legatees
Facts:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, ded in Spain on December 11, 1964 with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance
of Manila. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratix submitted a project of partition that the property be divided
into 2 parts. One part shall go to the widow, and the other (the “free portion”) shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Also, 1/3 of the “free portion” is charged with the widow’s usufruct
while 2/3 is with the usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto’s opposition:
(a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to
Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator;
(b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs
are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article
863 of the Civil
Code;
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that
(d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between
the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them.
Issues/Held:
4. WON the partition granting usufruct to 1/3 of the free portion to the widow is valid. – NO
5. WON the provisions for fideicommissary substitution in favor of Wanda, Juan Pablo, and
Horace, are valid. – YES
6. WON the usufruct in favor of Wanda violates Art. XIII, Sec. 5 of the 1935 Constitution. -
NO
Decision:
1. They do not question the portion of the widow. Under Art 900 of the Civil Code, "If the
only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." The usufruct is more than what she was given under the will and
she is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate.
1. "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code). The
testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and
Jorge Ramirez and the appellants do not question this. Instead, they question the
substitution in connection with Wanda’s usufruct in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace.
The appellants are correct in their claim that it is void because the substitutes (Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
2. The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The Court found that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession. However, the usufruct in
favor of Wanda is valid because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Notes:
Usufruct: the right to enjoy the use and advantages of another's property short of the
destruction or waste of its substance.
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the
three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
A self-reliant and independent economic order: National Economy and Patrimony
Tañada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295
Date of Promulgation: May 2, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioners: WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the
Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as
members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation
of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations
Respondents: EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES,
ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO,
BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the
Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO
SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
Facts:
Secretary Navarro, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations on April 15, 1994. Come August 12 and 13 of the same year, the Senate of the
Philippines received two letters from the President stating that: 1) "the Uruguay Round Final Act
is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution." and 2) "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On December 9, the President certified
the necessity of the of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in
the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." And so, on
December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 that stated its
concurrence in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification,
which contained the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof." While
the one that Secretary Navarro signed last April embodied not only the WTO Agreement (and its
integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2)
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed which was given due course by the Court
on December 12, 1995.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy – YES
2. WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its three Annexes contravene Sec. 19,
Article II and Sec. 10 and Sec. 12, Article XII of the Constitution – NO
3. WON the provisions of the said Agreement and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by the Congress – YES
4. WON the said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power by
this court in promulgating rules on evidence – NO
5. WON the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its Annexes was
sufficient and/or valid considering that it did not include the Final Act, Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services

 
Ratio: Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation
1. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Court has jurisdiction over the In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
controversy. Moreover, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
legislative and executive officials. The power of the Supreme Court to take this case locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
on is also embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Petitioners stated that the Agreement and Annexes allegedly render meaningless the
phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." as stated in the Constitution’s provisions.
But as ruled by the Court, these principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. The judiciary uses
them as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. The Court also took note that Secs.
10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections
in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13. These provisions laid down the basics of
economic nationalism BUT the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development
of the Philippine economy. In addition, the Court enumerated the Constitution and
WTO’s characteristics that help in the pursuance of self-reliance of the country’s
economy: 1) WTO recognizes the need to protect weak economies; 2) there are
certain specific provisions that protect developing countries like the Philippines; 3)
Constitution does not rule out foreign competition; and 4) Constitutions favors
consumers, not industries or enterprises.
3. The country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws. The sovereignty of a state cannot
in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture:
(1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and
(2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. The Court then enumerated examples on
how other ongoing treaties do limit the power of the Congress but maintained the
stand that it is a inescapable consequence of interdependence and in the commitment
that other contracting states will grant the same privileges and immunities to the
Philippines.
4. Since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will
not be substantial.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. The Final Act is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the
proceedings of a protracted conference, which may have taken place over several
years. Moreover, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted
without need for ratification while the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines.

Decision:
Petition dismissed

Notes:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

 
  
Agan v. PIATCO
G.R. No. 155001 (2003 & 2004)

Date of Promulgation: May 5, 2003 & January 21, 2004 (Resolution)

Ponente: Puno, J.
Petition: Petition for Prohibition (2003) & Motion for Reconsideration (2004)
Petitioners: Demosthenes Agan Jr., Joseph Catahan, Jose Mari Reunilla, Manuel Antonio
Bone, Mamerto Clara, Reuel Dimalanta, Mory Domalaon, Conrado Dimaano, Lolita Hizon,
Remedios Adolfo, Bienvenido Hilario, MIASCOR Workers Union – Nat’l Laber Union, & Phil.
Airlines Employees Assoc.

Respondents: Phil. Int’l Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), Manila Int’l Airport Authority, DOTC
(and Sec. Leandro Mendoza)

Facts:

6 business leaders formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) in 1993 and explored the
possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal. They submitted unsolicited proposal to
the government, and NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.

Bidders were invited in 1996, and among them the Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen.
AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was
awarded to Paircargo which then incorporated into Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO).

The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate
the said terminal for 25 years.

In 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to
the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the
termination of contract.

2 monopolies were created by the PIATCO contracts: (1) That NAIA Terminal III will be the
only facility to be operated as an international passenger terminal and that no one (including the
government) will be allowed to compete with PIATCO in the operation of an international
passenger terminal in the NAIA Complex; and (2) the business of providing international airlines
with groundhandling, in-flight catering, cargo handling, and aircraft repair and maintenance
services.

Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a
contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that
they would lose their jobs.

The service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of
the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed
similar petitions.

Pres. GMA then declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the
Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

Issues/Held:

WON the State can take over a private enterprise if affected with public interest. - YES

State Operation of Private Enterprises: Art. XII, Sec. 17-18 Ratio:

 
  
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on
temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay “reasonable cost for the
use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”

The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operations and not to the DCCCO v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
ownership per se. G.R. No. 182722

The government is not required to compensate the owner since there is no transfer of Date of Promulgation: January 22, 2010
ownership. Also, the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and Ponente: Alampay, J.
not of its power of eminent domain (which gives just compensation). Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO)
Decision: Respondents: Commissioner of Internal Revenue

The 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement and the Facts:
Supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit cooperative duly registered with
and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority.
Opinions:
Concur: Davide, Jr., C.J. (BIR) Operations Group Deputy Commissioner issued Letters of Authority authorizing BIR
Bellosillo Officers to examine petitioner’s books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal
Ynares-Santiago revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and 2000.
Sandoval-Gutierrez
Austria-Martinez On 2002, DCCCO received Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding taxes for taxable
Corona years 1999 and 2000. In reply, DCCCO informed BIR that it would ONLY pay the deficiency
Carpio-Morales, JJ. withholding taxes that was asked for in correspondence to the honorarium of the Board of
Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees for the year 1999 and
Separate Concur: Panganiban 2000, EXCLUDING penalties and interest.
Callejo, Sr.
Azcuna, J After payment, DCCCO received from the BIR Transcripts of Assessment and Audit
Results/Assessment Notices, ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes,
Dissent: Vitug, J INCLUSIVE of penalties.
The court has no jurisdiction. Petition prays for nullification of contract and does not involve
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This prompted the petitioner to file a protest against the Letters of Demand and Assessment
Notices with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The CIR, however, failed to act on the
No Jurisdiction: Quisumbing, J protest within the prescribed 180-day period. Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before
the CTA.
No Part: Carpio, J
The petition was only partially granted and the court ordered that the payment as stipulated by
Notes: the respondents be complied with. Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration,
but it was denied.
Article XII, Section 17:
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the Another petition for review was filed before the CTA interposing the lone issue of whether or not
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interests. The court, finding no
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. merit, again denied the petition, as well as petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The CTA En Banc held that Section 57 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) requires
the withholding of tax at source. Pursuant thereto, Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 was issued
enumerating the income payments subject to final withholding tax, among which is “interest from
any peso bank deposit and yield, or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and
from trust funds and similar arrangements x x x”. Petitioner's business falls under the phrase
“similar arrangements' and it should have withheld the corresponding 20% final tax on the
interest from the deposits of its members.

DCCO's contention:
The phrase "similar arrangements", under Sec. 24 (B) (1) of the NIRC, is preceded by terms
referring to banking transactions that have deposit peculiarities. Therefore, the savings and time

 
deposits of members of cooperatives are not included in the enumeration, and thus not subject
to the 20% final tax. Also, pursuant to Article XII, Section 15 of the Constitution 25 and Article 2
of Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938) or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, cooperatives
enjoy a preferential tax treatment which exempts their members from the application of Section
24(B)(1) of the NIRC.
Respondent's counter:
Respondent invokes the legal maxim “Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos”
(where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish). Respondent maintains
that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC applies to cooperatives as the phrase “similar arrangements”
is not limited to banks, but includes cooperatives. Regarding the exemption relied upon by
petitioner; respondent asserts that tax exemptions are highly disfavored and construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power.
Issue/s/Held:
WON DCCCO is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the delinquency interest
of 20% per annum – NO
Ratio:
DCCCO is not liable. Considering that the members’ deposits with the cooperatives are not
currency bank deposits nor deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1),
therefore, do not apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations,
respectively. Petitioner’s invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888, reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-
2006], is therefore proper. The interpretation in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that cooperatives are
not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of
their members, which was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], applies to the instant case.
the legislature. Thus, although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be
construed to include the members.
It is also worthy to note that the tax exemption in RA 6938 was retained in RA 9520. The only
difference is that Article 61 of RA 9520 (formerly Section 62 of RA 6938) now expressly states
that transactions of members with the cooperatives are not subject to any taxes and fees. Thus:
ART. 61. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with both members and
non-members shall not be subjected to tax on their transactions with members. In relation to
this, the transactions of members with the cooperative shall not be subject to any taxes and
fees, including but not limited to final taxes on members’ deposits and documentary tax.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives
dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax exemptions. Moreover, no less than our
Constitution guarantees the protection of cooperatives. Section 15, Article XII of the Constitution
considers cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development. At the
same time, Section 10 of Article II of the Constitution declares that it is a policy of the State to
promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Decision:
Petition granted.

Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State to foster
the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and
harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice.
Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to
their growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is apparent in Articles 61
and 62 of RA 6938, which read:

ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. — Duly registered cooperatives under this Code which
do not transact any business with non-members or the general public shall not be subject to any
government taxes and fees imposed under the Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws.
Cooperatives not falling under this article shall be governed by the succeeding section.

ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. — Cooperatives transacting business with both members
and nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to members. Notwithstanding
the provision of any law or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with
nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax exemptions; x x x.

This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized that cooperatives

exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary objective of every cooperative is to
provide goods and services to its members to enable them to attain increased income, savings,
investments, and productivity. 30 Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to
cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the
exemption to members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of

 
  

Regulation of economic activities: Operation of public utilities

Gamboa v. Teves
G.R. No. 176579

Date of Promulgation: June 28, 2011

Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition: petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and declaration of nullity
Petitioners: Wilson Gamboa
Respondents: Finance secretary Margarito Teves, Finance undersecretary John Sevilla, and
Commissioner Ricardo Abcede of the Presidential Commisiion on Good Government (PCGG) in
their capacities as Chair and Members of the Privatization Council, et al

Facts:
According to petitioner:

In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a
major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to
PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC
by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and
Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415
PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC,
were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine

Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6
billion or US$510 million.

First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and
buy the PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. However, First Pacific failed to do so
by the deadline set by IPC and yielded its right to PTIC itself which was then given by IPC until 2
March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary,
MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the PTIC shares, or 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price of
P25,217,556,000. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007.

 

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125
percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3
percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific’s
common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent
According to public respondents:
PTIC held 26,034,263 PLDT common shares, or 13.847 percent of the total PLDT outstanding
common shares. PHI, on the other hand, became the owner of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 PTIC shares held by
PHI were sequestered by the PCGG, and subsequently declared by this Court as part of the ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The sequestered PTIC shares were
reconveyed to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with this Court’s decision which
became final and executory on 8 August 2006.
The Philippine Government decided to sell the PTIC shares, which represent 6.4 percent
of the outstanding common shares of stock of PLDT, and designated the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), composed of the Department of Finance and the PCGG, as the
disposing entity.
During the 8 December 2006 bidding, Parallax Capital Management LP emerged as the highest
bidder with a bid of P25,217,556,000. The government notified First Pacific, the majority owner
of PTIC shares, of the bidding results and gave First Pacific until 1 February 2007 to exercise its
right of first refusal in accordance with PTIC’s Articles of Incorporation. First Pacific announced
its intention to match Parallax’s bid.
On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good Government
conducted a public hearing on the particulars of the then impending sale of the PTIC shares.
The HR Committee Report No. 2270 concluded that: (a) the auction of the government’s
111,415 PTIC shares bore due diligence, transparency and conformity with existing legal
procedures; and (b) First Pacific’s intended acquisition of the government’s 111,415 PTIC
shares resulting in First Pacific’s 100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent
constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only 13.847
percent of the total outstanding common shares of PLDT. On 28 February 2007, First
Pacific completed the acquisition of the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC.
Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts:
(a) the IPC conducted a public bidding for the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC (the remaining 54 percent of PTIC shares was already owned
by First Pacific and its affiliates);
(b) Parallax offered the highest bid amounting to P25,217,556,000;
(c) pursuant to the right of first refusal in favor of PTIC and its shareholders granted in PTIC’s
Articles of Incorporation, MPAH, a First Pacific affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by
matching the highest bid offered for PTIC shares on 13 February 2007; and
(d) on 28 February 2007, the sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000
and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondent
Pangilinan denies the other allegations of facts of petitioner.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory
relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among
others, that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific’s
common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with
Japanese NTT DoCoMo’s common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign
common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional
limit.
On 13 August 2007, Pablito V. Sanidad and Arno V. Sanidad, as PLDT subscribers, filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In the Resolution of
28 August 2007, the Court granted the motion and noted the Petition-in-Intervention.
Issues/Held:
7. WON the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total
common shares only of PLDT, a public utility - YES
Ratio:
2. Since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national
economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus. The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus,
where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.
3. Under Section 17(4)70 of the Corporation Code, the SEC has the regulatory function to
reject or disapprove the Articles of Incorporation of any corporation where “the
required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of
the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the
Constitution.” Thus, the SEC is the government agency tasked with the statutory
duty to enforce the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution on the ownership of public utilities. This Court, in a petition for declaratory
relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, can direct the
SEC to perform its statutory duty under the law, a duty that the SEC has apparently
unlawfully neglected to do based on the 2010 GIS that respondent PLDT submitted to
the SEC.
4. The interpretation of the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has
far-reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will
determine whether Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their own
country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective
control of the national economy.
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress
when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share
in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines.
5. The 1987 Constitution “provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring
that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only
to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the

 
laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).
citizens.’ The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply
position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national this definition of the term “capital” in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in
security.” respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section
6. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.
pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to “conserve and
develop our patrimony” and ensure “a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
7. The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by
the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e.,
common shares.
8. We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting
preferred shares.
9. Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if
the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in
the election of directors.
10. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities.
As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, “capital” refers to
the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation.
11. Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60
percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that “no franchise, certificate, or any other Regulation of economic activities: Monopolies, combinations, and unfair competition
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum PPA v. Mendoza
of whose capital is owned by such citizens. G.R. No. L-48304

How? Date of Promulgation: Sept 11, 1985

(1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares
exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over
PLDT;
(2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of the
voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT;
(3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights;
(4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;63
(5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares;
(6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and
common shares only 22.15%.
12. Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution is
self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions of the Constitution.
Decision
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
Ponente: Alampay, J.
Petition: Certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Respondents: Hon Rafael Menoda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of CFI of Cebu; Pernito
Arrastre Services, etc
Facts:
Prior to the declaration of martial law, the operation of arrastre (dock work) and stevedoring
(on-ship work) services in domestic ports was in great disarray. The pernicious ‘cabo’ system
ruled by bosses had proliferated. A recommendation to improve the operation of the system was
to integrate arrastre-stevedoring services where only a single contractor operates in a port.
In Cebu, there were more than 50 arrastre-stevedoring contractors. The Bureau of Customs
planned to integrate the system in two stages: first is by requiring merger into ten
corporations, and then to later on to one. Respondent Pernito was one of those assimilated
into the 10 mergers.
In 1974, the PPA was created through PD 505. It was entrusted with the function of carrying out
the integrated program. It conducted studies regarding port problems and found that the
proliferation of too many services was both wasteful and inefficient. It then passed

 

Resolution No 10 adopting its own Bureau of Customs policy of placing on only one
organization the operation of arrastre and stevedoring.
Accordingly, the various port contractors formed the United South Dockhandlers Inc (USDI), a
merger of the 10 corporations plus another one (Bisaya Land Traspo Co).It was recognized and
granted a special permit by the PPA.
In 1977, private respondents Pernito et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted for a relief and
mandamus with injunction and damages against petitioner. They argue that the big
contractors in the merged USDI were controlling the system, to the disadvantage of the small
contractors. The CFI granted the petition. The petitioner together with 2 other
contractors/petitioners-in-intervention (Aquino Arrastre Services and Watergate Arrastre
Services) enjoyed the benefits of injunction. They were able to operate.
The PPA appealed, thus this petition.
Issues/Held:
8. WON petitioner has the power to require integration of arrastre-stevedoring services in
Philippine ports - YES
9. WON PPA’s policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and void
for being violative of:
a. Sec 2*, Art XIV of 1973 Constitution on private monopolies and restraint of
trade – NO
b. Sec 20*, Act 3581 prohibiting combinations, mergers, or acquisitions in
restraint of trade – NO
Ratio:
6. Section 26 of PD 857 empowered PPA to make rules and regulations governing
Philippine ports. Under paragraph V, the PPA has been granted a wide discretion in
adopting and implementing the policy which it deems most effective in successful
attainment of the law’s objective.
7. a. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Constitution and Act 3581 do not
necessarily prohibit private monopolies. The use of the word “regulate” indicates
that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means it includes
the power to control, govern, and to restrain. By their very nature, certain public
services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity, transportation,
etc, must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served.
In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in Cebu. The operations
there affect not only the city, but also the economy of the country on the whole. Any
prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-
island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore
imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public
good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger may
not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly because the
fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in
the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI,
actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that
previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted
themselves as USDI.
Decision:
Petition granted.
Opinions:
Concur:
• Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
Dela Fuente, Cuevas
Notes:
Section 26. Power to Make Regulations—
a) The Authority may, after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or
regulations for the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control supervision and
management of any port or port District and the services to be provided therein, and for the
maintenance of good order therein, and generally for carrying out the purposes of this Decree.
b) The Authority may provide separate regulations for each category of ports or port districts.
(Rollo, p. 16).
With respect to the issue at bar, specific power was granted under Section 6, Subsection
2, par. V of P.D. 857. Paragraph V reads:
(V) To provide services (whether on its own by contract or otherwise) within the Port Districts
and the approaches thereof, including but not limited to—
—berthing, towing, mooring, moving, slipping, or docking any vessel;
—loading or discharging any vessel
—sorting, weighing, measuring, storing, warehousing, or otherwise handling goods.
Section 2, Art XIV, 1973 Constitution. The state shall regulate or prohibit private monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed. (Section 2, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution).
Section 20 of Act No. 3518 No corporation engaged in commerce may acquire, directly and
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation or
corporations engaged in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation or corporations whose stock is so acquired and the
corporations making the acquisition, or between any of them or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly with any line of commerce.
Regulation of economic activities: Monopolies, combinations, and unfair competition
PPA v. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-48304
Date of Promulgation: Sept 11, 1985
Ponente: Alampay, J.
Petition: Certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Respondents: Hon Rafael Menoda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of CFI of Cebu; Pernito
Arrastre Services, etc
Facts:
Prior to the declaration of martial law, the operation of arrastre (dock work) and stevedoring
(on-ship work) services in domestic ports was in great disarray. The pernicious ‘cabo’ system
ruled by bosses had proliferated. A recommendation to improve the operation of the system was
to integrate arrastre-stevedoring services where only a single contractor operates in a port.
In Cebu, there were more than 50 arrastre-stevedoring contractors. The Bureau of Customs
planned to integrate the system in two stages: first is by requiring merger into ten

corporations, and then to later on to one. Respondent Pernito was one of those assimilated
into the 10 mergers.
In 1974, the PPA was created through PD 505. It was entrusted with the function of carrying out
the integrated program. It conducted studies regarding port problems and found that the
proliferation of too many services was both wasteful and inefficient. It then passed
Resolution No 10 adopting its own Bureau of Customs policy of placing on only one
organization the operation of arrastre and stevedoring.
Accordingly, the various port contractors formed the United South Dockhandlers Inc (USDI), a
merger of the 10 corporations plus another one (Bisaya Land Traspo Co).It was recognized and
granted a special permit by the PPA.
In 1977, private respondents Pernito et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted for a relief and
mandamus with injunction and damages against petitioner. They argue that the big
contractors in the merged USDI were controlling the system, to the disadvantage of the small
contractors. The CFI granted the petition. The petitioner together with 2 other
contractors/petitioners-in-intervention (Aquino Arrastre Services and Watergate Arrastre
Services) enjoyed the benefits of injunction. They were able to operate.
The PPA appealed, thus this petition.
Issues/Held:
10. WON petitioner has the power to require integration of arrastre-stevedoring services in
Philippine ports - YES
11. WON PPA’s policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and
void for being violative of:
c. Sec 2*, Art XIV of 1973 Constitution on private monopolies and restraint of
trade – NO
d. Sec 20*, Act 3581 prohibiting combinations, mergers, or acquisitions in
restraint of trade – NO
Ratio:
8. Section 26 of PD 857 empowered PPA to make rules and regulations governing
Philippine ports. Under paragraph V, the PPA has been granted a wide discretion in
adopting and implementing the policy which it deems most effective in successful
attainment of the law’s objective.
9. a. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Constitution and Act 3581 do not
necessarily prohibit private monopolies. The use of the word “regulate” indicates
that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means it includes
the power to control, govern, and to restrain. By their very nature, certain public
services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity, transportation,
etc, must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served.
In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in Cebu. The operations
there affect not only the city, but also the economy of the country on the whole. Any
prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-
island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore
imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public
good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger may
not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly because the
fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in
the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI,
actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that
previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted
themselves as USDI.
Decision:
Petition granted.
Opinions:
Concur:
• Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
Dela Fuente, Cuevas
Notes:
Section 26. Power to Make Regulations—
a) The Authority may, after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or
regulations for the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control supervision and
management of any port or port District and the services to be provided therein, and for the
maintenance of good order therein, and generally for carrying out the purposes of this Decree.
b) The Authority may provide separate regulations for each category of ports or port districts.
(Rollo, p. 16).
With respect to the issue at bar, specific power was granted under Section 6, Subsection
2, par. V of P.D. 857. Paragraph V reads:
(V) To provide services (whether on its own by contract or otherwise) within the Port Districts
and the approaches thereof, including but not limited to—
—berthing, towing, mooring, moving, slipping, or docking any vessel;
—loading or discharging any vessel
—sorting, weighing, measuring, storing, warehousing, or otherwise handling goods.
Section 2, Art XIV, 1973 Constitution. The state shall regulate or prohibit private monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed. (Section 2, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution).
Section 20 of Act No. 3518 No corporation engaged in commerce may acquire, directly and
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation or
corporations engaged in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation or corporations whose stock is so acquired and the
corporations making the acquisition, or between any of them or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly with any line of commerce.
Regulation of economic activities: Operation of public utilities
Tatad v. Garcia
G.R. No. 114222
Date of Promulgation: April 6, 1995
Ponente: Quiason, J.
Petition: writ of prohibition
Petitioner/s: Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmena, and Rodolfo G. Biazon
Respondent/s: Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as the Secretary of the Dept. of
Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd.
Facts:
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct an LRT along EDSA (EDSA LRT III), intending to

provide a mass transit system along EDSA and to alleviate the congestion and transportation
problem in the metro.
On March 3, 1990, Elijahu Levin (of Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc.) sent a letter of intent to DOTC
Sec. Oscar Orbos, proposing to construct it on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis and on
March 15, was invited to send a technical team to discuss it with the DOTC.
R.A. No. 6957 aka the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law was signed by then Pres. Corazon
Aquino on July 9 and took effect on Oct. 9. The Act provides for two schemes for the financing,
construction, and operation of gov’t projects through private initiative and investment: BOT or
Build-Transfer (BT).
The Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee then issued guidelines for the prequalification
of contractors for the project, and on the last day for submission of documents, the
prequalification criteria proposed by the Technical Committee were adopted and are as follows:
a.) Legal aspects – 10%; b.) Management/Organizational capability – 30%; c.) Financial
capability – 30%; and d.) Technical capability – 30%.
Of the 5 applicants, only the EDSA LRT Consortium “met the requirements of garnering at
least 21 points per criteria, except for Legal aspects, and obtaining an over-all passing mark of
at least 82 points.”
Subsequently, Sec. Orbos was appointed Exec. Sec. to the Pres. of the Phils. and was replaced
by Nicomedes Prado. Through letters to the Pres., Prado recommended the award of the EDSA
LRT III project to the sole complying bidder and requested for authority to negotiate with the said
firm for the contract pursuant to the BOT Law. Authority was granted and so the EDSA LRT
Consortium submitted its proposal to DOTC. Finding the proposal to be in compliance with the
bid requirements, DOTC and EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT
Consortium, entered into an “An Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit
System for EDSA” under the terms of the BOT Law. Prado then requested presidential approval
of the contract, but Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon, who replaced Sec. Orbos, informed him that the
Pres. could not grant the requested approval for failure to comply with the requirements of the
BOT Law.
In view of the comments of Exec. Sec. Drilon, the DOTC and private respondent re-negotiated
the agreement and on April 22, 1992, they entered into a “Revised and Restated Agreement to
BLT a LRT for EDSA” and on May 6, DOTC, represented by Sec. Jesus Garcia, and private
respondent entered into a Supplemental Agreement to the April one so as to clarify their
respective rights and responsibilities. The two agreements were approved by Pres. Fidel Ramos.
According to the agreements, the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450k passengers a day.
The system will have its own power facility, 13 passenger stations, and one depot in 16-hectare
gov’t property at North Ave.
Private respondent shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete
operational LRT system. Target completion date is approx. 3 years from the implementation date
of the contract. Upon full and partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall
deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC, which shall operate the
same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable
Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally
accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As agreed upon, private respondent’s
capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC, which, in turn, shall come
from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed
payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a
consideration of only US $1.00.
In the main, petitioners asserted that the agreement of April 22 and as amended by that of May
6 is unconstitutional because:
1. The EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation
thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic
corporations, not foreign corporations like private respondent
2. The BLT scheme is not the BOT or BT scheme under the law
3. The contract to construct the LRT was awarded not through public bidding,
which is the only mode of awarding under the BOT Law
4. The agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the gov’t
Issues/Held:
• WON the agreements are unconstitutional – NO
Ratio:
1. While it is true that private respondent is a foreign corp., having been incorporated in
HK, what constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the
public. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without
operating them as a public utility, and vice versa.
The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies
for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization to operate a public utility.*
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the
EDSA LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility; it will
be DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one that would exact
fees from the people for its use and from the proceeds, pay the rent due to private
respondent.
2. According to Sec. 2 of the BOT Law:**
BOT: contractor undertakes construction and financing and operates and maintains
the facility, and so therefore must comply with the citizenship requirement
BT: contractor undertakes construction and financing, but after completion, gov’t will
own and maintain the facility
The BLT scheme is but a variation of the BT scheme, since the gov’t will be operating
it under a lease-purchase agreement and so will own it after 25 years and upon full
payment.
3. Only 1 applicant passed the prequalification process and so to conduct a bidding
for that 1 participant will be pointless. According to P.D. No. 1594, when there is a lack
of qualified bidders, the award may be made by negotiation.*** Also, R.A. No.
7718****, a curative statute, recognizes and defines a BLT scheme and allows direct
negotiation of contracts, which renders the petitioners’ claim moot and academic.
4. The terms of the agreements were arrived at after a painstaking study by DOTC.
Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and
strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioners have not
presented evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other.
The matter of valuation is an esoteric field, which is better left to the experts and
which this Court is not eager to undertake.
Decision:

 
Dismissed. ****R.A. No. 7718 recognizes and defines a BLT scheme in Section 2 thereof as:
(e) Build-lease-and-transfer — A contractual arrangement whereby a project proponent is
Notes: authorized to finance and construct an infrastructure or development facility and upon its
*Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution provides: completion turns it over to the government agency or local government unit concerned on a
No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility lease arrangement for a fixed period after which ownership of the facility is automatically
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized transferred to the government unit concerned.
under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive character or for a Section 5-A of the law, which expressly allows direct negotiation of contracts, provides:
longer period than 50 years. Direct Negotiation of Contracts. — Direct negotiation shall be resorted to when there is only one
complying bidder left as defined hereunder.
**Sec. 2 of the BOT Law defines the BOT and BT schemes as follows: (a) If, after advertisement, only one contractor applies for prequalification and it meets the
(a) Build-operate-and-transfer scheme — A contractual arrangement whereby the contractor prequalification requirements, after which it is required to submit a bid proposal which is
undertakes the construction including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the subsequently found by the agency/local government unit (LGU) to be complying.
operation and maintenance thereof. The contractor operates the facility over a fixed term during (b) If, after advertisement, more than one contractor applied for prequalification but only one
which it is allowed to charge facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals and charges sufficient to meets the prequalification requirements, after which it submits bid/proposal which is found by the
enable the contractor to recover its operating and maintenance expenses and its investment in agency/local government unit (LGU) to be complying.
the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon. The contractor transfers the facility to the (c) If, after prequalification of more than one contractor only one submits a bid which is found by
government agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term, which shall the agency/LGU to be complying.
not exceed fifty (50) years. For the construction stage, the contractor may obtain financing from (d) If, after prequalification, more than one contractor submit bids but only one is found by the
foreign and/or domestic sources and/or engage the services of a foreign and/or Filipino agency/LGU to be complying. Provided, That, any of the disqualified prospective bidder [sic]
constructor [sic]: Provided, That the ownership structure of the contractor of an infrastructure may appeal the decision of the implementing agency, agency/LGUs prequalification bids and
facility whose operation requires a public utility franchise must be in accordance with the awards committee within fifteen (15) working days to the head of the agency, in case of national
Constitution: Provided, however, That in the case of corporate investors in the build-operate- projects or to the Department of the Interior and Local Government, in case of local projects from
and-transfer corporation, the citizenship of each stockholder in the corporate investors shall be the date the disqualification was made known to the disqualified bidder: Provided, furthermore,
the basis for the computation of Filipino equity in the said corporation: Provided, further, That, in That the implementing agency/LGUs concerned should act on the appeal within forty-five (45)
the case of foreign constructors [sic], Filipino labor shall be employed or hired in the different working days from receipt thereof.
phases of the construction where Filipino skills are available: Provided, furthermore, that the
financing of a foreign or foreign-controlled contractor from Philippine government financing
institutions shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total cost of the infrastructure facility or
project: Provided, finally, That financing from foreign sources shall not require a guarantee by
the Government or by government-owned or controlled corporations. The build-operate-and-
transfer scheme shall include a supply-and-operate situation which is a contractual agreement
whereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest
of the Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer
and training to Filipino nationals.
(b) Build-and-transfer scheme — "A contractual arrangement whereby the contractor undertakes
the construction including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and its turnover after
completion to the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the
contractor its total investment expended on the project, plus a reasonable rate of return thereon.
This arrangement may be employed in the construction of any infrastructure project including
critical facilities which for security or strategic reasons, must be operated directly by the
government (Emphasis supplied).

***Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1594 reads as follows:

Bidding. — Construction projects shall generally be undertaken by contract after competitive
public bidding. Projects may be undertaken by administration or force account or by negotiated
contract only in exceptional cases where time is of the essence, or where there is lack of
qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and
efficiency would be achieved through this arrangement, and in accordance with provision of laws
and acts on the matter, subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Works and
Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy,
as the case may be, if the project cost is less than P1 Million, and the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister, if the project cost is P1 Million or more
(Emphasis supplied). Communication and information in nation building

 

Chavez v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 168338
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2008
Ponente: Puno, CJ
Petition: Special Civic Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Petitioners: Francisco Chavez
Respondents: Raul Gonzalez, in his capacity as the Secretary of the DOJ; and National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
Facts:
The case starts when Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition, in order
to destabilize the administration, is planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly acquired through wire-taping between the President of the
Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-rankng official of the Commission on
Elections. Later in a Malacanang press briefing, he produced two conversations of the audio
file: 1) supposedly complete version and 2) an altered version which would suggest that the
president had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the
president’s favor. Atty. Alan Paguia, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, also
said he had with him an authentic tape recording of the conversation and it even included the
conversations of the President, FG Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano
and the late Senator Barbers.
Secretary Gonzales, in another briefing, ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go
after media organization who have been spreading, playing and printing the contents of the said
tape. He started with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7.
After two days, NTC sent a press release which warned the radio and television owner/operators
to be mindful and observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law. He also reminded the companies that the
permits (Provisional Authority and Certificate of Authority) issued to them by the Government
explicitly state that they [media companies] should not use their stations for spreading
false information or willful misrepresentation. Violation of this rule shall be a just cause
for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of their companies’ licenses. NTC then
had a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas
(KBP) to assure the latter that NTC’s press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. NTC clarified that what they
are just asking from the media is to exercise press freedom responsibly.
Alleging that the acts of the respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the
press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, Chavez filed a
petition to annul the void proceedings, and to prevent the respondents’ unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority.
The Supreme Court then said that the petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing since
he failed to establish a personal stake in the outcome of the issue but the SC will still decide on
the case since it involves serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest.
Issues/Held:
WON the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press - YES
Ratio:
In order to decide on the case, Justice Puno first discussed in this Decision, the law on freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press; types of speeches and their differing restraints
allowed by law; core concepts of different government regulations that may be used; difference
between print and broadcast media. In his discussion, it became apparent that a governmental
action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content should be given
the strictest scrutiny with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality of the actions in question through the use of the clear and
present danger rule. This rule requires that there must be a very substantive or extremely
serious evil related to freedom of speech that the government sought to prevent in order to
justify its actions.
The great evil that the government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording that was
acquired through wire-tapping. But the respondents failed to comply with the requirements of the
clear and present danger test. Also, Justice Puno enumerated the respondents’ evidence that
fell short of satisfying the test:
1. various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording
2. questionable integrity of the taped conversation
3. ambivalence of the who’s and how’s of the wiretapping act
4. uncertainty as to whether the airing of the audio violates the anti-wiretapping law
For this failure, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
Decision:
Petition granted
Notes:
• Freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of every democratic government
and a preferred right that stands on a higher level than the substantive economic
freedom or other liberties.
• “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.” – Article III, Section 4, 1987 Constitution
• Constitution’s basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.
• Constitution has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press:
o Freedom from prior restraint (refers to official governmental restrictions on
the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination)
o Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication
o Freedom of access to information
o Freedom of circulation
• Restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests:
o Dangerous tendency doctrine
o Balancing of interests tests
o Clear and present danger rule

Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
Chavez v. PEA
G.R. No. 133250
Date of Promulgation: July 9, 2002
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition: mandamus with write of preliminary injunction and TRO
Petitioner/s: Francisco I. Chavez
Respondent/s: Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Bay Development Corp.
Facts:
In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim Manila Bay areas and construct
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
In 1977, PEA (Public Estates Authority) President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority
(PEA) under P.D. 1084, which was tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These
lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road
and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands, which also required the reclamation of another 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding the islands. PEA and AMARI entered the JVA,
through negotiation without public bidding, and then President Ramos approved it.
In 1996, Sen. Maceda denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams” and so the Senate
committees investigated this and found that the lands were part of public domain which haven’t
been classified as alienable so PEA cannot alienate them, that the certificates of title of the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and that the JVA itself is illegal. President Ramos then created a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of JVA, but it upheld the legality of the JVA.
Reports were published about the ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI.
In 1998, Frank Chavez, as taxpayer, filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. He contends that:
1. The government will lose billions of pesos in the sale of PEA reclaimed lands to AMARI
2. PEA should disclose terms of renegotiation of JVA on the right of people to information on
matters of public concern
3. Sale to AMARI of lands of public domain violates the prohibition on the sale of alienable
lands to private corporations
In 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended and JVA and President Estrada approved it. Due
to the approval of the Amended JVA, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issues/Held:
1. WON the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events – NO
2. WON the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the
hierarchy of courts – NO
3. WON the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies – NO
4. WON petitioner has locus standi – YES
5. WON the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement – NO
6. WON the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution – YES
7. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the Amended JVA is grossly
disadvantageous to the government – No need to decide
Ratio:
1. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional
contract. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one that seeks to
transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of
Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to
resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Further, there is a need to
resolve immediately the constitutional issue because of the possible transfer at any time by
PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands.
2. ‘Hierarchy of courts’ only apply to factual issues. The case raises constitutional issues and
are therefore of importance to the public. The petition for mandamus is also within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
3. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue is a
constitutional question. The transfer of lands from PEA to AMARI is viewed under the
constitutional prohibition on the transfer of public domain to private corporations.
Furthermore, the negotiations on the PEA-AMARI transfer were not through public bidding,
so PEA has a legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its
lands.
4. Petitioner has standing since two constitutional rights are being legally demanded and
enforced: right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and the constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain, which are matter of transcendental importance to a taxpayer and a citizen, thus
petitioner is a party in interest.
5. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by
the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from
anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property because the
Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any
citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a

 
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never Art. 12 Sec. 2
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
late for the public to expose its defects. energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
The right covers three categories of information, which are "matters of public concern," namely: the State.
• official records
• documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions Art. 12 Sec. 3
• government research data used in formulating policies Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
6. Amended JVA violates Sec. 2 and 3 of Art. 12 of the Constitution. corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
• The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public thousand hectares in area...
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
• The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
• Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to the constitutional prohibition that disallows private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
• Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be unconstitutional because private corporations are prohibited from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.

Decision:
Petition granted. PEA and AMARI are permanently enjoined from implementing the Amended
JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab initio.

Notes:
Art. 2 Sec. 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Art. 3 Sec. 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

 
  

Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Resources

G.R. No. L 135385 Cruz v DENR Separate Opinions

Date of Promulgation: December 6, 2000

Ponente: Per Curiam
Petition: Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus PUNO
Petitioners: Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
Respondents: Sec. Environment and Natural Resources A review of our sociology and history is required to appreciate the concepts of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997). The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the provisions that they
believe amounts to the deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands, minerals, and other The IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
natural resources as public domain, a violation of Sect. 2, Art. XII of Constituion. Petitioners
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a
also claim that the turnover of “ancestral domain” and “ancestral lands” might entail the turnover grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
of private lands found in these areas, which is a violation of the private landowners’ rights.

Issues/Held:
WON The RA 8371 is unconstitutional. (tied)
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Decision:
The Court was split with a 7-7 decision. The case was rediliberated but the results were the A) Law of the Indies
same. As a result, by Rule 56, Sect 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedures, the petition is
DISMISSED. -The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western legal concept introduced by Spain into the
country through Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedula.
Opinions:
7 justices, including Justices Kapunan, Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago, and the Chief
Justice voted to dismiss the petition in their opinion that RA 8371 is constitutional. Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition on the basis that it does not raise a controversy and that -It supports the capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.
petitioners do not have locus standi. The Philippine lands became exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown by virtue
of “discovery” and conquest.
The other 7 voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban expresses that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5,
6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice Vitug on the other
hand expressed that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
-December 10, 1898, under the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded to the U.S. all the rights, interests,
Notes: and claims over the territories of the Philippines.

 
  
In 1903, the Philippines as U.S. colony passes the first Public Land Act (Act. No. 926).

D) Consitution

B) Valenton v Murciano -The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of
-In the case of Velenton v Murciano in 1994, a land dispute between a current occupiers since
1860 with one who claims to have purchased the land in 1892. the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the
The US Court concluded that the Spanish Government that preceded them required
settlers on public lands to obtain title deeds from the state, which has been continued by the US country.
with No. 926.

-The 1973 and 1987 Constitution reiterated Regalian Doctrine both with Articles on “National
C) Public Land Act and Torrens System Economy and Patrimony”

-No 926 governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the
The Constitution states that all natural resources on public or private lands belong to the State,
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and which PETITIONERS claim the IPRA violates.
prescribed the

terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands" peoples (ICCs/IPs) as

a distinct sector in Philippine society.

The law operated on the assumption that the title to public lands belonged to the government.

It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. It is given under customary law, which
nd
The 2 Public Land Act (No. 2874) expanded the scope but limited exploitation of agricultural traces its origin to native title.
lands to Filipinos and Americans.

Rights given to ICCs/IPs include

Torrens System- requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described.
- the right to develop lands and natural resources - the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs

- the right to stay in the territories - the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer

- the right in case of displacement

- the right to safe and clean air and water

- the right to claim parts of reservations

- the right to resolve conflict

 

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory.
-In these communities there is no private ownership of land. The land belonged to the
community and individuals participated in that ownership through mutual sharing of resources.
The Spaniards regarded it as their duty to “civilize” IPs. With them they brought the concept of
public domain.
Also the conversion of many Filipinos to the Christian faith created a mutual feeling of fear,
suspicion, and hostility between Christian and non-Christian Filipinos.
The IPRA addresses centuries of neglect of our Indigenous Peoples.
Senator Juan Flavier (sponsor of the bill):
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the
land long before
any central government was established...Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land
rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as
distinct peoples.”
Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulate:
1) the concept of native title
2) principle of parens patriae
Ancestral Domain vs Ancestral Land
-Ancestral Domain- All areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPscomprising lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial.
-Ancestral Lands- refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and
clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial
In short, Ancestral Domain includes everything to the area, including waters and natural
resources. Ancestral Land is restricted to land only.
IPRA gives the power to identify and delineate these ancestral domains and lands to the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
-The NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) or a Certificate of Ancestral
Land Title (CALT) to the community concerned.
The CADT and CALT is a formal recognition of the ICCs rights over the domain or land. It is
evidence of private ownership of land by native title.
-With the native title, the IPRA declares the domain or land to have never been public land.
Carino v Insular Government
In this case, a land dispute between an Ibaloi and the colonial government, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes of the US Supreme Court held that:
-The US does not need to follow/continue Spanish law, that the decision over the Philippines
and the land issues that reside in must follow US law.
-There is no evidence that Spanish law did not recognize native titles.
-Decision ruling in favor of Carino
Comparison with US Situation with Native Americans
American jurisprudence recognizes Native’s rights to land they occupied before “discovery” by
Europeans.
-Discovery of lands was regarded as the acquisition of said lands, but mere acquisition did not
extinguish the Native’s claims to the land.
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands"

 
THUS, PUNO VOTES TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE IPRA (dami sinabi)

IPRA and Ownership

For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act, the IPRA
converts ancestral land into agricultural land, which may be disposed by the State.

CADT recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain.

Note: The concept recognizes the private but community property

-This does not mean co-ownership, the land is not partition between individuals. It is
based on indigenous customary laws, which claim that the domain belongs to the community
for current and future generations.

-Customary law is a primary source under the IPRA and is recognized in the Civil
Code.

The IPRA also distinguishes land and natural resources. The natural resources still belong to
the State, the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the rights to manage them.

IPRA gives priority rights to ICCs/IPs to exploit any natural resource within their ancestral
domains. Priority, meaning they are given preferences. The State still owns the natural
rd
resources and has say over the utilization of natural resources, especially if a 3 party comes
into play.

With large-scale utilization of resources, the State, as owner of the resources, can:

1) May directly undertake the development and exploitation of the resources

2) Recognize the priority rights of ICCs/IPs by entering agreement with them
3) Enter into an agreement with a non-member of ICCs/IPs
4) May allow a non-member to participate in an agreement with ICCs/IPs

CONCLUSION

There is a growing concern over the rights of indigenous people in the international scene.
International institutions have recognized the need of policies that can accommodate IPs and
respect their rights. Also our 1987 Constitution formally recognizes their existence and declares
as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity.

 

IDEALS v. PSALM
G.R. No. 192088
Date of Promulgation: October 9, 2012
Ponente: Villarama, J.
Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners:
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), represented by its Executive Director, Mr. Edgardo Ligon, and
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), represented by its Vice President Rebecca L.
Malay, AKBAYAN CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY, represented by its Chair Emeritus Loretta Anne
P. Rosales, ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR, represented by its Chairperson, Daniel L.
Edralin, REP. WALDEN BELLO, in his capacity as duly-elected Member of the House of
Representatives
Respondents:
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM),
represented by its Acting President and Chief Executive Officer Atty. Ma. Luz L. Caminero,
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS), represented by its
Administrator Atty. Diosdado M. Allado, NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA),
represented by its Administrator Carlos S. Salazar, KOREA WATER RESOURCES
CORPORATION, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Kim Kuen-Ho and/or Attorneys-in-
fact, Atty. Anna Bianca L. Torres and Atty. Luther D. Ramos, FIRST GEN NORTHERN
ENERGY CORP., represented by its President, Mr. Federico R. Lopez, SAN MIGUEL CORP.,
represented by its President, Mr. Ramon S. Ang, SNABOITIZ POWER-PANGASINAN INC.,
represented by its President, Mr. Antonio R. Moraza, TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President and CEO, Mr. Francisco L.
Viray, and DMCI POWER CORP., represented by its President, Mr. Nestor Dadivas
Facts:
be owned and operated by a foreign-owned corporation (SRPC) will violate the provisions
Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of
Republic Act No. 9136,1 otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001"
(EPIRA).
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. AHEPP’s main units built in 1967 and
1968, and 5 auxiliary units, form part of the Angat Complex which includes the Angat Dam,
Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.
On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water (a Korean
corporation)
Issues/Held:
8. WON petition is moot; - NO
9. WON it violates the right to information; - YES
10. WON it is a violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution; - YES
11. WON it is a violation of the Water Code provisions on the grant of water rights; and
Ratio:
1. PSALM’s contention that the present petition had already been mooted by the issuance
of the Notice of Award to K-Water is misplaced. PSALM’s contention that the present
petition had already been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of Award to K-Water is
misplaced.
1. The people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s
constitutional duty. Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-
going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals.
However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a
"definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public’s
right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. duty of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.28 Section 28,
2. Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to allow
petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and
legal capacity of the winning bidder.
1. Petitioners further assert that the terms of the sale of AHEPP allowing the buyer the
operation and management of the Non-Power Components, constitutes a
relinquishment of government control over the Angat Dam, in violation of Art. XII, Sec.
2 of the Constitution.
Decision
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief/s
is PARTLY GRANTED.
1) The bidding conducted and the Notice of Award issued by PSALM in favor of the winning
bidder, KOREA WATER RESOURCES CORPORATION (K-WATER), are declared VALID and
LEGAL;
2) PSALM is directed to FURNISH the petitioners with copies of all documents and records in its
files pertaining to K-Water;
2. Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws.
3. The crucial issue at hand is the determination of whether the utilization of water by the
power plant
To
of the
Water Code
４．Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said
to be "appropriating" our natural resources

II. Attributes of the State
A. Inherent Powers of the State
1. POLICE POWER
Basco v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649
Date of Promulgation: May 14, 1991
Ponente: Paras, J.
Petition: Petition for Annulment
Petitioners: Attys. Humberto Basco, Edilberto Balce, Socrates Maranan, & Lorenzo Sanchez
Respondents: Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Facts:
PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Petitioners contend that
PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies
of whatever nature, whether National or Local”.
OTHER ISSUES OF THE CASE (might be asked):
Other issues raised were for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order,
monopolistic & tends toward “crony economy”, and violating the equal protection clause
(gambling should be same level as drugs, prostitution, etc).
Issues/Held:
WON PD 1869 is violates of the principle of local autonomy. - NO
Ratio:
The National Government is supreme over local governments. The police power of the state
is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance. The police power of the state has no specific Constitutional grant because it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty, along with taxing power and eminent
domain. Police power is the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". The police power
of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity" and "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers."
Local Government Units (LGUs) have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. The
matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a state concern. PAGCOR is
an instrumentality of the government, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The power of LGUs
to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state
(imperium in imperio), it simply means decentralization.
Also, the power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government.
OTHER ISSUES OF THE CASE (might be asked):
Regarding the other issues of contrary to morals and public policy: Section 11 (Personality
Dignity), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article
XIII and Section 2(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, these facts are
merely statements of principles and policies and not self-executing.
Regarding the equal protection clause: A law doesn’t have to operate in equal force on all
persons/things. For example, some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions
(cock fight, horse race), while others are prohibited.
Decision:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes:
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869:
Income and other taxes. — (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local, shall be assessed and collected under this Franchise from the Corporation; nor shall
any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a
Franchise Tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable
quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial, or national government authority.
Binay v. Domingo
G.R. No. 92389
Date of Promulgation: Sept 11, 1991
Ponente: Paras J.
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioners: Hon. Jejomar Binay and Municipality of Makati
Respondents: Hon. Eufemio Domino and COA
Facts:
On Sept 27, 1988, the petitioner, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 601. (A
resolution to Conform and/or Ratify the Ongoing Burial Assistance Program Initiated

by the Office of the Mayor, of Extending Financial Assistance of 500 pesos to a Bereaved
Family, Funds to be Taken Out of Unappropriated Available Funds Existing in the Municipal
Treasury)
Under the Burial Assistance Program, qualified beneficiaries of Makati whose gross family
income does not exceed P2000, would receive the amount of P500 cash relief.
After the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) approved the resolution, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the program. The resolution was
then referred to COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the
resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of the funds.
Mayor Binay filed two letters for reconsideration. The grounds for reconsideration were:
• Resolution No. 60 fall within the twin principles of police power and parens patriae
• MMC has already appropriated the amount P400000 to implement the resolution, and
the function of COA is to allow the financial assistance in question
The COA denied the reconsideration on the following grounds:
• A statute must have a real relation to public safety, health, morals or welfare to be sustained as
a legitimate exercise of police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates
to public welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police power of a state. In the
resolution, there is no perceptible connection between the objective sought to be attained under
the resolution and the alleged general welfare of Makati inhabitants.
• It should be noted that the resolution is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure
covered thereby should be for public purpose. It should benefit the whole of the inhabitants, not
just the few individuals.
This is a petition to nullify the COA decision (Decision No. 1159).
Issues/Held:
1. WON Resolution No 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause – YES
2. WON Resolution No 60 is subject to the limitation that ordinances/resolutions should
benefit the whole of inhabitants – NO
Ratio:
1. The COA’s disapproval and disallowance of the disbursement was grounded on the fact that
the resolution does not relate to public safety, health, morals or welfare. However, the police
power of a municipal government is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with the
duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience.
It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with
whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exist to
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people. The resolution is a valid exercise of power
since it sought to provide cash relief to poor families as a support for burial of their family
members.
2. Legislations are not unconstitutional merely because they incidentally benefit a limited
number of persons. This is because these laws, ordinances, and resolutions are geared
towards social justice, where the poor, the disabled, the minorities, are made the subject of
such legislations. The Burial Assistance program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death.
Decision:
Petition granted.
Notes:
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police
power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the
municipal corporation.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity
and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7
of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for
governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals,
and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions.
Agustin v. Edu
G.R. No. L-49112
Date of Promulgation: February 2, 1979
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Petition: Prohibition
Petitioner/s: Leovillo C. Agustin
Respondent/s: Romeo F. Edu, LTO Commissioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of Natl
Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications;
and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways
Facts:
Agustin, owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction
No 229 of Pres. Marcos, issued Dec 2, 1974, which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning
devices” and arguing in a petition for prohibition w/ writ of preliminary injunction, that said LOI:
- "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power. For him they are
"oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to
the precepts of our compassionate New Society"
- "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;"
- "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because they will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to
P72.00 per set.”
- “unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
Society as being compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could

very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of EWD's."
In an Answer submitted by the respondents, they specifically deny the aforementioned
allegations stating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police
power. Furthermore, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a
citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for
application. They are Calalang v. Williams, Morfe v. Mutuc, and Edu v. Ericta. Reference was
also made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and
signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified.
Issues/Held:
WON the Letter of Instruction no. 229 is a valid exercise of police power and constitutional –
YES
Ratio:
- The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. In
the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after
the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’
- Petitioner lack factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. Such early warning
device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars
are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps because: Being universal
among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from
any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the
travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.
Decision:
Petition is dismissed.
Opinions:
Dissent: Teehankee, J.
- It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory o require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
E.W.D.'S, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
- The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been
made of petitioner's assertion that the E.W.D.'s are not useful in the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents based on statistics.
- The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering
- No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D.
- There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles.
The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested
in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents
- a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic
mindedness in having filed the present petition as capricious and unreasonable the "all
pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and
property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
2. POWER OF TAXATION
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
G.R. No. 120082
Date of Promulgation: September 11, 1996
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Petitioners: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
Respondents: Hon. Ferdinand Marcos (Presiding Judge of RTC of Cebu City), The City of
Cebu
Facts:
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by RA 6958 for the
purpose of encouraging, promoting, and developing the international and domestic air traffic in
Central Visayas and Mindanao regions and upgrade services and facilities of the airports. Since
its creation it has enjoyed exemption from payment of realty taxes, which was given to it by
Sect. 14 of its Charter.
On October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Treasurer of
Cebu City, demanded the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to
MCIAA (petitioner). MCIAA objected to the demand citing Sect. 133 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991 saying that government agencies and instrumentalities are exempted from
taxes, fees, or charges. Cebu City (respondent) answered by saying that based on Sect. 193
and 234 of LGC 1992, tax exemptions for natural or juridical persons, including government-
owned corporations, are withdrawn.
MCIAA argued that it was an instrumentality of the government, thus not subject to taxation.
While, Cebu City claimed that MCIAA is merely a government-owned corporation, which IS
subject to taxation. MCIAA filed a petition for Declaratory Relief with RTC of Cebu. RTC of Cebu
dismissed the petition, MCIAA soon filed an appeal.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the lands that is transferred to MCIAA is subject to tax, as a government-owned
corporation – YES
2. WON MCIAA is a taxable person - YES
Ratio:
1. Transfer of lands entails ownership of those lands. Thus MCIAA would be considered an
owner of the lands transferred, which is subject to realty tax. The exemption in Sect. 234 of
the LGC is not applicable to petitioner.
2. MCIAA was merely exempted. The fact that it was exempted shows that the default would
make it a taxable person. Taxations is the general rule, an exemption is merely applied and
can be revoked.
Decision:

Petition DENIED, RTC order AFFIRMED
Notes:
Sect. 133 of LGC- Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units-
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following
o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
Sect. 234 of LGC-
a) Real property owned by Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person.
e) Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code.
Difference between “Republic of the Philippines” and “National Government”
Republic of the Philippines- Is the broader term that is synonymous with “Government of the
Republic of the Philippines” which includes the National Government as well as the Local
Government, and all of its forms.
National Government- It is strictly the central government and its operations. Does not include
the local governments and its forms.
*Note Republic of the Philippines is mentioned in Sect. 234 while only National Government is
stated in Sect. 133. The term Republic of the Philippines is the more expansive term and if Sect.
234 intended to extend the exception, in which the MCIAA was to be included, then it would
have not used the broader term.
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 112024
Date of Promulgation: January 28, 1999
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
Petition: Petition for review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners: Philippine Bank of Communications
Respondents: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Court of Tax Appeals and Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) paid the total income tax of
P5,016,954.00 for the first and second quarters of 1985. Subsequently, however, PBCom
suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended
December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus
declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income
from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable
taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986.
On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for a tax credit
of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of
1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld
by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.
Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner
instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
According to the petitioner, its excess tax payments amounted to P5,299,749.95
On May 20, 1993, the CTA denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit in the sum
amount of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary
period provided for by law. The petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to P234,077.69
was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its
tax payment in the succeeding year.
On June 22, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA's decision but the
same was denied due course for lack of merit. Thereafter, PBCom filed a petition for review of
said decision and resolution of the CTA with the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed in toto
the CTA's resolution dated July 20, 1993.
Issues/Held:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax credits on the ground
of prescription, despite petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period
of two years to ten years? - NO
Ratio:
Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by prescription
relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985.
The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive
period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess
quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through Solicitor General, argues that the two-
year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of
Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is
generally done on April 15 following the close of the calendar year.
The Court however ruled that the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not
warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law.
Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation." The primary purpose is to
generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common
weal. Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings in tax
cases. This must necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly relies
to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost importance that the modes
adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little
as possible.
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the time
fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its
functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters.
The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is
commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time of
filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year. When the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two
years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a
clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not
simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by
Congress.
Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more

specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a
statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the
courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found
to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override,
instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.
Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC
No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative
interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so
would, in effect, amend the statute.
Decision:
Petition denied
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124043
Date of Promulgation: October 14, 1998
Ponente: Vitug, J.
Petition: appeal seeking the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
Petitioners: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Respondents: Court of Appeal; Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Facts:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. On
various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of
trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes, all of which were
thought to be classified as foreign brands art first since they were listed in the World Tobacco
Directory as belonging to foreign companies. Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to
Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign
brand category.
A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654
was enacted – 55% for locally manufactured foreign brand while 45% for locally manufactured
brands. 2 days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the real owner/s
are of Champion, Hope and More, it follows that the same shall be considered locally
manufactured foreign brand for purposes of determining the ad valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via
telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco addressed to no one in particular. Then
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. CIR assessed
Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. CTA upheld the position of Fortune
rendering RMC 37-93 defective, invalid and unenforceable. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for
review stating the ff:
• RMC 37-93 is a ruling interpreting the provisions of the tax code and thus being an
interpretative ruling, prior hearing is not necessary to its validity, effectivity and
enforceability.
• RMC 37-93 is not discriminatory since it applies to all locally manufactured cigarettes
similarly situated as 'hope,' 'more' and 'champion' cigarettes.
Issues/Held:
1. WON RMC 37-93 is an interpretative ruling of the code, hence, prior hearing is not
necessary to its validity, effectivity and enforceability - NO
2. WON RMC 37-93 is discriminatory and might have infringed on uniformity of taxation - YES
Ratio:
1. The court first distinguished between two kinds of administrative issuances - a legislative
rule and an interpretative rule.
A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be
hearing.
On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering that it was issued days before RA 7654 was
enacted, cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or an interpretative ruling. It has
been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the
classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them
covered by RA 7654 since its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands.
Hence, Without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA 7654, "Hope Luxury," "Premium More," and
"Champion" cigarettes would be in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing
foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax and would have had no new tax rates.
In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-
legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication should not have been then ignored.
2. Art VI, Sec 28, par 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and
equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated,
are to be treated alike or put on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities.
RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium More" and "Champion" cigarettes and,
unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private respondent that the
circular should, be considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process.
Decision:
The CA and CTA decisions are AFFIRMED.
Gerochi v. Department of Energy
G.R. No. 159796
Date of Promulgation: July 17, 2007
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petition: original action to declare Sec. 34 of EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR unconstitutional, for
the Universal Charge to be refunded to petitioners, for a preliminary injunction and/or TRO to be
issued directing respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said
charge

Petitioners: Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers
Network, Inc. (ECN)
Respondents: Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), National
Power Corporation (NPC), Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM
Corp.), Strategic Power Utilities Group (SPUG), and Panay Electric Company Inc. (PECO)
Facts:
R.A. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was
enacted and took effect in 2001.
Respondents filed several petitions with ERC for their share of the universal charge and were
granted. On the basis of the ERC decision, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged
Romeo Gerochi and all other end-users with the universal charge as reflected in their electric
bills.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR, which
imposes a universal charge on all end-users of electricity, is unconstitutional on the ff. grounds:
1. The universal charge is tax and the power to tax is a legislative function, thus the
delegation to ERC is unconstitutional
2. ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected would
go
3. The imposition is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented
Issues/Held:
1. WON the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax – NO
2. WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC – NO
Ratio:
1. Universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police
power. Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as
an implement of police power.
Power to tax:
• Incident of sovereignty, unlimited in its range
• Security in its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax
• Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need
• Necessity; without it, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting general welfare of
the people
Police power:
• Power to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property
• Most pervasive, least limitable, and most demanding of the three powers
• Salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a task; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally
raised does not make imposition a tax. In exacting the assailed Universal Charge, the State’s
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Also, the establishment and
maintenance of the STF (Special Trust Fund) is well within the police power of the government
to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, and reasonably
serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purpose for which the Universal Charge
is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry.
2. With the principle of separation of powers come the logical corollary of the principle of
non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegate non
delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated), wherein such delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
However, given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful that
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies except that
there are requirements known as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Requirements for the valid exercise of subordinate legislation requires the regulation be:
1. germane to the objects and purposes of the law
2. not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards of law
Completeness Test
• Law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that the delegate only needs to enforce it
Sufficient Standard Test
• Adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot
Passes both Completeness & Sufficient Tests:
EPIRA, read in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains
sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of EPIRA does not state the specific amount to be paid
as Universal Charge, the amount is made certain by legislative parameters provided in the law
itself. Moreover, ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the
Universal Charge. In fact, Sec. 51 d) and e) provide for the powers of PSALM in determining
said charge. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification
of the country and the quality, reliability, security, and affordability of the supply of electric power”
and “ watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation as
they provide limits on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR.
Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
EPIRA:
Provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including privatization of the assets of
the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains
the division of the industry into 4 distinct sectors: generation, transmission, distribution, and
supply. Petitioners failed to overcome the law’s presumption of constitutionality; the Court finds
no clear violation that would declare it unconstitutional.
Decision:
Dismissed for lack of merit.
Notes:
Section 34. Universal Charge. – Within 1 year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge
to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users
for the ff. purposes:

 
a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by the National discussed in this Review.
Government and stranded contract costs of NPC and as well as qualified stranded contract
costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry; Issues/Held:
b) Missionary electrification; Procedural:
c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of 1. WON the petition is dismissible for failure to comply with the provisions of Sec 5, Rule
energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels; 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure – YES
d) An environmental charge equivalent to ¼ of 1 centavo per kWh, which shall accrue to an
environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said Substantive:
fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and 1. WON ownership of the land registered under PD 1529 is limited – NO
e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding 3 years 2. WON the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the
taking (as opposed to the time of finality of the decision) – YES
Section 51. Powers – The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the 3. WON the affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by Onorio exempts NIA from
attainment of its objective, have the ff powers: making payment to the former – NO
d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which
shall form the basis for the ERC in the determination of the universal charge; Ratio:
e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other 1. Sec 5, Rule 7 requires a certificate of non-forum shopping from the petitioner with
regard to the filing for review on certiorari of a decision by CA. Failure to do so is a
property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal charge.
ground for the dismissal of the review. The certification must be executed by the
plaintiff/petitioner, not counsel or any other person, because the plaintiff knows better
than anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case
3. EMINENT DOMAIN or issues.

Eslaban v. Vda de Onorio In this case, the petition for review was filed by Eslaban Jr, BUT the certificate of non-
G.R. No. 146062 forum shopping is signed by Cesar Gonzales (NIA administrator). On this ground
alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Date of Promulgation: June 28, 2001
Ponente: Mendoza, J. 2. The respondent argues that pursuant to PD 1529, an encumbrance is imposed on the
Petition: Review on certiorari of a decision of the CA land. PD 1529 provides that:
Petitioners: Santiago Eslaban Jr, in his capacity as Project Manager of National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
Respondents: Clarita Vda. De Onorio registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from all
Facts: encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following
This is a petition for review of the decision of CA and RTC ordering NIA to pay Onorio the encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
amount of P107k as just compensation for the taking of her property.
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
Onorio is an owner of a lot in South Cotabato. She has a transfer certificate of title (TCT) from government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does
the Registry of Deeds. not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, have been determined.
In 1981, Eslaban (project manager of NIA), approved the construction of an irrigation canal on
Onorio’s lot, affecting 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Onorio’s husband agreed to the However, according to the provision, the only servitude which a private property owner is
construction of the canal provided that they be paid by the government. required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of “any government
canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries have been pre-
4
In 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between Onorio and NIA. NIA agreed to pay determined.”
P4k as a Right-of-Way damages. Onorio then executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees wherein she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements she This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of registration of
suffered as a result of the right-of-way. That same year, NIA offered Onorio the sum of P35k by the land. In this case, the canal was constructed by NIA in 1931, years after the property
way of amicable settlement pursuant to Sec 18 of EO 1035*. had been registered. Hence, the ownership is not limited by PD 1529.

Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but NIA refused. She then filed a 3. Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land
complaint against NIA before the RTC praying that NIA be ordered to pay her P111k as but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
compensation for the portion of her property used in the canal construction. RTC ruled in favor of
Onorio. NIA appealed in CA, and the issues discussed in the CA decision will again be Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered ‘just’ for then the owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
A legal right of passage over another person’s land.

 

made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.
The amended Sec 4, Rule 67 provides that the value of the property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
‘whichever came first.’ But before this amendment, it was held in Commissioner of
Public Highways v Burgos that the price of the land at the time of the taking, not its
value after the passage of time, represents the true value of the land.
Thus, the CA erred when it ruled that the just compensation to be paid to Osnorio should
be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking in
1981.
4. The CA was right in ruling that the affidavit of waiver did not exempt NIA from making
just compensation. This is because the waiver pertains only to improvements and
crops, and not to the value of land utilized by NIA for its canal.
Decision:
Petition affirmed with modification to the extent that the just compensation for the contested
property be paid to respondent in the amount of P16,047 per hectare.
Notes:
Sec 18 of EO 1035:
Financial Assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired under CA 141, as amended,
for the area of portion subject to the reservation under Sec 12 thereof in such amounts as may
be determined by the implementing agency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with COA
and assessor’s office concerned.
Regarding just compensation, the reason why the payment must be determined from the time of
the taking, it was observed in Republic v Lara:
“Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings,
the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken;
the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value
thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property
from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated
only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be
paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is
taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it"
Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102976
Date of Promulgation: October 25, 1995
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Petition: Petition for review of a decision of the CA
Petitioners: Iron and Steel Authority
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp.
Facts:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD 272 on August 9, 1973. It was created to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Upon its creation it was given
a 5-year term, in 1978 it would expired, in that year it was given a 10-year extension. The
National Steel Corporation (NSC) a government owned corporation was given public land in
Iligan City, where the private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) was
located. The ISA exercised its power of eminent domain and initiated expropriation proceedings
in respect of occupancy rights to MCFC.
Negotiations between the NSC and respondent MCFC failed. Petitioner ISA commenced with
eminent domain proceedings in the RTC of Iligan City. RTC issued a writ of possession to the
ISA, ISA then placed possession of the land from MCFC to NSC. The case proceeded to a trial
was ongoing however ISA’s expiration date has passed and the MCFC filed a motion to dismiss
the case since petitioner ISA has ceased to become a juridical person. On November 9, 1988
trial court granted MCFC’s motion and dismissed that case. They also argued that the NSC will
use the land not for public use but for profit.
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, in which the TC denied. ISA
filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the trial court’s order. ISA appealed again.
CA ruled that ISA ceases to have juridical identity once ISA expired (Rule 3, Sect. of the Rules
of Court), but stated that it was premature for court to rule whether the use of the land in
question is appropriate under eminent domain.
ISA contends that although it ceases to exist, the Republic of the Philippines takes over as the
party.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the Republic of the Philippines replaces ISA as petitioner – YES
2. WON the issue of whether the use of the public land can be decided as appropriate – NO
Ratio:
1. The ISA acted on behalf of the government when it exercises its power of eminent domain
to promote iron and steel production. ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of
the Republic, so all its powers, duties, functions, assets, and liabilities are given back to the
government once it ceases to exist. Hence, in a case such as this the Republic of the
Philippines will replace ISA as the party during the remainder of the trial
2. It is premature to decide whether the public land in question will be lawful, since the
respondent’s claim is pure speculation.
Decision:
Decision is reversed and case is remanded back to the RTC in which the petitioner is replaced
with Republic of the Philippines.
Notes:
Rule 3, Sec. 1 of Rules of Court- Who May Be Parties- Only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
a) those who are recognized as persons under the law whether natural, i.e. biological
persons, on the one hand, or juridical persons such as corporations, on the other
hand; and
b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections
G.R. No. 132922
Date of Promulgation: April 21, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Petition: Petition for review of a decision of the Commission on Elections
Petitioners: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
and GMA Network Inc.
Respondents: The Commission on Elections
Facts:
Petitioners are assailing the validity of B.P. Blg No. 881, Section 92 which states that
“The Commission [on Elections] shall procure radio and television time to be known as “Comelec
Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.”
TELEBAP asserted an interest in the abovementioned provision as lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. On the
other hand, GMA claimed that it suffered loses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
election and it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year (1998).
Issues/Held:
Procedural:
3. WON the petitioners have legal standing in assailing the B.P. Blg. 881 –
TELEBAP – NO; GMA - YES
1. No merit. All broadcasting is licensed by the government. This franchise is a privilege
subject to amendment by the Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision
in Article 12, Section 11 that states “any such franchise or right granted…shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires.” Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service.
The claim of petitioner GMA that they should be compensated for the government’s
usage and operation of the station is flawed. Under Section 92 B.P. Blg. 881, the
COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of airtime to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity, time and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution in Articles 9-C,
Section 4. B.P. Blg. 881 Section 92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner’s
franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting
a public grant of privilege.
The right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, is paramount.
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast
stations give free airtime. The failure of broadcast stations to provide airtime unless
paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Article
3, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on
maters of public concern shall be recognized,” while Article 12, Section 6 states that
“the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and
operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”

Substantial: 2. Argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled
WON Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 to the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print
12. Takes property without due process of law and violates the eminent domain clause of media. The government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the
the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation – NO broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the
13. Denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws – NO radio and television broadcast industry to provide free airtime for the COMELEC Time
is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Ratio:
Procedural: Decision:
1. TELEBAP’s petition must be held without standing: Petition denied.
a. As citizens: Members of TELEBAP have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the operation of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881
b. As registered voters: This case does not concern their right to suffrage
c. As taxpayers: This case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power
d. As a corporate entity: TELEBAP does not have standing to assert the rights
of radio and television broadcasting companies; the mere fact that
TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle
them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected
companies
GMA, on the other hand, has standing:
a. It operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected
by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. Blg. 881
b. It lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning
from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from
7pm-8pm and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in the
view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
Substantive:

 
  

B.  State  immunity  from  suit  

1. When  is  a  suit  against  a  State  

 
Republic  v.  Feliciano  
G.R.  No.  70853  
 
Date  of  Promulgation:  March  12,  1987  
Ponente:  Yap,  J.    
Petition:  review  of  the  decision  of  the  Intermediate  Appellate  Court  
Petitioners:  Republic  of  the  Philippines  
Respondents:  Pablo  Feliciano  and  Intermediate  Appellate  Court  
 
Facts:  
On  January  22,  1970,  respondent  Feliciano  filed  a  complaint  with  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance  
of  Camarines  Sur  against  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  represented  by  the  Land  Authority,  for  
the  recovery  of  ownership  and  possession  of  a  parcel  of  land,  consisting  of  four  (4)  lots  with  an  
aggregate  area  of  1,364.4177  hectares,  situated  in  the  Barrio  of  Salvacion,  Municipality  of  Tinambac,  
Camarines  Sur.  
 
Plaintiff  alleged  that  he  bought  the  property  in  question  from  Victor  Gardiola  by  virtue  of  a  
Contract  of  Sale  dated  May  31,  1952,  followed  by  a  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  on  October  30,  1954.  
Gardiola  had  acquired  the  property  by  purchase  from  the  heirs  of  Francisco  Abrazado  whose  title  to  
the  said  property  was  evidenced  by  an  informacion  posesoria.    
 
On  November  1,  1954,  President  Ramon  Magsaysay  issued  Proclamation  No.  90  which  reserved  
for  settlement  purposes,  under  the  administration  of  the  National  Resettlement  and  Rehabilitation  
Administration  (NARRA),  a  tract  of  land  situated  in  the  Municipalities  of  Tinambac  and  Siruma,  
Camarines  Sur.    
 
NARRA  and  its  successor  agency,  the  Land  Authority,  started  sub-­‐dividing  and  distributing  the  land  
to  the  settlers.  The  property  in  question  was  part  of  the  reservation  on  Proclamation  No.  90  but  
petitioner  claims  that  it  is  his  private  property  and  should  be  excluded.  
 
Plaintiff  prayed  that  he  be  declared  the  rightful  and  true  owner  of  the  property  in  question  
consisting  of  1,364.4177  hectares  and  that  his  title  of  ownership  based  on  informacion  posesoria  of  
his  predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest  be  declared  legal  valid  and  subsisting.  He  prayed  that  defendant  be  
 
  
ordered  to  cancel  and  nullify  all  awards  to  the  settlers.   properties.    
  • There  is  some  sophistry  involved  in  this  argument,  since  the  character  of  
The  defendant,  represented  by  the  Land  Authority,  filed  an  answer,  raising  by  way  of  affirmative   the  land  sought  to  be  recovered  still  remains  to  be  established,  and  the  
defenses  lack  of  sufficient  cause  of  action  and  prescription.   plaintiff's  action  is  directed  against  the  State  precisely  to  compel  the  
  latter  to  litigate  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  property.    
A  motion  to  intervene  and  to  set  aside  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  in  August  29,  1970  was  filed   4. The  inscription  in  the  property  registry  of  an  informacion  posesoria  under  the  Spanish  
by  eighty-­‐six  (86)  settlers,  together  with  the  barrio  council  of  Pag-­‐asay,  alleging  among  other  things   Mortgage  Law  was  a  means  provided  by  the  law  to  record  a  claimant's  actual  possession  
that  intervenors  had  been  in  possession  of  the  land  in  question  for  more  than  twenty  (20)   of  a  piece  of  land.  Such  inscription  merely  furnishes,  at  best,  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  
years  under  claim  of  ownership.   fact  that  at  the  time  the  proceeding  was  held,  the  claimant  was  in  possession  of  the  land  
  under  a  claim  of  right  as  set  forth  in  his  application.  The  possessory  information  could  
On  August  31,  1970,  intervenors  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss,  principally  on  the  ground  that  the   ripen  into  a  record  of  ownership  after  the  lapse  of  20  years  (later  reduced  to  10  years),  
Republic  of  the  Philippines  cannot  be  sued  without  its  consent  and  hence  the  action  cannot   upon  the  fulfillment  of  the  requisites  prescribed  in  Article  393  of  the  Spanish  Mortgage  
prosper.     Law.  
  • There  is  no  showing  in  the  case  at  bar  that  the  informacion  posesoria  held  by  
Issues/Held:     the  respondent  had  been  converted  into  a  record  of  ownership.    
• Using  this  possessory  information,  the  respondent  could  have  applied  for  
1. WON  the  doctrine  of  non-­‐suability  of  the  State  has  proper  application  in  this  case.  -­‐  YES   judicial  confirmation  of  imperfect  title  under  the  Public  Land  Act.  
  However,  having  failed  to  do  so,  it  is  rather  late  for  him  to  pursue  this  avenue  
at  this  time.  Respondent  must  also  contend,  as  the  records  disclose,  with  the  
Ratio:   fact  admitted  by  him  and  stated  in  the  decision  of  the  Court  a  quo  that  settlers  
have  been  occupying  and  cultivating  the  land  in  question  since  even  
1. We  find  the  petition  meritorious.  The  doctrine  of  non-­‐suability  of  the  State  has  proper   before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  which  puts  in  grave  doubt  his  own  claim  of  
application  in  this  case.  The  plaintiff  has  impleaded  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  as   possession.  
defendant  in  an  action  for  recovery  of  ownership  and  possession  of  a  parcel  of  land,    
bringing  the  State  to  court  just  like  any  private  person  who  is  claimed  to  be  usurping  a  
piece  of  property.   Decision:  
• A  suit  for  the  recovery  of  property  is  not  an  action  in  rem,  but  an  action  in  
personam.  It  is  an  action  directed  against  a  specific  party  or  parties,  and  any   Judgment  is  hereby  rendered  reversing  and  setting  aside  the  appealed  decision  of  the  Intermediate  
judgment  therein  binds  only  such  party  or  parties.  The  complaint  filed  by   Appellate  Court,  dated  April  30,  1985,  and  affirming  the  order  of  the  court  a  quo,  dated  August  21,  
plaintiff,  the  private  respondent  herein,  is  directed  against  the  Republic  of  the   1980,  dismissing  the  complaint  filed  by  respondent  Pablo  Feliciano  against  the  Republic  of  the  
Philippines,  represented  by  the  Land  Authority,  a  governmental  agency  created   Philippines.  No  costs.  
by  Republic  Act  No.  3844.   Republic  v.  Sandoval  
• By  its  caption  and  its  allegation  and  prayer,  the  complaint  is  clearly  a  suit  
against  the  State,  which  under  settled  jurisprudence  is  not  permitted,  except   No.  84607  
upon  a  showing  that  the  State  has  consented  to  be  sued,  either  expressly  or  
by  implication  through  the  use  of  statutory  language  too  plain  to  be    
misinterpreted.  The  complaint  itself  fails  to  allege  the  existence  of  such  
consent  and  the  case  should  have  been  dismissed.   Date  of  Promulgation:  March  19,  1993  
2. Private  respondent  contends  that  the  consent  of  petitioner  may  be  read  from  the  
Proclamation  itself,  when  it  established  the  reservation  "subject  to  private  rights,  if  any  
Ponente:  Campos,  Jr.,  J.  
there  be."  We  do  not  agree.  No  such  consent  can  be  drawn  from  the  language  of  the  
Proclamation.  The  exclusion  of  existing  private  rights  from  the  reservation  established  
Petition:  Suit  
by  Proclamation  No.  90  cannot  be  construed  as  a  waiver  of  the  immunity  of  the  State  
from  suit.  Waiver  of  immunity,  being  a  derogation  of  sovereignty,  will  not  be  inferred  
lightly,  but  must  be  construed  in  strictissimi  juris.   Petitioner:  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  Gen.  Ramon  Montano,  Gen.  Alfredo  Lim,  Gen.  Alexander  
• The  Proclamation  is  not  a  legislative  act.  The  consent  of  the  State  to  be  sued   Aguirre,  Col.  Edgar  Dula  Torres,  Col.  Cezar  Nazareno,  Maj.  Filemon  Gasmen,  Pat.  Nicanor  Abando,  PFC  
must  emanate  from  statutory  authority.  Waiver  of  State  immunity  can  only   Serafin  Cebu,  Jr.,  Gen.  Brigido  Paredes,  Col.  Rogelio  Monforte,  PFC  Antonio  Lucero,  Pat.  Jose  Mendiola,  
be  made  by  an  act  of  the  legislative  body.   Pat.  Nelson  Tuason,  Police  Corporal  Panfilo  Rogos,  Police  Lt.  Juan  B.  Beltran,  Pat.  Noel  Managbao,  
3. Neither  is  there  merit  in  respondent's  submission,  which  the  respondent  appellate  court   Marine  Third  Class  Trainee  (3CT)  Nolito  Nogato,  3CT  Alejandro  B.  Naguio,  Jr.,  Efren  Arcillas,  3CT  
sustained,  on  the  basis  of  our  decision  in  the  Begosa  case,  that  the  present  action  is  not   Agerico  Luna,  3CT  Basilio  Borja,  3CT  Manolito  Luspo,  3CT  Cristituto  Gervacio,  3CT  Manuel  Dela  Cruz,  
a  suit  against  the  State  within  the  rule  of  State  immunity  from  suit,  because  plaintiff   Jr.,  Marine  (CDC)  Bn.,  (Civil  Disturbance  Control),  Mobile  Dispersal  Team  (MDT),  Lt.  Romeo  Paquinto,  
does  not  seek  to  divest  the  Government  of  any  of  its  lands  or  its  funds.  It  is   Lt.  Laonglaang  Goce,  Majr.  Demetrio  De  La  Cruz,  Police  Captain  Rodolfo  Naval,  John  Doe,  Richard  Doe,  
Roberto  Doe  and  other  Does  
contended  that  the  complaint  involves  land  not  owned  by  the  State,  but  private  land  
belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  hence  the  Government  is  not  being  divested  of  any  of  its  

 
  
Respondent:  Hon.  Edilberto  G.  Sandoval,  RTC  Manila  Branch  IX,  Erlinda  C.  Caylao,  Anatalia   Art.  XIV,  Sec.  3,  1987  Constitution  says  that  the  State  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent.  The  
Angeles  Perez,  Myrna  Bautista,  Cipriana  Evangelio,  Elma  Grampa,  Amelia  Gutierrez,  Nemesio   Citizens’  Mendiola  Commission  created  by  Administrative  Order  No.  11  was  only  for  investigation  
Lakindanum,  Purita  Yumul,  Miguel  Arabe,  Teresita  Arjona,  Ronaldo  Campomanes  and  Carmencita   purposes;  its  findings  and  recommendations  do  not  bind  the  State  immediately.  The  speeches  of  
Ardoni  Vda.  De  Caylao,  Rogelio  Domunico  in  their  capacity  as  heirs  of  the  deceased  (Roberto  C.  Caylao,   President  Corazon  Aquino  are  also  not  binding  on  the  State,  they  don’t  amount  to  any  waiver  or  
Sonny  “Boy”  Perez,  Dionesio  Bautista,  Dante  Evangelio,  Adelfa  Aribe,  Danilo  Arjona,  Vicente   admission  of  liability  of  the  State.  
Campomanes,  Ronilo  Domunico)  respectively;  and  (names  of  sixty-­‐two  injured  victims)  Eddie  
Aguinaldo,  Felicismo  Albasia,  Napoleon  Bautista,  Danilo  Cruz,  Eddie  Mensola,  Albert  Pitalbo,  Vicente    
Rosel,  Ruben  Carriedo,  Joy  Cruz,  Honorio  Labamba,  Jr.,  Efren  Macaraig,  Solomon  Manaloto,  Romeo  
Duran,  Nilo  Tagubat,  Jun  Carsellar,  Joey  Clemente,  Gerardo  Coyoca,  Luisito  Daco,  Benjamin  Dela  Cruz,   It  is  a  settled  rule  that  the  State  as  a  person  can  commit  no  wrong.  While  the  Republic  in  this  case  is  
Arthur  Fontanilla,  Wilson  Garcia,  Carlos  Siray,  Jose  Perras,  Tomas  Vallos,  Arnold  Enaje,  Marianita   sued  by  name,  the  ultimate  liability  does  not  pertain  to  the  government.  
Dimapilis,  Francisco  Angeles,  Marcelo  Esguerra,  Jose  Ferrer,  Rodel  de  Guia,  Elvis  Mendoza,  Victoriano  
Quijano,  Joey  Adime,  Resieno  Adul,  Alberto  Tarsona,  Carlos  Alcantara,  Mamerto  Alias,  Emelito  Almonte,    
Benilda  Alonuevo,  Emma  Abadillo,  Reynaldo  Caballes,  Jr.,  Jaime  Caldeto,  Fabian  Cantelejo,  Rodrigo  
Carabara,  Enrique  Delgado,  Jun  Delos  Santos,  Mario  Demasaca,  Francisco  Gonzales,  Ernesto  Gonzales,   The  military  officials  are  personally  held  liable  for  the  damages  for  their  official  functions  
Ramiro  Jamil,  Juan  Lucena,  Perlito  Salaysay,  Johnny  Santos,  Marcelo  Santos,  Emil  Sayao,  Bayani  Umali,   ceased  the  moment  they  exceeded  to  their  authority.  
Remigio  Mahalin,  Bong  Manlulo,  Armando  Matienzo,  Carlo  Medina,  Lito  Novenario,  and  Rosella  Robale  
 
 
Decision:  
Facts:    
Petitions  are  dismissed.  
In  January  1987,  farmers  and  their  sympathizers  presented  their  demands  for  what  they  called  
"genuine  agrarian  reform".  On  January  22,  1987,  the  group  decided  to  march  to  Malacañang  to  air    
their  demands,  joined  by  other  leftist  groups  (which  were  infiltrated  by  CPP/NPA).  There  was  a  
marchers-­‐police  confrontation  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  12  rallyists  and  scores  were   Notes:  
wounded.  
Art.  XIV,  Sec.  3,  1987  Constitution:  (Doctrine  of  immunity  of  the  government  from  suit  expressly  
  provided  in  the  Constitution)  

President  Corazon  Aquino  issued  Administrative  Order  No.  11  creating  the  Citizens’  Mendiola    
Commission  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  an  investigation.  The  Commission  recommended  the  
prosecution  of  the  head  of  the  rally  for  holding  the  demonstration  without  permit,  to  the  military  
Some  instances  when  a  suit  against  the  State  is  proper:  
officers  involved  who  ordered  the  unnecessary  firing,  and  for  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  and  
wounded  victims  to  be  compensated  by  the  government.  
1. When  the  Republic  is  sued  by  name;  
2. When  the  suit  is  against  an  unincorporated  government  agency;  
 
3. When  the  suit  is  on  its  face  against  a  government  officer  but  the  case  is  such  that  the  
ultimate  liability  will  belong  not  to  the  officer  but  to  the  government.  
Pres.  Cory  Aquino  also  had  acts  and  utterances  which  were  sympathetic  to  the  cause.  
 
 
 
Issues/Held:    
Philippine  Agila  Satellite  v.  Trinidad-­‐Lichauco  
 
G.R.  No.  134887  
WON  the  State  has  waived  its  immunity  from  suit  -­‐  NO  
 
WON  this  case  qualifies  as  a  suit  against  the  State  -­‐  NO  
Date  of  Promulgation:  July  27,  2006  
 
Ponente:  Carpio-­‐Morales,  J.    
Ratio:  
Petition:  certiorari  

 
  
Petitioners:  Philippine  Agila  Satellite  Inc.    

Respondents:  DOTC  Secretary  Josefina  Trinidad-­‐Lichauco  and  the  Hon.  Ombudsman   Because  a  prejudicial  question  under  Sec  7  of  Rule  111  of  the  Rules  of  Court  (see  notes)  was  found  
by  the  Evaluation  and  Preliminary  Investigation  Bureau  (EPIB),  it  recommended  that  the  criminal  
  suit  be  dismissed  and  such  was  approved  by  the  Ombudsman.  

Facts:      

June  6,  1994  -­‐  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MOU)  was  entered  into  by  a  consortium  of   PASI  concedes  that  the  issues  in  the  civil  case  are  similar  or  intimately  related  to  the  issue  raised  in  
private  telecommunications  carriers  and  the  Department  of  Transportation  and  Communications   the  criminal  case  which  give  rise  to  a  prejudicial  question.  It  contends,  however,  that  the  resolution  
(DOTC),  they  formed  a  corporation  and  adopted  the  corporate  name  Philippine  Agila  Satellite,  Inc.   of  the  issues  in  the  civil  case  is  not  determinative  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  Lichauco,  it  arguing  
(PASI).   that  even  if  she  is  adjudged  liable  for  damages,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  she  would  be  
convicted  of  the  crime  charged.  
 
 
June  28,  1996  -­‐  They  requested  the  then  DOTC  Secretary  Amado  S.  Lagdameo,  Jr.  for  official  
government  confirmation  of  the  assignment  of  Philippine  orbital  slots  161ºEand  153ºE  to  PASI  for   PASI  moved  to  reconsider  the  dismissal  but  was  subsequently  denied.  Same  outcome  was  met  upon  
its  AGILA  satellites  by  a  letter  which  was  confirmed.  PASI  then  undertook  preparations  for  the   elevating  the  case  before  the  CA.  Hence,  this  petition  for  review  on  certiorari,  arguing  that  the  
launching,  operation  and  management  of  its  satellite.   Ombudsman  erred  in  dismissing  the  complaint.  

   

December  3,  1996  -­‐  They  requested  the  Land  bank’s  confirmation  thru  its  President  and  CEO,  Jesli   Issues/Held:    
Lapuz,  of  its  participation  in  a  club  loan  for  the  government’s  assignment  to  PASI  of  orbital  slots  
161ºE  and  153ºE.  The  same  letter  was  sent  by  Lapuz  to  DOTC  Undersecretary  Josefina  T.  Lichauco,   1) WON  there  exists  a  prejudicial  question  –  YES    
who  in  response,  sent  a  letter  to  the  bank  controverting  the  said  assignment,  clearly  stating  that   2) If  in  affirmative,  WON  the  dismissal  of  the  complaint  on  that  account  is  in  order  –  NO  
orbital  slot  153°E  can  no  longer  be  assigned  to  PASI.    
Ratio:  
 
1) There  exists  a  prejudicial  question  because  if  the  award  to  the  undisclosed  bidder  of  the  
December  1997  -­‐  She  subsequently  issued  a  Notice  of  Offer  for  several  orbital  slots  including  153ºE   orbital  lot  153°E  is,  in  the  civil  case  declared  valid  for  being  within  Lichauco’s  scope  of  
in  December  1997.   authority  to  thus  free  her  from  liability  for  damages,  there  would  be  no  prohibited  act  to  
speak  of  nor  would  there  be  basis  for  undue  injury  claimed  to  have  been  suffered  by  
  petitioner..  
2) As  laid  down  in  Yap  v.  Paras,  Section  6,  Rule  111  of  the  Rules  of  Court  (see  notes)  directs  
January  23,  1998  -­‐  PASI,  claiming  that  the  offer  was  without  its  knowledge  and  that  another   that  “the  proceedings  may  only  be  suspended,  not  dismissed,  and  that  it  may  be  made  only  
company  whose  identity  had  not  been  disclosed  won  the  bid,  filed  a  complaint  before  the   upon  petition,  and  not  at  the  instance  of  the  judge  alone  or  the  investigating  officer.”  It  
Mandaluyong  RTC  against  Lichauco  and  the  "Unknown  Awardee,"  for  injunction  to  enjoin  the   would  sanction  the  extinguishment  of  the  criminal  liability,  if  there  be  any,  through  
award  of  orbital  slot  153ºE,  declare  its  nullity,  and  for  damages.   prescription  under  Article  89  vis  a  vis  Article  90  and  91  of  the  RPC  (see  notes).  
 
 
Decision:  
PASI  filed  another  complaint  against  Lichauco,  this  time  before  the  Office  of  the  Ombudsman  
charging  her  with  gross  violation  of  Section  3(e)  of  Republic  Act  No.3019,  otherwise  known  as  the   Petition  GRANTED.  Order  of  dismissal  by  the  RTC  was  set  aside.  
Anti-­‐Graft  and  Corrupt  Practices  Act  which  states:  
The  Ombudsman  was  ordered  to  reinstate  the  case  for  further  proceedings  
 
 
(e)  Causing  any  undue  injury  to  any  party,  including  the  Government,  or  giving  any  private  party  any  
unwarrantedbenefits,  advantage  or  preference  in  the  discharge  of  his  official,  administrative  or  judicial   Notes:    
functions  throughmanifest  partiality,  evident  bad  faith  or  gross  inexcusable  negligence.  This  provision  
shall  apply  to  officers  andemployees  of  officers  or  government  corporations  charged  with  the  grant  of   Sec  6  of  Rule  111  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  Suspension  by  reason  of  prejudicial  question.  –  A  petition  
licenses  or  permits  or  otherconcessions.   for  suspension  of  the  criminal  action  based  upon  the  pendency  of  a  prejudicial  question  in  a  civil  

 
  
action  may  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the  prosecutor  or  the  court  conducting  the  preliminary   G.R.  No.  169304  
investigation.  When  the  criminal  action  has  been  filed  in  court  for  trial,  the  petition  to  suspend  shall    
be  filed  in  the  same  criminal  action  at  any  time  before  the  prosecution  rests.   Date  of  Promulgation:  March  13,  2007  
Ponente:  Carpio  Morales,  J.    
Sec  7  of  Rule  111  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  Elements  of  prejudicial  question.  –  The  elements  of  a   Petition:  review  on  the  CA  decision  
prejudicial  question  are:  (a)  the  previously  instituted  civil  action  involves  an  issue  similar  or   Petitioners:  Department  of  Health,  Secretary  Manuel  M.  Dayrit,  USec.,  Ma.  Margarita  Galon  and  USec.  
intimately  related  to  the  issue  raised  in  the  subsequent  criminal  action,  and  (b)  the  resolution  of   Antonio  M.  Lopez  
such  issue  determines  whether  or  not  the  criminal  action  may  proceed.   Respondents:  Phil.  Pharmawealth,  Inc.    
 
Art.  89.  How  criminal  liability  is  totally  extinguished.  —  Criminal  liability  is  totally  extinguished:   Facts:  
Phil.  Pharmawealth  is  a  domestic  corporation  engaged  in  the  business  of  supplying  pharmaceutical  
1.  By  the  death  of  the  convict,  as  to  the  personal  penalties  and  as  to  pecuniary  penalties,  liability   products  to  government  hospitals  in  the  Philippines.  Then  Sec.  Romualdez,  Jr.  issued  A.O.  No.  27  
therefor  is  extinguished  only  when  the  death  of  the  offender  occurs  before  final  judgment.   outlining  the  guidelines  and  procedures  on  the  accreditation  of  government  suppliers  for  
pharmaceutical  products.  A.O.  No.  27  was  later  amended  by  providing  for  additional  guidelines  for  
2.  By  service  of  the  sentence;   accredidation  of  drug  suppliers  aimed  at  ensuring  that  only  qualified  bidders  can  transact  business  
with  petitioner  DOH.  
3.  By  amnesty,  which  completely  extinguishes  the  penalty  and  all  its  effects;    
Phil.  Pharmawealth  submitted  to  DOH  a  request  for  the  inclusion  of  additional  items  in  its  list  
4.  By  absolute  pardon;   of  accredited  drug  products,  including  the  antibiotic  “Penicillin  G  Benzathine.”  DOH  issued  an  
invitation  for  bids  for  the  procurement  of  1.2M  vialts  of  Penicillin  G  Benzathine.  Despite  the  lack  of  
response  from  DOH  re:  Phil  Pharmawealth’s  request,  they  submitted  their  bid  for  the  Penicillin  G  
5.  By  prescription  of  the  crime;  
Benzathine  contract.  Only  2  companies  participated,  and  while  they  were  the  lower  bidder,  in  view  
of  the  non-­‐accrediation  of  their  Penicillin  G  Benzathine  product,  the  contract  was  awarded  to  
6.  By  prescription  of  the  penalty;  
the  other  company.  Hence,  they  filed  a  complaint  for  injunction,  mandamus,  and  damages  against  
DOH.  
7.  By  the  marriage  of  the  offended  woman,  as  provided  in  Article  344  of  this  Code.  
 
Issues/Held:    
Art.  90.  Prescription  of  crime.  —  Crimes  punishable  by  death,  reclusion  perpetua  or  reclusion   WON  DOH  can  invoke  state  immunity  from  suit  –  NO  
temporal  shall  prescribe  in  twenty  years.  
 
Crimes  punishable  by  other  afflictive  penalties  shall  prescribe  in  fifteen  years.  
Ratio:  
Those  punishable  by  a  correctional  penalty  shall  prescribe  in  ten  years;  with  the  exception  of  those   The  suability  of  a  government  official  depends  on  whether  the  official  concerned  was  acting  
punishable  by  arresto  mayor,  which  shall  prescribe  in  five  years.   within  his  official  or  jurisdictional  capacity,  and  whether  the  acts  done  in  the  performance  of  
official  functions  will  result  in  a  charge  or  financial  liability  against  the  government.  In  the  
The  crime  of  libel  or  other  similar  offenses  shall  prescribe  in  one  year.   first  case,  the  Constitution  itself  assures  the  availability  of  judicial  review,  and  it  is  the  official  
concerned  who  should  be  impleaded  as  the  proper  party.  As  regards  petitioner  DOH,  the  defense  of  
The  crime  of  oral  defamation  and  slander  by  deed  shall  prescribe  in  six  months.   immunity  from  suit  will  not  avail  despite  its  being  an  unincorporated  agency  of  the  government,  for  
the  only  causes  of  action  directed  against  it  are  preliminary  injunction  and  mandamus.  Moreover,  
Light  offenses  prescribe  in  two  months.   the  defense  of  state  immunity  from  suit  does  not  apply  in  causes  of  action  which  do  not  seek  to  
impose  a  charge  or  financial  liability  against  the  State.  
When  the  penalty  fixed  by  law  is  a  compound  one,  the  highest  penalty  shall  be  made  the  basis  of  the  
application  of  the  rules  contained  in  the  first,  second  and  third  paragraphs  of  this  article.  (As    
amended  by  RA  4661,  approved  June  19,  1966).  
While  the  doctrine  of  state  immunity  appears  to  prohibit  only  suits  against  the  state  without  its  
Art.  91.  Computation  of  prescription  of  offenses.  —  The  period  of  prescription  shall  commence  to   consent,  it  is  also  applicable  to  complaints  filed  against  officials  of  the  state  for  acts  allegedly  
run  from  the  day  on  which  the  crime  is  discovered  by  the  offended  party,  the  authorities,  or  their   performed  by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties.  The  suit  is  regarded  as  one  against  the  State  
agents,  and  shall  be  interrupted  by  the  filing  of  the  complaint  or  information,  and  shall  commence  to   where  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  against  the  officials  will  require  the  State  itself  to  perform  a  
run  again  when  such  proceedings  terminate  without  the  accused  being  convicted  or  acquitted,  or   positive  act,  such  as  the  appropriation  of  the  amount  necessary  to  pay  the  damages  awarded  against  
are  unjustifiably  stopped  for  any  reason  not  imputable  to  him.   them.  
 
 
 
DOH  v.  Phil.  Pharmawealth,  Inc.   However,  the  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  public  official  is  charged  in  his  official  capacity  

 
  
for  acts  that  are  unauthorized  or  unlawful  and  injurious  to  the  rights  of  others.  Neither  does  it   However,  the  Office  of  Collector  of  Customs,  acting  on  an  info  that  the  shipment  consisted  of  
apply  where  the  public  official  is  clearly  being  sued  not  in  his  official  capacity  but  in  his  personal   mosquito  net  made  of  nylon  dutiable  under  Tariff  and  Customs  Code,  ordered  a  re-­‐examination  of  
capacity,  although  the  acts  complained  of  may  have  been  committed  while  he  occupied  a  public   the  shipment.  It  was  revealed  that  there  was  a  total  of  1600  rolls  (as  each  bale  contained  20  rolls).  
position.   Re-­‐appraised,  the  shipment  was  valued  at  $37,560  or  $10.15/yard  instead  of  $0.75/yard.  Also,  the  
screen  net  was  made  of  synthetic  (polyethylene)  woven  fabric  and  classified  under  Tariff  Heading  
  51.04  at  100%  ad  valorem.  Thus,  the  total  duties  and  taxes  should  have  been  P272,600.  Since  the  
shipment  was  misdeclared  as  to  the  quantity  and  value,  the  Customs  forfeited  it.  
In  this  case,  suing  individual  petitioners  in  their  personal  capacities  for  damages  in  
connection  with  their  act  of  abusing  their  positions  is  permissible,  for  an  officer  who  exceeds    
the  power  conferred  on  him  by  law  cannot  hide  behind  the  plea  of  sovereign  immunity  and  
must  bear  the  liability  personally.   Bagong  Buhay  appealed  to  Commissioner  of  Customs,  which  affirmed  the  Collector  of  Customs.  They  
moved  for  reconsideration,  but  it  was  denied.  Hence,  they  elevated  the  case  to  the  CTA,  which  
  reversed  the  decision.  The  Commissioner  of  Customs  moved  for  reconsideration,  which  was  denied.    

Decision:    

Petition  denied.  Assailed  decision  of  CA  affirmed.   On  Aug  20,  1976,  Bagong  Buhay  filed  a  petition  asking  for  the  release  of  the  forfeited  shipment,  
  which  the  SC  firstly  denied,  but  after  reconsideration,  granted  and  ordered  the  release.  Bagong  
  Buhay  posted  a  cash  bond  to  secure  the  release  64  of  the  80  bales  originally  delivered.  16  bales  
remain  missing.  
Farolan  v.  Court  of  Tax  Appeals  
 
G.R.  No.  42204  
Subsequently,  Bagong  Buhay  alleged  that  of  the  143,454  yards  (64  bales)  released,  only  116,950  
  yards  were  in  good  condition.  The  private  respondent  then  demands  that  the  Bureau  of  Customs  be  
ordered  to  pay  for  damages  for  the  43,050  yards  (missing  +  in  bad  condition)  it  actually  lost.  
Date  of  Promulgation:  Jan  21  1993  
 
Ponente:  Romero  J.    
Issues/Held:  
Petition:  Review  on  certiorari  of  the  decision  of  CTA  
8. WON  the  shipment  is  subject  to  forfeiture  under  Sec  2530-­‐M  subparagraphs  3,4,5  of  the  Tariff  
and  Customs  Code  –  NO    
Petitioner/s:  Hon.  Ramon  Farolan  Jr,  in  his  capacity  as  Commissioner  of  Customs  
9. WON  The  shipment  falls  under  the  Tariff  Heading  No.  39.06-­‐B  of  the  Tariff  and  Customs  Code  
subject  to  ad  valorem  duty  of  35%  instead  ad  valorem  of  100%  -­‐  YES    
Respondent/s:  CTA  and  Bagong  Buhay  Trading  
10. WON  the  Bureau  of  Customs  can  be  held  liable  for  the  damages  -­‐  NO  
 
 
Ratio:    
Facts:  
6. Sec  2530-­‐M  subparagraphs  3,4,5,  the  requisites  for  forfeiture  are:  
This  is  a  petition  for  review  of  the  decision  of  CTA  reversing  the  decision  of  Commissioner  of   • The  wrongful  making  by  the  owner,  importer,  exporter  or  consignees  of  any  
Customs  which  affirmed  the  decision  of  Collector  of  Customs.    
declaration  or  affidavit,  or  the  wrongful  making  or  delivery  by  the  same  persons  of  
any  invoice,  letter,  or  paper  
 
• That  such  declaration,  affidavit,  invoice,  letter,  or  paper  is  false  (there  is  fraud)  
 
On  January  30,  1972,  a  vessel  arrived  at  the  Port  of  Manila  carrying,  among  others,  80  bales  of  
screen  net  consigned  to  Bagong  Buhay  Trading.  The  said  importation  was  declared  under  Entry  No.  
Although  there  was  indeed  a  misdeclaration,  such  violation  does  not  warrant  forfeiture  since  
8651-­‐72  as  80  bales  of  sceen  net  of  500  rolls  with  a  weight  of  12,777kg  valued  at  $3,750  and  
the  act  was  not  committed  directly  by  the  owner,  importer  exporter,  or  consignee  set  forth  in  
classified  in  the  Tariff  and  Customs  Code  under  Tariff  Heading  39.06-­‐B  at  35%  ad  valorem  (specific  
Sec  2530-­‐M  subparagraphs  3,4,5.  The  one  who  prepared  the  documents  was  the  foreign  
tax).  Bagong  Buhay  paid  the  duties  and  taxes  due  in  amount  of  P11,350.  
shipper,  not  Bagong  Bayan.  Hence,  the  first  requirement  is  not  satisfied.  
 
  As  to  the  second  requirement,  the  evidence  on  record  (decision  of  Collector  of  Customs  and  

 
  
Commissioner  of  Customs)  do  not  reveal  that  the  importer  or  consignee,  Bagong  Buhay,  had   concerning the importation or exportation of such article;
any  knowledge  of  any  falsity  or  subject  of  importation.     and.
  (5) Through any other practice or device contrary
Fraud  must  be  committed  by  an  importer/consignee  to  evade  payment  of  duties  due.  It  must   to law by means of which such articles was entered through a
be  actual  and  not  constructive.  It  must  be  intentional  fraud,  consisting  of  deception  willfully   custom-house to the prejudice of government. (Emphasis
and  deliberately  done  or  resorted  to  in  order  to  induce  another  to  gove  up  some  right.  In  this   supplied).
case,  Bagong  Buhay  can  be  considered  to  have  acted  in  good  faith  when  it  relied  to  the    
documents  prepared  by  the  foreign  shipper.  
   
 
7. Products  made  of  polymers  are  classified  under  Tariff  Heading  39.06-­‐B  at  35%  ad  valorem.  On    
the  other  hand,  woven  fabrics  of  man-­‐made  fibers  are  classified  under  Tariff  Heading  51.04  at  
100%  ad  valorem.     Lansang  v.  Court  of  Appeals  
 
The  Court  relied  on  laboratory  findings  of  chemical  analysis  conducted  by  the  Bureau  of   G.R.  No.  102667  
Customs  and  Adamson  University.  The  subject  shipment  was  found  to  be  classified  as  
polyethylene  plastic  under  Tariff  Heading  39.06-­‐B  
 
 
Date  of  Promulgation:  February  23,  2000  
 
Ponente:  Quisimbing,  J.    
8. The  Bureau  of  Customs  cannot  be  held  liable.  Otherwise,  to  permit  Bagong  Bayan’s  claim  to  
prosper  would  violate  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  immunity.  Since  it  demands  that  the  
Petition:  Petition  for  review  on  certiorari  of  decision  of  CA  
Commissioner  be  ordered  to  pay  for  actual  damages,  the  ultimate  liability  will  fall  on  the  gov’t.  
 
The  political  doctrine  that  “the  state  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent,”  categorically   Petitioners:  Amado  J.  Lansang  
applies.  As  an  unincorporated  agency  without  any  separate  juridical  personality  of  its  own,  the  
Bureau  of  Customs  enjoys  immunity  from  suits.  Along  with  the  BIR,  it  is  invested  with  an   Respondents:  Court  of  Appeals,  General  Assembly  of  the  Blind,  INC,  and  Jose  Iglesias  
inherent  power  of  sovereignty,  namely,  taxation.  As  an  agency,  the  Bureau  of  Customs  
performs  the  governmental  function  of  collecting  revenues  which  is  definitely  not  a    
proprietary  function.  
Facts:    
 
The  General  Assembly  of  the  Blind  Inc  (GABI),  the  private  respondent,  came  into  a  verbal  agreement  
Decision:   with  the  National  Parks  Development  Committee  (NPDC),  a  government  civic  body  engaged  in  the  
development  of  national  parks.  Under  the  agreement  GABI  is  allowed  to  set  up  an  office,  library,  and  
Decision  of  CTA  affirmed.  Customs  Collector  is  directed  to  re-­‐compute  duties  applying  35%  ad   kiosks  selling  drinks  and  food  within  Rizal  Park.  The  NPDC  would  then  receive  40%  of  GABI’s  
valorem.   profits.  There  was  no  document  on  record  of  the  agreement  or  the  profits  made.  

   

Notes:   After  the  EDSA  Revolution  petitioner  Amado  Lansang  took  over  as  Chairman  for  the  NPDC.  He  
sought  to  clean  up  Rizal  Park  and  sent  a  notice  to  the  president  of  GABI,  Jose  Iglesias  who  is  blind,  
Sec. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law. — Any vehicle, vessel or that  the  verbal  agreement  was  now  terminated  and  order  the  company  to  vacate  the  premises.  On  
aircraft, cargo, article and other objects shall, under the following conditions be subjected to forfeiture: the  day  of  the  supposed  eviction  GABI  filed  for  damages  and  injuction  in  the  RTC  against  Lansang  
xxx xxx xxx stating  that  the  Iglesias,  being  blind,  was  deceived  when  he  signed  the  notice  of  eviction  and  eviction  
m. Any article sought to be imported or exported. was  unlawful.  
xxx xxx xxx
(3) On the strength of a false declaration or affidavit or  
affidavit execute d by the owner, importer, exporter or
consignee concerning the importation of such article; RTC  ruled  that  GABI  cannot  file  for  damages  and  file  an  injunction  because  it  needed  consent  from  
(4) On the strength of a false invoice or other document the  State  to  sue  the  State  and  that  since  it  was  a  verbal  agreement  GABI  was  a  mere  accommodation  
executed by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee concessionaire  thus  they  cannot  claim  damages.  GABI  appealed  and  the  CA  reversed  the  decision.  CA  
ordered  the  petitioner,  Amado  Lansang  to  pay  Iglesias  P50,000  for  moral  damages,  P10,000  in  

 
  
exemplary  damages,  and  P5,ooo  in  attorney’s  fees.    

  Date  of  Promulgation:  April  18,  2012  

CA  ruled  that  mere  allegation  that  allegation  that  a  government  official  is  being  sued  in  his  official   Ponente:  Villarama  Jr.,  J.    
capacity  is  not  enough  to  protect  him  from  liability  for  acts  done  in  excess  of  such  authority.  The  CA  
claims  that  petitioner  had  authority  to  evict  GABI,  but  it  was  the  abusive  and  capricious  manner  in   Petition:  Petition  for  review  on  certiorari  of  the  amended  decision  and  resolution  of  the  Court  of  
doing  so  which  led  to  the  granting  of  damages.   Appeals  

  Petitioners:  Lockheed  Detective  and  Watchman  Agency,  Inc.  

Petioner  Lansang  filed  for  an  appeal.     Respondents:  University  of  the  Philippines  

   

Issues/Held:     Facts:    

WON  whether  petitioner  should  be  tried  as  the  Chairman  of  NPDC-­‐  YES   Petitioner  Lockheed  entered  into  a  contract  for  security  services  with  respondent  UP.  However,  in  
1998,  several  security  guards  assigned  to  UP  filed  complaints  against  petitioner  and  respondent  for  
WON  NPDC’s  termination  of  respondent’s  concession  is  valid  and  done  in  lawful  performance  of   payment  of  the  following:  
official  duty-­‐  YES  
1. underpaid  wages  
  2. 25%  overtime  pay  
3. premium  pay  for  rest  days  and  special  holidays  
Ratio:   4. holiday  pay  
5. service  incentive  leave  pay  
1) Petitioner  is  clearly  being  sued  not  in  his  capacity  as  NPDC  chairman  but  in  his  personal   6. night  shift  differentials  
capacity.  The  petitioner  as  NPDC  chairman  was  acting  on  behalf  of  his  official  position  and   7. 13th  month  pay  
his  actions  were  clearly  within  the  limits  of  his  authority,  thus  he  should  be  tried  in  his   8. unpaid  wages  from  December  16-­‐31,  1998  
capacity  as  NPDC  chairman,  and  given  state  immunity.   9. attorney’s  fees  
2) The  NPDC  has  authority  over  national  parks.  The  Rizal  Park  is  beyond  commerce  and  the   refund  of  the  following:  
past  agreement  between  NPDC  and  GABI  was  only  verbal.  The  petitioner  as  chairman  
may  discontinue  the  accommodation  to  private  respondent  and  may  eject  them  from  the   1. cash  bond  
park  if  necessary.     2. deductions  for  the  Mutual  Benefits  Aids  System  (MBAS)  
   

Decision:   The  Labor  Arbiter  rendered  a  decision  declaring  the  petitioner  and  respondent  to  be  solidarily  liable  
to  the  claims  of  the  security  guards  except  the  following:  
Petition  is  GRANTED.  Decision  of  CA  is  set  aside  and  trial  court  decision  is  affirmed.  
1. night  shift  differential  and  13th  month  pay  –  lack  of  merit  
  2. salaries  for  December  15-­‐31,  1997  –  paid  already  
It  also  held  UP  liable  to  the  security  guards  and  petitioner  for  the  unpaid  legislated  salary  increases  
for  the  years  1996-­‐1998  in  the  total  amount  of  P13,066,794.14  
 
 
2. Express  consent  
 
Both  Lockheed  and  UP  appealed  and  NLRC  modified  the  Labor  Arbiter’s  decision  by  dismissing  the  
complainants’  claims  for  premium  pay  for  work  on  rest  day  and  special  holiday,  and  5  days  service  
 
incentive  leave  pay  for  lack  of  basis.  The  complaining  security  guards  and  UP  filed  their  respective  
motions  for  reconsideration  but  was  denied  by  the  NLRC.  Since  the  parties  did  not  appeal  the  NLRC  
Lockheed  Detective  and  Watchman  Agency,  Inc.  v.  University  of  the  Philippines  
decision,  a  writ  of  execution  was  then  issued  but  later  quashed  by  the  Labor  Arbiter  on  motion  of  UP  
due  to  disputes  regarding  the  amount  of  the  award.  
G.R.  No.  185918  

 
  
  Decision,  and  12%  interest  on  the  entire  amount  from  date  of  finality  of  this  Decision  until  fully  paid.  

Later,  however,  the  said  order  quashing  the  writ  was  reversed  by  an  NLRC  Resolution  and  UP    
moved  to  reconsider  it  but  was  upheld  with  modification  that  the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  award  
in  favor  of  Lockheed  will  be  only  against  funds  of  UP  which  are  not  identified  as  public  funds.    
Lockheed  files  a  motion  for  the  issuance  of  an  alias  writ  of  execution  and  was  granted.  Subsequently,  
a  Notice  of  Garnishment  was  issued  to  PNB  UP  Diliman  Branch  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  award  of    
P12,142,522.69.  UP  filed  an  Urgent  Motion  to  Quash  Garnishment  stating  that  the  funds  being  
subject  to  garnishment  (covered  by  Savings  Account  No.  275-­‐529999-­‐8)  are  government/public  
 
funds.  Labor  Arbiter  dismissed  the  urgent  motion  and  so  the  amount  of  P12,062,398.71  was  
withdrawn  by  the  sheriff  from  UP’s  PNB  account.  
 
 
A. Money claims arising from contract
UP  appealed  to  the  CA  on  the  following  grounds:   ACT NO. 3083
AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
1. NLRC  gravely  abused  its  discretion  by  misusing  the  concept  of  “solidary  liability”  to  justify   PHILIPPINEISLANDS MAY BE SUED
the  garnishment  by  the  executing  Sheriff  of  public/government  funds  belonging  to  UP  
2. NLRC  and  LORA  acted  without  jurisdiction  when,  by  means  of  an  Alias  Writ  of  Execution   SECTION 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any
against  UP,  authorized  the  Sheriff  to  garnish  UP’s  public  funds.  Also,  LORA  gravely  abused  
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could
her  discretion  when  she  resolved  petitioner’s  Motion  to  Quash  Notice  of  Garnishment  and   serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
when  she  disregarded  an  official  Certification  that  the  funds  garnished  are   SECTION 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show
public/government  funds  but  it  sill  allowed  the  Sheriff  to  withdraw  the  same  from  PNB.   that he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor and that the latter did not decide the
3. NLRC  and  LORA,  despite  prior  knowledge,  effected  the  execution  that  caused  paralyzation   same within two months from the date of its presentation.
and  dislocation  to  petitioner’s  governmental  functions.   SECTION 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this
Act shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province
CA  rendered  decision  dismissing  UP’s  petition  but  on  reconsideration,  it  issued  an  Amended  
were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original
Decision  reconsidering  the  dismissal  of  the  petition  in  light  of  the  ruling  in  the  case  of  National   jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.
Electrification  Administration  v  Morales  which  mandates  that  all  money  claims  against  the   SECTION 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of
government  must  first  be  files  with  the  Commission  on  Audit.  Lockheed  moved  to  reconsider  the   procedure, both original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
amended  decision  but  was  denied.  Hence  this  petition.   SECTION 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted
in any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by
way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties.
  SECTION 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands
pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-
Issues/Held:     General whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself or through
delegates.
WON  the  CA  correctly  applied  the  NEA  case  to  the  present  case  -­‐  YES   SECTION 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any
court against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a
  copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be
Ratio:   transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, within five days after the same becomes
final.
Like  NEA,  UP  is  a  juridical  personality  separate  and  distinct  from  the  government  and  has  the   SECTION 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, at the commencement of
capacity  to  sue  and  be  sued.  Also,  like  NEA,  it  cannot  evade  execution  and  its  funds  may  be  subject  to   each regular session of the Legislature, shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all
decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it
garnishment  or  levy.  However,  under  CA  No.  327  (as  amended  by  Section  26  of  PD  No.  1445),  it  is  
shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the
the  COA  which  has  the  primary  jurisdiction  to  examine,  audit  and  settle  “all  debts  and  claims  of  any   same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
sort”  due  from  or  owing  the  Government  or  any  of  its  subdivisions,  agencies  and  instrumentalities,   SECTION 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
including  GOCCs  and  their  subsidiaries.  Hence,  before  execution  may  be  had,  a  claim  for  payment  of   Approved, March 16, 1923.
the  judgment  award  must  first  be  filed  with  the  COA.   COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327
as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445
  ** COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities

Decision:   Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend
to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the
Petition  denied.  Petitioner  is  ordered  to  reimburse  respondent  the  amount  of  P12,062,398.71  plus   keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
interest  of  6%  per  annum  to  be  computed  from  September  12,  2005  up  to  the  finality  of  this   thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and
papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all

 
  
persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, 2. WON the doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. – YES
as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from
or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The Ratio:
said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government,
and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the 5. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "the State may not be sued without
Government, those funded by donations through the government, those required to pay its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
fund or those partly funded by the government. from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty.
  • As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
  from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
  but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
  as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
  depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the
  royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-
G.R. No. 104269 suability. We have had occasion, to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for
Date of Promulgation: November 11, 1993 the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
Ponente: Vitug, J. performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in
Petition: certiorari severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if
Petitioners: Department of Agriculture such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial
Respondents: The National Labor Relations Commission, et al. remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
6. The doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
Facts: import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a given expressly or impliedly.
contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said • Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from
the various premises of the petitioner. suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift action between private parties."
differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional • Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
Security Agency. into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner itself of its sovereign immunity.
and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims of • However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
the complainant security guards. waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, commanding the City Sheriff to which is done in its proprietary capacity.
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. On 19 July 1991, 7. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have
the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion 8. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages,
for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for
jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the Service, clearly constitute money claims.
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the • Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied,… Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. be brought to the Commission on Audit.
9. We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A.
Issues/Held: No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The
Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability

 

but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in
accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by
P.D. 1445.
10. In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy
a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus —
• The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the
Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined
permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued
pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
B. Torts committed by Special Agents
NCC.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
C. Incorporated Government Agencies
3. Implied Consent
A. Government submits itself to the court’s jurisdiction
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. UP
B. The State itself files a complaint
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 129406
Date of Promulgation: March 6, 2006
Ponente: Garcia, J.
Petition: For Certiorari to nullify Sandiganbayan decisions March 28, 1995 and March 13, 1997
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines represented by Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG)
nd
Respondent: Sandiganbayan (2 Division) and Roberto S. Benedicto
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sequestered all the
businesses and properties of Roberto Benedicto (including his majority shares in
corporations), due to case of ill-gotten wealth. This includes Benedicto’s 227 shares of stock of
the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI).
The PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee (as the sequester of the 227 shares), and
later on these shares were declared delinquent and put on auction sale. Then the Republic and
Benedicto had a compromise agreement, for the PCGG to lift the sequestration of the 227
shares and implying that Benedicto got these shares by his own money and not through ill-
gotten wealth.
Afterwards, Benedicto filed a motion for release and return of the sequestered 227 shares to
him, as part of the compromise agreement. But PCGG failed to comply with no justifiable
reason. In order to escape liability, the Republic (through PCGG) invokes state immunity
from suit.
Issues/Held:
WON the State can invoke immunity from suit. - NO
Ratio:
Immunity from suit was stripped from the State when it entered into a compromise
agreement with Benedicto, placing it in the same level as its adversary (who is Benedicto).
When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a
legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual
or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued
even without its express consent.
Additionally, it was the fault/delinquency of the representatives of PCGG (sitting at the Board of
Directors of NOGCCI), for the non-payment of the monthly dues and therefore for the loss of the
227 shares.
Decision:
Petition is dismissed.

Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
G.R. No. L-6060
Date of Promulgation: September 30, 1954
Ponente: Paras, C.J.
Petition: Appeal from an order from Court of First Instance of Manila
Petitioners: Fernando Froilan
Respondents: Pan Oriental Shipping Co. and Republic of the Philippines (intervenor)
Facts:
1) February 3. 1951 Fernando Froilan (petitioner) filed a complaint against Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. (respondent) alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission
the vessel FS-197 for P200,000 with a P50,000 down payment, with the rest paid in
installments, the ship itself was chattel.
2) Due to non-payment and other reasons, Shipping Commission took possession of the
vessel.
3) The ship was then delivered to Pan Oriental Shipping Co. with approval of the
President
4) Lower court issued writ of replevin and divested Pan Oriental of possession of the
ship.
5) Pan Oriental contended the decision, stating that the contract between petitioner and
Shipping Commission was null and void since the petitioner did not commit to his
obligations, thus giving up his right to the ship.
6) Later Government intervened, filing a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan
failed to pay Shipping Commission. It prayed that Froilan deliver the ship to the Board
of Liquidators and that he be declared to be without any rights on the vessel.
7) Pan Oriental then filed an answer to the complaint of intervention, praying that the
Shipping Commission would return the ship to them once they have taken possession.
8) Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, with a check amounting to P162, 576.96
for the rights to the ship.
9) Lower court held that the payment to the BOL is the same as the petitioner’s obligation
to the Shipping Commission, thus extinguishing his obligation.
10) Pan Oriental filed a counter claim. Lower court dismissed the counterclaim.
Issues/Held:
WON RP is immune from a suit in this case – NO
Ratio:
By filing a complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability.
“…By taking initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant.”
Decision:
Appeal order is reversed.
C. Government entering into business contracts; unincorporated agencies
exercising propriety functions
Air Transportation Office v. David
G.R. No. 159302
Date of Promulgation: February 23, 2011
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Petitioners: Air Transportation Office
Respondents: Sps David and Elisa Ramos
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land
registered in the Baguio City was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO).
The respondents (Spouses Ramos) agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed
to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
The respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the
RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of
land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s
consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of
governmental functions.
The RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. ATO
commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assai ledorders
were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC rendered its decision on the merits, ORDERING the defendant Air Transportation
Office to pay the plaintiffs DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS
CA AFFIRMED. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues/Held:
WON the ATO can be sued without its consent? – YES
Ratio:
§ An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized. Although the state may own stock or property of such a
corporation, engaging in business operations through a corporation divests itself so far
of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
State’s immunity from suit.
§ The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a
valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation
and without the proper expropriation proceedings.

The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court
explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus
gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without
just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners.
§ The issue has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497,
otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO and Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497
established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which
thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers, duties and rights, assets, real and personal
properties, funds, and revenues
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the
power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to
construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real
properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by
or against it.
Decision:
The petition for review has no merit. The Court denies the petition for review oncertiorari, and
affirms the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals.
Pacific Products, Inc. v. Ong
G.R. No. L-33777
Date of Promulgation: January 30, 1990
Ponente: Medialdea, J
Petition: An appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
34038-R (which reversed the decision of the CFI of Manila in Civil Case No. 53124)
Petitioner: Pacific Products, Inc.
Respondent: Vicente S. Ong
Facts:
On April 12, 1962, Pacific Products, Inc. filed against H.D. Labrador (doing business under
the name and style of BML Trading and Supply) for recovery of Php 9,111.70, plus
interest, costs and attorney's fees. This was filed at the CFI of Manila Branch 14, who then
directed the Sheriff of Manila to attach the estate, real or personal, of H. D. Labrador, etc.
Meanwhile, BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications with
15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate worth Php 10,500.00. H.D. Labrador, as agent of
BML Trading, delivered the compound on October 8, 1962. Before the Bureau could release
the payment to BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished Php 9,111.70 of Php
10,500.00 on October 17, 1962.
Unknown to Pacific Products, BML Trading, through H.D. Labrador, assigned its rights for the
Php 10,500.00 to Vicente S. Ong on October 19, 1962.
Apparently, it was Vicente Ong who advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper
sulfate and it was agreed that the profits will be shared by BML Trading and Vicente Ong on a
40-60 percent basis. It was also their agreement that BML Trading will waive its share in the
possible net profits from the transaction, if it fails to secure the payment from the Bureau of
Telecommunications within seven (7) days from the delivery of the blue copper sulfate.
Pacific Products learned about this only when Vicente Ong filed a third party claim on November
19, 1962. On November 29, 1962, Pacific Products filed a motion to strike out the third party
claim of Vicente Ong, but the same was denied for lack of merit.
On Dec. 21, 1962, H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ordered to pay Pacific
Products the sum of Php 9,111.70. The corresponding writ of execution was issued and the
Sheriff of Manila further garnished Php 1,181.65 of the Php 10,500.00 in the possession of the
Bureau.
Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the
Sheriff. Thus, the action for damages against the Sheriff, Pacific Products and First Quezon City
Insurance filed by Ong on February 14, 1963 to vindicate his claim on the amount garnished.
On February 21, 1964, CFI Manila (Branch 14) dismissed the complaint. Ong then filed at CA,
which reversed the decision of CFI Manila, on April 25, 1964. The CA declared as illegal the
garnishment of Php 10,500 by the Sheriff of Manila since the money was still being held
by the Bureau of Telecommunications (it was not part of Labrador’s ‘estate’), and
therefore to involve the Bureau would be suing the State (which is illegal).
Pacific Products & First Quezon City Insurance were ordered to pay Ong Php 10,293.35
with legal interest. Pacific Products filed MR which was denied on July 2, 1971. Hence, this
appeal by certiorari filed by Pacific Products on July 17, 1971.
Pacific Products contends that immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau of
Telecommunications entered into a business transaction with BML Trading since it is now "a well
established doctrine that when the Government engages in business, it abdicates part of its
sovereign prerogatives and ascends to the level of a citizen".
Pacific Products also contends that, where the Bureau is authorized to enter into a contract, the
government "may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
person,"
Issues/Held:
WON the immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau of Telecommunications entered into a
business transaction with BML Trading - NO
Ratio:
Suability would follow only if the contract entered into by the government is in the
exercise of a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function. The Bureau of
Telecommunications is a service bureau and is not engaged in business. There is also nothing
in the records of this case from which it could be concluded that in the purchase of the 15,000
pounds of bluestone copper sulfate, the Bureau was engaging in business.
The Bureau of Telecommunications is a government agency created under Section 78 of
Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947. It has no charter and no distinct personality of its
own. Being a government agency, the doctrine of State immunity from suit applies.
Decision:
The petition is DISMISSED. The CA decision is AFFIRMED.
Notes:
Super short version (for easy reading only, not for recit) ~Dré

Pacific Products wanted to get Php 9K from HD Labrador (BML Trading), so the court ordered
the sheriff of Manila to hold any property of HD Labrador (BML Trading) worth Php 9K, so that it
could be used to ‘pay’ Pacific Products.
The sheriff got something equivalent of this worth (Php 10.5K), in the form of the payment
supposed to be paid by the Bureau of Telecommunications to HD Labrador (BML Labrador) for
the delivery of some compound to the Bureau.
Then came Kevin Ong, este, Vicente Ong who funded HD Labrador (BML Trading) with Php
10.5K to initially get the compound from a supplier, before it was sold to the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Ong and HD Labrador (BML Trading) had agreement to split the Php
10.5K earnings 60-40, but Ong will get 100% if ever the Php 10.5K payment was delayed (more
than 7 days).
Since the payment of the Bureau of Telecommunications to HD Labrador (BML Trading) did not
push through since it was held (forcibly taken) by the sheriff, Ong invoked his 100% claim to the
Php 10.5K. Pacific Products did not comply with the demand of Ong. He then filed at CFI Manila,
then at CA.
The CA ordered Pacific Products to pay Ong, also saying that it was illegal for the sheriff of
Manila to hold the Php 10.5K since it was still in the hands of the Bureau of Telecommunications
and not yet part of the property of HD Labrador (BML Trading), and by this reason the State was
sued by involving the Bureau (therefore it was illegal).
For Pacific Product’s complaint, see last part of Facts. For SC’s reasoning, see Ratio. :3
D. When inequitable for government to claim immunity
Vigilar v. Aquino
G.R. No. 180388
Date of Promulgation: January 18, 2011
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera
Petition: Petition for reveiew on certiorari of a decision of CA
Petitioner: Gregorio Vigilar, Secretary of DPWH, DPWH Undersecretaries
Respondent: Arnulfo Aquino
Facts:
• June 19, 1992 – petitioner Twano, then OIC-District engineer of DPWH, sent an Invitation
to Bid to respondent Aquino who is the owner of AD Aquino Construction and Supplies. The
bidding was for the construction of a dike in Pampanga.
• July 7, 1992 – project was awarded to Aquino and a Contract of Agreement was executed
between respondent and petitioner for an amount of P1,873,790.
• July 9, 1992 – project was completed.
Subsequently, respondent Aquino claimed that P1,262,696 was still due him, but petitioners
refused to pay. He thus filed a complaint for the collection the payment in RTC of Pampanga
The petitioners, in their defense, set up the ff defenses:
• That it was a suit against the state
• Respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
• Contract of Agreement was void for violating PD 1445 (the proper appropriation and Cert of
Availability of Funds were absent)
Court ruled in favor of respondent. It ordered DPWH to pay Aquino P1,873,790 (note that Aquino
was only asking for P1,262,696). On appeal, CA reversed the decision and declared the
Contract of Agreement null and void. COA was ordered to determine, on a quantum meruit (what
one has earned) basis, the total obligation due to Aquino for his undertaking the project.
The DPWH OICs were dissatisfied with the CA ruling, hence this petition for review.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the doctrine of non-suability is applicable in this case – NO
2. WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure of respondent to exhaust all
administrative remedies – NO
3. WON COA should be ordered to allow payment to respondent on a quantum meruit
basis despite the latter’s failure to comply with requirements of PD 1445 – YES
Ratio:
1. DPWH and the government benefitted from the work done by Aquino. To deny
payment to the contractor would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at
the expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of
quantum meruit.
Petitioners cannot invoke non-suability to escape their obligations. The doctrine
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating injustice to a citizen. The Court, as the
staunch guardian of citizen’s rights and welfare – cannot sanction an injustice so
patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the State’s cloak of
invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance.
2. Petitioners claim that Aquino should have filed a petition first in COA, before going to
RTC, to exhaust all admin remedies. However, it has been established that the
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies and doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules. There are exceptions to these rules, namely:
a. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine
b. Where the challenged admin act is patently illegal
c. Where there is unreasonable delay that will irretrievably prejudice
complainant
d. Where the amount involved is so relatively small
e. Where the question involved is purely legal
f. Where juridical intervention is urgent
g. Where the application of doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage
h. Where controverted acts violate due process
i. Where the issue of non-exhaustion of admin remedies has been rendered
moot
j. Where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
In this case, conditions (c) and (e) are present. The project was completed almost 2
decades ago, and to delay the proceedings will definitely prejudice respondent. Also,
the issues are purely legal since they involve the validity of the Contract of Agreement.
It’s beyond the scope of COA.
3. In ordering the payment of obligation due on a quantum meruit basis, the CA relied on
a number of cases which involved gov’t projects undertaken in violation of relevant
laws. Consistently in these cases, the Court has held that the contracts were void,
however, the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work
dome.

Decision:
Petition denied.
4. Execution
Republic v. Villasor
G.R. No. L-30671
Date of promulgation: November 28, 1973
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, Judge of the CFI Cebu, Br 1; the provincial sheriff of
Rizal; the provincial sheriff of QC; the sheriff of the City of Manila; the clerk of court, CFI Cebu;
P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.; Gavino Unchuan; International Construction Corp.
Facts:
Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor rendered a decision in a Special Proceeding in favor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396,40. Villasor later declared the
decision final and executory in an Order, directing the sheriffs of Rizal, QC, and Manila to
execute it.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued and on
the strength of this writ, the Rizal sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks,
specially on the 'monies due the AFP in the form of deposits. The Philippines Veterans Bank
received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated
for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel
and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
The Republic is now challenging the validity of the order on the ground that Villasor acted in
excess of his jurisdiction.
Issue/Held:
WON Villasor acted in excess of his jurisdiction – YES
Ratio:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. (Holmes)
If we don’t adhere to the doctrine:
- loss of government efficiency
- obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions
- loss of time and energy in defending law suits
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution’ and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. (Teehankee)
Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not
liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
1. The State may not be sued except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to
subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited
directly.
2. Moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment
may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
3. Every consideration of public policy forbids it
Decision:
Writs granted. Oder and Alias Writ of Execution nullified and set aside.
Republic v. NLRC
G.R. No. 120385
Date of Promulgation: October 17, 1996
Ponente: Vitug, J.
Petition: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines, represented by Asset Privatization Trust
Respondents: National Labor Relations Commision, Hon. Eduardo J. Carpio and Pantranco
Association of Concerned Employees Union
Facts:
This case is about the petition of the Republic, as represented by the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) for the issuance of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order for the writs of
execution and notices of garnishment that were ordered from different suits (see below).
Pantranco North Express, Inc (PNEI) is one of the sequestered companies by the Presidential
Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) after the 1986 events. The full ownership of PNEI
was transferred to its creditor, National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) following
Philippine National Bank’s (PNB) foreclosure of PNEI assets. Prompted by the continuing
deterioration of its financial condition, PNEI lodged a Petition for Suspension of Payments with
SEC to prevent further dissipation of PNEI’s assets and to make PNEI a viable source of income
for the government. PNEI’s management recommended the sale of the company through
privatization and the retrenchment of some 500 employees in order to best serve the interest of
all the parties concerned. The retrenchment was carried out during the months of November and
December of 1992 and January of 1993, and various labor complaints against PNEI were then
filed:
1) NLRC NCR Case No 00-08-05380-93:
• Started by PEA-PTGWO against PNEI and APT for unfair labor practice, for non-
th
payment of 13 month pay, and various other claims
• Only PNEI made an appearance, APT submitted a position paper with motion to
dismiss the case
• Decision: held PNEI and APT jointly and solidarily liable
• PEA-PTGWO filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of execution

 
• Labor Arbiter Carpio directed the Reseaech and Information Unit of the NLRC to respondent in the monetary claims against PNEI is merely the consequence of its being a
submit an official computation of PEA-PTGWO’s monetary entitlements. conservator of assets. The liability of APT should be co-extensive with the amount of assets
• A writ of execution, dated May 26, 1994, was sought to be implemented but only taken over from the privatized firm.
a partial satisfaction of judgment could be realized.
• Sheriff served a notice of garnishment to Land Bank of the Philippines in carrying Decision:
out the writ ordering the bank to cover the remaining balance of the judgment Petition granted. Notice of garnishment directed against funds of APT is nullified and the TRO
award. Land Bank, in turn, responded that since the funds of APT, a GOCC, issued by this Court is made permanent.
were considered public in nature, they could not be the subject of the
garnishment.
2) NLRC NCR 00-05-03587-93: National Electrification Administration v. Morales
• Lodged by PACEU against PNEI, APT and DOTC for claims for separation pay, G.R. No. 154200
th
13 month pay and other benefits
• Only the complainant appeared, efforts to settle the case failed Date of Promulgation: June 22, 2007
• PNEI ordered to submit its position paper but failed to do so Ponente: Austria-Martinez J.
• Decision: PNEI to pay individual complaints the following amount as Petition: Review on Certiorari of a decision of the CA
computed. Petitioners: National Electrification Administration and its Board of Administrators
• Labor Arbiter Aquino issued a writ of execution Respondents: Danilo Morales
• By virtue of the writ, various properties of PNEI were levied upon and sold at
public auction. APT filed and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Execution while Facts:
PEA-PTGWO claimed an interest over the same property of PNEI as stated in Daniilo Morales and 105 other employee from NEA filed with the QC RTC Branch 88 a class
their Motion for Intervention because of the union’s own monetary claims against suit against their employer for payment of rice allowance, meal allowance,
the latter. Labor Arbiter Aquino denied the two filings. medical/dental/optical allowance, children’s allowance, and longevity pay purportedly authorized
• NLRC affirmed the order of the Labor Arbiter which became final and executor. under RA 6758 (Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, eff. July 1, 1989).
3) NLRC Case No. Sub-Rab-01-12-7-0225-93:
• Initiated by Antonio Cabugao against PNEI and APT also involving claims for The RTC in its December 16, 1999 decision ordered NEA to settle the claims of the petitioners
th
separation pay, 13 month pay and other benefits and other employees similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and allowances to which
• PNEI and APT failed to file their answers they are entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5
of DBM CCC No. 10 and their inclusion in the Provident Funds Membership, retroactive from the
• Decision: ordered PNEI to pay the complainant P208,954.60
date of their appointments up to the present or until their separation from the service. (Emphasis
• Labor Arbiter Gambito issued a writ of execution
supplied, part of the dispositive of the Decision) The RTC decision then effectuated a Writ of
Execution, which mandates NEA to settle the claims of the petitioner and other employees
Issues/Held:
similarly situated.
WON APT itself can be held liable for the obligations of PNEI - NO
Thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment was issued against the funds of NEA with the DBP to the
Ratio:
extent of P16,581,429.00. NEA then filed a Motion to Quash Writs of
APT is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines and so enjoys immune
Execution/Garnishment, claiming that the garnished public funds are exempt from execution
from suit. However, the doctrine that “the State may not be sued without its consent” is not
under Sec. 4, PD No. 1445 (Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the
absolute. The state may be sued through: express consent – made through a general or special
Philippines, app. June 11, 1978). In its May 17, 2000 RTC denied the Motion to Quash but, at
law – and implied consent – when the State itself commences litigation. According to Act No.
the same time, held in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution to formally inform
3083, the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon and money
the Court and petitioners of the prospect of obtaining funds from FBM within 30 days from
claim involving liability arising form contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
receipt and every 30 days thereafter, until the 90-day period has lapsed.
basis of civil action between parties.
Morales et al filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it.
Proclamation No. 50, which created APT, clearly provided that said instrumentality can “sue and
be sued”. Nonetheless, suability does not necessarily mean liability on the part of the
In a letter dated June 28, 2000, former DBM Sec. Benhamin E. Diokno informed NEA
particular instrumentality or agency of the government. The State does not necessarily
Administrator Conrado M. Estrella III of the denial of the NEA request for supplemental budget
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. When the State waives its immunity, all it
on the ground that the claims under RA No. 6758 which the RTC had orderd to be sttled cannot
does it so give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. It
be paid because Morales, et al are not “incumbents of positions as of July 1, 1989 who are
may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
actually receiving and enjoying such benefits”
execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishments to
Moreover, in an endorsement dated March 23, 2000, the COA advised NEA against making
satisfy such judgments.
further payments in settlement of the claims of Morales, et al. COA had already passed upon
claims similar to those of Morales, et al. in its earlier “Decision No. 95-074” dated January 25,
It is a clear and patent error to construe the decredd joint and solidary liability of APT as
1995, portions of the endorsement read as follows:
extending beyond what APT has held in or acquired from PNEI. The inclusion of APT as a

 

This Office concurs with the above view. The court may have exceeded its
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the entitlement of the after-hired
employees which had already been passed upon by this Commission in COA
Decision No. 95-074 dated January 25, 1995. There it was held that: “the adverse
action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance made by the Auditor, NEA, on the
payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired from July 1, 1989 to
October 31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject to disallowance is lifted.”
Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to
the above COA decision cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for
mandamus in the lower court. PD No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe
that the only mode for appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari
to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the subject case of
mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much
less be executed. Moreover, COA was not made a party thereto, hence, it cannot
be compelled to allow the payment of claims on the basis of the questioned
decision.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the auditor of NEA should post-audit the disbursement
vouchers on the bases of this Commission’s decision particularly the above-cited COA
1
Decision No. 94-074 [sic] and existing rules and regulations, as if there is no decision of
the court in the subject special civil action for mandamus. At the same time,
management should be informed of the intention of this Office to question the validity of
the court decision before the Supreme Court through the Office of the Solicitor General.”
Parenthetically, records do not indicate when Morales, et al. were appointed. Even the
December 16, 1999 RTC Decision is vague for it merely states that they were appointed after
June 30, 1989, which could mean that they were appointed either before the cut-off date of of
October 31, 1989 or after. Thus, there is not enough basis for this Court to determine that the
goregoing COA Decision No. 95-074 adversely affects Morales, et al.
Morales, et al then filed for a Motion for an Order to Implement Writ of Execution, pointing
out that the reason cited in the May 17, 2000 RTC Order no longer exists since DBM already
denied NEA’s request for funding. Also, they filed a Petition to Cite NEA Board of Administrators
2
Mario Tiaoqui, Victoria Batungbcal , Federico Puno, and Remedios Macalingcag in Contempt of
Court for allegedly withholding appropriations to cover their claims.
RTC then issued a Resolution dated December 11, 2000 which says that: “from the comments
of the respondents, it appears they did or are doing their best to secure the needed funds to
satisfy the judgment sought to be enforced” eventually denying Morales, et al.’s contempt
charges.
The following events took place after:
• Jan 8, 2001 – RTC denied the Motion for an Order to Implement Writ of Execution, citing
the same SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
• July 4, 2002 – Morales, et al. filed for a Petition for Certiorari.
The CA held that NEA can no longer take shelter under the provisions of PD No. 1445 and SC
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 because it is a government-owned or controlled corporation
(GOCC) created under PD No. 269, eff. August 6, 1973. It held that NEA, being a GOCC, may
be subject to court processes just like any other corporation; specifically, its properties may be
proceeded against by way of garnishment or levy.
Issues/Held/Ratio:
1. WON Morales, et al. can proceed against the funds of NEA– NO
The December 16, 1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a
specific sum of money susceptible of execution by garnishment; it is a special
judgment requiring petitioners to settle the claims of respondents in accordance with
existing regulations of COA.
It merely directs petitioners to “settle claims of Morales, et al. and other employees
similarly situated” It does not require petitioners to pay a certain sum of money to
respondents which is governed by Sec. 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
garnishment cannot be employed to implement such form of judgment, this is
governed by Sec. 9, Rule 39. It is only proper when the judgment to be enforced
is one for payment of a sum of money.
The RTC exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction when it directed petitioners to extend
the benefits and allowances to which they are entitled to. Also, it countenanced the
issuance of a notice of garnishment against the funds of petitioners with DBP.
2. WON NEA is a GOCC and can execute orders from courts independently from COA - NO
NEA is a GOCC – a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government,
with capacity to sue and be sued. As such, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds
may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it.
However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under CA No. 327, as amended by Sec. 26, PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary
jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due from or
owing the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including GOCC’s and their subsidiaries
Claims from RA No. 6758 is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal
by petition for certiorari to the SC.
Decision:
RTC decision (Jan. 8, 2001) reinstated. CA decision reversed and set aside. Petition granted.
Notes:
1
Should be COA Decision No. 95-074 but this is the one reflected in the COA endorsement
2
HAHAHAHAHA naalala ko si Jbats
SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the COA, judges are hereby enjoined
to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money
judgments against government agencies and local government units.
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, “The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and the power of
the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects as appropriated by law.”
PD 1445 - Sec 4. Fundamental Principles. – Financial transactions and operations of any government
agency shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth here under, to wit:

1. No money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an
appropriation law or other spevific statutory authority;
2. Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes;
3. Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific purpose for which the trust
was created or the funds received;
4. Fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all those exercising authority over
the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the government agency;
5. Disbursements or dispositions of government funds or property shall invariably bear the
approval of the proper officials;
6. Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete documentation;
7. All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be faithfully adhered to;
8. Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as of sound management and
fiscal administration shall be observed, provided that they do not contravene existing laws and
regulations.
ROC – Sec. 11, Rule 39. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment requires the performance of
any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is
rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person
may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
ROC - Sec 9, Rule 39. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
xxxxxx
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. – The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor and other
credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not
capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice
upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or control such credits to which the judgment
obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful
fees.
Gumaru v. Quirino State College
G.R. No. 164196
Date of Promulgation: June 22, 2007
Ponente: Puno, C.J.,
Petition: petition for review
Petitioners: Constantino Gumaru
Respondents: Quirino State College
Facts:
On June 25, 1985, C.T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College (an educational
institution organized and existing under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 440) entered into an
Agreement for the construction of the state college’s building through its president, Julian A.
Alvarez. Construction was done in stages and was covered by supplemental agreements,
because funding depended on the state college’s annual budget allocation and fund
releases from the government.
On October 17, 1997, Constantino T. Gumaru, the owner and proprietor of C.T. Gumaru
Construction, filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against the state
college and Julian A. Alvarez, asking for:
(1)P368,493.35, the expected profits which he would have realized from the
construction of an unfinished portion of the project which was allegedly awarded by
the defendants to another contractor in violation of his preferential right to finish the
project;
(2) P592,136.51, the escalation costs of construction materials and supplies;
(3) P50,000.00, the value of plaintiff’s bodega allegedly demolished by the
defendants; and
(4), P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.
On January 11, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
the first time as counsel for the defendants. It filed a "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" on
the following grounds:
(a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since the OSG was not notified of the
proceedings; and
(b) writs of execution may not be issued against government funds and properties
to satisfy court judgments.
In an "Urgent Motion" dated March 13, 2002, the OSG asked the court to take judicial notice of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000, as well as Commission on Audit
(COA) Resolution No. 2000-366 dated December 19, 2000, which finally adjudged plaintiff
liable to the state college for P4,681,670.00 in overpayments, and liquidated damages for delay
in the construction of the college building.
Issues/Held:
3. WON respondent state college was properly represented before the trial court – NO
Ratio:
11. The OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the government, its agencies,
instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the
services of a lawyer in accordance to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292). With respect to government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs), the OSG shall act as counsel only when authorized
by the President or by the head of the office concerned.
• In the case at bar, respondent state college is classified under the Code
as a chartered institution, not a GOCC. Therefore, the proper statutory
counsel of respondent state college is the OSG, not a private lawyer.
12. The Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government, its agencies,
instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just and valid reason. Unlike a
practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or
the Solicitor General in the case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his functions without
violating his oath of office. Actions filed in the name of the Republic that are not
initiated by the OSG will be summarily dismissed.
13. Sound government operations require consistency in legal policies and
practices among the instrumentalities of the State.
• Sound management policies require that the government’s approach to
legal problems and policies formulated on legal issues be harmonized and
coordinated by a specific agency.
• The government owes it to its officials and their respective offices to assure
them of a degree of certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
14. The Solicitor General has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being
the "principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.” It would be
difficult for any law firm to match its expertise, experience, resources, staff and
prestige.
• The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who would best
uphold and protect the legal interests of the government. His non-
representation of the government is dangerous and should not be
allowed.
15. There was utter failure of justice for the respondent state college. It was as if it was not
represented by counsel at all. While it may be argued that the officials of respondent
state college should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against the state college,
and that it was their fault or negligence that the OSG was not informed in the first
place, it is settled, however, that the principle of estoppel does not operate against

 
the government for the act of its agents or their inaction. The State has to protect
its interests.

Decision:
The petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for trial anew, with the Office
of the Solicitor General appearing as counsel for respondent Quirino State College. The
Decision dated February 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Civil
Case No. Q-97-32470, and the assailed Decision dated November 25, 2003 and Resolution
dated June 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72603 are, for this reason,
VACATED and SET ASIDE.

Notes: III. Structure of Government

Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292):
In Re Saturnino Bermudez
Section 35. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the G.R. No. 76180
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the Date of Promulgation: October 24, 1986
President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or Ponente: Per Curiam
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Petition: Petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. x x x x Petitioners: Saturnino V. Bermudez
Respondents: none
Section 2, Introductory Provisions, of the Administrative Code of 1987:
Facts:
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, Satrunino V. Bermudez, a lawyer, just wanted to clear up Sec. 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This 1986 Constitution which states:
term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
(13) A government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a 30, 1992.
stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its He asks the Court to answer the following, who among the present incumbent President Aquino
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the and VP Laurel and the elected President Marcos and VP Tolentino is being referred to in the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or provision mentioned.
controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge Issues/Held:
of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations. Procedural:
Locus Standi - NO, the petitioner lacks personality to sue or bring this to action.

Substantial:
WON the issue is a justiciable matter - NO

Ratio:
This issue belongs to the realm of politics where the people themselves are the judge. With that
said the Aquino administration is clearly accepted by the people and in the international
community. There is no question that President Aquino and VP Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and VP of the Republic of the Philippines.

Decision:
Petition dismissed

Opinions:
Concur:
Feliciano: Court has no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief, there is a lack of cause
of action, and in all previous Constitutions the boards of canvassers in each province certify who
the elected President and VP are in their respective areas. Thus case must be dismissed.

 

Cruz: The Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified and thus is not yet
effective. No actual conflict of legal rights at the time.
  compulsory in nature; the latter are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of
SSS Employees Association v. Soriano
G.R. No. L-18081
Date of Promulgation: April 30, 1963
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Social Security System Employees Association
Respondents: Hon. Judge E. Soriano
Facts:
SSS Employees Assoc (PAFLU) transmitted a set of demands containing terms and conditions
of employment to their employer Social Security Commission which the latter refused to address
directly. Instead, the Commission filed a petition for declaratory reflief praying that SSS be
declared a governmental agency performing governmental functions so that its employees
may be prohibited from joining labor unions and strikes.
The union filed a counterclaim alleging that SSS exercises proprietary functions, not
governmental. Sensing that the Commission is not inclined to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement, the union filed a charge against SSC for unfair labor practice. 2 days after, they went
on strike and picketed the premises of the SSC.
The Commission filed on that same day an urgent petition to compel the workers to return to
work and desist from causing disturbance. The Court presided by herein respondent, Hon.
Judge Soriano, who immediately granted an ex parte petition to enjoin the union members to
desist and refrain from violence. The union members filed for certiorari with temporary injunction
against respondent judge. The court granted the injunction however, it denied the dissolution of
the injunction of Soriano altogether.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON SSS is a government agency exercising proprietary functions as claimed by the petitioners
– YES
Ratio:
An entity declared to be separate from the Government or not exercising governmental functions
when (1) it is not a municipal corporation, (2) its powers are not exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, (3) it was given a separate personality and powers separate and distinct from the
government, and (4) it may sue and be sued as any other private corporations. (Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation)
SSS is not a municipal corporation. A municipal corporation is a body politic established by
law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil government, chiefly to regulate and
administer the local and internal affairs of the city, town or district. The SSC does not exericse
any of these duties.
SSS has its own personality; hence, it can sue and be sued, as can be inferred from RA
1161. It is endowed with the same powers of a private corporation.
Therefore, it is said that SSS may be declared as an entity separate from the government.
With regard to the performance of governmental functiions, the court enumerated these under
constituent and ministrant functions. The former constitutes the very bonds of society and are
society and are merely optional.
The constituent functions are enumerated by President Wilson are:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crimes.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers; the preservation of the state from external danger
or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
Under the ministrant functions are: public works, education, charity, health and safety
regulations and regulations of trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not a
government shall exercise their optional functions are:
(1) a govt should do for public welfare those things w/c private capital would not naturally
undertake
(2) govt should do those things which by their nature it is better equipped to administer for public
welfare than any private individual
The court held that the main objective of SSS which is to provide social security to a large
group of employees who are not in the government service because private capital cannot
undertake such while the government by its very nature is better equipped to do so, is a
ministrant function. Altho handled by the govt, private entities thru insurance companies and
mutual aid associations are private entities, like SSS, have been existent performing functions in
line with these objectives.
Surely, SSS is created by the state in the exercise of its police power since it's for the promotion
of social justice. However, this does not mean that SSS is a government function since the State
may easily do away with it, it being unnecessary in the exercise of its sovereign powers and
merely optional in promoting public welfare.
Decision:
Petition AFFIRMED.
ACCFA v. CUGCO
G.R. No. L-21484
Date of Promulgation: November 29, 1969
Ponente: Makalintal, J.
Petition: Two separate appeals by certiorari from the decision dated March 25, 1963 (G.R. No.
L-21484) and the order dated May 21, 1964 (G.R. No. L-23605)
Petitioner: The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)
Respondent: Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations Offices (CUGCO), ACCFA
Supervisors’ Association, ACCFA Workers’ Association, & Court of Industrial Relations

Facts:
The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a government
agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844).
The ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA) are
labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively,
in the ACCFA (now ACA).
In September 1961 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was agreed upon by the two labor
unions and ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be effective on July 1, 1962. Due to non-
implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike on October 25, 1962. And 5 days later
CUGCO (Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices), the mother union
of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices; violation of the collective bargaining
agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal to
bargain.
In April 1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, Republic Act
No. 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA (Agricultural Credit
Administration). In March 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole
bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, in the same month of
March 1964, Executive Order No. 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land
Reform Project Administration (LRPA). Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial
court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA and ruled that they have bargaining
rights with ACA.
Issues/Held:
Main: WON ACCFA (ACA) is performing governmental functions (compared to proprietary
functions) – YES
(This is also stated as: WON the CIR had jurisdiction over the case)
Secondary: WON ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA - NO
Ratio:
The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to RA 3844 is a
governmental, not a proprietary, function. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land
reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality.
For that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project
Administration. These include powers not really accorded to non-government entities such as
tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and prosecution of officials.
The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their
affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which
only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.
Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been
doing when it was still ACCFA. Therefore the Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA, in
behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right
to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the
ACCFA.
The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies,
plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but
in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel
are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and
salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
The CIR's two decisions are therefore baseless (since ACA performed a governmental function).
The Court also said: gone are the days where constituent functions are exclusively performed by
the government and not delegated to private institutions. In this case, a constituent function is
left to be performed by a private entity like ACA (formerly ACCFA).
Decision:
The decisions and orders appealed from are SET ASIDE and/or MODIFED in accordance with
the foregoing pronouncements.
Opinions:
Separate Concurring: Fernando, J.
The Philippines has abandoned the concept of laissez-faire. It follows the welfare state concept
(e.g. the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor and others that
provide for the social welfare).
Governmental functions are classified into constituent and ministrant. The former are those
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that
are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely
optional.
Constituent functions:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence
and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents
and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger
or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
The most important of the ministrant functions:
(1) Public works
(2) Public education
(3) Public charity
(4) Health and safety regulations
(5) Regulations of trade and industry
The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of the optional
functions are:
(1) That a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would
not naturally undertake.
(2) That a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

Notes:
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875:
Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not
strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.
 
Spouses Badillo v. Tayag
G.R. No. 180388
Date of Promulgation: April 3, 2003
Ponente: Panganiban
Petition: Review on certiorari decision of RTC
Petitioner: Spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo
Respondent: Hon Arturo Tayag, presiding judge of RTC of Bulacan, and Nat’l Housing Authority
(NHA)
Facts:
NHA, a gov’t owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from paying appellate docket fees
when it sues or is sued in relation to its governmental function of providing mass housing. It it
likewise exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the execution of a forcible entry
case.
Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case in the MTC of Bulacan. They filed for
an ejectment case against NHA who occupied a portion of their lands. The MTC ruled in their
favor and ordered NHA to vacate the land, to return its possession to the petitioners, to pay
rental for its use, and to pay the attorney’s fees.
Upon receipt of the MTC decision, NHA filed a Notice of Appeal. However, it did not pay
appellate docket fees within the reglementary period. Consequently, petitioners filed with the
Court a Motion for immediate issuance of writ of execution and demolition. They contended that
because of NHA’s failure to pay the fees within the described period, the MTC decision has
become final. MTC granted the petition and issued the Writ of Execution against NHA.
Four months later, NHA paid the appellate docket fees and filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, and injunction before the RTC of Bulacan. The RTC declared that the
NHA has been able to perfect its appeal on time (despite its nonpayment of appellate docket
fees), and ordered the MTC to transmit the records of the case for appropriate appellate
proccedings. After proceedings, it partly affirmed the MTC decision, and held that petitioners
were entitled to the right of possession of the property and t the award of damages, but that the
grant of rental was baseless.
Hence, this recourse. This is a review of the two rulings of RTC of Bulacan: first one is the order
annulling the writ of execution issued by MTC, and the second one is the RTC decision which
modified the MTC decision.
Issues/Held:
4. WON NHA perfected its appeal to the RTC despite failure to pay docket fee within the
15-day reglementary decision – YES
5. WON the NHA being a government corporation is exempt from posting of the
superseseas bond to stay execution – YES
6. WON it was proper fot the RTC to delete rentals awarded by the MTC – YES
Ratio:
1. Mass housing is a governmental function, thus, the NHA, being a gov’t owned
corporation acting in a governmental function is exempt from paying docket fees.
As regards the perfection of the appeal, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure do not
mandate the dismissal of an appeal as a consequence of nonpayment of fee. Hence,
the appeal was perfected despite failure to pay the fee within the 15-day period.
2. In the present case, the posting of supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay the
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. When a case involved provable rents or
damages incurred by a GOCC, the real party in interest is the Republic of the
Philippines. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damahes
because it is presumed to be always solvent.
Note: Rationale for requiring the losing party to file a supersedeas bond: such bond is
required to assure the payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal is
found frivolous.
3. In order to have some bases for fixing the reasonable amount of rent in a forcible entry
case, courts must rely on the evidence presented by the parties. In this case, RTC
took account of the ff in determining the rent:
a. Realty assessment of land
b. Increase in realty taxes
c. Prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity
RTC declared that there is no evidence on record to support MTC’s award of rent. The
Court finds no reason to disturb such judgment.
Decision:
Petition denied.
A. CONGRESS
1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office
a. Senate
Art VI – The Legislative Department
Sec 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by
the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Sec 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Sec 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term of which he was elected.
b. House of Representatives
Art VI – The Legislative Department

 
Sec 5 (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and Hon. Camilo L. Sabio, Secretary, HoR
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with Facts:
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM in the next elections.
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by Secretary of the HoR excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the HoR
law, except the religious sector. pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)*
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each When he lost in the elections, Dimaporo wrote to respondents expressing his intention to
province, shall have at least one representative. resume performing his duties and functions.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. Petitioner Respondents
Sec 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural- Did not lose seat: Filing means resigning:
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, - Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district under the present Constitution; term of office of members - voluntary act of resignation
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year of the HoR, as well as the grounds by which the in Sec 67 falls within the term
immediately preceding the day of the election. incumbency of said members may be shortened are “voluntary renunciation” in
Sec 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years provided for in the Constitution.** par. 2, Sec. 7, Art. VI*** of the
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next (BP repugnant to Consti because it provides for the Consti.
following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground (Just because Sec 67 is not
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be not provided for in the Constitution) included in the Consti doesn’t
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was - It is only when a congressman holds another office or mean it is not valid, because the
elected. employment that forfeiture is decreed. (Filing does not equal grounds in the Consti are not
Sec 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members holding an office.) exclusive. There are other
of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. Respondents acted without authority and so their grounds like resignation, death,
“administrative act” in striking out his name is ineffective and conviction of a crime.)
Art IX-C – Constitutional Commissions - The Commission on Elections
Sec 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of Issues/Held:
the people, subject to the provisions of this Article. 1. WON Sec 67, Art IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution – YES
Sec 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except 2. WON the respondents could exclude Dimaporo from the rolls of the HoR – YES
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall Ratio:
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of 1. The intent of the authors of BP 881 in adding this provision was to ensure that congressmen
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in service the mandate of the people and not cut short their tenure. Filing of candidacy for another
accordance with law. other shows that the congressman does not intend to finish the term he was elected for.

Art XVIII – Transitory Provisions This is affirmed by the Sec 1, Art XI^ of the Consti, calling on elected officials to respect the
Sec 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the mandate given by their constituents. The elective public officers must serve their principal, the
respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of people, not their own personal ambition.
Article V1 of this Constitution.
  Re: cutting short the term:
a. Dimaporo failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
Dimaporo v. Mitra officials, this statutory provision (Sec 67, Art IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that
G.R. No. 96859 such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from
running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it
Date of Promulgation: October 5, 1991 clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J. position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must
Petition: review the decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate, which they have
Petitioners: Mohammad Ali Dimaporo received from their constituents.
Respondents: Hon. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., Speaker, HoR, and (Hon. Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.)

 

b. Dimaporo confused "term" with "tenure" of office:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds
the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of
said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of
the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short
his tenure, not his term.
That the ground cited in Sec 67, Art IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Consti itself does
not prevent its application to present members of Congress. Sec 2 of Article XI^^ provides that
aside from the exceptions, all public officers may be removed from office as provided by law,
and so clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Art VI about shortening tenure
are not exclusive and neither do they prevent the legislature from prescribing other grounds.
The concept of voluntary renunciation is broad enough to include the situation in Sec 67, Art IX
of B.P. Blg 881.
2. As administrative officers, respondents perform ministerial functions; it was their duty to
remove Dimaporo's name from the Roll. They had no choice but to abide by its clear and
unmistakable legal effect. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty for the reason that it might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
Decision:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Opinions:
Gutierrez, dissenting:
Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or
removal of constitutional officers. Validating BP 881 effectively adds to the grounds by which
tenure of office is shortened. Because this ground is not provided for in the 1987 Constitution,
the Congress (in the person of the Speaker of the House) would be appending to the
Constitution. Petition should be granted.
For 50 years of constitutional history, running for local government position was not considered
voluntary renunciation. Also, what we are dealing with here is not just the right of Dimaporo to sit
in the HoR but the right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress.
Notes:
*Sec 67, Art IX of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
**Sec 2, Art XVIII
The Senators, Members of the HoR and the local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
**Sec 7, Art VI
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.
***4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman
may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in
the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
^Sec 1, Art XI
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
^^Sec 2 Art XI
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
i. Apportionment and Reapportionment
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176970
Date of Promulgation: December 8, 2008
Ponente: Brion, J.
Petition: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition.
Petitioners: Rogelio Bagabuyo
Respondents: Commission on Elections
Facts:
On Oct. 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then representative Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859 (An Act for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan de Oro). This eventually became Republic Act 9371
(promulgated by COMELEC en banc on March 13, 2007 through Resolution No. 7837). The
law increases the legislative district of CDO from 1 to 2, with each district electing their
representative to Congress and eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Voters would
st nd
be classified either as belonging to the 1 or 2 district depending on their place of residence
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed a petition (amended April 10, 2008) asking for the issuance of
an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. 9371 and
COMELEC Resolution 7837. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot implement R.A. 9371
without providing the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite pursuant to
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that R.A.
9371 merely increased the number of representatives of CDO in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It did

not involve a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay. Hence, no plebiscite is required under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues/Held:
1) WON the petitioner violated the rule of hierarchy of courts - NO
2) WON R.A. 9371 is unconstitutional for failure to meet the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution - NO
3) WON R.A 9371 violate the equal representation doctrine - NO
Ratio:
1. Petitioner did not violate the rule of hierarchy of courts
- The case at bar involves a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition assailing the
validity of R.A. 9371, of which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction but shared
with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs
2. R.A. 9371 merely provides for legislative reapportionment (defined as the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation) pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
- No plebiscite pursuant to Section 10, Article X is needed since there was no alteration
with respect to Cagayan de Oro as a political and corporate entity and its territory
remains whole intact
- A legislative district, under Article VI, is a political unit established for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. They do not act for or on behalf of the
people comprising, and they only delineate the areas occupied by people who will
choose a representative. LDs don’t have chief executives, since congressmen only
represent the people of the district in Congress
- Local government units (provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays) under Article X, are
political and corporate units. They are territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
They have a chief executive (governor, mayor, barangay chairman) and a juridical
personality separate from the state. They exercise special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents.
3. R.A 9371 does not violate the doctrine of equality of representation
- Although there are discrepancies in the terms of the population of the districts, the
Constitution does not require rigid equality or mathematical exactitude, for as long as
each district complies with the Constitutional requirement.
st
- Whether the two districts are unequal with respect to the rural and urban areas (1
nd
district was largely rural while the 2 district was mostly urban according to petitioner),
is not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment and
reapportionment.
In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of established legal parameters, the
Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies.
Decision:
Petition denied for lack of merit.
Notes:
Article VI, Section 5
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Article X, Section 10
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political unit directly affected.
Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No.189793
Date of Promulgation: April 7, 2010
Ponente: Perez, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Mayor Jesse Robredo
Respondents: COMELEC
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur
by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law
originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issues/Held:
WON RA 9716 is unconstitutional – NO
Ratio:
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
  (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
ii. Party-List Representatives
RA 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already
registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall
file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it
was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have
applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies
thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his
bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order
of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for
member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast
for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally,
That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate
on the matter of the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the
COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the

office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party
or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as
party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall
be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the
COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same
salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the
regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General
Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of
its information campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Approved, March 3, 1995.
  “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766
Date of Promulgation: April 2, 2013
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: Atong Paglaum, Inc.
Respondent: COMELEC
Facts:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
Issue/Held:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists -
NO
Ratio:
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established
in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners
deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent
of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved
for the marginalized sectors.)
III. Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the SC stated that it is
“not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.” The high court stressed that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out “non-sectoral parties” in the party-list
system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are
ideologically marginalized.
Decision:
Petition granted, remanded to COMELEC to determine whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Notes:
RA 7941
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
BANAT v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271
Date of Promulgation: April 21, 2009
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition: Petition for certiorari and mandamus on COMELEC resolution
Petitioners: BANAT(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency)
Respondents: COMELEC
Facts:
1) June 27, 2007 the COMELEC proclaimed 13 parties as winners in the party-list
elections.
2) The COMELEC decided who the winners under the following rules.
a) Sec. 5, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution- Party-list members shall make up 20% of
total representatives
b) Sec. 11b of RA 7941 “Party-List System Act”- Parties who garner at least
2% are entitled to one seat
c) Panganiban Formula- Additional 2% of votes would entitle the party to an
additional seat, up to a 3-seat cap
3) Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Rep. Provided by the Constitution.
4) BANAT questions the Panganiban Formula and Sec. 11 of RA 7941, also wants to
clear up whether 20% stated in Sec. 5, Art VI of the Constitution is merely a limit.
Issues/Held:
WON the 20% seat rule in Sec. 5, Art. VI of the Constitution is ceiling or cap
WON Sec. 11 of RA 7941, or 2% rule is unconstitutional, in which every 2%, up to 6%,
guarantees a party one seat in the House, up to 3 seats.
WON 3 seat cap rule is unconstitutional
WON major political parties are allowed to run in the party-list elections.
Ratio:
1) YES, there is nothing in the Constitution nor in RA 7941 that makes it mandatory to fill
up the 20% seats reserved for the party-list.
2) YES, the 2% system is unconstitutional, not based on any provision in the
Constitution, but because it is mathematically impossible to implement the formula
without breaking the 80-20 rule. Instead parties shall be ranked by the number of
votes, those garnering 2% shall guarantee a party one seat, and those garnering
sufficient number of votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to the
number of total votes.
3) NO, the 3-seat cap is to ensure no party dominates the party-list system
4) NO, the Court voted to uphold the Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC,
disallowing major parties from entering party-list elections. Based on CJ Puno’s
opinion.
Decision:
Petition is partially granted, COMELEC Resolution is Set Aside.
Opinions:
Puno: The marginalized sector will be constraint if major political parties join the fray, thus
“suffocating the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic
spirit of the Constitution”.
Notes:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

RA 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582
Date of Promulgation: April 8, 2010
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
Respondent: COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic
Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
“the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot
ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
Issue/Held:
WON Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941 – YES
Ratio:
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections
be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Decision:
Petition granted, directed COMELEC to grant application for party-list accreditation.
2. Election
a. Regular Election
Art. VI
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
b. Special Election
Art VI
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
3. Salaries, Privileges, and Disqualification
a. Salaries
Art. VI
Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase.
b. Freedom from arrest
Art. VI
Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
RPC
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of
the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions
or committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the
penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall,
while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member

 
thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a special statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest
penalty higher than prision mayor. provision of the Constitution.

 
Art. 145 of RPC cannot be invoked since it was passed in 1932 (older than the 1935
Martinez v. Morfe Constitution). The 1935 Constitution said that after it comes into effect “All laws of the Philippine
G.R. No. L-34022 Islands shall continue in force x x x unless inconsistent with this Constitution”. Also, the
Constitution is of course, a higher law than the RPC.
Date of Promulgation: March 24, 1972
Ponente: Fernando, J Freedom from arrest for a legislator would amount to the creation of a privileged class. A
Petition: For Certiorari and Habeas Corpus legislator or a ConCon delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
Petitioner: Manuel F. Martinez for any transgression of the criminal law. Should there be a transgression of the criminal law,
Respondent: Hon. Jesus P. Morfe (CFI Manila), & City Warden of Manila then the legislator/delegate is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
Separate Case, combined here:
Petition: For Certiorari and Prohibition To give to the members of the Congress more privileges that what the nature of the office
Petitioner: Fernando Bautista Sr. demands is contrary to the new theory that every man is equal in the idea of law. The
Respondent: Hon. Francisco Ma. Chanco (CFI Baguio & Benguet) Legislature is an agent of the State, its principal. Giving more privileges to a legislator, who
commits a crime that endangers the State, is not sound policy.
Facts:
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Decision:
Convention. Both petitions are DISMISSED.

While the ConCon was still in session, both were arrested for different reasons: Martinez Notes:
due to falsification of a public document (he declared on certificate of candidacy to constitutional Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
convention that he was born on 1945 instead of 1946). Bautista due to violation of the Revised
Election Code (he gave free food, drinks, and cigarettes during public meetings in two towns). A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Defense of Martinez and Bautista Sr.: member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
The petitioners contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest Congress or in any committee thereof.
because they are members of the ConCon and have parliamentary immunity. (Sec. 15, RA  
6132: Constitutional Convention Act 1970 - Delegates are entitled to the parliamentary
immunities of a senator or a representative). People v. Jalosjos
G.R. No. 132875-76
According to the petitioners, the above RA 6132 (ConCon Act) is also in line with Art. 145 of the
Revised Penal Code (Members of Congress have immunity from arrest unless crime has penalty Date of Promulgation: February 3, 2000
higher than prision mayor). Penalty of Martinez was Prision Mayor, while penalty of Bautista Sr. Ponente: Ynares-Santiago
was not higher than Prision Mayor. Petition: Motion to be allowed to discharge duties as Congressman
Complainant: People of the Philippines
Issues/Held: Respondent: Romeo Jalosjos
WON Martinez and Bautista Sr. could invoke immunity from arrest. - NO
Facts:
Ratio: Romeo Jaslosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who was confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress. This goes the same six counts was pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, so they are accorded the same constitutional duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace. His motion was hinged on the ff grounds:
1. His reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any
In this case, Martinez and Bautista were arrested for crimes under “breach of peace”. ruling
2. To deprive electorate of their elected representatives amounts to taxation without
Sec. 15, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution clearly said that the immunity from arrest does not representation
cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. 3. To bar him from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal nd mocks
the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any 4. The electorate wants their voice to be heard

 

5. A precedent-setting US case allowed a detained lawmaker to attend session of the US
Congress
6. The House treats him as a bona fide member thereof and urges co-equal branch of
gov’t to respect its mandate
7. Concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate
8. He has always complied with the conditions when allowed to leave jail
Issues/Held:
WON membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general – NO
Ratio:
True, election is the expression of sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be restricted by law.
All top officials of the government are subject to law. While immunity from arrest or detention
arises from a provision in the Constitution (Sec 11, Art VI), the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense.
Jalosjos argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored by Sec
16(2), Art. However, he has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec 11, Art VI. The members oof Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely allowed by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Jalosjos’ reliance on ruling in Aguinaldo v Santo will not extricate him from imprisonment. In
Aguinaldo, the officer was removed from office for acts done PRIOR to his term. The case was
also administrative, not criminal.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman.
One rationale behind confinement is public self-defense. A person charged with crime is taken
into custody for purposes of the administration of justice.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. The
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a man validly in prison.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
  evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
Trillanes v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 179817
Date of Promulgation: June 27, 2008
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Antonio F. Trillanes IV
Respondents: Hon. Oscar Pimentel, Sr., Presiding Judge, RTC Br 148 Makati, et al
Facts:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City
and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series
of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes
IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later,
Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes
filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos as his case is
still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. He
asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is
still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e.,
two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for
coup d’etat, which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in
the AFP.
The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, this petition for certiorari to set aside orders of the
RTC.
Issues/Held:
1. WON Trillanes‘ case is different from the Jalosjos case – NO
2. WON Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator – NO
3. WON there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail – NO
Ratio:
1. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.
2. The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation
does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet
that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution, which the people themselves ordained
to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed
by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members.
x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
3. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed
petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February
2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office
on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
c. Speech and Debate Clause
Art. VI
Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
 
Jimenez et al. v. Cabangbang
G.R. No. L-15905
Date of Promulgation: August 3, 1966
Ponente: Concepcion, CJ.
Petition: Appeal from an order of dismissal rendered by the CFI of Rizal, Caluag J.
Petitioners: Nicanor Jimenez, et al.
Respondents: Bartolome Cabangbang
Facts:
This case is about the civil action filed by Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose
Lukban for the recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages, for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
The defendant, a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, wrote a an open letter to the President of the Philippines describing the
“allegedly three operational plans” of some members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
1. “an insidious plan or a massive political build-up” of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, as a way to “be prepared to become a candidate for
President in 1961”
2. a “coup d’état” although the plan “seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments”
3. assuagement of the President and the public through a loyalty parade, in
connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and
integrity of the Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind
him, and gain popular and civilian support
The letter then recommended Secretary Vargas, Gen. Arellano to resign, the present chiefs of
the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces to be reassigned, no Congressman to be
appointed to the said office, among others. The letter in question also said that the plaintiffs are
under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as “planners” and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs “probably belong to the Vargas-
Arellano clique”.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the letter is not libelous and that
is it a privileged communication. Motion was granted by the lower court, hence this petition.
Issues/Held:
3. WON the publication in question is a privileged communication – NO
4. WON it is libelous - NO
Ratio:
10. According to Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution:
“The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of he Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.”
The publication involved in this case does not belong to the category stated in the
abovementioned provision. It was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines when Congress presumably was not in session and the defendant

caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation
in the Philippines. It can then be concluded that he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof when he
made the letter.
11. The letter explicitly indicates that the plaintiffs might be absolutely unaware of
the alleged operational plans, and they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. Although one can conclude that the letter has the intent to impeach
plaintiffs’ reputation, expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule,
and to alienate them from their associates, the letter in question is not sufficient to
support plaintiff’s action for damages.
Decision:
Petition denied. Order affirmed.
 
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
A.C. No. 7399
Date of Promulgation: August 25, 2009
Ponente: Velasco, Jr., J.
Petition: -
Petitioners: Antero J. Pobre
Respondents: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
Facts:
In his sworn complaint, dated 22 December 2006, invited the Court’s attention to a speech
delivered by Sen. Defensor-Santiago in Senate:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
To Pobre, it was total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of
her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her,
was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust
act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to
the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
Issues/Held:
WON Sen. Defensor-Santiago had parliamentary immunity when she delivered such statements
against the Chief Justice – YES
Ratio:
Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House
of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.”
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v.
Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense.”
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts,
can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member
of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
d. Disqualifications and other prohibitions
Art. VI
Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other

administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.
 
Flores v. Drilon
G.R. No. 104732
Date of Promulgation: June 22, 1993
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.,
Petition: petition for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
Petitioners: Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, Rogelio Palo, Domingo Jadloc, Carlito Cruz and
Manuel Reyes
Respondents: Hon. Franklin Drilon, Executive Secretary, and Richard Gordon
Facts:
Respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) pursuant to Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.”
The constitutionality of this provision is challenged in this petition "to prevent useless and
unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses
attached to the office . . . ."
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales,
and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the
Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, because the City Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices;
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts;
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code for the reason that the
appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent
Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to
the 11 May 1992 Elections.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however,That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. – YES
Ratio:
ON SEC. 7, ART. IX-B
The proviso directing the President to appoint an elective official to other government posts
contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
16. The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time
with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services.
17. It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office.
• BUT no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
18. The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the
wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
nd
• 2 par: authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position
st
• 1 par: more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post
unless otherwise stated in the Constitution
nd
• Therefore, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the 2
paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed
st
by the 1 paragraph.
EX OFFICIO (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary)
19. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor
of Olongapo City, hence, an exception. However, Congress did not contemplate
making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment.
• Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio,
Congress would have avoided the words "shall be appointed" and, "ex
officio" would have been used.
APPOINTING POWER
20. Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President because he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor
of Olongapo City.
21. DEFINITIONS of Appointment:
• The selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of
the same.
• Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office."
• Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power is an
executive act involving the exercise of discretion.
22. Hence, Congress cannot limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Since in this case, only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. This goes
against the very nature itself of appointment.
DIFFERENCE BET. SEC 13, ART. VI AND SEC. 7, ART. IX-B
23. As long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another public office. Since an incumbent elective official is not eligible, his
appointment or designation cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack
of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution.
• DIFFERENCE between the two provisions: incumbent national legislators
lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first
resign their posts before they can be appointed.

Decision:
The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
Notes:
Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Art. IX-B
Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that:
"[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint”
Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which says:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g)
Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary
increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless
it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the
office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may
be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment
shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment.
Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any
government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or
privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations . . . .
  Petition GRANTED
Liban v. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352
Date of Promulgation: January 8, 2011
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Petition: Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration
Petitioners: DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI
Respondents: RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS,
Intervenor
Facts:
In a decision the Court held that respondent (Richard Gordon) did not forfeit his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). The
Court ruled that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes prohibited in Sect. 13, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution. The decision went even further ruling that the PNRC is a private corporation
and should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the SEC if it wants to be a
private corporation. Also RA No. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643 are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
The respondent filed for a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration raising the following
grounds
1) the issue of constitutionality of RA No. 95 was not raised by the parties, thus the Court
went beyond the case.
2) Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the
issue of the validity of RA No. 95 should be considered obiter.
Issues/Held:
WON Court should have decided on the constitutionality of RA No. 95
WON the PNRC is a private corporation.
Ratio:
1) No, the Court should not have decided on this matter, “it is a well-established rule that
a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties”.
2) No, the PNRC is a National Society which partakes a sui generis character. This
gives it recognition by their public authorities as voluntary aid societies and as
auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, and also benefits from
recognition at the International level. With their auxiliary status, the Red Cross Society
means that is at one and the same time a private institution and public service
organization because the nature of its work implies cooperation with authorities, a link
with the State.
“It is the recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that RA No. 95
has remained valid and effective.”
Also the Court must not interpret Sect. 16 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution in such a mechanical
way in which will hinder the State from adopting measures that will benefit the public welfare.
Also the Court should recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.
Decision:
Opinions:
Dissenting: Carpio
1) The constitutional issue was inevitably thrust upon the Court upon its finding that the

PNRC is a private corporation. The fact that the constitutionality of RA 95 was not
questioned for more than 60 years does not mean it could no longer be declared
unconstitutional.
2) National Societies are bound by laws of their host countries, in this case Sect. 16, Art
XII of 1987 Constitution applies, in which prohibits the formation of private
corporations except by general law. The Court’s duty is to faithfully apply the
provisions of the Constitution and has no power to make PNRC an exception. The
PNRC could either choose to remain unincorporated or it could adopt its own articles
of incorporation and by-laws and incorporate under the Corporation Code and register
with the SEC.
Notes:
Section 16. Article XII of 1987 Constitution
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
  for not adhering to it.
SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board
G.R. No. 157870
Date of Promulgation: November 3, 2008
Ponente: Velasco Jr., J.
Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners: Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr.; Social Justice Society; Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
Respondents:COMELEC; Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA)
Facts:
- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 as implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office including
senators thereby imposing a new qualification among senatorial candidates.
- Petitioner Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. impugns Sec. 36(g) along with the implemeting rules
and regulations under COMELEC Resolution No. 6486. He avers that the Constitution only
prescribes a maximum of 5 qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He invokes Sec. 3 of Art VI of the Constitution w/c states:
"Sec. 3. No person chall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
(CITIZENSHIP), and on the day of the election, is atleast 35 yrs of age (AGE), able to read and
write (LITERACY, a registered voter (VOTER REGISTRATION), and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
(RESIDENCY)"
- He states that requiring a senatorial aspirant to undergo a mandatory drug test create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He
adds that no provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress and COMELEC to
expand the qualiications of candidates for public office.
Issue/Held:
WON Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for senatorial candidates – YES
WON the Congress is authorized enact a law prescribing qualifications for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution – NO
WON Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional – YES
Ratio:
Legislative power is subject to substantive constitutional limitations which circumscribe
both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards prescriced for senatorial
candidates, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) effectively enlarges the qualification reqts enumerated in the Constitution as it
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal drug-clean which is obviously
a pre-condition to a certificate of candidacy.
Even though the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug-testing
imposition does not disqualify a candidate, it, however, made drug-testing MANDATORY,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences
Decision:
PETITION GRANTED. Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
____________________________
ALTERNATIVE (in case Ma'am asks for all the facts other than those focused on the senatorial
qualification imposition--also, di ako sure baka dapat pala kasama talaga lahat hahaha)
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires random drug testing of:
a. students of secondary and tertiary schools
b. officers and employees of public and private offices
and mandatory drug testing of:
a. candidates for public office
b. persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certaing offenses, among other
personalities
They argue in several petitions that the said provisions constitute:
1. an imposition of an additional qualification for candidates for public office not
included among the reqts in the Constitution
2. undue delegation of legislative power giving unbridled discretion to schools and
employers
3. a violation of the equal protection clause and due process
4. an infringment on the constitutional right to privacy, against unreasonable search
and seizure, and against self-incrimination
Issue/Held:
1. WON Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for senatorial candidates? YES
WON the Congress is authorized enact a law prescribing qualifications for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? NO
WON Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional? YES
2. WON paragraphs (c), (d) and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power and violate the right to privacy, against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause?

Ratio:
1. Same as above.
2. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY and AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE
Sec 36 (c)
- The Court guided by Vernonia School District v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent
School District v. Earls, et al., held that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. It is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. The right to enroll is not absolution; it is subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable requirements [Art XIV. Sec 5(2)]
Sec 36 (d)
The right to privacy* is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against UNREASONABLE
search and seizure (Art II. Sec 2). Therefore, prohibition depends upon REASONABLENESS**
of govt search or intrusion. The right to privacy must yield to certain paramount rights of the
public and defer to the state's exercise of police power.
The need for drug testing to atleast minimize illegal drug use is substantial enought to override
the individual's privacy interest. RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees and civil servants alike.
Sec 36 (f)
The Court found no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
The imposition of mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. Drug testing in such case violates a person's right
to privacy.
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
In all cases, there is no undue delegation as participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme are all subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
* The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. It means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
** REASONABLENESS STANDARD: balancing of the govt mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of a compelling state interest.
  Respondent: Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. & Sen. Marcelo Fernan
e. Duty to disclose
Art. VI
Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption
of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors.
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to
the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Art. XI
Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.
In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of
the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
4. Internal Government of Congress
Art. VI
Sec. 16.
1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by
a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
2. A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
3. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
4. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
5. Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the
two Houses shall be sitting.
a. Election of Officers
Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577
Date of Promulgation: November 18, 1998
Ponente: Panganiban, J
Petition: Original petition for Quo Warranto
Petitioner: Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago & Sen. Francisco Tatad
Facts:
On the 1st regular session of the 11th Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming
the position of minority leader, because those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority so those who had voted for him belonged to the minority.
Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party (7
senators, also a minority) had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the
majority leader informed the body that he received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority
leader of the Senate.

 
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona It is within the jurisdiction of the SC to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. functions and prerogatives.
Issues/Held:
RELATED TO CONSTI TOPIC: Decision:
WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution - NO Petition is DISMISSED.
WON Guingona usurped, unlawfully held and exercised the position of Senate minority leader -
NO Opinions:
WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority Separate Opinion: Romero, J.
leader - NO Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a Senate "office" and
does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of internal rules for the Senate's
SIDE TOPIC: conduct of its business, no constitutional breach has been made and therefore there is nothing
WON the Court has jurisdiction over the petition - YES for this Court to uphold.

Ratio: Separate Opinion: Vitug, J.

The interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. There was no violation,
since all that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate does not say anything
about the positions of majority and minority leaders. The method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court
cannot determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature.
There was no sufficient proof that Guingona usurped the position of Senate minority
leader since there are no clear guidelines in the selection of the said position. No law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. By
the same reason, Tatad also has no clear right to the office.
When the question pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court will not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government.
Concurring and dissenting opinion: Mendoza, J.
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question on who constitute the minority in the
Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. The Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate are not state officers. As presiding officers of
their respective chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the
majority of the members of the house to which they belong.
Notes:
Rule I, Rules of the Senate
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro
Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.

Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President because Guingona belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, and by unanimous resolution
of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Rule II, Rules of the Senate
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members.
Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken;
otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

No provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly No. 1, Sec. 16, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, therefore grave abuse of The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
discretion cannot be imputed to Fernan for acts done within his competence and authority. majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary.
SIDE TOPIC:
The SC initially did not consider the case since it belonged to another branch of the government.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, the SC ultimately assumed jurisdiction "in the light of b. Quorum
subsequent events which justify its intervention."
Avelino v. Cuenco
The SC has jurisdiction over the case because “Judicial power includes the duty of the court of G.R. No. L-2821
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion Date of Promulgation: March 4, 1949
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Ponente: Per Curiam
Government.", according to the 1987 Constitution. Petition: RESOLUTION

 

Complainant: Jose Avelino
Respondent: Mariano Cuenco
Facts:
This is a resolution of the earlier case of Avelino v Cuenco, where the Court, by a vote of six
justices against four, resolved to deny the petition.
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada requested that
his right to speak on the next session day, to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator
Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner
delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the
rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a
copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the
public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his
colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting
to order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in
the United States, all the Senators were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed
with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of
petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
The dilatory tactics continued until Senator Avelino adjourned the session, despite several
opposition. After he banged the gavel, he abandoned the Chair, followed by Senator David,
Tirona, Francsisco, Torres, Magalona, and Clarin, while the rest of senators remained.
Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators
present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting
Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed
the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68),
and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of
the Philippines Senate.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the subject matter – NO
2. WON there was a quorum – YES
Ratio:
1. Court has no jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers, political nature of the
controversy, and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with by the judiciary.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House”. There is a difference between a majority of "the
House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23) constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
In this case, 12 senators approved the resolution. That is considered a majority,
considering Senator Confesor was not in the country.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
c. Rules of proceedings
Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255
Date of promulgation: June 26, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Petition: certiorari and/or prohibition
Petitioner: Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, John Henry R. Osmena, Wigberto E. Tanada,
and Ronaldo B. Zamora
Respondents: Jose De Venecia, Raul Daza, Rodolfo Albano, The Executive Secretary, The
Secretary of Finance, and the Commission of Internal Revenue
Doctrines:
• Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and courts have no concern with their
observance.
• Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of the bill by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive of its due enactment.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
• It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President
that a bill has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
• It prevents the court from looking behind an enacted law, unless there is a
constitutional violation in its passing.

Separation of Powers
• The principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine
• It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases, which will cast a
cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature.
Facts:
This petition was filed challenging the validity of R.A. 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the HOR, claim that there
were violations of rules that they claim are constitutionally mandated such that violation of
such is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They also claim that the passage of the
law in the House was "railroaded."
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of:
1. Rule VIII, Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House
The Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas
or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
2. Rule XIX, §112
The Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did
not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify
3. Rule XVI, §97
The Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's
motion and afterward declared the report approved
4. Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109
The Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question, which, it is
alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should
have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the HOR and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses as having been finally passed
by the House of Representatives and by the Senate. The enrolled bill was then signed into law
by President Fidel V. Ramos.
Issue/Held:
WON RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House – NO
Ratio:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative
body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. The principle
of Separation of Powers likewise compels reluctance on the Court to enter upon an inquiry
when there is no grave abuse of discretion.
Re: the alleged ignored privileged question:
What happened was The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. He was not
ignored, he was simply not heard. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair.
Re: the asking for an objection instead of putting it to vote:
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. In fact, the procedure in the House is that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. The
Constitution also does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only on some instances.
Re: the claim that there was no quorum
Their problem was actually that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of
a quorum.
Re: petitioners wanting the court to depart from the enrolled bill doctrine
The enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding
provided it is in harmony with the constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent
urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order,
and Safety
G.R. No. 170338
Date of Promulgation: December 23, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petition: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
Petitioners: Virgilio Garcillano
Respondents: The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order
and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
Facts:
The Hello Garci Tapes, which purportedly contained the wiretapped conversations between
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
wherein the President instructed Garcillano to manipulate the 2004 election results in her favor,
caught widespread public attention that weakened the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration.
On June 8, 2005, a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent committees) was set
in motion through the privilege speech of House Minority Floor Leader Francis Escudero.
Subsequently, Wycoco, Paguia, and the lawyer of former NBI Director Samuel Ong submitted
seven alleged “original” tapes to the respondent committees. On Aug. 3, 2005, respondent

House Committees decided to suspend hearings indefinitely but prepared committee reports
based on testimonies of resource persons.
Garcillano filed a petition with the Supreme Court for Prohibition and Injunction and a
Prayer for TRO (G.R No. 170338) to prevent the respondent House committees from using
“illegally obtained” tapes in hearings for committee reports and other purposes. Two
years later, Senator Panfilo Lacson revived the issue through his privilege speech and sought
inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunication providers in wiretapping activities.
On Aug. 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago recommended a legislative investigation
into the role of the AFP, PNP and other government agencies in the alleged illegal wiretapping of
public officials. Then, CA retired justices Ranada and Agcaoili filed a petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for TRO/Preliminary Injunction to prevent from conducting the said legislative inquiry on
the grounds that it violates RA 4200 and Article III Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution (G.R. No.
179275).
Issues/Held:
WON the petitions are meritorious – Garcillano’s petition – NO; Ranada and Agcaoili’s
petition - YES
Ratio:
In G.R. 170338:
Court held that Garcillano has the requisite standing to file the petition for Prohibition since he
will sustain a direct injury in the House committees’ actions by the fact that he was the person
alluded to in the tapes. But the petition was dismissed for being moot and academic. The
Court’s exercise of judicial power is limited only to resolution of actual cases or controversies,
and not hypothetical questions or when the purpose of the case has become stale due the fact
that the tapes were already played and that the committee reports were already submitted to the
plenary.
In G.R. 179275:
Court ruled that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili have the requisite standing as taxpayers and as
members of the IBP, while intervenor Sagge has the requisite standing through his assertion of
his constitutional right to due process. The Court held that the Senate cannot proceed with the
legislative hearings without duly published rules of procedure as provided for in Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. Moreover, the Senate must publish its rules even if the Senate did not amend its rules
since 1995 and even if the said rules are available for free in booklet form and online.
“Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result
in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering
that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective.”
Decision:
The petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. A writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
Hello Garci tapes.
Notes:
1. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that:
the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
2. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
3. Republishing of rules is necessary since 12 of the Senators are replaced every 3 years
and only 12 are able to continue to the next Congress, and there is a need for a
majority in order to have quorum to do business
4. Online versions of the rules cannot constitute publication of such rules. RA 8792
(Electronic Commerce Act of 2000) does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations. It only allows online documents as functional
equivalent for written documents for evidentiary purposes.
d. Power over members and right to sit
e. Discipline of members
f. Sessions
Art. VI
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for
such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
Sec. 16 (5). Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
Art. VII
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in
the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended
nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Sec. 18 (par. 2). The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
g. Journal and Congressional Records
Art. VI
Sec. 16 (4). Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in
the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
  WON the Congress can punish a nonmember for contempt - YES
5. Powers of Congress
a. General plenary powers
Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820
Date of Promulgation: July 18, 1950
Ponente: Ozaeta, J.
Petition: Original Action. Petition for Habeas Corpus
Petitioners: Jean L. Arnault
Respondents: Leon Nazareno, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine Senate and Eustaquio Balagtas,
Director of Prisons
Facts:
The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the
attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the
price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a
Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair
and just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the
purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence
the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the
custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid
Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who
received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong
Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust
Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an
interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that
involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him;
and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000
payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer
the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person
Issues/Held:
Ratio:
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness
may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the
inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the
inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness
is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent
to the matter under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a
constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony
before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation,
consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the
House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative function involved.
Decision:
Instant Petition dismissed.
General Plenary Powers (discussed in pp. 45-46)
Patterned after the American system, the Philippine Constitution vests the powers of the
Government in three independent, yet coordinate Departments – L, E, and J.
The legislative power is vested in the Congress – House and Senate (Sec. 1, Art. VI). Each
House may determine rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member (Sec. 10, Art. VI)
The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)

Like the Constitution of the United States, ours do not contain an express provision empowering
either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmebers for contempt.
It may be viewed that in the US, the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of
the United States and the respective legislatures of the different States. In the Philippines, the
legislative power is vested in the Congress alone – the Congress of the Philippines therefore has
a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the US legislature.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such powers is so far incidental to the legislative
functions as to be implied.
Power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Without it,
the body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
Mere requests of information are often unavailing and are not always accurate or complete, so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
The Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt by any
other person.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
Since the Congress of the Philippines has a wide range of legislative field, the field of inquiry to
which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject
matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.
b. Legislative power
i. Substantive limitations
1. Express substantive limitations
Art. III
Art. VI
Sec. 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for
the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless
it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to
be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Sec. 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Art. XIV
Sec. 4 (3). All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and
duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their
assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational institutions,
including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
Art. VI
Sec. 29.
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special
fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
2. Implied substantive limitations
3. Prohibition against delegation of legislative powers

è Criterion of valid delegation
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 168056
Date of Promulgation: September 1, 2005
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.,
Petition: petition for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
Petitioners: ABAKADA Guro Party List (Formerly AASJAS) Officers Samson Alcantara and Ed
Vincent Albano
Respondents: The Honorable Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Hon. Secretary of the
Department of Finance Cesar Purisima and Hon. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Guillermo
Parayno, Jr.
Facts:
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
Reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted: mounting budget deficit, revenue
generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for health workers,
and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits…
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT
on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties. These provisions authorizes the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%.
Petitioners contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise
the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met is
a.) a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax
because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution AND
b.) contrary to republicanism.
Issues/Held:
1. WON there is an undue delegation of legislative power - NO
Ratio:
Re: PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWER
1. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere. Under this is the principle of non-delegation
of powers, or "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated."
• PURELY LEGISLATIVE POWER, which can never be delegated, has been
described as the authority to make a complete law – complete as to the
time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable –
and to determine the expediency of its enactment.
2. DISTINCTION/DIFFERENCE:
• delegation of power to make the laws - involves discretion as to what it
shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
• delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
THE GENERAL RULE BARRING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS is subject to
the following recognized LIMITATIONS OR EXCEPTIONS:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
The delegation is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
1. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
2. The legislature determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or
administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or
no action at all is to be taken.
• Therefore, while the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an
exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to
determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.
• RATIONALE: the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the
enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply
ancillary to legislation.
The case before the Court is NOT A DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
1. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition.
2. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the
fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso.
B. The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al.
that the law effectively nullified the President’s power of control over the Secretary of
Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance.
1. In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will is to take effect.
• This is because he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
2. Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of
the discretion as to the execution of a law.

Decision:
Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207,
168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No.
9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon
finality of herein decision.
Notes:
VAT AND DIRECT TAX
1. VAT: tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or
lease of goods or properties and services. An indirect tax on expenditure, the burden
of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.
2. DIRECT TAX: is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or
business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else. Examples
are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter
or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor:provided, that the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions
has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods. –
(A) In General. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a
value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of
Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and
other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from
customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the
quantity or volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus
excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
twelve percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties –
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of
services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%). (Emphasis supplied)
è Undue delegation of legislative power
Pelaez v. Auditor General
G.R. No. 175352
Date of Promulgation: December 24, 1965
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
Petition: Writ of prohibition with prohibition with preliminary injunction against Auditor General
Petitioners: Emmanuel Pelaez
Respondents: Auditor General
Facts:
From September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President acting through Sect. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), created 33 municipalities (EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124, and 126 to 129).
Public funds were ready for disbursement to these new municipalities.
The Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President and as a taxpayer filed a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Auditor General as well as its representatives and agents from passing
in audit any expenditure of public funds by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the grounds that Sect. 68 of
RAC has been repealed by RA No. 2370 and that it constituted an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Par 3, Sect. 3 of RA No. 2370 states that Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
With EOs stated above creating 33 municipalities, the President has created barrios which make
up municipalities.
Issues/Held:
WON Executive Orders issued creating the 33 municipalities are null and void due to the lack of
authority the President has to create municipalities, since this power has been vested to the
legislative.
Ratio:
YES, although Congress may delegate power to another branch to fill in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – and (b) fix a standard. Without
these standards there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Sect.68 of RAC does not meet the stated requirements.
It is cited though in the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: ... may
change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require

Although, the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but it is essentially
legislative in character, so the question of whether or not “public interest” demands the exercise
of such power is NOT one of fact, it is purely a legislative question. The President does not have
the power to create a municipality under public welfare, he can however change the seat of the
government within a subdivision.
If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any official, by creating a
new municipality and inducing the barrio in which the official concerned resides he could compel
local officials to submit to his dictation, thus ex exercising power which is denied to him by the
Constitution.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. Executive Orders are null and void ab inito
Notes:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.
  Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
è Proper delegation
- By express authority of the Constitution
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 101273
Date of Promulgation: July 3, 1992
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Petition: certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
Petitioners: Cong. Enrique T. Garcia
Respondents: Executive Secretary, Commissioner of Customs, Nationel Economic Devt
Authority, Tariff Commission, Secretary of Finance and Energy Regulatory Board
Facts:
- Petitioner is assailing the (1)constitutionality and (2)legality of Executive Order No. 475
(which imposes additional duty of 9% ad valorem on crude oil and other oil products) and 478
(which levies a special duty of 0.95Php/liter or 151.05Php/barrel of imported crude oil and
1Php/liter of imported oil products in addition to the existing ad valorem duties,
- He argues that they are violative of Sec. 24 Art VI of the Constitution which states:
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."
- He further contends that the said EOs contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
w/c according to him, authorizes the President to increase, reduce or removetariff duties, or to
impose additional duties ONLY when necessary to PROTECT local industries or products but
NOT for the purpose of raising additional govt revenue.
Issue/Held:
WON the Executive Orders' No. 475 and 478 are UNCONSTITUTIONAL and ILLEGAL? NO
Ratio:
(1) QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
- Sec. 28(2) Art VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
"Sec. 28. The Congress may, BY LAW, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts w/in the framework of the natl
devt program of the Govt."
- Clearly, there is explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
"subject limitations and restrictions as (Congress) may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff
rates."
- The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code and the pertinent
provisions invoked under which in promulgating the EOs in question are Sec. 104 and 401.
(2) QUESTION OF LEGALITY
- Sec. 104 and 401 states:
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty under
Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under Executive
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in the
Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the
maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four HundredOne of this
Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the
President upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority.
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the
limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase,
reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary change in
classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate
of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate
of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish
import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an
additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary;
Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the
NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One
hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of
this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem,
the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings
wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence
and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and recommendations of any government
office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings and
recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in
subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the
corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal
competing foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all customs import
entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized representatives shall
have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs import entries and other documents
appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take effect thirty

(30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent
ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the President.
-FIRSTLY, NOTHING IN THE LANGUAGE of either sections suggest a sharp and absolute
limitation of authority granted to the President. The entire contention of the petitioner is anchored
on just 2 words under Sec . 401(a) namely: "existing protective rates of import duty" and
"protection levels granted in Sec. 104 of this Code". They are simply not enough to support the
very broad and encompassing limitation.
- Exercise of authority delegated to the President by this provision must be consistent: it must be
in "the interest of natl economy, general welfare and/or natl security." Petitioner's altercation that
the "protection of local industries" is the ONLY permissible objective upon w/c such delegated
authority is anchored to is like saying that the sum total or the alpha and the omega of the
"natl economy, general welfare and/or natl security" is the "protection of local
industries."
-MOREOVER, Customs duties are very much like taxes w/c are frequently imposed for both
revenue-raising and regulatory purposes.
- The levying of customs duties may have the effect of protecting local industries--where such
local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, the same
customs duties inevitably have the effect of generating revenue.
- In this case, since 10-15% of consumed crude oil in the Philippines are produced locally, the
imposition of increased tariff and special duty on imported oil products may have some
"protective" impact upon indigenous oil production as it increases the price of its counterpart
internationally.
- Also, it is impt to note that it is commonly established that custom duties are also levied and
collected upon some articles and goods w/c are not found at all locally. In such cases, customs
duties may be seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes only, or in certain cases, to
discourage importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties
are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local
industries to protect.
Petitioner has FAILED TO OVERCOME the presumption of unconstitutionality and legality
accorded to the EOs in question.
Decision:
Petition DISMISSED.
- Delegation to the President
Art. VI
Sec. 23 (2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
  executed.” While the authority of the president to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
Biraogo v. PTC
G.R. No. 192935
Date of Promulgation: December 7, 2010
Ponente: Mendoza, J
Petition: Special Civil Action for Prohibition
Petitioner: Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo
Respondent: The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
CONSOLIDATED CASE WITH:
Petition: Special Civil Action for Certiorari & Prohibition
Petitioner: Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong, &
Rep. Orlando B. Fua Sr.
Respondent: Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., & DBM Sec. Florencio B. Abad
Facts:
On July 2010, Pnoy issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1) creating the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
involving third level public officers during the Arroyo administration, and to submit its findings
and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman.
The petitions assailed the constitutionality of EO 1 based on the belief that the creation of the
PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration.
Issues/Held:
RELATED TO CONSTI TOPIC:
WON the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of
Congress - YES
SIDE TOPIC:
WON the PTC supplants the powers already vested on the Ombudsman and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) - NO
WON the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. - YES
Ratio:
RELATED TO CONSTI TOPIC:
The President’s power to control all executive offices is NOT the basis to create new offices
since “control” is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties. The power of control is entirely different from
the power to create public offices.
Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the President to restructure the Office of
the President, is also NOT the basis to create new offices since “restructure” refers to reduction
of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This
pertains to an already existing office. The creation of an office is not mentioned in the said
provision.
Sec. 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution IS THE BASIS of the President’s power to
create new offices under the executive department “to ensure that the laws be faithfully
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not
necessarily mean that he does not have such authority.
The president has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
(whether from past or present administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose
of ad hoc investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance
of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

SIDE TOPICS:
Biraogo does not have legal standing since he is not directly affected with the case, but this
condition was set aside because the case is of paramount public interest.
The investigative function of the PTC will not undermine the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman or DOJ. It will only complement the functions of the Ombudsman and the
Department of Justice. It is not a quasi-judicial body and can only recommend prosecution. The
actual prosecution is not a function of the PTC.
While the President had the authority to create the PTC, the goals of the commission itself was
an apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed (equality among equals). The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination.
The clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
The equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
• The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
• It is germane to the purpose of the law;
• It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
• It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The Arroyo administration is just a member of a class (of past administrations). It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Decision:
The petitions are GRANTED. EO 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Notes:
Sec 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Excerpts from Exec. Order No. 1, 2010
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out
the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for
all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and
find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall
be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman.
- Delegation to local governments
Art. X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
SJS v. Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 156052
Date of Promulgation: Feb 13, 2008
Ponente: Corona J.
Petition: Motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of a division of the SC
Petitioner: SJS, Vladimir Cabigao, Bonifacio Tumbokon
Respondent: Hon. Jose Atienza, Jr in his capacity as Mayor of City of Manila
Facts:
This is a resolution of a decision dated March 7, 2007. After the Court rendered its decision, oil
companies (Chevron, Petron, Shell) and the GRP (represented by DOE), filed their respective
motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Petitioners SJS et al, in an original petition for mandamus, sought to compel Hon. Atienza to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 (dated Nov 2001). The Ordinance reclassified certain areas in
Manila from industrial to commercial and directed the owners of businesses to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies.
In 2002, the City of Manila and DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the terminals was the most viable and
practicable option. Resolution No 97 was passed, declaring the MOU effective for 6 six months
beginning July 2002.
The Court held in the 2007 decision that Hon Atienza had the ministerial duty under the LGC to
enforce all laws and ordinances. The issue of whether the MOU could amend or repeal
Ordinance 8027 was not decided since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it
binding on the City expressly gave it full force only until April 30, 2003. There was nothing that

hindered the mayor from enforcing the ordinance.
In the motions for reconsideration, the oil companies call to attention the fact that on April 23,
2003, Chevron had filed a complaint against the Mayor and City of Manila in the RTC for the
annulment of the ordinance. The RTC granted the injunction. Petro also filed a similar case
which was also granted.
In 2006, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119 (Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Ordinance of 2006), which the oil companies complained before the RTC. This
ordinance reclassified areas in the City to High-Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone. The RTC
issued a TRO.
Given these additional info, the petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene – YES
2. WON the ff are impediments to the execution of the 2007 decision
a) Ordinance No 8119 – NO
b) Writs of injunction and status quo order issued by RTC – NO
3. WON the implementation of Ordinance 8027 will unduly encroach upon DOE’s
powers and functions involving natural resources – NO
Ratio:
1. The oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the implementation of
Ordinance 8027. Their claim is that they will need to spend billions if they are
compelled to relocate their oil depots out of Manila. They should be allowed to
intervene even if they filed their motions long before the 2007 decision. Also, there
are compelling reasons to allow the motions in light of the new information filed.
Likewise, DOE’s motion for intervention is allowed.
2. a) Ordinance 8119 is not a legal impediment since it did not repeal Ordinance 8027.
The conflict between the two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No 8027 is
applicable to particular areas only, whereas Ordinance 8119 is applicable to the
entire City of Manila.
b) The writs of injunction and status quo are not legal impediments since the
constitutionality of ordinance 8027 is not clearly challenged. Nowhere in the judge’s
decision is there a showing that he was convinced that the oil companies had made
out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance.
3. Ordinance 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its
police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, and general welfare of the people. The ordinance was enacted for the
purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and general welfare of manila residents.
The ordinance does not encroach upon DOE’s powers. Under RA 7639, DOE was
given the power to establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution and storage of energy resources. Under RA
8749, DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which
serve the interest of the public. Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of
Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in Art II, Sec 25 of the constitution. An
entire article (Art X) has also been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of the LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure
autonomy of local governments.
The Court does not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE
stripped the City of Manila of its powers to enact ordinances in the exercise of
police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. When the
ambiguous powers contained in the statutes are pitted against the unequivocal
power of the LGU to enact police power, it is not difficult to favor the latter.
Decision:
2007 decision affirmed.
- Delegation of power to carry out defined policy according to prescribed standards
Osmeña v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99886
Date of promulgation: March 31, 1993
Ponente: Narvasa, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: John H. Osmeña
Respondents: Oscar Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; Wenceslao Dela Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of
Energy Affairs; Rex v. Tantiongco, and the Energy Regulatory Board
Doctrine:
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be:
1. Complete in itself, that is, it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate
2. It must fix a standard – limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable –
to which the delegate must conform.
Facts:
President Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated
as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," under E.O. 1024, and ordered released
from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy and authorized the investment of the
fund in government securities, with the earnings from such placements accruing to the fund.
Pres. Cory Aquino amended P.D. 1956 by promulgating E.O. No. 137, expanding the grounds
for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the
reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery to be
determined by the Ministry of Finance.
Petition alleges that the status of the OPSF showed a deficit of P12.877B, which was to be
recovered by the Energy Regulatory Board’s (ERB) “Trust Account”. Petitioner contends that it is

unconstitutional for delegating legislative power of taxation to the ERB since it violates Section
28 (2), Article VI, which only authorizes the President, through Congress, to fix tariff rates.
Issue/Held:
1. WON the Trust Account created is invalid as it is contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution – NO
2. WON there is an undue delegation of legislative power of taxation to the ERB –
NO
3. WON the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the OPSF are illegal because
they are not embraced in the enumeration in the PD – NO
Ratio:
1. The court ruled that the power in question here is not so much taxation as it is the
exercise of police power in protecting local markets from highly volatile petroleum
prices. The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of
minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment
and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products."
The stabilization and subsidy of domestic prices of petroleum products and fuel oil are
regarded as public purposes. While the funds collected may be referred to as
taxed, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
2. The provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by
stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly
authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the
Fund.
Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be
construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding
consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out
the objectives of the law, which are embraced by the police power of the State.
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be:
1. Complete in itself, that is, it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate
2. It must fix a standard — limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform.
Petitioner wants a fixed, definite, quantitative restriction on the tax, but this will not allow the ERB
to adjust to the fluctuating petroleum prices and therefore unable to serve its purpose. The
standard to which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be
implied from the policy and the purpose of the act. The challenged law sets forth a
determinable standard that governs the exercise of power granted to the ERB. The law
intended to permit additional imposts for as long as there existed a need to protect the general
public and petroleum industry.
3. Reimbursement of financing charges is not authorized by P.D. 1956; but payment of
inventory losses and cost underrecoveries from sales of oil to NPC are permitted to be
made by Energy Regulatory Board. Doubts about the propriety of such reimbursement
for cost underrecoveries have been dispelled by the enactment of R.A. 6952,
establishing the Petroleum Price Standby Fund, § 2 of which specifically authorizes
the reimbursement of "cost underrecovery incurred as a result of fuel oil sales to the
National Power Corporation."
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement of financing
charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.
Notes:
ejusdem generis:
Where words follow an enumeration of persons of things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are held to be as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
5. Promulgation of rules and regulations
6. Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws
ii. Procedural Limitations
Art. VI
Section 26.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and
return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
c. Question Hour
Art. VI
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance

shall be conducted in executive session.
d. Legislative investigations
Art. VI
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820
Date of Promulgation: July 18, 1950
Ponente: Ozaeta, J.
Petition: Original Action. Petition for Habeas Corpus
Petitioners: Jean L. Arnault
Respondents: Leon Nazareno, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine Senate and Eustaquio Balagtas,
Director of Prisons
Doctrine: The power of inquiry, with the process to enforce it through compulsion of private
individuals and public officials to provide information necessary in legislation, is inherent to the
legislative function.
The Constitution does not contain an express provision that grants either House of Congress the
power to hold a person in contempt. However, Congress has an attendant power to conduct
inquiries in matters where it has jurisdiction. The power of inquiry must be coextensive with the
range of legislative power. Once the inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to make a witness answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry. The materiality of the question must be determined by its
direct relation to the subject inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. In the case at hand, the Senate has the authority to compel Arnault to answer the
questions since the Special Committee was created solely for the purpose of investigating the
Buenavista and Tambobong estate deals. By refusing to answer the questions and invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination, petitioner has obstructed the performance by the Senate of
its legislative function. The Senate has the power to remove that obstruction and compel the
petitioner to answer the question by restraining his liberty until he shall have answered them.
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914
Date of Promulgation: November 20, 1991
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Petition: Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Petitioners: JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE
MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO
CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO
LIMJAP
Respondents: THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented
by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Facts:
This case is about petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or injunctive relief to enjoin
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the
Lopa Group in 36-39 corporations.
On July 30, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez, et al) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The
complaint alleges that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of
their relationship with Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to unjust enrich themselves and in
helping them, petitioners:
1. obtained control of MERALCO, Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation, Pilipinas
Shell Corporation and the Philippine Commercial International Bank by employing
devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion
and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible cash out from
Benjamin Romualdez
2. manipulated, with the help of Philguarantee officials, the formation of Erectors Holdings,
Inc. and made it look viable just so it can borrow more capital
3. manipulated and employed series of devices in order to conceal and place beyond the
jurisdiction of the PCGG the petitioners’ individuals and collective funds and assets
now the subject of the complaint
4. maneuvered the purported sale of Benjamin Romualdez’s interest in
a. Professional Managers Inc.
b. A&E International Corporation
c. First Manila Management Corporation
d. Maguindanao Navigation
e. SOLOIL, Inc
f. Philippine World Travel Inc
g. Subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations
in order to deceive PCGG and make it look like Romualdez already divested himself of
his ownership of the said interests; and to entice the PCGG to approve the fictitious
sale, the petitioners offered P20M to the Government as “donation”
5. misused the Meralco Pension Fund in the amount of P25M by causing it to be invested
in the PCIB and through the Bank’s TSG and used this instance as an excuse to
unlawfully dismantle or cancel the Fund’s 10 million shares for allegedly violating
Section 12-B of the General Banking Act
6. hid behind the veil of corporate entity the ill gotten wealth of Benjamin Romualdez
On September 13, 1988, Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
speech on the alleged “take-over of Soloil Inc. by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to
look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to RA 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Thereafter, the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee) started its investigation but Ricardo Lopa and Jose F.S.
Bengzon Jr. declined to follow the subpoena of the Committee to appear and testify since
according to them their testimonies can adversely affect the rights of their co-defendants in the
Civil Case No. 0335 before the Sandiganbayan. The Committee rejected the petitioners’ plea to
be excused from testifying, hence this petition.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has the power to inquire into the transactions
of the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations – NO
2. WON the right to inquire of a congressional committee is subject to limitations - YES
Ratio:
1. According to Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. The
investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published

rules of procedure” and “rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected”. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. Also, as held in Arnault v. Nazareno, the inquiry
must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in it (the
Congress) by the Constitution.
Under Section 4 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in
aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an
inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an
inquiry is proposed to be made. Senator Enrile’s speech, which prompted the
whole investigation of the Blue Ribbon Committee, contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation. He merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. This matter appears to be more within the province of
the courts rather than that of the legislature. Moreover, the issue sought to be
investigated by the Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired
by the Sandiganbayan through the filing of Civil Case No. 0035.
2. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to
all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,'
including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." One of the basic rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination.
This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the
accused in a criminal case; but may also be invoked by other witnesses only as
questions are asked of them. The distinction is ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Decision:
Petition granted. Respondent Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling petitioners
and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at said inquiry.
Senate v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 169777
Date of Promulgation: April 20, 2006
Ponente:Carpio-Morales, J.
Petition: Certiorari and Prohibition
Petitioners: Senate of the Philippines – Franklin M. Drilon, Senate President, Juan M. Flavier,
Senate President Pro Tempore, Francis N. Pangilinan, Majority Leader, Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., Minority Leader, Senators Rodolfo G. Biazon, "Companera" Pia S. Cayetano, Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada, Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, Juan Ponce Enrile, Richard J. Gordon, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Alfredo S. Lim, Maria A. Madrigal, Sergio Osmena III, Ralph G. Recto, and Mar Roxas
Respondents: Eduardo R. Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the
President of the Philippines
Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations for members of the
AFP to attend as resource persons in a public hearing to discuss National Defense and Security with
regard to the “Hello Garci” issue.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita a letter respectfully requesting for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail
project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited in order to afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better
enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.
The president then issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Further, Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides
that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice
the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order, including:
• Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by
this executive order;
• Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged;
• Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements;
• Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings; and
• Matters affecting national security and public order.
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
• Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege;

• Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
• Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
• Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
• Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan
and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
SUMMARY OF PETITIONS
G.R. No. 16959 (Bayan Muna):
• Claims that they have standing because the case is of transcendental importance.
• E.O. 464 unconstitutional because it threatens and imposes sanctions on officials who
will appear before Congress due to congressional summons
• It infringes on the Congress’ rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective
obligations ie. Conducting investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws
• Government officials have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law and the people’s right
to information and to transparent governance are threatened by the effects of E.O.
464
G.R. No. 169660 (Francisco “Frank” Chavez):
• Claims that he has legal standing as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner.
• E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 169667 (Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG)):
• Claims that they have standing because they are a coalition of 17 legal resource
NGO’s engaged in developmental lawyering and works with the poor and marginalized
sectors in the different parts of the country, and that they are an organization of
Filipino citizens and a part of the general public.
• Invokes their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, which for
them is denied to the public by E.O. 464.
• E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that the Exec. Sec.
be ordered to cease its implementation.
G.R. No. 169777 (Senate of the Phils.):
• Prays for certiorari and prohibition and E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional since it
stands to suffer imminent and material injury, since the Order interferes and impedes
its valid exercise of its functions and conceals information of great public interest and
concern.
G.R. No. 169834 (PDP-Laban):
• Prays for certiorari and prohibition and E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional since it
hampers the Congress’ legislative agenda, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation and transcendental issues needs to be resolved between the
executive and the legislative departments.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
• Art. VI, Sec. 21
• Art. VI, Sec. 22
• Art. VI, Sec. 1
• Art. XI, Sec. 1
• Art. III, Sec. 7
• Art. III, Sec. 4
• Art. XIII, Sec. 16
• Art. II, Sec. 28
Issues/Held:
WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress – YES
WON the Order violates the right of the people to info. on matters of public concern – YES
WON respondents have committed GAD when they implemented the Order prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation - YES
Ratio:
Procedural Issue
All have legal standing except for Cbavez, and PDP Laban
Substantive Issues
1. Constitutionality of E.O. 464
• E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials.
• The power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
• This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature
established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.
• The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power
to legislate.
• The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch and is co-
extensive with legislation.
• Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it
would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
• [McCarthy era reference] However, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is susceptible to abuse and it may be subjected to judicial review.
• In Bengzon v. SBRC, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation and
beyond the power of Congress and thus the need to indicate in invitations the possible
needed statute, which prompted the need for the inquiry.
• Safeguards of Section 21: (i) requires inquiry be done in accordance with the
Senate/House’s duly published rules of procedure; and (ii) mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry is respected and adheres to the Bill of

Rights.
• Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution
and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as
limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI.
• The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be
interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1
cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
• Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464,
therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
• The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of
each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
2. Right to information
• The controversy does not only involve the exercise of legislative power of inquiry but also
the right of the people to information.
• Though, there are distinctions: For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force
as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
• Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry,
the people are exercising their right to information.
• To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public,
however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their
own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various
legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
• The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s
power of inquiry.
3. Implementation prior to publication
• Citing Tanada v. Tuvera, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which
members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires
that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
[SIDE TOPICS DISCUSSED BY CARPIO-MORALES, J.]
Art. VI - Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)
A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely
related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be
used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight
function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the president
on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the
power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is
on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional
independence of the judiciary.
Executive Privilege
• The power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress. [Schwartz]
• The right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. [Rozell]
• Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
o President’s conversation and correspondences (Almonte v. Vasquez)
o State secrets – military, diplomatic and other natl. security matters (Chavez
v. PCGG)
o Privileged information (Chavez v. PEA)
• The extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
• Fundamental to the operation of government and is essential to the principle of
separation of powers
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 - VOID.
Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
Romero v. Estrada
G.R. No. 174105
Date of Promulgation: April 2, 2009
Ponente: Velasco, Jr., J.
Petition: temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction
Petitioners: Reghis Romero II, Edmond Sese, Leopoldo Sanchez, Reghis Romero III, Michael
Romero, Nathaniel Romero, Jerome Canlas
Respondents: Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and
Human Resources Development
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other

compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human
Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.
On August 15, 2006, Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the
Committee an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which informed him that
the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development chaired by Sen.
rd
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23 day of August
nd
2006 at the Sen. G.T. Pecson Room, 2 floor, Senate of the Philippines, Pasay City.
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, “the Migrant Workers Act” and to craft a
much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned
Resolutions.
By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987
Constitution regarding inquiries in aid of legislation, they invited him to the hearing to shed
light on any matter, within his knowledge and competence, covered by the subject matter and
purpose of the inquiry.
Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its
scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos.
537 and 543.
Petitioners filed a petition seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to
enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.
However, they failed to get the desired TRO and petitioner Romero II appeared at the
September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO alleging,
among others, that:
(1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey
Mountain project and how much of OWWA’s original investment had already been paid;
(2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the
latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry; and
(3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II
and Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of
the Chavez petition – NO
Ratio:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s
assailed investigation, is no longer sub judice or “before a court or judge for consideration. For
by an en banc Resolution, the Court denied with finality the motion of Chavez.
Even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, such
circumstance would still not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. A legislative
investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes.
• On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle,
through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants
and involving demandable rights.
• On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are,inter alia, undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and
effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact
new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential
legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21
of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset.
The Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to
appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
Notes:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
e. Act as board of canvassers
Art. VII
Section 4. xxx The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes. Xxx
f. Call special election for Pres and VP
Art. VII
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy
in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended
nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
g. Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus and declaration of martial
law

Art. VII
By Congress
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for
which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
By the Commission on Appointments
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
j. Concur in treaties
Art. VII
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Art. VII
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
h. Approve presidential amnesties
Art. VII
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
i. Confirm certain appointments
Sombilon v. Romulo
G.R. No. 175888
Date of Promulgation: February 11, 2009
Ponente: Azcuna, J.
Petition: Certiorari as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of CA
Petitioners: Suzette Nicolas Sombilon
Respondents: Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Facts:
Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith, a member of the US Armed Forces, was charged with
rape against a Filipina. The facts are as follows:
November 1, 2005, in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City, Daniel Smith with other
members of the US Marine Corps conspired and committed rape on Suzette Nicolas, a 22 year
old unmarried woman in a Starex Van.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the US, entered
into on February 10, 1998, the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant pending the
proceedings.
Daniel Smith was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing RAPE defined under
Article 266-A, Par 1 (a) of RPC, as amended by RA 8353. He shall serve his sentence in
facilities agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and US authorities (Art. V, Par 10 of VFA).
Smith to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnify complainant in the amount of
P50,000 plus P50,000 for moral damages.
On December 29, 2006, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a
facility for detention under US control. Smith was transferred to Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, US
Embassy Compound. This was under a new agreement between the Philippines and the US,
referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant and that the VFA is
void and unconstitutional. Hence this petition.

Issues/Held:
WON VFA is unconstitutional, in which agreement is not binding for both parties, the Philippines
and the US
WON Equal Protection Clause is violated for different treatment of foreign military armed forces.
WON the Romulo-Kenney agreement is in accordance with the VFA
Ratio:
1) The contention of this issue is based on Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the 1987 Constitution, and
whether the VFA abides by this provision. Note that the reason this provision was added in the
first place was to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities are equally binding between Philippines and the other State.
Court finds VFA Constitutional.
First, because as held in Bayan v Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US. The fact that the VFA was not submitted
for advice and consent of the US Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by said State.
Second, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with
concurrence of both Philippine and US Senate. Under this agreement, it was not necessary to
submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under
the Case-Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. Thus, the US has certified that it
recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement.
2) No, it is a rule in international law that foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is
immune from local jurisdiction except to the extent agreed upon. Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or custody of diplomats and
members of the armed force. In Art II, Sec 2, of the Constitution, the Philippines accepts
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Although applying the VFA, there is a
difference in treatment between detention and custody.
3) The Romulo-Kenney Agreements are not in accord with the VFA. The VFA recognized the
difference between custody during trial and detention after conviction. It clearly states not only
that detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also
that detention shall be “by Philippine authories”. The Romulo-Kenney agreements transferred
the defendant to a location not under Philippine authority.
Decision:
Petition is partly granted, with modifications. VFA upheld as constitutional while Romulo-Kenney
Agreements are declared not in accordance with VFA.
Notes:
1987 Constitution Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Sec. 10. Visiting Forces Agreement
The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities.
United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and
material assistance.
3 types of treaties in the American system:
1)Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance
with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
2) Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and
Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.
3) Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements entered into by the President. They are
to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the
Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable. It is intended to carry out obligations under RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
k. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers
Art. VI
Section 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
l. Be judge of president’s physical fitness
Art. VII
Section 11. xxx If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Xxx
m. Power of impeachment
Art. XI
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding

resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.
n. Amendment or revision of the Constitution
Art. XVII
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
6. The Legislative Process
a. Requirements as to bills
i. As to title
Lidasan v. COMELEC
GR No.L-28089
Date of Promulgation: October 25, 1967
Ponente: Sanchez, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: Bara Lidasan
Respondent: COMELEC
Facts:
President signed into law RA 4790 w/c is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao Del Sur"
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted a resolution pursuant to the RA 4790 w/
regard to the precinct and registration of voters
The Office of the President, thru the Asst Exec Sec, recommended to COMELEC that the
operation of the statute to be suspended because 12 barrios in 2 municipalities in Cotabato are
being transferred to Lanao Del Sur under the said municipality. This brought about a change in
boundaries of the 2 provinces.
COMELEC stood by its own interpretation and declared that the statute shoudl be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by SC
Hence, this petition for certiorari by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato and a qualified voter for the coming election. Invokes Art VI, Sec
21(1)
Issue/Held:
WON RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional reqt under Art Vi. Sec 21(1) - NO
If in the negative, WON RA 4970 can still be made to apply to the nine barrios under Lanao Del
Sur w/ the mere nullification of the portion thereof w/c took away the 12 barrios under Cotabato -
NO
Ratio:
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations:
First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenous subjects.
Second. The title of thebill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and minute
details in the title, as it suffices if the title should serve the purpose of informing legislators,
persons interested and the public, of the nature, scope nd consequences of the proposed
law and its operation.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading. The title "An Act

Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao Del Sur" projects the impression
that solely the province of Lanao Del Sur is affected and not the slightes intimation is there that
the communities in adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated, which then makes it
misleading, deceptive.
The baneful effect is that such title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the
full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns affected in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken away and added to the adjacent
province and it kept public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill.
2. Court is mindful of the rule that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional,
the remainder which are deemed valid shall be upheld as constitutional. However, an exception
to this rule would be where the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently.
W/ the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of
progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, it cannot be said that
the Congress intended to create Dianaton w/ only nine of original 21 barrios.
Decision:
RA 4970 is hereby declared null and void in its totality
ii. Requirements as to certain laws
(1) Appropriation Laws
Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571
Date of Promulgation: April 22, 1991
Ponente: Gancayco, J
Petition: Case of First Impression Questioning Constitutionality
Petitioner: Teofisto Guingona Jr. & Aquilino Pimentel Jr.
Respondent: Hon. Guillermo Carague (DBM Sec), Hon. Rozalina Cajucom (Nat’l Treasurer), &
COA
Facts:
The 1990 budget is Php 233.5 Billion, consisting of RA 6831 (General Approriations Act) as well
as automatic appropriations. From this national budget, Php 27 Billion was allocated to DECS
(Department of Education, Culture, and Sports) and Php 86.8 Billion was allocated for
debt servicing.
The automatic appropriation for debt service was authorized under PD 18 (which amended RA
4861: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD 1177 (which made automatic appropriations for debt), and
by PD 1967 (which further expounded regarding RP paying its debts).
The petitioners then questioned the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the 1990 budget, because the 1987 Constitution was specific in the mandate to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” (Sec. 5, Art. XIV).
In effect, they were also questioning also the PD’s which were from the martial law era.
Issues/Held:
WON the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional - NO
Ratio:
While Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution mandates our Congress to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it refers allocation among departments. Among the
department budgets, DECS has the highest allocation therefore the appropriation is
compliant with the Constitution.
The Congress needs to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives, which includes in providing an appropriation that can
reasonably service our enormous debt. This debt service is not only for the honor and to protect
the credit standing of the country, but for the very survival of our economy. Therefore, if the
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court holds that the appropriation is not unconstitutional.
There is no undue delegation of power to the executive (regarding the automatic appropriation),
because RA 4860 (as amended, Section 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967) passes the completeness
test.
While the 1987 Constitution repeals any law or decree inconsistent with it, the said PD’s are not
inconsistent because they provide the flexibility for execution of debt management policies
(example: the government could take advantage of current market conditions). This flexibility
cannot be provided by the periodic enactments of separate laws.
Also, the PD’s are also not repealed because it is intended that some of the laws made by
Marcos (who had the power of legislation during martial law) would still be recognized in order to
preserve social order.
Decision:
Petition is DISMISSED.
Notes:
Sec. 5, Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
Sec. 24, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Part l, Sec 29, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica v. Ochoa

G.R. No. 208566
Date of Promulgation: Nov 19, 2013
Ponente: Perlas Bernabe
Petition: Injunction, Prohibition, Mandamus
Petitioner: Greco Belgica, Jose Villegas, Jose Gonzalez, Reubem Abante, Quintin San Diego,
SJS Pres Samson Alcantara, Pedrito Nepomuceco (Former mayor of Boac, Marinduque; Former
provincial board member of Marinduque)
Respondent: Hon Exec Sec Paquito Ochoa, DBM Sec Abad, Treasurer Rosalia De Leon;
Senate (Represented by Drilon), HOR (represented by Belmonte), Pres Aquino
Facts:
• Pork Barrel – collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government
• Representatives – usually get 70M each, broken down into 40M for hard projects, and
30M for soft projects; Senator – 200M; VP – 100M
• Presidential Pork – from Malampaya funds ( originated from PD 910 by Marcos which
was intended to intensify and consolidate government efforts to exploration and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth) and from the
Presidential Social Funds (PD 1869 which was describes as a special funding
manages by the Presidential management Staff through which the President provides
direct assistance to priority projects not funded under regular budget; sourced from
earnings of PAGCOR)
• It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the pork barrel erupted. Former
Marikina Rep Candazo blew the lid on the huge amount of money that regularly went
to the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
2.
• In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the gov’t has been defrauded of
some 10B by a syndicate using funds from pork barrel for scores of ghost projects.
Issues/Held:
1. Procedural
a. WON there is an actual controversy – YES
b. WON the matters are of policy not subject to judicial review – NO
c. WON petitioners have legal standing – YES
d. WON the decisions on Philconsa and LAMP ba relitigation under the principles of
res judicata and stare decicis – NO
2. Substantive – WON PDAF and Pork barrel system violated the constitutional
provisions on:
a. Separation of powers – YES
b. Non-delegability of legislative power – YES
c. Checks and balances – YES
d. Political dynasties – NO
e. Local autonomy – Yes
Ratio:
1. a. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of parties on the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. It is ripe for
adjudication since the provisions allowing their utilization (2013 GAA for PDAF) are
currently existing and operational.
b. The issues are legal and within the Court’s province to resolve. Art 8, Sec 1 of the
Constitution vests the judicial power to the SC, and one of the duties of the SC is to
determine WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
c. Petitioners have come before Court in their respective capacities as taxpayers, and
accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to the coffers of National Treasury. As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question validity of the pork barrel
system under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized
d. Res judicata means matter adjudged. Stare decisis follow the principle that past
precedents should not be disturbed as they are already settled. The ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal on a procedural technicality. As for the Philconsa ruling (that
pork barrel is not unconstitutional), the Court observes that it was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which countervail against a full resort to stare
decicis.
As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental
premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be
that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation
which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such
authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within
the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after
the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA,
has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory.
a. Separation of powers. There is a violation of the principle of separation of pwers
when there is impermissible 1) interference with and/or b) assumption of another
department’s functions. Congress’ role is only up to the budget legislation, thus it
cannot encroach upon budget execution (but it may have the powers of oversight).
In the system, legislators, through project lists or program menus, have been
consistently accorded post enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to
be funded through congressional pork barrel allocation.
Aside from this, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment.
b. Non-delegability of legislative power. As an adjunct to the separation of powers
principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to the which the
Constitution has conferred the same. Sec 1, Art 6 vests that power to the Congress
acting as a bicameral body.
Exception: grant of rule0making power to admin agencies. Subordinate legislation or
admin regulations calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects og
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law.
The 2013 PDAF, insofar as it confers p ost-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability.

 
Doctrine:
The power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from In the budgetary process, the DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund.
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF The members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are programs, which may be funded by the PDAF. The list submitted by the members of Congress
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or is endorsed by the House Speaker to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the list are consistent with the guidelines set by the Executive. In this set-up, the President still
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the executes the appropriation law and exercises the spending per se of the budget.
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution Facts:
does not, however, allow. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the implementation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) provided by RA 9206 or the General Appropriations
c. Checks and Balances. The fact that the three branches are intended to be kept Act of 2004, seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
separate does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of order to enjoin the Secretary of DBM from releasing budget allocations to members of the
each other. An example of the constitutional check and balance is the President’s Congress as pork barrel.
power to veto an item written into an appropriation (Sec 27(2), Art 6).
Petitioners Respondents
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there The GAA prohibits an automatic or direct Petitioners failed to present proof that the
exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the allocation of lump sums to senators and DBM Sec has been releasing lump sums
field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and congressmen for the funding of projects. from the PDAF to the members of Congress.
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In contrast, what beckons • In previous GAA's allocations and Inconclusive media reports, assumptions,
constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump- identification of projects were the and conjectures have no probative value.
sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. As a practical main features of the pork barrel
result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the system or the Countrywide CDF and PDAF are appropriations for
entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or Development Fund (CDF). substantially similar purposes. Invoking the
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. • The silence of the GAA on this matter decision in Philconsa, where CDF was
shows intent on the part of the described as an imaginative and innovative
As for accountability, certain features embedded in congressional pork barrel have an Executive and the Congress to do process or mechanism of implementing
effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post- away with the pork barrel system. priority programs/projects specified in the
enactment roles in budget implementation makes it difficult for the legislators to Members of Congress do not possess the law, the respondents said that members of
become disinterested observers when practicing congressional oversight. power to propose, select, and identify which Congress could propose and identify priority
projects are to be funded by the PDAF. projects because this was merely
d. Political dynasties. Sec 26, Art 2 is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase • The situation runs afoul against the recommendatory in nature.
as may be defined by law. principle of separation of powers • Individual members of Congress
because Congress would be were likely to be knowledgeable
e. Local Autonomy. Congressional pork barrel goes against the constitutional intruding into the functions of the about the needs of their respective
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, to substitute their Executive branch. constituents far more than the
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. President.
• The proposal and identification of
projects do not involve legislation.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this
Issue/Held:
type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the
Procedural:
overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review were met – YES
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government.
Substantial:
WON the implementation of PDAF by members of Congress is unconstitutional or illegal – NO
LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management
G.R. No. 164987 Ratio:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
Date of promulgation: April 24, 2012 valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
Ponente: Mendoza, J. effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
Petition: certiorari constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and
Petitioner: Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Thus, the GAA is presumed valid unless there is a clear
Respondents: Secretary of Budget and Management, Treasurer of the Phils, CoA, Senate and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
President, House Speaker
• In the case at bar, the allegation that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution

 

was not substantiated.
• The Court in accordance with the rules of evidence cannot appreciate newspaper or
electronic reports showing the effects of PDAF.
• Even if graft and corruption propagate a piece of valid legislation, this cannot be used as
a tool to overstep constitutional limits and annul acts of the Congress.
• Absent a clear showing that the principle of separation of powers was violated, the Court
is constrained to hold that a lawful government budgeting and appropriation process
ensued during the enactment and implementation of the 2004 GAA.
The process which was explained in Corona v. Carague, was reiterated in the decision:
1. Budget preparation - Executive
• DBM: budget call
• Upon issuance, Bureau of Treasury: computation of interest and principal payments
2. Legislative authorization – Legislative
• Congress: deliberations on the budget proposals of the President; formulation of
appropriation act
3. Budget execution – Executive
• Operational aspects of budgeting
4. Budget accountability
• Evaluation of actual performance and comparison with targets
• In the budgetary process, the DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the
fund. The members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend
projects and programs, which may be funded by the PDAF. The list submitted by the
members of Congress is endorsed by the House Speaker to the DBM, which reviews
and determines whether such list are consistent with the guidelines set by the
Executive. In this set-up, the President still executes the appropriation law and
exercises the spending per se of the budget.
• As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual
Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the
possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and
conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being
offensive to the Constitution.
• Moreover, authority to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. So
long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
Decision:
Petition is dismissed. RA 9026 declared constitutional.
(2) Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws
(3) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
b. Procedure for the passage of bills
c. The President’s veto power
Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia
G.R. No. L-20740
Date of Promulgation: June 30, 1964
Ponente: Barrera, J.
Petition: Petition for prohibition, mandatory injuction
Petitioners: Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc
Respondents: Brigido Valencia, Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications, Robert San Andres of the Radio Control Division
Facts:
Petitioners filed the case at bar because of the investigations respondents are conducting due to
the former’s failure to renew their license within the time period alloted. The intention of the
investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for
renewal. It should be noted that the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the
ground for the disapproval of the applications is the alleged late filing of the petitions for renewal.
The petitioners claim, on the other hand, that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of
late filing was condoned or pardoned by the respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July 24, 1962 which states that “You (broadcasting corporations) are, therefore, requested to
examine closely your operating practices, permits and licenses and take remedial measures as
soon as possible but not later than August 10, 1962.”
Issues/Held:
1. WON the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners'
applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis - NO
2. WON there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network
(CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS - NO
3. WON PBS is entitled to damages for CBN’s refusal to give up operations of Channel 9,
which is dependent on whether the President’s veto of the conditions of the
Appropriations Act of the Philippine Broadcasting Service General Fund is
constitutional – BOTH NO
Ratio:
1. It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that the
previous non-observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations of the
Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among others, was
condoned if the necessary steps were taken to correct their records and practices
before August 10, 1962. It is not denied that herein subject applications for
renewal were all made before said date, or even before the issuance of the
circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason given for the investigation of
petitioners' application, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable.
The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor
need for the present investigation.
2. The assignment of Channel 10, in connection with the planned transfer of its station to
Baguio, was to be effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This was
necessary to avoid interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force base
station in Pampanga, which is operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10
would be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate.
When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean
abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in
Quezon City. The fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of proposed transfer, is proof
that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the
approval of its petition to transfer.
3. The Executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no

effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill,
therefore, remains.
The appropriation of funds in the operation of PBS provides that it cannot be used for
the operation of television stations in Luzon or in any part of the Philippines where
there are already television stations in operation. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS for the purpose of operating a television station in Manila, where
there are already television stations in operation, would be a violation of the
said condition and is consequently null and void. Even if it was able to prove its
right to operate on Channel 9, PBS would not be entitled to a reimbursement of its
illegal expenditures.
Decision:
Petition granted.
Notes:
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of
the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular
item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20).
Gonzales v. Macaraig
GR No. 87636
Date of Promulgation: November 19, 1990
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.
Petition: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus
Petitioners: Neptali A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez,
Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D.
Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani,
Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan
Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor
Ziga
Respondents: Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Hon. Vicente Jayme, Hon. Carlos Dominguez, Hon.
Fulgencio Factoran, Hon. Fiorello Estuar, Hon. Lourdes Quisumbing, Hon. Raul Manglapus,
Hon. Alfredo Bengson, Hon. Jose Concepcion, Hon. Luis Santos, Hon. Mita Pardo De Tavera,
Hon. Rainerio Reyes, Hon. Guillermo Carague, Hon. Rosalina Cajucom And Hon. Eufemio C.
Domingo
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill
for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the
proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the
passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and
approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same
to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General
Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 ("Authorizing and Directing the Committee
on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of
Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
(H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes") was adopted.
On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A.
Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente
T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E.
Tañada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero
Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members
of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests
may be affected by this case," with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of
Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez,
Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson,
Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague,
Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688.
No Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.'s cause is anchored on
the following grounds:
(1) the President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not
cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions;
(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire bill;
(3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and
(4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case
is a political question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that Gonzales et al. had a
political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President's veto; that the power
of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already
been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended
by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto
provisions or other "distinct and severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
Issue [1]: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution
(Whether the President has the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill)
Held [1]: NO. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised
would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as
the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto
less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to
disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the
elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a
provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935
Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable

part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and
Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power
to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16
(FY '90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and
other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
items by no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway
granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to
come only from savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation
from savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An
Appropriations Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of
money from the public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252).
It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from
savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It
is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
Issue [2]: WON Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions, not items, in the
appropriation bill.
Held [2]: NO. Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 25 (2) No
provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates." Explicit is the requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some " particular appropriation"
therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions"
do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have
to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated
by the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office." Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are
more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather
than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90)
although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the President's veto power.
Issue [3]: Whether the Legislature’s inclusion of qualifications, conditions, limitations or
restrictions on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill was proper.
Held [3]: There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the
Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions
on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a
condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The veto
of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the
condition related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to
apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are
more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations
Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. "It is not enough that a provision be related to
the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly
included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation
that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness." Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must
also be held to be inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have
been "artfully drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law
measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. Further, neither
of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason is that
items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the enrolled bill or
Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with the original budgetary
submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) themselves provide that
an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act." Herein, there is no condition, in the
budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which
was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) partake more of a
curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words, "a general provision of law,
which happens to be put in an appropriation bill."
Issue [3]: Whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by
the executive were unconstitutional.
Held [3]: YES. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the
executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A
Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the
Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.'s argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing
to override" has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld. There
need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to the
spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of
governmental powers remains on even keel.
Decision:
Petition DISMISSED.
Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524
Date of Promulgation: April 15, 1992
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Petition: petition for review
Petitioners: Cesar Bengzon, Querube Makalintal, Lino Patajo, Jose Leuterio, et al.
Respondents: Hon. Franklin Drilon, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo
Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and Hon.
Rosalina Cajucom, in her capacity as National Treasurer

Background:
The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1797.
The respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the Executive
Department involved in the implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the
Annual Appropriations Law.
Facts:
On June 20, 1953, RA 910 (amended by RA 1797) was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who:
1. have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both,
2. having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office.
The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he
was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
President Marcos then issued Presidential Decree 644 repealing Section 3-A of Republic
Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential
Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices,
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number
in the tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of this, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
But President Aquino vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on the ground that according to her "it
would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to
and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act
No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that
"the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement
benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority
of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their
monthly pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that
Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no
valid publication pursuant to Tañada v. Tuvera.
Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for the first time only in the
supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but
published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force
and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
Congress then included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain
appropriations for the Judiciary. But the President vetoed these.
Issues/Held:
1. WON the veto by the President of provisions in the General Appropriations Act 1992 was
constitutional – NO
Ratio:
Veto Power
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally
vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its
exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
• The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all.
Item Veto Power
The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority
to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
Item vs. Provision
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.
• An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose
• An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000. The President
did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to
insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell
due. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items.
They are provisions.
PD 644 did not become law and did not repeal RA 1797
Misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992 Appropriations Act were
being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else. What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.
No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his term of office.
Neither may the President set aside a final and executory judgment of this Court through
the exercise of the veto power.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The
vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The
respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal
autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for
the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28,
1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
Notes:
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (2)
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez
GR 113105; 113174; 113766; 113888
Date: August 19, 1994
Petition: review of orders or resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Budget and
Management, National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner: Philippine Constitution Association
Respondent: HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
General Appropriations Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both houses of Congress
on December 17, 1993. The bill imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted to the President and allowed
Congress members to propose projects in “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993 the President signed the bill into law as well as delivered a veto
message, specifying provisions in the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
No steps taken to override by either House of Congress.
Petitioners acting as Senators and taxpayers challenge the constitutionality of the Presidential
vetoes on the following for:
(a) Supreme Court
(b) Commission on Audit (COA)
(c) Ombudsman
(d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUÊS)
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCÊs)
They also challenge the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation
for debt service.
NO In the veto of the SUCs provision, there was no undue discrimination by the President. If
some government agencies were allowed to use their agencies were allowed to use and
maintain their funds, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privileges before by
virtue of past special laws allowing them
YES This provision which establishes a 70/30 appropriation of roads is not inappropriate and
cannot be subject to veto
YES This provision is to strictly comply with the National Drug Policy formulary and is thus
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicine by AFP
NO These provisions are inappropriate thus they were properly vetoed. Also the case at bench
is not the proper occasion to resolve said issues.
NO Said provision violates Sect 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, thus veto is
proper
NO On the conditions imposed, the President stated that expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot yet be determined if they are
proper or inappropriate. Faithful Execution Clause allows President to take necessary steps to
carry out laws.
Decision:
Petitions DISMISSED
Except GR 113105 and 113766 insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service and GR 113888 insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of the
item appropriation for DPWH and AFP medicine purchase. These petitioners are GRANTED.
Opinions:
Padilla (Concurring & Dissenting)
Presidential vetoes are restricted only to ‘items’ and cannot be applied to ‘provisions’. Despite
these provisions being considered ‘inappropriate’ it is still not applicable to presidential veto.

Issue Notes
WON petitioner has locus standi Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof
WON Presidential vetoes on the following were unconstitutional: (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]).
1) Debt Ceiling
2) Appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) Realigning savings appropriated
3) Ratio for Road Maintenance, 70% Administrative and 30% Contract with DPWH Members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
4) Purchase of medicine by AFP allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are
5) Special Provision: Modernization Fund the ones who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are
6) Provision authorizing Chief of Staff to use AFP savings to increase pension and deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is
gratuity funds the Senate President and the Speaker
7) Conditions on appropriation for SC, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR d. Legislative veto

Held Macalintal v. COMELEC

1) Despite the issue being a political question (overriding a veto) the Court decided to not G.R. No. 157013
question the locus standi of the petitioner. The action to veto is an Executive act that intrudes
into the Legislative, thus any time a claim arises that a veto was done with no authority or in Date of Promulgation: July 10, 2003
excess of it, it is equivalent to the Executive causing injury to the Legislative as an institution. Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
2) YES It is clear that the vetoing of the debt servicing provision is an attempt to repeal Petition: certiorari
Section 31 of PD No 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and EO No 292 and to reverse the debt Petitioners: Romulo B. Macalintal
payment policy. The repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the Respondents: COMELEC
appropriations law.

 
  
Facts: RA 9189 was pursuant to the Constitutional mandate that the Congress shall provide a
Petitioner Macalintal, as a taxpayer and a lawyer, assalis certain provisions in RA 9189 (The system for voting for Filipinos abroad. Since Sec 2 does not provide for restrictions,
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as unconstitutional. Congress in enacting the said law, is presumed to have duly exercised its function.

Petitioner raises 3 points or questions for contention: Under our election laws and countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is synonymous w/
1.) That Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or domicile.
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of The Court looked into discussion of the Constitutional Commission and from there, it is
the Constitution. discerned that the clear intent of the framers is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of
devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications in Sec 1 shall remain except for the
2.) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning residency requirement. The discussions clearly show that the framers intended to enfranchise all
candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.
Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Therefore, Section 5(d) is enacted in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in
Congress. Sections 1 and 2 of Article V. If actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is
no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for
3.) That Section 25 of RA 9189, allowing Congress through the Joint Congressional absentee voting.
Oversight Committee, (JCOC) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit is not
independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec 1 of the Constitution. only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
Issues/Held: that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
5
WON Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 violates Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution? NO
6
WON Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 in relation to Sec 4 of the same Act contravenes Sec 4 Art VII of the Furthermore, the same section does not only require an affidavit or a promise to return, Filipinos
Constitution? YES abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus,
7
WON Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates of Sec 1 Art IX-A of the Constitution? they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the
YES removal” of their names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.”
Ratio:
8
1. Sec 2 Art V serves as an exception to the residency requirement in Sec 1 of the same Article 2. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Sec 4, Article VII of the Constitution
of the Constitution. only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates
5
 Sec
 1.
 ART
 V.
 Suffrage
 may
 be
 exercised
 by
 all
 citizens
 of
 the
 Philippines
 not
 otherwise
 
for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
disqualified
 by
 law,
 who
 are
 at
 least
 eighteen
 years
 of
 age,
 and
 who
 shall
 have
 resided
 in
 the
 
Congress.
Philippines
 for
 at
 least
 one
 year,
 and
 in
 the
 place
 wherein
 they
 propose
 to
 vote,
 for
 at
 least
 six
 
months
 immediately
 preceding
 the
 election.
 No
 literacy,
 property,
 or
 other
 substantive
 requirement
 
3. The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
shall
 be
 imposed
 on
 the
 exercise
 of
 suffrage.
 
6
 Sec
 4.
 ART
 VII.
 
 x
 x
 
 The
 returns
 of
 every
 election
 for
 President
 and
 Vice-­‐President,
 duly
 certified
 
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be “independent.”
by
 the
 board
 of
 canvassers
 of
 each
 province
 or
 city,
 shall
 be
 transmitted
 to
 the
 Congress,
 directed
 to
 
the
 President
 of
 the
 Senate.
 Upon
 receipt
 of
 the
 certificates
 of
 canvass,
 the
 President
 of
 the
 Senate
 
In this case, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions:
shall,
 not
 later
 than
 thirty
 days
 after
 the
 day
 of
 the
 election,
 open
 all
 the
 certificates
 in
 the
 presence
  (a) to “review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
of
 the
 Senate
 and
 the
 House
 of
 Representatives
 in
 joint
 public
 session,
 and
 the
 Congress,
 upon
  and 19]
determination
 of
 the
 authenticity
 and
 due
 execution
 thereof
 in
 the
 manner
 provided
 by
 law,
 canvass
  (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
the
 votes.
  countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The
 person
 having
 the
 highest
 number
 of
 votes
 shall
 be
 proclaimed
 elected,
 but
 in
 case
 two
 or
 more
 
shall
 have
 an
 equal
 and
 highest
 number
 of
 votes,
 one
 of
 them
 shall
 forthwith
 be
 chosen
 by
 the
 vote
  Both provisions violate the autonomy or independence of COMELEC. By vesting itself the
of
 a
 majority
 of
 all
 the
 Members
 of
 both
 Houses
 of
 the
 Congress,
 voting
 separately.
  powers to revise, review, or amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
The
 Congress
 shall
 promulgate
 its
 rules
 for
 the
 canvassing
 of
 the
 certificates.
 x
 x
 x
  COMELEC, is by far an action that goes way beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
7
 Sec
 1.
 ART
 IX-­‐A.
 The
 Constitutional
 Commissions,
 which
 shall
 be
 independent,
 are
 the
 Civil
 Service
 
The Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on
Commission,
 the
 Commission
 on
 Elections,
 and
 the
 Commission
 on
 Audit.
  Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the
8
 Sec
 2.
 
 ART
 V.
 The
 Congress
 shall
 provide
 a
 system
 for
 securing
 the
 secrecy
 and
 sanctity
 of
 the
 
other departments of the Government.”
ballot
 as
 well
 as
 a
 system
 for
 absentee
 voting
 by
 qualified
 Filipinos
 abroad.
 x
 x
 x
 
 

 

Decision:
Partly granted.
e. Effectivity of laws
f. Journal and Congressional Records
the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
G.R. No. L-1123
Date of Promulgation: March 5, 1947
Ponente: Tuason, J
Petition: Petition for Prohibition
Petitioners: Alejo Mabanag et al
Respondents: Jose Lopez Vito et al
Facts:
At this time, the Senate was composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23,
1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23,
1946, minus 2 who resigned to assume other positions in the Government.
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker.
On September 18, 1946, there was a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution, which would allow American citizens the right to use and develop natural
resources in the Philippines.
The petitioners argued that their numbers were not considered in determining the required ¾
vote (of each house) in order to pass the said resolution (which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then).
At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective
House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but if these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the
Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
Issues/Held:
WON the SC can take cognizance of the issue. - NO
WON the journals can be investigated against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bills. - YES
Ratio:
The amendment to the constitution is a political question, so the proposal to amend (the
resolution) is also a political question. Therefore the SC has no jurisdiction over this case.
Even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not
imply rejection of the enrolment theory. The due enactment of a law may be proved in either
of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the
journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what
the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the
two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding
Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
To go behind the enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the
journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent
department of the state. It would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the
legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to confusion in the
administration of the law. Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts
and the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of
the journals.
Decision:
Petition is DISMISSED.
Notes:
Section 313, old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210:
“Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of
Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
DISSENTING OPINION OF J. PUNO
Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 95756
Date of promulgation: June 26, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Petition: certiorari and/or prohibition
Petitioner: Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, John Henry R. Osmena, Wigberto E. Tanada,
and Ronaldo B. Zamora
Respondents: Jose De Venecia, Raul Daza, Rodolfo Albano, The Executive Secretary, The
Secretary of Finance, and the Commission of Internal Revenue
Summary of the case:
During a session, Joker Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question to the quorum,
but he never did. When the Speaker of the House finally ratified and approved the committee
report, petitioner Arroyo simultaneously stood up and tried to clarify what was said (“What is
that…Mr Speaker?”). On the same day, the bill was signed by Speaker of the House and Senate
President and their secretaries, and then it was signed into law by Pres. Marcos. Petitioners
assail the validity of the law (RA 8240), saying that several rules of proceedings were violated.

Court held that because of the 1) principle of separation of powers, and 2) enrolled bill doctrine,
it cannot decide on the issue, as it is not justiciable. Internal rules of proceedings should be
decided by the Congress, not the Court.
Dissenting Opinion:
1. J. Puno concurs in the result, but he thinks that the matter is justiciable. He also does
not agree that the Court would trivialize the principle of separation of power if the
Court assumes jurisdiction over the case at bar.
• Even in the US, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving
breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
• US cases cited to support the claim:
i. US v Bailin – confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, that is WON they are
constitutional; By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle
of separation of powers; Test on WON a rule is constitutional: 1) it
did not ignore any constitutional constraint, 2) it did not
violate any fundamental right, and 3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained.
ii. US v Smith - Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its own
rules in relation to the nomination of MR. Smith as member of
Federal Power Commission
iii. Christophel v US – Court invalidated a rule concerning quorum
iv. Yellin v US – Court should follow its rules strictly specially if it
would prejudice the rights of a third person
• In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
reject the ‘political question’ defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For section 1, Art XIII of the Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower the courts “to determine WON there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch”. This power is new and has
not been granted to courts in the previous constitutions. The ConCom
granted this power to the courts in view of the experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny
by misuse of the political question doctrine.
• Sec 18, Art VII completely eliminated the political question defense when it
provided that the SC may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law. The ConCom did not outlaw the use of political
question defense in national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished
its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts
to penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch.
• In Tolentino v Sec of Finance, J. Puno also expounded on the matter. Re
Sec 1, Art VIII, what the Constitution granted the Court is not a mere power
which it can decline to exercise. It is a duty to strike down any act of a
branch done with great abuse of discretion.
2. J. Puno dissents from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to
justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.
• Brief History: Doctrine originated in England where there is no written
Constitution controlling the legislative branch. Over the years, it has
undergone important mutations.
i. Modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule – under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
The rule concedes validity unless there affirmatively appears in
the journals a statement that there had not been compliance with
one or more constitutional requirements.
ii. Extrinsic evidence rule – holds that an enrolled bill is only prima
facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The
presumption, however, can be destroyed vy clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that constitutional requirements have
been violated.
• Modern rationale for enrolled bill doctrine (Field v Clark) – the principle of
separation of powers is the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The
doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids
difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it will prevent the filing
of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by
legislature. The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill os justified on the ground
that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not
fraud.
• But, these justifications have been rejected in various jurisdictions in US (as
cited by J. Regalado in his opinion in Tolentino v Sec of Finance).
i. Gwynn v Hardee – the presumption of enrolled bill is not
conclusive, and when it is shown from legislative journals that a
bll enrolled contains provisions that have not passed both houses,
such provisions will be held spurious and not part of the law
ii. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bull which all too often results
in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the
constitution. Preamble demands that we live not only under a rule
of law, but also a regime of truth.
iii. The doctrine defeats the policy on transparency.
• “It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off
truth in much litigation. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the
search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled
bill a prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of
dispensing justice based on truth.”
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-17931
Date of promulgation: February 28, 1963
Ponente: Conception, J.
Petition: review
Petitioners: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Respondents: Hon. Pedro Gimenez, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Phils, and Hon.
Ismael Mathay, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank
Facts:
Central Bank issued Circular No. 95 (July 1, 1959) fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions; supplemented by a memorandum establishing the procedure for

 
applications of exemption from the payment of the said fee (pursuant to the provisions of RA
2609 - Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law)

Caso, a company engaged in the manufacture of synthetic glue, which main components are
urea and formaldehyde, sought to refund the margin fee they paid (Php 33,765.42 and Php
6,345.72) relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank (Nov 3, 1959)
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.

CB issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of Casco but the Auditor of the
Bank refused to approve the vouchers upon the ground that the exemption is not in accord with
Sec 2, Par XVIII of RA 2609.
*The margin established by the Monetary Board…shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the ff: XVIII - urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users

Issue/Held:
WON urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of margin fee – NO

Ratio:
Urea formaldehyde (RA 2609) is different from urea and formaldehyde (Casco)
*National Institute of Science and Technology: urea formaldehyde is a synthetic resin produced
by urea AND formaldehyde

Court did not accept petitioner’s argument citing the records of the Senate on its floor discussion
(they used urea AND formaldehyde) BUT individual statements of the members of the House or
Senate are not reflective of the Congress’ intent.

It is well settled that the enrolled bill (use of urea formaldehyde in the printed bill and RA) is EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
conclusive upon the Court in that this was passed by Congress and approved by the President
*If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill before the certification of Congress and 1. The President
approval of the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial a. Singular Executive
decree.
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior
Decision: G.R. No. 46570
Decision appealed from is affirmed.
Date of Promulgation: April 21, 1939
Notes: Ponente: Laurel, J.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Petition: Original action of prohibition
Once a bill is signed and passed into law, the Courts, respecting the separation of powers, will Petitioners: Jose D. Villena
assume that the enactment rules were properly followed. Respondents: Secretary of the Interior

Facts:
This case is about the inquiry into the legal authority of the Secretary of the Interior by the
petitioner, who is the mayor of Makati, Rizal.

The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of
the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter
was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized
practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to
the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of
witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the Solicitor-General
of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior
suspended the petitioner from office and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of
Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the
respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying

 
  
him of the designation of Emiliano Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The 2. Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code does not preclude the respondent as
special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be Secretary of the Interior from exercising the Dower vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation
commenced due to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set definitely for with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must
March 28, 1939. be read in relation with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of 1932
3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question the power or
Petitioner’s side: jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the administrative charges against him
(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority as the power to suspend 4. That the authority of a department head to order fie investigation of any act or conduct of any
municipal elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of person under his department necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such
duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government; measures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation,
(2) That the acts of the respondent are null and void for the following reasons: furthermore, the suspension from office of the herein petitioner by the respondent was
(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior has exercised control over local governments when authorized by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of the Administrative
that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution Code to remove officials from office
(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local 5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the granting of
governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (Par. 8.)
the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective 6. That it is a well-settled rule 'that courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by
municipal officials are those contained in section 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. injunction from performing any official act which they are by law required to perform, or acts
(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an arbitrary power by which are not in excess of the authority and discretion reposed in them.'
converting himself into a complainant and at the same time judge of the charges he has
preferred against the petitioner; Issues/Held:
(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not based on any sworn 1. WON the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to order an investigation, by a
statement of any private person or citizen of this government when section 2188 of the special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity
Administrative Code requires the complaint against elective municipal officials to be under oath brought to his attention against the petitioner – YES
in order to merit consideration by the authorities. 2. WON the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to decree the suspension of the said
mayor pending the investigation of the charges – YES

Ratio:
1. Section 79(c) should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which
OSG’s side: grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the administration
9 of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions." In
1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly
the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed that "Supervision is net a
empowers the respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order the investigation of any act or
meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department" and in
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power
connection therewith to 'designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigation’
real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and
conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation."
9
 Section
 79
 (C)
 of
 the
 Administrative
 Code
 provides
 as
 follows:
 
2. Admitting that the President of the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend
"The
 Department
 Head
 shall
 have
 direct
 control,
 direction,
 and
 supervision
 over
 all
 bureaus
 and
 offices
 under
 his
 
the petitioner, and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least acquiesced in
jurisdiction
 and
 may,
 any
 provision
 of
 existing
 law
 to
 the
 contrary
 notwithstanding,
 repeal
 or
 modify
 the
 decision
  the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner
of
 the
 chiefs
 of
 said
 bureaus
 or
 offices
 when
 advisable
 in
 the
 public
 interest.
  should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the
Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.
"The
 Department
 Head
 may
 order
 the
 investigation
 of
 any
 act
 or
 conduct
 of
 any
 person
 in
 the
 service
 of
 any
 
bureau
 or
 office
 under
 his
 department
 and
 in
 connection
 therewith
 may
 appoint
 a
 committee
 or
 designate
 an
  With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose
official
 or
 person
 who
 shall
 conduct
 such
 investigations,
 and
 such
 committee,
 official,
 or
 person
 may
 summon,
  which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
witness
 by
 subpoena
 and
 subpoena
 duces
 tecum,
 administer
 oath
 and
 take
 testimony
 relevant
 to
 the
 investigation."
  and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the

  enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive
1.
 All
 executive
 and
 administrative
 organizations
 are
 adjuncts
 of
 the
 Executive
 Department,
 the
 heads
 of
 the
  of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
various
 executive
 departments
 are
 assistants
 and
 agents
 of
 the
 Chief
 Executive,
 and,
 except
 in
 cases
 where
 the
  departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in
Chief
 Executive
 is
 required
 by
 the
 Constitution
 or
 the
 law
 to
 act
 in
 person
 or
 the
 exigencies
 of
 the
 situation
 
the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence"
demand
 that
 he
 act
 personally,
 the
 multifarious
 executive
 and
 administrative
 functions
 of
 the
 Chief
 Executive
 are
 
performed
 by
 and
 through
 the
 executive
 departments,
 and
 the
 acts
 of
 the
 secretaries
 of
 such
 departments,
 
(7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op.,
performed
 and
 promulgated
 in
 the
 regular
 course
 of
 business,
 are,
 unless
 disapproved
 or
 reprobated
 by
 the
 Chief
  Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without
Executive,
 presumptively
 the
 acts
 of
 the
 Chief
 Executive.
  minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is
in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each

 

 
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs.
United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the
law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction
of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental
autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority
in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head
of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his
secretaries. it is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for
the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own
conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which,
the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These
are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if
there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself.
Decision:
Petition denied.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President,
or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of
the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618
Date of Promulgation: June 7, 2011
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Petition: Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioners: Atty. Romulo Macalintal
Respondents: Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his
b. Qualifications, Election, Term, and Oath 10
arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of
11
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VII of
Art VII
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the                                                                                                                
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
10  Sec.  4,  Art.  VII  
The  President  and  the  Vice-­‐President  shall  be  elected  by  direct  vote  of  the  people  for  a  term  of  six  years  which  
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
shall  begin  at  noon  on  the  thirtieth  day  of  June  next  following  the  day  of  the  election  and  shall  end  at  noon  of  the  
election. same  date,  six  years  thereafter.  The  President  shall  not  be  eligible  for  any  re-­‐election.  No  person  who  has  
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for succeeded  as  President  and  has  served  as  such  for  more  than  four  years  shall  be  qualified  for  election  to  the  same  
a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of office  at  any  time.  
No  Vice-­‐President  shall  serve  for  more  than  two  successive  terms.  Voluntary  renunciation  of  the  office  for  any  
the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not length  of  time  shall  not  be  considered  as  an  interruption  in  the  continuity  of  the  service  for  the  full  term  for  which  
be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as he  was  elected.  
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Unless  otherwise  provided  by  law,  the  regular  election  for  President  and  Vice-­‐President  shall  be  held  on  the  
second  Monday  of  May.  
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
 
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the The  returns  of  every  election  for  President  and  Vice-­‐President,  duly  certified  by  the  board  of  canvassers  of  each  
service for the full term for which he was elected. province  or  city,  shall  be  transmitted  to  the  Congress,  directed  to  the  President  of  the  Senate.  Upon  receipt  of  the  
certificates  of  canvass,  the  President  of  the  Senate  shall,  not  later  than  thirty  days  after  the  day  of  the  election,  
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
open  all  the  certificates  in  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in  joint  public  session,  and  
held on the second Monday of May. the  Congress,  upon  determination  of  the  authenticity  and  due  execution  thereof  in  the  manner  provided  by  law,  
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvass  the  votes.  
 
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
The  person  having  the  highest  number  of  votes  shall  be  proclaimed  elected,  but  in  case  two  or  more  shall  have  an  
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate equal  and  highest  number  of  votes,  one  of  them  shall  forthwith  be  chosen  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the  
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the Members  of  both  Houses  of  the  Congress,  voting  separately.  
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the  
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner The  Congress  shall  promulgate  its  rules  for  the  canvassing  of  the  certificates.  
provided by law, canvass the votes. The  Supreme  Court,  sitting  en  banc,  shall  be  the  sole  judge  of  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns,  and  
qualifications  of  the  President  or  Vice-­‐President,  and  may  promulgate  its  rules  for  the  purpose.  
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
 
11  Sec.  12,  Art.  VII  
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. In  case  of  serious  illness  of  the  President,  the  public  shall  be  informed  of  the  state  of  his  health.  The  members  of  
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. the  Cabinet  in  charge  of  national  security  and  foreign  relations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  
Philippines,  shall  not  be  denied  access  to  the  President  during  such  illness.  
 
  
the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 to judicial review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that
that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits jurisdiction.
that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme
Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
Issue/Held: case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be
WON the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional. – YES inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution
Ratio: is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of
under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last the present Constitution.
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The
provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
"dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12,
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts
Government." The power was expanded, but it remained absolute. the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it
is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality.
The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the
the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is
Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme
Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant
Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific
wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET. Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
to the present case is an unmitigated quantum leap.
“The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) “finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.” A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e.,
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals
vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively. that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and the
Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of
At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial - the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional
exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Commission during the drafting of the present Constitution.
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking,
courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election Decision:
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section
17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when
Pormento v. Estrada
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      G.R. No. 191988
 
 
  
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
Date of Promulgation: August 31, 2010 assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
Ponente: Corona, C.J. employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
Petition: certiorari any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
Petitioners: Atty. Evillo C. Pormento or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
Respondents: Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and COMELEC or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Facts:
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
the President from "any reelection."
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
Erap was elected President of the Philippines in 1998. He sought the presidency again in the
subsidiaries.
general elections held in 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy
and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by COMELEC. Funa v. Ermita
G.R. No. 184740
Issues/Held:
WON the issue is moot. – YES Date of Promulgation: Feb 11, 2010
Ponente: Villarama Jr, J.
Ratio: Petition: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
1. Erap was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the Petitioners: Dennis Funa
proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person’s Respondents: Exec Sec. Eduardo Ermita,DOTC Sec Leandro Mendoza, USec and OIC of
second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or MARINA Maria Elena Bautisa
controversy to be resolved in this case.
• As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of Facts:
judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
lacking in this case. Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
2. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.
• In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
• An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again Dennis A. B. Funa, as a taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed this instant petition
between the parties. challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
Decision: their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.(See Table)
Petition DENIED and DISMISSED.
Issues/Held:
Notes: Procedural
Section 4. xxx The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. xxx 1. WON the petitioner has legal standing – YES
2. WON the petition is moot and academic given the supervening event of Bautista’s
relinquishment of the DOTC USec position having been appointed as MARINA Admin –
c. Privilege and Salary YES
Substantive
1. WON Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
Art VII 12
violation of Sec 13 Art VII of the Constitution – YES
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and
Ratio:
Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No
Procedural
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure                                                                                                                
any other emolument from the Government or any other source. 12  Sec  13.  Art.  VII  The  President,  Vice-­‐President,  the  Members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  their  deputies  or  assistants  shall  
not,  unless  otherwise  provided  in  this  Constitution,  hold  any  other  office  or  employment  during  their  tenure.  They  
d. Prohibitions shall  not,  during  said  tenure,  directly  or  indirectly,  practice  any  other  profession,  participate  in  any  business,  or  be  
financially  interested  in  any  contract  with,  or  in  any  franchise,  or  special  privilege  granted  by  the  Government  or  
Art VII any  subdivision,  agency,  or  instrumentality  thereof,  including  government-­‐owned  or  controlled  corporations  or  
their  subsidiaries.  They  shall  strictly  avoid  conflict  of  interest  in  the  conduct  of  their  office.  
 
 
  
1. The fact that he filed this suit alleging a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition designation was intended to be merely against holding other offices i.e., w/o
against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more temporary, still, such designation violates a additional compensation (she didn’t receive
positions in government as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue standing constitutional prohibition - since a any emolument as MARINA OIC) and as
for redress of such illegal act by public officials. temporary designation does not have a required by the primary functions of the
2. Supervening events cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave maximum duration, it can go on for months office.
violation of the Constitution. Also, an exception to the rule on mootness is if it is capable of or years. In effect, such can effectively
repetition yet evading review. In this case, the question of the constitutionality of the circumvent the prohibition
President’s appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in- Incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Any recommendation by the MARINA Admin
charge of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment. USec and MARINA Admin - the DOTC USec concerning issues of policy and
for Maritime Transport and the OIC of administration go to the MARINA Board and
Substantive MARINA have become one and the same not the USec for Maritime Transport. The
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the person. There is no more checking and USec for Maritime Transport is, in turn,
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of “any other office” is not qualified by the counter-checking of powers and functions. under the direct supervision of the DOTC
phrase “in the Government” unlike in Sec 13, Art VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the No longer a person above the Administrator Sec. Petitioner’s fear that there is no longer
House of Representatives from holding “any other office or employment in the Government” of MARINA who will be reviewing the acts of a person above the MARINA Admin is,
said agency therefore, clearly unfounded.
13
In relation to, Sec 7 Art IX-B which laid down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Sec 13 Art VII is meant to be the exception Strong possibility that the challenge be There no longer exists an actual controversy
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and rendered moot by simply revoking the in view of the appointment of respondent
assistants. temporary designation. But since a similar Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective
violation can be committed in the future, and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC
This is because the intent of the framers, as held in Civil Liberties Union, to treat the President there exists a possibility of “evading review,” Undersecretary for Maritime Transport,
and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter and hence supervening events should not which rendered the present petition moot
prohibitions. prevent the Court from deciding and academic

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, Bautista’s e. Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office (VP as member of
designation as OIC of MARINA would not serve as merely an imposition of additional duties cabinet; Sec of Justice as member of JBC)
related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
CLU v. Executive Secretary
Lastly, the Court finds respondents’ theory that being just a “designation,” and temporary at that, G.R. No. 83896
respondent Bautista was never really “appointed” as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable.
Citing Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr: Date of Promulgation: February 22, 1991
Ponente: Fernan, CJ
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the Petition: Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. x x However, where the person Petitioners: Civil Liberties Union
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only Respondents: The Executive Secretary
in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
Facts:
While the designation was in the nature of acting in temporary capacity, the words “hold the Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) was issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on
office” were employed. Such holding of office as it was used in Sec 13 Art VII pertains to both July 25, 1987, and allowed members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant
14
appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and Secretaries to hold other government positions in addition to their primary positions.
functions of the office.

Decision:
Petition granted. Designation is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore, NULL and VOID.
                                                                                                               
Petitioner Respondents
14  Sec.  7,  Art.  IX-­‐B  of  the  1987  Constitution:  
Position of MARINA Administrator is not ex- No violation of Sec 13, Art VII because
No  elective  official  shall  be  eligible  for  appointment  or  designation  in  any  capacity  to  any  public  office  or  position  
officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary. Bautista was merely designated as acting
during  his  tenure.  
Even if Bautista’s appointment or head. Also, such falls under the exceptions
                                                                                                                Unless  otherwise  allowed  by  law  or  by  the  primary  functions  of  his  position,  no  appointive  official  shall  hold  any  other  
13  Sec  7.  Art.  IX-­‐B  xxx  Unless  otherwise  allowed  by  law  or  the  primary  functions  of  his  position,  no  appointive   office  or  employment  in  the  government  or  any  subdivision,  agency  or  instrumentality  thereof,  including  government-­‐
official  shall     owned  or  controlled  corporations  or  their  subsidiaries.    
hold  any  other  office  or  employment  in  the  Government  or  any  subdivision,  agency  or  instrumentality    
thereof,  including  government-­‐owned  or  controlled  corporations  or  their  subsidiaries.    
 
  
Petitioners then challenged EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions violated Sec. 13,
15
Art. VII of the Constitution.
Dela Cruz v. COA
According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment G.R. No. 138489
in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be
appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is Date of Promulgation: Nov 29, 2001
and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII. Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Petition: Certiorari
Issues/Held: Petitioners: Eleanor dela Cruz and 19 others as members of the Board of National Housing
WON EO 284 is constitutional – NO Authority (NHA) from 1991-1996
Respondents: COA, represented by its Commissioners
Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, Facts:
their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the This petition for certiorari assails the decision rendered by COA denying the petitioners’ appeal
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above for disallowance issued by NHA.
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office. In 1997, COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of
the national gov’t agencies and GOCCs which have effected payment of any form of additional
Only the additional functions and duties “required,” as opposed to “allowed,” by the primary compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
16
functions may be considered as not constituting “any other office.” representatives, in violation of the provision on multiple positions , to:

The term ex-officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from 1. Immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather 2. Effect the refund of the same from the time of finality of the SC decision in Civil
annexed to the official position.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official character, Liberties Union v Exec Sec and Anti-Graft League
or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.” An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his Pursuant to the COA memo, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador Vasquez issued a notice of
title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. disallowance, disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of
“cabinet members who were ex officio members of NHA BOD and/or their respective alternates
Ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as who actually received payments”. The petitioners are the alternates of the cabinet members.
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the
definition of “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. The petitioners appealed, saying that:

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it 1. The SC clarified in the Civil Liberties decision that the constitutional ban or multiple
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his positions applies only to members of Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the
by the compensation attached to his principal office. position of Assistant Secretary.
2. The NHA directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries, or Assistant Secretaries
In cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assitant Secretary
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office.
                                                                                                               
Decision: 16   Art.   VII,   Sec.   13.   The   President,   Vice-­‐President,   the   Members   of   the   Cabinet,   and   their   deputies   or   assistants  
Petitions are GRANTED. EO 284 is NULL AND VOID and is SET ASIDE. shall   not,   unless   otherwise   provided   in   this   Constitution,   hold   any   other   office   or   employment   during   their   tenure.  
They  shall  not,  during  said  tenure,  directly  or  indirectly,  practice  any  other  profession,  participate  in  any  business,  
or   be   financially   interested   in   any   contract   with,   or   in   any   franchise,   or   special   privilege   granted   by   the  
                                                                                                                Government   or   any   subdivision,   agency,   or   instrumentality   thereof,   including   government-­‐owned   or   controlled  
15  Sec.  13,  Art.  VII  of  the  1987  Constitution:   corporations  or  their  subsidiaries.  They  shall  strictly  avoid  conflict  of  interest  in  the  conduct  of  their  office.    

The  President,  Vice-­‐President,  the  Members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  their  deputies  or  assistants  shall  not,  unless  otherwise    
provided  in  this  Constitution,  hold  any  other  office  or  employment  during  their  tenure.  They  shall  not,  during  said  
tenure,  directly  or  indirectly  practice  any  other  profession,  participate  in  any  business,  or  be  financially  interested  in  
The   spouse   and   relatives   by   consanguinity   or   affinity   within   the   fourth   civil   degree   of   the   President   shall   not,  
any  contract  with,  or  in  any  franchise,  or  special  privilege  granted  by  the  Government  or  any  subdivision,  agency,  or  
during  his  tenure,  be  appointed  as  Members  of  the  Constitutional  Commissions,  or  the  Office  of  the  Ombudsman,  
instrumentality  thereof,  including  government-­‐owned  or  controlled  corporations  or  their  subsidiaries.  They  shall  
or   as   Secretaries,   Undersecretaries,   chairmen   or   heads   of   bureaus   or   offices,   including   government-­‐owned   or  
strictly  avoid  conflict  of  interest  in  the  conduct  of  their  office.  
controlled  corporations  and  their  subsidiaries.    

 
 
  
COA denied the petition, hence this recourse. Computerised Identification Reference System” on two grounds:

Issues/Held: 1. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate

WON the constitutional ban under Art VII, Sec 13 applies to alternates of Cabinet Members
(petitioners) – YES
Ratio:
PD 757 which created the NHA provides that the persons mandated by law to sit as members of
the Board are the ff: Sec of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Director-General
of NEDA, Sec of Finance, Sec of Labor, Sec of Industry Exec Sec, Gen Manager of Authority,
and their alternates. The acts of these alternates are considered as the acts of their principals.
As the Court held in Civil Liberties, the prohibition under Sec 13 is not to be interpreted as
covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities. The term ex-
officio means ‘from office; by virtue of office’. It refers to an authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title
to a certain office.
The ex-officio being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive addisional compensation for his services in the
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for by the compensation attached to
his principla office. Since the secretaries, as ex-officio members of the NHA Board, are
prohibited from receiving extra compensation, it follows that the petitioners who sit as alternates
cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensations. A contrary rule would give petitioners
a better right than their principals.
Decision:
Dismissed.
2. Powers and Functions of the President
a. Executive power
i. Power to execute laws
Art VII
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
2. It impermissibly intrudes on the citizenry’s protected zone of privacy
Other Facts:
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies” through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and “computer application designs”
Biometric Technology may provide precise confirmation of an individual’s identity through the
use of his own physiological and behavioral characteristics.
AO No 308 doesn’t state what characteristics and what kind of technology would be used to
identify people. The Solicitor General admitted that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other data.
Pursuant to the said Administration order, an individual must present his PRN every time he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. The more frequent the
use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base. This
data may be mishandled.
Issues/Held:
WON the administrative order is a law – YES
Ratio:
Respondents argue that the said administrative order implements the Administrative Code of
308. This argument is bereft of merit.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President , which relates to specific
17

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.                                                                                                                
17  Sec.  1,  Art.  VII.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  the  President  of  the  Philippines.  
 
Ople v. Torres Executive  power—the  power  to  enforce  and  administer  the  laws.  It  is  the  power  of  carrying  the  laws  into  
G.R. No. 127685 practical  operation  and  enforcing  their  due  observance.  
 
Date of Promulgation: July 23, 1998 The  President  has  the  power  of  control.  It  is  the  power  to  control  the  executive  department,  bureau  and  office,  or  
Ponente: Puno, J. interfere  with  the  discretion  of  it's  officials.    
Petition: Review a decision of the Executive Secretary and the Members of the Inter-Agency  
Coordinating Committee Because  the  President  also  has  the  duty  to  supervise  the  enforcement  of  laws  for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  
and  public  order,  he  is  granted  administrative  power  over  bureaus  and  offices  under  his  control  to  enable  him  to  
Petitioners: Blas F. Ople discharge  his  duties  effectively.  
Respondents: Ruben D. Torres, Alexander Aguirre, Hector Villanueva, Cielito Habito, Robert  
Barbers, Carmencita Reodica, Cesar Sarino, Renato Valencia, Tomas P. Africa, Head of the Administrative  power—  is  concerned  with  the  work  of  applying  policies  and  enforcing  orders  as  determined  by  
National Computer Center and Chairman of the Commission on Audit proper  governmental  organs    
 
Facts: What  is  the  administrative  power  for?  It  is  to  enable  the  President  to  fix  a  uniform  standard  of  administrative  
Petitioner Ople wants the court to invalidate AO No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National efficiency  and  check  the  official  conduct  of  his  agents.  

 

aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. The questioned administrative order establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Hence, the AO is not an administrative order.
It is further argued that the AO No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no protection, and creates no office. Under the administrative order, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies without the identification card required. This, in
effect, imposes a duty since no can avoid dealing with the government.
ii.
Art VII
Section 17 The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Date of Promulgation: November 17, 1967
Ponente: Sanchez, J.
Petition: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
Petitioners: Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc.
Respondents: Jose Paño, Hon. Juan Pajo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. Juan
Be G. Rodriguez, in his capacitu as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Facts:
This case is about the Executive Secretary’s (by authority of the President) modification of
a decision of the Director of Lands, which dismissed Paño’s complaints against petitioner
for trumping upon their sales application.
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Davao. In 1953, he ceded a portion of the public land to the petitioner. The next year,
the portion Magallanes ceded to petitioner was officially declared agricultural land. Jose Paño
and 19 other claimants applied for purchase of 90 ha of land but petitioner also filed its own
sales application covering the entire released area. Paño and the other claimants protested,
saying that they were the actual occupants of the part of the land covered by their sales
application. The Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
separately dismissed complaints filed by Paño. The case was then elevated to the President
of the Philippines; and on June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, “[b]y authority of
the President” decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands
and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, granting the land to Paño and the other
claimants, and ordering the lot to be subdivided into convenient lot sizes. Petitioner argues that
Sec. 4 of CA141 provides that decisions of the Director of Lands “as to questions of facts
shall be conclusive when approved” and that this statute is controlling not only upon
courts but also upon the President.
Issues/Held:
WON the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse a decision of
the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources – YES
Ratio:
  Issues:
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments: VII, 10 (1). These department heads are men of his confidence,
therefore he has the power to appoint, dismiss, and control and direct their acts. Implicit then is
his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of
control over the executive departments. In this context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the
executive departments. Control simply means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or
Control and Supervision over the Executive Branch of the Govt nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
The constitutional powers granted to the President are those he must exercise in person.
However, the President is not expected to perform in person all executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño assists the President in matters such as the present case. Where the Executive Secretary
G.R. No. L-27811 acts “by authority of the President”, his decision is that of the President’s. Such decision is to be
given full faith and credit by the courts, and the assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is
to be accepted. For only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not
authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive”, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be
successfully assailed.
Decision:
Petition denied.
Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620
Date of Promulgation: April. 20, 2010
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Petition: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Petitioners: Atty. Sylvia Banda, and employees of the National Printing Office
Respondents: Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, The Director General of
the Philippine Information Agency, and the National Treasurer
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo which seeks to amend Executive Order No 285 of President Corazon C.
Aquino, which provided for, among others, the creation of the National Printing Office (NPO)
from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA). However, on October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued
EO 378 which seeks to amend Section 6 of EO 285 removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
WON the petition can be considered as a class suit- NO

WON EO 378 is unconstitutional since:
1. It is beyond the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO 285
which was made when then Pres. Aquino had legislative powers; - NO
2. EO 378 violates the petitioner’s security of tenure because it paves way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO – NO
Ratio/Held:
[Procedural]
WON the petition can be considered as a class suit- NO
As held in Board of Optometry v. Colet, courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a
class suit for a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed
impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
From the definition of a class suit provided in Sec. 12, Rule 3, ROC, the requisites of a class suit
are:
1. The subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
2. The parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to the
court; and
3. The parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numeroius or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the court held that an action does not
become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings, and is dependent
on the attending facts and its existence.
The OSG contends that the present action cannot be considered a class suit for it failed to state
the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed EO and who were
allegedly represented by the petitioners. The Solicitor General pointed out that the 67 petitioners
comprised a small fraction of the 549 NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. The
OSG then found out that only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned as having duly subscribed
the petition before the notary public. Effectively decreasing the total number of petitioners to 20.
Moreover, the OSG contends that there is an apparent conflict between petitioners’ interest and
those of the persons they claim to represent when the previously mentioned Affidavit of
Desistance was filed by the president of the National Printing Office Workers Association
(NAPOWA).
[Substantive]
1. WON EO 378 is unconstitutional since it is beyond the exec. Powers of Pres. Arroyo…-
NO
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally
granted power of control over the executive agencies and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides.
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department
or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or agencies.
Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including lines of control, authority
and responsibility between them.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary, is
part of the Office of the President (OP). Concomitant to such power to abolish, consolidate or
merge offices in the OP and to transfer functions or offices not only among the offices in the OP
Proper but also to the rest of the OP and the Executive Branch, the President has implicit
powers to effort less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and internal structure
of the OP, including the modification of functions of such executive agencies as the
exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, NPO remains the main printing arm of the government, but in the interest of
greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the
private sector for printing jobs, with the exception of printing election paraphernalia which
remains the executive responsibility of the NPO, together with the BSP, as the COMELEC may
determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO.
In a reply to the petitioner’s view that the reorganization actions of the President are strictly
limited to transfer of functions and offices, the Court cited Sec. 20, Ch. 7, Title 1, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Reorganization and Restructuring under the GAA
Pursuant to Sec. 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Sec.
31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. An
example is that from the GAA. As held in Larin v. Exec. Sec., RA 7645, GAA of 1993 is
considered as among the statutory bases for the President’s power to reorganize executive
agencies as provided for in Sec. 48 and 62 of the said Act.
In the GAA of 2004, the year wherein EO 378 was implemented, likewise gave the President the
authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the
Executive Branch as provided for in Sec. 77 and 78 of the said Act.
Implicitly, the provisions in the GAA’s recognize the power of the President to reorganize even
executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to
implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and,
in so doing, modify or realign appropriation of funds as may be necessary under such
reorganization.
Thus, insofar as petitioner’s protest the limitation of the NPO’s appropriations to its own income
under EO 378, the same statutorily authorized by said GAA provisions.
Constitutional Sanction

Under the 1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17 provides that “The president shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.” and should be read in consonance to Sec. 31
of the Administrative Code, paragraph 1(supra.)
The rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under the Administrative code is for the
recognition of the need to reorganize the office, “to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency”.
To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and
policies.
As ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Exec. Sec, the legislature is presumed to have
deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject, it is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the OP, it was in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize.
The issuance of EO 378 is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by Sec. 31 of
the Admin. Code of 1987.
Conclusion
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in
order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the
functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a self-
reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President
Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office.
As pointed out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the
state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to
encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who are
eligible and qualified.
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not
include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the
executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid
"abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds
2. WON EO 378 is unconstitutional since it violates the petitioners security of tenure…-
NO
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim.
They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s
budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from
office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that
the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
Decision:
Petition DISMISSED. Prayer for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction DENIED.
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 196425
Date of Promulgation: July 24, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.
Respondents: Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of
the Monetary Board
Facts:
In 2001, then President Arroyo issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases for
possible graft and corruption against presidential appointees.
In 2010, President Aquino issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions
to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
In 2011, Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members
of the LWUA Board of Trustees, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares
of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Now, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13.
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner claims that:
1. the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-
ODESLA) and
2. that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions,
the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but
has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman.
3. the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process
requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
Issues/Held:
1. WON E.O. 13 is unconstitutional. – NO
Ratio:
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under
E.O. 292.
• Section 31 of E.O. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in

 
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. controversy is not a judicial function.
• As Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure
President's power to reorganize the Office of the President VS. His power to reorganize the enforcement of the laws. (Art. VII, Sec. 17)
the Office of the President Proper.
• The President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, Decision:
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. Petition DISMISSED.
• In contrast, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments Araullo v. Aquino
or Agencies, and vice versa. G.R. No. 209287
o When the PAGC was created, it was placed directly "under the Office of the
President." On the other hand, the ODESLA is an office within the Office of Date of Promulgation: July 1, 2014
the President Proper. Ponente: Bersamin, J.
o THEREFORE, since both of these offices belong to the Office of the Petition: certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and Petitioners: Maria Carolina P. Araullo (Chairperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan); Judy M.
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of Taguiwalo, UP Prof (Co-chairperson, Pagbabago); etc
E.O. 292. Respondents: Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Pres; Paquito N. Ochoa Jr, Exec Sec; Florencio
B. Abad, Sec of Dept Budget and Mngt
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
• The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct Facts:
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were Several petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of Disbursement Allocation
simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the Program (DAP), Natl Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541 and related issuances of the Dept of
President Proper. 18
Budget and Mngt (DBM). Petitioners alleged that DAP violates Sec 29(1) Art VI of the
• It was a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division. Constitution by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and
unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the exercise of his constitutional authority under
19
Definition of Reorganization = when there is an alteration of the existing structure of Sec 25(5) Art VI .
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof Antecedents:
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. ⋅ On Sept 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in
The Reorganization was pursued in Good Faith. favor of the impeachment of then CjRenato Corona.
• A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but ⋅ Secretary Abad, in response, claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
must also be pursued in good faith. was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. He further claimed that it was not the first
• A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of time since DAP has already been instituted since 2011
economy and efficiency. ⋅ DBM soon came out to claim that DAP had been sourced from savings generated by the
Govt, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from:
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds. (1) pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
• In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
to recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government. appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero based
• Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General budgeting findings; and
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the (2) withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects
organizational units or key positions in any department or agency,” which is, "even to that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Govt.
the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose." ⋅ The DBM listed the following as legal bases for the DAP namely:
• And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is (1) Sec 25(5), Art VI
likewise given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for his office.
o THEREFORE, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sourced from the President's own office budget. 18
  Art.
  VI
  Sec
  29(1)
  No
  money
  shall
  be
  paid
  out
  of
  the
  Treasury
  except
  in
  pursuance
  of
  an
  appropriation
  made
  by
 
law.
 
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-
 
19
 Art.
 VI
 Sec
 25(5)
 No
 law
 shall
 be
 passed
 authorizing
 any
 transfer
 of
 appropriations;
 however,
 the
 President,
 the
 
judicial powers.
President
 of
 the
 Senate,
 the
 Speaker
 of
 the
 House
 of
 Representatives,
 the
 Chief
 Justice
 of
 the
 Supreme
 Court,
 and
 
• As said in Biraogo, fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the the
  heads
  of
  Constitutional
  Commissions
  may,
  BY
  LAW,
  be
  authorized
  to
  augment
  any
  item
  in
  the
  general
 
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. appropriations
 law
 for
 their
 respective
 offices
 from
 savings
 in
 other
 items
 of
 their
 respective
 appropriations.
 

 

 
(2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (1) There is a law authorizing the transfer of funds w/in their respective offices
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Before NO, now YES!
Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) Pertinent provisions are Sec 59 (2011 GAA), Sec 53 (2012 GAA) and Sec 52
(3) General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their (2013 GAA). The first 2 provisions were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for lack
provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; of the phrase “for their respective offices.” Realizing the problem, Congress inserted
and (c) priority in the use of savings. the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA.
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
Issue/Held: their respective offices NO
PROCEDURAL “Savings” should be strictly construed the expanding scope of the power to
1. WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies? YES augment. Such power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which
2. WON there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination? YES the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
3. WON petitioners have legal standing? YES ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. The definition of
Substantive Issues: 21
"savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this
1. WON the DAP violates Sec. 29(1) Art. VI? NO
interpretation.
2. WON the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances implementing the
DAP violate Sec. 25(5) Art. VI insofar as:
With regard to unreleased appropriations, the mere fact that they are
a) unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from govt
unreleased means that they have not yet ripened into categories of items from which
agencies are treated as "savings" as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to
savings can be generated.
the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013? YES
b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided
With regard to unobligated allotments, NBC No. 541 shows that the withdrawal
in the GAAs for the Executive Department; YES
of these allotments to fund priority PAPs depend on whether they pertain to slow-
c) They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs. YES
moving projects and such allotments may be reissued for the original PAPs from w/c
3. WON the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the
they were withdrawn. Hence, PAPS had not yet been finally discontinued or
GAAs. YES
abandoned and therefore, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings is
4. WON the DAP violates:
impossible.
(1) Equal Protection Clause –NO
(2) system of checks and balances
Furthermore, NBC No. 541 and corresponding executive issuances effectively
(3) principle of public accountability considering that it authorizes the release of funds
shortened the period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital
upon the request of legislators. – the latter were not addressed as they have
outlays from 1 year, as provided by the Congress in the GAA to only 3 mos.
already been answered in the prev issues
As regards impoundment, Philconsa case defined it as: "a refusal by the
Ratio:
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the
PROCEDURAL
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the
I. Following the recent disposition of the Pork Barrel, the Court will exercise its expanded
GAA is understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations and is allowed
judicial power in reviewing the limitations on the Chief Executive’s spending power. 22
II. The requisites of judicial review were complied with. An actual and justiciable controversy only in case of unmanageable National Government budget deficit.
exists in the incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the
DAP and its relevant issuances. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the 21
 Savings
 refer
 to
 portions
 or
 balances
 of
 any
 programmed
 appropriation
 in
 this
 Act
 free
 from
 any
 obligation
 or
 
DBM. encumbrance
 which
 are:
 (i)
 still
 available
 after
 the
 completion
 or
 final
 discontinuance
 or
 abandonment
 of
 the
 
III. Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient work,
 activity
 or
 purpose
 for
 which
 the
 appropriation
 is
 authorized;
 (ii)
 from
 appropriations
 balances
 arising
 from
 
interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. unpaid
 compensation
 and
 related
 costs
 pertaining
 to
 vacant
 positions
 and
 leaves
 of
 absence
 without
 pay;
 and
 (iii)
 
SUBSTANTIVE from
 appropriations
 balances
 realized
 from
 the
 implementation
 of
 measures
 resulting
 in
 improved
 systems
 and
 
I. The DAP was a government policy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated efficiencies
 and
 thus
 enabled
 agencies
 to
 meet
 and
 deliver
 the
 required
 or
 planned
 targets,
 programs
 and
 services
 
approved
 in
 this
 Act
 at
 a
 lesser
 cost
 
spending and its adoption and implementation is a function pertaining to the Executive as

 
the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage. Hence, Congress not need legislate to 22
 Section
 66.
 Prohibition
 Against
 Impoundment
 of
 Appropriations.
 No
 appropriations
 authorized
 under
 this
 
adopt or to implement it. Act
 shall
 be
 impounded
 through
 retention
 or
 deduction,
 unless
 in
 accordance
 with
 the
 rules
 and
 regulations
 to
 be
 
20 issued
 by
 the
 DBM:
 PROVIDED,
 That
 all
 the
 funds
 appropriated
 for
 the
 purposes,
 programs,
 projects
 and
 activities
 
The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
authorized
 under
 this
 Act,
 except
 those
 covered
 under
 the
 Unprogrammed
 Fund,
 shall
 be
 released
 pursuant
 to
 
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation because the money had been already Section
 33
 (3),
 Chapter
 5,
 Book
 VI
 of
 E.O.
 No.
 292.
 
set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs.
II. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5) must meet 3 requisites:
Section
 67.
 Unmanageable
 National
 Government
 Budget
 Deficit.
 Retention
 or
 deduction
 of
 appropriations
 
authorized
 in
 this
 Act
 shall
 be
 effected
 only
 in
 cases
 where
 there
 is
 an
 unmanageable
 national
 government
 budget
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  deficit.
 
20
 Program,
 activity
 or
 project
 

 
 

 

 
The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be
The Court ruled that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue
should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds, targets stated in the BESF.
not the retention or deduction of appropriations. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess
revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure
23 because it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of
Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI (Administrative Code of 1987) may not also
the Government’s surplus budget policy.
be used to justify the withdrawal because the provision authorizes only the suspension
IV. The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause lacks
or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware
of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them having refused to
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the GAA for their respective
accept such funds were unsupported.
offices.
V. The Doctrine of operative fact is applicable.
The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree. The
24 The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to
GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented MUST be deficient. that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were
not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Decision:
Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: DAP, NBC No. 541 and related executive issuances are hereby declared
(1) Principle of the Public Fisc - asserting that all monies received from whatever UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
source by any part of the government are public funds
(2) Principle of Appropriations Control - prohibiting expenditure of any public money
without legislative authorization STRADEC v. Radstock
G.R. No. 178158
Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure
for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive Date of Promulgation: December 4, 2009
transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by Ponente: Carpio
so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. Petition: For Review
Petitioner: Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
Also, regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border Respondent: Radstock Securities Limited, Phi. Nat’l Const. Corp.
transfers of funds [for COA (IT infrastructure program) and HoR (Library)], the plain
text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border Facts:
transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited. The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly Construction Development
III. Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), was incorporated in 1966 under the Corporation Code
GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013. The unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, with the franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon
were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.
appropriations required.
In 1978 and 1981, Basay Mining Corp. (later CDCP Mining Corp.), an affiliate of PNCC, obtained
loans from Marubeni Corp, with PNCC obliged to pay solidarily with Basay Mining. There was no
PNCC board resolution authorizing this, so for 20 years, PNCC refused to recognize the

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Marubeni loans.

 Section
 38.
 Suspension
 of
 Expenditure
 of
 Appropriations.-­‐
 Except
 as
 otherwise
 provided
 in
 the
 General
 
23

Appropriations  Act  and  whenever  in  his  judgment  the  public  interest  so  requires,  the  President,  upon  notice  to  the  
In 2000, PNCC Board recognized a Php 10.7 billion liability to Marubeni Corp. 3 months later,
head  of  office  concerned,  is  authorized  to  suspend  or  otherwise  stop  further  expenditure  of  funds  allotted  for  any  
agency,  or  any  other  expenditure  authorized  in  the  General  Appropriations  Act,  except  for  personal  services   Marubeni assigned its credit to Radstock Securities Limited (a Hongkong based corporation with
appropriations  used  for  permanent  officials  and  employees.   unknown owners, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands) for only $2 million (or less than Php
100 million, in stark contrast to the Php 10.7 billion admitted receivable from PNCC).
 
In 2001, Radstock then initiated to collect the Marubeni loan from PNCC. The Trial Court
 Section  52.  Use  of  Savings.  The  President  of  the  Philippines,  the  Senate  President,  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  
24 garnished the PNCC’s accounts and properties, and denied the motion to dismiss. The CA also
Representatives,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Heads  of  Constitutional  Commissions  enjoying  fiscal   denied petition for Certiorari.
autonomy,  and  the  Ombudsman  are  hereby  authorized  to  use  savings  in  their  respective  appropriations  to  
augment  actual  deficiencies  incurred  for  the  current  year  in  any  item  of  their  respective  appropriations.   The PNCC and Radstock then entered into a compromise agreement for PNCC to pay Php 6.2
Billion instead of Php 17.6 Billion. This was approved by COA and the CA. To satisfy the
 
 
  
reduced obligation, PNCC would (1) assign to a third party (designated by Radstock) the rights Since the PNCC is a GOCC and therefore a government agency, it has no power to compromise
of the listed real properties of PNCC; (2) issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the Marubeni loan since only the Congress can do so (as stated in the Revised Administrative
the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding Code). Since the compromise agreement was not approved by Congress, it is void under Art.
capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for 28
1409 , NCC.
the next 27 years, in the gross toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporation.
An additional note would be that Radstock, being a foreign corporation, cannot own lands in the
According to Senator Drilon, the compromise agreement was extremely disadvantageous to
Philippines (part of the assets of PNCC in the compromise agreement).
the government because of the undervaluation of the assets (17.6 Billion was made to
appear only 6.2 Billion), and the PNCC also had financial obligations worth Php 36 Billion to the
Decision:
National Government (which should be the priority to pay instead of to Radstock).
The PNCC board resolutions recognizing the Marubeni loans are VOID AB INITIO. The
compromise agreement between PNCC and Radstock is VOID AB INITIO.
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) then filed for MR regarding the
compromise agreement, stating that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National
iii. General Supervision of Local Govt and autonomous regions
Government’s shares, receivables, securities and interests in PNCC.
Art X
The question is if the PNCC Board had the power to enter the compromise agreement
Section 4 The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
(because the Revised Administrative Code did not allow this).
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
Issues/Held:
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
WON the Administrative Code is applicable to the PNCC (is it a GOCC or an ‘autonomous
Section 16 The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
entity’) - YES
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Ratio:
The PNCC cannot compromise the obligation (Marubeni loan) because it is a Government iv. Power of Appointment
Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC), hence the Revised Administrative Code is Ø With Consent of COA
applicable, which states that “compromise of claims from a government agency exceeding Php
100,000 must be submitted to Congress.” Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R. No. 79974
Even if the PNCC was incorporated under the Corporation Code, it is not a private corporation or
“autonomous entity” because it is under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), over Date of Promulgation: December 17, 1987
25 Ponente: Padilla
which the President exercises control (by virtue of by virtue of the Executive Order 331 , Petition: For Prohibition
2004). Petitioner: Sarmiento III, Arcilla
Respondent: Mison (Bureau of Customs), Carague (DBM)
26
Sec. 2 on Introductory Provisions of the Revised Administrative Code states that GOCC’s are
27 Facts:
also government agencies. In line with this, Sec. 20 of the Administrative Code states that In 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner
compromise may be release by the Commission on Audit (COA), with the approval of the of the Bureau of Customs.
President, if not exceeding Php 100,000. If the amount exceeds this, the compromise application
should be submitted to Congress with the recommendations of COA and the President. Petitioners questioned this appointment since it was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) for approval.
                                                                                                                Guillermo Carague (Secretary of the Department of Budget) was also enjoined from releasing
25  Executive  Order  No.  331  Signed  on  July  16,  2004:  Placing  the  Philippine  National  Construction  Corporation  
(PNCC)  under  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry.  
 
                                                                                                               
26  Sec.  2,  Introductory  Provisions,  Revised  Administrative  Code  of  1987Agency  of  the  Government  refers  to  any  
28  Art.  1409,  New  Civil  Code  The  following  contracts  are  inexistent  and  void  from  the  beginning:  
of  the  various  units  of  the  Government,  including  a  department,  bureau,  office,  instrumentality,  or  government-­‐owned  
or  controlled  corporation,  or  a  local  government  or  a  distinct  unit  therein.   (1)  Those  whose  cause,  object  or  purpose  is  contrary  to  law,  morals,  good  customs,  public  order  or  public  policy;  
 
27  Sec.  20(1),  Chapter  IV,  Subtitle  B,  Title  I,  Book  V,  Administrative  Code  of  1987  Power  to  Compromise  Claims.   x  x  x  
-­‐  (1)  When  the  interest  of  the  Government  so  requires,  the  Commission  may  compromise  or  release  in  whole  or  in  part,  
any  settled  claim  or  liability  to  any  government  agency  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  pesos  arising  out  of  any  matter  or   (7)  Those  expressly  prohibited  or  declared  void  by  law.  
case  before  it  or  within  its  jurisdiction,  and  with  the  written  approval  of  the  President,  it  may  likewise  compromise  or  
release  any  similar  claim  or  liability  not  exceeding  one  hundred  thousand  pesos.  In  case  the  claim  or  liability  exceeds   These  contracts  cannot  be  ratified.  x  x  x.  
one  hundred  thousand  pesos,  the  application  for  relief  therefrom  shall  be  submitted,  through  the  Commission  and  the  
President,  with  their  recommendations,  to  the  Congress[.]  x  x  x  
   
 
  
Mison’s salary. 31
CoA, while the 1973 Constitution did not require any confirmation (it was Martial Law at that
time!). The ConComm for the 1987 Constitution then tried to find “middle ground” for these two
Issues/Held:
extreme provisions, by limiting the confirmation to only certain positions which are listed (as
WON Mison’s appointment was valid. - YES
could be gleaned from the ConComm records that “bureau heads” were removed from the Sec.
32
Ratio: 16 provision ).
The appointment of bureau heads are not included in the 1987 Constitution.
Bureau heads are obviously not part of the list which requires confirmation from CoA, therefore
29
1 Mison’s appointment is valid.
There are 4 groups that the President can appoint (according to Sec. 16 , Art. VII, 1987
Constitution):
The SC laid down that the appointment of public officials is essentially an exercise of
executive power. The Constitution providing for a Commission on Appointments does not
1. Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
minimize the extent of such a power. In Concepcion v. Paredes, the SC stated that "appointment
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion."
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (only this
group requires confirmation from CoA)
It was further explained in Springer v. Philippine Islands that while the legislature may create a
2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
public office, it cannot name the official to discharge the functions appurtenant thereto, and while
for by law;
it may prescribe the qualifications therefor, it cannot circumscribe such qualifications, which
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
would unduly narrow the President's choice. In that event, it is as if it is the legislature itself
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
conferring the appointment.
President alone.
33
30 Also, we have The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines which stated the power of the
The 1935 Constitution required almost all Presidential appointments to be confirmed by the
President to appoint the Commissioner of Customs. While this was enacted under the 1935
                                                                                                                Constitution, it can be read in harmony with the 1987 Constitution (which removed the “bureau
29  Sec.  16,  Art.  VII,  1987  Constitution  The  President  shall  nominate  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on   heads” jurisdiction from the CoA).
Appointments,  appoint  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments,  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  or  
officers  of  the  armed  forces  from  the  rank  of  colonel  or  naval  captain,  and  other  officers  whose  appointments  are   Decision:
vested  in  him  in  this  Constitution.  He  shall  also  appoint  all  other  officers  of  the  Government  whose  appointments  are   Petition DISMISSED.
not  otherwise  provided  for  by  law,  and  those  whom  he  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  appoint.  The  Congress  may,  by  
law,  vest  the  appointment  of  other  officers  lower  in  rank  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts,  or  in  the  heads  of  the  
departments,  agencies,  commissions  or  boards.                                                                                                                  
31  Sec.  10,  Art.  VII,  1973  Constitution  The  President  shall  appoint  the  heads  of  bureaus  and  offices,  the  officers  of  
  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  from  the  rank  of  Brigadier  General  or  Commodore,  and  all  other  officers  of  The  
government  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  those  whom  he  may  be  authorized  by  
The  President  shall  have  the  power  to  make  appointments  during  the  recess  of  the  Congress,  whether  voluntary  or   law  to  appoint.  However,  the  Batasang  Pambansa  may  by  law  vest  in  the  Prime  Minister,  members  of  the  Cabinet,  the  
compulsory,  but  such  appointments  shall  be  effective  only  until  disapproval  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments  or   Executive  Committee,  Courts,  Heads  of  Agencies,  Commissions,  and  Boards  the  power  to  appoint  inferior  officers  in  
until  the  next  adjournment  of  the  Congress.   their  respective  offices.  

   
30  Sec.  10,  Art.  VII,  1935  Constitution  Xxx     32  1986  Constitutional  Commission  xxx    

(3)  The  President  shall  nominate  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments,  shall  appoint  the  heads  of   Mr.  Monsod:  With  the  Chair's  indulgence,  I  just  want  to  take  a  few  minutes  of  our  time  to  lay  the  basis  for  some  of  the  
the  executive  departments  and  bureaus,  officers  of  the  army  from  the  rank  of  colonel,  of  the  Navy  and  Air  Forces  from   amendments  that  I  would  like  to  propose  to  the  Committee  this  morning.  
the  rank  of  captain  or  commander,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  Government  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  
otherwise  provided  for,  and  those  whom  he  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  appoint;  but  the  Congress  may  by  law  vest   Xxx    
the  appointment  of  inferior  officers,  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments.  
Mr.  Monsod:  On  Section  16,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  the  power  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments  be  limited  to  
(4)  The  President  shall  have  the  power  to  make  appointments  during  the  recess  of  the  Congress,  but  such   the  department  heads,  ambassadors,  generals  and  so  on  but  not  to  the  levels  of  bureau  heads  and  colonels.  
appointments  shall  be  effective  only  until  disapproval  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments  or  until  the  next  
adjournment  of  the  Congress.  
Xxx  

Xxx  
 
 Sec.  601,  RA  1937  (amended  PD  34)  Chief  Officials  of  the  Bureau  of  Customs.-­‐The  Bureau  of  Customs  shall  have  
33
(7)  ...,  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments,  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers   one  chief  and  one  assistant  chief,  to  be  known  respectively  as  the  Commissioner  (hereinafter  known  as  Commissioner)  
and  consuls  ...   and  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Customs,  who  shall  each  receive  an  annual  compensation  in  accordance  with  the  rates  
prescribed  by  existing  law.  The  Commissioner  and  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Customs  shall  be  appointed  by  the  
  President  of  the  Philippines.  
 
  
1. WON RA 6975 was constitutional – NO
Manalo v. Sistoza 2. WON the appointments were valid – YES
GR No. 107369
Ratio:
Date of Promulgation: Aug 11, 1999 1. The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive by Sec 16, Art VII
Ponente: Purisima, J. 36
of the Constitution. As was held in Sarmiento v Sison, requiring confirmation by the
Petition: Prohibition
COA of certain appointments issued by the President contemplates a system of
Plaintiff: Jesulito Manalo
checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government.
Defendant: Pedro Sistoza, etc, and Hon. Salvador Enriquez, in his capacity as Budget
Secretary
As consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison,
there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
Facts:
a. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers,
In 1990, RA 6975 creating the DILG was signed into law by Pres. Aquino. According to Sec
34 and consuls, officers of the armed forces, and other officers
26 of the Act, The Chief of PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior b. All other officers of government whose appointments are not otherwise
officers down to the rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission provided for by law
35 c. Those whom the President may be authorized by alw to appoint
on Appointments. Sec 31 also reiterates the need for confirmation by the COA.
d. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone
In accordance therewith, the President, through Exec Sec Drilon, promoted 15 respondent
officers, by appointing them to positions in the PNP with the rank of Chief Superintendent to st
Only presidential appointments belonging to the 1 group require confirmation. Hence,
Director. Thereafter, DBM authorized disbursements for their salaries and emoluments. Their
Sec 26 and 31 are unconstitutional. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid
appointments were not confirmed by COA.
sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that
when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the
The petitioner in this case contends that the appointments were invalid as it violated Sec 26 and
removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and
31 of RA 6975.
enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided
sections.
Issues/Held:

                                                                                                                2. Appointments were valid as the confirmation by COA was not required under the
Constitution.
34  Sec.  26.    Powers,  Functions  and  Term  of  Office  of  the  PNP  Chief.  -­‐  The  command  and  direction  of  the  PNP  shall  be  
vested  in  the  Chief  of  the  PNP  who  shall  have  the  power  to  direct  and  control  tactical  as  well  as  strategic   Decision:
movements,  deployment,  placement,  utilization  of  the  PNP  or  any  of  its  units  and  personal,  including  its   Petition dismissed.
equipment,  facilities  and  other  resources.    Such  command  and  direction  of  the  Chief  of  the  PNP  may  be  delegated  
to  subordinate  officials  with  respect  to  the  units  under  their  respective  commands,  in  accordance  with  the  rules   Notes:
and  regulations  prescribed  by  the  Commission.    The  Chief  of  the  PNP  shal  also  have  the  power  to  issue  detailed  
implementing  policies  and  instructions  regarding  personnel,  funds,  properties,  records,  correspondence  and  such  
According to the petitioner, PNP is akin to the AFP, hence the appointments needed COA’s
st
other  matters  as  may  be  necesary  to  effectively  carry  out  the  functions,  powers  and  duties  of  the  Bureau.    The   confirmation as it belongs to the 1 group). Court held that they are not one and equal.
Chief  of  the  PNP  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President  from  among  the  senior  officers  down  to  the  rank  of  the  chief  
superintendent,  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments:  Provided,  That  the  Chief  of  the  PNP   Ø Limitations on appointing power of the Pres
shall  serve  a  term  of  office  not  to  exceed  four  (4)  years:  Provided,  further,  That  in  times  of  war  or  other  national  
emergency  declared  by  Congress,  the  President  may  extend  such  term  of  office.”  34  (underlining  supplied).   Ø Interim or Recess Appointments
 Sec.31.    Appointment  of  PNP  Officers  and  Members.  -­‐  The  appointment  of  the  officers  and  members  of  the  
35

PNP  shall  be  effected  in  the  following  manner:  

                                                                                                               
(a)  Police  Officer  I  to  Senior  Police  Officer  IV  -­‐  Appointed  by  the  PNP  regional  director  for  regional  personnel  
36  Section  16.    The  President  shall  nominate  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  on  Appointments,  
or  by  the  Chief  of  the  PNP  for  the  national  headquarters  personnel  and  attested  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission;  
appoint  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments,  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  or  officers  of  the  
(b)  Inspector  to  Superintendent  -­‐  Appointed  by  the  Chief  of  the  PNP,  as  recommended  by  their  immediate   armed  forces  from  the  rank  of  colonel  or  naval  captain,  and  other  officers  whose  appointments  are  vested  in  him  
superiors,  and  attested  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission;   in  this  Constitution.    He  shall  also  appoint  all  other  officers  of  the  Government  whose  appointments  are  not  
otherwise  provided  for  by  law,  and  those  whom  he  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  appoint.    The  Congress  may,  by  
(c)  Senior  Superintendent  to  Deputy  Director  General  -­‐  Appointed  by  the  President  upon  recommendation  of   law,  vest  the  appointment  of  other  officers  lower  in  rank  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts,  or  in  the  heads  of  
the  Chief  of  the  PNP,  with  the  proper  endorsement  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission  and  subject  to   departments,  agencies,  commissions,  or  boards.  
confirmation  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments;  and  
The  President  shall  have  the  power  to  make  appointments  during  the  recess  of  the  Congress,  whether  
(d) Director General - Appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of chief voluntary  or  compulsory,  but  such  appointments  shall  be  effective  only  until  disapproval  by  the  Commission  on  
superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; Provided, That the Appointments  or  until  the  next  adjournment  of  the  Congress.”  
Chief of the PNP shall serve a tour of duty not to exceed four (4) years; Provided, further, That, in times of war
or other national emergency declared by Congres
 
  
ART VI Petition: Prohibition and Mandamus
Section 19 The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted Petitioners: J. Antonio Araneta
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized Respondents: Rafael Dinglasan, Judge of First Instance Manila , and Jose P. Bengzon, Fiscal
with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet of City of Manila
only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members,
to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. Facts:
Petitioners are questioning various executive orders issued by the President by virtue of the
ART VII Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671).
Section 16 The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public J. Antonio Araneta is under prosecution for violation of EO 62, which regulates rentals for
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, houses and lots for residential buildings.
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for Leon Ma. Guerrero wants her shoes exported from the Philippines, which is prohibited by EO
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, 192.
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. EO 225 appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, Philippines.
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. EO 226 appropriates funds to defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national
elections.
Ø Temporary Designations
Issues/Held:
Administrative Code of 1987, Bk III WON there must be a law in order to terminate the emergency powers of the President—NO
Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. - When did CA No. 671 cease/ When did the President’s emergency powers terminated—When
(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any Congress met for it's first regular session
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, Ratio:
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the 3. There is no need for a new and different law to terminate CA No. 671’s delegation of
office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) emergency powers to the President since
there exists a vacancy; A. otherwise the legislature may choose not to revoke such
(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is delegation and it wouldn’t be temporary anymore as required by
already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional the Constitution;
compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the B. the President would have the power to veto such law,
position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated and the Congress might not be able to override such veto;
for the office or agency concerned. C. this would make it harder for Congress to take back the
37
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. emergency powers it delegated because if vetoed by the
President, 2/3 of all the Members of each House have to vote to
b. Powers over Legislation terminate it (Section 27 overriding the veto of the President).

i. Veto 4. CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946 since
ii. Delegated Decree Authority A. the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed during regular sessions except

Emergency Powers
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37
 SECTION
 23.
 (1)
 The
 Congress,
 by
 a
 vote
 of
 two-­‐thirds
 of
 both
 Houses
 in
 joint
 session
 assembled,
 voting
 
separately,
 shall
 have
 the
 sole
 power
 to
 declare
 the
 existence
 of
 a
 state
 of
 war.
 
ART VI Section 23(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
 
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, (2)
 In
 times
 of
 war
 or
 other
 national
 emergency,
 the
 Congress
 may,
 by
 law,
 authorize
 the
 President,
 for
 a
 limited
 
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner period
 and
 subject
 to
 such
 restrictions
 as
 it
 may
 prescribe,
 to
 exercise
 powers
 necessary
 and
 proper
 to
 carry
 out
 a
 
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment declared
 national
 policy.
 Unless
 sooner
 withdrawn
 by
 resolution
 of
 the
 Congress,
 such
 powers
 shall
 cease
 upon
 
thereof. the
 next
 adjournment
 thereof.
 

 
Araneta v. Dinglasan The
 words
 “limited
 period”
 as
 used
 in
 the
 Constitution
 are
 intended
 to
 mean
 restrictive
 in
 duration
 and
 
“emergency”
 means
 temporary
 otherwise
 it
 won’t
 be
 an
 emergency.
 
G.R. No. L-2044

 
CA
 No.
 671
 must
 have
 been
 approved
 with
 this
 limitation
 (temporary)
 in
 view
 otherwise,
 it
 would
 be
 contrary
 to
 
Date of Promulgation: August 26, 1949 the
 principle
 that
 the
 legislature
 deemed
 to
 have
 full
 knowledge
 of
 CA
 No.
 671’s
 powers.
 
Ponente: Tuason, J.
 

 

by those imposed by the Charter (compared to a special session)
B. President Quezon stated in his autobiography that Act No. 671 was only for a “certain
period” and would “become invalid unless reenacted”. These phrases connote automatic
extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a CERTAIN PERIOD and that the same Act
should be passed if emergency powers would be prolonged. The “certain period” would end
when Congress would convene again, since the reason for CA No. 671 was the inability of
Congress to function.
C. if not then there would be 2 legislative bodies operating (the President and the
Congress). In such instance, the President could nullify the laws promulgated by the Congress
during its recess; while Congress could nullify the President’s EOs whenever it is in session.
(This is what happened in this case. While Congress was in recess, a former President issued
an EO regulating house rentals and the present President issued an EO on export control)
All executive orders promulgated by the President AFTER the date of the adjournment of the
regular session of the Congress in 1946 are null and void because the Commonwealth Act No.
671 has already ceased to be in force in so far as the delegation of powers was concerned. As
such, EOs 62 192, 225, 226 were issued without authority of law.
The rules and regulations made would be good only up to the time when the Legislature would
adjourn “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly”
The question where war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant in order for the President to
exercise Emergency Powers.
Decision:
Petition granted.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396
Date of Promulgation: May 3, 2006
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Petition: Special Civil Action, Certiorari and Prohibition
Petitioners: Prof. Randolf David, Lorenzo Tanada III, Ronald Llamas, Harry Roque Jr., Joel
Ruiz Butuyan et. Al.
Respondents: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Commander in Chief, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Hon. Avelino Cruz, General Generoso Senga, Director General
Arturo Lomibao
Facts:
th
On Feb. 24, 2006, on the celebration of the 20 anniversary of EDSA people power I, PGMA
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and in
pursuant thereto, the implementing General Order No. 5, commanding the AFP and PNP “to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
Factual bases of the PP1017 according to the SolGen:
1. Oplan Hackle I – detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippines Military
Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City
2. Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that Magdalo’s D-Day would be on Feb. 24,
th
2006, the 20 Anniversary of EDSA I
3. Information obtained regarding the plan of a huge number of soldiers to join the rallies to
provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests that will be
held on Feb. 24, 2006
4. Bombing of telecom towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan
5. Raid of an army outpost in Benguet
6. Directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests
Effects of the issuances according to the petitioners:
1. Cancellation of all programs and activities
2. Revocation of permits to hold rallies
3. Violent disperser of the march of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of
Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]
4. Arrests (with or without warrant) of different party-list representatives, former soldiers
etc.
Issues/Held:
Substantive
1. WON PP1017 in constitutional – PARTLY YES
2. WON G.O. 5 is invalid for violating freedom of association and freedom of the press—
NO
Ratio:
Procedural (just in case she asks):
Petitioners all have locus standing due to the transcendental importance of the issue. The Court
holds that President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. And it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law
Substantive:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and relevant jurisprudence. As Chief
Executive, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 allows for proclamations to declare a
“state of rebellion” as a status or condition of public moment or interest. This is distinct
from declaration of a state of national emergency. The Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers: calling-out power, power to suspend the
privilege of write of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. PP1017 was an
exercise of calling-out power, summoning the armed forces to aid in suppressing lawless
violence through ordinary police action.
However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to
impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President -
acting as Commander-in-Chief - addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions
of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard - that the military and the police
should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence." But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have
not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted
from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the
AFP's authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

Decision:
Petition partially granted
Notes:
1. Sec 18, Art VII states, “whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forced to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”.
2. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine
clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the
press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical
seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5.
iii. Integrative Powers
c. Special Powers
i. Power as Commander-in-Chief
ART VII
Section 18 The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
ART III
Section 13 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
ART VIII
Section 1. Par 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Gudani v. Senga
G.R. No. 170165
Date of Promulgation:
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Petition: Petition for Certiorari and Injunction
Petitioners: B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco Gudani, and Lt. Col. Alexander Balutan
Respondents: Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, as Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Col. Gilberto Jose Roa, as the Pre-trial Investigating Officer, The Provost Marshall
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the General Court-Martial
Facts:
On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to
appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the
conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive
cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between President Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Gen. Francisco Gudani and Col. Alexander Balutan, who were
designated as commander and member, respectively, of the “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the
AFP Southern Command in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections, received invitations to attend the
said Senate hearing.
In the evening of September 27, a message was transmitted from the office of AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Generoso Senga, stating that: “per instruction of her excellency PGMA, no AFP personnel
shall appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her approval.” On the day of
the hearing, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464) which enjoined officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her approval. Despite E.O. 464 and despite the order from Gen. Senga, Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan appeared and testified during the Senate hearing.
The Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) recommended that Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan be charged with violation of Article of War 65, for willfully disobeying a superior officer,
in relation to Article of War 97, for conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline.
The day after Gen Gudani and Col. Balutan were required to appear before the OPMG, Gen.
Gudani was compulsorily retired from service.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan claims that E.O. 464 is unconstitutional and seeking that the
charges against them be quashed. Furthermore, it is stressed that Gen. Gudani was no longer
subject to military jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement.
Issues:
1. WON the violation of the President’s directive could lead to any investigation for court-martial
of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan - YES
Ratio/Held:

 
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority
38 39 includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military
VII . Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI ,
the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority
includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or
executive control.
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life
circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military
Any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military career
consent of the President has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any
and instead find satisfaction in other fields. After all, if need be, the men and women of the
armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal military officer whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
inclinations. President.

As a general rule, based from the Kapunan case, the discretion of a military officer to restrain the If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel
speech of a soldier under his/her command will be accorded deference, with minimal regard if at the attendance of the military officer. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness,
all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be the attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries – remedy is judicial relief.
with the consent and approval of the military commander.
Decision:
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing Petition DENIED.
before Congress pertains to the commander-in-chief powers of the President.

The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a Lansang v. Garcia
civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief G.R. No. L-33964
represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being
clearly civil in nature. Date of Promulgation: December 11, 1971
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
The commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: In the matter of the petition for habeas corpus of Teodosio Lansang Rodolfo del

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
Rosario and Bayani Alcala

 Sec.
 18,
 Art.
 VII.
 The
 President
 shall
 be
 the
 Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief
 of
 all
 armed
 forces
 of
 the
 Philippines
 and
 whenever
 it
  Respondents: Brigadier-General Eduardo Garcila, Chief, Philippine Constabulary
becomes
 necessary,
 he
 may
 call
 out
 such
 armed
 forces
 to
 prevent
 or
 suppress
 lawless
 violence,
 invasion
 or
 rebellion.
 In
 
case
 of
 invasion
 or
 rebellion,
 when
 the
 public
 safety
 requires
 it,
 he
 may,
 for
 a
 period
 not
 exceeding
 sixty
 days,
 suspend
  Facts:
the
 privilege
 of
 the
 writ
 of
 habeas
 corpus
 or
 place
 the
 Philippines
 or
 any
 part
 thereof
 under
 martial
 law.
 Within
 forty-­‐ In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines
eight
 hours
 from
 the
 proclamation
 of
 martial
 law
 or
 the
 suspension
 of
 the
 privilege
 of
 the
 writ
 of
 habeas
 corpus,
 the
  was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates
President
 shall
 submit
 a
 report
 in
 person
 or
 in
 writing
 to
 the
 Congress.
 The
 Congress,
 voting
 jointly,
 by
 a
 vote
 of
 at
 least
 
in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, 2 hand grenades were thrown at the
a
 majority
 of
 all
 its
 Members
 in
 regular
 or
 special
 session,
 may
 revoke
 such
 proclamation
 or
 suspension,
 which
 
platform where the candidates and other persons were.
revocation
 shall
 not
 be
 set
 aside
 by
 the
 President.
 Upon
 the
 initiative
 of
 the
 President,
 the
 Congress
 may,
 in
 the
 same
 
manner,
 extend
 such
 proclamation
 or
 suspension
 for
 a
 period
 to
 be
 determined
 by
 the
 Congress,
 if
 the
 invasion
 or
 
rebellion
 shall
 persist
 and
 public
 safety
 requires
 it.
  As a consequence, 8 persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the

  aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries
39

 Sec.
 5,
 Art.
 XVI.
 Section
 5.
 (1)
 All
 members
 of
 the
 armed
 forces
 shall
 take
 an
 oath
 or
 affirmation
 to
 uphold
 and
 defend
  which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
this
 Constitution.
 
(2)
 The
 State
 shall
 strengthen
 the
 patriotic
 spirit
 and
 nationalist
 consciousness
 of
 the
 military,
 and
 respect
 for
 people’s
  On August 23, soon after noontime, the President announced the issuance of Proclamation
rights
 in
 the
 performance
 of
 their
 duty.
  No. 889, dated August 21, 1971 where he suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
(3)
 Professionalism
 in
 the
 armed
 forces
 and
 adequate
 remuneration
 and
 benefits
 of
 its
 members
 shall
 be
 a
 prime
  corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly
concern
 of
 the
 State.
 The
 armed
 forces
 shall
 be
 insulated
 from
 partisan
 politics.
  detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion.
No
 member
 of
 the
 military
 shall
 engage,
 directly
 or
 indirectly,
 in
 any
 partisan
 political
 activity,
 except
 to
 vote.
 
(4)
 No
 member
 of
 the
 armed
 forces
 in
 the
 active
 service
 shall,
 at
 any
 time,
 be
 appointed
 or
 designated
 in
 any
 capacity
 to
  Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, who, having been
a
 civilian
 position
 in
 the
 Government,
 including
 government-­‐owned
 or
 controlled
 corporations
 or
 any
 of
 their
 
arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation,
subsidiaries.
 
assail its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:
(5)
 Laws
 on
 retirement
 of
 military
 officers
 shall
 not
 allow
 extension
 of
 their
 service.
 
(6)
 The
 officers
 and
 men
 of
 the
 regular
 force
 of
 the
 armed
 forces
 shall
 be
 recruited
 proportionately
 from
 all
 provinces
 
1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners in
and
 cities
 as
 far
 as
 practicable.
  Case No. L-33964 — filed on August 24, 1971 — who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and
(7)
 The
 tour
 of
 duty
 of
 the
 Chief
 of
 Staff
 of
 the
 armed
 forces
 shall
 not
 exceed
 three
 years.
 However,
 in
 times
 of
 war
 or
  6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary — which is under the command
other
 national
 emergency
 declared
 by
 the
 Congress,
 the
 President
 may
 extend
 such
 tour
 of
 duty.
  of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia — to go and did go to the headquarters of the

  Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter,

 

detained., etc. (too long to list everyone)
The return and answer in L-33964 alleges that
1. the petitioners had been detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in
the crime of insurrection or rebellion;"
2. that "their continued detention is justified due to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of
the Philippines;"
3. that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety
and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus,";
4. that in making the declaration, the "President acted on relevant facts gathered thru the
coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which
the Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full account and disclosure without
risking revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security";
5. that the determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court
and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which
cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry,"
6. that petitioners "are under detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities
on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still committing,
individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency and
other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government;
7. that petitioners cannot raise "the question of their guilt or innocence";
8. that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the
existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that
petitioners come within the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been suspended";
9. that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and
preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and
public interest";
10. that the President of the Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to
insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of the
other persons in current confinement remain unimpaired and unhampered"; and
11. that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of
the proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various
safeguards contained in directives issued by proper authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971,
directing, that, except when caught in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant
authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority shall not be
granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences,"
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all
units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons
than those specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve material law; that
precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by
improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will
be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces
down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that
arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and
that members of the detainee's immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;
3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing
the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to
prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ;
and
4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative
Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the
implementation of Proclamation No. 889.
On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation
No. 889.
Issues/Held:
1. WON Court should adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker, pursuant to which,
"the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is
final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." – NO
2. WON the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
valid. – YES
Ratio:
1. 2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege
to the writ, to wit:
• there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to
paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger
thereof," and
• "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
2. The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by 2 factors, namely: (a) it
relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott involving the U.S. President's power to call out the
militia and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General,
whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects,
can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the
freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all
government authority emanates.
3. The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The
authority conferred by the Constitution is limited and conditional.
• For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend is thus confined
and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential
to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it
may be exercised.
• And, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
4. The Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely
abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security
required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if he had data on the
NPA’s plans.
• He had consulted his advisers. He had reason to feel that the situation was
critical and demanded immediate action.
• This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And he had
substantial grounds to entertain such belief.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has,
under the Constitution, 3 courses of action open to him, namely:
1. to call out the armed forces;
2. to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
3. to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to
attain the desired result. Of the 2 other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the
least harsh.
Decision:

Petition DISMISSED.
Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 183711
Date of Promulgation: June 22, 2010
Ponente: Brion, J.
Petition: certiorari
Petitioners: Edita Burgos
Respondents: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., Lt. Gen.
Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col. Noel Clement,
Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, And Director General Oscar Calderon
Facts:
In 2007, Jonas Burgos (farmer advocate and Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan member) was
abducted at about 1:30 pm by 4 armed men and a woman in civilian clothes while having lunch
at the Hapag Kainan Restaurant in Ever Gotesco Mall, Quezon City. Jonas’s family filed a
complaint at the CHR (CHR) alleging military involvement in the abduction of Jonas after tracing
the license plate of the vehicle used in the abduction to a vehicle impounded in the 56th Infantry
Battalion of the AFP and another complaint with the Intelligence Service of the AFP, and Task
Force-USIG – NCR.
Thereafter, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the CA asking that the government
produce Jonas to the court.
Almost five years since the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, the Burgos family concluded their
presentation of witnesses and evidences for the Habeas Corpus Petition. The defense shall start
presenting their witnesses in May 2012.
In light of the latest developments on the abduction case of Jonas Burgos, the
SC reviews the Court of Appeal’s decision on the consolidated petitions of Edita Burgos for
Habeas Corpus, Contempt and Writ of Amparo.
The assailed CA decision:
1) dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
2) denied the petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and
3) partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
Last 2010, the SC issued a resolution ordering the Commission on
Human Rights to continue the investigation regarding the abduction of Jonas Burgos.
The Court tasked the CHR to conduct further investigations because of the lapses by the PNP-
CIDG
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo,
as she is entitled as President to immunity from suit. On March 2011, CHR submits its report to
the SC. (See Findings under Notes.)
Issues/Held:
WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas Burgos is sufficient enough for
the SC to issue a final ruling w/ regard to:
1) Issue a writ of Habeas corpus? YES
2) Declare respondents in contempt? NO
3) Issue a writ of Amparo? NO
Ratio:
Writ of Amparo
1. After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and SC findings in
the June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings
that Lt.Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in
abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and refer
this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo
respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
2. The CA shall continue hearing on the Amparo petition.
3. On the non-compliance of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) to provide
the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby
disobeyed the SC 2010 Resolution.
4. Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the above considerations, we
resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff,
AFP, to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court
for defying 2010Resolution.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
1. In light of the new evidence, the Court hereby dismisses the Court of Appeal’s
decision to dismiss the habeas corpus petition.
2. For this purpose, SC also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas
corpus petition and require him - together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the
incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of
the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano - to produce
the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not be released from detention
Petition for Contempt
1. Two types of Contempt: Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority
and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."
On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by
a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an
offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose
is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
2. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for
which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though
strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty - a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
3. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for
filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of
Jonas.

 
4. In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
who is no the longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines, she should now The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions. cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
Decision: the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
Habeas Corpus issued. Petition for Contempt dismissed. information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for
the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly
unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President
might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
IBP – ANDRE
constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

Lacson v. Perez network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
GR No. 147780 or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss
Date of Promulgation: May 10, 2001 of human lives and mass destruction of property
Ponente: Melo J.
Petition: injunction, mandamus Decision:
Plaintiff: Panfilo Lacson etc; Miriam Defensor-Santiago; Rodolfo Lumbao; Laban ng Petitions dismissed.
Demokratikong Pilipino
Defendant: Sec Perez, P. Director Leandro Mendoza; Angelo Reyes (Defense Sec); Sec Perez;
DOJ
Sanlakas v. Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 159085
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 , declaring that there was a state of
Date of Promulgation: February 3, 2004
rebellion in the NCR. This was because an “angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
Ponente: Tinga, J.
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons” attempted to break into
Petition: Petition to declare unconstitutional Proclamation 427 and GO 4
Malacanang. The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and PNP to
Petitioner: Sanlakas
suppress the rebellion.
Respondent: Executive Secretary Angelo Reyes
On May 6, 2001, she lifted the declaration of state and rebellion.
Facts:
Enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premier apartments in Makati City in July
This is a consolidation of four petitions. All these petitions assail the declaration of a state of
27, 2003. The soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the
rebellion by Pres. Arroyo and the alleged warrantless arrests effected thereafter.
Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine National Police.
Issues/Held:
Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring “a
1. (All of the peititons) WON there were warrantless arrests that happened – NO
state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
2. (Petition filed by Lumbao) WON the declaration of state of rebellion is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers – NO
By the evening of the same day, the Oakwood occupation ended and the soldiers agreed to
return to the barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state
Ratio:
of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435.
1. The Secretary denied that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the rebellion. What was extant were general instructions to law
Petitioners say that
enforcement officers and military agencies to implement the Proclamation.
(3) there is no need to for a declaration of a state of rebellion in order to call out the armed
forces
In quelling rebellion, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests if the
(4) the declaration of a state of rebellion is a circumvention of the report requirement under
circumstances so warrant. 40
Section 18 Article VII , commanding the President to report to Congress within 48 hours
2. Petitioner Lumbao argues that the declaration is violative of doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the                                                                                                                
constitutional prerogative to determine or interpret what took place on May 1, 2001. 40  Article  VII  Section  18.  The  President  shall  be  the  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  of  all  armed  forces  of  the  Philippines  
and  whenever  it  becomes  necessary,  he  may  call  out  such  armed  forces  to  prevent  or  suppress  lawless  violence,  
invasion  or  rebellion.  In  case  of  invasion  or  rebellion,  when  the  public  safety  requires  it,  he  may,  for  a  period  not  
The Court disagreed with this. Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution expressly provides exceeding  sixty  days,  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  or  place  the  Philippines  or  any  part  
that “the president shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the thereof  under  martial  law.  Within  forty-­‐eight  hours  from  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  or  the  suspension  of  the  
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  the  President  shall  submit  a  report  in  person  or  in  writing  to  the  Congress.  
prevent lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.” The  Congress,  voting  jointly,  by  a  vote  of  at  least  a  majority  of  all  its  Members  in  regular  or  special  session,  may  
 
  
from the proclamation of martial law. 3. In declaring a state of rebellion, the President exercises purely executive powers, vested on
42
(5) The declaration of a state of rebellion is actually an exercise of emergency powers, as such the President by Article VII Sections 1 and 18 .
41
there would be a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Article VI Section 23(2) 4. A person may be subjected to warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion, regardless
(6) the declaration of a state of rebellion would open the door for unconstitutional warrantless whether the president has declared a state of rebellion or not, so long as the requisites for a
arrests for the crime of rebellion valid warrantless arrest are present. Thus, the declaration wouldn’t really “open the door” for
warrantless arrests.
The Court said that the case is already moot since the President already issued Proclamation
435 but they decided the case anyway since it is “capable of repetition yet evading review”. Decision:
Petition dismissed
Issues/Held:
1. WON there is a need to declare a state of rebellion in order to call out the armed forces—NO Notes:
2. WON the declaration would circumvent the report requirement—NO The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
3. WON the declaration would constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers and thus power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are:
usurp the power of Congress to delegate emergency powers—NO 1. the calling out power,
4. WON the declaration would open the door for unconstitutional warrantless arrests—NO 2. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
3. the power to declare martial law.
Ratio:
1. In order to exercise the calling out power the Constitution doesn’t require the President to In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
make a declaration of a state or rebellion since Article VII Section 18 provides that “xxx conditions, namely,
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress 1. an actual invasion or rebellion, and
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”. In other words, he exercises discretion in calling out 2. that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
the armed forces. NEVETHERLESS, the President is NOT EXPRESSLY prohibited from
declaring a state of rebellion under Article VII Section 18. (The Court said that they may examine However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, “these conditions are
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it
abuse of discretion, but none of the petitioners have, by way of proof, supported their assertion becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
that the President acted without factual basis.) violence, invasion or rebellion.”
2. The report requirement is only required if the President declares martial law not for a
declaration of a state of rebellion. There is no indication that the President has attempted to The Court may review the factual basis of the President’s exercise of the calling out power and
exercise or has exercised martial law powers determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

As commander in chief he has the power to take over the operation of vital utilities for the public
interest under Article XII Section 18.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
revoke  such  proclamation  or  suspension,  which  revocation  shall  not  be  set  aside  by  the  President.  Upon  the  
initiative  of  the  President,  the  Congress  may,  in  the  same  manner,  extend  such  proclamation  or  suspension  for  a   David v. Macapagal-Arroyo - supra
period  to  be  determined  by  the  Congress,  if  the  invasion  or  rebellion  shall  persist  and  public  safety  requires  it.    
 
The  Congress,  if  not  in  session,  shall,  within  twenty-­‐four  hours  following  such  proclamation  or  suspension,  
convene  in  accordance  with  its  rules  without  need  of  a  call.     Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Puno
  G.R. No. 190259
The  Supreme  Court  may  review,  in  an  appropriate  proceeding  filed  by  any  citizen,  the  sufficiency  of  the  factual  
basis  of  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  or  the  suspension  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  or  the  extension  thereof,  and  
Date of Promulgation: June 7, 2011
must  promulgate  its  decision  thereon  within  thirty  days  from  its  filing.    
 
Ponente: Abad, J.
A  state  of  martial  law  does  not  suspend  the  operation  of  the  Constitution,  nor  supplant  the  functioning  of  the  civil   Petition: Petition for Prohibition
courts  or  legislative  assemblies,  nor  authorize  the  conferment  of  jurisdiction  on  military  courts  and  agencies  over   Petitioners: Datu ZaldyUy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, Regie Sahali-Generale
civilians  where  civil  courts  are  able  to  function,  nor  automatically  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ.     Respondents: Hon. Ronaldo Puno, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior
  and Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting
The  suspension  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  shall  apply  only  to  persons  judicially  charged  for  rebellion  or  offenses   in his stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, Armed Forces of the
inherent  in  or  directly  connected  with  invasion.     Philippines(AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
During  the  suspension  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ,  any  person  thus  arrested  or  detained  shall  be  judicially  charged   (ARMM), and Philippine National Police (PNP), or any of their units operating in ARMM
within  three  days  otherwise  he  shall  be  released.  
Facts:
41  Article  VI  Section  23(2).  In  times  of  war  or  other  national  emergency,  the  Congress  may,  by  law,  authorize  the   On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including
President,  for  a  limited  period  and  subject  to  such  restrictions  as  it  may  prescribe,  to  exercise  powers  necessary  
and  proper  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy.  Unless  sooner  withdrawn  by  resolution  of  the  Congress,  such  
powers  shall  cease  upon  the  next  adjournment  thereof.                                                                                                                    
  42  Article  VII  Section  1.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  the  President  of  the  Philippines.
 
  
some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proc. 1946, placing "the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of 2. WON Pres. Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and
emergency." She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents – NO
Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places. 3. WON the President had factual bases for her actions - YES

On November 27, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM Ratio/Held:
from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues raised over the terminology used 1. WON Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy
in AO 273, the President issued AO 273-A amending the former, by delegating instead of under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded
transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. ARMM Organic Act - NO

Petitioners
The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
• The executive issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in
o The Proclamation and AO’s empowered the DILG Sec. to take over ARMM’s operations
the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed
and seize regional government’s powers – Violation of the Principle of Local
the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII,
Autonomy under RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution
Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM
o The Pres. gave the DILG Sec. the power to exercise, not merely administrative
Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.In short, the DILG
supervision, but control over ARMM since the Sec. can suspend ARMM officials and
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
replace them.
• The Pres. had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency especially in the
Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents 2. WON Pres. Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
occurred – Invalid Exercise of President’s Emergency Powers and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents – NO
• Prayer: Proclamation 1946, AO 273, and AO 273-A be declared unconstitutional and DILG
Sec., the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
46
OSG 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution .
• Proc. 1946 did not divest ARMM of its autonomy, it only seeks to restore peace and order
in subject places The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
o It was an exercise of the President’s calling-out power as Commander-in-Chief under places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized
43
the first sentence of Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution – purely discretionary in her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
nature and determination rests solely in her wisdom based on intelligence reports and lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
such best information available to call out the armed forces to supress and prevent She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
lawless violence.
• AO 273 and AO 273-A merely delegated supervisory powers over ARMM to DILG On the other hand, the President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
o Orders did not authorize suspension and replacement of ARMM officers but was violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
necessary to facilitate investigations on the mass killings Constitution.
• The assailed proclamation and AO’s did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers

As was held in IBP v. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
Issues: determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
1. WON Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
44 the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution , and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded
45
ARMM Organic Act - NO 3. WON the President had factual bases for her actions - YES

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45

 Sec.
 1,
 Art.
 V,
 RA
 9054.
 General
 Supervision
 of
 the
 President
 Over
 the
 Regional
 Governor.
 –
 Consistent
 with
 the
 
43
Constitution
 and
 basic
 policy
 on
 local
 autonomy,
 the
 President
 of
 the
 Republic
 shall
 exercise
 general
 supervision
 over
 

 Sec
 18,
 Art.
 VII.
 The
 President
 shall
 be
 the
 Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief
 of
 all
 armed
 forces
 of
 the
 Philippines
 and
 whenever
  the
 Regional
 Governor
 to
 ensure
 that
 his
 or
 her
 acts
 are
 within
 the
 scope
 of
 his
 or
 her
 powers
 and
 functions.
 
it
 becomes
 necessary,
 he
 may
 call
 out
 such
 armed
 forces
 to
 prevent
 or
 suppress
 lawless
 violence,
 invasion
 or
 rebellion.
  46

 Sec.
 23,
 Art.
 VI.
 x
 x
 x
 (2)
 In
 times
 of
 war
 or
 other
 national
 emergency,
 the
 Congress
 may,
 by
 law,
 authorize
 the
 
x
 x
 x
  President,
 for
 a
 limited
 period
 and
 subject
 to
 such
 restrictions
 as
 it
 may
 prescribe,
 to
 exercise
 powers
 necessary
 and
 
proper
 to
 carry
 out
 a
 declared
 national
 policy.
 Unless
 sooner
 withdrawn
 by
 resolution
 of
 the
 Congress,
 such
 powers
 
44

 Sec.
 16,
 Art.
 X.
 The
 President
 shall
 exercise
 general
 supervision
 over
 autonomous
 regions
 to
 ensure
 that
 laws
 are
  shall
 cease
 upon
 the
 next
 adjournment
 thereof.
 
faithfully
 executed.
 
 

 

The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts
The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the
"calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the
ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take-over of the entire ARMM
by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The OSG on the other hand was able to provide factual basis on why the President has used her
calling-out powers:
• Both the Ampatuans and Mangundadatus are prominent families engaged in the
political control of Maguindanao and both are known to have an arsenal of armed
followers who hold elective positions in various parts of ARMM and Mindanao
• They even have Rebel Armed Groups (RAGs) who support them
• The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proc. 1946
was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities
in the places covered by the said AO
• The executive issuances are preventive action to pacify people’s fears and stabilize
the situation
Even the present administration of Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of state of
emergency under Proc. 1946 since it was still necessary to disband private armies and
confiscate loose firearms to ensure the pacification of the area and supress any violence that
may still erupt.
Decision:
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ii. Executive clemencies
ART VII
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
ART IX-C
Sec. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation
of the Commission.
iii. Diplomatic powers
iv. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Constantino v. Cuisia
G.R. No. 106064
Date of Promulgation: October 13, 2005
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Petition: Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Petitioners: Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino and their minor children
Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa, and Anna Karmina, Freedom From Debt
Coalition, and Filomeno Sta. Ana III
Respondents: Hon. Jose B. Cuisia, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, Hon.
Ramon del Rosario, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, Hon. Emmanuel V. Pelaez, in his
capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the National Treasurer
Facts:
Named respondents were the then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Secretary of
Finance, the National Treasurer, and the Philippine Debt Negotiation Chairman Emmanuel V.
Pelaez. All respondents were members of the Philippine panel tasked to negotiate with the
country’s foreign creditors pursuant to the Financing Program.
During the term of former President Corazon Aquino, the Financing Program was created to
manage the country’s external debt problem through a debt strategy involving cooperation
and negotiation with foreign creditors.
The Aquino government entered into 3 restructuring agreements with representatives of
foreign creditor governments during the period of 1986 to 1991. (buyback and bond conversion
schemes)
On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team negotiated an agreement with
the country’s Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on
the Financing Program which respondents characterized as "a multi-option financing
package." Petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program, respondents had
already implemented its "buyback component" when on 15 May 1992, the Philippines bought
back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to the Program.
Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the country’s foreign
creditors consisting of two debt-relief options. Debt buyback or bond-conversion. The
buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond-
conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a new loan by virtue of
a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original
loan.
According to respondents, the Financing Program would cover about U.S. $5.3 billion of
foreign commercial debts and it was expected to deal comprehensively with the commercial
bank debt problem of the country and pave the way for the country’s access to capital
markets. They add that the Program carried 3 basic options from which foreign bank
lenders could choose, namely:
1. to lend money,
2. to exchange existing restructured Philippine debts with an interest reduction bond; or
3. to exchange the same Philippine debts with a principal collateralized interest reduction
bond.
Petitioners:
1. They object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program
as beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the

 
47 • We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee
Constitution. It is claimed that the buyback and securitization/bond conversion
foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class.
schemes are neither "loans" nor "guarantees," and hence beyond the power of the
President to execute. • Therefore, respondents’ actions are not unconstitutional.
2. Even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally
permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into Decision:
these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents. Petition DISMISSED.
3. The Financing Program violates several constitutional policies and that contracts
executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or will be done by respondents with v. Power over foreign affairs
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. vi. Recognition of foreign states
vii. Settlement of disputes with foreign powers
Issues/Held: viii. Treaty-making
WON the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. – YES ART VII
Ratio: Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain
kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous Executive Agreements
than others.
• This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would Bayan v. Executive Secretary
unduly burden the powers of the President. G.R. No. 138570
(See Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno)
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED AGENCY:
If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, it Date of Promulgation: October 10, 2000
would hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. This would negate the Ponente: Buena, J.
very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are Petition: certiorari and prohibition
accorded. Petitioners: Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)
• Here, it fell upon the Secretary of Finance, who had the expertise as the alter ego of the Respondents: Ronaldo Zamora (Exec Sec), Domingo Siazon (Foreign Affairs Sec), Orlando
President regarding "the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of Mercado (Defense Sec), Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Sen Pres Marcelo Fernan, Senators
the Government,” to formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy publicly Tatad, Ople, Drilon and Biazon
expressed by the President herself.
Facts:
Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued the Program without On March 14, 1947, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the United
prior authorization of the President or that the terms of the contract were agreed upon without States (US) forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized the use of installations in
the President’s authorization. Philippine territory by US military personnel.
• Congruent with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and On August 30, 1951 the GRP and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) where
restructure existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the the parties agreed to respond to any external attack on their territory, armed forces, public
acts of respondents leads us to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval. vessels, and aircraft.

RA 245: On 1991, the parties negotiated for an extension of the Military Bases Agreement but it
Section 1 thereof empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and was rejected by the Senate. Albeit the suspension of periodic military exercises upon the
after consultation of the Monetary Board, "to borrow from time to time on the credit of the expiration of the said Agreement on the same year, defense and security relations continued
Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government."
On July 18, 1997, the parties exchanged anew notes and discussed the possible elements of the
• While the President wields the borrowing power, it is the Secretary of Finance who
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
normally carries it out.
After several negotiations and conferences, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which
then was respectively signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon and United States
Exception?
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances. The
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the
approved it by (2/3) votes.
pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
Issue/s:
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
Procedural:
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
1. WON petitioners have locus standi? NO
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
Substantive:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47
 The
 provision
 states
 that
 the
 President
 may
 contract
 or
 guarantee
 foreign
 loans
 in
 behalf
 of
 the
 Republic.
 

 
2.
3.
Ratio:
1. WON petitioners have locus standi? NO
The Court relaxed the standing requirements in view of the transcendental importance of
the presented issues.
2. WON Art VII Sec 21 should apply as opposed to Art XVIII Sec 25? NO
PETITIONERS/RESPONDENTS
Petitioners argue that Art XVIII Sec 25 is
applicable considering that the VFA has for
its subject the presence of foreign military
troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that
Art VII Sec 21should apply inasmuch as the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an
agreement which involves merely the
temporary visits of US personnel engaged in
joint military exercises.
Respondents further argue that Art XVIII
Sec 25 is not controlling since no foreign
military bases, but merely foreign troops and
facilities, are involved in the VFA.
48 49
WON Art VII Sec 21 should apply as opposed to Art XVIII Sec 25 ? NO
a. WON the requirements pursuant to the applicable provision are sufficiently
complied w/? YES
WON the President acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA? NO
COURT HELD:
Art VII Sec 21 is a general provision dealing
with treatise or international agreements
needing 2/3 vote of the Senate while Art
XVIII Sec 25 is a special provision applying
to treaties involving the presence of military
bases, troops, or facilities.
Under the doctrine of lex specialis derogat
generali, the special provision should
always prevail over the general one.
However, the provisions of Art VII Sec 21
will find applicability for the purpose of
determining the # of votes required to obtain
the valid concurrence of the Senate.
The Constitution makes no distinction
between “transient’ and “permanent”
When no distinction is made by law, the
Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
A perusal of the provision reveals that the
proscription covers “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.” NOT collectively as
separate and independent subjects.
The use of comma and the disjunctive word
“or” clearly signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others
included in the enumeration.
§ under a treaty
§ duly concurred in by the Senate (and by majority of votes through national
referendum IF required by Congress) – 2/3 vote or not <16 favorable votes J
§ recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state
First two requirements were undisputedly met. “Recognized as a treaty” means the contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. It is inconsequential if the US treats it
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
50
binding as a treaty
Furthermore, the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate
should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to be bound by
said treaty, hence, our state has a duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
in it.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance
of the treaty is proclaimed. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty itself provides for such ratification, (b) it is
otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification,
or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the
full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.
In our laws, the power to ratify is vested in the President. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
3. WON the President acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA? NO
The President acted within the confines and limits vested in him by the Constitution and
as the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
51
Although Art VIII Sec 1 is said to have broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it
has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations as in this case.
Decision:
PETITION DISMISSED.
Notes:
Other issues were raised but were not addressed by the court in view of the separation of
powers as it will constitute encroachment upon legislative wisdom: (PERO DI KO GETS WHY
KASI CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NAMAN TO)

2.a. WON the requirements pursuant to Art XVIII Sec 25 are sufficiently complied w/? YES
Art XVIII Sec 25 disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country unless the
                                                                                                               
50  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties:  
following are met:
TREATY  is  defined  as  an  international  instrument  concluded  between  States  in  written  form  and  governed  by  
international  law,  whether  embodied  in  a  single  instrument  or  in  two  or  more  related  instruments,  and  whatever  
                                                                                                                its  particular  designation.    
48  ART  VII  Sec  21  No  treaty  or  international  agreement  shall  be  valid  and  effective  unless  concurred  in  by  at  least   ART  2(2)  provides  that  “the  provisions  of  paragraph  1  regarding  the  use  of  terms  in  the  present  Convention  are  
two-­‐thirds  of  all  the  Members  of  the  Senate.   without  prejudice  to  the  use  of  those  terms,  or  to  the  meanings  which  may  be  given  to  them  in  the  internal  law  of  
49  ART  XVIII  Sec  25  After  the  expiration  in  1991  of  the  Agreement  between  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  and  the   the  State.”  
United  States  of  America  concerning  military  bases,  foreign  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities  shall  not  be  allowed   51  ART  VIII  Sec  1  x  x  x  Judicial  power  includes  the  duty  of  the  courts  of  justice  to  settle  actual  controversies  

in  the  Philippines  except  under  a  treaty  duly  concurred  in  by  the  Senate  and,  when  the  Congress  so  requires,   involving  rights  which  are  legally  demandable  and  enforceable,  and  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  
ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  by  the  people  in  a  national  referendum  held  for  that  purpose,  and   grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  branch  or  instrumentality  
recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  other  contracting  State.   of  the  Government.  
 
  
1. WON the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty insofar as: At best, the VFA would be more akin to a sole or presidential executive agreement which
- Philippine courts are deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses would be valid if concluded on the basis of the U.S. President’s exclusive power under
committed by US military personnel? the U.S. Constitution.
- the Supreme Court is deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher? LEGAL FORCE: SOLE EXECUTIVE
TREATY
2. WON VFA violates the equal protection clause? As against AGREEMENT
3. WON VFA violates the prohibition against nuclear weapons? Pursuant to the Supremacy
52
State law Clause of the US Constitution, it same
is superior over State law
Opinion:
- Generally, it cannot
DISSENTING OPINION OF J. PUNO A treaty and an Act of Legislation supersede interfering federal
are placed on the same footing; 53
Main Focus of the Dissent: Acts of Congress legislation
such as one can supersede the 54
rd other in case of inconsistenc - Art I Sec 7 of the US
WON the VFA sufficiently complied w/ the 3 requirement under Art XVIII Sec 25 w/c is that it
must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state? NO Constitution
US Constitution same
The VFA is not recognized as a treaty in the US, but merely an executive agreement.
As can be discerned from the comparison, a treaty in the US is different from a sole executive
In ascertaining the VFA’s compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be “recognized rd
agreement as regards especially its legal effect. Therefore, it falls short of the 3 requirement
as a treaty by the other contracting state,” it is crystal clear from the above exchanges of the under Art XVIII Sec 25.
Constitutional Commissioners that the yardstick should be U.S. constitutional law.
Negotiate
In U.S. practice, a “treaty” is only one of four types of international agreements, namely:
treaties, executive agreements pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive agreements, and The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
sole executive agreements. G.R. No. 183591
The term “executive agreement” is used both colloquially and in scholarly and governmental
writings as a convenient catch-all to subsume all international agreements intended to bind the Date of Promulgation: October 14, 2008
United States and another government, other than those which receive consent of two-thirds of Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
the U.S. Senate. Petition: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
Petitioners: Province of North Cotabato et al.
Furthermore, these executive agreements may be classified into three types, namely: Respondents: The Government of the RP
Facts:
1) Treaty-authorized executive agreements, i.e., agreements made by the President pursuant On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by
to authority conferred in a prior treaty the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro
(2) Congressional-executive agreements, i.e., agreements either (a) negotiated by the Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the
President with prior Congressional authorization or enactment or (b) confirmed by both Houses Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
of Congress after the fact of negotiation; and 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD, as the Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, briefly sums up, contains the commitment of the parties to pursue peace
(3) Presidential or sole executive agreements, i.e., agreements made by the President based negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and
on his exclusive presidential powers, such as the power as commander-in-chief of the armed pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
forces pursuant to which he conducts military operations with U.S. allies, or his power to receive advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.
ambassadors and recognize foreign governments.
However, aforementioned signing was unable to materialize upon several motions of petitioners,
This classification is important as the different types of executive agreements bear lead by the Province of north Cotabato Gov. Jesus Sacdalan and/or Vice Gov. Emmanuel Piñol,
distinctions in terms of constitutional basis, subject matter, and legal effects. that were brought to this Court, seeking temporary injunction, compelling respondents to
Using these three types of executive agreements as bases for classification, the VFA would not disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, invoking their right to
fall under the category of an executive agreement made by the president pursuant to
authority conferred in a prior treaty because although the VFA makes reference to the Mutual
                                                                                                               
52  "This  Constitution,  and  the  Law  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance  thereof;  and  all  Treaties  
Defense Treaty in its Preamble, the Mutual Defense Treaty itself does not confer authority upon
made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the  Authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  Law  of  the  Land;  
the U.S. President to enter into executive agreements in implementation of the Treaty. and  the  Judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  Thing  in  the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  any  State  to  the  
Contrary  notwithstanding."  
Neither does the VFA fall under the category of a Congressional-Executive Agreement as 53  US  v  Guy  W.  Capps:  President  might  act  in  external  affairs  without  congressional  authority,  but  not  that  he  might  
it was not concluded by the U.S. President pursuant to Congressional authorization or act  contrary  to  an  Act  of  Congress.  
enactment nor has it been confirmed by the U.S. Congress. 54  ART  I  Sec  7  The  president  does  not  have  power  to  repeal  existing  federal  laws.  Consequently,  he  cannot  make  

an  indirect  repeal  by  means  of  a  sole  executive  agreement.  

 

informations on matters of public concern. Furthermore, the petitioners seek to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon, assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the agreement.
Issues/Held:
1.) PROCEDURAL:
WON the constitutionality and legality of the MOA-AD is ripe for judicial review
a. Ripeness - YES
b. Locus Standi - YES
c. Mootness - NO
2.) SUBSTANTIVE:
a. WON there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) - YES
b. WON the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
-to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
- to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
-to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)
Ratio:
6. PROCEDURAL – Ripeness ?- YES
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
review, reasoning that the MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further
negotiations, and that it remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations. Hence, there are no concrete acts that create the imminent
possibility of violating the petitioners’ rights.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The petitioners’ case is ripe for adjudication. The
failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing necessary changes to the
legal framework and amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
7. PROCEDURAL - Locus Standi? – YES
Legal standing is granted to a person who alleges to have personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. The petitioners are all granted locus standi. In view of the direct and substantial
injury that the representative of LGUs would suffer as their territories, whether In whole or in
part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE, their legal standing is beyond doubt.
The private petitioners, on the other hand, alleging their standing as taxpayers and invoking
the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, were also granted standing.
8. PROCEDURAL - Mootness? – NO
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of
all the reliefs prayed for by the petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive
Secretary that “no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not
sign the MOA.”
The court finds that contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD
and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the petitions
have not become moot and academic. The non-signing was due to the Court’s issuance of TRO.
The Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the “moot and academic”
principle in view of:
(a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest;
(c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In relation to the MOA-AD,
petitions are imbued with paramount public interest involving significant part of the country’s
territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. Also, the assertion that
the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments provides impetus to the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.
The petitions for mandamus, however, have become moot for respondents having furnished the
Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.
9. SUBSTANTIVE - WON there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest including public consultation under RA
7160?
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991). The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, which
directly affects the lives of the people at large. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society. Hence, PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to carry out the
pertinent consultations.
10. SUBSTANTIVE - WON the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,

does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will
eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Decision:
Respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied. The main and intervening petitions are given
due course and hereby granted. The MOA-AD Aspect of GRP-MILF Tripolo Agreement on
Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the constitution.
ix. Deportation of undesirable aliens
x. Tariffs
SOUTHERN CROSS - KARINA
d. Residual Power
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
Date of Promulgation: September 15, 1989
Ponente: Cortes, J.
Petition: mandamus and prohibition
Petitioners: Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Aranet,
Imee Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Gregorio Araneta, Pacifico E. Marcos, Nicanor Yniguez, and
Philconsa, represented by its President, Conrado F. Estrella
Respondents: Hon. Raul Manglapus, Catalino Macaraig, Sedfrey Ordonez, Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Fidel Ramos, Renato De Villa
Facts:
Former Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish
to return to the Philippines to die.
President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is

 
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of had been ratified by the Philippines
Marcos and his family.
Issues/Held:
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats and the ff supervening events: 1. WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
4. Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines – YES
5. Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists 2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
6. Plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
7. Honasan’s failed coup return – NO
8. Communist insurgency movements
9. Secessionist movements in Mindanao Ratio:
10. Devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt and plunder of nation by The court framed the question not so much as WON the right at bar is the right to travel but that
Marcos and cronies it is the right to return to one’s country. This locates it outside the circle of specifically guaranteed
rights in the Bill of Rights and into the sphere of international law, which, under our Constitution,
Marcos filed this petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them is part of the law of the land.
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of Pres. Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos
from returning in the Philippines. The court adopted a two-tiered approach: first, the issue of WON the president has the power to
bar entry will be resolved, and second, WON the president acted arbitrarily.
According to the Marcoses, barring their Respondents argue:
return deprives them of their right to: Executive power
The court first struggles with the question of WON one should limit executive powers to those
1. Life, liberty, property without due 1. That this case involves a political explicitly mentioned in the Constitution (control, CIC, faithfully execute laws, etc). Petitioners
process and equal protection of the question which is non-justiciable claim that the President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly
55
laws 2. For the primacy of the right of the denied to her. If we apply the principle of inclusio unius est exclusion alterius, then we would
56
2. Travel which may only be impaired State to national security over have a clear-cut picture of what powers the President actually has.
by a court order 59
individual rights
Also, they assert that under international law, However, from an analysis of other similar Constitutions, the court rules that the principle does
3. That the decision to ban them for
their right to return to the Philippines is not apply in this case. The executive power can even go beyond merely executing the laws. In a
reasons of national security and
guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of similar vein, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
57 public safety has international
Human Rights and the International enumerated in the Constitution. The court even goes to say that whatever power inherent in
58 precedents
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , which the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

                                                                                                                The power involved

55  Art.  III,  Sec  1.  No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  nor  shall  any   The Court cites Art. II, Sec. 4 and 5: “the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
person  be  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.   the people” and that “the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
  property and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all people
56  Art.  III,  Sec.  6.  The  liberty  of  abode  and  of  changing  the  same  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  law  shall  not  be   of the blessings of democracy”.
impaired  except  upon  lawful  order  of  the  court.  Neither  shall  the  right  to  travel  be  impaired  except  in  the  interest  
of  national  security,  public  safety,  or  public  health,  as  may  be  provided  by  law.   These principles are the ones that President has sworn to preserve and defend especially in the
57  Art.  13.  (1)  Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  movement  and  residence  within  the  borders  of  each  state.(2)  
face of the question at bar. This provides the basis for the President’s actions and the source of
Everyone  has  the  right  to  leave  any  country,  including  his  own,  and  to  return  to  his  country.  
 
the power that is being exercised.

58  Art.  12.1)  Everyone  lawfully  within  the  territory  of  a  State  shall,  within  that  territory,  have  the  right  to  liberty  of  
Although the Constitution outlines tasks of the President, this list is not definite and exclusive.
movement  and  freedom  to  choose  his  residence.   She has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution, which include
2)  Everyone  shall  be  free  to  leave  any  country,  including  his  own.   the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people,
3)  The  above-­‐mentioned  rights  shall  not  be  subject  to  any  restrictions  except  those  which  are  provided  by  law,  are   60
promote their welfare and advance national interest .
necessary  to  protect  national  security,  public  order  (order  public),  public  health  or  morals  or  the  rights  and  
freedoms  of  others,  and  are  consistent  with  the  other  rights  recognized  in  the  present  Covenant.  
4)  No  one  shall  be  arbitrarily  deprived  of  the  right  to  enter  his  own  country.   The problem is one balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual powers, which,
  according to Theodore Roosevelt, is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do

 Art  II,  Sec.  4.  The  prime  duty  of  the  Government  is  to  serve  and  protect  the  people.  The  Government  may  call  
59                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
upon  the  people  to  defend  the  State  and,  in  the  fulfillment  thereof,  all  citizens  may  be  required,  under  conditions   Sec.  5.  The  maintenance  of  peace  and  order,  the  protection  of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  and  the  promotion  of  the  
provided  by  law,  to  render  personal,  military,  or  civil  service.   general  welfare  are  essential  for  the  enjoyment  by  all  the  people  of  the  blessings  of  democracy.  
60  Art.  II,  Sec.  4-­‐5  of  the  Constitution  

 

anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution or laws that the needs of the nation demand.
Also, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace,
which is not limited to CIC powers or emergency powers, but also includes the powers needed
to attend the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They are flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President, which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must
be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
It did not find the decision arbitrary since it was the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses
that could really “prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel’s back.” With
all the documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country, their return would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos.
As for the question of WON there exists factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines, it is proven the
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual.
The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country
and protection of the people. She has sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to
see the faithful execution of laws, and cannot shirk from that responsibility.
Decision:
Petition dismissed.
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
Date of Promulgation: October 27, 1989
Ponente: Cortes, J.
Petition: MFR
Petitioners: Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Aranet,
Imee Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Gregorio Araneta, Pacifico E. Marcos, Nicanor Yniguez, and
Philconsa, represented by its President, Conrado F. Estrella
Respondents: Hon. Raul Manglapus, Catalino Macaraig, Sedfrey Ordonez, Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Fidel Ramos, Renato De Villa
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of 8-7, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those
who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the
tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be
brought back in the Philippines.
A MFR was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their
country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue/Held:
WON the Court should reconsider its earlier decision – NO
Ratio:
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. Factual scenario
during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been
shown to have ceased.
The Court merely reiterated what it had said in the earlier decision but adds:
Contrary to the petitioner’s view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution.
While the 1986 ConCom limited the specific powers of the President, it was not a diminution of
the general grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest
to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the
Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not
enumerated so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers v. US).
Also, the recognition of implied/residual power is not tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution and the power of Marcos under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No.
6.
1. Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied.
2. It refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect and promote interest and welfare of the people. She
bound to comply with that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily.
Decision:
Petition denied for lack of merit.
3. Prohibitions and Immunity
i. Immunity from Suit
In Re Saturnino Bermudez
G.R. No. 76180

 
Date of Promulgation: October 24, 1986 consolidated cases (GR No. 82585, GR No. 82827 and GR No. 83979), three principal issues
Ponente: Per Curiam were raised:
Petition: Petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
Petitioners: Saturnino V. Bermudez against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by
Respondents: none the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
Facts: issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
Satrunino V. Bermudez, a lawyer, just wanted to clear up Sec. 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed if any, to determine probable cause; and
1986 Constitution which states: (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992. Beltran argued that since Pres. Aquino was the complainant in the criminal charges, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
He asks the Court to answer the following, who among the present incumbent President Aquino court’s jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege
and VP Laurel and the elected President Marcos and VP Tolentino is being referred to in the of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
provision mentioned. herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

Issues/Held:
Procedural:
Locus Standi - NO, the petitioner lacks personality to sue or bring this to action.
Substantial:
WON the issue is a justiciable matter - NO
Ratio:
This issue belongs to the realm of politics where the people themselves are the judge. With that
said the Aquino administration is clearly accepted by the people and in the international
community. There is no question that President Aquino and VP Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and VP of the Republic of the Philippines.
Decision:
Petition dismissed
Opinions:
Concur:
Feliciano: Court has no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief, there is a lack of cause
of action, and in all previous Constitutions the boards of canvassers in each province certify who
the elected President and VP are in their respective areas. Thus case must be dismissed.
Cruz: The Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified and thus is not yet
effective. No actual conflict of legal rights at the time.
Issues/Held:
WON such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the presiden t– NO
Ratio:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive
it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
Decision:
Petitions dismissed.

ii. Executive Privilege

Beltran v. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82827 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
G.R. No. 180643
Date of Promulgation: November 14, 1988
Ponente: Per Curiam Date of Promulgation: March 25, 2008
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari and prohibition Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Petitioners: Luis D. Beltran Petition: Petition for Prohibition
Respondents: Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar, Hon Luis Victor, and the Members of the Process Petitioners: Romulo Neri
Serving Unit at the RTC of Manila Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and
Facts: Security
Luis Beltran, among others, were charged with libel by President Cory Aquino. In the three

 

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in the investigation on the NBN
Project on a number of dates, however, he attended only on the September 26 hearing. On
September 18, 2007, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the Project which
initially was approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese government.
On September 26, 2007, Neri testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed
that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When
probed further on what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking
“executive privilege”:
a. Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b. Were you (Neri) dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about
the alleged bribe?
Respondents issued a subpoena ad testificandum, requiring petitioner to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007. However, a letter dated November 15, 2007 by Executive Secretary Ermita
requested respondents to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of “executive
privilege” that covers above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations of the
President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process and
for the protection of the public interest – disclosure of information might impair our diplomatic
and economic relations with China.
In reply to this, on November 22, 2007, the Senate Committee issued a show-cause letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
Neri replied that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He further requested to
be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it was
stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, and that the
conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal.
On January the following year, respondents found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory, and
without responding to his reply, issued an order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he gives his testimony.
The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable to the Court’s proposal
of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the respondents to answer
other questions without prejudice to the decisions on the merits of this petition. However the
Senate disagreed.
OSG – Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum:
• Communications between petitioner and President are covered by the executive
privilege.
• Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the power to inquiries
in aid of legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v.
Ermita
Consequently, on March 6, 2008, PGMA issued Memo Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 and
Memo Circular No. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the Consitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, Senate v. Ermita, when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Issues:
1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive Privilege. -
YES
2. WON respondent committee committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Contempt Order -
YES
Ratio/Held:
1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive
Privilege. - YES
Congress has powers to conduct inquiries for legislative (Sec. 21, Art. VI) and oversight
functions (Sec. 22, Art. VI). The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad enough to cover acquisition of information so as to provide a basis for wise and effective
legislation respecting several conditions which it is intended to affect or change. It is a
compulsory process. However, it has a limitation: it must be validly done in accordance with duly
published Senate or House rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing before it
be respected. Such power extends to executive officials and exemption can only be through a
valid claim of executive privilege. In the case at bar, there is a recognized claim of executive
privilege despite revocation of EO 464 and the concept of executive privilege has
constitutional underpinnings.
US v. Nixon – For the benefit of public interest, the preservation of confidentiality of
conversations that take place in the President’s performance of his official duties is of paramount
importance, Presidential Communications Privilege, since the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality should provide him and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.
In Re: Sealed Case – There are 2 kinds of executive privilege:
(1) Presidential Communications Privilege (PCP) – communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations which President believes
should remain confidential. This concerns the decision making of the President (Separation of
Powers)
Elements:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”;
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President; and
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority

(2) Deliberative Process Privilege – advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. This
concerns the decision making of Executive Officials (Common Law Privilege)
Moreover, Courts have ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military/state secrets, identity of government informers, information related to pending
information and foreign relations.
• Chavez v. PCGG – secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.
• Chavez v. PEA – Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-door Cabinet
meetings
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy
decision-making process and that its disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic
relations with People’s Republic of China. - PCP and Exec. Privilege on matters relating to
Diplomacy or Foreign Relations
• Communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power (enter into an
executive agreement w/ other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature)
• Communications are received by a close advisor of the President (operational
proximity test – petitioner is a member of the cabinet)
• No adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege. No categorical explanation from respondents to show a compelling need for
the answers to the questions, and veer more towards exercise of legislative oversight
function (Sec. 22, Art. 6 of the Constitution)
On Crimes and Wrongdoing
On the claim that the executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime
or wrongdoing as was held in US v Nixon that specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial
outweighs President’s interest in confidentiality, the Court held that the information in this case is
elicited not in a criminal proceeding but a legislative inquiry. The validity of executive privilege
depends not only on the ground invoked but also on the procedural setting or context which the
claim is made.
On the Violation of the People’s Right to Information
The grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3, Constitution). However the Court held
that the Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing, questioned for 11
hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answer more questions except the 3 covered by
executive privilege.
People’s right to information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229; RA 3019, Sec.
3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this case is classified as
confidential wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not every legislative inquiry is an
exercise of people’s right to information.
The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.
The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement for a formal claim of executive
privilege - a precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality: “this Office is constrained
to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the
President has advised Sec. Neri accordingly… The information if disclosed might impair
diplomatic and economic relations with People’s Republic of China.” The grounds were specific
enough so as not to leave respondent in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of information which the privilege sought to
protect.
2. WON respondent committee committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Contempt
Order – YES
The Court provided 5 reasons.
1. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from
constitutional infirmity
2. The Committees did not comply with the requirement, as in Senate v. Ermita, that the
invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry”,
“the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
furtherance thereof”. Compliance is imperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. VI
of Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and affected by the inquiry are
respected.
3. It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on January 30, 2008 had only a
minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present during the
deliberation (7 only were present). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its members may
punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is doubted. Sen.
Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the committee was only 2 and that the will of the
lead committee prevails over all the other.
4. The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21,
Art. VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly
published rules of procedure”, which the respondents failed to meet therefore its
hearings were procedurally infirm.
5. Issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did not pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly
dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order.
Petitioner was not an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify.
Respondents denied him due process of law.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. Contempt Order NULLIFIED.
Dissenting Opinion of Puno, J.
Introduction on Executive Privilege
• The principle of separation of powers is not absolute. It is a hermetic sealing off of the 3
branches of government from one another would preclude the establishment of a nation
capable of governing itself effectively.
• System of checks and balances – the power of congressional oversight is to enhance its
understanding of and influence over implementation of legislation it has enacted. The review
and investigation of executive branch action by legislature is a corollary power of
investigation. The standard justification for this is the presumed need for new or remedial
legislation (investigations in aid of legislation)
• Legislative power of investigation includes power of contempt or process to enforce
(Arnault v. Nazareno) – this is incidental to legislative function. The Legislative cannot
legislate wisely and effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect/change

 
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
Two (2) requirements for the valid exercise of power of investigation and contempt of Respondents: Thomas Aquino, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Trade
witness for contumacy: and Industry (DTI) and Chairman and Chief Delegate of the Philippine Coordinating Committee
1. Existence of a legislative purpose (in aid of legislation); and (PCC) for the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, et al.
2. pertinence of the question propounded.
Facts:
The validity of the claim of executive privilege depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the Petitioners (NGOs, Congressmen, citizens, taxpayers) – filed the petition for mandamus and
context in which it is made. prohibition to obtain the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process
Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. To overcome the presumption, there and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
must be sufficient showing or demonstration of specific need to withheld information based on
two standards: evidentiary and constitutional. Congressmen Tañada and Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into
the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government.
• Function Impairment Test – the Court weighs how the disclosure of the withheld information
would impair the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties more than In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested Undersecretary Tomas Aquino,
nondisclosure would impair other branch’s ability to perform its constitutional functions. Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating Committee created under Executive Order No. 213
("Creation of A Philippine Coordinating Committee to Study the Feasibility of the Japan-
On the Case at Bar Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement") to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and
The SC cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive Secretary because of the paucity to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA.
of explanation on how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest
if petitioner answers disputed questions. The Court cannot determine whether there is Usec. Aquino did not heed the request. By letter, he replied that they shall be provided with a
reasonable danger if petitioner answers – Court cannot engage in guesswork. copy "once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the
proposed agreement has been conducted.”
It is self-evident that the assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of legislative
investigation and have direct relation to the subject and pending Senate bills. The agreement was to be signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the
On Neri’s claim that respondent Senate Committees were seeking to establish the culpability of President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the President or the anomalies in the NBN-ZTE Contract, it must be noted that motive of the 61
the Constitution.
Senate Committees in conducting their investigation is beyond the purview of the Court’s power
of judicial review – questions are pertinent and there is no effective substitute for the information The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
sought.
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad
range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin,
The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is assailed as invalid for customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
failure to be republished since the Senate is not a continuing body and its membership changes
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
every 3 years due to election. This should not cease its labor, Committees continue their work.
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and
By tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not republish its rules especially when general and final provisions.
the same has not undergone any material change. Existing rules which have already
undergone publication should be deemed adopted and continued regardless of election
While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public since
of new members.
September 11, 2006, respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to the
filing of petitioners’ Reply, the initial drafts were kept from public view.
Respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing to
appear for its November 20 hearing. There is no basis for petitioner and Executive Secretary to
Issues/Held:
assume that petitioner’s further testimony will be limited only to the 3 disputed questions.
Procedural:
1. WON petitioners have standing. – YES
2. WON petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent
AKBAYAN v. Aquino event that occurred. – NO
G.R. No. 170516 Substantive:
1. WON diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. – YES
Date of Promulgation: July 16, 2008 2. WON there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. – NO
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
Petition: mandamus and prohibition Ratio:
Petitioners: AKBAYAN Citizens Action Party, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Samahan sa
Kanayunan (“PKSK”), Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL), Vicente Fabe, Angelito Mendoza,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuel Quiambao, Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles, Cong. Lorenzo Tanda III, Cong. Mario Joyo
61
 Section
 21.
 No
 treaty
 or
 international
 agreement
 shall
 be
 valid
 and
 effective
 unless
 concurred
 in
 by
 at
 least
 two-­‐
thirds
 of
 all
 the
 Members
 of
 the
 Senate.
 
Aguja, Cong. Loreta Ann Rosales, Cong. Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, and Cong.

 

 

Procedural:
1. WON petitioners have standing. – YES
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, it
is sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which
possesses the right.
2. WON petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the
subsequent event that occurred. – NO
The petition is not entirely moot because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the
JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
Substantive:
1. WON diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. –
YES
Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and
the context in which it is made.
In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest."
• Such privilege, however, is only presumptive.
o For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context may it be determined if
there is a public interest that is strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
Applying PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
confidential – since there should be ‘ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty is
approved’ – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
• The Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern. Disclosing these offers could impair the
ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments
in future negotiations.
o By hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be
jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones.
Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not be
construed as a waiver by the Executive branch.
• What respondents received from the House Committee and Congressman Aguja were
mere requests for information.
The assertion of executive privilege by the Executive Secretary, even without him adding the
phrase “by order of the President,” shall be sustained.
• The requirement that the phrase “by order of the President” should accompany the
Executive Secretary’s claim of privilege is a new rule laid down for the first time in
Senate v. Ermita which was not yet final and executory at the time respondents filed
their Comment to the petition.
2. WON there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. – NO
There are at least 2 kinds of public interest that considered:
1. The presumed public interest in favor of keeping the subject information
confidential, and
2. The public interest in favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by
the party asking for information
“Sufficient Showing of Need” Standard:
Public interest favoring confidentiality can be defeated only by a STRONG SHOWING OF
NEED, whether that party is Congress or a private citizen. (balancing of interests)
o The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend on
whether the materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions.
o Mere assertion that the JPEPA covers a subject matter over which
Congress has the power to legislate would not suffice.
Decision:
Petition DISMISSED.
Notes:
The “informer’s privilege” – privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a
person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law.
Privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without
distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not,
the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power.
The “deliberative process privilege” recognized in the US - privileged status of such
documents rests on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news”
4. Succession
Constructive Resignation
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15/ G.R. No. 146738
Date of Promulgation: March 2, 2001
Ponente: Puno, J.
Petition: prohibition
Petitioners: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Respondents: Aniano Desierto (Ombudsman), Ramon Gonzales, Volunteers Against Crime
and Corruption, Graft Free Philippines Foundation Inc, Leonard de Vera, Dennis Funa, Romeo
Capulong and Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.; Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts:
Estrada(Erap) was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo(GMA) as his VP.

 
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, 65
Sec 11 . The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
exposed Erap's alleged tie-up with illegal jueteng lords who give him millions of pesos.
suit.
Various sectors began to call for his resignation including former Presidents Aquino and Ramos.
Respondents, relying on several cases w/c held that the legitimacy of the Aquino Government
Thereafter, senior economic advisers and several cabinet members resigned, including VP GMA
62 present a political question, aver that the cases at bar essentially assail the “legitimacy of the
as DSWD Secretary (appointed in accordance with Art VII Sec 3 ). Arroyo administration” and similar to that of the Aquino Administration, respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power, hence, such are beyond judicial scrutiny.
In November, impeachment proceedings against Erap was then formally opened in the
Senate. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency thru
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with CJ EDSA I and EDSA II:
Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
Protests against Estrada grew when during the proceedings an envelope was voted NOT to be government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
opened (vote of 11-10) supposedly containing evidence regarding a Php3.3 billion secret bank assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which ONLY affected the
account under the name "Jose Velarde". office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
A crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the IBP and the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. The PNP and the AFP also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. 66
2. WON Estrada resigned as president and thus under Art VII Sec 8 , GMA validly took her
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying oath as the 14th President of the Republic -- YES.
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, GMA took her oath of 67
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. Since there was no letter of formal resignation, the Court using the Totality Test looked
at his acts and omissions before, during, and after January 20 when he left Malacanang,
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a and concluded that Estrada's statements and acts signify resignation.
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed Resignation is essentially an: 1) intent to resign coupled with 2) acts signifying relinquishment.
against him not until his term as president ends. It may be express or implied. As long as it is clear, it can be given legal effect.
He likewise prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President • The Court looked at "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada" authored by his Exec.
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and Sec. Angara published in series in the Phil Daily Inquirer. This "diary" narrated that
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, Estrada expressed his intention to resign during the days nearing his Malacanang exit.
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” § Estrada proposed snap elections where he said that he will not run as a
candidate.
Issue/s: 68
§ He also said "Ayoko na " w/c the court ruled as words of resignation.
4. WON the cases at bar involve a political question – NO § His camp drafted negotiations w/ the opposition to ensure peaceful transition w/c
5. WON Estrada effectively resigned as president – YES was premised on his resignation.
6. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as president – NO § After withdrawal of support from armed forces, Estrada’s silence and non-
7. WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit as a non-sitting president – NO objection to the option of a “dignified exit or resignation” can be taken as
8. WON prosecution against petitioner must be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity – NO admission by him
Ratio: • Estrada left Malacanang and issued a press statement acknowledging the oath
1. WON the cases at bar involve a political question -- NO. taking of Arroyo. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
The cases involved are justiciable because the issues for resolution require proper disability disappears
63 64
interpretation of the 1987 Constitution notably Art II Sec 1 and Article VII Sec 8 and

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65
 ART
 VII
 Sec
 11
 Whenever
 the
 President
 transmits
 to
 the
 President
 of
 the
 Senate
 and
 the
 Speaker
 of
 the
 House
 
of
 Representatives
 his
 written
 declaration
 that
 he
 is
 unable
 to
 discharge
 the
 powers
 and
 duties
 of
 his
 office,
 and
 
until
 he
 transmits
 to
 them
 a
 written
 declaration
 to
 the
 contrary,
 such
 powers
 and
 duties
 shall
 be
 discharged
 by
 the
 
Vice-­‐President
 as
 Acting
 President.
 x
 x
 x
 
66
 Id.
 See
 left
 side.
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  67
 TOTALITY
 TEST:
 prior,
 contemporaneous
 and
 posterior
 facts
 and
 circumstantial
 evidence
 bear
 a
 material
 
62
 ART
 VII
 Sec
 3
 x
 x
 x
 The
 Vice-­‐President
 may
 be
 appointed
 as
 a
 Member
 of
 the
 Cabinet.
 Such
 appointment
  relevance
 on
 the
 issue
 
requires
 no
 confirmation.
  68
 Excerpt
 from
 the
 "Final
 Days
 of
 Joseph
 Ejercito
 Estrada":
 “If
 the
 envelope
 is
 opened,
 on
 Monday,
 he
 says,
 he
 
63
 ART
 II
 Sec
 1
 The
 Philippines
 is
 a
 democratic
 and
 republican
 State.
 Sovereignty
 resides
 in
 the
 people
 and
 all
  will
 leave
 by
 Monday.
 The
 President
 says.
 “Pagod
 na
 pagod
 na
 ako.
 
 Ayoko
 na
 masyado
 nang
 masakit.
 
 Pagod
 na
 ako
 
government
 authority
 emanates
 from
 them.
  sa
 red
 tape,
 bureaucracy,
 intriga.
 
 (I
 am
 very
 tired.
 
 I
 don’t
 want
 any
 more
 of
 this
 –
 it’s
 too
 painful.
 
 I’m
 tired
 of
 the
 red
 
64
 Id.
 See
 above.
  tape,
 the
 bureaucracy,
 the
 intrigue.)
 I
 just
 want
 to
 clear
 my
 name,
 then
 I
 will
 go.””
 

 

 
The letter sent to the Senate President and Speaker of the House stating that he is unable to Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office
exercise his duties as president and that the VP must then sit as Acting President by virtue of and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office
Article VII Sec 11 was not given legal significance by the Court because 1) it was not referred to in the same manner as the President.
during the pleadings and oral arguments, and 2) the Congress has already settled the issue that The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires
rd
indeed he has permanently vacated the Presidency as will be discussed on the 3 issue. no confirmation.
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as president -- NO. term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of
69 the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not
Court ruled that under Art VII Sec 11 , Congress has ultimate authority to determine be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
whether President is unable to govern. such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
Senate President and Speaker Fuentabella had issued a Joint Statement declaring their support No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
to the constitutional successor to the Presidency: an a priori recognition of Arroyo as office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
“constitutional successor to the presidency”, followed by post facto resolutions of the Senate and service for the full term for which he was elected.
House confirming this recognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President. held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
Moreover, the Court held that it has no jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
petitioner Estrada. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
Constitution shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the
4. WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit -- NO. House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
Immunity cannot be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President nor can it be authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
expanded to an extent that the President be held non-liable for criminal acts. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
First, the court cited In re: Saturnino Bermudez in which they held that: “incumbent Presidents the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
tenure” but not beyond. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
Second, the cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery rules for the purpose.
and graft and corruption.By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
president. He is not immune because unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State but "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
only of the officer himself. President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
70 Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of
Sustaining petitioner’s claim will devalue several constitutional policies. [Art XI Sec 1 and Art the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
71 Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-
II Sec 27 ]
President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No
5. WON prosecution against petitioner must be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity -- NO. increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure
There is not enough evidence that the judge's capacity to render a bias-free decision has any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
been impaired. Besides, petitioner has an option later to assail the decision. Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for
Decision: which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members
PETITION DISMISSED. of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

ART XI
5. The Vice President Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
ART VII the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
                                                                                                                and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
69  Id.  See  3.   employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
70  ART  XI  Sec  1  Public  office  is  a  public  trust.  Public  officers  and  employees  must,  at  all  times,  be  accountable  to   Sec. 3. 1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
the  people,  serve  them  with  utmost  responsibility,  integrity,  loyalty,  and  efficiency;  act  with  patriotism  and  justice,   impeachment.
and  lead  modest  lives.   2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
71  ART  II  Sec  27  The  State  shall  maintain  honesty  and  integrity  in  the  public  service  and  take  positive  and  effective  
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
measures  against  graft  and  corruption.  
 
  
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be exercising the powers and duties of his office.
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.

Right of succession and membership in Cabinet

ART VII
Sec. 3 par 2. The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent
disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of
powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of C. Judiciary
the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers Ynot v IAC
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such G.R. No. 74457
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate Date of Promulgation: March 20, 1987
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is Ponente: Cruz, J.
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately Petition: Certiorari
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Petitioners: Restituto Ynot
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, Station Commander (INP, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo),
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume Regional Director (Bureau of Animal Industry, Reg. IV, Iloilo)
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Facts:
of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on 13 January 1984, when
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
without need of call. EO 262-A (prohibiting transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, another).

 
  
Ynot petitioned for recovery at the RTC Iloilo City, but the petition was denied and the court Date of Promulgation: Dec 18, 2008
refused to rule on the constitutionality of the EO (it was Marcos era at that time). Ynot then Ponente: Tinga, J.
appealed at the IAC, but it upheld the RTC decision. Hence this petition. Petition: Special civil action
Petitioners: Severino Manotok and his family
Issue/s: Respondents: Heirs of Homer Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez
WON EO 626-A is constitutional -- NO.
Facts:
The Due Process Clause was violated because Ynot was denied the right to defend This is a land dispute between the Manotok family and the Barque family for the Piedad
himself. The EO sets the immediate confiscation of the carabaos/carabeef and immediately Estate.
condemns the violator. The minimum requirements of Due Process is a notice and hearing,
as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. In 1988, a fire in portions of the Quezon City Hall destroyed records stored in the Office of the
Register of Deeds. The Barques claimed that their title was among those destroyed. The
Police power was not justified for EO 626-A. For the 2 tests of police power: Manotoks claimed that the property is part of the land covered by their reconstituted title.
a.)
Lawful Subject: Compelling state interest to prevent slaughter of carabaos Felicidad Manahan filed motion to intervene and claimed ownership.
because they are needed by small farmers (Passed).
b.) Lawful method: Prohibit movement of carabao from one province to another (Not The appeal reached the Supreme Court and its 1st Division sustained the order for the
passed, there is no sense for this prohibition with regards to preventing cancellation of the Manotoks’ title without need of a direct proceeding before the RTC and for
slaughter). the reconstitution of the Barques’ title. The Manotoks filed for motions for reconsideration but
There was improper exercise of legislative power by the president. The EO should have were all denied. They then moved to refer their motion to the Court en banc. “Court opted to
been a PD because it enacted a new law instead of implementing an existing rule. While review the petition on a pro hac vice (lit. for this event) basis to lend much needed
72
Marcos had the power (under the 1973 constitution ) to issue Presidential Decrees and jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc may provide.”
Letters of Instructions if there is an emergency, the issue on hand (slaughter of carabaos)
is not enough justification for an “emergency” in order to issue a decree. Hence this resolution.

There was violation of separation of powers due to encroachment of judicial functions. Issue/Ratio:
The EO was in essence a penal law, so the judgment of guilt of the violator should not have st
come from the administrative authorities. Only the courts have the power to declare if there WON the Court en banc can validly reevaluate the decision of the 1 decision - YES
is a violation of a law and impose any corresponding penalty. [DOCTRINE FOR CONSTI The Court cited the constitutional principle that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
TOPIC] the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
74
Sec. 5(2a), Art. VIII (1987 Constitution) states that the SC may review the final judgment of
73 except by the court sitting en banc. ”
lower courts regarding cases of constitutionality. Therefore, the lower courts may also resolve
constitutional questions, subject for review by the Supreme Court. [DOCTRINE FOR It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with
CONSTI TOPIC] precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en
banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and
Decision: judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard
with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to
EO 626-A is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IAC decision is REVERSED. be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which implement that
system do not deserve needless hassle.

The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the
particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by
Manotok v Barque ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field.
G.R. No. 162335 & 162605
(After everything, the SC ruled later on that the P4B Piedad Estate belongs not to the Manotoks,
the Barques or the Manahans but to the Government. The Manotoks’ title is null and void while

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  the Barques’ and Manahans’ is fake and spurious, therefore the property, in accordance with the
72
 Amendment
 6
 to
 the
 1973
 Constitution
 Whenever
 in
 the
 judgment
 of
 the
 President
 (Prime
 Minister),
 there
 
Friar Lands Act, is still part of the patrimonial property of the government.)
exists
 a
 grave
 emergency
 or
 a
 threat
 or
 imminence
 thereof,
 or
 whenever
 the
 interim
 Batasang
 Pambansa
 or
 the
 
regular
 National
 Assembly
 fails
 or
 is
 unable
 to
 act
 adequately
 on
 any
 matter
 for
 any
 reason
 that
 in
 his
 judgment
 
requires
 immediate
 action,
 he
 may,
 in
 order
 to
 meet
 the
 exigency,
 issue
 the
 necessary
 decrees,
 orders,
 or
 letters
 of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
instructions,
 which
 shall
 form
 part
 of
 the
 law
 of
 the
 land.
  74
 Art.
 VIII
 Sec.
 4(3)
 Cases
 or
 matters
 heard
 by
 a
 division
 shall
 be
 decided
 or
 resolved
 with
 the
 concurrence
 of
 a
 
73
 Sec
 5
 (2a),
 Art.
 VIII,
 1987
 Constitution
 The
 Supreme
 Court
 shall
 have
 the
 following
 powers:
 
majority
 of
 the
 Members
 who
 actually
 took
 part
 in
 the
 deliberations
 on
 the
 issues
 in
 the
 case
 and
 voted
 thereon,
 
xxx
  and
 in
 no
 case
 without
 the
 concurrence
 of
 at
 least
 three
 of
 such
 Members.
 When
 the
 required
 number
 is
 not
 
(2)
 Review,
 revise,
 reverse,
 modify,
 or
 affirm
 on
 appeal
 or
 certiorari,
 as
 the
 law
 or
 the
 Rules
 of
 Court
 may
 provide,
  obtained,
 the
 case
 shall
 be
 decided
 en
 banc:
 Provided,
 that
 no
 doctrine
 or
 principle
 of
 law
 laid
 down
 by
 the
 court
 in
 
final
 judgments
 and
 orders
 of
 lower
 courts
 in
  a
 decision
 rendered
 en
 banc
 or
 in
 division
 may
 be
 modified
 or
 reversed
 except
 by
 the
 court
 sitting
 en
 banc.
 
(a)
 All
 cases
 in
 which
 the
 constitutionality
 or
 validity
 of
 any
 treaty,
 international
 or
 executive
 agreement,
 law,
 
presidential
 decree,
 proclamation,
 order,
 instruction,
 ordinance,
 or
 regulation
 is
 in
 question.
 
 

 

Decision:
The decision of the 1st Division to deny the Manotoks’ petition and sustain the order for
cancellation of their title without a direct proceeding is recalled and set aside. The case is
remanded to the CA to receive and hear evidence, conclude proceedings and submit to the SC
a report on its findings and recommended conclusions. If the proper claimant to the subject
property is revealed, then the SC would take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final
relief.
De Castro v. JBC
G.R. 191002
Date of promulgation: March 17, 2010
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Petition: special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; petition to enjoin the JBC
from submitting a list of nominees for the position of CJ to President
Petitioner: Arturo M. de Castro
Defendant: Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Constitutional Provisions:
1. Article VII, Section 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
2. Article VIII, Section 4(1): The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
This inevitably creates a constitutional conflict or dilemma between Sec 15, Article VII and Sec
4(1), Article VIII of the constitution.
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office
of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
On the January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution agreeing to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
which must be submitted not later than 4 February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC "automatically considered" for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court.
On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the
names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, not later than February 22, 2010: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo- De Castro,
Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.
The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of
February 13, 2010
11. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments dated March 30,
1998 of Mateo A. Valenzuela and Placido B. Vallarta as Judges, referred to here as Valenzuela,
by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII PROHIBITED the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
12. Issues/Held:
13. Procedural:
14. 1. WON petitioners have Locus Standi – YES
15. 2. WON controversy is ripe for Judicial Determination (Justiciability) – YES
Substantive:
1. WON Article VII, Sec 15 applies to judicial appointments – NO
2. WON Judiciary Act of 1948 is applicable – NO
3. WON A Writ of Mandamus must be issued to the JBC – NO
4. WON A Writ of Prohibition must be issued to the JBC – NO
16.
Ratio:
17. Procedural:
18. 1. WON petitioners have Locus Standi – YES
19. transcendental importance
20.
21. 2. WON controversy is ripe for Judicial Determination (Justiciability) – YES
JBC already commenced the process of nomination, which is already makes the situation ripe
for judicial determination.
A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a constitutional interest is
already sufficient.
6. Substantive:
7. 1. WON Article VII, Sec 15 applies to Judicial appointments – NO
8.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary
1) Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
• Court reversed its prior ruling on the Valenzuela case as the decision arbitrarily
ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4
(1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision.
• The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on October
8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the
90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
2) One of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to
eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive, which
specifically pertains to ONLY the Executive department.
The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because
their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates
for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and that the JBC was precisely
intended to de-politicize the Judiciary.

 
having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over.
3) Confirmation by Senior Associate Justice Regalado, former member of the Constitutional
Commission, that the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of 18. 3. WON A Writ of Mandamus must be issued to the JBC – NO
Appeals (implying its non-applicability to the Judiciary in general). 19.
75 76
Section 8(5) and Section 9 , Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three
4) Temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the independence of the nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary.
Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. There is no law in the books that authorizes the 20.
revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to mandatory retirement or resignation, 21. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
members of the Judiciary can be removed for cause (judges on lower courts) or impeachment unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
(members of the Supreme Court). from an office, trust, or station.
22. Requisites of Mandamus:
5) Intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from 23. a. the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded
the Executive and Legislative Departments 24. b. it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by
law
6) The need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 25. c. the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law
4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member 26. d. the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary
of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the 27. e. there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. course of law.
28.
7) JBC list no longer necessary if appointee is to come from within the sitting justices of 29. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the
the Supreme Court, as previously vetted by the JBC (Section 9 Article VIII of the Consti only list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to
applies to outsiders who are candidates for Supreme Court positions) appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy.
9. 30.
10. 2. WON Judiciary Act of 1948 is applicable – NO 31. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's
11. mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose
12. To rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC.
13. “Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. - In case of a vacancy in the office 32.
of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his 33. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.” in order to or judgment
forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain 34.
intent of the Constitution. 35. Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to
issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because
14. The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest
office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his
duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the office of the 36. 4. WON A Writ of Prohibition must be issued to the JBC – NO
Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence until a new 37.
Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed. 38. Since only the President can appoint the Chief Justice, petition for prohibition,
which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor
15. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.
contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, 39.
they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Decision:
Dismissed petitions for certiorari and mandamus, and for prohibition.
The Court directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
16. For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be PERMANENT, a. To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy.
not one to be occupied in an ACTING or TEMPORARY capacity. In relation to the scheme b. To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a 40. c. To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of
rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010
Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be 41. d. To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies
remembered, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935
Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the confirmation process might take longer than expected. 75
 Section
 8(5):
 The
 Council
 shall
 have
 the
 principal
 function
 of
 recommending
 appointees
 to
 the
 Judiciary.
 
 
76
 Section
 9.
 The
 Members
 of
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 and
 judges
 of
 lower
 courts
 shall
 be
 appointed
 by
 the
 President
 
17. The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to from
 a
 list
 of
 at
 least
 three
 nominees
 prepared
 by
 the
 Judicial
 and
 Bar
 Council
 for
 every
 vacancy.
 Such
 
appointments
 need
 no
 confirmation.
 

 

 
in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to
accordance with this decision. apply many principles of statutory construction.

Notes:
Ministerial act or duty - one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Discretionary act or duty – one wherein the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
Also, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and
explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them. Interpolation of words is unnecessary,
because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation.

In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And,
De Castro v. JBC even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word
G.R. 191002 or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the
language of the law itself.
Date of promulgation: April 20, 2010
Ponente: Bersamin, J. Decision:
Petition: MFR Denied with finality.
Petitioner: Arturo M. de Castro
Defendant: Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Chavez v. JBC
Facts: G.R. No. 202242
Same petitioners and intervenors, with the addition of Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr, filed motions
for reconsideration against Court’s prior ruling. Date of promulgation: July 17, 2012
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Issues/Held: Petition: Petition to question the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
Same shit Petitioners: Francisco Chavez
Respondents: Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph Escudero, and Rep. Niel Tupas
Ratio: Jr.
Denied with finality for lack of merit. All matters raised already resolved by the March 17, 2010
decision. Court opted to answer some matters for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez, former Solicitor General and a nominee to the position of Chief
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and Justice after Chief Justice Renato Corona was convicted by the impeachment court and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. removed from office on May 29, 2012. He now assails the constitutionality of the composition of
the JBC. He argues that only one representative from Congress may sit as a member of the JBC
77
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively pursuant to Section 8 (1) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
bound to enforce obedience to them. Respondents JBC as well as Sen. Francis Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. (members of the
JBC), argue on the other hand that the term “Congress” in the subject provision means both the
The Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by House of Representatives and the Senate, owing to the bicameral nature of the legislative
precedent, which is followed only when its reasoning and justification are relevant and for the department. Furthermore, they argue that the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
sake of convenience and stability. legislature and the phrase in the provision (“a representative of the Congress”) was not modified
accordingly to the change from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature ultimately adopted by the
The Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse Commission.
a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.

Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Ratio:
Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments WON the composition of the JBC wherein two members are representatives from Congress (one
during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII. from each House) violates Section 8(1) Article VIII of the Constitution – YES

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the                                                                                                                
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article 77  Section  8.  (1)  A  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  is  hereby  created  under  the  supervision  of  the  Supreme  Court  
VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. composed  of  the  Chief  Justice  as  ex  officio  Chairman,  the  Secretary  of  Justice,  and  a  representative  of  the  
Congress  as  ex  officio  Members,  a  representative  of  the  Integrated  Bar,  a  professor  of  law,  a  retired  Member  of  the  
Supreme  Court,  and  a  representative  of  the  private  sector.  
Lastly: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not

 
  
appointment, however, was not released, but
Applying the principles of verba legis and noscitur a sociis of statutory construction, the term instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
“Congress” should be understood in its ordinary and generic sense since no particular allusion is Ong’s citizenship.
made as to whether it is the Senate or the House of Representatives. Following, only one
representative from Congress may sit as a member of the JBC. It is clear, even by looking at the The President did not gravely abuse her
ConCom records, that they intended the JBC to be composed of seven (7) members to provide discretion as she appointed a person, duly
a solution should there be a tie in the votes. nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the
appointee’s qualifications.
The definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers only to its primary function of Ong is a Chinese citizen and therefore cannot
legislation and other non-legislative functions such as appropriation, declaration of state of be appointed since this is a contravention of
war, impeachment and canvassing of election returns for President and Vice-President, where Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by
Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution;
the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles of each House of Congress. the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the
• Birth certificate indicates his
This does not apply, however, for purposes of JBC representation. To allow the DOJ, which have the authority and jurisdiction
Chinese citizenship
legislature to have two representatives to the JBC would entitle them to more quantitative to make determination on matters of
• It also reflects that at the time he
influence and would negate the principle of equality between the three branches of citizenship.
was born on May 25, 1953, both his
government. parents were Chinese citizens
Even if it were granted that 11 years after his
In finding that the membership of the JBC is unconstitutional, the Court held that by the doctrine birth, his father was finally granted Filipino
of operative fact, all prior official actions of the JBC are still nonetheless valid citizenship by naturalization, that by itself,
would not make Ong a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Decision: Invoking Art. 410, CC. Petitioners contend
Petition granted. that the entry in Ong’s birth certificate
Undisputed evidence disclosed that
indicating his nationality is prima facie
respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
evidence that his citizenship at birth is
KILOSBAYAN v. Ermita
Chinese.
G.R. No. 177721
Art. 412, CC also maintains that as long as
Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by
Date of Promulgation: 3 July 2007
judicial order, the JBC, as well as the whole
Ponente: Azcuna., J.
world, is bound by what is stated in his birth
Petition: Writ of Certiorari
certificate.
Petitioners: Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation
Respondents: Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita; Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory Ong Subsequently prayed for an Urgent Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO, to prevent and
Facts: restrain ES from releasing appointment of Ong Petitioners are not entitled to a TRO.
On May 16, 2007, Exec. Sec. Ermita, in representation of the Office of the President (OP), and to restrain Ong from assuming office as
issued an appointment in favour of Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court an Assoc. Justice of the SC.
to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Assoc. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on April
28, 2007. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, by the major daily To corroborate the ES’s comments, Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining
publications. that:
1. he is a natural-born Filipino citizen;
On May 18, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was “held in abeyance” or 2. petitioners have no standing to file the suit;
“recalled” by the Palace in view of the question relating to the citizenship of Ong. Howver, there 3. issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated
is no indication whatsoever that the appointment was cancelled by the OP. to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts; and
4. petitioners, in his view, failed to include the President who is an indispensable party
On May 19, the major daily publications reported that the ES stated that the appointment is “still as the one who extended the appointment.
there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the JBC.”
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos,
Petitioners Executive Secretary Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who married Chan
Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in
Appointment was made by the President
China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship.
pursuant to the powers vested in her by Sec.
Appointment is patently unconstitutional,
9, Art. VIII of the Constitution. Furthermore,
arbitrary, whimsical, and issued with GAD That at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino
the President appointed Ong from the list of
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. citizen; that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan
nominees duly screened by the JBC under
Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927.
Sec. 8, Art. VIII of the Constitution. The

 

Therefore, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth and that when Dy Guiok Santos
later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, she became a Chinese citizen.
However, when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a
certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sec. 1
and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Issues:
Procedural
1. WON petitioners have standing - YES
2. WON the President should be impleaded as a party – NO
3. WON the Court is a proper forum for litigating the issue – YES
Substantive
4. WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen – NO
Ratio/Held:
1. WON petitioners have standing - YES
Petitioners have standing to file the suit. As people’s organizations and taxpayers they have
standing to challenge a matter that involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
importance, namely, the qualification, i.e. citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of
the Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.
2. WON the President should be impleaded as a party – NO
The ES acted as an alter ego of the President. He has in fact spoken for her in his Comment.
Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but
only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
3. WON the Court is a proper forum for litigating the issue – YES
The Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue. The case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate, and therefore gives the Court
jurisdiction as it is the body tasked to determine the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution.
4. WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen – NO
Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, rather he is a naturalized Filipino citizen. In his
petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted
because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen since his father Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a
Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he was 11 years old, and thus he, too, became a
Filipino citizen.
He submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father as evidence, in
support of his petition. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth, and that
both his parents were also Chinese citizens.
In fact, the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote Ong a letter in 1979 stating that in
connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he still has to submit a
certified clear copy of his birth certificate and a certification of non-appeal regarding his
citizenship from the OSG. It was on this basis that the Court allowed Ong to take oath as a
lawyer.
It is clear therefore that he is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The subsequent recognition of the
Bureau of Immigration and DOJ that Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.
The Court holds that the petitioners are correct in saying that no substantial change or correction
in an entry in a civil register can be made without judicial order. A change in citizenship is a
substantial change. RA 9048 Sec. 2 (3) provides that a summary administrative proceeding to
correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in
nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil
registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108, ROC.
---
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
17
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this
reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
---
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is
hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he
shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of
his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Notes:
DID YOU KNOW?
Respondent Gregory S. Ong was found guilty on September 23, 2014 for gross misconduct,
dishonest, and impropriety and was subsequently dismissed from his position as Justice of the
Sandiganbayan by the SC as a result of an investigation linking him to pork barrel scandal
mastermind Janet Lim-Napoles. Votes were 8-5-2 in favour of his dismissal
• IN FAVOR
(CJ Sereno, Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza)
• DISSENT
(Bersamin, Velasco, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes)
• INHIBIT
(Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta – former colleagues at the SB)

 
De la Llana v. Alba Removal is different from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
G.R. No. L-57883 tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.
Date of Promulgation: March 12, 1982 • Therefore, there is no question of any impairment of security of tenure.
Ponente: Fernando, C.J. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
Petition: prohibition separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
Petitioners: Gualberto de la Llana Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, the office.
Estanislao Cesa, Jr., Fidela Vargas, Benjamin Escolango, Juanito Atienza, Manuel Reyes
Rosapapan, Jr., Virgilio Acierto, and Porfirio Aguillon Aguila The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
Respondents: Manuel Alba, Minister of Budget, Francisco Tantuico, Chairman, Commission on functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the
Audit, and Ricardo Puno, Minister of Justice security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed.

Facts: Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
This Court has to resolve the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human
units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
The assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court
of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty.
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Decision:
Petition DISMISSED.
In the Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, it was pointed out that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise
of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations
of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being Oil and Natural Gas Commission v CA
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. G.R. No. 114323

Issues/Held: Date of Promulgation: September 28, 1999

1. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is constitutional. – YES Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
2. WON the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure Petition: Motion for Reconsideration
enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Petitioners: Oil and Natural Gas Commission
78
Constitution. – NO Respondents: Court of Appeals

Ratio: Facts:
Procedural:
1. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is constitutional. – YES This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge
of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, Pacific Cement
Article X, Section 1, of the Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to Co. Inc. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
establish inferior Courts by law. while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines.
The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. The abolition of an office within the The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from failure of the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had
already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then
2. WON the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause
enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the 16 of their contract which stipulates that the venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
Constitution. – NO
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favor of the petitioner
setting forth the arbitral award.
                                                                                                               
 SEC.  7.  The  Members  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  judges  of  inferior  courts  shall  hold  office  during  good  behavior  
78 Consequently, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
until  they  reach  the  age  of  seventy  years  or  become  incapacitated  to  discharge  the  duties  of  their  office.  The   of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The
Supreme  Court  shall  have  the  power  to  discipline  judges  of  inferior  courts  and,  by  a  vote  of  at  least  eight  Members  
order  their  dismissal.  
 
  
private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a jurisprudence and the tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice
valid cause of action. would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive
portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have conclusions of law made by the tribunals that rendered the decision.
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties and that full text of the foreign court’s
judgment did not contain any findings of facts and law but merely a “simplistic decision This is particularly true where the decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in
79
containing literally, only the dispositive portion in contravention of Art VIII Sec 14 of the another jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enforcement of the decision would be based on
Constitution” thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are similar to our laws, at the expense of justice
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. based on the merits.

Issue/s: Moreover, the constitutional guideline set for in the mentioned section, cannot prevail over the
1. WON the non-delivery of the cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under fundamental elements of due process. Matters of procedure even if laid down in the Constitution
Clause 16. – NO must be tempered by substantial justice provided it has factual and legal basis.
2. WON the judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India was enforceable in the
Philippines given that the judgment did not contain any statement of facts and the law upon Considering that the case involves significant properties, the overriding consideration of a
which the awards is based. – Yes (BUT..) judgment based on the merits should prevail over the primordial interests of strict
enforcement on matters of technicalities.
Ratio:
In this case, considering that petitioner simply prayed the remand of the case to the lower court,
1. WON the non-delivery of the cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under Clause 16. – the outright ruling and adherence to the foreign courts’ order adopting by reference another
NO entity’s findings and conclusion was misplaced.
Non-delivery should be outside jurisdiction of an arbitrator and well within the jurisdiction The adjudication of this case demands a fill ventilation of facts and issues and presentation of
of the regular courts. their respective arguments in support and in rebuttal of the claims of the contending parties. This
is all the more applicable herein since the Court is not a trier of facts.
Clause 16 only pertains to matters involving the technical aspect of the contract since the
underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon Decision:
by a person possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in Case REMANDED to RTC.
the regular courts. Clause 16 is prefixed with the proviso, “Except where otherwise provided in
the supply order/contract x x x,” thus indicating that arbitrator’s jurisdiction is not all
encompassing.
Maceda v Vasquez
Clause 16 should be confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design,
G.R. No. 102781
drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract and
Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes. Date of Promulgation: April 22, 1993
Ponente: Nocon, J.
2. WON the judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India was enforceable Petition: Certiorari
in the Philippines given that the judgment did not contain any statement of facts and Petitioners: Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge, RTC Antique Br. 12)
the law upon which the awards is based. – Yes (BUT..)
Respondents: Hon. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, Atty. Napoleon Abiera
Foreign court ruling may be categorized in the nature of memorandum decisions or Facts:
thosewhich adopt by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior
tribunals. Judge Bonifacio Maceda was accused of falsifying his Certificate of Service (that he laid
down decisions for certiain civil and criminal cases when in fact he did not render the decisions
In this jurisdiction, it has been held that memorandum decisions do not transgress the
yet) several times.
constitutional requirement in Art VIII, Sec. 14, on clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
law on which the decision is based. Judge Maceda then counters that this case should be under the jurisdiction of the SC, not
the Ombudsman, since it was regarding his official duties as judge (therefore different from
Nonetheless, it would be more prudent for a memorandum decision not to be simply limited to another SC ruling: Orap v Sandiganbayan).
the dispositive portion but to state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with
references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and Also, Judge Maceda contends that he has been granted by the SC a 90 day extension to render
the decisions mentioned.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Issue/s:
79
 ART
 VIII
 Sec
 14
 No
 decision
 shall
 be
 rendered
 by
 any
 court
 without
 expressing
 therein
 clearly
 and
 distinctly
 the
 
facts
 and
 the
 law
 on
 which
 it
 is
 based.
 No
 petition
 for
 review
 or
 motion
 for
 reconsideration
 of
 a
 decision
 of
 the
 
court
 shall
 be
 refused
 due
 course
 or
 denied
 without
 stating
 the
 legal
 basis
 therefor.
 

 

 
WON the investigation by the Ombudsman, prior to an administrative action by the SC, is an This is a resolution of an administrative case triggered by reports on 21 July 2000 by certain
encroachment of the SC’s supervision of all lower courts. -- YES. national dailies that the respondent tried to influence the outcome of pending litigation on
behalf of a suspected Chinese drug queen, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC).
The Ombudsman CAN investigate regarding a judge’s offenses. The Orap v
Sandiganbayan decision applies to the offense of a judge, whether it be related or unrelated to The SC en banc then ordered an investigation (with Justice Griño-Aquino as Investigator), which
80
his official duties. Judge Maceda is administratively liable to the SC under the Rules of Court led to the following facts:
and criminally liable under the Revised Penal Code (due to his falsification offense).
HOWEVER, the Ombudsman should not proceed with the investigation since there is no On 9 December 1998, Yu Yuk Lai and her nephew were charged before the Manila RTC (Judge
administrative action yet by the SC. The case should first be referred to the SC for determination Laguio) for selling 3 kilograms of shabu (non-bailable offense). They were detained in Camp
of the true status of Judge Maceda’s cases (the ones pending for his decision). Crame. After some time, Yu Yuk Lai filed a petition for bail, arguing that the evidence against her
was not strong. On 10 November 1999, the two were transferred to Manila City Jail (MCJ), due
The SC has administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the to information received that the accused, Yu Yuk Lai, in particular, had been seen playing
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, by virtue regularly in certain Manila casinos. On 18 January 2000, the petition for bail was denied for lack
81
of Sec. 6, Art. VIII (1987 Constitution) . [DOCTRINE FOR CONSTI TOPIC] of merit. The accused then filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Laguio, which the latter
granted, although believing that the same was without merit.
The Ombudsman also cannot compel the SC to submit its records or to allow its personnel to
testify regarding these cases. Even between the Offices created by the Constitution and the The case was then re-raffled and assigned to another judge. Yu Yuk Lai then requested for
3 branches of government, the doctrine of separation of powers applies. confinement in a hospital. Before the judge could act upon said motion, Judge Muro handled
Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their the case.
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action and refer this to the SC for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their Judge Muro granted the motion, which effected her confinement at Manila Doctors Hospital,
administrative duties. Only the SC can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s contrary to the recommendation of the Chief of Health Services of MCJ that she be
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them. confined at PGH. Upon motion of the accused, said confinement was extended until “she is fit
to be discharged.” He also granted a motion to file a demurrer to evidence by the accused.
Decision:
Soon, rumors circulated that the latter judge was partial towards the accused. An anonymous
Petition GRANTED. Ombudsman must dismiss complaint and refer it to the SC. letter (by concerned court employees) was then to the DOJ Secretary, the Chief State
Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro, alleging that the order for hospitalization was
made despite the fact the Yu Yuk Lai was not sick and that there were rumors that Judge Muro
In Re Demetria would grant a motion to quash in consideration of millions of pesos.
AM No. 00-7-09
SP Formaran, the prosecutor assigned to the case, then filed a motion for inhibition against
Judge Muro. In the meantime, Yu Yuk Lai was arrested at a Manila casino.
Date of Promulgation: March 27, 2001
Ponente: Per Curiam On 18 July 2000, SP Formaran received a visit (at the DOJ) from the respondent Justice, Go
Petition: IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE Teng Kok, and Atty. Paas, that latter’s lawyer and a friend of respondent. Go Teng Kok pleaded
JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED for Formaran to withdraw the motion for inhibition. The respondent then asked for the status of
DRUG QUEEN the case and if Formaran could do something to help Go Teng Kok. After declining the request,
Petitioners: (not stated) Formaran told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuño, which ended the conversation.
Respondents: CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria
After the consultation with Formaran, CSP Zuño received a call from Justice Demetria
Doctrine: A person connected with the Judiciary should exercise propriety and be above requesting him to tell SP Formaran to withdraw the motion for inhibition so that Judge Muro
suspicion— whether inside or outside the courtroom. There is a higher expectation of could already issue an order.
righteousness in the Judiciary.
The news reports were then published leading to Judge Muro inhibiting himself. Justice
Facts: Demetria denied the allegations saying that he only went to the DOJ to visit old friends and that
his meeting with Go Teng Kok and Atty. Paas was purely accidental. He also explained that he
only asked Formaran to help Go Teng Kok and that the help he was requesting, which was

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  unspecified, could well be within legal bounds. He also said that he had no knowledge of the
80
 Sec.
 1,
 Rule
 140,
 Rules
 of
 Court
 Complaint
 -­‐
 All
 Charges
 against
 judges
 of
 first
 instance
 shall
 be
 in
 writing
 and
  case and did not know Formaran and Yu Yuk Lai. On these grounds, he claimed that he could
shall
 set
 out
 distinctly,
 clearly,
 and
 concisely
 the
 facts
 complained
 of
 as
 constituting
 the
 alleged
 serious
 misconduct
  not have interceded (supposedly bolstered by his asking of the status of the case). Atty. Paas, in
or
 inefficiency
 of
 the
 respondent,
 and
 shall
 be
 sworn
 to
 and
 supported
 by
 affidavits
 of
 persons
 who
 have
 personal
  defense of the respondent, stated that it was he who called CSP Zuño.
knowledge
 of
 the
 facts
 therein
 alleged,
 and
 shall
 be
 accompanied
 with
 copies
 of
 documents
 which
 may
 
substantiate
 said
 facts.
  Issue/Held:
81
 Sec.
 6,
 Art.
 VIII,
 1987
 Constitution
 The
 Supreme
 Court
 shall
 have
 administrative
 supervision
 over
 all
 courts
 
and
 the
 personnel
 thereof.
 

 

WON respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk
Lai (in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct)— YES
The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the
following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA
President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD
No.1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.".
Also, the claim that it was Atty. Paas who called CSP Zuño is farfetched in that CSP would
recognize the voice of respondent since he was a former Undersecretary and Acting Secretary
of the DOJ, and now a CA Justice.
Further, the help requested could not have referred to any other than the withdrawal of the
motion for inhibition, which was precisely the request of Go Teng Kok. The claim to only visit old
friends in the DOJ is contrary to the fact that respondent was not acquainted with Formaran,
whose office they decided to “stay a while.” That he did not know Go Teng Kok and Yu Yuk Lai
is in-consequential since he is a close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has
been helping the accused.
Such actuations makes a mockery of his high office and causes incalculable damage to
the entire Judiciary.
Decision:
SC sustained the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria
GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government
owned or controlled corporation or institution
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans Co.
G.R. No. L-37878
Date of promulgation: November 25, 1932
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Petition: ORIGINAL ACTION in tjae Supreme Court. Petition under the provisions of section 11
of Act No. 1446
Petitioner: Manila Electric Company
Respondents: Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., et al.
DOCTRINE: SC has no legal right to sit as members of the board of administrators exercising
judicial functions whose decision will be reviewed by them as sitting justices. Nor can they sit
as members of the board of administrators exercising quasi- judicial functions.
Facts:
Petitioner Manila Electric Co. (Meralco) is requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of Meralco and the compensation to be paid.
Petitioner invokes Sec 11, Act No. 1446, which provides:
“Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or
hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be
paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final.”
Basically, the statute effectively delegates a kind of legislative power (revenue generation) to the
SC, sitting as board of arbitrators.
Issue/Held:
WON the designation of the Supreme Court to act as a board of arbitrators and have them fix
compensation fees is unconstitutional – YES
Ratio:
A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust
the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. The Court also held that it is
contrary to public policy when a clause in a contract, providing all matters in dispute between the
parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone. Simply put, one cannot oust the
courts of jurisdiction.
The court viewed the issue of WON the SC can sit as a board of arbitrators in the said scheme
in two cases:
1. The SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercising judicial functions;
This would not fall within the jurisdiction granted the SC. If it does, it would mean that the
courts would be ousted of jurisdiction & render the award a nullity. If this follows, we would then
have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken
there from to the courts & eventually coming before the SC, where the SC would review the
decision of its members acting as arbitrators.
2. The SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions.
This would mean that the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, considered as
administrative or quasi-judicial in nature, would result in the performance of duties which the
members of the SC could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.
It is judicial power, and judicial power alone, which is exercised by the SC.
“Just as the SC, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations
by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act.”
Decision:
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic Act and it would be illegal for the members
of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition. The
members of the SC decline to proceed any further in the matter.
In Re: Judge Rodolfo Manzano
A.M. No. 88-7 1861-RTC
Date of promulgation: October 5, 1988
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Petition: Administrative request
Petitioners: Judge Rodolfo Manzano
Respondents:

 
Facts: The Prosecution Panel sent letters asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of
The governor of Ilocos Norte, pursuant to Presidential Executive Order 856, designated Judge certified copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations for purposes of
Manzano, executive judge of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, as member of the Ilocos Norte Articles 3 and 7 of the Impeachment Complaint.
Provincial Committee on Justice.
Case Title Status of the Case Information Sought
In line with this, the judge sent the Court a letter requesting authorization to perform such Flight Attendants and • Presently pending on the • Examination of the rollo
functions and guarantee that it will not amount to an abandonment of his present position as Stewards Association of the merits • Issuance of certified copies
RTC judge, as it is not violatice of Art. VIII, 12 or Art. IX (B). Philippines v. Philippine of the Agenda and the
Airlines, Inc. Minutes of the case
Provincial committees, according to EO 856, are created to insure the speedy disposition of Navarro v. Ermita or the • Still pending on the merits • Examination of the rollo
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigents, thus alleviating jail congestion and Dinagat Case
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions are receiving complaints against Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez • A close and terminated • Examination of the rollo
apprehending officers, wardens, fiscals or judges abusing their office and referring them to v. The House of case
proper authorities; and recommending revisions of any law or regulation believed to be Representatives Committee
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. on Justice, et al.
League of Cities of the Phils. • A close and terminated • Examination of the rollo
(LCP) v. COMELEC case
Ratio:
WON the judge may be designated as member the committee— NO
Per its Manifestation in open court in the impeachment trial of February 7 and 8, the House
Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Court for the issuance of subpoena duces
A member of the judiciary is not a subordinate of the executive or the legislative; and
tecum and ad testificandum for the production of records of cases, and attendance of Justices,
must be confined to the task of adjudication. As incumbent RTC judges, they form part of the
officials and employees of the SC, to testify on these records and on the various cases
structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute
mentioned above.
to the solidity of such structure. But as public officials, RTC judges should render assistance
to said committees but only to the extent where such assistance may be reasonable
Instead of issuing subpoenas as requested, the Hon. Presiding Senator-Judge Juan Ponce
incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Enrile, issued an Order denying the Prosecution Panel’s request to Justices VIllarama, Sereno,
Reyes, and Velasco. (Justices mentioned here are the ones requested to attend the
It is evident that the committees contemplated in EO 856 perform administrative functions, or
impeachment proceedings. The attendance of SC Justices under compulsory process now
those w/c involve regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
appears to be moot and academic.)
welfare and promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the admin agency by the organic law of its existence. Designation
Subsequently, Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, received the same Subpoena Ad
in admin bodies is prohibited under the Constitution.
Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Supoena Ad Testificandum commanding her to appear with
the original and certified true copies of the documents requested and to likewise appear at
2:00pm every day, to produce the documents and testify.
Decision:
Petition denied.
Issues:
5. WON the Court can comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Impeachment Panel - NO
Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses
Ratio/Held:
Date of Promulgation: 14 February 2012 1. WON the Court can comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the
Ponente: Per Curiam Prosecution Impeachment Panel - NO
Petition: Resolution Court’s Prefatory Statement
Petitioners: - Resolution issued not to favour or prejudice CJ but to consider the requests in light of what the
Respondents: - Constitution, the laws, and Court rules and policies mandate and allow.

Facts: The Independence of the Judiciary

During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel
manifested in a Compliance, dated Jan. 27, 2012, that it would present about 100 witnesses and
almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public offices. The list of
proposed witnesses includes Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees
who will testify on matters which are internal to the Court.
• Doctrine of Separation of Powers
It is an essential component of our democratic and republican system of government. The
doctrine insures not by express provision of the Constitution, but as an underlying principle that
constitutes the bedrock of a system of checks and balances in the government.
Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and, supreme within its own
sphere, under the legal and political reality of one overarching Constitution that governs

 

one government and one nation for whose benefit all the three separate branches must
act with unity.
The Court’s mandate, is to keep the different branches within the exercise of their respective
assigned powers and prerogatives through the Rule of Law.
• Principle of Comity
Deemed written into the rules by established practice and rendered imperative by the
department’s inter-dependence and need for cooperation among themselves is the practice of
voluntarily observing inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional
duties for the harmonious working government.
The Court applies this principle at the first instance in its interpretation and application of laws. In
appreciating the areas wholly assigned to a particular branch of government in its exercise of
discretion, the courts tread carefully; they exercise restraint and intervene only when grave
abuse of discretion is clear and must act with carefully calibrated steps, safely and surely
made within constitutional bounds.
A case in point is on the matter of impeachment whose trial has been specifically assigned by
the Constitution to the Senate. A standard that should not be forgotten is the need to preserve
the structure of a democratic government and republican government; checks and balances
should prevail.
• General Rule – A Policy of Transparency
Art. III, Sec. 7 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own terms, is not
absolute. In line with this right, the Court has adopted a policy of transparency with respect to
documents in its possession or custody, necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to
adjudicate justiciable disputes as embodied in Sec. 11, Rule 136, ROC which states that:
Section. 11. Certified copies.—The clerk shall prepare, for any person demanding the same, a
copy certified under the seal of the court of any paper, record, order, judgment, or entry in
his office, proper to be certified, for the fees prescribed by these rules.
Notably, the rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees and
compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This
grant, however, is not as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is
subject to the limitations the laws and the Court’s own rules provide. As heretofore stated,
for the Court and the Judiciary, a basic underlying limitation is the need to preserve and protect
the integrity of their main adjudicative function
• Confidential Court Records
The need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Court’s decision-making function which
may be affected by the disclosure of information.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of:
(1) Result of the raffle of cases;
(2) Actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the
Court’s session; and
(3) Deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before it.
Rule 7, Sec. 3, IRSC: Results of the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and
their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters, administrative cases and criminal cases
involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict confidentiality and where
the raffle results are not disclosed even to the parties themselves.
Rule 10, Sec. 2, IRSC: Actions taken in each case in the Court’s agenda, as noted by the Chief
Justice or Division Chairman, shall be treated with strict confidentiality. Only after the official
release of the resolution embodying the Court action may that action be made available to the
public. A Resolution is officially released once the envelope containing the final copy, addressed
to the parties, has been transmitted to the process server for personal service or to the mailing
section of the Judicial Records Office.
Furthermore, the under the same rule, Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as
privileged communication – Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be
disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the
Court (Sec. 2, Rule 10, ISRC)
• Deliberative Process Privilege
Justice Abad discussed in the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion in Arroyo v. De
Lima. The rule on confidentiality will enable Members of the Court to “freely discuss the issues
without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s
comments”
“Written advice from a variety of individuals is an important element of the government’s
decision-making process and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the
government to disclose those recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent the
‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
Chavez v. PEA (Carpio, J.): Privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary; applies to other two
branches as well.
Neri v. Senate Committee (Brion, J. – Sep. Concurring Opinion): This type of privilege is not
for the Executive to enjoy alone. All the great branches of government are entitled to this
treatment for their own decision and policy making conversations and correspondence.
Thus, Senators may invoke legislative privilege when questioned outside the Senate about
information gathered during an executive session. In the same manner, a justice of the court
may invoke judicial privilege in the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court. What applies to
magistrates applies with equal force to court officials and employees who are privy to
these deliberations.
Sec. 2, Rule 10, IRSC extends to documents and other communications which are part of or are
related to the deliberative process. The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component
parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions and policies.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the
document is both predecisional and deliberative.
Predecisional – if it precedes, the decision to which it relates. Communications are considered
predecisional if they were made in attempt to reach a final conclusion

Deliberative – if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process. Key question in
determining its nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid
discussion within the agency. If yes, then it is deemed privileged i.e. notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar
papers
The deliberative process can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making process to
public scrutiny before or even after the decision is made.
Two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as preventing
members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process:
a. the disqualification by reason of privileged communication; and
b. the pendency of an action or matter.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Phil. Judiciary, Sec. 9, Canon 4 states:
“Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.
To ensure the observance of these rules, the improper disclosure of confidential information
learned in official capacity is made criminally punishable under Article 229, RPC (Revelation of
secrets by an officer), 28 Section 3 (k) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and Sec. 7 of RA 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Official and
Employees.
• Immunity from Compulsion to Testify
The disclosure of confidential information that could subject them to criminal prosecution violates
judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest levels of each department be exempt
from the compulsory processes of the other departments on matters related to the functions and
duties of their office.
Court officials and employees are likewise covered by the same rules on confidentiality
that applies to justices and judges.
However, this is to be differentiated from a situation where the testimony is on a matter which is
external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
e.g. the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be called as a
witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is not
connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a magistrate.
A Justice, however, may not be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice presented
in the internal debates as these constitute details of the deliberative process.
Public interest demands that justices, judges, and judicial proceedings must not only be, but
must appear to be impartial – indispensable component to the right to due process.
• Matters of Public Record
Witnesses need not be summoned to testify on matters of public record.
A record is a public record within the purview of a statute providing the books and records
required by law to be kept by a clerk may be received in evidence in any court if it is a record
which a public officer is required to keep and if it is filled in such a manner that it is subject to
public inspection (Sec. 44, Rule 130, ROC). These records, however, may be presented and
marked in evidence only where they are not excluded by reasons of privilege and the other
reasons discussed above.
• Public Officers
A public officer is excused from appearing in court in order that public business may not be
interrupted, hampered or delayed.
Where there is no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time attending as witnesses in court, delivering their deposition before an
officer.
Trustworthiness is a reason because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty. The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes that they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in
the discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
Thus, the trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on:
(1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made;
(2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty;
(3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements; and
(4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of
such errors as might have occurred.”
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential or privileged
information under well-defined rules.
At the most basic level and subject to the principle of comity, Members of the Court, and Court
officials and employees may not be compelled to testify on matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties,
while testimony on matters external to their adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled
by compulsory processes.
Decision:
1. Court cannot grant the requested examination of the rollos of the cases since some are still
pending while the others contain privileged communication. They may, however, issue
certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions issued, as well as copies of
the parties’ pleadings.
2. Clerk of Court Enriqueta Vidal and other Court officials and employees are covered by
privilege and confidentiality, the Court cannot waive their privileges.
3. Courts Internal Rules and Revision of Rules Committees shall forthwith meet for the
alignment of the above discussed laws, rules and policies with the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court and the Rules of Court, and to further discuss these rules and policies to
the end that the needs of transparency can fully meet, and be harmonized with, the
requirements of confidentiality.

 
Petitioner raises 3 points or questions for contention:

1.) That Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.

2.) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the
Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by
Congress.

3.) That Section 25 of RA 9189, allowing Congress through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee, (JCOC) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the
independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issues/Held:
82
1. WON Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 violates Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution – NO
2. WON Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 in relation to Sec 4 of the same Act contravenes Sec 4 Art
83
VII of the Constitution – YES
3.
84
4. WON Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates of Sec 1 Art IX-A of the
Constitution – YES

Ratio:
85
1. WON Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 violates Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution – NO
86
Sec 2 Art V serves as an exception to the residency requirement in Sec 1 of the same
Article of the Constitution.

                                                                                                               
82
 Sec  1.  ART  V.  Suffrage  may  be  exercised  by  all  citizens  of  the  Philippines  not  otherwise  disqualified  by  law,  who  are  at  
least  eighteen  years  of  age,  and  who  shall  have  resided  in  the  Philippines  for  at  least  one  year,  and  in  the  place  wherein  
they  propose  to  vote,  for  at  least  six  months  immediately  preceding  the  election.  No  literacy,  property,  or  other  
substantive  requirement  shall  be  imposed  on  the  exercise  of  suffrage.  
83
 Sec  4.  ART  VII.    x  x    The  returns  of  every  election  for  President  and  Vice-­‐President,  duly  certified  by  the  board  of  
canvassers  of  each  province  or  city,  shall  be  transmitted  to  the  Congress,  directed  to  the  President  of  the  Senate.  Upon  
receipt  of  the  certificates  of  canvass,  the  President  of  the  Senate  shall,  not  later  than  thirty  days  after  the  day  of  the  
B. Suffrage – Article V election,  open  all  the  certificates  in  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in  joint  public  session,  
and  the  Congress,  upon  determination  of  the  authenticity  and  due  execution  thereof  in  the  manner  provided  by  law,  
Macalintal v. COMELEC canvass  the  votes.  
G.R. No. 157013 The  person  having  the  highest  number  of  votes  shall  be  proclaimed  elected,  but  in  case  two  or  more  shall  have  an  equal  
and  highest  number  of  votes,  one  of  them  shall  forthwith  be  chosen  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the  Members  of  
Date of Promulgation: July 10, 2003 both  Houses  of  the  Congress,  voting  separately.  
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J. The  Congress  shall  promulgate  its  rules  for  the  canvassing  of  the  certificates.  x  x  x  
84
 Sec  1.  ART  IX-­‐A.  The  Constitutional  Commissions,  which  shall  be  independent,  are  the  Civil  Service  Commission,  the  
Petition: certiorari
Commission  on  Elections,  and  the  Commission  on  Audit.  
Petitioners: Romulo B. Macalintal 85
 Sec  1.  ART  V.  Suffrage  may  be  exercised  by  all  citizens  of  the  Philippines  not  otherwise  disqualified  by  law,  who  are  at  
Respondents: COMELEC least  eighteen  years  of  age,  and  who  shall  have  resided  in  the  Philippines  for  at  least  one  year,  and  in  the  place  wherein  
they  propose  to  vote,  for  at  least  six  months  immediately  preceding  the  election.  No  literacy,  property,  or  other  
Facts: substantive  requirement  shall  be  imposed  on  the  exercise  of  suffrage.  
Petitioner Macalintal, as a taxpayer and a lawyer, assalis certain provisions in RA 9189 (The 86
 Sec  2.    ART  V.  The  Congress  shall  provide  a  system  for  securing  the  secrecy  and  sanctity  of  the  ballot  as  well  as  a  
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as unconstitutional. system  for  absentee  voting  by  qualified  Filipinos  abroad.  x  x  x    
 
  
RA 9189 was pursuant to the Constitutional mandate that the Congress shall provide a The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
system for voting for Filipinos abroad. Since Sec 2 does not provide for restrictions, constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
Congress in enacting the said law, is presumed to have duly exercised its function. ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be “independent.”

Under our election laws and countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an In this case, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions:
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is synonymous w/ (a) to “review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
domicile. and 19]
(b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
The Court looked into discussion of the Constitutional Commission and from there, it is countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
discerned that the clear intent of the framers is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of
devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications in Sec 1 shall remain except for the Both provisions violate the autonomy or independence of COMELEC. By vesting itself the
residency requirement. The discussions clearly show that the framers intended to enfranchise all powers to revise, review, or amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. COMELEC, is by far an action that goes way beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
The Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on
Therefore, Section 5(d) is enacted in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V. If actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is other departments of the Government.”
no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for
absentee voting. Decision:
Partly granted.
The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit is not
only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. GR No. 147066

Furthermore, the same section does not only require an affidavit or a promise to return, Filipinos Date of promulgation: March 26, 2001
abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, Ponente: Buena, J.
they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the Petition: review on certiorari
removal” of their names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent Petitioner: AKBAYAN – Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II – Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI,
disqualification to vote in absentia.” PATRICIA Q. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY
ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI
2. WON Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 in relation to Sec 4 of the same Act contravenes Sec 4 Art MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL
87
VII of the Constitution – YES Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTION
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Sec 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. Facts:
There are two petitions consolidated in this case:
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs 1) Akbayan Youth, Student Council Alliance of the Philippines (SCAP) et al seeking to set aside
to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for and nullify by certiorari COMELEC Resolution 3584 and/or to declare RA 8189 Sec 8
president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray for mandamus to direct COMELEC to hold special
88
registration.
3. WON Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates of Sec 1 Art IX-A of the 2) UP student Michelle Betito praying for mandamus to direct COMELEC to hold special
Constitution – YES registration.

                                                                                                                Petitioners claim that 4 million first time voters were not able to register for the May 14, 2001
87
 Sec  4.  ART  VII.    x  x    The  returns  of  every  election  for  President  and  Vice-­‐President,  duly  certified  by  the  board  of   elections before COMELEC’s deadline of voters’ registration set on December 27, 2000.
canvassers  of  each  province  or  city,  shall  be  transmitted  to  the  Congress,  directed  to  the  President  of  the  Senate.  Upon  
receipt  of  the  certificates  of  canvass,  the  President  of  the  Senate  shall,  not  later  than  thirty  days  after  the  day  of  the   Upon lobbying efforts from petitioners, Sen. Roco (Chair of Committee on Electoral Reforms)
election,  open  all  the  certificates  in  the  presence  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in  joint  public  session,   set a public hearing on January 25, 2001 for possible special registration of two days preferably
and  the  Congress,  upon  determination  of  the  authenticity  and  due  execution  thereof  in  the  manner  provided  by  law,   on February 17-18, 2001. It was attended by COMELEC Commissioners Tancangco and
canvass  the  votes.   Lantion who, in light of said hearing, issued Memo 2001-027 with safeguards against possible
The  person  having  the  highest  number  of  votes  shall  be  proclaimed  elected,  but  in  case  two  or  more  shall  have  an  equal   fraudulent registrants and order for meeting. On February 8, 2001, request for special
and  highest  number  of  votes,  one  of  them  shall  forthwith  be  chosen  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the  Members  of   registration was denied by COMELEC Resolution 3584 after commissioners voted. Hence these
both  Houses  of  the  Congress,  voting  separately.   petitions.
The  Congress  shall  promulgate  its  rules  for  the  canvassing  of  the  certificates.  x  x  x  
88
 Sec  1.  ART  IX-­‐A.  The  Constitutional  Commissions,  which  shall  be  independent,  are  the  Civil  Service  Commission,  the   Issues/Held/Ratio:
Commission  on  Elections,  and  the  Commission  on  Audit.  
 
  
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing Resolution 3584, hands.) Further, vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt (the law aids the
denying request for special registration. – NO vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights).

First, the right to suffrage is not absolute. It is subject to substantive and procedural Fifth, there was no grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a) capricious
limitations under Constitution Art V Sec 1. and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or b) arbitrary and despotic
exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility COMELEC simply applied the law
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise (RA 8189 Sec 8) on the matter and exercised a prerogative on election-related questions.
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have COMELEC simply exercised its wide latitude of discretion, pertaining to wisdom rather than
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose legality of the act.
to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of 2. WON Ct can issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel COMELEC to add
suffrage. two days of registration. – NO
(Note: Notice how there is actually no constitutional requirement for registration.)
Said writ can be issued only for ministerial duties. Determination of feasibility, practicality,
Registration is one such procedural limitation. It cannot be denigrated to the lowly stature of and possibility involves the exercise of discretionary functions, not ministerial ones.
statutory requirement, contrary to petitioners’ argument. It is an indispensable precondition to the Further, President has already issued PP 15 to call Congress to special session for special
right to suffrage. registration.
89
Second, under RA 8189 (Voters’ Registration Act of 1996) Sec 8 , no registration shall be As such, HB 12930 and SB 2276 have been filed to amend the 120-day prohibitive period under
conducted during the period starting 120 days before regular elections. Said period has already RA 8189. The foregoing is proof of clear intimation on the part of both executive and legislative
elapsed since the public hearing in Senate to discuss the possibility of two additional registration departments that there indeed exists a legal obstacle against holding of special registration per
days, dated January 29, 2001. Said period is from January 14 to May 13, 2001. Ergo, last day of petitioners’ request.
registration should have been January 13, 2001.
Decision:
90
Against this provision invoked by COMELEC, petitioners invoke RA 8436 Sec 28 , granting Petitions DENIED.
“stand-by or residual power” to COMELEC to fix other dates for pre-election acts so as not to
deprive voters of their right to suffrage.

RA 8189 Sec 8 and RA 8436 Sec 28 are actually not contradictory. They should be
interpreted to harmonize and stand together. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi. (The best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other
laws.) Thus, RA 8189 Sec 8 holds. (JCT: What the Ct is probably trying to say is that, although
COMELEC may fix other dates for registration under RA 8436, it can only do so before the 120-
day prohibitive period under RA 8189, which can be interpreted simply as a limitation to such
discretionary power under RA 8436.)

Third, even if COMELEC were to grant two additional days under RA 8436 Sec 28, there is no
more time to finish by May 14, 2001 all the bureaucratic processes required to qualify new voters
to vote in May 2001. In fact, given the required processes, COMELEC will finish them all only by
June 10, 2001. Exercise of said stand-by or residual power presupposes possibility, but it is
simply impossible. Nemo tenetur ad impossible (the law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility) and Impossibilium nulla obligato est (there is no obligation to do an impossible
thing).

Fourth, petitioners are not without fault: They were given the opportunity but failed to
register. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. (Let no one come to court with unclean

                                                                                                               
89
 RA  8189  Sec  8.  System  of  Continuing  Registration  of  Voters.  The  personal  filing  of  application  of  registration  of  voters  
shall  be  conducted  daily  in  the  office  of  the  Election  Officer  during  regular  office  hours.  No  registration  shall,  however,  
be  conducted  during  the  period  starting  one  hundred  twenty  (120)  days  before  a  regular  election  and  ninety  (90)  days  
before  a  special  election.  
90
 RA  8436  Sec  28.  Designation  of  other  dates  for  certain  pre-­‐election  acts.  -­‐  If  it  shall  no  longer  be  reasonably  possible  to  
observe  the  periods  and  dates  prescribed  by  law  for  certain  pre-­‐election  acts,  the  Commission  shall  fix  other  periods  and  
dates  in  order  to  ensure  accomplishment  of  the  activities  so  voters  shall  not  be  deprived  of  their  suffrage.  
 
  
VI. Constituent Power
Decision:
Del Rosario v. COMELEC Petition is DENIED. RA 6132 is NOT unconstitutional.
G.R. No. L-32476

Date of Promulgation: Oct. 20, 1970 Imbong v. COMELEC

Ponente: Makasiar, J. G.R. No. L-32432
Petition: Declaratory Relief
Petitioners: Simeon Del Rosario Date of Promulgation: Sept 11, 1970
Respondents: Jaime Ferrer, Lino Patajo, Cesar Miraflor (Chairman & Members of COMELEC), Ponente: Makasiar, J.
& Ubaldo Carbonell (National Treasurer) Petition: Declaratory relief
Petitioners: Manuel Imbong, Raul Gonzales
Facts: Respondents: Jaime Ferrer (Chairman of COMELEC), Lino Patajo, Cesar Milaflor
RA 6132 called for the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
91
Del Rosario questioned the constitutionality of RA 6132 (specifically Sec 20 ), assailing Facts:
that the appropriation of Php 29 million was simply a waste of public funds. 93
This is a consolidation of 2 petitions for declaratory relief filed pursuant to Sec 19 of RA 6132
94

No time limit was set for the duration of the Constitutional Convention, so there was the by petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers, and
possibility that the Convention would waste its time in pointless discussion without interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
reaching any conclusion.
95
In 1967, Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly pursuant to Sec 1, Art XV of the
Issue/s: Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
1. WON RA 6132 is unconstitutional. – NO Convention to propose amendments to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative
92
district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.
Art XV of the 1935 Constitution authorizes the Congress sitting as a Constituent
Assembly either to propose amendments or to call a convention for the purpose. This In 1969, Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending a provision of Res. No. 2 by providing
refutes the charge that the Congress abdicated its power as a constituent body to propose that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
amendments in favor of the Constitutional Convention. representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, provided that a
Invoking the doctrine of political question, the SC stated that the choice of either representative district shall be entitled to at least 2 delegates.
alternative is solely committed to Congress which cannot be interfered with by the SC.
RA 6132 implemented Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4.
Whether there is necessity for amending the Constitution is also addressed to the wise judgment
of Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, against which the court cannot pit its own Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular
judgment, continued the Court. 96 97 98
provisions embodied in Sections 2 , 4 , 5 , and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an                                                                                                                
93
ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted  Section  19.  Petition  for  Declaratory  Relief.  Any  natural  or  juridical  person  whose  rights  are  affected  by  any  provision  
to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate of  this  Act,  may,  before  breach  or  violation  thereof,  bring  an  action  to  determine  any  question  of  construction,  validity  
about the validity of the new Constitution. or  constitutionality  arising  under  this  Act  and  for  a  declaration  of  his  rights  or  duties  thereunder.    
In  any  action  involving  the  construction,  validity  or  constitutionality  of  any  provision  under  this  Act,  the  Solicitor  General  
shall  be  notified  by  the  party  contesting  such  provision  and  shall  be  entitled  to  be  heard  upon  such  question.    
The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one by the
Constitutional Convention is no argument against the validity of the law because "amendment"
The  petition  shall  be  filed  with  the  Supreme  Court  and  shall  be  given  precedence  over  any  other  civil  business  pending  
includes the "revision" or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the
therein.    
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial
the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. 94
 AN  ACT  IMPLEMENTING  RESOLUTION  OF  BOTH  HOUSES  NUMBERED  TWO  AS  AMENDED  BY  RESOLUTION  OF  BOTH  
HOUSES  NUMBERED  FOUR  OF  THE  CONGRESS  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  CALLING  FOR  A  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION,  
                                                                                                               
91
PROVIDING  FOR  PROPORTIONAL  REPRESENTATION  THEREIN  AND  OTHER  DETAILS  RELATING  TO  THE  ELECTION  OF  
 Sec  20,  RA  6132.  Appropriation.  There  is  hereby  appropriated  out  of  any  funds  in  the  National  Treasury  not  otherwise   DELEGATES  TO  AND  THE  HOLDING  OF  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION,  REPEALING  FOR  THE  PURPOSE  REPUBLIC  
appropriated,  the  sum  of  seventeen  million  pesos  for  the  holding  of  the  election  of  delegates  to  the  Constitutional   ACT  FOUR  THOUSAND  NINE  HUNDRED  FOURTEEN,  AND  FOR  OTHER  PURPOSES.  
95
Convention  which  shall  upon  request,  be  made  immediately  available  to  the  Commission  on  Elections  only  for  purposes    Section  1.  The  Congress  in  joint  session  assembled,  by  a  vote  of  three-­‐fourths  of  all  the  Members  of  the  Senate  and  of  
of  this  Act  and  twelve  million  pesos  for  the  expenses  of  said  convention.   the  House  of  Representatives  voting  separately,  may  propose  amendments  to  this  Constitution  or  call  a  convention  for  
92
 Sec  1,  Art  XV,  1935  Constitution.  The  Congress  in  joint  session  assembled,  by  a  vote  of  three-­‐fourths  of  all  the   that  purpose.  Such  amendments  shall  be  valid  as  part  of  this  Constitution  when  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  
Members  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  House  of  Representatives  voting  separately,  may  propose  amendments  to  this   at  an  election  at  which  the  amendments  are  submitted  to  the  people  for  their  ratification.  
96
Constitution  or  call  a  convention  for  that  purpose.  Such  amendments  shall  be  valid  as  part  of  this  Constitution  when    Composition  of  the  Convention;  Qualifications  of  Delegates.  The  Constitutional  Convention  authorized  by  Resolution  
approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  an  election  at  which  the  amendments  are  submitted  to  the  people  for  their   of  Both  Houses  Numbered  Two  of  the  Congress  of  the  Philippines,  adopted  on  March  sixteen,  nineteen  hundred  and  
ratification.   sixty-­‐seven,  as  amended  by  Resolution  of  Both  Houses  Numbered  Four  of  the  Congress  of  the  Philippines,  adopted  on  
 
  
99
impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said RA No. 6132. Both impugn the power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
constitutionality of RA claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates for delegates in apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of
the Constitutional Convention. funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of
the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
Issues/Held: indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the
1. WON RA 6132 was valid – YES above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.
2. WON the specific provisions assailed are valid – YES (not so important; I just included
this in case tanungin niya) c) While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the
Ratio: power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in
1. WON RA 6132 was valid – YES Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, the Court sustained the are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, for necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit
the ff reasons: of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.
a) Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or d) Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for
to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting
session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the
constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote. gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by
Res. No. 4.
b) The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary e) The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the
implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative
body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a
June  seventeen,  nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-­‐  nine,  shall  be  composed  of  three  hundred  and  twenty  delegates  who  shall   resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
have  the  same  qualifications  as  those  required  of  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  
97
 Section  4.  Persons  Holding  Office.  Any  person  holding  a  public  office  or  position,  whether  elective  or  appointive,  
including  members  of  the  armed  forces  and  officers  and  employees  of  corporations  or  enterprises  owned  and/or  
controlled  by  the  government,  shall  be  considered  resigned  upon  the  filing  of  his  certificate  of  candidacy:  Provided,  That  
any  government  official  who  resigns  in  order  to  run  for  delegate  and  who  does  not  yet  qualify  for  retirement  under  
existing  laws,  may,  if  elected,  add  to  his  length  of  service  in  the  government  the  period  from  the  filing  of  his  certificate  
of  candidacy  until  the  final  adjournment  of  the  Constitutional  Convention.  
98
 Section  5.  Disqualification  to  Run.  Any  person  elected  as  delegate  to  the  Constitutional  Convention  shall  not  be  
qualified  to  run  for  any  public  office  in  any  election  or  to  assume  any  appointive  office  or  position  in  any  branch  of  the  
Government  until  after  the  final  adjournment  of  the  Constitutional  Convention.  
99
 Section  8.  Prohibited  Acts.  In  addition  to  and  supplementing  prohibited  acts  provided  for  in  the  Revised  Election  Code,  
in  the  election  of  delegates:    
(a)  No  candidate  for  delegate  to  the  Convention  shall  represent  or  allow  himself  to  be  represented  as  being  a  candidate  
of  any  political  party  or  any  other  organization,  and  no  political  party,  political  group,  political  committee,  civic,  
religious,  professional,  or  other  organization  or  organized  group  of  whatever  nature  shall  intervene  in  the  nomination  of  
any  such  candidate  or  in  the  filing  of  his  certificate  of  candidacy  or  give  aid  or  support,  directly  or  indirectly,  material  or  
otherwise,  favorable  to  or  against  his  campaign  for  election:  Provided,  That  this  provision  shall  not  apply  to  the  
members  of  the  family  of  a  candidate  within  the  fourth  civil  degree  of  consanguinity  or  affinity,  nor  to  the  personal  
campaign  staff  of  the  candidate,  which  shall  not  be  more  than  one  for  every  ten  precincts  in  his  district:  Provided,  
further,  That  without  prejudice  to  any  liability  that  may  be  incurred,  no  permit  to  hold  a  public  meeting  shall  be  denied  
on  the  ground  that  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph  may  or  will  be  violated:  and  Provided,  finally,  That  nothing  
contained  herein  shall  be  construed  to  impair  or  abridge  the  freedom  of  civic,  political,  religious,  professionals,  trade  
organization  or  organized  groups  of  whatever  nature  to  disseminate  information  about,  or  arouse  public  interest  in,  the  
forthcoming  Constitutional  Convention  or  to  advocate  constitutional  reforms,  programs,  policies,  or  proposals  for  
amendment  of  the  present  Constitution,  and  no  prohibition  contained  herein  shall  limit  or  curtail  the  right  of  their  
members,  as  long  as  they  act  individually,  to  support  or  oppose  any  candidate  for  delegate  to  the  Constitutional  
Convention.    

 

 

2. WON the specific provisions assailed are valid – YES (not so important)
PROVISION PETITIONER
Sec 2 Sec 2 on apportionment of
delegates is not accordance with
proportional representation and
therefore violates the Constitution
and the intent of the law itself
Sec 4
Sec 5 Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on
the ground that it is an undue
deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and denies the
equal protection of the laws. Said
Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected
delegate from running "for any
public office in any election" or
from assuming "any appointive
COURT
Unlike in the apportionment of
representative districts, the Constitution
does not expressly or impliedly require
such apportionment of delegates to the
convention on the basis of population in
each congressional district. Congress,
sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may
constitutionally allocate one delegate for,
each congressional district or for each
province, for reasons of economy and to
avoid having an unwieldy convention
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2
of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict
with its own intent expressed therein; for it
merely obeyed and implemented the intent
of Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No.
4, which provides that the 320 delegates
should be apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, but
fixing a minimum of at least two delegates
for a representative district
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132,
which considers, all public officers and
employees, whether elective or appointive,
including members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as well as officers and
employees of corporations or enterprises
of the government, as resigned from the
date of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, was recently sustained by this
Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the
same is merely an application of and in
consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2
of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it
does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the
law. Likewise, the constitutionality of
paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132
was upheld
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against
delegates to the Constitutional Convention
is likewise constitutional; for it is based on
a substantial distinction which makes for
real differences, is germane to the
purposes of the law, and applies to all
members of the same class.
the challenged disqualification prescribed
in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid
office or position in any branch of
the government government until
after the final adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention."
Sec 8, par Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
1(a) 6132 is impugned by both
petitioners as violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due
process, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of expressions,
freedom of assembly and freedom
of association.
Decision:
Petition denied. RA 6132 and the assailed provisions constitutional.
limitation on the right to public office
pursuant to state police power as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary.
That the citizen does not have any
inherent nor natural right to a public office,
is axiomatic under our constitutional
system. The State through its Constitution
or legislative body, can create an office
and define the qualifications and
disqualifications therefor as well as impose
inhibitions on a public officer.
Consequently, only those with
qualifications and who do not fall under
any constitutional or statutory inhibition
can be validly elected or appointed to a
public office.
This Court ruled last year that the
guarantees of due process, equal
protection of the laws, peaceful assembly,
free expression, and the right of
association are neither absolute nor
illimitable rights; they are always subject to
the pervasive and dormant police power of
the State and may be lawfully abridged to
serve appropriate and important public
interests.
The ban against all political parties or
organized groups of whatever nature
contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined
to party or organization support or
assistance, whether material, moral,
emotional or otherwise
It is therefore patent that the restriction
contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the
basic constitutional rights themselves
remain substantially intact and inviolate.
And it is therefore a valid infringement of
the aforesaid constitutional guarantees
invoked by petitioners.

Lambino v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 174153
Date of Promulgation: October 25, 2006
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition: Petition to amend the 1987 Constitution
Petitioners: Raul L. Lambino, Erico B. Aumentado w/ 6,327,952 registered voters
Respondents: Commission on Election
Facts:
Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado together with other groups gathered signatures in favor of a
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution on February 15, 2006. On August 25, 2006, Lambino
and his group went to COMELEC to file a petition to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their petition
under Section5(b) and (c) of RA no. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The petition:
4. had the support of 6,327,952 individuals consisting at least 12% of all registered
voters
5. had signatures that were verified by the COMELEC election registrars
6. initiated changes in the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Section 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and
by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”.
On August 30, 2004, Lambino and his group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
because they modified the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The
following day, the COMELEC denied the petition for it lacked an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution.
Issues/Held:
WON the petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constituton – NO
Ratio:
In order for a petition to satisfy the aforementioned provision, it has to have two elements: 1) the
people must author and thus SIGN THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL and 2) THE PROPOSAL MUST
BE EMBODIED IN A PETITION. The people must sign on the petition containing the FULL
TEXT of the petition. These requirements are intended by the framers of the Constitution
because of the following:
3. to avoid misleading the people
4. to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate
the petition
Also, Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires the people to sign the petition as signatories.
Lambino and his group did not attach the copy of the paper the people have signed when they
gave the petition to the Court. Moreover, they were only able to provide signature sheets THAT
DID NOT EVEN CONTAIN THE FULL TEXT OF THE PETITION WITH THE VOTERS’
SIGNATURES.
This fact made the Court doubtful as to the constitutionality of the petition since:
1) not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the initiative petition is in the signature sheet
2) the signature sheet does not state that the petition was attached to it.
To add fuel to the fire, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they were only able to print
100,000 copies of the full text of the petition. Provided that each copy was attached to a
signature sheet and it’s a fact that one signature sheet had space for 10 signatures, it can be
concluded that only 1,000,000 registered voters were able to read the full text and sign the
petition.
The petition did not satisfy the basic requirement in conduction a petition initiated by the people
as laid down by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Hence, it is void and unconstitutional.
Decision:
Petition denied.
Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350/G.R. No. L-56404
Date of promulgation: April 2, 1981
Ponente: Fernando, CJ.
Petition: prohibition
Petitioner: Samuel C. Occena
Respondents: COMELEC, COA, the National Treasurer, the Director of Printing
Petitioners 2: Ramon A. Gonzales, Manuel B. Imbong, Jo Aurea Marcos-Imbong, Ray Allan T.
Drilon, Nelson B. Malana, and Gil M. Tabios
Respondents 2: the National Treasurer and COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners Occena and Gonzales filed to prohibit the ratification of three Batasang Pambansa
(BP) resolutions on the ground of their validity as amendments:
Resolution No. 1: proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was
approved by the vote of 122 to 5
Resolution No. 2: dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention
Resolution No. 3: on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of
148 to 2 with 1 abstention.
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three
BP Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes further than merely assailing their
alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
Issue/Held:
1. WON the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law – YES
2. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments – YES
3. WON the ¾ vote requirement is necessary to propose amendments – NO
4. WON the Interim BP can propose a revision – YES
5. WON 3 BP Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid – YES
Ratio:
1. WON the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law – YES
The ruling in Javellana v. Executive Secretary is authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution whose provisions have been applied already in several cases before the Supreme
Court.
On January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the SC and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the SC
says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was

 
removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the The Constitution clearly states when a proposed amendment to the Constitution should be
101
fundamental law. submitted to the people for ratification and indicates the way the matter should be resolved.

2. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments – YES The 3 were approved by the Interim BP sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27,
1981. In the BP Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
The 1973 Constitution vests in the BP the power to propose amendments by special call of 90-day period provided by the Constitution, making them valid.
the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
100
article on amendments. The existence of this power is indubitable as the applicable provision Decision:
in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Dismissed.

When, therefore, the Interim BP, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such competence. Gonzales v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
3. WON the Interim BP can propose a revision – YES
Date of promulgation: November 9, 1967
Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections: Ponente: Concepcion, CJ.
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or Petition: Original Action for prohibition
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Petitioners: Ramon Gonzales
Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be Respondents: Commission on Elections, Director of Printing, and Auditor General
submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can
be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing resolutions:

4. WON the ¾ vote requirement is necessary to propose amendments – NO 1. R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, pro-posing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Phil-ippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Sitting as a constituent body, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies maximum of 180, xxx although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
as well when it has been convened through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a Constitutional Convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either 2. R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
when, as in this case, the Interim BP exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three-fourth votes applies,
such extraordinary majority was obtained: 3. R.B.H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Arti-cle VI, of the same Constitution, be amended
Resolution No. 1 was approved by a vote of 122 to 5, so as to author-ize senators and members of the House of Representatives to become
Resolution No. 2 by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention, and delegates to the aforementioned constitutional conven-tion, without forfeiting their
Resolution No. 3 by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. respective seats in Congress.

5. WON the 3 BP Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid – YES Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
As to the standard: proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
The question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before people, at the general elec-tions which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been
called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a
properly informed as to the proposed changes. voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.

As to the period: Issue/Held:

Whether Republic Act No. 4913, HB 1 and 3 are unconstitutional and void on the following
grounds:

                                                                                                               
100
 The  Interim  Batasang  Pambansa  shall  have  the  same  powers  and  its  Members  shall  have  the  same  functions,                                                                                                                  
101
responsibilities,  rights,  privileges,  and  disqualifications  as  the  interim  National  Assembly  and  the  regular  National    Any  amendment  to,  or  revision  of,  this  Constitution  shall  be  valid  when  ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  
Assembly  and  the  Members  thereof.   plebiscite,  which  shall  be  held  not  later  than  three  months  after  the  approval  of  such  amendment  or  revision.  
 
  
1.Question of Legal Status and Authority: Congress was de facto, they did not have the authority 4.It was argued by the petitioners that there was inadequate time for the public to be informed of
to pass such act since they failed to undertake a valid apportionment as prescribed in the 1935 the implications of the proposed amendments in the Constitution. The Court refutes this
constitution(Sec. 5, Art. VI) - NO argument by stating that the measures stated in RA 4713 were adequate. They further cited that
2.Question of Grammar: The Congress can propose amendments in the constitution OR call for these measures were no different from those employed in previous amendments and laws. The
a convention; it cannot do both. (moved by Juan T. David, amicus curiae) – NO only difference is that RBH 1 and 3 did not undergo rigorous debates and examination such in
3.Question of Execution: The ratification of the proposed amendments must be held during a the cases of Women’s Suffrage. However, it is not grounds for nullification if sectors are unable
special election which is contrary to what is provided in RA 4713 which proposes the ratification to discuss it sufficiently.
102 103
during a general election. (Art. XV ) – NO
4.Question on the Spirit of the Constitution: The proposed amendments violate the spirit of the (In Essence: As long as the voting public is duly informed, it is ok)The Court ultimately decided
constitution since it did not go under rigorous examination and consultation as compared to that the Congress performed well within its authority and within the bounds stated in Article XV
previous amendment proposals and thus was not able to “inform the people of the amendment of the Constitution.
sought to be made”. - NO
Decision:
Sub-issue on Court Jurisdiction: The Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief or pass upon the Petitions dismissed.
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives. - NO

Ratio: Tan v. Macapagal

On Court Jurisdiction: GR Nos. 92191-92
“The Judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among theintegral or Date of Promulgation: February 29, 1972
constituentunits thereof”(Dr. Jose P. Laurel) Sec. 2 (1), Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution can Ponente: Fernando, J.
be used to respond to this issue. Petition: Resolution
Petitioners: Eugene Tan, Silvestre Acejas,and Rogelio Fernandez, on their behalf and on
Substantive issues: behalf of the People of the Philippines
104
1.This argument was based on Sec. 5, Article VI . The premise of this argument is that the Respondents: Diosdado Macapagal, on his behalf and on behalf of the other Delegates of the
apportionment is mandatory whereas failure to comply results with the members of the congress 1971 Constitutional Convention
being illegal and unconstitutional and becoming de facto officers. The Court refuted this
argument by citing the continuing provision,“...Until such apportionment shall have been made, Facts:
the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law...“ Petitioners filed for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves
which implies that despite the expiration of the period indicated, the Congress will continue to and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel Leido Resolution, would have the
function as was. Furthermore, the Court argued that neither political law nor the law on public court declare that the Constitutional Convention is without power to seek to revise the present
officers support the view that failure to discharge mandatory duties would automatically result in Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form outlined on the
the forfeiture of office. present Constitution.

2.The Court deemed the argument to be “a weak one in absence of other circumstances”. The The Convention being merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution
disjunctive “or” can be held to mean vice-versa depending on the context it is used. Furthermore, without altering the general plan laid down therein. The Court however issued a resolution
while the three resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote dismissing it.
separately; they were not passed at the same time.
Petitioners filed an MR based from American Jurisprudence. The Court however finds that
3. The petitioners argued that the election indicated in the provision pertains to a special petitioners are oblivious of the authoritative precedents in the country’s jurisdiction. Considering
election. Amendments in the constitution are vital in nature and must be given due focus. By however, the compulsion of the fundamental principle of separation of powers, the Court cannot
ratifying such proposed amendments during a general election, there is a tendency that it exercise the competence petitioners would erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming
adversely affect its outcome. Some members of the Court agree on these arguments and further that they have the requisite standing.
stating that the elections refer to a “plebiscite” although they are unable to subscribe to such
notion due to it not being written in the Constitution Issue/Held:
Procedural
1. WON Petitioners have locus standi – NO
Substantive

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102
2. WON the issue is ripe for adjudication - YES

 Article
 XV
 on
 Constitutional
 Amendments
 provides,
 “..
 Such
 amendments
 shall
 be
 valid
 as
 part
 of
 this
 Constitution
 
when
 approved
 by
 a
 majority
 of
 the
 votes
 cast
 at
 an
 election
 at
 which
 the
 amendments
 are
 submitted
 to
 the
 people
 for
 
their
 ratification.”
  Ratio:
103

 The
 majority
 view
 -­‐
 although
 the
 votes
 in
 favor
 thereof
 are
 insufficient
 to
 declare
 Republic
 Act
 No.
 4913
  1. WON Petitioners have locus standi – YES
unconstitu-­‐tional
 -­‐
 as
 ably
 set
 forth
 in
 the
 opinion
 penned
 by
 Mr.
 Justice
 Sanchez,
 is,
 however,
 otherwise.
 
104

 The
 Congress
 shall
 by
 law
 make
 an
 apportionment
 within
 three
 years
 after
 the
 return
 of
 every
 enumeration,
 and
 not
 
otherwise.
 

 

 
In the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit
for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
There has been a relaxation of this rule in Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works:. jurisdiction.
"Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling.
the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot therefor be
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be sustained.
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
Decision:
A Senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. MR DENIED.
Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, it was a member of the Senate who was heard by this Court in
a suit for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the congressional resolution proposing the
parity rights amendment. Likewise, in the latest case in point, Tolentino v. Commission on Sanidad v COMELEC
Elections, it was a Senator who brought action challenging the validity of Organic Resolution No. G.R. No. 166006
1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was quite sucessful too. Petitioners in the present
case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category. Date of Promulgation: October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J.
As a taxpayer's suit is concerned, Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it Petition: certiorar
should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should petitioners Petitioners: Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad
10
feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, a member of Respondents: Comission on Elections
the Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his action for
prohibition instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment Facts:
as such suit could be distinguished from the present. On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) 991
calling for a national referendum for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
2. WON the issue is ripe for adjudication – YES [However, the Doctrine of among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the
Separation of Powers prevents the Court from acting on such case] powers of such replacement, the period of its existence and the length of the period for time
exercised by the President of his present powers.
Petitioner Gonzales in accordance had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the
enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to Subsequently, he issued a related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by
the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in
judiciary had to keep its hands off. "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite that will be held soon and quite
105
relevantly, repealing Section 4 of PD 991 allowing fifteen-year olds to participate in said
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to assembly.
discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will
neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action ... ." On the same day, he likewise issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite to be held. The questions ask, to wit:
The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do (1)Do you want martial law to be continued?
or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that (2)Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the
come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of
"when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding." Article XVI of the Constitution.
Enumerated immediately after the questions above are the Proposed Amendments.
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged
in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility
according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot
be otherwise if it is to perform its function well.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its powers 105

 The
 repealed
 portion
 now
 reads:
 
are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification proposals which may SEC.
 4
 Who
 shall
 participate.-­‐Every
 Filipino
 citizen,
 literate
 or
 not,
 fifteen
 years
 of
 age
 or
 over
 who
 has
 resided
 in
 the
 
radically alter the organization and functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is barangay
 for
 at
 least
 six
 months
 shall
 participate
 in
 the
 consultation
 in
 his
 barangay.
 Provided,
 however,
 that
 any
 person
 
therefore much more imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until the who
 may
 not
 be
 able
 to
 participate
 in
 the
 consultations
 of
 his
 barangay
 may
 do
 so
 in
 any
 barangay
 member
 shall
 
appropriate time comes. participate
 in
 more
 than
 one
 barangay
 consultation.
 

 

 
Herein petitioners (father and son, see above), timely commenced a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the above
contemplated Referendum Plebiscite.
They also sought to declare without force and effect PD 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs COMELEC
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is NO grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution. Hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite is devoid of constitutional or legal
basis.
Issue/Held:
1. WON President possess the authority to propose amendments to the constitution? YES
2. WON the Referendum-Plebiscite will be rendered nugatory by the participation of 15-yr
olds? NO
3. WON submission to the people of the proposed amendments is within a sufficient time
frame? YES
Ratio:
1. WON the President possess the authority to propose amendments to the constitution --
YES
The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. [SEE NOTES FOR BRIEF DISCUSSION
ON THIS]
"plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act. It is generally associated with
the amending process, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
3. WON the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within a sufficient time
frame – YES
The period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-
plebiscite issues. The questions are not new, they are the issues of the day and the people
have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law 4 years ago.
Decision:
PETITION DISMISSED.
Notes:
Concentration of Powers in the President during Crisis Government
⋅ According to Rossiter, "The concentration of government power in a democracy faced by
an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers.”
⋅ There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in
unanimity of purpose and action because the more complete the separation of powers,
the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis.
⋅ The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for worry as the steady
increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called
upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion,
secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war.

Under Art XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to
the interim National Assembly during the transition period. In this case, the President decided
not to call the interim National Assembly and the Court concluded that such is within the bounds
of the constitution
The reasoning behind is that if the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments, which is but adjunct, to its gross legislative
power.
Furthermore, the referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, proceed not from
the thinking of a single man but rather are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will.
In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in
a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only
by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a
sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
in a particular body.
2. WON the Referendum-Plebiscite will be rendered nugatory by the participation of the 15-
year olds – NO
The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein
the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach
the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
Tolentino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L34150
Date of Promulgation: October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.
Petition: petition for prohibition
Petitioners: Arturo M. Tolentino
Respondents: Commission on Elections, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor, and the
Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera,
Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y Feria, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Victor F. Ortega, and Juan V. Borra
Facts:
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain the Commission on Elections "from undertaking
to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment
"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines
from 21 to 18 years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing
resolutions, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of 2 resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2
106

pursuing his program for a New Order. The plebiscite aspect comprised of the succeeding and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress.
question on the proposed amendments and only those of voting age of 18 years may participate.
The Court distinguished between a referendum and plebiscite. A "referendum" is merely
                                                                                                               
 Resolution  2.  SECTION  1.  There  is  hereby  called  a  convention  to  propose  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  
106
consultative in character. It’s simply a means of assessing public reaction to given issues. A the  Philippines,  to  be  composed  of  two  elective  Delegates  from  each  representative  district  who  shall  have  the  
same  qualifications  as  those  required  of  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  
 
  
In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be
President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
implement its resolution." appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws Decision:
in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite with the elections of eight senators Petition GRANTED.
and all city, provincial and municipal officials.

Petitioner contends that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a UNIDO v. COMELEC
power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by G.R. No. 56515
the Convention.
Date of Promulgation: April 3, 1981
Also, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question Ponente: Barredo, J.
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other Petition: Appeal
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. Petitioners: United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO)
Respondents: COMELEC
Issues/Held:
3. WON the Court has jurisdiction. – YES Facts:
4. WON Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution was violated by the act of the The Batasang Pambansa proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution in 1981. The
Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the people’s approval.
Resolution No. 1. – YES
The COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469, providing equal opportunity, equal time
Ratio: and equal space on media use for the YES and NO campaign. The YES vote was being
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction. – YES advanced by Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (which was under Marcos), while the NO vote was being
advanced by UNIDO.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its
existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution. It was On March 12, 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30 PM to
called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by 11:30 PM. The same presentation was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio
107
authority of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution. Therefore, the acts of convention, its stations nationwide.
officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.
UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as
This is not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to Marcos has (pursuant to COMELEC Resolutions 1467-69). COMELEC denied the demand.
the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject
to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice UNIDO assailed the denial of equal air time as a denial of equal protection before the laws.
Laurel, it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in
this case. Issue/s:
1. WON Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution was violated by the act of the WON UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request. --
Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic NO.
Resolution No. 1. – YES
UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they denied equal protection.
The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981 in his
be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines, and not as the head of any political party
“election” or plebiscite. (in this case, KBL).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the “Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible for the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy”. It would be an
xxx  xxx  xxx  
Idle, if not absurd proposition, to declare that the President/Prime Minister is 'responsible
SECTION  7.  The  amendments  proposed  by  the  Convention  shall  be  valid  and  considered  part  of  the  Constitution  
when  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  an  election  at  which  they  are  submitted  to  the  people  for  their  
for the program of government and the guidelines of policy' and yet deprive him of the
ratification  pursuant  to  Article  XV  of  the  Constitution.   right and opportunity to inform and enlighten the people of the rationale of such initiatives
107  ARTICLE  XV  —  AMENDMENTS.  SECTION  1.  The  Congress  in  joint  session  assembled,  by  a  vote  of  three-­‐ without at the same time granting the same right to the opposition.
fourths  of  all  the  Members  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  House  of  Representatives  voting  separately,  may  propose  
amendments  to  this  Constitution  or  call  a  convention  for  the  purpose.  Such  amendments  shall  be  valid  as  part  of   It cannot be denied that seeking constitutional changes through the means sanctioned by the
this  Constitution  when  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  an  election  at  which  the  amendments  are   Constitution constitutes a program of government imbued with the nature of highest importance.
submitted  to  the  people  for  their  ratification.   The President/Prime Minister initiated this program of constitutional remaking. It is,
 
 
  
therefore, his corollary prerogative to enlighten the people on the sense, significance,
necessity and nuance of the constitutional amendments which he wanted the people to support.

The program 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political or partisan vehicle but an innovative
system of participatory democracy where the President as leader of the nation enunciates
certain programs or policies and thereafter subjected to interrogation by panelists (common
men and women) in various strategic places. This is why the title is 'Pulong-Pulong'. It is not a
one way arrangement; its format is intended to result in effective multi-way consultation between
the leader of the nation and the people.

Under our Constitution the President/Prime Minister has no counter-part, not even the
Opposition still waiting in the uncertain wings of power.

In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is
in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with
the governed.

The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. As such,
UNIDO has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos. The rule
of equal time for campaigning as to duration and quality is not applicable under the
circumstances of this case, for the reasons above-stated.

The SC also cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they
are not party to this case. UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with
the TV or radio stations concerned but they must contract with these TV stations and
radio stations at their own expense.

Decision:
Appeal is DISMISSED.