Criminal Law II

Case Digests
Araya, Yuri
Biglaen, Mark Angelo
Bries, Avril
Co, Charles
Fernandez, Maite
Marcelo, Pamela
Ng, Audrey
 LAUREL v. MISA
January 30, 1947 | Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus
| Resolution | Treason
SUMMARY: Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus arguing that he should not be
prosecuted for the crime of treason as sovereignty of the Philippine government was
suspended during the Japanese military occupation. The SC held that a citizen owes
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government, which subsists even during
belligerent occupation.
DOCTRINE: The crime of treason does not depend upon the current occupant or
form of government for it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people.
FACTS:
1. Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as defined in the RPC,
because 1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government and consequently
the correlative allegiance of citizens thereto was then suspended, and 2)
there was a change in sovereignty over the islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN sovereignty of the legitimate government and allegiance of citizens
was suspended during the Japanese military occupation—NO
2. WoN there was a change in sovereignty over the islands—NO
is the exercise of rights of sovereignty with the passing of control of the
government to the occupant. However, the military occupant is enjoined to
respect or continue in force laws unless in conflict with laws and orders of
the occupier. Such laws and orders must come within the limitations
prescribed by the Hague convention, meaning that such action must be 1)
demanded by the exigencies of military service, 2) necessary for the control
of the inhabitants, 3) necessary for the safety and protection of his army. If
the contrary were true, invaders would be able force the citizens, without
fear of prosecution for treason, to be party to the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own independence and repressing the exercise of their
own sovereignty—to commit a political suicide.
3. Because the question of sovereignty is a purely political question, its
determination by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of the country. By virtue of Section 1, Article II of the
1935 Constitution, which states that “all references in such laws to the
Government…shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution”, the crime
of treason was made applicable not only to the sovereignty of the United
States but also to the sovereignty of the Government of the Philippines. The
change in form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people.

RULING: Petition DENIED.

RATIO:
1. A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance,which consists in
fidelity and obedience, to his government or sovereign. It cannot be equated
to the qualified or temporary allegiance w/c a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives. In the same way, such foreigner remains liable to
prosecution for treason against his own government or sovereign, to which
he owes absolute and permanent allegiance. This absolute and permanent
allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of
the government is not transferred to the occupier, a theory adopted in the
Hague Convention of 1907. Thus, it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
2. The existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence at least during the period of ‘suspension’. What may be suspended
 PEOPLE v. PEREZ 4. The accused, although acquitted from treason, can be punished for the rape
April 19, 1949 | Tuason, J. | Appeal | Treason of the victims as principal by direct participation because none would have
materialized without his cooperation.
SUMMARY: Susano Perez appealed a decision of the People’s Court 5. The accused’s contention that the provision punishing perpetrators of rape
convicting him of treason punishable by death which was granted. The four instead of treason is unconstitutional won’t hold water. He argued that it
rape cases were considered separate and do not constitute treason. violated Sec 1 Par 17 of Article III which asserts the right of the accused “to
DOCTRINE: Treason is done when a person renders assistance to people as be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.This is
enemies of the state and not as individuals. Treason may only be proven by untenable because the crimes of rape against Susano was averred in the
acts which directly and materially go against the interest of the govt and intent information and supported by evidence which gave rise to a warning to the
of disloyalty must always be present. defendant that he may be convicted of said crime. There is no element of
surprise or anomaly that could possibly violate the constitutionally asserted
FACTS: right.
1. Appellant Susano Perez furnished Japanese Colonel Mini of Bohol, along
with other officers, with Filipino women for carnal knowledge against the
will of the victims.
2. In the process of providing women, Susano Perez also acquired carnal
knowledge from several women against their will before and after he turned
them over to the officers.
3. Appellant was convicted of treason, supported by evidence for 5 counts,
when the People’s Court of Cebu considered providing women for Japs as a
boost to the morale of the latter which contributed to their war efforts.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN Susano’s action of providing women for the Japs can be considered
treason? – NO.
2. WoN conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason provided in
section 2 of C.A. No. 682 is unconstitutional? - NO
RULING: Appellant is not guilty of treason but is guilty of four separate crimes
of rape accompanied by four indeterminate penalties.

RATIO:
1. Appellant’s actions of providing women cannot be considered as treason
because any act of hospitality which provides the same result of boosting
morale would also be considered as treason.
2. The kind of disloyalty punished as treason is that which contributes directly
to the agenda of enemies against the state and not that aid given to enemies
as merely individuals.
3. Susano’s actions which led to the satisfaction of the lust of Japanese
officers did not directly and materially improve their war efforts. The
effects are trivial and are of no significance to the strengthening of the
Japanese empire or its army.
 PEOPLE v. PRIETO
January 29, 1948 | Tuason, J. | Appeal | Treason
SUMMARY: Appellant was found guilty on 4 counts of treason after
pleading guilty. He was acquitted on 3 counts because evidence failed to
satisfy the two-witness principle which requires corroboration on the
stories of the two witnesses.
DOCTRINE: Acts charged as an element of treason cannot be subject of
separate punishment or be used to increase the penalty of treason. They
can only be subject of prosecution if government chooses to try
perpetrators specifically for those acts but the felony of treason will then
be excluded.
identified with the latter crime and cannot be used as subject of separate
punishment nor as a means to increase the penalty for treason.
3. Although the murder or physical injuries were absorbed by a single felony,
treason can be modified by several circumstances. Aggravating is the
brutality carried out with the killing qualified by the augmentation of the
sufferings of the aviator. But this circumstance was offset by the mitigating
circumstance of pleading guilty.
4. The reluctance of the counsel who did not wish to represent the accused did
not overcome the presumption of legality of the trial court proceedings just
because he did not sympathize with the client. The former counsel’s
hesitation to represent the accused does not equate to his inability to
perform his duty to protect the interest of the client.

FACTS:
1. Appellant, after being charged for 7 counts of treason, pled guilty for 4. Of
the 3 counts for which he pled not guilty, the prosecutor was only able to
present evidence for one.
2. The prosecutor then presented the testimonies of two witnesses who
narrated how they saw the accused, Filipino undercovers, and Japanese
soldiers with the American Aviator who was held prisoner.
3. The statements of the witnesses did not coincide on any single detail of the
event.
4. After presenting evidence, the People’s court sentenced the accused to death
for being guilty of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries
considering the two latter crimes as distinct from treason.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN defendant can be held guilty according to the testimonies of the two
witnesses? – NO
2. WoN the case should be dismissed based on the failure of the trial court to
replace the accused’s counsel who did not want to represent the former? -
NO
RULING: Appellant is only guilty of treason for the counts which he plead
guilty.

RATIO:
1. Defendant cannot be held guilty based on testimonies which did not satisfy
the two-witness principle. The two witnesses who gave their statements
failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any
part of it.
2. The lower court erred in considering the killing and the physical injuries
mentioned in the counts against the defendant as separate from the crime of
treason. When crimes are charged as elements of treason, they become
 PEOPLE v. MANAYAO
July 28, 1947 | Hilado, J. | Appeal from judgment of the People’s Court |
Treason
SUMMARY: Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili who joined the
Japanese soldiers in killing the residents of Banaban, Angat, Bulacan. The
People’s Court sentenced him to death for treason with multiple murder. On
appeal, he contended that the PC had no jurisdiction over his case because (1) he is
a member of the Japanese Armed Forces and was subject to military law and (2) he
lost his citizenship by joining the Japanese army. The Supreme Court held him
liable for treason but commuted his sentence to reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: Loss of citizenship by joining the enemy army is not a good defense
against criminal liability for treason; otherwise the very crime that the offender
committed would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
FACTS:
1. Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili who joined the Japanese
soldiers in killing the residents of Banaban, Angat, Bulacan on Jan. 29,
1945. The event was part of the reprisal after the guerilla raid (Jan. 27,
1945) on the Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan in Angat, Bulacan.
2. The People’s Court sentenced Manayao to death based on the testimony of
two witnesses who were survivors in the Banaban massacre, Maria Paulino
and Clarita Perez.
3. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Manayao assigns the following errors,
among others:
a. He was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan and was subject to
military law; therefore, the People’s Court had no jurisdiction over his case.
b. He lost his citizenship by swearing an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution and laws of Japan (as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 63)
such that the Philippine law on treason is not applicable to him.
c. The aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men and employment of a
band were separately taken into account
d. That the he was acting under orders from a superior
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Manayao’s joining in the Makapili was tantamount to
joining the Japanese armed forces - NO
2. Whether or not the defense of loss of citizenship by joining the army of the
enemy would make Manayao not criminally liable for treason under
Philippine law - NO
3. Whether or not he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to
a lawful order of a superior – NO
RULING: Death penalty commuted to reclusion perpetua and its accessories
due to J. Perfecto’s dissent. Aid of armed men absorbed in the aggravating
circumstance of employment of a band.
RATIO:
1. Although the Makapili was organized to render military aid to the Japanese
Army in the Philippines during the late war, it was not a part of the said
army. It was simply an organization of Filipino traitors.
2. The oath that Manayao swore to when he became a Makapili is not
tantamount to the oath of allegiance to support the constitution and the laws
of Japan that would result to loss of Philippine citizenship under par. 3 of
Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63. The Makapili could have sworn to
help the Japanese even without swearing an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution and laws of Japan.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support that Manayao accepted a
commission in the “military, naval, or air service” of Japan (also one of the
grounds for loss of Philippine citizenship under par. 4 of Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act. No. 63).
If Manayao’s defense of loss of citizenship to escape criminal liability for
treason is sustained, the very crime that he committed would be the shield
that would protect him from punishment. Thus, he cannot divest himself of
his Philippine citizenship through the treasonous acts being charged against
him to escape liability under Philippine treason law.
3. Obedience to an order of a superior cannot be construed to include acts
done in compliance of an order from a foreign sovereign, any more than
obedience to an unlawful order.
Obiter: The Court also held that he is also not entitled to the exempting
circumstance of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear even if such really
existed since (1) he voluntarily joined the Makapili knowing very well the
consequences of his actions; (2) it was noted that Manayao insisted to have
the children killed (including the two prosecution witnesses who survived
the massacre) even when the Japanese soldiers had decided to spare them.
 PEOPLE v. ADRIANO
June 30, 1947 | Tuason, J. | Appeal from judgment of the People’s Court |
Treason
SUMMARY: Accused-appellant was charged with treason due to membership
in the Makapili. Witnesses did not testify to a same single treasonous act.
Accused-appellant acquitted due to non-fulfillment of the two-witness rule.
DOCTRINE: To sustain a conviction for treason, each of the witnesses must
testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act.
not required to prove adherence; criminal intent and knowledge may be
established by the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act
itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. As an overt act, its
effect is similar to enlisting in the invader’s army.
2. Based on jurisprudence, the two-witness rule was deliberately created to be
restrictive and inflexible, requiring the direct testimony of two witnesses to
the same whole overt act. Although it is possible to piece together bits of
the overt act, each bit must have the support of two oaths. Natural
inferences flowing from a single trustworthy witness or other sources do not
fulfill the requirement. The two-witness rule was not fulfilled.

FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Apolinar Adriano was charged with treason due to his
membership with the Makapili, an organization “established and designed
to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines in
[its] war efforts and operations against the United States and the
Philippines. No other evidence than his having joined the Makaipili was
introduced by the prosecution.
2. The People’s Court found:
a. Evidence of adherence (not established by two-witness rule): accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in raids and confiscation of personal
property.
b. Supposedly established by two-witness rule: the accused-appellant and
other Makapilis had their HQ in the enemy garrison in Gapan where he
performed sentry duties; accused-apellant was in Makapili military
uniform and armed with rifle; drilled with other Makapilis under a
Japanese instructor; on liberation of Gapan by US forces, retreated with
the enemy to the mountains; and later surrendered to the Americans.
3. The PC’s findings were not under the two-witness rule, since no two of the
prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the treasonous acts
imputed to the accused-appellant (e.g. different dates). The only item on
which they agree is that he was a Makapili and seen in Makapili uniform
carrying arms.

ISSUE/S:
1. WoN Makapili membership is treasonous – YES.
2. WoN the two-witness rule was fulfilled – NO.

RULING: Judgment reversed. Appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

RATIO:
1. The mere fact of joining is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and an
overt act giving him psychological aid and comfort. The two-witness rule is
 PEOPLE v. LOL-LO and SARAW
February 27, 1922 | Malcolm, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Piracy
SUMMARY: Lol-lo and Saraw were among the armed Moros who attacked a
boat with Dutch nationals aboard. The Moros attacked the men, brutally raped the
women, stole the cargo, and made holes on the boat to make it submerge. After
returning home to Sulu, Lol-lo and Saraw were arrested and charged with piracy
for which they were found guilty. Defendants primarily raised a question on
jurisdiction. The Court held that the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try cases
involving piracy.
DOCTRINE: Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas without
lawful authority and done animo furandi (with the intention of stealing) and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a crime against mankind and
not just against a particular state. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
FACTS:
1. Two boats with Dutch nationals aboard were sailing for Peta in the Dutch
East Indies. The second boat (with 11 men, women, and children) arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid, where it was surrounded by six
vintas with 24 armed Moros aboard.
2. The Moros first asked for food and once they were on the Dutch boat, they
attacked the men, brutally raped the two women and took all the cargo for
themselves. They then made holes on the boat with the idea of making the
boat sink. (Fortunately, the Dutch nationals were rescued after 11 days of
hardship). The Moros also took the two women with them, who were
repeatedly raped before being able to escape at Maruro, where the Moros
landed.
3. Lol-lo and Saraw, who were among the armed Moros (Lol-lo raped one of
the women), later went back to their home in Sulu. They were later arrested
and charged with piracy at the Zamboanga CFI, and were found guilty of
the crime. On appeal, defendants primarily raised the issue of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts over their case.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the crime of piracy was committed by the defendants – YES
2. Whether or not the Zamboanga CFI or any Philippine court has jurisdiction
over the case – YES
3. Whether or not the provisions of the (Spanish) Penal Code on piracy are
still in force – YES
RULING: Judgment modified with respect to Lol-lo (penalty raised from
cadena perpetua to death) in view of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, ignominy and cruelty.
RATIO:
1. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi (with the intention of stealing) and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. Since the crime was accompanied
by rape and the offenders abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves, the applicable provision in the Penal Code is Art. 154, with
penalty of cadena perpetua to death. The death penalty was imposed on
Lol-lo due to the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength,
ignominy and cruelty without benefit of any mitigating circumstance.
2. Piracy is a crime against mankind and not just against a particular State. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Pirates are in law
considered hostes humani generis (“enemies of mankind”).
3. The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy are still in force in the
Philippines even when there is a change in the sovereign power from Spain
to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris (1898). While political
laws are necessarily changed with the change in the sovereign, municipal
laws remain in force as long as they are consistent with the U.S.
Constitution, the laws of the U.S., or the characteristics and institutions of
the government. As such, laws of municipal character designed to secure
order and peace in the community subsisting during the time of the transfer
of sovereignty remain in force until altered or repealed by the new
government through direct action.
The Penal Code provisions on piracy are held not to be inconsistent with the
laws of the U.S., since the Penal Code provisions on piracy have similarities
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to concepts of public law, while the
laws of the U.S. on piracy rest on the universal conception of piracy under
the law of nations.
Using this construction, the word "Spain" in the Penal Code should be
substituted by the words "United States" and the word "Spaniards" should
be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens
of the Philippine Islands.”
 PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ
March 30, 1985 | Appeal from a CFI decision | Per Curiam | Piracy

SUMMARY: The 4 accused robbed and killed crew members and

passengers of a trading vessel. 3 pled guilty but were still sentenced to death,
which they question before the SC. SC held that the mandatory penalty
prescribed under PD 532 shall be applied despite mitigating circumstances.
DOCTRINE: If rape, homicide, or murder is committed as a result of or on
the occasion of piracy, the mandatory punishment of death shall be imposed.

FACTS:
1. On the evening of Aug 30, 1981, M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
Philippine registry, left the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. 2-3 hours after
its departure, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez, Davio Reyes and Peter Ponce,
armed with bladed weapons and firearms, robbed crew members and
passengers of their belongings. On the occasion, they stabbed and shot these
victims and threw them off the ship.
2. They were apprehended by Malaysian authorities and upon arraignment,
Rodriguez, Lopez and Reyes pled guilty. Ponce was later pronounced guilty
and all were sentenced to the death penalty.
3. On appeal, Rodriguez, Lopez and Reyes argued that the court erred in
applying the death penalty despite their guilty plea, while Ponce continued
to deny his participation.

ISSUE/S: Won the death penalty was applicable in this case—YES

RULING: Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. PD 532 or the Anti-Piracy Law, which took effect on Aug 8, 1974, provides
that where on the occasion of piracy, rape, murder or homicide results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. Thus, the lower court did not
err in not appreciating their plea of guilty. Also, Art 63 of the RPC states
that in cases w/c the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances w/c attended the commission of the crime.
2. Sub-issue: Ponce was proven to be a conspirator through witness
testimonies 1) describing him to be indiscriminately firing his M-14 rifle
with the other accused, and 2) joining Reyes in the pumpboat after the
commission of the crime.
 PEOPLE v. SIYOH
February 18, 1986 | Abad Santos, J. | Automatic Review of CFI Basilan
Decision | Piracy
SUMMARY: 4 traveling merchants who slept once in Kiram’s house and
were accompanied by Siyoh and Kiram were attacked while riding Kiram’s
motorboat towards Pilas Island. Siyoh and Kiram acted in concert with the 2
armed men to steal from and kill the merchants, of which Antonio de Guzman
survived. Siyoh and Kiram are later apprehended, convicted by TC of
Qualified Murder with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder. SC affirms.
DOCTRINE:PD 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder, or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims
FACTS:
1. Traveling merchants Antonio de Guzman and 3 others purchased goods in
order to sell them on another island and make a profit. They slept in the
accused Kiram’s house and used his pumpboat to transfer from island to
island in order to sell the goods. On the day of the incident where the
merchants were on their way to Pilas Island, Kiram and Siyoh who were
armed with barongs accompanied them, While peddling, de Guzman also
saw the two talking to 2 armed men.
2. On the way to another island, Kiram turned off the pumpboat’s engine
while another pumpboat containing the aforementioned 2 persons moved
towards them and 2 shots were fired. The merchants’ pumpboat was towed
towards another island while the 4 merchants’ cash, goods, etc worth
P18,342 was stolen from them. The accused then ordered them to undress
while Hiolen and the other de Castro was hacked to death. Antonio de
Guzman then jumped into the water and escaped despite being shot.
3. Antonio later found the dead bodies of 2 of his companions and was
brought to the Philippine Army station.He was able to point out Siyoh and
Kiram. The two were then apprehended and found guilty of Qualified
Piracy with Triple Murder & Frustrated Murder and sentenced to death.
Both appeal, claiming that their guilt wasn’t proven beyond reasonable
doubt and that they were merely victims of the crime that was committed
only by In-danan and Jamahali.
RATIO:
1. Siyoh and Kiram’s claim that the 2 could have robbed them at the Kiram
house or anytime when they were travelling together is unconvincing since
doing so would make Kiram and his family immediate suspects and robbing
the merchants before all the goods were sold would be premature. Likewise,
their claim that they reported the incident to the PC immediately does not
match the record since their witnesses were all friends of the accused and
the defense failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book. The
defense also failed present any evidence to infer the reason why Antonio de
Guzman would testify against them and to manufacture such a heinous
crime.
2. Accused’s claim that In-danan and Jamaphali were the killers and not them
is baseless since conspiracy was proven based on de Guzman’s testimony
that (a) he saw the 2 armed strangers who later divested them of their
belongins and killed his compnions talking to Siyoh and Kiram prior to the
incident, (b) Siyoh and Kiram transferred the unsold goods to the captors’
boat, (c) Siyoh and Kiram remained unharmed and unmolested.
3. Accused also claims that there was no evidence that Anastacio de Guzman
was also killed since his remains were never recovered. But the number of
persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD 532 considers
qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.

ISSUE/S: WON de Guzman as lone prosecution eyewitness should be believed

over Siyoh and Kiram who claim they are victims – YES.

RULING: Decision AFFIRMED with modifications. Penalty is reclusion

perpetua for lack of necessary votes.
 UMIL v. RAMOS
July 9, 1990 | Per Curiam | Petitions for Habeas corpus | Arbitrary Detention
SUMMARY: These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus wherein the
petitioners assert that their detention is unlawful because they were arrested without
warrant and that no prior preliminary investigation was conducted making the
informations filed against them null and void. The court held that they have not
been detained illegally nor arbitrarily arrested because arresting people without
warrant is recognized by law.
DOCTRINE: Warrantless arrests are justified when the people being arrested are
caught in flagrante delicto. Also, the crimes of rebellion, subversion, or proposal to
commit such crimes or in furtherance of the mentioned crimes constitute direct
assaults against the state and are continuing crimes.
FACTS:
1. Rolando Dural who shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers, was charged with “Double
Murder with Assault upon Agents of Persons in Authority” without bail.
Later on, Bernardo Itucal was included as defendant. On February 6 1988, a
petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural and Renato Villanueva. Umil and Villanueva who were charged for
violating the Anti-subversion Act posted bail and were released. The double
murder case filed against Dural and Itucal was tried. The two were found
guilty and were in fact serving their sentences as of posting of the case'
decision. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural.
2. Rogelio Ramos, an NPA member who surrendered, informed the military of
the CPP's operations in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former
comrades and pointed to a certain house belonging to Renato Constantino
which is being used as a safe house by the CPP-NPA. Because of this,
Constantino's house was placed under surveillance. A search warrant was
also issued. Firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications
equipment were found. Because Constantino could not produce the permit
for the articles found in his house, he was brought to the CIS headquarters
for investigation where he admitted being a ranking member of the CPP-
NPA. On the evening of the same day, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at
Constantino's house carrying letters for some of the rebels and a piece of
paper containing the jumbled telephone number of Amelia Roque's sister.
Buenaobra admitted to being a regular member of the CPP-NPA. Amelia
Roque on the other hand was found using the leads available to the military.
Her abode was searched and in it subversive documents were found,
ammunition and a fragmentation grenade. Roque and her companions were
taken to Camp Crame but her companions were released when Roque
admitted that the articles belonged to her. Roque was charged of violating
PD 1866. Buenaobra and Roque were also charged of violating the Anti-
subversion Act. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of the two
but Buenaobra, at the hearing, manifested his desire to stay at Camp Crame.
Only Roque's petition remains for resolution.
3. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, both members of the NUFC-CPP,
were apprehended at Constantino's house. They were found carrying a bag
of subversive materials. They also carried firearms for which they had no
permit to possess or carry. They were charged of violating PD 1866 No bail
was recommended. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed on
behalf of the two alleging that they were unlawfully arrested and that the
informations filed against them were null and void for having been filed
without preliminary investigation. The two however, refused to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. They
also failed to ask for a preliminary investigation after the filing of
informations against them.
4. The PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command
conducted a search of a house located in Marikina believed to be occupied
by the head of the CPP-NPA. During the search, Vicky Ocaya and Danny
Rivera arrived. In Ocaya's car were found subversive documents and
ammunition. Ocaya could not produce the authorization required to possess
the ammunition so an information charging her of violating PD 1866 was
filed against her. Rivera however was released. A petition for habeas corpus
was filed on behalf of the two. Ocaya however appears to have been
arrested in flagrante delicto. She was arrested without warrant so no
preliminary investigation was conducted. She also refused to waive the
Provisions of Article 125.
5. Deogracias Espiritu, the General Secretary of PISTON was arrested without
warrant in his home. He was then brought to respondent Lim and then to the
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police
District where he was detained. The respondents claim that he was lawfully
arrested because of an offense he committed in November 22 1988 where
he urged drivers and operators to go on a nationwide strike to force the
government to give in to their demands. Policemen waited for him but he
escaped. He was later found at Sta. Mesa where he was heard saying that
they will not stop until the government gives in. The police caught up with
him on November 23, invited him for questioning, and filed an information
against him for violating Art 142 of the RPC. He filed for a petition for
habeas corpus but this was denied because his arrest was in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 113 Sec 5b of the Rules of Court. Espiritu however
may be released upon posting bail. The court reduced the bail from 60,000
pesos to 10,000 pesos.
6. Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the killing of Romulo Bunye II was
 arrested. Upon questioning, he identified Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions in killing the victim. Because of this, the police, without
warrant, picked up Nazareno for questioning. On Januray 3 1989, an
information charging Nazareno, Regala and two others with the RTC
Makati. Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but this was denied. A petition
for habeas corpus returnable to the presiding judge of RTC Laguna was
then filed on his behalf but this was denied because of the information filed
against him in Makati RTC and the strength of the evidence against him.
7. Petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Caiple and Roque claimed that the subversive
documents found in their possession were planted by the military. They
however, failed to substantiate their claim. There was also no evil motive on
the part of the respondents and they had no motive to accuse the petitioners
falsely. The OSG also points out that the arrest of the petitioners was not a
product of a “witch-hunt” but of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe
houses.
ISSUE/S: WoN the petitioners' warrantless arrests were valid – YES
RULING: Petitions dismissed, bail bond for Espiritu reduced to 10,000 pesos.
RATIO (Case Specific):
1. Since Dural was arrested a day after the commission of the offense, it
cannot be said that he was arrested in flagrante delicto and his unwarranted
arrest seemed unjustified. He however was arrested for being a member of
the NPA which was a subversive organization. Rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion and subversion are continuing
crimes which set them apart from common offenses. The arrest of persons
involved in these crimes is to quell the rebellion first than to prosecute the
offenders. Hence, the arrests need not follow the usual procedure as it is
impelled by the exigency of the circumstances. Also, as stated earlier, Dural
was already sentenced for the double murder and was already serving his
sentence so the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
2. Since the respondents' contention of Roque's and Buenaobra's membership
to the NUFC-CPP was not controverted by Roque and Buenaobra, their
warrantless arrests were justified with the same reasons as that of the case
of Dural. Roque's arrest was further justified by her unlicensed possession
of ammunition at the time of arrest.
3. The petitioners' contention regarding their warrantless arrests is untenable
because they were in possession of unlicensed firearms when they were
arrested. Their contention that the informations filed against them were null
and void due to lack of preliminary investigation was likewise untenable
because the filing of information without preliminary investigation is
sanctioned by Sec 7 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court without prejudice to the
petitioners' option to ask for a preliminary investigation by signing a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. The petitioners did not sign the
waiver nor did they ask for a preliminary investigation after informations
were filed against them in court.
4. Ocaya was arrested while carrying ammunitions, with her not having the
license to carry the aforementioned items. She was arrested in flagranti
delicto so her warrantless arrest was justified.
5. Espiritu's arrest was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113 Sec 5b
of the rules of court and he was detained by virtue of valid information filed
in a competent court, hence he cannot be released on habeas corpus.
6. Nazareno's arrest without warrant was effected pursuant to Sec 5b Rule 113
of the Rules of Court after being implicated by Regala. The court also held
that the detention can be perfectly legal if the agent making the arrest has
sufficient grounds to believe that there was the existence of a crime and the
person being arrested participated in the crime.
RATIO (General):
The Court held that since in all the cases above, criminal charges have
been filed against the petitioners habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court states that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make
the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed.
The petitioners also wanted the court to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v
Enrile which disallowed the availability of the writ of habeas corpus after the
filing of information against the detained person. The court refused however and
stated that the remedy would be that the Court inquires into every phase of
detention. The court held that all cases involving deprivation of individual
liberty be brought to the courts for immediate scrutiny and disposition.
 PEOPLE v. BURGOS
September 4, 1986 | Guttierez | Appeal from RTC Davao Decision | Arbitrary
Detention
SUMMARY: Ruben Burgos is arrested while plowing his field and his house
searched, despite no arrest warrant and based solely on Masamlok’s testimony that
the latter was forcibly recruited to the NPA by the accused by threatening him with
a revolver. TC finds Burgos guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance
of Subversion, SC declares warrantless arrest illegal & acquits him.
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 113, Sec 5(a), personal knowledge of the officer that an
act was committed/is being committed/will be committed is required. If an arrest
without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful.
FACTS:
1. Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at the Phil.
Constabulary (PC) Headquarters, stating that Ruben Burgos with some
companions forcibly recruited him as an NPA member by threatening him
and his family with a firearm.
2. The next day, A PC team headed by Pat. Bioco located Burgos who was
plowing his field near his house and questioned him about said firearm,
which the accused denied possession of. However, accused’s wife pointed
to below their house where the gun was buried and the revolver was
recovered. Accused then admitted that the gun was issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez and pointed to the location of subversive documents hidden in a
stock pile of cogon.
3. TC justified Burgos’ arrest without warrant by claiming that since the
authorities received an urgent report of Burgos’ involvement in subversive
activities from a reliable source (Masamlok’s report), the instant case would
fall under Rule 113, Sec 5(a). They justified the search under Rule 126,
Section 12, wherein the consequent search and seizure of dangerous
weapons/proof of the commission of the offense in a valid arrest would also
be lawful as an incident to a lawful arrest
4. Firearm was proven to have no license. Ruben Burgos convicted in the RTC
of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion, which he
appeals on the ground that the Court erred in ruling that his arrest and the
search of his house, both without valid warrant, was lawful and that he was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE/S:
3. WoN Burgos’ arrest and the search on his house, despite both having
no warrant, was lawful – NO.
4. WoN he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt – NO
RULING: Conviction REVERSED. Burgos ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. Art 4, Sec 3 of the Constitution “…no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”Burgos’ failure to object can’t be
presumed as consent/waiver of rights.
2. However, Rule 113 Sec 5(a) provides the exceptions when an arrest may be
made by a private person/peace officer without warrant:
a. when in his presence, person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c. When person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment…
These exceptions must be strictly construed.
3. TC’s justification of the arrest and search/seizure (Fact 3) is erroneous. Rule
113, Sec 5a requires that the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of the fact. Offense must be committed in his presence
or within his view. In this case, there was no such personal knowledge since
the arresting officers’ knowledge stemmed solely from Masamlok’s report
and firearm’s location was given by Burgos’ wife. Nor was Burgos in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document when he was arrested,
nor was he committing any act which could be described as subversive (he
was plowing his field).
4. SolGen’s claim that arrest is lawful under Sec6(b) using the reasonableness
test is faulty since test applies only to the perpetrator’s identity, not the
crime. A crime must be undisputable & in fact actually have been
committed first. It’s not enough to reasonably suspect that a crime may have
been committed. In this case, when Burgos was arrested the authorities
merely suspected that the accused committed a crime solely on Masamlok’s
testimony – they were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. Subsequent recovery of the gun based on the wife’s testimony
doesn’t make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at
the moment it is made, nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards
can make it lawful.
5. Hence, said firearm and alleged subversive documents are inadmissible.
Masamlok’s testimony as the only admissible evidence is totally
uncorroborated and he may be considered an interested witness. Hence,
evidence fails to prove Burgos’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
MILO v. SALANGA
July 20, 1987 | Gancayco, J. | Certiorari |Arbitrary Detention
SUMMARY:Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon Milo filed a petition for review
on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against
Judge AngelitoSalanga, granting Juan Tuvera, Sr.’s motion to quash an
information for Arbitrary Detention.
DOCTRINE: Elements: 1) Offender is a public officer or employee, 2) That he
detains a person, 3) That the detention is without legal grounds.
A barrio captain is recognized is a public officer vested with authority to detain
or order detention of persons accused of a crime, and as such, may be liable for
Arbitrary Detention.
FACTS:
1. Apr 21, 1973(?): At around 22:00 in Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan,
accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., (barrio captain), Juan Tuvera, Jr., BertilloBataoil
and Dianong maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting him with the butts of
their guns and by fist blows. Valdez was immediately thereafter locked
inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan by Tuvera, Sr., Cpl.
Tomas Mendoza, and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat for 11 hours without legal
grounds.
2. Oct 12, 1972: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against
Tuvera, Sr., Mendoza and Mangsat to which they were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
3. Apr 4, 1973: Tuvera filed a motion to squash the information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proof
adduced in the investigation are insufficient to support the filing of the
information.Respondent Judge AngelitoC.Salanga granted the motion,
finding that Tuvera was not a public officer who can be charged with
arbitrary detention.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN a barrio captain is a public officer that can be charged of arbitrary
detention. – YES.
2. WoN the motion to quash was validly granted – NO.
3. WoN respondent Tuvera, Sr. can claim double jeopardy – NO.
RULING: Petition for certiorari GRANTED. Order granting motion to quash
information SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. D-529 REMANDED to
appropriate trial court for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. Barrio lieutenants/barangay captains were recognized as persons in
authority long before PD 299 (decreed barrio captains as persons in
authority) and were convicted of arbitrary detention in various cases (US v.
Braganza; US v. Gellada).
2. RA 3590 (The Revised Barrio Charter) enumerates the following powers
and duties of the barrio captain: Maintain public order and general welfare,
assist mayors and councilors in their duties in said barrio, enforce all laws
and ordinances operative in the barrio, and to organize and lead
emergency groups whenever necessary to maintain peace and order.
3. According to Prof. Jose M. Aruego’s treatise on Barrio Government Law
and Administration, the barrio captain maintains the public order of the
barrio, and as such, may take preventive measures to address any threats or
acts disturbing said public order. He is a peace officer considered under the
law as a person in authority, and may make arrest and detain persons within
legal limits.
4. Other public officers, like judges and mayors, who abuse their functions,
may be guilty of arbitrary detention. A barrio captain has similar powers
and functions with the mayor, albeit within a smaller territorial jurisdiction.
Given that both have the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both
are vested with the authority to detain or order detention.
5. A motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information, therefore, it cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in
the information or which are not on the information itself. The only
exception is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. Tuvera, Sr.’s
allegations that there was no crime of arbitrary detention, that he only
sought the aid of the Manaoag Police Force, and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for his safety can only be raised as a defense at
trial.
6. An order granting a motion to quash is a final order and is immediately
appealable. He cannot claim double jeopardy since the dismissal was
secured at his instance.
 STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
June 19, 1967 | Concepcion, C.J. | Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and
Injunction | Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained
SUMMARY: Petitioners contested search and seizure of their corporations’
offices and their personal residence based on certain warrants. Warrants were
found null and void due to general nature and lack of probable cause, and the
searches and seizures made pursuant to the same illegal.
DOCTRINE: Warrants may only be issued on probable cause and must
particularly describe the things to be seized. Evidence obtained through illegal
search and seizure is inadmissible.
FACTS:
1. Respondents-judges issued 42 warrants to respondents-prosecutors against
petitioners and/or their corporations for the search of their persons and
premises and the seizure of certain personal properties, “Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements”, which were effected upon the
petitioners’ offices and residences.
2. Petitioners alleged that the warrants are null and void and unconstitutional
and contrary to the RoC because: (1) they do not particularly describe the
things to be seized; (2) cash, not mentioned in the warrants, was seized; (3)
they were fishing for evidence in deportation cases filed against petitioners;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
items seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of according to law.
3. Respondents-prosecutors alleged: (1) the warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; (2) any defects were cured by petitioners’ consent;
and (3) the effects seized are admissible evidence against petitioners
regardless of illegality of the searches and seizures.
RATIO:
1. The things seized under the warrants are split into two groups:
a. Those found and seized in corporate offices – Petitioners have no cause
of action to assail the warrants and seizures since corporations have
separate and distinct personalities from the petitioners’ personalities. A
seizure’s legality can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and the right to object is purely personal. The
right to object belongs exclusively to the corporations to whom the
seized effects belong.
b. Those found and seized in the petitioners’ residences – Petitioners have
cause of action since it affects their constitutional rights as their
property was seized and the privacy of their homes disturbed.
2. It is required that warrants (1) are issued only upon probable cause; and (2)
particularly describe the things to be seized. The contested warrants did not
comply with these. They were issued upon applications stating the cause as
“a violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code”. No specific offense was alleged,
thus no probable cause could have been found. They also authorized the
search and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners, whether legal or illegal, and thus were general in nature.
3. The exclusionary rule which prevents the admission of evidence obtained
through illegal search and seizure is essential to the right to privacy; without
it, the right against illegal search and seizure would be of no value.

ISSUE/S:
1. WoN petitioners have cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants
and seizures – PARTIALLY.
2. WoN the warrants violated the Constitution and the RoC – YES.
3. WoN the evidence seized pursuant to the warrants was admissible – NO.

RULING: Moncado doctrine abandoned. Warrants for petitioners’ residences

null and void; searches and seizures therein illegal; writ of preliminary
injunction made permanent; writs prayed for granted insofar as effects seized in
the residences.
 BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
December 26, 1984 | Escolin, J. | Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction | Search Warrants Maliciously
Obtained
SUMMARY: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction assailing the validity of search
warrants nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-
Paño against “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”.
DOCTRINE:Sec. 3, Art IV, 1987 Constitution: No search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
FACTS:
1. Dec 7, 1982: Col. Rolando Abadilla, Intelligence officer of the PC
Metrocom filed an application for search warrants, supported by the joint
affidavits of Alejandro Gutierrez and Pedro Tango, members of the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group, against “Metropolitan Mail”
and “We Forum”, alleging that said newspapers were in possession of
articles of subversion, punishable under PD 885. Respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Paño, issued said warrants.
2. The premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” were searched,
wherein articles and equipment used for printing, publication and
distribution of the newspapers, as well as documents and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of “We Forum”, were seized.
3. Respondents’ arguments: a) petitioners should have filed a motion to quash
the warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of
said warrants: seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised, as
well as the public interest generated by the search; b) laches or for failing to
file the petition within a period of 6 months: extrajudicial efforts exerted by
the petitioners which caused the said delay negates the presumption that
they have abandoned their rights; c) Petitioner is estopped from challenging
the validity of the search warrants since he used and marked as evidence
some of the seized documents: Use of documents seized as evidence does
not affect the validity of the search warrants.
ISSUE/S: WoN circumstances mentioned by petitioner are sufficient to declare
the search warrants null and void. (1-3: No. 4: Yes.)
RULING: Search warrants declared NULL AND VOID.
RATIO:
1. Same address: The defect is merely a typographical error. 2 search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent is to search 2
distinct places. Also, the address intended to be searched appears in the
opening paragraph of the 2nd warrant.
2. Articles seized were not owned by Jose Burgos, Jr, to whom the warrants
were directed against:Sec. 2, Rule 126, ROC: search and seizure of personal
property: a) Property subject of the offense; b) Property stolen or embezzled
and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; c) Property used or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense.
Ownership is of no consequence. It is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property
sought to be seized.
3. Properties seized were real properties: Movable properties become
immovable when placed by the owner of the tenement, or by any person
acting as the agent of the owner. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners
of the land on which the machineries were placed, therefore, said properties
remain movable and susceptible to seizure.
4. Insufficiency of the application and affidavits filed as basis for a finding of
probable cause: a search warrant must state with particularity the alleged
subversive material that the publisher has or intends to publish. The broad
statement in the application and the affidavits do not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. The Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Also, the search warrants were general warrants. The articles sought to be
seized were described in too general a manner: a) All printing equipment,
etc., and documents related to “We Forum”, b) Subversive documents, etc.
promoting objectives of subversive orgs; c) Motor vehicles used in
distribution…and other subversive materials.
Furthermore, the search and seizure resulted in the closure of the
aforementioned premises, thereby discontinuing the printing and
publication of said newspaper. Such closure constitutes a denial of the
freedom of the press and of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in
print. It cannot be justified by Sec. 8, PD 885 which authorizes
sequestration of properties used in subversive activities due to the absence
of any IRRs promulgated by Minister of National Defense. Lastly, Pres.
Marcos denied the request to sequester the property.
Abad Santos, concurring:
Constitutional requirement: 1) Probable cause: Specific offense must be
alleged in the application. – It merely claimed that certain objects were used
for subversion without any mention of a specific provision of the decree
which was violated. 2) Particularity: Nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants explained why the documents were subversive.

NOTES:
Probable Cause: Facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
 PEOPLE v. MANDORIAO, JR
February 25, 1955 | De Leon, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Offending
Religious Feelings
SUMMARY: Mandoriao was charged with violating Article 133 of the RPC
after he went up the stage and tried to have a debate with Plutarco Salvio, an
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) minister, during a religious rally of the INC at a public
place in Baguio City. The Court acquitted Mandoriao on grounds that (a) the
venue was not a place for religious worship (b) it was not a religious ceremony
and (c) his acts were not proven to be offensive to the religious feelings of the
faithful.
DOCTRINE: A religious meeting is defined as “assemblage of people met for
the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform
religious rites in recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience,
it matters not the faith with respect to the Deity entertained by persons so
assembled.”
Mere saying of prayers and the singing of hymns in an open space do not render
such place as one devoted to religious worship and do not also make such an
occasion a religious ceremony.
FACTS:
1. Jose Mandoriao, Jr. was charged with violating Article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code after he went up the stage and tried to have a debate with
Plutarco Salvio, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) minister, during a religious rally
of the INC at a public place in Baguio City. The information also alleges
that he grabbed the microphone from Salvio, uttered derogatory remarks
against the INC, and threatened to shoot Salvio.
2. In the said rally, there were about 200 people but only about 50 of them
were members of the INC. The others were non-members who were just
invited to the said rally by way of a broadcast in a loud speaker installed in
the venue.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the rally was held in a place dedicated for religious worship
– NO
2. Whether or not the aforementioned rally can be considered as a religious
ceremony as defined by Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code – NO
3. Whether or not Mandoriao committed acts that were notoriously offensive
to the religious feelings of the faithful – NO
RULING: Mandoriao, Jr. acquitted
RATIO:
1. The mere saying of prayers and the singing of hymns in an open space do
not render such place as one devoted to religious worship and do not also
make such an occasion a religious ceremony. Such were incidental to attract
people to the rally with the purpose of holding such rally in order to acquire
new members of the church.
The permit secured to hold the rally in the said public place also proves that
such place was not a place devoted for religious worship considering the
fact that the INC had chapels within and outside Baguio City where they
can hold religious ceremonies without causing interruption or securing first
a permit from local authorities.
2. A religious meeting is defined as “assemblage of people met for the purpose
of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform
religious rites in recognition of God as an object of worship, love and
obedience, it matters not the faith with respect to the Deity entertained by
persons so assembled.” Under this definition, one attends a religious
ceremony because he or she believes that it’s his or her duty to her religion
and not because he or she was invited to such event.
3. In Justice Laurel’s dissent in People v. Baes (1939), for an act to be
considered as offensive to the religious feelings, the act must be directed
against a religious dogma, belief or ritual for the purpose of ridicule. This
includes mockery and attempts to damage an object of religious veneration
and must be abusive, insulting and obnoxious. In this case, no object of
veneration was ridiculed nor the alleged acts of grabbing the microphone
and challenging Salvio to a debate were for the purpose of ridiculing a
religious ritual.
4. Mandoriao did not utter any insulting remarks against the INC nor any of
their religious practices. In fact, he went up to the stage to have a debate
with Salvio at the urging of the people after hearing the latter’s remarks
against Christ, Mandoriao being a Baptist minister himself. When he was
already at the stage, he was not even able to talk at the microphone because
it was already disconnected to the loud speaker.
5. There was already a commotion among the people even before Mandoriao
went up the stage, which was caused by Salvio’s assertions that Jesus Christ
is not a God but just a man and those who believe that Jesus is God are anti-
Christ. Furthermore, Salvio even remarked that all Roman Catholics are
marked by the demon and the Pope is Satan’s commander-in-chief. As such,
it was Salvio who offended the religious feelings of those Catholics who
went to the rally.
 PEOPLE v. BAES
May 25, 1939 | Concepcion, J. | Appeal by virtue of Mandamus issued by the
court in G.R. No. 45780 | Offending Religious Feelings
SUMMARY: A Catholic Priest filed a complaint against members of the
“Church of Christ” for causing the funeral of one of its members, held in
accordance with the rites of the said sect, to pass through the front of the
parish church even over the opposition of the priest. The priest charged them
of violating Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
DOCTRINE: Whether an act offends the feelings of a religious sect should be
viewed from the said religious sect's point of view and not in the eyes of those
professing another faith.
complaint but forgot that the churchyard belonged to the church and is devoted
for its religious use. Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged
only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful
ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who
profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those
professing another faith. The court found that the facts alleged in the complaint
constitute the offense defined and punished by Article 133 of the RPC. It also
said that if the fiscal decides to file an information using the complainants' facts
and the facts be established, the accused may be found guilty of the offense
complained of, or of coercion or trespass, as may be proper pursuant to Section
29 of General Orders No. 58.

FACTS:
1. At about 9 in the morning of April 14, 1947, Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro
Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario, members of the religious sect “Church of
Christ”, holding a funeral for Antonio Macabigtas, caused the funeral to
pass through the churchyard of the Roman Catholic Church of the
Municipality of Lumban, Laguna over the opposition of the church' parish
priest, Jose Baes. The three compelled the priest to let them pass through
force and threats of physical violence. The priest filed charges against them
for violating Article 133 of the RPC, by profaning the place and
disregarding the feeling of the Catholics.
2. Before the case was remanded to the CFI of Laguna, the priest filed a sworn
statement so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts
and of the witnesses who could testify. Upon remand to the court, the fiscal
however, instead of filing the information put in a motion for dismissal
stating that what the accused did was not offensive at all and that the most
that the priest could charge was the threat and the accused's passing through
the property without consent of the owner. The court dismissed the case but
reserved to the fiscal the right to file information for the crime found to
have been committed by the accused. The priest however, appealed.

ISSUE/S:
WoN the offense is punishable under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code –
YES

RULING: Appealed order reversed, fiscal required to comply with his duty
under the law.

RATIO:
The court held that the fiscal questioned the sufficiency of the facts in the
 PEOPLE v. TENGSON permit to be conducted in the Catholic cemetery. This means that the
August 30, 1969 | Esguerra, J. | Appeal | Offending Religious Feelings religious rites performed by the sect which the family belonged to,
performed upon the request of the husband, cannot be offensive to the
SUMMARY: Tengson appealed a decision of the Municipal Court for the violation feelings of those who practice Christian religion.
of Article 133 when he performed a kind of religious rite of a Christian sect in the 5. Based on the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel in People v Baes, which is
Roman Catholic Cemetery. The decision was reversed and he was acquitted. the bedrock of this decision, an offense to religious feelings cannot be
DOCTRINE: An act notoriously offensive to religious feelings must be performed dependent upon the conception of any particular religion. It should be
in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a religious gauged by the nature of the acts committed and must be scrutinized along
ceremony and it must be directed against a religious practice or ritual for the the lines of unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the offense will have
purpose of ridicule. basis on the subjectivity of a particular religion which is very dangerous for
a country with different religious sects.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Tengson, minister of “Christ is the Answer” sect, was asked by
the husband of the deceased to perform a religious service when he went to
the latter’s house.
2. The following day appellant was again asked to hold another service in the
barrio chapel of his sect by the husband before the funeral cortege started.
3. Appellant and his assistant Olegariothen joined the funeral cortege going to
the Roman Catholic cemetery. As the coffin was being pushed inside the
tomb, Olegario closed his eyes and prayed with the crowd joining him.
ISSUE/S:
WoN appellant performed acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
Roman Catholic faithful? - NO
RULING: The decision of the Municipal Court of Batangas is reversed.
Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

RATIO:
1. Of the two essential elements of the offense required in Article 133, only
the first one is present in this case. Specifically, the acts complained of
indeed took place inside a place devoted to celebration of religious
ceremonies but it was not performed for the purpose of ridicule directed to a
practice or ritual of the Roman Catholics.
2. Acts for the purpose of ridicule can be qualified as mocks or attempts to
damage an object of religious veneration and at the same time,are abusive,
insulting and obnoxious.
3. The burial rites in accordance with the practices of “Christ is the Answer”
are not at all notoriously offensive to the feelings of other religious persons
because there was no intent to mock or desecrate any religious act or object
of veneration by people of a particular religion.
4. The Roman Catholic priest and his adherents cannot claim that appellant
violated Article 133 for the reason that the burial of Ines Cepillo had a valid
 PEOPLE v. NANOY
Feb. 24, 1972 | Fernandez, J. | Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court
of Bohol | Offending Religious Feelings

SUMMARY: Nanoy, in an allegedly drunken state, entered the congregation

with uplifted hands, attempted to grab the song leader, and was escorted out of
the chapel. The SC held that it was not a crime of offending religious feelings.
DOCTRINE: An essential element to the crime of offending religious
feelings is to “perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful”.

FACTS:
1. On April 27, 1969 at 4:00 pm, the congregation of the Assembly of God
was having its afternoon services when EpifanioNanoy, in an allegedly
drunken state, entered with uplifted hands then attempted to grab the song
leader LevitaLapura, who ran away from him.
2. A member of the congregation, Romeo Zafra then held him and led him
outside the church. The other members also ran out of the church, causing
the religious service to be discontinued.
3. The accused was charged w/ a violation of Art 133, offending religious
feelings but was later found guilty of disturbance or interruption of a
religious ceremony penalized under Art 153 of the RPC.He was sentenced
to 10 mos and 21 days of imprisonment and a fine of P50. The accused
argues that he should only be guilty of unjust vexation penalized under Art
287.

ISSUE/S: Whether the accused was guilty of violating Art 133, 153, or 287—
287.

RULING: Judgment MODIFIED to P100 fine w/ subsidiary imprisonment.

RATIO:
1. The SC held that the accused is not guilty under Art 133 because he did not
“perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful”, which is
an element of the crime of offending religious feelings.
2. Likewise, he is not guilty under 153 since he did not cause such a “serious
disturbance” as to “interrupt or disturb” the services. All he did was entered
the chapel with uplifted arms and attempted to grab the song leader. The
Court also held that he had no intention of interrupting the services for he
allowed himself to be escorted out by Zafra.
3. Nanoy is guilty of unjust vexation penalized under par. 2 of Art 287.
 ENRILE v. SALAZAR
June 5, 1990 | Narvasa, J. | Habeas Corpus | Rebellion
SUMMARY: Because of the charges filed against Senator Enrile, the Supreme
Court revisited the Hernandez doctrine.
DOCTRINE: Murders, arsons and robberies are necessary means to perpetrate
rebellion. Hence, the aforementioned crimes cannot be complexed with
rebellion.
FACTS:
1. Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile, Gregorio Honasan and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio were charged with the crime of
rebellion with murder, and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1989.
Sen Enrile was held at the NBI headquarters at Taft and was not allowed to
post bail. Enrile, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that he had been (1) held to answer for a crime not in the statute books, (2)
was denied due process because he was charged in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed, (3) denied his right to bail and (4) arrested
and detained on the strength of a warrant without the issuing judge first
determining the existence of probable cause.
2. The OSG answered that Enrile's and the Panlilio's cases do not fall within
the Hernandez Ruling because Hernandez et al committed the murders and
the common crimes as a necessary means for the furtherance of rebellion
whereas Enrile et al were charged of committing murder on the occasion
but not in furtherance of rebellion.
3. The Supreme Court granted provisional liberty to Enrile and the spouses
upon payment of surety bonds.
4. The SC stressed that it was not inquiring on the guilt of Enrile et al.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the Hernandez Doctrine should be abandoned – NO
2. WoN the information filed against them charges an offense – YES
3. WoN Enrile was denied the right to bail – YES
RULING: Enrile and the Panlilio spouses charged with simple rebellion only,
proceedings remanded to respondent judge to fix the bail bond.
RATIO:
1. The court voted against abandoning the Hernandez Doctrine and held that it
was good law because no new challenges were persuasive enough to
warrant the doctrine's reversal. This was also reinforced by the fact that
President C. Aquino saw it fit to have President Marcos' PD 942—imposing
the most serious penalties on acts that constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law—repealed. President Aquino in effect
reinstated the Hernandez Doctrine. The court also held that if murder were
not be complexed with rebellion, in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance, the extreme penalty could not be imposed whereas if murder
was complexed with rebellion, the extreme penalty would be imposed even
in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. This is in contravention
of the purpose of enacting Art 48 which is to favor the culprit and not to
give him a penalty more severe than which would be proper if several acts
performed were punished separately.
2. A complaint for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the NBI and
on the strength of which a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
prosecutors. This culminated in the filing of the questioned information.
The court held that there is nothing irregular in filing against a respondent
an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
3. After the court reaffirmed the ruling in Hernandez thus charging Enrile only
of simple rebellion, Enrile is correct in saying that he was denied the right
to bail. The court held however, that Enrile's petition for habeas corpus filed
in the Supreme Court was not an appropriate vehicle to assert the right to
bail. Enrile could have filed a petition to be admitted to bail under the trial
court's jurisdiction and only after the trial court's denial should the review of
the CA and then the SC been invoked. Another argument of the court is that
even if going by the Hernandez ruling the information against Enrile
charges a non-existent crime, Enrile could have filed a motion to quash
brought in a criminal action against the respondent judge.
 ENRILE v. AMIN furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
September 13, 1990 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Certiorari | Rebellion cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. It cannot
also be complexed with any other offense committed on the occasion
SUMMARY: Enrile was charged with violation of PD 1829 for harboring and thereof either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
concealing Col. Gregorio Honasan, who is suspected of having committed a crime, effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
thus impeding the apprehension of the latter. The case was filed separately from 2. While the case of People v. Hernandez and other rebellion cases mention
the rebellion charge against Enrile. The SC held that he cannot be separately common crimes (e.g. murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping, etc.) as absorbed
charged for violation of PD 1829 since the crime of harboring or concealing in the crime of rebellion, in this particular case, the act of harboring or
Honasan is deemed to have absorbed in the crime of rebellion. concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of
DOCTRINE: All crimes whether punishable under a special law or a general law, rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion.
which are mere components or ingredients or committed in furtherance of 3. The intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Enrile is not charged with
rebellion become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and rebellion and he harbored or concealed Honasan simply because the latter is
charged as separate crimes in themselves. a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different.
But if the act is committed with political or social motives, which are in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime
FACTS: of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
1. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with
multiple murder in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court and now he is
being charged with violation of PD 1829 at the Makati City Regional Trial
Court. The criminal charge against Enrile for rebellion was due to his
alleged conspiracy with Col. Gregorio Honasan in the failed December,
1989 coup.
2. On the other hand, the said criminal case filed in the Makati RTC was in
connection with Enrile’s supposed harboring and concealing of Col.
Gregorio Honasan in his house, the latter being suspected of committing a
crime. PD 1829 punishes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases through harboring or
concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent that person’s arrest, prosecution and
conviction
3. Judge Amin of the Makati RTC denied Enrile’s Omnibus motion as well the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss Information,
hence this petition in the SC

ISSUE/S: WoN Enrile may be separately charged with violation of PD 1829 -

NO

RULING: Petition granted. Information in criminal case of Enrile quashed.

RATIO:
1. All crimes whether punishable under a special law or the Revised Penal
Code, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
 PEOPLE v. DASIG NPA’s liquidation squad, with the objective of overthrowing the
April 28, 1993 | Nocon, J. | Appeal from RTC Decision | Rebellion government.
2. Rebellion consists of many acts. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion
SUMMARY: Appellant and several others who were part of a sparrow unit through crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
killed a police officer performing traffic duties. Appellant was convicted of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing that the victim is a
murder with direct assault. He appealed that it was merely rebellion. Court ruled person in authority, is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion, or an act
in his favor. done in its furtherance. It cannot be the basis of a separate charge.
DOCTRINE: Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion through crimes in 3. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. rebellion. The Art 135 penalty for any person who promotes, maintains or
heads a rebellion is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P200,000. But
FACTS: since there is no evidence that appellant headed the crime committed, and in
1. Pfc. Redempto Manatad and two other police officers, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and fact Pfc. Catamora pinpointed him as not the person giving instructions to
Pfc. Rene Catamora, were tasked to man traffic. Pfc. Catamora noticed the group that attacked Pfc. Manatad, the imposed penalty is eight years of
eight persons, including Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously, one of whom prision mayor and civil indemnity of P50,000 to Manatad’s heirs.
gave instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad.
2. Pfc. Catamora followed the, but they sensed it and proceeded to the middle
of the road and engaged him in a gunfight. He then heard a series of shots
from the other group and saw Pfc. Manatad on the ground. Pfc. Catamora
sought refuge at the BIR Office, from where he saw two persons take Pfc.
Manatad’s gun and again fired on him to assure he was dead before the
group fled.
3. Nuñez and appellant Rodrigo Dasig were located in a safehouse, where they
were apprehended and disarmed. In the process, Dasig was shot in the arm.
He confessed that he and Nuñez’s group had killed Pfc. Manatad, and that
he and Nuñez, alias ‘Armand’ and ‘Mabi’ respectively, were members of a
sparrow unit. He was found guilty of murder with direct assault. Nuñez died
while the trial was still ongoing.
4. Dasig contended, among others, that assuming arguendo he conspired in the
killing, he should have been convicted at most of simple rebellion, not
murder with direct assault.

ISSUE: WoN the proper crime charged is rebellion, not murder with direct
assault - YES

RULING: Accused found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond

reasonable doubt. Penalty of 8 years prision mayor, and to pay deceased’s heirs
P50,000 as civil indemnity.

RATIO:
1. Art 135, RPC: Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. Appellant voluntarily confessed his
membership in the sparrow unit and his participation and that of the group
in Pfc.Manatad’s killing. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the
 PEOPLE v. LOVEDIERO
Novermber 29, 1995 | Kapunan, J. |Appeal | Rebellion
SUMMARY: Lovediero killed an off-duty policeman as corroborated by his
uncle’s testimony. He was convicted of murder by the trial court aggravated by
treachery and evident premeditation. He appealed and averred that the trial court
was mistaken to convict him of murder instead of rebellion. Petition denied
DOCTRINE: In rebellion, it is not enough that overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven because the purpose must also be established. Political motive of the act
will determine whether an act was indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion or
if it just a common crime.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Lovediero, accompanied by three people, shot off-duty
policeman SPO3 Jesus Luciloin the head. One of his companions, then shot
Lucilo four more times before they took the victim’s gun. The incident was
witnessed by Nestor Armenta who was the cousin of appellant’s father.
2. The office of the provincial prosecutor charged appellant with the crime of
murder. Witness Armenta testified that he saw Lovediero shoot the victim’s
head and that the appellant is a member of the NPA. The accused was
convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
3. Lovediero appealed to the SC alleging that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder instead of rebellion. He averred that the murder should have
been absorbed by the rebellion. He also claimed that he deserved a lower
penalty, acting only as a participant in the commission of the crime and not
the person firing the fatal shot.
elaborated that he knew no plan prior the incident. He claimed that he was
only standing in front of a store as his companion shot the policeman
approaching him but never did he mention that he was a member of the
NPA.
3. Allegations regarding membership with the subversive group only surfaced
when Armenta was cross-examined after the confession. Trial court was
correct to reject it as part of the testimony since the sole eyewitness later
admitted that he was forced to identify the appellant as an NPA member.
4. Appellant’s testimony saying that Lucilo was shot by his companion
because the latter offended their organization without elaborating on the
offense is too general and non-specific. Never was it alleged that the victim
is an informer of the authorities and neither was it proven that the killing
would have contributed to NPA’s subversive aims. Evidence on record only
shows that appellant is just trying to mitigate his liability by using his
membership in the NPA.
5. Armenta’s testimony is adequate to convict the appellant. It was determined
that Armenta did not show any signs of falsehood as he identified the
appellant as the perpetrator. Furthermore, appellant’s admission that he and
his uncle bore no grudges against each other made the testimony of the
witness more credible and reliable.

ISSUE/S: WoN appellant is guilty of rebellion, thus absorbing the crime of

murder? – NO

RULING: Trial court decision is affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Any act against the law, however grave, assumes a different color by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion which generally carries a lighter penalty
compared to murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the
act was done in furtherance of a political end.
2. The burden of demonstrating political motive is always with the defense
and it must be established before an accused can benefit from the lesser
penalty imposed by political crimes. In the case at bar, appellant admitted in
his extrajudicial confession that he participated in the killing of Lucilo but
 PEOPLE v. CABRERA ET AL.
March 4, 1922 | Malcolm, J. | Appeal from CFI Decision| Sedition
SUMMARY: A policeman posted on Calle Real had an encounter with some
constabulary soldiers, resulting in the death of a constabulary private. Desiring to
exact revenge, constabulary soldiers escaped from the barracks and attacked the
police force, killing policemen and some civilians.
DOCTRINE: Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. It is committed by persons who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods: 4) Inflicting
any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of
the Government.
It is not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended
party a public functionary.
FACTS:
1. Dec. 13, 1920: The arrest of a woman who was a family member of a
Constabulary soldier at the Santa Lucia Barracks incited tension between
the policemen of Manila and the Constabulary soldiers. The next day,
policeman Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, Intramuros, had an
encounter with some Constabulary soldiers, mortally wounding
Constabulary private Macasinag, and engendering a deep sense of
resentment towards the policemen. Being aware of such resentment,
Captain Page, commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of
guards and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.
2. Dec. 15, 1920: Upon learning that policeman Mojica was allowed to
continue on duty and that Macasinag died, corporal Ingles of the 4 th
Company asked private Nicolas Torio, the man in charge of quarters, to let
the soldiers out through the window. Private Francisco Garcia of the 2 nd
Company saw out the window bars of the quarters allowing he soldiers to
escape with rifles and ammunition, under the command of their sergeants
and corporals.
3. One platoon, about 10-12, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calle
Real and Cabildo where an American policeman Driskill and his fried
Jacumin, a field clerk in the US Army, were killed. They also squad fired
upon a car instantly killing 1 civilian passenger and gravely wounding 3
others. Captain William Wichman and patrolman Saplala, riding in a
motorcycle, were also killed in the crossfire. A police car from the Meisic
police station was also fired upon by soldiers stationed in the courtyard of
San Agustin Church.
4. Another platoon, 30-40, arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken
Gardens, and from said advantageous position, fired upon a motorcycle
passing by, mortally wounding Sergeant Armada and policeman Policarpio.
They also fired a volley of shots into the Luneta police station and the office
of the secret service of the city of Manila, but fortunately, no in was injured.
5. The statements of the 77 soldiers who took part in the shooting were taken,
and signed in the presence of 2 or 3 witnesses. They were charged and
found guilty of sedition, in one information, and of murder and serious
physical injuries in another.
ISSUE/S: WoN the crime of sedition was committed. – YES.
RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The Philippine Law on Sedition (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of
sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or
outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting
any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or
agent of the Insular Government or of the provincial or municipal
government. It is not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen
and the offended party a public functionary.
2. On the admissibility of the evidence: Confessions contain statements that
they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity.
Such was corroborated by attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been
successfully impeached.
3. On conspiracy:If two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act,
each is responsible for all the acts of the others done in furtherance of the
common design. If it be proved that the defendants pursued the same object,
one performing one part, the other, another part of the same so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be
justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect
that object. The facts incontestably show that the defendants all had one
purpose: to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. Also,
conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime sedition.
 U.S. v. TOLENTINO 2. The publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily
March 6, 1906 | Carson, J. | Appeal from a CFI Decision | Inciting to Sedition tended to commit the 3 modes of sedition (D, E, and F under Fact 2). The
drama was presented to the public less than 2 years after the establishment
SUMMARY: Aurelio Tolentino is convicted of uttering seditious words against of the Civil Government, where the smoldering embers of a dangerous
the US and for writing the play “Kahapon, Ngayon, at Bukas.” SC ruled that the insurrection were not yet extinguished, outbreaks still occur, and a junta in
purpose was to inculcate hatred against the US. HongKong are actively engaged in keeping Filipinos from accepting the US
DOCTRINE: When an offense may be committed in several different ways, government so as to eventually engage open revolt and rebellion. Taking
conviction may lie as long as one of the modes are accomplished. // In literary into account the time, place, and manner of the play’s presentation, its
work, what is considered in ascertaining the intent of the accused is the time and manifest tendency is to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
place in which the message was conveyed. American people and the US Gov’t in the Philippines.
Petitioner’s defense (fact 3) is untenable since the manner and form in
FACTS: which the drama was presented at such a time and under such condition
1. Aurelio Tolentino wrote the Filipino drama “Kahapon, Ngayon, at Bukas” renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary
and presented it on May 14 1903 in Teatro Libertad, Manila. or artistic production. Tolentino’s principal intent as the author was to incite
2. Tolentino is charged and convicted for violating Section 8, Act No 292 of the Filipinos to open and armed resistance and to induce them to conspire
the Philippine Commission where the 7 ways of committing “inciting to together for the secret organization of armed forces and to overthrow the
sedition” is enumerated: (a) Uttering of seditious words or speeches, (b) present Government.
Writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against US Gov’t or
Philippine Insular Gov’t; (c) Writing, publishing, or circulating of libels
which tend to disturb/ obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; or,
(d) Which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes, (e) Or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, (f)
Or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of community, safety and order of the Gov’t, (g)
Knowingly concealing such evil practices.
3. Tolentino’s counsel insists that Tolentino’s intent to commit the crime
doesn’t appear from the evidence of record and that the drama is in itself, a
purely literary and artistic production showcasing the Philippines’
legendary history and their future, and is merely for the instruction and
entertainment of the public.

ISSUE: WON Tolentino’s intent in presenting the drama was to incite the
people to sedition – YES.

RULING: Judgment affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes and
the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes
specified, it’s enough to prove the offense committed in any one of them.
Hence, the judgment of conviction in this case may be sustained if it
appears from the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as
charged of any one of the offenses.
 ESPUELAS v. PEOPLE
December 17, 1951 | Bengzon, J. | Certiorari | Inciting to Sedition
SUMMARY: Espuelas wrote a fake suicide note and took a fake suicide photo,
criticizing the Roxas administration and caused it to be published in newspapers.
The Court held that this was seditious and punishable by Art 142 of the RPC.
DOCTRINE: The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent and induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to repress
the evils which press upon their minds.
libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof. The essence of
seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent and to
induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided in the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. The
letter spoke of committing suicide because he could not put the Roxasmen
under the juez de cuchillo (the law of the knife). The Court held that the
idea he intended to convey was “no other than bloody, violent and
unpeaceful methods to free the govt from the administration of Roxas and
his men.” It also suggested decapitation and assassination of all Roxas
officials.

FACTS: J. Tuason, dissenting.

1. In 1947, Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he
were hanging lifeless from a piece of rope suspended from a tree. He sent
copies to local newspapers, weeklies of general circulation, and even abroad
for publication. He attached a suicide note by one Alberto Reveniera to his
wife, whose personality was fictitious.
2. The letter stated how displeased he was of the Roxas administration, the
situation in Central Luzon, Hukbalahaps, and the banditry in Leyte. He also
‘ordered’ the wife to write to Pres. Truman and Churchill about how the
govt is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Lastly, he wrote, “I
committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo
all the Roxas people now in power.”
3. He was charged and convicted for violating Article 142 of the RPC, inciting
to sedition.
1. To protect the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it is said that unless
the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise disturb
the peace and tranquility of the Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in
the discussion of all public affairs. Here, the letter only conveyed the fact
that the author was desperate and was going to kill himself because he was
impotent to remedy or suppress this deplorable state of affairs.
2. The criterion for prosecution for sedition should be the presence or absence
of real, not imaginary, danger of the utterance materializing or inciting
others to disloyalty to the Govt and its laws.

ISSUE: WoN the letter was a seditious libel against the government—YES

RULING: Petition DENIED. Judgment AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the govt or
to weaken the confidence of the people in the govt (seditious libels) are
against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to
incite a breach of peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of
the very govt itself. Free speech is not absolute. Not to be restrained is a
privilege of any citizen to criticize the govt and govt officials, but such must
be constructive, reasoned and tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire govt set-up. When the use of irritating language
centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbance, the
rationale of free speech cannot apply and the speaker is removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.
2. Even if the letter was aimed only at President Roxas and his men, it still
violates Article 142 for it covers all libels against the Government, and
 MARTINEZ v. MORFE
March 24, 1972 |Fernando, J. | Certiorari and Habeas Corpus |
Violation of Parliamentary Immunity
SUMMARY: Martinez and Bautista, ConCon delegates with pending criminal
cases, argue that warrants against them should be quashed on the grounds of
parliamentary immunity accorded by Sec 15, Art 6, Constitution and Art 145,
RPC. SC held that
DOCTRINE: Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the
expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy—for every
crime committed endangers the State.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista were delegates of the
1973 Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez
was accused of falsifying a public document (birth date in his certificate
of candidacy): punishable by prision mayor, while Bautista was accused
of violating the Revised Election Code when he allegedly distributed free
food, drinks, and cigarettes at 2 public meetings: punishable by not
higher than prision mayor.
2. Both invoked parliamentary immunity (Constitution and RPC) to quash
their warrants of arrest. Judges for both cases dismissed their motions to
quash and granted the warrants. Martinez was arrested while on his was
to the Convention, and Bautista just arrested.
3. Constitution, VI, 15 states, “The Senators and Members of the HoR shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same.”
4. Art 145 of the RPC provides, “The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or
fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly from attending
meetings of the Assembly…from expressing his opinions or casting his
vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall, while Congressis in regular or
special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor.”
ISSUE: WoN parliamentary immunity apply to petitioners–NO.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. 2nd part of Art 145, RPC is inoperative.
RATIO:
1. Under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunity granted to Congressmen. However, the
constitutional provision provides that immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of the peace. All crimes are
offenses against the peace, the phrase “breach of peace” thus extends to all
indictable offenses, as well as those which are only constructive breaches of
the peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its good order.
2. The history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was not intended to
exempt National Assembly members from arrest since it endangers the state
and would create an unjustifiable privileged class. The power or the right of
the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right to self-
preservation—to carry out its functions without obstacles. However, the
Legislature remains but a member of the State. The State is the principal.
Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense
of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy—for every crime
committed endangers the State.
3. The Court opined that even if they were arrested while Congress was in
session, where RPC prescribes an additional requirement that the offense
should be punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor, the arrest
would still be lawful. The RPC took effect Jan 1, 1932, or before the 1935
Constitution, which explicitly states that laws remain operative so long as
they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. Since parliamentary only
covers civil cases, the RPC cannot expand the scope of that immunity.
Thus, Article 145 penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, arrest
or search any member while Congressis in session, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision
mayor is declared inoperative.
 PEOPLE v. QUIJADA
July 24, 1996 | Davide, Jr., J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Illegal possession of
firearms
SUMMARY: Quijada, after a previous altercation with Diosdado, shot the latter
on the back of the head using an unlicensed firearm.
DOCTRINE: Aggravated illegal possession of firearm constitutes 2 separate
offenses.
FACTS:
1. Dec. 25, 1992, Dauis, Bohol: Diosdado Iroy and Daniel Quijada had a
fistfight at a benefit dance since the latter kept on pestering Rosita, the
former’s sister. 5 days after, another benefit dance was attended by Rosita
and Diosdado, and others. Rosita went to the dancehall while Diosdado,
along with 2 other people watched 4m away.
2. At around 11:30, saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother from
behind, fire his revolver, hitting at the back of the head. Rosita shouted that
appellant shot her brother while he ran towards the cornfield. Diosdado was
rushed to the hospital but the injury was fatal. Rosita, informed her parents
who reported the incident to the Chief of Police Felipe Nigparanon who
recorded the incident and ordered his men to pick appellant up, but they
were unable to locate him.The next day, appellant, together with his father
Teogenes, went to the police station and was pinpointed by Rosita.
3. The firearm used by appellant was not licensed. Per certifications issued on
April 26, 1993, the appellant was not a duly licensed firearm holder as
verified by a list of licensed firearm holders in the province.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN killing another with the use of unlicensed firearm should be treated as
two separate crimes – YES.
2. WoN Sec. 1, par. 2 of PD 1866 intended for illegal possession and murder
or homicide as a single and integrated offense – NO.
3. WoN the charge of two offenses resulting from the same act offends the
constitutional bar to double jeopardy – NO.
RULING: Appeal DISMISSED. Decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Two separate crimes. Homicide or murder is punished by the RPC and
aggravated illegal possession of firearm, by a special law. A simple act may
be an offense against 2 different provisions of law. The acquittal in one
offense does not bar prosecution for the other.
PD penalizes the unlawful possession. Said possession is aggravated if used
in the commission of murder. It may be loosely stated that murder or
homicide qualifies the offense for it increases the penalty. However, murder
or homicide is absorbed by the offense for such would result in the
absurdity that a more serious crime penalized by the RPC will be absorbed
by a statutory offense which is merely malum prohibitum.
2. The PD uses the clause “with the use of” and not “as a result or on the
occasion of”. Difference between:
a. Commission of homicide or murder as a result of an unlicensed
firearm: homicide or murder is merely incidental or secondary which
resulted from the commission of the primary intention.
b. Commission of homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm: killing is primary purpose and the unlicensed firearm is merely
an instrument to carry out the purpose.
The intent of par. 2 is to preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense
and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such
firearm is used in killing a person. It does not intend to repeal or modify
said offenses by reducing them to mere aggravating circumstances wherein
an unlicensed firearm arm is used in the killing.
3. Same evidence test is not conclusive. There are 2 categories of double
jeopardy: same offense and same act punished by 2 statutory provisions.
Double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
“Additional element test”: Where the same act violates 2 statutory
provisions, to determine whether there are 2 offenses or only 1, is whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
Elements of aggravated illegal possession of firearm are different from
elements of murder or homicide.
Regalado, J., concurring and dissenting:
 A lesser offense may absorb a graver offense (e.g. murder in rebellion).
 Illegal possession and resultant killing is a single integrated offense. The
majority not only created 2 offenses by dividing a single offense into 2, bur
worse, it treated the original offense as a single integrated crime, then
created another offense by using an element of the other.
 Double jeopardy: same-evidence test: evidence on murder in aggravated
illegal possession and murder is essential. Murder was an indispensable
component for the other composite offense of illegal possession of firearm
with murder (e.g. charging an accused convicted of robbery w/ homicide
again with either robbery or homicide).
 PD 1866: unification of illegal possession and murder, becoming a
component offense in a new and different composite crime punished by
another and gravely higher penalty (i.e. special complex crime).
 PEOPLE v. FELOTEO
September 17, 1998 | Puno, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Illegal Possession
of Firearms
SUMMARY: Feloteo shot Sotto with an armalite which he took from a
policeman. He was charged separately with murder under Article 248 of the
RPC and illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866. The SC affirmed the
judgment for murderbut set aside that for illegal of firearmssince R.A. 8294
(amending P.D. 1866) provides that the use of unlicensed firearms becomes an
aggravating circumstance for homicide or murder and such law may be given
retroactive effect insofar as it is beneficial to the accused.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1 of R.A. 8294 (1997), if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance instead of being charged as a
separate offense.
FACTS:
1. On May 6, 1993, Wilfredo Feloteo was carrying an armalite and suddenly
fired at Sonny Sotto who was on his way home with his friends, after
having a drinking session. Before firing, he told Sotto jokingly: “Boots,
don’t get near me, I’ll shoot you”. Sotto died due to the gunshot wounds he
sustained.
2. The firearm used belongs to SPO2 Roman Adion. It is said that Feloteo
took the firearm after it was left by Adion in the house of a certain Teofisto
Alaquin where Adion and Feloteo had gone before the shooting incident
happened.
3. Adion then went on to serach for Feloteo, whom he found the next day
(May 7, 1993) in another sitio. Feloteo surrendered the firearm. Upon
inspection by Adion, he found that there were only 19 bullets out of the 20
which were loaded before it was taken by Feloteo.
4. Feloteo was charged with and convicted for murder under Article 248 of the
RPC and illegal possession of firearms (since it was found that he was not
licensed to carry such firearm) under P.D. 1866.
RATIO:
1. For Murder: treachery can exist even if the attack was frontal, as long as
the attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was not in a position
to repel the attack or defend himself. In this case, the attack was sudden and
unexpected since the victim was a bit drunk (as shown by the zigzag
manner of Sotto’s walking based on Feloteo’s testimony) and the alleged
warning by way of a joke did not give Sotto sufficient time to evade the
bullet.
2. For Illegal Possession of Firearms: P.D. 1866 penalizes illegal possession
of firearms as a separate offense. It was amended, however, by R.A. 8294
(1997), which provides that use of unlicensed firearms shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance when homicide or murder is committed
through the use of such firearms. Included in the coverage of the term
unlicensed firearms are: (1) firearms with expired license, or (2)
unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
Feloteo’s case falls under the second category.
In People v. Molina et al., R.A. 8294 was given retroactive effect since it
favors the accused by charging him with one offense with an aggravating
circumstance, instead of two separate offenses. Thus, it can also be given
retroactive effect to Feloteo’s case, however, this will not affect the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for murder.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Feloteo is criminally liable for murder – YES
2. Whether or not Feloteo shall be charged separately for illegal possession of
firearms – NO

RULING: Judgment for murder affirmed, while that for illegal possession of
firearms set aside.
 PEOPLE v. NARVASA
November 16, 1998 | Panganiban, J. | Appeal | Illegal Possession of Firearms
SUMMARY: The appellants who killed a policeman using unlicensed firearms
appealed from the lower court's ruling convicting them of Aggravated Illegal
Possession of Firearm.
DOCTRINE: R.A. No. 8294 considers the use of an unlicensed firearm only an
aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide.
FACTS:
(Prosecution's Version)
1. Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal, councilmen of Bani, Pangasinan,
acting upon reports of missing carabaos, pigs and goats, went to a far-flung
sitio of the said town and patrolled there. While patrolling, they chanced
upon 5 men, 3 of whom were carrying firearms. Fearing for their lives, the 2
councilmen did not do anything and proceeded to go home.
2. On their way home, the 2 met 2 policemen, officers Navora and Camba,
who were on patrol. The council men reported what they saw which then
led to the 4 of them tracking the armed men. When they reached one of the
armed men's house, they were met by a volley of gunfire which then led to a
shootout which then led to Officer Camba's getting hit and eventual death.
3. Shortly thereafter, Felicisimo Narvasa, Glicerio Narvasa, Rederio Narvasa
and Jimmy Orania were apprehended. Mateo Narvasa was not found.
Felicisimo and Jimmy were found positive of gunpowder burns.
4. The trial court held that the homicide was merely an element of the illegal
possession of firearms in its aggravated form, and was taken not as a
separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance which increased the
penalty for the illegal possession of firearms. They were initially sentenced
to death but since it was prohibited by law, they were sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua.
(Defense' Version):
1. Felicisimo testified that he was sleeping at his house at the time of the
shooting and that he was woken up by Glicerio informing him, Felicisimo,
that his son was shot by Laderas' group which led them to file charges
against Laderas' group. He averred that Orania and the other accused were
merely helping him fix the fence in his house. They also averred that they
had nothing to do with Camba's death and that the day after the shooting
incident, they were picked up by the police.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the Nagal's and Laderas' testimonies were credible – YES
2. WoN the evidence was sufficient – YES
3. WoN the trial court was correct in convicting them of Aggravated Illegal
Possession of Firearm – NO
RULING: Decision MODIFIED, Appellants Narvasa and Orania found guilty
of homicide with the special aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed
firearms.
RATIO:
1. The alleged inconsistencies in the witnesses' (Nagal and Laderas)
testimonies on who fired at whom was due to their being under fire at that
time. The uncertainty was too insignificant to impair their credibility.
2. The appellants contend that the existence of the firearms was not
sufficiently proven because the prosecution had not presented the firearms
as evidence. The court however, was not persuaded and cited People v
Orehuela where Orehuela was convicted despite the fact that the firearm
used was not presented as evidence. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the
witnesses indubitably demonstrate the existence of the firearms. The bullets
recovered at the place where the shooting occurred also established the
existence of the said firearms. Also, SPO4 Roberto Manuel, the Assistant
Firearms and Explosives NCPO of the Pangasinan Provincial Command,
attested to the fact that Orania's and Narvasa's names did not appear in the
list of licensed firearm holders.
3. The trial court, applying People v Barros, convicted the appellants of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in its Aggravated Form and considered homicide
merely an element of the principal offense. The court imposed upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, RA 8294 was enacted which
imposes a lighter penalty for the crime. Applying People v Molina where
the court explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an unlicensed firearm
only an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the court held that
appellants can only be held liable for homicide and penalized with reclusion
temporal. RA 8294 was applied in the case at bar and was given retroactive
effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
 PEOPLE v. BELTRAN
September 13, 1985 | Relova, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Direct Assault
(Art 148)
SUMMARY: Mayor Quirolgico, his son Vicente, and a policeman went to
Puzon Compound to arrest some individuals after Alvarado complained of being
insulted by Beltran. His son dies and the 2 are severely injured. SC finds them
guilty of Murder & double attempted murder w/ direct assault.
DOCTRINE: 2nd form of Direct Assault requisites 1) offender makes attack/
employs force/ makes serious intimidation or resistance; 2) person assaulted is a
person in authority; 3) at time of assault, person in authority or his agent is
engaged in actual performance of his official duties or assaulted b/c of the past
performance of official duties; 4) offender knows that he’s assaulting a person in
authority/agent in the exercise of his duties; 5) no public uprising
RATIO:
1. Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform. Both were also performing
their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community. Hence,
the TC’s finding that the accused are gulty of attempted murder wih direct
assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.
2. D. Beltran’s claim of self-defense and Bugarin, C. Beltran, and Puzon’s
denial of their actions is belied by the positive identification of the Mayor,
Patrolman Usita, and Collados and physical evidence (medical and post-
mortem exam). Conspiracy also existed since at the time of the offense,
they had the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.

FACTS:
1. In January 11, 1972, while Ernesto Alvarado was driving Calizto Urbi home
in a jeep and was passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted
“Oki ni Inayo” (vulva of your mother). He reported said incident to Mayor
Bienvenido Quirolgico. The newly-elected mayor then informed Chief of
Police to do something about it.
2. The Mayor, his son Vicente, and Patrolman Tolentino went to the Puzon
Compound to talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions, who were
Congressman Puzon’s underlings, to surrender. However, D. Beltran,
Hernandez, and Bugarin were already hiding behind some buildings and
upon the Mayor’s approach, there was a simultaneous exchange of shots.
All three suffered gunshot wounds, with Vicente having the worst injuries.
When the gunshots stopped they decided to bring Vicente to the hospital.
As the jeep left the compound, 3 men (Siazon, C.Beltran, Puzon) came out
of the Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle with Siazon, Hernandez,
and D. Beltran chasing them.
3. Vicente died from the gunshot wounds. The 6 perpetrators were charged in
CFI Cagayan of murder (penalty imposed was death) & double attempted
murder w/ direct assault, which they appeal.

ISSUE/S: WoN there was direct assault – YES.

RULING: Decision AFFIRMED. Beltran, Bugarin, Puzon, Beltran, Hernandez

guilty of murder and double attempted murder with direct assault (AC:
treachery, evident premeditation; MC: voluntary surrender)
 PEOPLE v. DOLLANTES
June 30, 1987 | Paras, J. | Appeal from RTC | Direct assault
SUMMARY: One of the accused disrupted a dance in preparation for the
barangay fiesta while the barangay captain was giving a speech. When the
barangay captain went to reprimand him, he was stabbed and stoned by the
group of the accused. The group was found guilty of the complex crime of
assault upon a person in authority. On appeal, the SC ruled that the crime was
correctly charged.
DOCTRINE: Two of the elements of direct assault are: (1) That the person
assaulted is a person in authority or his agent engaged in the performance of
actual duties or who is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties, and (2) The offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
FACTS:
1. Barangay Captain Marcos Gabutero was delivering a speech to start a dance
for the barangay fiesta. Accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the
dance floor and did a Visayan dance move (nagkorantsa), brandishing his
knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among those present.
2. Gabutero approached him and admonished him to keep quiet so as not to
disturb the dance, but the accused instead stabbed him on his left arm.
Accused Hugo Grengia held Pedro’s hand and Dionilo Garol grabbed the
knife from him. Accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed forward and stabbed
Gabutero in the back.
3. The other co-accused (total of 9:Pedro, Hamlet, Lauro, Monico, Merlando –
all surnamed Dollantes; Sidrito Lokesio, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban,
and Leonilo Villaester) took turns stabbing Gabutero, except Grengia,
Esteban and Villaester who were merely holding stones. As a result of his
wounds, Gabutero died; the accused kicked and danced around his body.
4. The TC found the co-accused guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a
person in authority resulting in murder. All appealed. Accused Grengia filed
a separate brief alleging, among others, that the TC erred in holding that he
was guilty of the crime charged.
enforcement thereof,he incurs the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
personin authority.”
2. The records show that when he was stabbed to death, Gabutero was trying
to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was causing trouble in the dance hall.
Therefore, he was killed in the official performance of his duties.
Sub-issues:
1. Credibility of witnesses – The three prosecution eyewitnesses were
unrelated to the victim or the accused, and were subjected to length cross-
examination. Their testimonies were categorical, straightforward and
specific, and they could not have been mistaken in their identification as the
crime scene was well-illuminated and they were familiar with the
appellants. Any inconsistency in testimonies are trivial and do not affect
their credibility.
2. Hamlet’s statement that he was the sole perpetrator and Grengia’s claim not
to have been present – not supported by sufficient evidence. An entry in the
Police Logbook that the wife of accused Lauro Dollantes turned over to the
police two hunting knives owned by Hamlet and Alfredo Dollantes, and the
number and location of the victim’s wounds are mute evidence that the
crime was perpetrated by several persons.
3. Conspiracy – The unity of action (e.g. stoning, kicking the body) and
certain statements uttered show the existence of conspiracy.

ISSUE: WoN the accused was correctly charged with assault upon a person in
authority resulting in murder - YES

RULING: Assailed decision affirmed.

RATIO:
1. In People v Hecto, the Court held that “As the barangay captain, it was his
duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the
 ALBERTO v. DELA CRUZ
June 30, 1980 | Conception Jr., J. Appeal from CFI Order | Delivery of Prisoners RATIO:
from Jail 1. Art 156 states provides two says to commit the crime of delivering
prisoners from jail: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal
SUMMARY: During the trial of a provincial guard for Infidelity in Custody of establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. The former does
Prisoner, it was investigated WoN the governor and assistant provincial warden not require the released person’s active cooperation, while the latter means
could be charged under Art 156 (Delivering Prisoners From Jail). The SC held in to furnish the escapee with the material means to escape (e.g. file, ladder).
the negative since there was insufficient evidence and if the person is a public 2. The crime under Art 156 is usually committed by an outsider who removes
officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he would be liable for a different from jail any person confined therein, or helps him escape. If the offender is
crime under Art 223. a public officer who has custody/charge of the prisoner, he is liable for
DOCTRINE: Delivery of prisoners from jail is committed either: (1) by removing infidelity in custody of prisoner (Art 223). Cledera, as governor, is the
a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; or (2) by helping such a person province’s jailer; and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden. Thus,
to escape. It is usually committed by an outsider. If the offender is a public officer they cannot be prosecuted for Denaque’s escape under Art 156.
with custody/charge of the prisoner, he is liable under Art 223.
Sub-issues: Can they be charged under Art 223 or Art 224? – Neither.
1. Art 223: There is insufficient evidence to prosecute them under Art 223,
FACTS:
since said article provides that it is necessary that the public officer
1. Provincial guard Eligio Orbita was prosecuted from Infidelity in the
consented to or connived in the escape of the prisoner of his custody or
Custody of Prisoner as due to unjustifiable negligence he left unguarded
charge. If there is no connivance, he is not guilty of the crime. It is certain
prisoner Pablo denaque, allowing the latter to escape from the accused’s
that no connivance could be deduced from Cledera’s note to Esmeralda, as
custody.
the notes do not mention the names of the prisoners brought to the guest
2. During the trial and particularly during cross-examination of prosecution
house, and Orbita himself was the one who picked the men to compose the
witness assistant provincial warden Jose Esmeralda, the defense confronted
work party.
Esmeralda with a note purportedly written by Gov. Cledera asking
2. Art 224: This article punished the public officer in whose custody or charge
Esmeralda to send five men to work on construction of a fence at his guest
a prisoner has escaped due to his negligence. The negligence resulting in
house. Esmeralda declared that he did not remember who gave him the note
evasion is definite laxity amounting to non-performance of duty.
and that he could not be sure of the authenticity of the signature therein, as
Respondent Judge ruled that if there was any negligence committed, it was
he was not present when it was made and signed by Cledera..
on the part of the officer charged with custody and guarding of the prisoner,
3. The defense counsel filed to amend the information to include Cledera and
Orbita. The SC found no reason to rule otherwise.
Esmeralda as defendants therein, based on the belief that Denaque’s escape
was made possible by the note. Respondent Judge dela Cruz directed the
Fiscal’s office to cause further investigation to determine whether the
governor and his assistant had any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of the escape. After reinvestigation by the Fiscal, they were
not charged.
4. Orbita filed an MR praying that instead of ordering reinvestigation, the
Court would amend the information to include Cledera and Esmeralda. The
respondent Court granted the MR. The Fiscal filed for an MR, which was
denied; hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: WoN Cledera and Esmeralda can be charged under Art 156 - NO

RULING: Orders issued by CFI annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge or
any acting in his stead directed to proceed with the trial.
 TANEGA v. MASAKAYAN
February 28, 1967| Sanchez, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Evasion of Service
of Sentence
SUMMARY: Tanega was found guilty of slander and when the date of
execution of sentence was set, she was nowhere to be found. More than a year
after warrants were issued for her arrest she resurfaced and argues the penalty
has prescribed.
DOCTRINE: For prescription of the penalty of imprisonment imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of
such imprisonment.
b. He is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty.
c. He evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
The 2nd element, which requires one to be in jail, is emphasized by the
terms “evasion or escape and of the penal institution” in the latter part
of Art 157. Thus, the Court declared evasion of sentence as but another
expression for jail breaking. Also, reason dictates that one can escape
only after he has started serving his sentence. Thus, for prescription of
penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to
run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

FACTS:
1. Adelaida Tanega was found guilty of slander by the CFO and was
sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the offended party
P100. The CA affirmed the decision.
2. CFI then directed the execution of the sentence be set for Jan 27, 1965; and
upon her motion, was deferred to Feb 12. She failed to show up and so the
Judge Masakayan issued a warrant for her arrest on Feb 15, and an alias
warrant of arrest on Mar 23. She was never arrested.
3. On Dec 10, 1966, Tanega through counsel filed a motion to quash the 2
warrants issued on the ground that the penalty has prescribed. On Dec 19,
the judge ruled that the sentence had to be served.

ISSUE: WoN penalty has prescribed—NO

RULING: Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1. The RPC provides that light penalties (w/c covers arrestomenor) prescribes
in 1 year (Art 92), and “shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence” (Art 93). Art157 of the
same Code provides the concept of evasion of sentence, “The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and minimum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However,
if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, …or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the
penal institution, the penalty shall be prisioncorreccional in its maximum
period.”

2. The Court held that the elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
a. The offender is convicted of final judgment.
 PEOPLE v. ABILONG
November 26, 1948 | Montemayor, J. | Evasion of Sentence
SUMMARY: Abilong was prohibited from entering the City of Manila due to
being sentenced with destierro for attempted robbery. He was later charged with
evasion of sentence under Art. 157 when he entered the prohibited places under
the final judgment. He argued that evasion of sentence applies only to those
escaping from imprisonment, not to destierro. The SC upheld his convction for
evasion of sentence.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio.
FACTS:
1. Florentino Abilong was convicted for attempted robbery by the municipal
court of on April 5, 1946 and sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and one 1 day
of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of
100 kilometers from the City of Manila.
2. He was accused of evading his sentence by entering the prohibited place on
Sept. 17, 1947 and committing vagrancy, and was convicted of the same.
3. Abilong contends that evasion of sentence under Art. 157 of the RPC does
not include that of destierro since the said provision only applies to those
evading their prison terms.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Abilong is criminally liable for evasion of sentence
for destierro – YES
to escape. In the penalty of destierro, the person is not confined in any way
from which he would escape from. In fact, he is free to move and to go
anywhere, except in the areas prohibited by the final judgment.
- Privacion de libertad has always been used by jurists in the Spanish
language to mean imprisonment.
- Under the prosecution’s theory, adopted by the majority, no person would
ever be free since even the freest person is subject to many limitations or
deprivations of liberty. Furthermore, it has the implication that for example,
when someone is sentenced to pay a fine (Php 1.00) and he refuses to pay
such fine since it deprives him of his liberty to use his money, he will be
criminally liable for evasion of sentence under Article 157.
Note: (Spanish text of Article 157)
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision
correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su
condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por
sentencia firme; pero si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado a efecto con
escalamiento, fractura de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos o suelos, o
empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o intimidacion, o
poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o dependientes del
establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena sera prision correccional en su
grado maximo.

RULING: Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157

of the Revised Penal Code.

RATIO:
1. In the construction of the Revised Penal Code, the Spanish text prevails
over the English text. In the Spanish text, the term used was “privacion de
libertad”, which was translated (inaccurately) to “imprisonment” in the
English text. Following the Spanish text, the penalty of destierro constitutes
a partial deprivation of liberty on the part of the sentenced person, as in this
case, the liberty to go to the City of Manila. By going into the place where
he is prohibited to go by reason of his penalty, he escapes from his
sentence, thus, Art. 157 is applicable to cases where the penalty of destierro
has been imposed.

DISSENTING OPINION of Perfecto, J. (joined by Briones, J.)

- The term privacion de libertad must be construed together with the word
fugandose (by escaping). To escape means to get away or break free from
confinement or detention, while evasion (as in evasion of sentence) means
 TORRES v. GONZALES
July 23, 1987 | Feliciano | Habeas Corpus | Violation of Conditional Pardon
SUMMARY: The President withdrewTorres’ conditional pardon after he allegedly
violated the condition to “not violate any Philippine laws” by being charged w/
estafa and sedition. He contests the withdrawal in the SC, alleging that he was
deprived of due process & did not violate his conditional pardon since he had yet
to be found guilty by final conviction. SC rules that since the Executive acted upon
Torres through RAC Section 69 and not RPC A159, the matter is purely the
President’s prerogative and not subject to judicial scrutiny.
DOCTRINE: The Executive has 2 options in a proceeding against a conditionally
pardoned convict who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon: to
proceed against him under RAC Sec 64 (i) subject exclusively to executive
prerogative, or proceed against him under RPC Art 159.
FACTS:
1. Wilfredo Torres was convicted of 2 counts of estafa in 1979 and was sentenced
to prison for 11y10m22d to 38y9m1d, with the maximum sentence expiring on
Nov 2, 2000. However, the President granted him a conditional pardon in 1979
provided that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law.” Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was
released.
2. On May 1986, the Minister of Justice wrote to the President, informing her of
the resolution of the Board of Pardons and Parole to cancel Torres’ conditional
pardon, citing Tesoro v Director of Prisons & Espuelas v Provincial Warden of
Bohol. This was because Torres had been charged with 20 counts of estafa,
pending trial, and convicted by the RTC of sedition, pending appeal in the IAC.
3. The President cancelled Torres’ conditional pardon, with the Minister of Justice
issuing an Order of Arrest and Recommitment “by authority of the President.”
Torres, after being arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired
portion of his sentence, impugns the validity of the Order and claims that he did
not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the 20 counts of estafa and sedition and was deprived of due
process since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was
arrested and recommitted to prison.
ISSUES: WON conviction by final judgment is necessary before petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and to serve the balance of his original sentence – NO.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. RAC Sec 64 (i): [The Governor-General may] authorize the arrest and
recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition(s) of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.
2. SC’s current stand on the matter based on jurisprudence:
a. The grant of pardon and the determinationof the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
b. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a conditional pardon and the
proper consequences of such breach may either be a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the RAC; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under RPC Art 159. When the President opts to proceed under RAC Sec
64(i), no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may
be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
c. Because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial
due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, RAC Sec 64 (i) is not unconstitutional.
3. In this case, what is involved is not the prosecution of the parolee for his
subsequent offenses (e.g. estafa, sedition) in the regular course of administration
of the criminal law, but rather the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. The Executive Department has 2 options in a proceeding
against a conditionally pardoned convict who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon: to proceed against him under RAC Sec 64 (i) subject
exclusively to executive prerogative, or proceed against him under RPC Art 159
which imposes prision correcional, minimum period. In this case, the President
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under RAC Sec 64 (i). This choice
is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
DISSENT: CRUZ, J.: Petition granted.
 All charges upon the accused has not resulted in a final conviction.
“Commission of a crime” is to be judicially determined through a final
conviction b/c of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not by the accuser (in this
case the Executive) in the filing of information for a prima facie case. RAC Sec
64 encroaches on judicial functions in so far as it allows the President to
determine WON a crime has been committed.
 Conditional pardon is a contract which also binds the President’s power of
recommitment, which can be exercised only if the condition is not observed.
 A conditional pardon should also be construed favorably to the grantee.
 PEOPLE v. DIOSIO prescribed by law for the new felony (murder) is death, regardless of the
October 23, 1964 | Escolin, J. | Quasi-recidivism presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or complete
absence thereof.
SUMMARY: The accused killed two members of their rival gang while serving
sentence in New Bilibid Prison. They voluntary surrendered and entered the plea
of guilty, invoking such circumstances for the attenuation of their death sentence
imposed by the trial court.
DOCTRINE: Any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.

FACTS:
1. The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
where both accused were serving sentence. One was convicted of homicide
(Abarca) and the other one of robbery (Dioso), both by final judgment.
2. The accused were members of “Batang Mindanao” gang whose co-member
was suspectedly killed by the victims herein, belonging to “Happy Go
Lucky” gang.
3. Abarca and Dioso planned to avenge the death of their gangmate and
decided to proceed with it when they learned that Reyno and Gomez
(victims) were sick and confined in the prison hospital.
4. Abarca, accompanied by Dioso, pretended to be sick one morning and
sought admission as a patient. Inside the ward of the victims, they saw
Reyno eating breakfast while Gomez was lying down in bed. Both accused
suddenly drew their improvised knives and stabbed the victims to death.
5. They rushed out of the ward but the prisoner guard caught them. They
immediately surrendered and handed their weapons.
6. The accused, after interrogation, admitted responsibility for the death of the
victims and then pleaded guilty during the trial.
7. Trial court imposed the death penalty because of the aggravating
circumstance of alevosia.
8. Petitioners appealed seeking attenuation of the death sentence by invoking
the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.

ISSUE: WoN the mitigating circumstances would lower the penalty? - NO

RULING: Trial court was correct in imposing the death sentence but for lack of
requisite votes in the SC, the sentence will be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

RATIO:
1. The accused, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence
for a prior offense, are quasi-recidivists. As such, the maximum penalty
 PEOPLE v. KONG LEON
January 17, 1950 | Labrador, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Counterfeiting
SUMMARY: Kong Leon was arrested for fabricating US gold coins which
were put out of circulation by the U.S. Gold Reserve Act of 1934. He
alleged that said coins cannot be subject of punishment under the Art 163 as
the same are already out of circulation. SC denied the petition.
DOCTRINE: Fabrication of a coin withdrawn from circulation is still
punishable under RPC. This is to protect the public from the possibility that
the counterfeiter may later apply his trade to the making of coins in actual
circulation.
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant is a goldsmith in a shop established after liberation of
Manila in April 1947. One day, police received information from Mansu
that appellant was selling illegally fabricated U.S. gold dollar coins. One the
same day, Lt. Versoza ordered Mansu to pretend buying dollar coins from
appellant then proceeded to search Kong Leon’s shop and person with a
search warrant.
2. As the police searched the shop, they found goldsmith tools in the fitting
room of the place, together with a gold foil, a gold nagget, several gold
coins of different currencies, one unfinished $5 dollar coin and two
unfinished $10 coins. Versoza also alleged that when he searched the
appellant’s pockets, he found eight pieces of $20 U.S. gold coins wrapped
in paper. All of these were brought to the station with Kong Leon.
3. Appellant then signed a statement after questioning at the police station,
with a police officer and the interpreter for the police as witnesses.
4. The coins confiscated were confirmed as counterfeited by the chemist of
Manila Police but appellant denied ownership of the same and only
admitted to the ownership of the goldsmith tools. He claimed that he only
occupied a space in the searched location and that he never went inside the
fitting room.
5. The CFI declared appellant guilty despite the latter’s witnesses who said
that the 8 pieces of coins were not found in the person of the appellant when
Versoza searched him. One of the witnesses was the detective
accompanying the Lieutenant.
6. Appellant appealed the decision of the lower court claiming that the coins
were not owned by him and that Art 163 of the RPC is not applicable in his
case.
RULING: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
RATIO:
3. Witnesses presented by the appellant contradicting the allegation of Versoza
regarding the confiscation of coins from the person of the former are not
enough to counter the latter’s claim. In the confession of the appellant as
interpreted, he expressly admitted that he made the counterfeited coins.
Even if Versoza’s claim was incorrect and that the coins were found in the
room and not with the appellant, it will have no substantial effect since
actual possession does not matter. Control over the coins and implied
possession thereof is enough.
4. Appellant contended that gold coins have ceased to be a currency of the
U.S. because of Gold Reserve Act 1934 (Act 1934) so considering him
guilty of Article 163 is erroneous. This is untenable since Act 1934 only
withdrew gold coins from circulation temporarily but did not declare the as
valueless or illegal. Act 1934 had no intent of declaring such coins’ use as
outlawed. Verily, even if such coins are out of circulation, Article 163
punished counterfeiting of coins, whether or not the same are in circulation.
5. In the US and England, counterfeiting of currency withdrawn from
circulation is not punishable. But the reason for this law is that in said
jurisdictions, no person is defrauded if the coin is not in circulation. This is
contrary to the case at bar wherein collectors were to be defrauded as
appellant passes the coins to Moros who value them as rare objects.
Moreover, the possibility and probability that the counterfeiter will use his
trade for the fabrication of coins in actual circulation exists.

ISSUE/S: WoN counterfeiting of coins out of circulation are not punishable

under art 163 of RPC? – NO
 DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE
December 22, 1961| Concepcion, J. | Appeal from CFI | Forgery

SUMMARY: Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of forged treasury
notes, but what he had were actually genuine treasury notes of the government
where the last digit of the serial number was altered. SC held that he is guilty.
DOCTRINE: Forgery can be committed even on genuine treasury bills, when
under Art 169, figures, letters, words or signs are erased, substituted or altered.

FACTS:
1. His co-accused Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar showed Sergio del
Rosario 3 Philippine one-peso bills and a Philippine two-peso bill where the
last digit of the serial number was changed from 9 to 0. They induced him
to believe that the bills were counterfeit paper money they manufactured
when in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Phil Govt.With this
scheme, they were able to obtain P1,700 from del Rosario for the purpose of
manufacturing more ‘counterfeit’ money.
2. Del Rosario filed a complaint but he was charged with illegal possession of
forged treasury notes under Art 168, together with Araneta and delPilar. Art
168 states, “Any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession,
with intent to use false or falsified instruments referred to in this section,
shall suffer the penalty…”
3. Del Rosario maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of out government,
the possession thereof cannot be illegal.

ISSUE/S: WoN Del Rosario can be convicted of illegal possession of forged

treasury notes—YES

RULING: Decision AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. Under Art 168, possession of false or falsified documents is punished. Art
169 outlines means of committing forgery (referred to in Art 168):
a. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to
bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and
genuine document.
b. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means
the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

2. Clearly, the treasury notes possessed fall under the second means, there
being alteration of “figures, letters, words or signs contained therein”.
 PEOPLE v. GALANO
December 2, 1967 | De Leon, J. | Appeal | Forgery
SUMMARY: Accused used a one-peso bill which is no longer in circulation to
pay off complainant. The former wrote Victory at the back of the bill to make it
appear as legal tender which the SC ruled as forgery under Par 1 of Art 166.
DOCTRINE:Forgery is punished because such documents are prejudicial to the
interests of society and state. Said offense produces lack of confidence of the
holders of genuine documents and intends to destroy the public credit. The forger
usurps one of the supreme attributes of government which is the exclusive maker
of currency.
FACTS:
1. Patrolman Villanueva followed a bunch of people chasing a man in Manila.
By the time he caught up with the pursuers, the latter already nabbed
Galano who was the person being pursued.
2. Villanueva was informed by Lilia Cruz, a balut vendor, that Galano paid her
a false pre-war one-peso bill for 4 balut eggs. Both parties were brought to
the police station.
3. Cruz stated that when Galano paid her, she discovered that the word
“victory” at the back of the money was only written in ink. Accused then
started running after Cruz tried to get his attention.
4. Villanueva turned them over to Patrolman Torres who alleged that Galano
admitted during the investigation that he did write the word “victory” in ink.
5. The bill is a genuine treasury certificate that was withdrawn from
circulation which is redeemable if presented to the Central Bank.
6. After pleading not guilty in trial, he was convicted. He appealed to the SC
stating that his admission to Torres was due to fear of getting hurt after the
latter intimidated him.
7. Fourth division of SC convicted Galano stating that the defense of Torres
intimidating him for his confession is flimsy. When Galano ran, it clearly
showed a guilty conscience. The police officers also have no reason why
they would implicate Galano..
8. However, there was a question of whether or not Galano is guilty of estafa
or forgery? And if forgery, what specific provision in Article 166 is
applicable.
ISSUE: WoN accused is liable for forgery under Art 166 of the RPC? – YES
RULING: Accused is still guilty but considering the severe penalty imposed, a
copy of the decision will be furnished to the President for the possible chance of
clemency.
RATIO:
1. Forgery may be committed by: (a) Giving to a treasury or bank note or any
instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance
of a true and genuine document; and (b) erasing, substituting,
counterfeiting, or altering by any means the figures, letters, or signs
contained therein.
2. Majority of the special division of the SC believes that Galano committed
forgery falling squarely under the first paragraph of Art 166. It cannot come
within the 2nd paragraph because no figure or letter or word has been erased,
substituted, counterfeited, or altered. The forgery only consisted of addition
of a word in an effort to give the bill the appearance of the true and genuine
certificate. Neither can it be considered estafa since it involves falsification
of a government obligation.
3. Majority also believes that the first provision does not only contemplate
situations where a fake document is given the appearance of a genuine
document but also to genuine documents which have been withdrawn.
DISSENTING by Castro, J.
Forgery is punished to maintain the integrity of the currency, to secure the credit
standing of the government, and to prevent the imposition on the public and the
government of worthless notes or obligations of any kind purporting to be
genuine. For a conviction for forgery to be valid, government must be defrauded
or at the very least, the culprit has intention to defraud the government. In the
case at bar, the questioned bill is no longer of legal tender but it is a genuine pre-
war series one-peso bill. Its value is still at one peso since it can be replaced by
the Central Bank as long as the holder requests so. Therefore, in no way can the
government be defrauded by Galano’s action since the latter’s intent was only to
pass said bill as legal tender to avoid spending time for replacement. What the
accused is guilty of is estafa. In passing the questioned bill, the accused
committed wrong recognized by law as swindling or a form of cheating under
Art 318. He deceived the complainant that the bill is of legal tender and at the
expense of the former’s time and money for the replacement of such.
 PEOPLE v. ROMUALDEZ and MABUNAY
September 10, 1932 | Vickers, J. | Appeal from the CFI of Manila | Falsification
SUMMARY: The secretary of the chairman of the BAR examinations
committee altered the exam scores of a candidate so that the candidate would
pass. The court found her guilty as principal for violating Article 300 of the
RPC. The candidate was found guilty as an accomplice under Article 301 of
the same code.
DOCTRINE: The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles
300 and 301 of the Penal Code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has
a technical meaning and the crime may be committed in any of the ways
enumerated in article 300.
FACTS:
1. The accused, Estela Romualdez was Justice Norberto Romualdez' secretary.
Justice Romualdez was the chief of the examination committee for
admission to the BAR in 1926. The other accused, Luis Mabunay, was one
of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations held in 1926.
2. Estelita was appointed Corrector in Political Law. The correctors worked
separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned to
them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in
a separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the
other corrector in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the
general average to be given to the composition.
3. The report of the examination committee was published and in the list of
successful candidates there appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay
with a general average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject are:
73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in Political
Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis
Mabunay showed that the grades of 73 in Civil Law and 64 in Remedial
Law had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking
out the grades of 63 given to the composition in Civil Law and 58 given to
the composition in Remedial Law. The investigation of this irregularity by
the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.
4. Before the prosecuting attorney could finish presenting his evidence, Estela
admitted that she was the one who changed the grades contending that she
did it both in her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of
the correctors; and that she was authorized by said chairman to revise the
compositions already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the
grades given by them.
5. The trial court found Estela guilty of the crime of falsification of
documents. It also found Luis guilty as an accomplice.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the alterations made by Estela constituted a crime - YES
2. WoN Estela is liable for the crime of falsification of public documents –
YES
3. WoN Estela was fully authorized to make the alterations – NO
4. WoN the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in
the commission of the crime - NO
HELD/RULING: The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is
increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor. While the prison sentence
of Luis Mabunayis increased to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of
prision correccional.
RATIO:
1. The examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial
function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the
papers submitted by Luis in the course of the examination were not public
and official documents, or that the alteration of the grades given to such
papers by the Estela was not a crime.
2. The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301
of the Penal Code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical
meaning, and according to article 300 may be committed in the following
eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or
different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or
official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the
alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors"
had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors"
and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by
her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to
the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only
explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to
do so.
3. Although Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain
occasion he gave his secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to
her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she
did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged, the
testimony is not positive. Also, even if she was given such authority, she was
not authorized to change the grades in question because she already knew that
the papers belonged to Luis. Furthermore, she did not confer with the other
correctors as to the change and she did not even attempt to explain why she
raised the grades or how she arrived at the increased grades.
4. It was found that Luis withdrew 600 pesos from his bank account and that
subsequently, Estela deposited 510 pesos in hers. The court asked them to show
cause for it but the two failed. The court held that although the burden to
produce evidence is on the prosecution, failure to produce evidence when asked
runs the risk of inference against the accused. The court found that the money
was withdrawn after Luis learned that he had failed and it was under that
specific circumstance that the court asked Luis to present evidence to show for
what purpose he withdrew the money. The court concluded that Luis and Estela
acted in common accord in the commission of the crime and reversed the trial
court's decision that Luis was merely an accomplice. The court found that Luis
was a co-principal and co-conspirator in the commission of the crime.
 BERADIO v. CA and PEOPLE
March 30, 1981| De Castro, J. | Certiorari | Falsification
SUMMARY: Beradio was charged for falsification of public or official
documents for allegedly making false entries in her daily time records. SC held
that she was not guilty, there being no malice or deliberate intent.
DOCTRINE: Elements of falsification under Art 171: 1) the offender makes
in a document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts
narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
FACTS:
1. Salud Beradio was an election registrar of the COMELEC in Pangasinan,
who was convicted with 4 counts of falsification of public or official
documents from 7 informations filed for making false entries in her daily
time records. As the nature of her job was fieldwork, she was required to fill
up and submit time records after having been countersigned by her
provincial supervisor.
2. These 4 counts were grounded on 4 different dates where her time card
displayed 7:30 a.m. to 12 n., 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. when in fact, court
records show that she appeared in court for hearings and reception of
evidence within those dates, either as counsel or counsel de
officio.RaymundoValez filed an administrative complaint against her for
unauthorized practice of law. She then tendered her resignation, which was
accepted, so she received her retirement benefits under the law. Upon
learning of this, Valez initiated the filing of criminal charges for
falsification and the provincial fiscal charged Beradio of the crime.
ISSUE: WoN Beradio’s act constituted falsification of public or official
documents—NO
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decision REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. For a conviction of the offense of falsification of public or official
documents under Article 171, these requisite elements must be clearly
established: 1) the offender makes in a document false statements in a
narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and
4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
2. In the first place, as Chief of Office, Office of Election Registrar,
COMELEC, Beladio was exempt from the requirement of submitting daily
time records under the Civil Service Rules. Thus, she submits only for the
sake of administrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice, not
by reason of a strict legal obligation (Req 2).
3. Even assuming that Beradio is under strict legal obligation to submit daily
time records, the Court held that the alleged false entries do not constitute
falsification under 171, there being no malice or deliberate intent (Req 4).
Noteworthy is the fact that her longest absence in time records was 45
minutes, which could be absorbed within the allowed coffee break of 30
min. Thus, there was a color of truth in the entries in the time record, not a
downright and willful falsehood which would constitute falsification (Req
3). Here the Court opined that she was merely making an honest claim for
pay corresponding to the time indicated, which she was entitled to since her
appearances in Court was duly authorized or for public service as counsel
de officio.
4. The Court of Appeals stated that in falsification of public document, the
intent to gain or injure a third person is unnecessary, for what is penalized is
the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the violation of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. However, SC held that it must be
borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to
affect the integrity of the document or change the effects which it would
otherwise produce, else there could not exist the essential element of
intention to commit a crime.
 LUAGUE v. CA AND PEOPLE
February 22, 1982 | Abad Santos, J. | Certiorari | Falsification
SUMMARY: Petitioner received three of her husband’s paychecks after the
latter had died, and used them to pay for the expenses of his illness and burial.
The money was less than her husband’s accumulated vacation and sick leaves,
from which the amount was later deducted. She was charged with estafa through
falsification for signing her husband’s name as payee on the treasury warrants
for endorsement. The court held that her actions were done in good faith and
acquitted her of the charges.
DOCTRINE: The absence of damage is considered to determine whether or not
there was criminal intent in committing falsification.
FACTS:
1. Teacher clerk Iluminado Luague died on 24 Jan 1972. Thereafter, the
Bureau of Public Schools sent his three salary warrants to the
Superintendent of schools at Catarman, North Samar, who forwarded them
to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register
accompanied the checks.
2. On their delivery, Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying
that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls
had received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on 7 Feb 1972,
17 Feb 1972, and 25 Feb 1972 respectively, and returned the same to Jose
Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.
3. The first salary warrant was personally received by appellant PilarLuague,
while the second was received by Glen Luague. The third was received by
EdumndoEchano, a relative of the deceased who claimed to be employed in
the Office of the District Supervisor.
4. Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to
return the treasury warrants, and that she promised to do so but atualy did
not. Upon receipt of the photocopies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of
Public Schools, Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants had been
encashed by appellant and Glen Luague with different local stores at
Laoang. Pilar’s warrant was cleared on 22 Feb 1972, while Glen’s was
deposited to the account of a certain Lee and/or Nicolas Chua, and
Edmundo’s was deposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive Phil.
5. Appellant was charged with Estafa through Falsification for signing the
name of her husband as payee on three treasury warrants for purposes of
endorsement. She was convicted by the CFI. The CA affirmed. Hence the
instant appeal, wherein she raises the defense of good faith and contends
that Guillermo himself suggested that the warrants could be used to settle
their financial obligations incurred by the deceased’s hospitalization and
death. Appellant further stated her actions were based on honest belief,
since heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever
unpaid salaries the deceased employee failed to receive.
ISSUE/S: WoN appellant’s actions constitute the crime of estafa through
falsification - NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision reversed and petitioner acquitted.
RATIO:
1. The CA failed to take into account the factual circumstances: Petitioner
signed her husband’s name to the checks because they were delivered to her
by no less than her husband’s district supervisor long after the husband’s
death, which was known by the supervisor; she used the proceeds to pay for
the expenses of her husband’s last illness and burial; and she believed that
she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband’s
vacation and sick leave credits, the money value of which exceeded the
value of the checks.
2. The government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of
the checks since the petitioner’s husband had accumulated vacation and sick
leaves which exceeded the value of the three paychecks. The value of the
paychecks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves—hence
petitioner’s conviction not for estafa but only for falsification. Although it
does not mean that where there is no damage there can be no falsification,
the absence of damage is to be considered to determine whether or not there
is criminal intent.
3. The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment
due to her husband’s recent death when she cashed the paychecks, and she
was in dire need of money to settle the expenses for her husband’s illness
and burial. A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by First Lady Imelda
Ramos would have been highly in order under the circumstances.
 CABIGAS v. PEOPLE
July 3, 1987 | Paras, J. | Petition for review | Falsification
SUMMARY: Petitioner, a Securities Custodian, discovered some missing
treasury bills while doing inventory. He amended the numbers and made
notations of such mismatch in count on forms he personally made, and reported
it to his supervisors. He was charged with falsification. The SC acquitted him
due to reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: Requisites of falsification under Art 171 par (4): (1) That the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2)
That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
(3) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (4) That the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
FACTS:
1. Accused Securities Custodian Dario Cabigas and Securities Receiving
Clerk BenedictoReynes worked for the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
The Fund Management Department (FMD) delivered to the Securities
Section for safekeeping 112 pieces of treasury notes and bills woth
P46,000,000, including 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-
000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in P500,000 denominations or a total of
P9,500,000. A copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) for the same
was issued to the FMD while the original was retained in the Securities
Section. After receiving the securities, as a matter of routine procedure, the
accused would prepare the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under
Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions and operations.
2. On 29 March 1982, while doing the inventory of the deposited treasury
notes and bills, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six treasury bills
of the 795th series, totaling P300,000,000. Upon verification that the SDR
was the source document of the missing securities delivered to them for
safekeeping, Reynes crossed out with red ink on the same document the last
two digits “82” and the added after them “76” on the serial numbers A-
000064 to A-000082, 795th series of the 19 treasury bills. Cabigas placed at
the bottom of the SDR “for adjustment” and the date “3/29/82”. Upon
Cabigas’s suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager,
Aurora Pigram. When the DR SDUC for 29 March 1982 was prepared, the
number of treasury bills of the 795 th series stood at P1,539 pcs with total
face value of P610,095,000.
3. Reynes prepared a draft report by carrying forward the ending balance of
the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the 29 March 1982 DR
SDUC. However, instead of following Reynes’s draft, Cabigas prepared his
own DR SDUC indicating 1,533 pcs of treasury bills of the 795 th series in
his possession when the report was prepared and at the bottom Cabigas
placed the notation “Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated
3/09/82” as legend of the asterisk appearing after the figure 1,533.
4. On 20 May 1982, Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the
Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial
No. A-000082 worth P500,000. Upon investigation by the NBI, it was
discovered that Pigram negotiated the said treasury bill with Gainsbo
Commodities, and the five missing treasury bills were negotiated by Pigram
with the Home Savings Bank to secure a loan. Cabigas and Reynes were
arrested for allegedly conspiring to falsify the SDR dated 9 March 1982 and
the DR SDUC dated 30 March 1982. Reynes was acquitted while Cabigas
was convicted. Hence the instant appeal.
ISSUE: WoN the accused committed the crime of falsification - NO
RULING: On ground of reasonable doubt, decision of the Sandiganbayan
reversed, and another rendered acquitting petitioner Cabigas.
RATIO:
1. In falsification by an employee under Art 171 par(4), “by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts”, the following elements must concur:
a. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts
b. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him
c. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
d. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
2. Petitioner argues that such elements are not present in the case at bar. The
correction of the figure to conform to the actual number of treasury under
custody was made not to falsify, but to speak the truth. Placing the asterisk
after such figure and writing “Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming)
dated 3/09/82”was not to hide the fact of the missing bills, as it would be
more difficult to discover the loss without the asterisk or footnote.
3. The evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss on 29
March 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor,
Estela Espiritu, and Branch Manager of the Securities Section Pigram. This
shows good faith and lack of motive on petitioner’s part to conceal the loss.
4. The DR SDUC is a form purely devised and adopted by petitioner; it is not
required or prescribed by the Land Bank. Thus, he was not under legal
obligation to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR the correct number and total
maturity value of the securities under their official custody as a given date.
It is purely optional on petitioner’s part to use said forms.
 PEOPLE v. SENDAYDIEGO
January 20, 1978 | Aquino, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Falsification
SUMMARY: Samson received cash payments from Sendaydiego (provincial
treasurer) for purchase of materials for purported bridge repair projects from the
company Samson allegedly represents. The vouchers for the payments, however,
were found to be fake vouchers, and the projects mentioned were noting but
bogus projects. The SC held Samson guilty of 6 separate counts of malversation
and 6 separate counts of falsification of public document by a private individual
(Art. 172(1), RPC).
DOCTRINE: If a person had in his possession a falsified document and be
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
If the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
FACTS:
1. Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, together
with Juan Samson, an employee of Carried Construction Supply Co. in
Dagupan City, and AnastacioQuirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, were accused of malversation and falsification of public
documents through the use of 6 forged provincial vouchers in order to
embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57, 048.23 in 3
separate cases.
2. Samson acted as representative of the construction supply company in its
deals with the provincial government, since he was a former employee in
the provincial government. He hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial
treasurer’s office, where it was initialed by several officers, before the
amounts covered by the vouchers were paid by Sendaydiego in cash
(instead of check).
3. The vouchers involved transactions regarding the purchase of materials for
the repair of several bridges. The vouchers contained the signatures of
Samson, Sendaydiego, Quirimit and other provincial government officers. It
turned out, however, that the vouchers were falsified as evidenced by the
facts: (1) there were no projects for the repair of the bridges; (2) the
amounts specified in the vouchers were never received by Carried
Construction; (3) the materials specified were never delivered; (4) Salvador
F. Oropilla (senior civil engineer); Rodolfo P. Mencias (supervising civil
engineer) Victoriano M. Sevilleja (acting provincial engineer) and Ricardo
B. Probincias (chief of equipment of the governor's office) denied that their
signatures appearing in the vouchers were there genuine signatures; (5) the
Seal of Approval For and By the Authority by the Governor appearing in
the vouchers were not genuine.
The signatures of Sendaydiego, Quirimit, appearing in the vouchers,
however, were authentic.Sendaydiego also later testified that Samson’s
signatures in the vouchers were genuine.
4. The RTC found Samson and Sendaydiego guilty but acquitted Quirimit.
Samson and Sendaydiego appealed to the SC. During the pendency of the
appeal, Sendaydiego died (Oct. 5, 1976), hence his appeal will only be
resolved for the purpose of showing criminal liability as basis for the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable.
5. Sendaydiego’s defense was primarily anchored on good faith that he signed
the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial
office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited
and approved by Quirimit, while Samson impugns the signatures appearing
in the vouchers to be his genuine signatures.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Samson is liable for a complex crime of malversation
through falsification or separate crimes of malversation and falsification –
SEPARATE CRIMES OF MALVERSATION AND FALSIFICATION
RULING: Samson guilty of 6 counts of malversation and 6 counts of
falsification. Samson and the estate of Sendaydiego are solidarily liable to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan.
RATIO:
Falsification of public, official, commercial document by a private person (Art.
172 (1))
- Offender is private individual or public officer/employee who did not take
advantage of his position
- He committed any act of falsification
- Falsification was committed in a public, official, or commercial document
or letter of exchange.
(Note: this crime is with regard to Samson, since Sendaydiego is already dead
when the case was decided by the SC)
I. For Sendaydiego:
1. The CFI held that there was conspiracy between Samson and Sendaydiego
based from the following facts:
 Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash. The forged character of the six
vouchers would have been discovered by the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of
checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned
them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make
any payments at all
  Sendaydiego signed the 6 vouchers ahead of his assistant (contrary to
usual procedure) and the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson
in Sendaydiego’s inner office, instead of in the cashier’s office.
 The cash payments were made to Samson even if he had no power of
attorney from the company authorizing him to receive payments on
their behalf.
 The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should
be present when the payments were received, was blank. The treasurer
did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require
the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
2. The argument that since the auditor (Quirimit) was acquitted, so the
treasurer (Sendaydiego) must also be acquitted cannot be sustained. First,
Sendaydiego is charged as a principal, while Quirimit an accomplice (the
evidence presented against them are different). Also, Quirimit was acquitted
due to the fact that he was misled by Sendaydiego’s certification of the 6
vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" which the former apparently assumed
to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
III. Complex Crime or Separate Crimes?
The Supreme Court held that the present case involves not a complex crime of
malversation through falsification, but separate crimes of malversation and
falsification, since falsification was committed to conceal the malversation. If
the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
The provincial treasurer (Sendaydiego), as the custodian of the money forming
part of the road and bridge fund, could have malversed or misappropriated it
without falsifying any voucher. The falsification was used as adevice to prevent
detection of the malversation. Also, each falsification of a voucher constitutes
one separate offense, instead of a single continuing crime impelled by a single
criminal impulse. Therefore, Samson, as co-conspirator with Sendaydiego, is
criminally liable for 6 counts of malversation and 6 counts of falsification.

II. For Samson:

1. Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of
denying the same as and when necessary.
Samson’s contention that the signatures purporting to be his which appears
on the vouchers are not his genuine signatures has been rebutted by the
handwriting expert (Lt. Col. Jose G. Fernandez), who found that even
though the alleged genuine signatures of Samson in valid documents and
those appearing in the falsified vouchers were different, it was concluded
that they were written by one person. In fact, even Sendaydiego testified
that Samson’s signatures appearing in the vouchers are genuine.
2. If a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.
Evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or
collector of the construction supply company, hand-carried the vouchers to
the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to
the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments.
Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the
vouchers.
3. Samson’s argument that the funds were not misappropriated since the
vouchers were genuine (yet he claims that his signatures in then were not
genuine) were rebutted by Jabanes (assistant manager of Carried
Construction) who testified that they never delivered the materials and
Sevilleja (cashier at Carried Construction) who testified that they never
received the payments of Sendaydiego made through Samson.
 SIQUIAN v. PEOPLE
March 13, 1989 | Cortes, J. | Petition to Review CA Decision | Falsification
SUMMARY: Former mayor of Isabela was charged with falsification of a public
document after issuing a certification that funds were available for the position of
complainant as clerk. SC affirmed the decision of the lower courts stating that
intent is immaterial in falsification of public documents.
DOCTRINE: In falsification of public or official documents, it is unnecessary
that there be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person. The
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, then Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, accompanied Jesusa Carreon
to the office of the Municipal Secretary after the latter went to the
Municipal Hall to seek employment. Carreon was apparently hired as clerk
of the Municipal secretary by the accused.
2. Carreon started working in July 1975 and rendered her services until
December. During this time, she was not paid even if she went to the
Municipal treasurer as early as October for the salary. She then filed a
complaint against the accused addressed to the Governor.
3. The trial court convicted the petitioner for falsification of a public document
which was affirmed by the CA. In addition, the courts averred that evidence
showed that there was a failure to enact the budget for that year and that the
budget for 1974, which contained no new item for the questioned position,
was reenacted.
4. Petitioner appealed to the SC stating that: (1) the evidence on record shows
the absence of criminal intent; (2) there is no evidence that the accused took
advantage of his position; (3) the statement of “Funds for the position are
available” is not a narration of fact but a conclusion of law; and (4) the
petitioner was deprived of due process because trial proceeded despite
pending petition in the SC for change of venue.
ISSUE/S: WoN intent is indispensable in falsification of public documents? –
NO
RULING: Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. In falsification of public or official documents, it is unnecessary that there
be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person. The principal
thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed. Although good faith is a good defense, the
petitioner has not clearly shown such ground for acquittal. As mayor then,
he is aware that there has been a failure to enact the budget for that year and
that there are no funds for the position of Carreon. Thus, he cannot claim
good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the
questioned position.
2. Falsification by a public officer under Article 171 is committed by “any
public officer who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making
untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .” It is settled that in this
fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthfulstatements in a
narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth ofthe facts
narrated by him; and
(c)That the facts narrated by the offender areabsolutely false.
3. All three requisites are present in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer,
being then the mayor of the municipality made an untruthful statement in
the certification he issued in connection with the appointment of Carreon.
As an authorized officer, he also has the legal obligation to disclose the
truth of all facts in said certification. Falsification happened when such
document stated that funds were available for the position of Carreon even
though it did not exist.
4. Petitioner’s defense that his certification that “funds are available” as a
conclusion of law is not meritorious. When he signed such certification with
the legal obligation to narrate the facts therein, he knew very well that the
reenacted budget did not contain a new item for Carreon’s position.
5. His defense that he did not take advantage of his position is also untenable.
Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office in making or
intervening in the preparation of a public document as displayed in
petitioner’s duty in issuing the certification necessary for Carreon’s
appointment.
 PEOPLE v. VILLALON and DE GUZMAN
December 21, 1990| Regalado, J. | Certiorari | Falsification
SUMMARY: De Guzman mortgaged Carrera’s property using the SPA for a P8,
500 loan and the contract was registered in the Register of Deeds on Feb 1964. It
was foreclosed and Carrera filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document on Mar 1974. SC held that De Guzman was guilty of the
crime according to the facts, but that the action has prescribed.
DOCTRINE: The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not
by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official
or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
FACTS:
1. Mariano Carrera (complainant) and his brother Severo Carrera owned a
parcel of land in Pangasinan. On Feb 5, 1964, Mariano executed a special
power of attorney (SPA) before the Notary Public, naming Federico de
Guzman as his lawful attorney-in--fact.
2. On Feb 13, 1964, de Guzman mortgaged the land with People’s Bank and
Trust Company using the SPA for a P8,500 loan and the mortgage contract
was then duly registered in the Pangasinan Registry of Deeds. After the
term expired and the loan being unpaid, the bank foreclosed said mortgage
and sold the land to Serafica and Quinto. In Jan 1972, Mariano allegedly
just then discovered that their property was registered in Serafica’s name so
he filed a complaint for ejectment. Mariano also filed a criminal case for
estafa thru falsification of a public document on Mar 29, 1974, alleging that
his signature was unlawfully forged and affixed by De Guzman in the SPA.
3. On Dec 16, 1975, de Guzman filed a motion to dismiss due to the partial
testimony of Mariano to the effect that he authorized the mortgage as to ½
of the property owned by him and his brother. Also, de Guzman argues that
the crime has prescribed (10 years). The CFI judge dismissed the complaint
and the CA (Judge Villalon) affirmed.
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element in falsification. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
In fact: From Mariano Carrera’s testimony, it appears that authorization to
mortgage the property only pertained to ½ of the property or only Severo
Carrera’s share. Thus, the charge was sufficient.
2. Prescription: Under Art 48, the penalty for the more serious crime
(falsification) in its maximum period (prision correccional) shall be
applied. As a correctional penalty, it prescribes in 10 years. Art 91 provides
that the prescriptive period commences to run “from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents”.
In People v. Reyes, the Court set down the doctrine that registration in a
public registry is a notice to the whole world; and the record is a
constructive notice of its contents and interests included therein. Thus, in
the crime of falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period
commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds
(Feb 1964). Also, this interpretation favors the accused, so it is the
interpretation adopted by the Court. Thus, when the complaint was filed on
Mar 1974, the action has prescribed.

ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law—YES
2. WoN the action has prescribed—YES

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. Decision AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. In law: Complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document
exists. Falsification may be a means of committing estafa because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud, the crime of
 PEOPLE v. DAVA
September 30 1991 | Fernan, C. J. | Certiorari | Use of Falsified Documents
SUMMARY:Dava’s driver’s license gets confiscated as evidence in a case
against him after he kills and injures someone while driving and a criminal
complaint was filed against him. He asks his friend Manalili to get one for him by
saying he had no license, and Manalili got one through fixers. SC: Guilty of
Falsification of a Public Document.
DOCTRINE: License is a public/official document, hence intent to cause
damage to another need not be proved since principal thing being punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
FACTS:
1. On Oct 19 1975, Michael Dava, the holder of Driver’s License No.
1474427, bumped pedestrians Bernadette Clamor and Dolores Roxas,
killing the former and injuring the latter. Police confiscated his driver’s
license and submitted it to the fiscal’s office for use as prosecution evidence
in a criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence filed against him.
2. On April 12 1978, Roxas (Clamor’s brother and Dolores’ father), saw Dava
driving a Volkswagen. Knowing that Dava’s driver’s license was used as an
exhibit in court, he sought Defense Minister Enrile’s help to apprehend
Dava for driving without a license, who indorsed his request to the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.M/Sgt Lising and S/Sgt Viduya saw
the Volkswagen parked in front of Uniwide Dept, Cubao. When Dava
arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted him and asked for his license. He
showed Driver’s License No. 2706887, and when asked where he procured
it from, he said that his officemate Manalili secured it for him. Upon
subsequent investigation, Lising concluded that Dava’s Driver’s License
was a fake b/c upon comparison to a Xerox copy of Dava’s License which
was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and
dates of birth were different. Accordingly, an information for falsification
of a public document under RPC A172 was filed against him.
3. Upon examination of Bureau of Land Transportation (Angeles Branch)
Registrar Vinluan, she found out that Form no. 2706887, which was
genuine, were one of those stolen from their office in 1976 and it was never
issued to any applicant for a license. Also, the signature in the license was
fake. And while the form was from the Angeles Agency, the license
appeared on its face to have been issued from the San Fernando, Pampanga
Agency.Manalili, Dava’s friend who procured the License, said that he
acquired the license upon Dava’s request since Dava said he had none. He
admitted that he employed fixers in the San Fernando office, who gave him
the license which was under a plastic jacket after a mere hour.
4. TC: Dava guilty as principal of the crime of Falsification of a Public
Document (RPC A172). Since he was the possessor or user of the fake
license, he himself was the forger or at the one who caused its forgery or
falsification. Upon appeal, Vinluan’s testimony was found inadmissible
since the court where said testimony was used had no jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S: WoN Dava is guilty of the use of a falsified document – YES.
RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Elements of Use of a Falsified Document in a Transaction
a. Offender knew that document was falsified by another person – Lising
was the one who requested Manalili to get the license upon falsely
misrepresenting himself as having none. Since he induced and left
Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was
Manalili who directly procured the license can’t exculpate petitioner
from the charge of falsification. He is a principal by inducement in the
commission of falsification. He obviously knew that it was not legally
possible for him to secure a 2nd license. And the fact that it was procure
din only 1 hour should be enough to make anyone suspicious.
b. False document embraced in A171 or A172(1) or (2) – A driver’s
license is a public document embraced in said Articles. The blank form
of the driver’s license. The blank form of the driver’s license becomes a
public document the moment it’s accomplished. Thu, when driver’s
license No 2706887 was filled up with petitioner’s personal date and
the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was
affixed in it, even if the same was simulated, the driver’s license
became a public document.
c. He used such document (not in judicial proceedings)– When petitioner
was apprehendede by Lising, the licesen was in his possession and it
was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. And since
he was a detaileman who did his job with the use of a car, most likely
he used the license from its date of issuance (Nov 1976) until Lising
caught him (April 1978)
d. Use of the False Document w/ Intent to Cause Damage –
IMMATERIAL. License is a public document. In falsification of public
or official documents, principal thing being punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
2. Dava invokes the Sendaydiego ruling (presumption that the possessor of a
forged document is the forger will hold only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation). But in the first place he had no satisfactory explanation – he
 mainly just blames his friend, Manalili, who couldn’t have acted on his own 2. In the case at bar, the element of intimidation and consequent fear, which
without Dava’s proddings are required in robbery are non-existent. The complainant already knew that
the accused was an impostor by the time she delivered the money. Such act
of delivering the money was not out of fear because of an alleged
intimidation but as part of a scheme to entrap. But assuming that the threat
PEOPLE v. CORTEZ of the appellant to examine the books caused fear on Reyes, such fear
October 24, 1977 | Ericta, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Usurpation disappeared after she learned of the appellant identity and voluntarily
collaborated with the BIR agents to perform an entrapment operation.
SUMMARY: Accused was caught pretending to be a BIR agent to get money
from Reyes who owns a store. The former was caught after an entrapment
operation and was convicted for robbery. SC ruled that no violence or
intimidation was involved so the correct crime committed is the complex crime
of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public doc.
DOCTRINE: Any person who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be
an officer, agent or representative of the Phil Govt or any foreign govt shall be
penalized.

FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant went inside the store of Elizabeth Reyes pretending to be
BIR agent Begunia by showing an ID card with some BIR papers.
Appellant then told Reyes that he was authorized to examine the books and
receipts of the latter’s store to generate funds for the “BIR Director” but
will not do so if a payment of P200 will be given.
2. Days later, Reyes went to the BIR where he was shown a picture of the real
Mr. Begunia whom she met and executed a plan with to entrap the accused.
3. When the day came that the accused went to the store, Mrs. Reyes handed
him the marked money amounting to P200. The former tried to write a
clearance notice on a piece of paper after Mrs. Reyes requested so, during
which the BIR agents tried to subdue him. He was arrested after and
brought to the NBI.
4. The accused tried to defend himself by protesting that it was a frame-up but
the CFI convicted him of robbery thru usurpation of authority and with the
use of falsified public document.

ISSUE/S: WoN the CFI erred in giving aforesaid penalty? –YES

RULING: Guilty of the complex crime of usurpation of authority thru

falsification of a public document by a private individual.

RATIO:
1. It is undisputable that the crimes of usurpation of authority and falsification
of a public document by a private individual were committed. But the crime
of robbery, requiring either violence or intimidation, should be an act which
inspires fear with the person against whom it is directed.
 GIGANTONI v. PEOPLE
June 16, 1988| Yap, C. J. | Appeal | Usurpation
SUMMARY: Galantoni, an ex-PC-CIS agent, represented himself as such agent
to obtain records from PAL. He was charged for usurpation of authority and
found guilty. SC acquitted him for the prosecution’s failure to establish one of the
elements of the crime, knowingly and falsely representing himself.
DOCTRINE: Under usurpation of authority, the accused has to knowingly and
falsely represent himself to warrant a conviction. Under usurpation of official
functions, the absence of power to represent oneself as having the authority to
perform acts pertaining to an office he was knowingly deprived of, would suffice.
FACTS:
1. Melencio Galantoni was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc and a
former CIS, Philippine Constabulary agent dismissed from service for gross
misconduct on June 30, 1980. On May 14 1981, he went to the PAL office
to conduct investigations on claims of per diem of Black Mountain officials
who had travelled. He represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-
CIS agent, even showing an identification card, investigating a kidnapping
case in the tracking stage, requesting passenger manifests for Manila-
Baguio-Manila flights from Feb 1 to 3, 1981. He was allowed access to
PAL records and he photocopied PAL tickets of Cesar Wong, an SGV
auditor and Daisy Britanico, a Black Mountain employee.
2. When he left, PAL general counsel was informed, became suspicious and
verified his identification. Counsel alerted the NBI and he was confronted
the next day about his identity when he went back to the office. The Fiscal
charged him for “knowingly and falsely representing himself as an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Phil Government
or of any foreign government.”
3. Gigantoni was found guilty. He appeals, arguing that he was merely
suspended and not yet informed of his termination; and that the receipt of
the notice of dismissal cannot be established by mere presumption of
regularity of official acts.
of any foreign government (usurpation of authority); or (b) who, under
pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so
(usurpation of official functions).
2. Gigantoni was charged under usurpation of authority, so the question is
whether the accused knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of
the PC-CIS. Gigantoni admits receiving a notice of suspension effective
Nov 20, 1980, but denies knowledge of dismissal. Burden of proof is upon
the prosecutor and here he failed to prove, through competent evidence, that
he had knowledge of his dismissal. The constitutional presumption of
innocence can only be turned by competent and credible evidence and never
by disputable presumptions.
3. The OSG argues that it makes no difference whether he was suspended or
dismissed from service, for both imply an absence of power to represent
oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to
which he knowingly was deprived of. The Court held that OSG’s position is
correct if the accused was charged with usurpation of official functions
(under the 2nd). It has not been shown in the information that PAL gave him
information as part of his exercise of his official function, it appearing that
representation as a PC-CIS agent was enough for them to make the
information available.

ISSUE/S: WoN Gigantoni was guilty of usurpation of authority—NO

RULING: The accused is ACQUITTED.

RATIO:
1. Article 177 of the RPC on usurpation of authority or official functions,
under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who
knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or
 LEGAMIA v. IAC however, that she be extended executive clemency. On appeal to the
August 28, 1984 | Abad Santos, J. | Petition for review on certiorari | Using Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto.
fictitious name
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner violated CA 142 – NO
SUMMARY: Corazon was convicted of violating CA 142 when she used the RULING: The decision under review is SET ASIDE and the petitioner is
name Corazon L. Reyes – which was different from her christened name – to sign ACQUITTED.
a letter and a voucher for death benefits on behalf of her son outside wedlock to
Emilio Reyes with whom she lived together for 19 years. The SC overturned the RATIO:
decision citing the Philippines' cultural environment and the fact that Corazon was 1. It is in light of the Philippines' cultural environment that the law must be
introduced to the public as Emilio's wife and she assumed that role and his name construed. In the Philippine setting, it is not uncommon for women to
without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind during the time they represent themselves as wives of the men they are living with and use the
lived together. family names of these men even though they are unmarried. And yet none
DOCTRINE: Using a name by which one has been publicly known for a long of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours
time and without any sinister purpose or personal gain in mind is not a violation of is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. In the case at bar,
CA 142. Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her
to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any
FACTS sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits
1. Corazon Legamia (petitioner) and Emilio N. Reyes were unmarried and upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years
lived together for 19 years from 18 Nov. 1955 to Emilio's death on 26 was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant
Sept. 1974 and had a son who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them
Reyes probably had their own Corazons.
2. During the time they lived together, Corazon was known as Corazon
Reyes – she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes and Emilio introduced her as
Mrs. Reyes.
3. After Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter on behalf of Michael for death
benefits. The letter was signed “Corazon L. Reyes” and the voucher
evidencing the payment of Michael's claim was also signed as such.
4. Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint against
Corazon for using the name Reyes even though Corazon was not married
to Emilio. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5
of that which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A.
Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima.
5. Corazon was accused of using the Corazon L. Reyes, which is different
from Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by
which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for
literary purpose and without having been previously authorized by a
competent Court to do so, in violation of CA 142, as amended.
6. Corazon was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an
indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years,
as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court recommended,
 DIAZ v. PEOPLE b. That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
October 31, 1990| Paras, J. | Petition to Review IAC Decision | Perjury officer, authorized to receive and administer oath;
c. That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
th
SUMMARY: Diaz stated in a Personal Data Sheet that he was a 4 yr college deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
student for appointment to a position with such requirement. This was filed in the d. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
Civil Service Commission. Diaz was charged with falsification but the SC held required by law or made for a legal purpose.
that he should be convicted of perjury.
DOCTRINE: Elements of perjury: 1) statement under oath on a material matter,
2) made before competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath; 3)
made willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in the statement; 4) statement
containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

FACTS:
1. In 1972, Reolandi Diaz who was a public employee as a senior clerk at the
Jose Abad Santos High School, sought appointment in the same school as
school administrative assistant. The minimum requirement for said position
is a 4th year college undergraduate. Diaz executed and filed in the Office of
the Civil Service Commission a Personal Data Sheet and made it appear
that he was a 4th year BA student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and
Harvardian Colleges. His appointment to the position was approved.
2. Prosecution charged him with falsification of an official document and was
found guilty.
3. Diaz argues that the finding that he was not a 4th year college student was
contrary to the evidence presented; and that he did not have a legal
obligation to state in the form that he was a 4 th year college student so he
cannot be charged under falsification.

ISSUE/S: WoN Diaz was guilty of falsification—NO

RULING: Guilty of PERJURY, not falsification. (Perjury carries lesser penalty)

RATIO:
1. Prosecution presented evidence showing that his name was not in
enrollment lists of Harvardian colleges, Tondo and Harvardian colleges,
San Fernando. Diaz, while not taking the witness stand, presented evidence
of an alleged transcript of records but it lacked authentication—the seal and
the president’s signature missing therein.
2. Following the doctrine laid down in People v Rufo Cruz, the crime
committed under the foregoing facts is perjury. The elements of perjury are
as follows:
a. That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter;
 OUANO v. CA
August 21, 1990 | Narvasa, J.| Certiorari | Machinations in Public Auctions
SUMMARY: Ouano and Echavez agreed that only Echavez woud bid in a public
auction for the same piece of land being sold by the DBP, and that they would share
in it. They induced another interested bidder into withdrawing from the auction by
paying them. Echavez won the bidding; he and Ouano executed an agreement
wherein they would share the property and the expenses therefor. Ouano paid
pursuant to the agreement but the DBP never consented to the same. Ouano filed for
specific performance and reconveyance of the land, but the SC held that the facts of
the case showed the commission of machinations in public auctions and thus the
agreement was based on an unlawful cause and produced no effect at all.
DOCTRINE: The elements of machinations of machinations in public auctions
through attempting to cause bidders to stay away: (1) That there be a public auction;
(2) That the accused attempted to cause the bidders to stay away from the public
auction; (3) That it was done by threats, gifts, promises or any other artifice; (4) That
the accused had the intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned.
FACTS:
1. A parcel of land in Cebu was offered for sale by public bidding for the
second time by the RFC on 1 April 1958. Prior to the bidding, petitioner
Ouano and Francisco Echavez orally agreed that only the latter would bid,
and that if it was accepted, they would divide the properties in proportion to
their adjoining properties. To ensure their success, they also agreed to
induce the only other party interested in the land—a group headed by a Mrs.
Bonsucan—to desist from bidding. Ouano’s wife paid Bonsucan’s group
P2,000 for expenses and the Bonsucan group withdrew from the sale.
2. The highest bid submitted and accepted by Francisco Chavez was P27,826,
of which he paid P5,565 as 20% deposit of the price. A week later, Echavez
sent Ouano a letter regarding the P2,000 paid to the Bonsucan group, stating
that since the money’s owner stipulated that that was the last day of the
return of the money, he requested that they return the P2,000 in exchange
for 250 sq. m in front of Ouano’s house at P8.05 per sq. m.
3. Two weeks later, Echavez and Ouano signed a document entitled
Agreement, in the former’s own handwriting, in which they agreed to share
in the property and the payments therefor, such that the land would be
subdivided into two portions. On the same day, Echavez noted in writing
the expenses of their joint venture, wth Ouano’s payable balance totaling
P1,724.70. Thereafter, on various dates Ouano and/or his wife delivered
sums totaling P1,725 to Echavez, who gave receipts therefor to the effect
that the money was part of their reimbursement he made with RFC for the
lot and which he consented to share with Ouano.
4. The RFC never approved the sharing agreement. It approved the sale to
Echavez only, on the condition that the purchase price be paid in cash. As
Echavez had difficulty complying with such condition, it took four years
and negotiation for him to acquire the title to the property in 9 Dec 1963.
5. Ouano tried to have the RFC (now DBP) accept or implement his sharing
agreement with Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price on Echavez’s
behalf. He sent a letter to the DBP requesting, among others, that he be
allowed to pay immediately either for his share in the lot or for all of it; he
tried to make such payment, but the DBP rejected his request.
6. Ouano filed for specific performance and reconveyance against Echavz and
the DBP. The TC ruled against him, holding that the agreement could not be
enforced in the absence of the DBP’s consent, and the agreement had an
unlawful cause and could produce no effect whatever because it involved
machinations in public auctions, a crime under Art 185 RPC.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner is guilty of the crime of machinations in public
auctions - YES
RULING: Decision modified so that the subject of said case is forfeited in favor
of the government.
RATIO:
1. The two material facts are: (1) that Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that
only the latter would bid, and that if accepted, they would divide the
property in proportion to their adjoining properties; and (2) That they
induced another interested party to withdraw from the sale by paying them.
2. The material facts constitute the felony of machinations in public auctions
under Art 185, RPC. The agreement being criminal in character, the parties
have no action against each other and are liable to prosecution and the
things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the
provisions of the criminal code, with the forfeiture of the proceeds of the
crime and instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Art. 185. Machinations in public auctions. — Any person who shall solicit any
gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any public
auction, and any person who shall attempt to cause bidders to stay away from an
auction by threats, gifts, promises, or any other artifice, with intent to cause the
reduction of the price of the thing auctioned, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine ranging from 10 to 50 per centum
of the value of the thing auctioned.

PEOPLE v. KOTTINGER
October 29, 1923 | Malcolm, J. | Appeal from CFI | Immoral Doctrines, Obscene
Publications and Exhibitions and Indecent Shows
SUMMARY: Kottinger was found guilty by TC of selling postcards which
contained pictures of women from different parts of the Philippines in native
dresses which allegedly violated a provision of the Libel law. SC reversed TC
decision.
DOCTRINE:Test of obscenity is: If the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall, and where it
would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more
advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character.
FACTS:
1. Detective Tolentino raided the premises of Camera Supply Company where
Kottinger was the manager. He found and confiscated postcards which
contained pictures of women in their native dresses from the different parts
of Philippines.
2. The pictures subject of prosecution are six different postures of non-
Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Pic1 is a picture of five young boys
and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines." Pic2 has the legend
"Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Pic3 has the
legend "Igorrot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Pic4 has the legend "Kalinga
Girls, Philippines." Pic5 has the legend "Moros, Philippines. Pic6 carries the
legend “Philippines, Bontoc Woman.”
3. Kottinger was sued in the CFI for keeping for sale in the store obscene and
indecent pictures violative of the Libel law. The defendant therein tried to
interpose a demurrer which the trial court overruled. He was found guilty
and sentenced to pay P50 with subsidiary imprisonment for insolvency.
4. Kottinger appealed contending that the pictures portraying inhabitants of the
country in native dresses as they appear and can be seen in regions in which
they live, are not obscene and indecent.
ISSUE/S: WoN the pictures are obscene or indecent? - NO
RULING: Decision is reversed. The appellant is acquitted.
RATIO:
1. The Phil statute does not attempt to define obsceneor indecent pictures,
writings, papers, or books. But thewords "obscene or indecent" are
themselves descriptive define obsceneor indecent pictures, writings, papers,
or books. At the same time, whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case.
2. In Federal laws, there is a law against use of mails for obscene matter and
prohibiting the importation into thePhilippine Islands of articles, etc., of
obscene or indecentcharacter. "Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes
signifies thatform of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity,and
has the same meaning as is given at common law inprosecutions for
obscene libel.
3. There are, however, in therecord, copies of reputable magazines which
circulate freelythroughout the United States and other countries, and
whichare admitted into the Philippines without question,containing
illustrations identical in nature to those formingthe basis of the prosecution
at bar.
4. Moreover, appellant presented evidence by offering witnesses stating that
none of the pictures represented poses that have not been observed in
various occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures
are true costumes regularly worn by them.
5. The test of obscenity is this: If the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall, and where it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or
even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and
libidinous character. In the instant case, court is convinced that the postcard
pictures cannot be characterized as having the aforestated tendency and are
likewise not offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
NOTE:
Libel law provision
"Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes,sells, or keeps
for sale, distributes, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book, or
other matter, or who designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise
prepares any obscene picture or print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise
makes any obscene or indecent figure, or who writes, composes, or prints any
notice or advertisement of any such writing, paper, book, print, or figure shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both."
 PEOPLE v. APARICI
August 30, 1955 | Paredes, J. | Appeal from CFI | Immoral Doctrines, Obscene
Publications and Exhibitions and Indecent Shows
SUMMARY: Aparici was apprehended when she was caught dancing almost
naked in a theatre. Her defenses of freedom of expression and performance of a
normal dance did not hold because the ultimate determinant, which are reaction
and expressions of the people watching, proved that what she was doing was
immoral and indecent. SC did not imprison her considering that it was a first
offense and the manager, equally guilty, was exonerated.
DOCTRINE:Artistic and aesthetic purposes as defense against violation of Art
201 shall not overcome the presumption of indecency and immorality when
during the performance, reactions of the public corroborate the same.
FACTS:
1. Detectives Nibungco and Jose with two photographers went to Azcarraga
Theatre to observe what was being exhibited there. They found a dark stage
where the accused was swaying to and fro with the middle part of her body,
dancing with her hips swaying and raising her feet one after the other. She
had nothing on except nylon patches over her breasts, nylon panties and a
furry girdle around her waist to punctuate to her private part.
2. There were more than 100 men watching and shouting “sige muna, sige
nakakalibog”. In the course of the performance, the two photographers took
pictures and the detectives apprehended her after stopping the show.
3. The accused argued that she was merely doing different poses if the hula-
hula dance in her portrayal of a life of a widow whose husband was killed
by the Japanese. She was found guilty by the lower court. She appealed to
this court stating that she was performing legitimate exercise of freedom of
expression.
ISSUE/S: WoN accused committed a violation of Art 201? - YES
RULING: Petition denied. She is given only a P200 fine considering that it is
her first offense and the manager, equally answerable for the offense, has been
exonerated.
RATIO:
1. Indecency is an act against good behaviour and a just delicacy. Nudity itself
is not inherently obscene or indecent but the artistic, the aesthetic, and the
pulchritude in the nude body of a living woman may be readily transformed
into an an indecent object by postures and movements which produce
perceptible and discernible reaction in the public witnessing the same.
2. In the case at bar, the reaction of the public during the performance by the
appellant should be made the gauge in the determination whether the dance
was indecent or immoral. Spectators that night definitely gave their verdict
of indecency and immorality of the same by their expressions.
3. Appellant’s defense that she was merely performing a hula-hula dance is
untenable. Performers of that dance cover their bodies with grass and
nothing of the sort that she had that night.
4. The argument that the reaction of the low class and uncultured audience is
not reliable as a gauge of the objective decency or indecency of a show is of
no moment. There is no evidence that those persons that night were low and
uncultured. Moreover, a particular act is obscene if it “depraves or corrupts
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences”, be they cultured
or not.
Note:
Art. 201: Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed
upon:
(1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals;
(2) (a) the authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any
form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the
establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit,
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which
are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which (1) glorify criminals or
condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet
traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order,
morals, and good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and
edicts;
(3) Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. (As amended by PD Nos.
960 and 969)
 PEOPLE v. PADAN naked. Tickets being sold also had the name Pepe Fajardo stamped at the back,
June 28, 1957 | Montemayor, J. | Appeal from CFI | Immoral Doctrines, Obscene which defendant Fajardo admitted to be his name.
Publications and Exhibitions and Indecent Shows
ISSUE/S: WoN appellants appeal for reduction of appeal has merit? - NO
SUMMARY: Appellants were caught after participating in a live sex show by
policemen pretending to be spectators. They were all found guilty in the CFI. RULING: Penalties imposed by trial court are correct.
Padan and Fajardo appealed asking for a reduction in the penalty without denying
the commission of the offense. SC ruled that they did not deserve leniency as to RATIO:
the penalty imposed by the trial court. 1. For Padan’s appeal, the trial court already considered the plea for leniency
DOCTRINE:An actual exhibition of sexual act, unlike naked pictures or and so the recommendation of the fiscal that she be fined P600 in addition
sculptures purporting the element of art, has no redeeming feature. It is a clear to the imprisonment term was reduced to P200. SC believes penalty is fit
and unmitigated obscenity that causes nothing but lust and lewdness that exerts a for the crime considering its seriousness because this is the first time this
corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. court has been asked to take cognizance of an offense against morals and
indecency of this kind. Usual subjects of contention include art, pictures and
FACTS: sculptures, but actual exhibition of sexual act does not have any redeeming
1. Marina Padan, Jose Fajardo, Cosme Espinosa and Ernesto Reyes were all feature that could merit her a lesser penalty. It is but a clear and unmitigated
found guilty in the CFI for violating Art 201. At first, they all pleaded not obscenity, an offense to public morals, and exerting a corrupting influence
guilty upon arraignment but Padan later on reversed her plea. on the youth of the land.
2. The four appealed to the SC but Espinosa and Reyes failed to file their 2. Fajardo’s appeal does not likewise deserve merit. Evidence adduced by the
briefs so decision as to them became final and executory. Because of plea of CFI conclusively indicate that he was indeed in-charge of the show and that
guilty, Padan prayed for a reduction of her penalty. Fajardo’s appeal on the he is the most guilty of all the four. He was the one who conducted the
other hand was based of his contention that he was not the manager of the show and presumably derived the most profit therefrom.
show which was raided and that he was a mere by-stander, who was
impleaded for his popularity as the sigaof the place. He further alleged that
he was only requested by the spectators to make the selection, after which
he left without even watching for a while. He was only caught because he
returned after hearing a commotion caused by the raid.
3. Findings of the trial court indicate the following:
In Tondo, Manila was a one-story building which had a small floor space
usually used for ping-pong. The pictures captured by the detectives before the
raid indicate that benches were placed along the sides of the room. On the night
of the raid in Sept 1953, there was already a crowd around the building because
it has been advertised by word of mouth that an exhibition of actual copulation
would be shown that night. Manila Police got word of the affair so several of its
members dressed in plain clothes attended the show. Said policemen testified at
the trial that customers paid P3 to gain entrance and that there were about 90
people inside the venue. At the gate was Fajardo who was assuring the
collection of the entrance fee and he was the one who ordered that a bed be
placed in the middle of the crowd. When the show was about to start, 2 girls one
of whom was Padan, was chosen by the crowd by Fajardo’s method of pointing
and waiting for the crowd’s approval. After that, Padan and Cosme undressed
and started having sex. Police among the spectators then stopped the show by
arresting the four appellants herein and took pictures of Padan and Cosme still
 FERNANDO v. CA
December 6, 2006 | Quisumbing, J. | Certiorari | Immoral Doctrines, Obscene
Publications and Exhibitions and Indecent Shows
SUMMARY: Petitioners were sued for selling obscene magazines and
pornographic videos after the same were duly confiscated in the execution of the
search warrants by PNP. Petitioners appealed that sale and ownership were not
proven by the prosecution but according to the SC, evidence adduced by the trial
court proves otherwise, since petitioners decided to waive their right to present
contradicting evidence.
DOCTRINE: Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to
regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public
from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or
limitation.
FACTS:
1. PNP-CIDG conducted surveillance on the store bearing the name
Gaudencio Fernando Music Fair and raided the same for violation of Art
201 after securing a search warrant against Fernando and a certain
Tingchuy. They confiscated copies of magazines with nude pictures and
VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
2. On the same day, PNP CIDG served the warrant for Rudy Estorninos who
was allegedly the store attendant of Music Fair and confiscated 25 VHS
tapes and 10 magazines which the former deemed pornographic.
3. After the appellants waived their right to present evidence, all except
Tingchuy were convicted by the RTC. Appellants herein went to the CA
which affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence the instant petition.
4. Petitioners contend that: (1) the prosecution failed to prove that they were
selling pornographic materials at the time of the raid; (2) that Fernando was
not charged as the owner of an establishment selling such materials and the
store had an expired mayor’s permit; and (3) that Estorninos was not an
attendant of the Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
ISSUE/S: WoN appellants can be held liable under Art 201? - YES
RULING: Petition denied.CA decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. To be held liable under Art 201, prosecution must prove that (a) the
materials, publication, publication, picture or literature are obscene;and (b)
the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials.
Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
2. Decision of the CA ruling that the materials confiscated were obscene and
offensive to morals is also not arbitrary. As elaborated by the said court,
pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act are offensive to
morals because they are made and shown not for the sake of art but rather
for commercial purposes. The VHS tapes also exhibit nude men and women
doing sexual intercourse. The lead actress’ dancing movements excited
sexual instinct of her male audience so even if the motive may be innocent,
the performance was revolting and shocking to good minds.
3. Mere possession of obscene materials without intention to sell is not
punishable but the law does not require that a person be caught in the act of
selling or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable. As long as the said
materials are offered for sale or exhibited to the public, one is in violation of
Art 201. In the present case, petitioners are engaged in the selling and
exhibiting of obscene materials.
4. Fernando’s arguments that the he was not proven as the owner of the store
because he was not there at the time of the search and that the expired
mayor’s permit is not enough to indicate ownership are erroneous. The store
was named after him and the fact that Fernando failed to renew his business
permit and is currently conducting illegal operations cannot possibly shield
him from an unlawful act.
5. For Estornino’s appeal, an inspector who conducted the search identified
him as the store attendance upon whom the search warrant was served. Said
inspector also had no motive for falsifying false against petitioner so the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties remains.
 MANIPON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
July 31, 1986 | Fernan, J. | Certiorari | Direct Bribery
SUMMARY: Sheriff of Court Manipon was convicted of direct bribery by
Sandiganbayan after the former tried to help Dominguez, who had garnished
accounts because of a labor case lost, to withdraw money in exchange of a
consideration. The SC affirmed the decision averring that the defense stated by
Manipon is too incredible.
DOCTRINE:Elements of direct bribery: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of
his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or
act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The promise of a
public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or
implied
FACTS:
1. Manipon, a deputy sheriff of the CFI of Baguio, was assigned to enforce an
order of the Minister of Labor dated Oct 31, 1979. Said order directed the
Sheriff of Baguio City to execute the decision ordering Mayor Harry
Dominguez of Tadian to pay Tabek, et al. P2720.
2. Pursuant to the order, Manipon on Nov 9, 1979 sent a notice to Comtrust
garnishing accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts
but Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he
satisfy the judgment under execution.
3. On Nov 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon’s help in the withdrawal of
the garnished account but the latter said it is not possible.
4. However, on Dec 27, 1979, the two met again at National Intelligence and
Security Authority (NISA) and Manipon told Dominguez that he “can
remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year.”
Dominguez agreed to meet at the bank later in the afternoon.
5. After Manipon left NISA, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA
Commander Sanchez so they planned an entrapment operation.
6. The next day at Comtrust, Dominguez met with Manipon who was
accompanied by two people. Manipon delivered the letter to the bank lifting
the garnishment and Dominguez withdrew money. As soon as the money
was handed, he took out P300 from the withdrawn money and added it to
the marked P700. Then they all left the bank.
7. After leaving the bank, Manipon walked down Session Road and moments
later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them and seized the P1000.
8. Sandiganbayan found Manipon guilty of direct bribery which the latter
appealed to the SC. His appeal was rejected but upon a motion for
reconsideration, SC reviewed the case.
9. Manipon contended that the amount of P1000 given was in partial
fulfillment of the judgment of the labor arbiter. He also pointed out that the
P1000 was illegally seized because there was no valid search warrant. His
defense further contests when he and Dominguez met at NISA, Dominguez
said that he was only willing to pay P1k to his creditors and the rest of the
balance next year. So he visited Tabek who allegedly consented to the lesser
amount. He further claims that Dominguez only framed him up because of a
grudge due to a levy in the vehicles of Dominguez before.
ISSUE/S: WoN accused committed direct bribery? - YES
RULING: Petition denied. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Defense’s allegations are too incredible to merit even the slightest degree of
credibility. With all Manipon’s transactions and the alleged novation, never
did he execute a written memorandum for his protection. His claim that he
tried to give a receipt after the P1k was paid is also self-serving without
support of evidence. Dominguez’s denial to accept a receipt is too irregular
since it is his only proof that he complied with his obligation.
2. Neither are the testimonies of his companion in the bank nor that of Tabek
give support to his defense. His companion is a co-sheriff which can only
signify bias in the testimony. While Tabek on the witness stand on several
occasions showed hesitation. He also failed to show any evidence that he
was given authority by his co-creditors to authorize the acceptance of a
lesser payment.
3. Manipon’s behavior of not executing the judgment even if he had already
garnished the accounts of Dominguez and not notifying the labor arbiter of
such is so irregular that it only shows how he had planned to get
Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment.
4. Seizure of the marked money cannot be deemed illegal and inadmissible as
evidence. It was a search and seizure incidental to an arrest by way of the
entrapment operation, which could not make it illegal.
 DACUMOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN RATIO:
April 16, 1991 | Cruz, J. | Appeal | Direct Bribery 1. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent court’s decision is tainted
arbitrariness or is not supported by substantial evidence. His claim that he
SUMMARY: Petitioner offered Samia (manager of Revilla Interiors) a tax was framed is not convincing at all. It is belied by his own acts. The
clearance in exchange of money consideration. The latter pretended to go along implausibility of his promises does not mean they were not made, coming
with it leading to the petitioner’s arrest during an entrapment operation by NBI. from one who has long experience in BIR and appeared to know his way
SC affirmed the decision of conviction by Sandiganbayan stating that the around.
petitioner failed to support his claims with substantial evidence. 2. The court also finds it remarkable that he met Samia a private place instead
DOCTRINE:Elements of direct bribery: (1) that the accused is a public officer; of his office at the BIR, considering that they were discussing official
(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or business and it was Samia requesting his assistance.
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of 3. Petitioner holding the respondent court at fault for misappreciating evidence
his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain will also not merit him a reversal of the assailed decision. It is within the
from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or discretion of respondent court to weigh the evidence of both parties and to
act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The promise of a admit such of it as it regarded as credible and reject those that it considered
public officer to perform anact or to refrain from doing it may be express or fabricated.
implied 4. Petitioner claims in conclusion to his petition that judgment was rendered
against him because he happens to be a tax collector whom he says is
FACTS: unpopular and vilified by all as proven by history. This plea does not
1. Petitioner, a revenue examiner of the BIR, offered to settle the tex liability persuade since he was convicted not because he is a tax collector, but
of Revilla Interiors in the amount of P73k by pulling out its assessments because he accepted a bribe.
papers and procuring a tax clearance. Gregorio Samia, manager of the firm,
pretended to go along with him but reported the matter to NBI, which
arranged an entrapment.
2. On Oct 28, 1986, Samia met petitioner in Rizal Café and told him he only
had P1000 but would deliver the P9000 that same evening at his residence
and that the balance of P20k will be paid in November. Petitioner agreed
and received a white envelope containing the marked peso bills. NBI
arrested him to which he reacted by trying to dispose of the envelope, but
one of the agents retrieved it. He was brought to the NBI headquarters
wherein he was found positive with fluorescent powder from the marked
money in the envelope.
3. Petitioner claimed that the charges against him were fabricated. He said that
he met with Samia because he was irritatingly insistent on securing his help
regarding the firm’s tax amnesty. He further contended that he could not
have promised to pull out the assessment papers as he had no access to that
place.

ISSUE/S: WoN accused committed direct bribery? - YES

RULING: Petition denied. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

 ALMEDA v. PEREZ Likewise for the argument that the amendment would have the effect of
August 30, 1962 | Labrador, J. | Original Petition in SC | Corruption presenting a charge within one year from the date of a general election.
2. According to Ra 1379, forfeiture proceedings is civil in nature and not
SUMMARY: Almeda was charged for the violation of the Anti-Graft law so a criminal. Such proceedings does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty
petitioner for forfeiture was instituted. During the course of the proceedings, a but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired
motion for amending the petition for forfeiture was requested by the SolGen 3. The procedure also outlined in the law (RA 1379) to forfeiture is that
which the CFI granted. Almeda appealed stating that forfeiture proceedings are provided for in a civil action. Even if the preliminary investigation required
criminal in nature and that amendments require new investigations and consent of prior to the filing of the petition is expressly to be one similar to that in a
respondents. SC denied the petition. criminal case but the other steps in the proceedings are those for in civil
DOCTRINE:Forfeiture proceedings may be civil or criminal. But RA 1379, ones, it stands to reason that it is not criminal.
forfeiture proceedings therein, although partaking of the nature of a penalty, are 4. Section 12 of the law also does not make it penal in substance. It is
civil proceedings. provided that a penalty will be imposed only for employees who transfer or
convey any unlawfully acquired properties. But it does not impose penalties
FACTS: on those who make unlawful acquisitions. It merely imposes the penalty of
1. In 1961, Villegas and Mendoza filed a complaint with the Secretary of forfeiture of said properties.
Justice charging Mariano Almeda Sr. with having acquired, during his 5. Having the nature of a civil proceeding, amendment of charges or the
incumbency as Asst. Director of NBI, cash and properties out of proportion petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions. The
to his lawful income. amendments may be made before the trial or in the course of the trial with
2. A preliminary investigation by a committee designated by the Secretary need for another investigation. Amendments then setting new unlawful
concluded that there is reasonable ground to believe that Almeda Sr acquisitions of property may be inserted with the consent of respondent.
acquired properties out of proportion to his salary from 1950 to 1959.
3. The SolGen then filed with the CFI a petition for forfeiture against
AlmedaSr charging him with having committed graft. His wife was
included as co-respondent in her capacity as wife and co-owner of conjugal
properties.
4. Petitioners herein then filed an answer on Dec 1965 but on Feb 1961, the
SolGen filed a “Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture” which
the judge granted. The SolGen then added alleged unlawful acquisitions.
5. Petitioners herein objected to the amendment on the ground that new
charges require a new preliminary investigation and that the proceeding
under RA 1379, being criminal in nature, does not allow amendments in the
substance of the petition without the respondent’s consent.
6. CFI found no merit in the contentions of respondents therein and ordered
the filing of the second amended petition without including Marano Almeda
Jr. Hence this original petition.

ISSUE/S: WoN RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect? - NO

RULING: Petition denied.

RATIO:
1. Petitioner’s argument that presentation of an amended petition without the
benefit of a new preliminary investigation is not allowed is erroneous.
 CABAL v. KAPUNAN
December 29, 1962 | Concepcion, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction| Graft and Corruption
SUMMARY: During the first investigation of a Presidential Committee tasked to
investigate the charge of “unexplained wealth” against petitioner Manuel Cabal, he
was asked to take the witness stand which he refused invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The committee insisted but Cabal still refused.
The committee referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila which subsequently
filed a charge against Cabal being “guilty of contempt of the Presidential
Committe” at the Court of First Instance of Manila that was then assigned to
respondent Judge Kapunan. The petitoner filed a motion to quash which was
denied by the the respondent. The SC held that the proceedings before the
Presidential Committee was criminal in nature thus exempting the petitioner from
being a witness against himself. Therefore, he could not be found guilty of being
in contempt.
DOCTRINE: Forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee as
authorized by the Anti-Graft Law (RA 1379) partakes the nature of a penalty. As
such, proceedings for such forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.
FACTS:
1. On or about August 19, 1961, a letter-complaint against petitioner Manuel
Cabal for "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming
of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of
his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts" was
filed by Col. Jose Maristela with the Secretary of National Defense. To
investigate the matter, the President created a Presidential Committee.
2. On Sept. 6, 1961, during the first investigation of the Committee, upon
request of Col. Maristela, Cabal was asked to take the witness stand and be
sworn into as a witness. Cabal refused invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted saying that Cabal may
refuse to answer incriminating questions but Cabal refused still. The
committee referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila which
subsequently filed a charge against Cabal being “guilty of contempt of the
Presidential Committe” at the CFI of Manila that was then assigned to
respondent Judge Kapunan.
3. Respondent judge issued an order for the petitioner to show cause or respond
to the charge against him within ten days on Oct. 2, 1961.
4. As a response, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
(1) that the City Fiscal had no personality to file the case, the same being
null and void because if criminal, there was no prelimenary investigation and
if civil, the City Fiscal was limited to civil cases representing the city of
Manila; (2) Art 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which the charge is
based violates due process; (3) that more than one offense is charged; and (4)
that the Committee had no power in order to require petitioner to take the
witness stand inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
5. Respondents allege that the investigation by the Committee is administrative
in character and not criminal.
ISSUES:
1. WON the proceedings before the Presidential Committee was criminal in
character thus exempting the petitioner from being a witness against himself
– YES
RULING: The writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined
permanently from proceeding further in the criminal case.
RATIO:
1. The purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held,
however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for such forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence,
the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
2. Boyd v US held that a proceeding seeking the declaration of forfeiture of
property because of the evasion of certain revenue laws “though technically
a civil proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one" and that suits
for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for
the purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself. Thurston v Clark held the the said portion of
the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecution is
not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and
punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a
criminal case is a action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the
criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a
statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case …" It has been concluded that
the said constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is not
 "purely remedial", or intended "as a redress for a private grievance", but c. P100k loan from CongresmanDurano, a wedding sponsor to their
primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter wedding
others from offending in likewise manner. ...".
ISSUE/S: WON Simplicio has unexplained wealth under RA 1379 – NO.

RULING: DENIED. Presumption successfully rebutted by Sps Berdon.

REPUBLIC v. IAC
April 17, 1989 | Cortes, J. | Review of IAC decision | Graft & Corruption RATIO:
1. RA 1379, Section 2 creates a prima facie presumption that property is
SUMMARY: Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer from the Bureau of unlawfully acquired whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
Public Highways, is charged by the Government after an investigation which during his incumbency an amount of property grossly disproportionate to
showed that he and his wife’s income was disproportionate with their several his income. However, said presumption is juristantum and may be rebutted
property acquisitions. In the CFI they were able to explain the acquisitions based by the accused by proving to the court’s satisfaction that he lawfully
on several loans and donations. SC: SpsBerdon were able to rebut the prima facie acquired said properties – if unable to do so, it’s forfeited in favor of the
presumption of unlawfully acquired property against them. State (Section 6).
DOCTRINE:.While RA 1379 creates a presumption of unlawfully acquired 2. While it’s true that the Spouses had acquired properties and constructed a
property if it’s found that a public officer’s acquisitions was disproportionate to house the costs of which were disproportionate to their combined incomes
his income, the law allows the accused to explain his wealth and rebut it. from their gov’t employment, it had been proven that these were financed
through several donations and loans.
FACTS: 3. In determining WON there is unexplained wealth within the purview of RA
1. George Valde sent a letter complaint to the Office of the President against 1379, the courts are not bound by the SALNs filed by the respondent. The
SimplicoBerdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer from the Bureau of statute affords the respondent every opportunities to explain, to the
Public Highways (Cebu Regional Office). This prompted Malacanang’s satisfaction of the court, how he had acquired the property in question
Complaint and Investigation Office to conduct a field investigation against (Section 5)
Berdon, which included his service record, the Spouses’ sworn statement of
financial condition, assets, income, and liabilities, and documents regarding
several acquisitions of land and their house. A Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition of a parcel of land acquired by his father, Luis Berdon, was
included b/c he was able to pay P1k despite having no source of income.
2. The SpsBerdon and Berdon Ser. was charged with having acquired
unexplained wealth from 1963-1969 amounting to P124, 495.82 in violation
of RA 1379. It’s alleged that the accused purchased several parcels of land
and constructed a house, the purchase prices and costs of which were not
commensurate to their incomes, savings, or declared assets. The Republic
sought the forfeiture of their properties and for a writ of attachment to be
issued. SimplicioBerdon presented evidence to explain his wealth, saying:
3. CFI dismissed the petition; IAC affirmed saying that based on the evidence
presented, the assets acquired by SpsBerdon in excess of their income and
receipts from their Gov’t employment were satisfactorily explained. Hence
this petition.
a. Mrs. Berdon’s parents, who owned several lands and a movie
house, donated P3k and loaned P5k
b. GSIS 14k loan; DBP 6k loan
 MORFE v. MUTUC
January 31, 1968 | Fernando, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | RA 3019
SUMMARY: Morfe challenged the constitutionality of a provision of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) calling for the disclosure of assets and
liabilities of public officials. The CFI ruled in favor of Morfe, but the SC
reversed said decision, relying on the presumption of validity as well as ruling
that it is valid exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is valid exercise of
police power enacted to promote morality in public service.
FACTS:
1. Jesus Morfe, a CFI judge, challenges the constitutionality of RA 3019, also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, approved on Aug. 17,
1960. The particular provision being challenged pertains to the submission
of sworn statement of assets and liabilities (see Section 7 of RA 3019).
2. Petitioner alleges that it violates due process, is an oppressive exercise of
police power and an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,
implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court
ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the challenged provision is unconstitutional for
violating the due process clause for infringing into one’s right to privacy, non-
incrimination clause, and the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
– NO
RULING: Lower court decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. Presumption of Validity: in the present case, no factual basis cited for the
nullification of the law. As such, the presumption of validity has not been
rebutted and must prevail. Furthermore, to declare a law unconstitutional,
the infringement of constitutional rights must be clear, categorical, and
undeniable.
However, evidence may not always be insisted to rebut the presumption.
Where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance is readily
apparent and the threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving
the freedom of the mind, is present and ominous, there should not be a rigid
insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented to reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberty cases.
2. Valid Exercise of Police Power: Police power embraces the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people (Ermita Malate Hotel, etc. v.
City Mayor of Manila). It is that inherent and plenary power in the state
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society (Rubi v. Provincial Board)
RA 3019 was enacted to promote morality in public service, in conformity
with the view that public office is a public trust. The conditions then
prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a
remedial device. Furthermore, there is a rational relationship between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved.
3. No Violation of Right to Privacy: while the challenged provision calls for
disclosure of certain information (assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal
and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year), there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.
4. No Violation of the Constitutional Guarantee against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure: the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give
testimony, and that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions.
Merely because there may be the duty to make documents available for
litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently
obtain them.
5. No Violation of the Non-Incriminatory Clause: whether or not the
disclosure of certain facts and information may infringe the non-
incriminatory clause is a question that can be raised only in actual cases
themselves, be they civil, administrative or criminal.
(Note: Non-incriminatory clause - No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself)
6. The challenged provision cannot also be nullified for being an “insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials (supposedly
premised "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that public
officials are and will be corrupt without such measure) since the Court does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
 JARAVATA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
January 31 1984 | Abad Santos, J. | Review of Sandiganbayan decision | Graft
and corruption
SUMMARY: Petitioner, the Asst. Principal of a high school, facilitated the
payment of the salary differentials of teachers. They were to pay him P36 each
to reimburse his expenses, but paid him in excess. He was accused of violating
Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019. The SC held that said law was inapplicable since his
official capacity did not invest him with the power to intervene in the payment
of the salary differentials.
DOCTRINE: Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019 refers to a public officer whose official
intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction
4. Petitioner was, at the time material to the case, a “public officer” as defined
by Sec. 2 of RA No 3019, i.e. “elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even normal from
the government”, and it may be said that any amount he received in excess
of P36 from each of the complainants was in the nature of a gift or benefit.
But in the opinion of the Court, Sec 3(b) refers to a public officer whose
official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.
2. No law invested petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the
salary differentials. Far from exercising in any power, he sought to expedite
the payment of the same. His official capacity as assistant principal does not
require him to intervene in the payment of salary differentials.

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Hilario Jaravata was the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao,
La Union Barangay HS. On 5 Jan 1979, he informed six classroom teachers
of the approval of the release of their salary differentials for 1978. To
facilitate its payment, petitioner and the teachers agreed to reimburse the
petitioner of his expenses, which totalled P220. The sum was divided
among the six, at the rate of P36 each.
2. The teachers actually received their salary differentials. Pursuant to their
agreement, they, with the exception of two teachers, gave the petitioner
varying amounts of money exceeding the P36. But as the school’s
administrator did not approve it, the petitioner was ordered to return the
money. Petitioner complied.
3. The petitioner was charged with violating Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019; the
Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the same.

ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner violated Sec 3(b) of RA No. 3019 - NO

RULING: Petition granted. Sandiganbayan judgment set aside.

RATIO:
1. R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and
any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law. Xxx
 TRIESTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
November 13, 1986 | Alampay, J. | Review of Sandiganbayan Decision |
Corruption
SUMMARY: Petitioner Trieste was charged for violation of the Anti-graft law
when he signed 12 vouchers for the construction materials delivered by a
company wherein he is the president and incorporator. Sandiganbayan convicted
him but the SolGen later filed a Motion for Acquittal after careful study of the
evidence. SC approved such motion and reversed the Sandiganbayan decision.
DOCTRINE:The anti-graft law, inter alia, wants to prevent actual intervention
in the transaction in which a public official has financial or pecuniary interest, in
order that liability may attach.
FACTS:
1. Mayor Trieste was found guilty by Sandiganbayan for 12 separate
violations of Section 3 paragraph H of RA 3019. It was stated that as
Municipal Mayor, he signed vouchers for a contract in 1980 which he had
financial interest and that he acted in his official capacity. This contract
concerned purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Aklan
from Trigen wherein the accused is the president, incorporator and major
stockholder
2. After a petition for review was filed in this case, petitioner’s counsel filed a
supplemental pleading narrating that Trieste did not, in any way, intervene
in making awards and payment of purchases in question as he signed the
voucher only after all the purchases had been made and paid for by the
Municipa Treasurer. Furthermore, there was no bidding at all because the
transactions were emergency direct purchases.
3. Before leave of the court, the former SolGen filed a comment averring that
the supplemental petition raises the same factual issues which are
technically non-reviewable. SolGen contended that petitioner’s failure to
present his divestment of interest in Trigen before becoming the mayor
before the Tanodbayan cannot be raised as a defense anymore. Moreover,
there was no evidence in the SEC of the alleged divestment of the
petitioner.
4. However, on Oct 1986 the new SolGen filed a motion for acquittal.
ISSUE/S: WoN Trieste by signing the vouchers committed intervention in a
transaction in which he had interest in, a violation of the Anti-Graft law? - NO
RULING: Decision of Sandiganbayan is reversed. Petitioner is acquitted.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner established that before he assumed the position of Mayor, he sold
his shares in Trigen to his sister. The sale was recorded in the stock and
transfer book of the corporation. Although it was not reported in the SEC,
absence in the sales report does not mean that it did not take place because
reporting of sale is not a mandatory requirement.
2. In the alleged intervention of the petitioner, it was established that no
bidding or awarding took place. The witness of the prosecution herself,
Municipal Treasurer, testified that no such activity took place. Given this
fact, petitioner could not have possibly awarded the supply to Trigen.
3. According to Sandiganbayan, in the absence of intervention in the bidding
or award, petitioner’s liability may still arise in his participation in the
transactions with Trigen, specifically his action of signing the vouchers.
However, there was no evidence that petitioner approved the payment. The
witness of the prosecution also testified that it was after the delivery of the
materials that Trieste signed the vouchers. As a matter of procedure, it can
be safely assumed that petitioner signed the vouchers after the Treasurer
had already signed and paid for the materials.
4. What is contemplated in the Anti-graft law prohibition in transactions is the
actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial interest.
The official need not dispose of his shares in the corporation as long as he
does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the local office. For the
law aims to prevent the dominant use on influence, authority and power.
 MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN part of the scheme which commenced when Mejorada approached them and
June 30 1987 | Cortes, J. | Review on Certiorari of Sandiganbayan decision | informed them that he could work or their claims.
Graft & Corruption (RA 3019)
Elements of 3(e) Petitioner’s Claim Court
Accused must be 3(e) requires that the Section 3 applies to all
SUMMARY: Mejorada, a Right-of-Way Agent, approached affected property
a public officer accused must be a public public officers without
owners in a road widening project and promised to facilitate their claims for just
officer charged with the distinction or qualification.
compensation. Instead, he inflated the land values and divested them of most of
duty of granting Last sentence in 3(e)
the compensation. Case filed against him under RA 3019, Sec 3(e). SC: Guilty.
licenses/permits/concessions intended to make clear the
DOCTRINE:. Section 3 which enumerates the crime punishable under RA 3019
inclusions of officers and
applies to all public officers without distinction or qualification. Last sentence in
employees of officers or
3(e) intended to make clear the inclusions of officers and employees of officers
gov’t corporation which
or gov’t corporation which ordinarily may not come within the term
ordinarily may not come
within the term
FACTS:
Public officer Denies that he caused any Injury was caused to the
1. Arturo Mejorada was employed as a Right of Way Agent in the Office of
caused undue injury or damages to the Gov’t b/c he inflated the
the Highway District Engineer in Pasig whose main duty was to negotiate
injury to any Gov’t b/c payment is made true claims of complainants
with property owners affected by highway constructions/improvements for
party, including on the basis of a document w/c became basis of said
the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
Gov’t, or gave solely made by the Highway report
2. Binangonan, Rizal residents were some of those affected by the wideing of
any private party District Engineer, not him
the Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba Road. Mejorada contacted them and informed
unwarranted He participated b/c as a
them that he could facilitate their claims regarding the pament of their lots’
benefits right-of-way-agent, his job
values affected by the road widening. He
advantage, or is to negotiate with the
a. gave them blank copies of the “Sworn Statement on the Correct
preference in the affected property owners
and Fair Market Balue of Real Properties” and “Agreement to
discharge of his
Demolish, Remove, and Reconstruct Improvementts” then inflated
official Complainants injured b/c
the amounts
administrative or they were divested of a
b. Accopanied the claimants to collect from the Office of the
judicial functions large proportion of their
Highway Engineer, then accompanied them to their car
claims and deprived of just
c. Divested them of the amounts w/ an armed man beside him,
compensation
leaving only P1k to the others and P5k to Carlos, explaining to
Injury done Damage caused to Mejorada took adv of his
them that there were many who would share in the money.
through manifest complainants when he was position as right-of-way
3. 8 complainants sued Mejorada under RA 3019, Section 3(e).
partiality, evident no longer discharging his agent
bad faith, gross official admin. functions
ISSUE/S: WON Mejorada is liable under RA 3019, Sec 3(e) – YES.
inexcusable Evident bad faith
negligence
RULING: DENIED. Mejorada sentenced to 56 years, 8 days of imprisonment.

RATIO:
1. Elements of RA 3019, Sec 3 (e) – See table
2. Mejorada’s allegation that he can’t be convicted for violating the Anti-Graft
Law b/c what he was guilty of robbery can’t hold. The manner by which
Mejorada divested the complainants of the compensation they received was
 LABATAGOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN RATIO:
March 21, 1990 | Padilla, J. | Review on Certiorari of Sandiganbayan decision | 1. Petitioner signed the audit reports without exception, which belies her claim
Malversation that she signed on the understanding that the shortage was only P2,000.
2. The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Guanzon confirmed that she assisted
SUMMARY: Petitinoer, a cashier and collecting officer of the MSU, was petitioner in collecting fees; that petitioner, despite filing for leave,
charged with malversation due to shortages discovered by the CoA. She raised continued reporting for work in March 1978; that although petitioner was
four defences. The SC rejected each one and held her guilty of malversation. on leave in April 1978, Guanzon turned over all her collected fees to
DOCTRINE: Malversation consists not only ill misappropriation or converting petitioner at the latter’s house with the duplicate copies of the receipts the
public funds or property to one's personal use but also by knowingly allowing petitioner signed after satisfying herself that the amounts turned over tallied
others to make use of or misappropriate them. with the receipts. This testimony is confirmed by the full accounts in the
reports of collection.
FACTS: 3. The auditor correctly refused to credit petitioner with the three amounts
1. From Jan 1978 to Dec 1980, petitioner Carmen Labatagos was the cashier mentioned in her letter. The sums were not supported by official
and collecting officer of the Mindanao Statute University. She filed for authorizations and unsupported by duly accomplished and approved
leave of absence during March-April 1978 and did not discharge her duties vouchers.
during said period. 4. Granting that the amounts reflected in the chits were really secured by the
2. On 1 Oct 1980, under CoA orders, Francisco Rivera was designated leader persons who signed them, the responsibility to account for them still rests in
of a team to examine petitioner’s cash and accounts. During examination, the accused accountable officer. Malversation consists not only ill
petitioner had no cash in possession, so she was asked to produce all her misappropriation or converting public funds or property to one's personal
records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittances use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate
advices and monthly reports of collections. them.
3. Based on the official receipts and record of remittances from Jan-Aug 1978,
the CoA reports revealed that petitioner collected P113,205.58 and remitted
P78,868.69, leaving a P34,336.19; and that from Jan 1979 to 6 June 1980,
petitioner collected P327,982 and remitted P256,606.25, incurring a
P71,365.75 shortage. Petitioner signed without exception the reports of
examination and their supporting summaries.
4. Rivera prepared and served letters of demand on petitioner, but petitioner
did no submit any explanation of the shortages. Hence, petitioner was
charged with malversation of public funds totalling P105, 711.94.
5. In her defense, petitioner claimed that she had signed the reports on the
understanding that the shortage would only be P2,000; that she could not be
held accountable for the March-May 1978 collections because she was on
maternity leave; that certain disbursements totalling P49,417.12 were not
credited in her favour by the auditors; and that she could not be held
accountable for the P34,336.19 alleged misappropriations in Jan-Aug 1978
since those who appropriated the amounts were her superiors and the
amounts taken were properly receipted, but such receipts were lost.

ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner’s defenses could be granted credence - NO

RULING: Petition denied. Appealed decision affirmed.

 ESTEPA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
February 15, 1990 | Feliciano, J. | Review of Sandiganbayan decision |
Malversation
SUMMARY: 7.64M was distributed among 10 paymasters, including Estepa
who received 850k (recounted before distribution). No complaints were made
when the supervising paymaster asked if everything was fine. 10 minutes
after the paymasters got their money, Estepa reported that 50k was missing
from the cash advances. All 10 paymasters were summoned and each money
was recounted. Everyone had the correct amount except for Estepa. He was
charged by the Tanodbayan of malversation of funds through negligence.
DOCTRINE: There is a prima facie evidence of malversation where the
accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds
with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. See 5.
FACTS:
1. Leonardo Estepa, senior paymaster of the Cash Division of the City
Treasury of Manila, Cesar Marcelo (Supervising Paymaster) and 9 other
paymasters went to PNB to encash checks amounting to 7,640,000, cash
advances being requisitioned by the 10 paymasters. The cash value was not
available at PNB making them proceed to Central Bank. In the presence of
Marcelo and the 10 paymasters, 7.64M in cash was counted and placed into
2 duffel bags, sealed and loaded inside an armored car and immediately
transported and deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurer’s Office.
2. A power outage occurred at about 1-2 pm making the central vault where
they customarily distribute cash advances dark. Marcelo and Atty. Kempis
decided to distribute the cash to the paymasters in Kempis’ room which was
well-lighted by sunlight. The door was closed and a guard was posted
outside the room during the distribution.
3. In the presence of Atty. Kempis and the 10 paymasters, Marcelo opened the
2 duffel bags and recounted the amount of 7.64M, which were segregated
and bundled in denominations of 100s, 50s, 20s and 10s. One at a time,
each paymaster was given the amounts they requisitioned. Estepa was given
850k of differing denominations. After all 10 paymasters got their money,
Marcelo, as his usual practice, asked if everything was fine. No complaint
was made by anyone and they all left.
4. 10 minutes later, Estepa reported to Marcelo that 50k was missing from the
cash advance. All 10 were summoned back, and each money was recounted.
Amount received by each, except for Estepa, was correct.
5. The City of Manila sent a formal letter demanding the amount of 50k to
which Estepa denied any liability therefor. The Legal Office of Manila filed
a complaint against Estepa with the Tanodbayan which charged him with
malversation through negligence.
6. Petitioner: 1) No crime of malversation of public funds through mere fault
to count the money, 2) not established that he in fact received 850k,
therefore he is not liable for the loss of 50k, 3) he was not negligent.
ISSUE/S: WoN Estepa is liable for Malversation through negligence – YES.
RULING: DENIED.
RATIO:
1. 217. “Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property… or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially…
Xxxx “Failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.”
2. Estapa received 850k beyond reasonable doubt: a) 7.64M was counted by
Marcelo before actual distribution; b) money was recounted after 50k was
reported to be missing, which showed that none of the 9 received an amount
in excess. The loss reported occurred after turnover to Estepa of the entire
amount of 850k.
3. Estepa’s explanation: Accused brought the money with smaller
denominations to Pangilinan’s table (3-4 m away from Kempis’ office),
leaving the bigger denomination at the sofa, since he could not carry the
whole amount. By then, there were already some people inside the office.
Then, he brought the bundles of bigger denominations (100s and 50s)
directly to his cage and then returned for the bundles of smaller
denominations. After counting the money inside his cage, he discovered
that one bundle of P50 bills worth 50k was missing.
4. Accused negligence consisted in the following: 1) failure to check and
recheck the denominations by him before paymasters dispersed, 2) not
sounding off that he was absolutely certain of the amount received when
Mr. Marcelo asked, “Ayos na ba kayo diyan?”, 3) failure to ask Atty.
Kempis or any other person to watch over the money of bigger
denominations ay his cage before he returned to Pangilinan’s table for the
smaller denominations.
5. In malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the 1)
baccountable officer had received the public funds and that 2) he did not
have them in his possession when demand was made and 3) he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. Petitioner was neither able to
produce the missing 50k nor adequately explain his failure to produce that
amount.
6. 2 possibilities where 50k was stolen: 1) from the sofa inside Atty. Kempis’
room where he left the bundles of large denomination bills without asking
anyone to keep an eye on them; 2) from his cage outside Kempis’ room
where he again left said bundles without leaving anyone in charge thereof to
retrieve the bundles in Pangilinan’s table.
ILOGON v SANDIGANBAYAN
February 9, 1993 | Campos Jr., J | Review on Certiorari of Sandiganbayan
decision | Malversation
SUMMARY: Ilogon, a custodian of funds from the Bureau of Posts, was found
by COA Auditors to have a P118,003 shortage from his cash and accounts. He is
charged with malversation with public funds, and his defence is that said funds
were cash advances of his co-workers’ salaries w/c had not yet been reimbursed
when he was audited and that he returned the amount later on. SC: Defences
invoked invalid. Ilogon guilty of malversation.
DOCTRINE: All that is required for malversation is that the accused had
received public funds and didn’t have them in his possession when demand was
made.No need for direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is
a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same.
FACTS:
1. Calinico Ilogon was a former duly-appointed cashier, who became the
acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts (Cagayan de Oro City). His job
was to accept payments, make collections, and effect disbursements since at
the time there was no cashier employed.
2. CoA Auditors, upon examination of his cash and accounts, found out that
Ilogon incurred a shortage in his account amounting to P118 871.29 from
Sept 8 1983 – Sept 13 1988. Pursuant to his, a criminal case was filed
against him for malversation of public funds.
3. Petitioner’s defense is that he never misappropriated the amount for his
own personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to his co-
employees, and that he did not have the cash on hand at the time of audit
because the reimbursements for said cash advances was not yet in his
possession. He even claimed that he should be lauded because he did it for
purely humanitarian reasons and alleviate the plight of his co-employees,
and it was the undisturbed practice in their office.
ISSUE/S: WON Ilogon is liable for malversation of public funds – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED.10 yrs of prision mayor (min) to 14 years of reclusion
temporal (maximum); perpetual special disqualification; P118k fine equal to
amount malversed.
RATIO:
1. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof
that the accountable officer – in this case, Ilogon, the official custodian of
the missing funds – had received public funds and didn’t have them in his
possession when demand was made. There’s no need for direct evidence of
personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and
petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, Ilogon
admitted that P118,003.10 shortage and couldn’t give a satisfactory
explanation for the lack of it.
2. Ilogon invokes ‘humanitarian reasons’ as justification for the shortage, but
he knows that his granting of ‘chits’ and ‘vales’ which constituted the bulk
of the shortage is a violation of postal rules and regulations prohibited by
Memorandum Circular 570 of the General Auditing Office as well as PD
1445 (Gov’t Auditing Code of the Phils), Section 69: “Postmasters are only
allowed to use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers,
and withdrawals from the roper depository bank whenever their cash
advances for the purpose are exhausted.”
3. The fact that he didn’t use funds for himself isn’t a valid defense. As aptly
said by the Sandiganbayan, “the fact that the immediate superiors of the
accused have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for
convenience didn’t legalize the disbursements.
4. The fact that Ilogon fully settled the amount of P188, 003.10 is of no
moment. The return of malversed funds is not a defense, nor an exempting
circumstance, nor a ground for extinguishing the accused’s criminal
liability. It is, at best, a mitigating circumstance.
 AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
February 26, 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Review of Sandiganbayan decision |
Malversation
SUMMARY: Petitioner, a private individual, was appointed the custodian of
distrained property by the BIR. However, such property was later removed from
his custody, and he attempted to cancel his obligation to the BIR. He was
charged with malversation before the Sandiganbayan and found guilty of the
same. The SC held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over him.
DOCTRINE: Malversation can only be committed by public officers.
Depositaries appointed by the BIR as custodians over distrained property are not
public officers.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon, who owned and operated an earth-moving
business hauling dirt and ore, was hired by the Paper Industries Corp. Of the
Philppines (PICOP). Petitioner occasionally engaged subcontractors like
James Ancia whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
2. On 25 May 1983, the BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property to the Regional Director or representative of Region 10, Butuan
City, commanding the distraint of personal properties of Jaime Ancia,
petitioner’s subcontractor and a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to petitioner ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit the Ancia’s property in petitioner’s possession to the
BIR. In voluntarily signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue, petitioner
assumed the undertakings specified therein, particularly regarding a truck
which he stipulated he would faithfully keep and protect, among others.
3. Subsequently, petitioner wrote to BIR’s Regional Director for Region 10B
Butuan City, stating that Ancia intended to cease his operations with them
and sometime in August 1985 Ancia withdrew his equipment from
petitioner’s custody; and that he therefore formally informed them that he
was relinquishing whatever responsibilities he had over said properties by
virtue of the receipt he had signed, effective immediately. Petitioner had
also reported the taking of the truck to PICOP’s security manager and
requested him to prevent it from being taken from PICOP’s concession, but
such order was given too late.
4. The Regional Director responded that failure to observe the provisions of
the receipt wherein petitioner had voluntarily assumed the liability of
safekeeping and preserving the unit on behalf of the BIR did not relieve
petitioner of his responsibility. Petitioner was then charged with
malversation of public funds or property, and was convicted of the same.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner, who is a private individual, may be charged with
malversation by virtue of being appointed custodian by the BIR over distraind
property- NO
RULING: Sandiganbayan Resolution and Decision set aside and declared null
and void for lack of jurisdiction.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner is not charged as co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. Unless he is proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Art 203 provides that to be a public
officer, one must be: (1) Taking part in the performance of public functions
in the government, or Performing in said Government or any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
class; and (2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public
functions or to perform public duties must be: a. by direct provision of the
law, or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority.
2. Granting arguendo that the petitioner in signing the receipt, commenced to
take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not
be deemed authorized by popular election.
3. Nor does petitioner’s designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained
property qualify as appointment by direct provision of law or by competent
authority. While the BIR had authority to require petitioner to sign a receipt
for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it
power to appoint him a public officer. Sec. 206 of the NIRC merely
authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person
to preserve a distrained property; but it does not stretch to appointing the
depositary as a public officer.
 RODILLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
May 20, 1988 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. |Review | Evasion Through Negligence
SUMMARY: Petitioner was assigned to escort Zenaida to the court for a hearing.
After the court adjourned, petitioner allowed Zenaida and his family to take
lunch. Thereafter, he consented to the use of the comfort room of Zenaida
because of a call of nature with a lady companion. Prisoner escaped and petitioner
immediately tried to search for the escapee without reporting it to his superior.
Sandiganbayan’s decision of evasion through negligence was affirmed by the SC.
DOCTRINE: The elements of the crime under evasion through negligence are:
a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance
or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment;
and c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence.
FACTS:
1. Accused is a Patrolman who was assigned with the jailsection. When he
reported for work on March 1980, the policewoman who was assigned to
escort Zenaida to the court was sick so he became the substitute together
with Pat. Andres.
2. Zenaida was being prosecuted for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. While
waiting for the arrival of the judge, Pat. Andres who happened to be a
relative of the husband of Zenaida approached the accused and requested
the latter if he could permit Zenaida to talk with the husband. The accused
consented and had a short talk with the husband.
3. After the court adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to
allow them to have lunch to which he consented.
4. Husband of Zenaida then asked him if he could accompany her to the
comfort room to answer the call of nature. The accused then accompanied
Zenaida and a lady companion to the comfort room and allowed both of
them to enter while he stood guard along the alley near the door.
5. The lady companion of Zenaida came out and told the accused that she was
going to buy sanitary napkins but she failed to return after 10 minutes.
Accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room where she found
out that Zenaida escaped through the window.
6. He immediately went out to look for the escapee with the help of patrolman
Andres but they were not able to see her. Andres advised the accused to go
to Zenaida’s house and that husband of the escapee is from Nueva Ecija.
Accused then borrowed a car to go to Nueva Ecija but the escapee was not
there. He returned to Zenaida’s house in Caloocan where he met Cpl.
Victoriano and related to the latter the escape of Zenaida. He formally
reported the matter to his superior after.
7. Sandiganbayan convicted the accused. Upon appeal to the SC,
appellant claimed that Sandiganbayan based his conviction only on his
admissions without evidence to prove his guilt.
ISSUE: WoN appellant is liable for evasion through negligence ? -YES
RULING: Petition dismissed. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. There is no question that the first two elements are present. The only
disputed issue is whether appellant’s acts are considered negligence which
the court sees in the affirmative. It was improper for the petitioner totake
lunch with the prisoner and her family when he wassupposed to bring his
charge to the jail. As a police officer charged with the duty to return the
prison to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the
regulations.
2. It is the duty of any police officer having custody of aprisoner to take
necessary precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A
failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite
laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty.
3. The use of a toilet is one of the most familiar and common place methods of
escape. The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the
petitioner’s suspicion because the only pretext given by the petitioner was
that she was going to answer the call of nature. It was unnecessary for her to
be accompanied by anyone. Despite this, the petitioner allowed the two to
enter the comfort room without first establishing for himself that there was
no window or door allowing the possibility of escape.
4. Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away, it would not have
been inhuman for the petitioner to deny the prisoner’s request to first take
lunch. Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of female
occupants and checked all possible exits first.
5. Moreover, instead of promptly reporting the matter so that an alarm could
be sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures followed, petitioner
decided to take matters into his own hands. This even gave the escapee
greater opportunity to make good her escape because the chances of her
being recaptured became much less.
 PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN 6. In the afternoon of the same day, a patrolman went to Sebastiana’s store to
September 23, 1982 | Abad Santos, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Parricide follow up on the attempted robbery case against Rodolfo. Traces of blood
were found in one of the wooden panels. He reported the matter to his
SUMMARY: The co-accused were the father-in-law, brothers-in-law, and superior, but when he returned the next day the panels were already planed
wife of the victim. They were charged and convicted of his murder. The SC and the blood could no longer be seen.
ruled that the wife should have been charged with parricide, but because the 7. Francisco, Cesario, Manuel and Presentacion were charged with and found
relationship was not alleged in the information, she could only be convicted of guilty of Rodolfo’s murder.
murder with aggravating circumstances.
DOCTRINE: The relationship must be alleged in the information for the ISSUE/S: WoN the accused can be charged with parricide - NO
accused to be charged with parricide.
RULING: Judgment affirmed in toto.
FACTS:
1. The deceased Rodolfo Magnaye was married to the accused Presentacion RATIO:
Jumawan, who left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana 1. Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her
Jumawan while Rodolfo stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara. relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the
Presentacion’s mother attempted several times to secure Rodolfo’s others, can only be convicted by murder qualified by abuse of superior
signature on a document agreeing to separate from his wife so that they strength.
would be free to remarry, but Rodolfo persistently refused. 2. Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating
2. On 19 June 1976 while Trinidad was at home, Rodolfo told her he was circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. Relationship may
going to the public market because his wife asked him to fetch her. He be inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder; and
asked Trinidad to prepare food because they were going to talk about their as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law are
lives, before he left at about 6:00 p.m. aggravating.
3. Witnesses reported seeing:
a. At about 9:30 p.m: accused Francisco Jumawan holding Rodolfo’s
hands while accused Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo with an
arm around Rodolfo’s neck and Cesario Jumawan in front of Rodolfo
with his left hand holding Rodolfo’s collar and the right hand holding a
small pointed bolo with which he stabbed Rodolfo below the right
nipple.
b. At about 11:00 p.m: Cesario and Manuel with Rodolfo between them,
crossing the national highway towards the south. They continued
walking after crossing the highway. Rodolfo was not walking, his head
bowed while his two arms were on Cesario’s and Manuel’s shoulder.
4. At about 11:45 p.m, Presentacion reported to the police that Rodolfo
threatened to rob Sebastiana’s store. Presentacion denied being related to
Rodolfo when questioned. On investigation, the patrolman saw one of the
panels used to close the store was destroyed, but nothing was taken.
Presentacion and her companions told the police they would file charges
against Rodolfo, and the report was entered in the police record book.
5. When Rodolfo did not return home, Trinidad went to the public market to
look for him the next day. Some children told her they saw a man near the
water, who turned out to be Rodolfo.
 PEOPLE v. TOMOTORGO ISSUE/S: WoN the lower court determined the correct penalty for parricide? –
April 30, 1985 | Alampay, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Parricide YES

SUMMARY: The victim tried to leave his husband after the latter refused to RULING: Judgment is affirmed but considering the circumstances which
sell their conjugal home and live with his parents. When the victim tried to attended the commission of the offense, executive clemency is recommended
leave with their son, the accused begged his wife to return home which led the after service of medium penalty of prision mayor.
wife to throw their son on the ground. Out of anger, accused hit the wife with a
piece of wood which killed her. He pleaded guilty and appealed the penalty RATIO:
imposed by the lower court. SC affirmed the decision. 1. Appellant contends that should be punished only for the offense he intended
DOCTRINE: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether to commit which he avers to be serious physical injuries, qualified by the
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his fact that the offended party is his spouse. Pursuant to subparagraph 4 of Art
spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of 246, this contention imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
reclusion perpetua to death. and maximum periods only. This argument is erroneous since Article 4 of
the RPC that criminal liability shall be incurred even if the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended.
FACTS: 2. The fact that appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict
1. Jaime Tomortogo was the husband of the deceased Magdalena de los physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and
Santos. The victim has been persistently asking her husband to sell the more serious crime committed.
conjugal home and wanted their family to transfer to the house of her in- 3. The provision which is the basis for appellant’s appeal, Article 49, does not
laws. Accused would not accede to the request because he had many plants also apply to the his case since it is only for incidents where the crime
and improvements on the land which he was then farming. committed is different from that intended and where the felony committed
2. On the day of the incident, accused left to work on his farm at around 7am. befalls a different person.
When he went back at 9 that same morning, he found his wife and three- 4. Parricide is punished by two indivisible penalties. As the commission is
month old baby already gone. When he proceeded to look for both of them, attended by mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances,
about 200 meters from their home, he saw his wife carrying his son and the lesser penalty which is reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
bringing a bundle of clothes.
3. He pleaded with his wife to return home and tried to take the child when the
former refused to do so. As he was trying to get his son, the wife threw the
baby on the grassy portion of the trail which angered the accused. The
husband then picked a piece of wood and started hitting his wife until she
fell to the ground.
4. Realizing what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and
brought her home and went back for his son. Soon thereafter, Magdalena
died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains.
5. The accused reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain and then
surrendered to Policeman Arelloroas while carrying with him the weapon
he used.
6. Charged with parricide, the accused first pleaded not guilty which he
reversed later on. The trial court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua
because of the plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and act based on passion
and obfuscation, which he appealed to this court.
 PEOPLE v. ABARCA
September 14, 1987 | Sarmiento, J. | Appeal from RTC Decision | Death or
Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances
SUMMARY: Accused caught his wife having intercourse with another man.
After a lapse of one hour during which he searched for a firearm, he searched for
the paramour and shot him, killing the paramour and injuring two others. He
was convicted of murder and double frustrated murder by the TC. On appeal, the
SC held that Art 247 was applicable.
DOCTRINES:
1. Elements of Art 247: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he
kills any of both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
2. The killing need not be instantly after the discovery for Art 247 to apply, so
long as the discovery was the proximate cause for the killing.
3. Art 247 does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a
privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing or infliction of serious physical
injuries under exceptional circumstances.
FACTS:
1. Khingsley Paul Koh and the accused’s wife, Jenny Abarca, had an illicit
relationship which began while accused Francisco Abarca was in Manila
reviewing for the Bar Exams.
2. On 15 July 1984, Francisco was in his residence and supposed to go to
Dolores by bus, but due to engine trouble it could not leave. He returned to
his residence around 6:00 p.m. and found Jenny and Kho having
intercourse. When they noticed Francisco, Jenny pushed Kho, who got his
revolver. Francisco then jumped and ran away.
3. Francisco went to look for a firearm in Tacloban and obtained one from the
house of a PC soldier at about 6:30 p.m. He returned to his house but Jenny
and Kho were not there. He went to Koh’s hangout where he found Koh
playing mahjong, and fired at him three times. Koh was hit, as well as
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were in a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong.
4. Koh died instantly, but the Amparados survived. Francisco was charged
with murder and double frustrated murder. The TC found him guilty of the
same, but recommended executive clemency (though not a full pardon).
Francisco appealed, contending, among others, that the TC erred in
convicting him of the crime as charged instead of entering a judgment of
conviction under Art 247 of the RPC.
ISSUE/S: WoN Art 247 is applicable - YES
RULING: Decision appealed from modified.
RATIO:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any
legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter,
or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.
1. Art 247 prescribes the ff. elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. It is unquestionable that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, resulting in
him killing the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Thu the elements
were present in this case.
2. Though about one hour had passed between the discovery of the illicit
sexual intercourse and the time the victim was actually shot, the shooting
must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused. The RPC, in requiring that the accused “shall kill any or both of
them… immediately” after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse
does not say that he should instantly commit the killing thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after finding his spouse engaged in the basest act
of infidelity. However, the killing must not be influenced by external
factors, but must be the direct by-product of the accused’s rage.
3. It must also be noted that Art 247 does not define and provide for a specific
crime, but rather grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing
of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the specified
circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be qualified by mitigating or
aggravating or any other qualifying circumstance, such as treachery.
4. As to the Amparados, since death inflicted under exceptional circumstances
is not murder, he cannot be charged of double frustrated murder. Instead it
will be less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence/negligence
for failure to give sufficient warning to other people in the area who may
sustain injuries as well.
 PEOPLE v. BUENSUCESO
September 28, 1984 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Murder
SUMMARY: Policemen shot and killed Tayag while the latter was already
wounded and running away. The whole incident started because of Tayag’s
refusal to give his knife to Aguilar, one of the policemen. The policemen were
convicted by the CFI for murder. SC affirmed the judgment.
DOCTRINE: Where the victim died as a result of wounds received from
several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown
which wound was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for
the death of the victim.
FACTS:
1. PariseoTayag was being accompanied by Rodolfo Aguilar (a policeman) to
the municipal building. During that time, Tayag was holding a knife but that
did not want to give it to Aguilar because he said that was not making any
trouble. Aguilar then suggested that they go to the Chief of Police, to which
Tayag agreed.
2. Upon reaching the municipal building, a heated argument ensued between
Aguilar and Tayag arising from the latter’s refusal to give the knife. After
the Chief of Police inquired what was the commotion all about, Tayag
hurriedly left the building and he was followed by Aguilar, Eduardo
Mallari, and Fidel de la Cruz (all policemen).
3. Upon going out of the building, Aguilar fired his gun upwards. When Tayag
heard the shot, he retreated backwards to the fence. Aguilar then fired at
him hitting Tayag above the right knee. Tayag continued to run to his
house, and he was followed by Mallari and Aguilar (both have guns) and de
la Cruz (no gun).
4. As Tayag continued to run away from them, Aguilar and Mallari then
intercepted him by taking the opposite sides of Rizal Road in front of the
Catholic Church. Thereafter, several gun shots were heard.
5. Tayag was seen lying prostrate on the ground near the back of a jeep parked
at the corner of San Juan and Rizal Streets (about 60 m from the municipal
building). De la Cruz, Ernesto Joson, ConradoIzon, and Jose Buensuceso
(all policemen) were seen at the scene of the crime by prosecution witness
Apolonio Salvador. Buensuceso was the one kept the knife after it was
taken by De la Cruz from Tayag, but from where Joson and Izon came from
is not known to the witness. Tayag died of multiple gunshot wounds, two of
which were fatal.
6. Upon inspection by P.C. officer Romualdo Espiritu, he smelled the barrel of
the gun and checked the bullets of the service firearms of Aguilar and
Buensuceso, and was able to find out that the same were fired. Aside from
this, the paraffin tests on Izon and Joson’s left hands yielded positive
results, but negative for Mallari and De la Cruz.
7. The 6 policemen were charged with murder. Mallari and De la Cruz were
absolved on reasonable doubt, but the other four (Aguilar, Buensuceso,
Izon, Joson) were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In
Mallari’s testimony, it was stated that before the shooting incident outside
the building, Aguilar was pursued by Tayag with the knife and the latter
tried to stab Aguilar but was not able to hit him. When Aguilar fired his
gun, De la Cruz took Mallari’s gun and returned it after the shooting. Upon
inspection by Espiritu, it was found not having been fired. Another defense
witness, a waitress, stated that Tayag and his friends were drinking at a
restaurant before the whole incident.
ISSUE/S: Whether the policemen committed the crime of murder such that the
CFI was correct in convicting them thereof – YES
RULING: RTC judgment affirmed. Indemnity to Tayag’s heirs increased.
RATIO:
1. There is sufficient evidence (ballistic examination and paraffin test) that
show Aguilar, Buensuceso, Izon and Joson fired their guns upon Tayag
hitting him at different parts of the body. While it has not been established
as to which wound was inflicted by each accused, the Court has held that
where the victim died as a result of wounds received from several persons
acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown which wound
was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death
of the victim.
2. The crime committed was murder, qualified by treachery. As shown,
Aguilar fired at Tayag hitting him just above the right knee. Still, the
policemen chased Tayag and fired several shots at him even though he was
already wounded and possibly immobilized. The means employed by the
accused tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim might
have made. While abuse of superior strength is present in this case, such is
already absorbed by treachery.
3. Aguilar’s plea of self-defense is unmeritorious. If it was true that Tayag
attempted to stab him inside the municipal hall and Aguilar shot him out of
self-defense, then the whole shooting incident should have just happened
inside the building. It should be noted that Aguilar followed Tayag after the
latter hurriedly left the building, and fired at him afterwards. The whole
incident ended at a place which is of considerable distance from the
municipal hall (60 m), where Tayag was shot to death after the policemen
continued to run after him who was already wounded.
 PEOPLE v. PUGAY
November 14, 1988 | Medialdea, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Murder and
Homicide
SUMMARY: Pugay and Samson were convicted of murder after the former
poured gasoline and the latter set the deceased Miranda on fire. The Court ruled
that the accused were not criminally liable for murder since there was no
criminal intent on their part. They are, however, criminally liable for homicide.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of criminal intent on can still incur criminal
liability through imprudence or negligence.
Failure to exercise all the necessary diligence to avoid any undesirable
consequences brought about by the actions of one’s companions may result to
criminal liability for a crime through reckless imprudence.
FACTS:
1. Fernando Pugay (one of the accused) and Bayani Miranda (the deceased), a
25-year old retardate, were friends.
2. During the town fiesta (May 19, 1982), Pugay, Benjamin Samson and other
companions met with Eduardo Gabion (who was reading a book) and Henry
3. Pugay’s group appeared to be drunk during that time, and when they saw
Miranda passing by, they may fun of him and made him dance by tickling
him with a piece of wood.
4. Not contented with what they were doing, Pugay took a can of gasoline
from under the engine of the Ferris wheel and poured it on Miranda, even as
Gabion told him to stop while he (Pugay) was on the process of pouring the
flammable liquid on Miranda. Samson, on the other hand, set Miranda on
fire after Pugay poured the gasoline.
5. The Ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused Miranda’s burning body
with water, while others poured sand or wrapped Miranda’s body with rags
to extinguish the flame. Miranda was later brought to the hospital, but died
later.
6. Pugay and Samson were brought to the police. They were subsequently
found guilty by the CFI for the crime of murder, with mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay on the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Pugay and Samson were correctly convicted for
the crime of murder – NO
RULING: CFI judgment affirmed with modifications. Crime committed is
homicide and not murder.
RATIO:
1. There was nothing in the records saying that there was any animosity
between the accused and the deceased. In fact, it has been established that
Pugay and Miranda knew each other and were even friends. Furthermore,
the meeting at the place of the incident was accidental.
2. There was no conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose or intent on the part
of the two accused and that they were just intending to make fun of the
deceased. This lack of intent has also been established by the testimony of
eyewitness Gabion that the two accused were stunned when they noticed
Miranda burning. As such, Samson and Pugay’s liability will be limited to
the acts that each one them executed by themselves.
3. For Pugay’s part, he failed to exercise all the necessary diligence to avoid
any undesirable consequences brought about by the actions of his
companions who were making fun of the deceased. This was shown by the
fact that he could have known that the can contained gasoline just from the
smell of it before he poured the contents on Miranda. Thus, Pugay is only
criminally liable for homicide through reckless imprudence.
4. For Samson, there can be no doubt that he knew from the start that gasoline
was the liquid being poured on the deceased by the fact that he later set
Miranda on fire and could not have done that if it was otherwise. Still, it can
be conceded that he had no intention to kill Miranda but was just making
fun of him, and as part of it he only intended to set the clothes of the
deceased on fire. As such no treachery exists because for such to exist, the
attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense the offended
party might make.
5. However, even in the absence of criminal intent, Samson will still be held
criminally liable under the RPC for physical injuries from burning
Miranda’s clothes if his intent was merely to burn the latter’s clothes which
may cause certain injuries to the victim. However, since the act resulted to
Miranda’s death, Samson will be held liable for homicide.
Under Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability can be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
 PEOPLE v. SALUFRANIA
March 30, 1988 | Padilla, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Unintentional Abortion
SUMMARY: Salufrania boxes his 8-month pregnant wife MarcianaAbuyo in
the stomach then strangles her to death. TC: Parricide with Intentional
Abortion. SC: Salufrania’s acts insufficient to show intent to cause an
abortion. Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the accused boxes the victim in the stomach
and then strangles them to death is insufficient to show an intent to cause an
abortion
FACTS:
1. According to Pedro, the accused and victim’s 13-year old child, at 6pm on
December 1974 in their house at Camarines Norte, Filomeno Salufrania got
into a quarrel with his 8-month pregnant wife, Marciana Abuyo. Pedro saw
his father Salufrania box his mother in the stomach and once fallen on the
floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes
and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot along w/ her 8-
month baby boy in the womb.
2. After the incident, Salufrania went out of the house to get a hammock,
returning the next morning and placing their mom on the hammock and
carrying her cadaver to the house of his sister Conching for burial. Pedro
states that he and his 2 other siblings now live with their Uncle Abuyo and
that his father-accused threatened to kill him and his other siblings should
he reveal the true cause of his mother’s death.
3. Salufrania claims that his wife’s cause of death was a stomach ailment +
headache, that he was dutifully applying ‘ikmo’ and ‘bantil’ to his wife as
native treatment but to no avail, that Pedro is an incompetent witness, and
there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion.
4. The trial court charged him with the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion and sentenced to death.
appellant in Pedro’s testimony have been satisfactorily explained as mere
misapprehensions of the question, some of which are not material anyway.
2. There’s no evidence to show that Salufrania intended to cause an abortion –
he should be held guilty of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion, and not
Parricide with Intentional Abortion. The abortion in this case was caused by
the same violence that caused Abuyo’s death. Salufrania meets the elements
of Unintentional Abortion, which are as follows:
a. There’s a pregnant woman
b. Violence is used upon pregnant woman w/o intending an abortion
c. That the violence is intentionally exerted
d. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled therefrom
The mere fact that Salufrania boxed his wife on the stomach, taken together
with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof
to show an intent to cause an abortion. Salufrania must have merely
intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
3. On Penalty: Under Article 48 of RPC, accused should be punished with the
penalty corresponding to the more serious crime of Parricide, to be imposed
in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987
Constitution’s abolishment of the death penalty, he is sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE/S: WON Pedro is an incompetent witness, as alleged – NO.

WON Salufrania committed parricide with intentional abortion – NO.

RULING: AFFIRMED w/ MODIFICATION. Parricide at maximum penalty.

RATIO:
1. On Witnesses: Pedro, while presumed incompetent under the Rules of Court
for being 13 years old when he testified and 11 when the offense charged
occurred, proved that he was intelligent and competent by being responsive
to the questions propounded to him when he was under oath. His testimony
was very clear, convincing, and truthful. The inconsistencies magnified by
 PEOPLE v. ORITA
April 3, 1990 | Medialdea, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Rape
SUMMARY: Orita threatened Abayan into having sexual intercourse by
pointing a knife to her. During the act, however, Orita’s penis was not able to
fully penetrate Abayan’s vagina. The RTC convicted him for frustrated rape.
The SC held that there can be no crime of frustrated rape, only attempted or
consummated.
DOCTRINE: From the moment the offender has carnal knowledge the crime
is already consummated all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished.
Perfect penetration is not essential for consummation of rape. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient to warrant conviction, even
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina.
FACTS:
1. Cristina Abayan, a 19-year old college freshman student, arrived at her
boarding house during the early morning of March 20, 1983 (after coming
home from a party) when CeilitoOrita, a Philippine Constabulary officer
and a frequent visitor of another boarder, poked a balisong to her neck and
dragged her upstairs to look for a room in the second floor of the boarding
house.
2. Upon reaching Abayan’s room, Orita pushed Abayan who hit her head on
the wall. While still pointing the knife to Abayan, Orita began to undress
himself and ordered Abayan to do the same, who took off her T-shirt out of
fear. Orita then proceeded to take off Abayan’s pants and underwear by
force.
3. Once both of them were naked, Orita mounted Abayan and ordered her to
insert his penis into her vagina. Abayan followed out of fear since the
balisong was still pointed to her all this time. However, Orita’s penis could
not fully penetrate Abayan’s vagina, so Orita laid down on his back and
ordered Abayan to mount him. In that position, Orita’s penis still could not
fully penetrate Abayan’s vagina.
4. After the change in the position, Abayan thought of escaping, and ran away
from Orita as fast as she could. She first went to the other room, but when
Orita was able to follow her, she jumped out of the window and ran to the
municipal building while still naked. After making it to the municipal
building, she was found by policemen crying, who helped her and upon
knowing of the incident, sought to apprehend Orita. They failed, however,
due to the darkness when they arrived at the boarding house.
5. Orita was later arrested and convicted by the trial court for frustrated rape.
ISSUE/S: WoN the RTC was correct in convicting Orita for frustrated rape –
NO
RULING: Orita found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of consummated rape.
Penalty is reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Abayan.
RATIO:
1. Orita argues that it is strange that Abayan herself helped him so that he can
have carnal knowledge of her, by having her insert his penis into her vagina.
Thus, Orita argues that this is the only case where the aggressor is being
helped by the victim in order for the act to be consummated. Even so, it
should be noted that all of this happened while he was poking his balisong
towards the complainant. Also, the abrasions and marks in the knees, back,
below the breast, and the unusual redness of the genital area found by the
physician are conclusive proof of the struggle against the force or violence
exerted upon the victim.
2. There is no doubt that the attempted and consummated stages of a felony
apply to the crime of rape. Black’s Law Dictionary defines carnal
knowledge as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman. From the moment the offender has carnal knowledge, the crime is
already consummated all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished and the last act necessary to produce the crime has been
performed.
3. In this case, it has been proven through Abayan’s testimony that there was
penetration of the female organ by the male organ, although it was only
partial. However, the Supreme Court has laid down the rule that that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips
of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. If there was no penetration of the
female organ, then the crime is at the attempted stage only because not all
acts of execution were performed.
 PEOPLE v. MANGALINO
February 15, 1990 | Sarmiento, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Rape
SUMMARY: Mangalino called Marichelle who was playing “takbuhan” into
his bedroom where he proceeded to violate her, inserting his finger into her
vagina and attempting to penetrate her underdeveloped genitalia with his penis.
There was no full penetration but there were indications of recent genital
trauma. SC held that Mangalino was guilty of statutory rape.
DOCTRINE: In statutory rape, proof of intimidation or force, or lack of it, is
immaterial. | Full penetration is not required for rape to be committed. Proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia is sufficient. | Rape may be
committed even in a place where people congregate. Lust is no respecter of
time or place.
FACTS:
1. March 7, 1984, Morning: 6-year old Marichelle Carlos, a Grade I pupil, was
playing “takbuhan” alone at the ground floor of the 2-storey apartment of
53-year old Semion Mangalino. Laura Gasmin, his wife, was in Balayan,
Batangas. Mangalino and Marichelle’s parents are neighbors.
2. 16-year old Ramillas Dulce, grandson of accused, and Armando Aryoso,
Laura’s nephew, were allegedly playing chess in the sala of the apartment.
Ramil said he did not hear or see the accused calling out to Marichelle and
motioning her to go inside his bedroom.
3. Once inside the bedroom, accused gave the girl P2 and told her not to tell
anybody about his calling her to his bedroom. He laid Marichelle down,
removed her jogging pants, then kissed her and fondled her infantile breasts.
He inserted his finger into the private part of the victim, then forcibly and
repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but
in vain.
4. Meanwhile, Bernardine, the victim’s mother, was looking for her daughter
who should be leaving for school by that time. Her sister Agnes who lived
next door, told her that Cielito, accused’s adopted daughter, told her that
Marichelle was in their apartment. Michael, Agnes’ 4-year old son was sent
to fetch Marichelle.
5. Hearing Michael’s call, Marichelle put on her garments and noticed that her
jogging pants were wet. Upon reaching home, she told her mother that “Si
Mang Semion nilagay ang daliriniya sa pikpik ko” and “yong titi ni Mang
Semion nilagay sa pikpik ko”.
6. Enraged, Bernardine submitted her daughter to a physical and genital
examination, the results certified as follows: No evidence or sign of any
extragenital physical injury noted in the body of the subject. Hymen intact
and its orifice, narrow. Sign of recent genital trauma, present. Dr. Garcia
opined that the vestibular mucosa contusion could have been caused by a
hard object like an erected penis, and such bruises would be an indication of
an unsuccessful penetration. He discounted the probability of an accident,
like bumping at an edge of a chair, as the accused argued.
7. The young victim candidly testified that she felt no pain when the accused
was trying to insert his penis into her vagina. She did not cry in pain nor
shout for help when she was being abused.
8. Defense: commission of the crime was impossible, taking place in broad
daylight and in the presence of at least 6 other persons on the ground floor
where the rape was supposedly consummated.
ISSUE/S: WoN Mangalino is guilty of statutory rape – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED with modification. Damages: 50k to 20k.
RATIO:
1. The gravamen of statutory rape is the carnal knowledge with a woman
below 12 years old. Marichelle was little over 6 years old. Proof of
intimidation or use of force is immaterial. The finding of Dr. Garcia
concluded that rape could have been perpetrated: the indications of recent
genital trauma could not have been caused by an accident. Due to her tender
age, the penetration could only go as deep as the labia. Full penetration is
not required for rape to be committed. It is enough that there is proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female
organ.
2. The absence of visible signs of physical injuries can be attributed to the
relationship and degree of respect Marichelle might have had for
Mangalino, being a nearby neighbor. That Marichelle did not cry out or
struggle deserves scant consideration, given the absence of hymenal
laceration which explains why she did not feel any pain. She did not know
that her chastity was being violated at the time. It was only upon realizing
that she had been defiled did she cry.
3. Given her age, Marichelle could not have concocted a serious charge of
rape. Also, the other people in the apartment were so engrossed in their own
activities that they wouldn’t have noticed Mangalino going into his
bedroom, and committing the act with the child. Lust is no respecter of time
or place.
 PEOPLE v. BALBUENA and TORRES
April 27, 1984 | Guerrero, J. | Appeal from a CFI Decision | Rape
SUMMARY: Elvira was invited to go drinking with Torres and some of his
male friends. She got dizzy and was raped. After 1 ½ months, she reported the
incident. Appellants contend that the unexplained delay should diminish her
credibility as a witness. SC held that the delay was explainable and upheld her
credibility.
DOCTRINE: The testimony of the victim, whose chastity has not been
questioned, is generally accorded credence because such offended party would
not have fabricated facts that could bring shame and dishonor on her.
FACTS:
1. On Aug 28, 1975 at 10pm, Elvira Polintan (20 yrs old) was invited by a
long-time friend Juanito Torres to drink liquor with 4 other male friends at
the house of co-accused Abelardo Balbuena. They drank gin inside the
billiard hall After drinking half a glass, she felt dizzy and decided to lie
down to rest. Balbuena then undressed her by removing her pants and
briefs. Torres then held her hands down as Balbuena went on top of her on
the billiard table. She struggled even as Balbuena threatened her and her
family with death. He finally succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
her and went down. Torres then went up the billiard table and could not be
overpowered and consummated the sexual act with her while covering her
mouth to prevent her from shouting. Afterwards, she ran away when
appellants were distracted.
2. On Oct 19, 1975, she finally told her mom of the incident. They gave a
statement in the police HQ the next day and filed a complaint for rape
against appellants. She was also examined by a medico-legal officer of the
NBI who found no evident sign of extragenital injury on her body.
3. The accused rest their defense on denial and alibi. Torres disclaimed his
presence at the drinking party and usually drove a PUJ around 6pm to 12
mn, further claiming that Elvira was a tomboy who had a grudge against
him for advising his cousin to break off their relationship. Balbuena claimed
that she only conversed with Elvira for 5 minutes and disclaimed any
participation in the drinking spree.
4. The TC did not give credence to the defense and found them guilty of rape
and sentenced each to suffer reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE/S: WoN Elvira was an incredible witness based on the grounds of: 1)
delay in reporting the incident, and 2) no bodily injuries noted—NO
RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED: Reclusion Perpetua.
RATIO:
1. The delay in filing the complaint was reasonable. She was fearful over
threats to her parents should she report the matter; worried that her ongoing
classes in school would be disrupted if she filed the complaint. Furthermore,
fear, shock, and desire to avoid further shame is more than sufficient to
restrain the offended part from immediately exposing her sad experience.
On her lack of bodily injuries by physical examination, such is explainable
by the lapse of more than a month from the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that she was injured in her struggle to
resist the acts of the accused.
2. The Court had previously held that there was an “innate modesty of Filipina
womanhood” and “an inherent reluctance of Filipino families” from
exposure to long-drawn trials scandalizing the family’s good name and
honor that would justify the delay. The general rule is that testimony of the
victim, whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded
credence because such offended party would not have fabricated facts that
could bring shame and dishonor on her. Nor would she disclose her
humiliating experience at a public trial, and thus give rise to gossip and
slander, unless her motive was to bring to justice the person who grievously
wronged her (People v Pimentel). Such a rule has been established because
the crime of rape of one of the hardest to prove and oftentimes there is only
one testimony available, that of the victim’s. The very fact that she came
forward in the case is persuasion that such act had been committed.
Abad Santos, DISSENTING:
 Her joining a group of men, who were strangers to her, to drink gin, is not
normal behavior for a Filipina her age. Her conduct casts a dark cloud on
her claim that she was raped.
 If there was sex, it was consensual because: 1) there was no determined
resistance ie shouting, 2) no external injury, 3) unreasonable delay
unexplained by a lame excuse.
 I accept the majority’s proposition re: Filipina woman. “But Elvira is not a
typical Filipino woman. Not yet 21 she was already a guzzler, not just of
ladies’ drinks, but full-strength distilled spirits like gin.” The prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The presumption of innocence w/c the law accords to the accused
has not been overthrown.
 PEOPLE v. CASTRO
May 6, 1991 | Padilla, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Rape
SUMMARY: Castro raped his niece by making her stand on the toilet bowl.
Castro denied this and claims he was at school at the time of the rape. The court
held that he was guilty.
DOCTRINE: Perfect penetration is not essential for the offense of consummated
rape.
FACTS:
Castro, uncle of the victim Diana Rose, pulled her inside the bathroom,
prevented her from going out, made her to stand on the toilet bowl then lean on
the wall and then inserted his penis into Diana's vagina causing her pain. Diana
was 6 years old. The rape was discovered when Diana refused to let her
grandmother wash her private part because it was painful and when Diana's
grandfather observed that Diana refused to eat and did not stop crying. Castro
denied that charges and said that Diana went inside their bathroom while he was
taking a bath the day before the date of the rape because she was being chased
by a limping dog and that she tripped causing her genitals to bruise, and that it
was impossible for him to have raped Diana on the date of the rape because he
was at school waiting for his term to be typed and that he treated the person who
typed the paper to lunch, and that he was forced by the police to admit that he
raped Diana. Castro points out that Diana's hymen was not lacerated and that
Diana was standing when the supposed act was committed and that Diana was
still a virgin.
proffered innocence.
2. The average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter,
making it compatible with or easily penetrable by an average size penis.
The victim being of tender age, the penetration of the male organ could go
only as deep as the labia. In any case, for rape to be committed, full
penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the
male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Even the
slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. Perfect
penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not
essential for the offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of
the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient.
3. For Diana's account that she was made to stand on the toilet bowl made it
easy for the Castro to do the act as she was too small and their private parts
would not align unless she was elevated to a higher position. The suggestion
of the defense counsel that a finger could have been used is absurd. For if it
were only a finger there would have been no need to let Diana stand on the
toilet bowl.
4. Castro claims he was coerced and tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the
rape, showing to the trial court bodily signs of said abuse. Aside from his
self-serving assertion, the truth of such allegation was not proven. Besides,
this allegedly coerced admission of guilt cannot affect the prosecution's case
which has been established by other positive evidence pointing to his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE/S: WoN laceration of the vagina or rupture of the hymen is essential for
consummated rape – NO

RULING: Lower court decision convicting him AFFIRMED. Castro is

sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA.

RATIO:
1. Castro's alibi that he was at school is disbelieved since term papers are
usually submitted at the end of the term and not at the start of it. He could
not even identify the topic of the term paper. (Court: 1, Castro: 0 LELS) It
was also not physically impossible for him to be at the place of the incident.
His suggestion that Diana was chased by a LIMPING dog is ridiculous
(Court: 2, Castro:0).“A dog whose two hind legs are limping chasing her
while she was going down the stairs? Where did that dog come from?”
Granted that it was true, the fall would cause abrasions, not hymenal
contusions. Finally, Castro's flight from his house is not consistent with his
 PEOPLE v. ATENTO
April 26, 1991 | Cruz, J. | Appeal from RTC judgment | Rape
SUMMARY: Cesar Atento raped 16-year old Glenda Aringo, a mental
retardate. SC held that he was guilty of rape under pars. 2 and 3 – deprived of
reason and under 12 years old.
DOCTRINE: Sexual intercourse with a woman with a mentality of a child
below 12 years old constitutes rape, even if force and intimidation are absent.
FACTS:
1. 39-year old Cesar Atento, a married man with 8 children, raped 16-year old
Glenda Aringo, a mental retardate, five times. She described the successive
acts as “masarap”. She never told anybody about the attack because he had
threatened her life. She gave birth 9 months later to a boy who had a
remarkable resemblance to Atento.
2. Atento denies the charge claiming that it was pure harassment concocted by
Aringo’s relative who wanted to eject him from the land where his house
was erected. He insisted that Aringo was a girl of loose morals and had
twice seen her in sexual congress with a man, and that she had once offered
her body to his 13-year old son for P5.
3. Aringo only reached 3rd grade, had a mental age of a 9-12 year old child,
and preferred playing marbles with children rather than feeding her child.
is congenitally retarded or has previously suffered some traumatic
experience that has lowered her mental capacity.
4. Physical intimidation need not precede the sexual intercourse considering
the age, mental abnormality and deficiency of the complainant. Because of
her mental condition, complainant is incapable of giving consent to sexual
intercourse.
5. CJ Aquino: Absence of will determines the existence of rape. It is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the
sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse with a mentally deficient woman
constitutes rape, and failure to offer resistance to the act does not mean
consent – for she is incapable of giving any rational consent.
6. Given the low IQ of Aringo, it is impossible that she could have fabricated
her charges against the accused, for she lacks the gift of articulation and
inventiveness, and could not even explain with ease the meaning of rape.
7. Other 4 rapes not conclusively proven.

ISSUE/S: WoN Atento is guilty of rape. – YES.

RULING: AFFIRMED with modification. Guilty of one count of rape, civil

indemnity increased from 20k to 30k. Sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the obligation to acknowledge and support Hubert BuendiaAringo.

RATIO:
1. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances
a. By using force or intimidation
b. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
and
c. When the woman is under 12 years old, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the 2 next preceding paragraphs shall
be present.
2. Atento is guilty of rape under par. 2 and 3, because Aringo was deprived of
reason and had a mentality of a girl less than 12 years old.
3. It is not necessary for the culprit to actually deprive the victim of reason
prior to rape (with the use of drugs). The provision also applies to a woman
who has been earlier deprived of reason by other causes, such as when she
 PEOPLE v. CAMPUHAN
March 30, 2000 | Bellosillo, J. | Automatic Review | Rape
SUMMARY: Primo Campuhan was found by the mother of the 4 yo victim
kneeling in front of the child with both their pants down. TC found him guilty
of consummated rape but SC held that it was only attempted, as the fact that
carnal knowledge had actually taken place had not been satisfactorily proven.
DOCTRINE: In rape, full penetration is not necessary; however, for rape to be
consummated, the act of touching should be an inherent part of the entry of the
penis into the labia of the vagina and not mere touching of the external surface.
FACTS:
1. On Apr 25, 1996, at 4pm, Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of the 4-yo
victim Crysthel Pamintuan, went downstairs to prepare Milo for her 2
children. Primo Campuhan, helper of Corazon’s brother, was there filling
plastic bags with water to be frozen to ice in the freezer located in the 2nd
floor. As Corazon was preparing drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry,
“Ayoko, ayoko!”; rushed upstairs, and saw Primo kneeling before Crysthel
whose pants were already removed while his shorts were down to his knees.
Corazon was outraged and boxed Primo several times; he ran out, and she
called for help and people apprehended him and brought him before
barangay officials.
2. The medico-legal officer found no evident sign of extra-genital injury and
found that her hymen was intact. Campuhan maintained that they were just
in a playful mood and Crysthel wanted a ride on his back; but they fell and
at this point, Corazon became hysterical. WTF.
3. TC found him guilty of statutory rape (sex with a girl below 12) and
sentenced him to death pursuant to RA 7659 Sec 11, which imposes the
penalty of death if the offended party is below 7 years of age.
ISSUE/S: WoN Campuhan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
consummated rape—NO
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE. Indeterminate
sentence of 8y4m10d of prision mayor to 14y10m20d of reculsion temporal.
RATIO:
1. In concluding that carnal knowledge has taken place, full penetration of the
vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.
But the act of touching should be an inherent part of the entry of the penis
into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching of the external
surface for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ ie touching the
labia, there can be no consummated rape; there can only be attempted rape,
if not acts of lasciviousness.
2. Here, the prosecution failed to prove that Primo’s penis was able to
penetrate the victim’s vagina, however slight. The mother’s testimony that
she was able to see such penetration is doubtful because from her own
testimony, Primo was in a kneeling position with his hand on his penis
thereby making observation difficult, even if she were standing beside
them. Also, the victim merely shouted “Ayoko” and not “Arayko” so the
Court cannot anchor, as it did in previous cases, the conclusion that rape
was consummated on the victim’s testimony that she felt pain. Thus, the
Court cannot conclude w/o serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all
achieved; and cannot overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent.
3. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in
reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated. If not, the thin line that separates
attempted from consummated rape will significantly disappear. Under Art 6
in relation to Art 335, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All elements
of attempted rape have been established and the accused shall be convicted
of such.
 PEOPLE v. GALLO
September 29, 1999 | Per Curiam | Automatic Review (Resolution) | Rape

SUMMARY: Gallo was sentenced to death for qualified rape (daughter). He

sought to reopen the case because subsequent Court decisions held that
attendant circumstances in RA 7659, Sec 11 are special qualifying
circumstances that must be alleged in the information. SC granted the motion.
DOCTRINE: Special qualifying circumstances must be pleaded in the
indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.

FACTS:
1. The death penalty was imposed by the RTC on Romeo Gallo, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape. SC affirmed the decision
on Jan 22, 1998.
2. On Aug 24, 1999, Gallo filed a Motion to Reopen Case seeking a
modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. The reduction was
sought in line with new Court rulings (People v Garcia) that the attendant
circumstances introduced in RA 7659, Sec 11 should be considered as
special qualifying circumstances directly applicable to the crime of rape. If
not pleaded as such, they could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances.
3. The information filed against Gallo merely stated that he “willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13yo girl, Marites
Gallo y Segovia.” It did not specifically allege that the victim was his
daughter, although proven during the trial.

ISSUE/S: Won the Garcia doctrine should be applied retroactively—YES

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Death penalty modified to reclusion perpetua.

RATIO:
1. The Court retains control over a case until full satisfaction of the final
judgment conformable with the legal processes, and has the authority to
suspend execution or cause modification when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting law form part of the law of the
land. As such, the Garcia doctrine forms part of the penal statute and
assumes retroactive effect as it is favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already been
pronounced against him.
 PEOPLE v. BERANA
July 29, 1999 | Romero, J. | Automatic Review | Rape
SUMMARY: The accused raped her sister in law and he was sentenced to
death by the RTC pursuant to RA 7659 (below 18 and relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the 3rd civil degree). SC held that
DOCTRINE: The prosecution must establisha more stringent proof of
relationship between the offender and the offended party to be recognized as a
qualifying circumstance in rape that would increase the sentence to death.
FACTS:
1. On June 2, 1994, at 2 am, 14yo Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping with her
4yo niece when she was awakened by her brother-in-law Raul Berana. He
pointed a “buntot page” at her neck and warned her not to make any noise,
otherwise he would kill her. He then inserted his organ and she felt
excruciating pain, until she felt something liquid in her organ. Raul then sat
down and warned her not to talk to anyone about the incident. He then lay
on top of her a second time and made push-pull movements. He left at 2:30
in the morning.
2. After he left, the victim put on her clothes and immediately went to the
adjacent room to report the incident to her sister, Ma. Ana. They
immediately told their parents the story and she was brought to the
Provincial Hospital for medical examination, and to the police station
afterwards to report the incident. On June 3, an information was filed before
the RTC stating that the victim was “a minor, 14 years of age”. On June 6,
an amended information was filed stating that the accused was “a relative of
the offended party within the 3rd civil degree”.
3. Raul raised the defense that it was consensual. The TC did not give
credence to his testimony and found him guilty of qualified rape under RA
7659 where death is imposed whenever the victim is 18 years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3 rd civil degree.
neck, as a threat to her life, was sufficient to intimidate a young girl of 14 to
submit. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance. Also, the fact that he “asked” for sex the 2 nd time does not make
it consensual, for there was a continuing threat on her life.
2. However, the prosecution failed to adduce clear and positive proof of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
complainant. To effectively prosecute the accused for rape committed by a
relative by affinity w/in the 3rdcivil degree, it must be established that a) he
is legally married to complainant’s sister and b) complainant and the wife of
the accused are full or half blood siblings.Considering that the relationship
of accused to complainant qualifies the crime of rape punishable by
reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper that a more
stringent proof of relationship between the offender and the offended party
must be established by the prosecution.
Here, the relationship is not adequately substantiated for it is merely based
on the testimony of the complainant, “he is the husband of my sister”; the
testimony of the mother, “he is the husband of my daughter”; and the use of
the accused of “mama” and “papa” in his letters to his parents-in-law. Thus,
evidence presented are not sufficient to dispel doubts about the true
relationship of the accused and the complainant, to the benefit of which the
accused is entitled.

ISSUE/S: WoN the accused should be liable for qualified rape—NO

RULING: Sentence MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua.

RATIO:
1. Sub-issues (credibility): Raul argues that the TC should not have convicted
him of rape based solely on medical findings. SC held that the TC merely
considered the medical findings as corroborative evidence for the
complainant’s testimony that the accused had sexual intercourse with her.
Also, the absence of external injuries does not necessarily mean that there
was no forcible sexual intercourse, for the “buntot page” pointed at her
 PEOPLE v. TOMIO
September 30, 1991 | Davide, Jr, J. | Kidnapping &Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: Tomio and Nakajima, in connivance with policemen, framed
Japanese tourist Nagao for possession of marijuana, then indebted Nagao to
them by allegedly advancing bribe money to the police. They demanded
payment for the bribe and held him captive in several hotels, until they got
captured by the police when they were getting the ransom money from RCBC.
SC: Guilty.
DOCTRINE: Deprivation of liberty need not be through physical restraint // As
long as the accused demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a
person from captivity, that money is ransom // Essential ingredients of
kidnapping & serious illegal detention may be committed in various places.
FACTS:
1. Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese National and Buddhist priest who couldn’t
speak English or Tagalog, came to Manila alone for a 5 day tour and stayed
at the Holiday Inn. On May 2 1986, while he was having lunch at the
hotel’s coffee shop 2 Japanese men named Tomio (alias Sato Toshio) and
Mitamura approached his table asking if he was Japanese, then offered to be
his guides. They had dinner and before leaving the restaurant, one of the
two placed a pack of cigarettes on Nagao’s shirt pocket and instructed him
to wait so they could get a taxi. Suddenly, 5 policemen searched him, found
the pack of cigarettes, claimed it contained marijuana, and brought him to
the Southern police District Station.
2. While he was at the police station, Nakajima (alias Yamada) with Tomio
arrived and offered to be his interpreters. One of them told him that the
penalty for illegal possession of marijuana is 6-12 years imprisonment but
the policemen are willing to accept $100K in lieu of this. Nagao agreed and
accused told him that they have advanced the amount to the police. Nagao
then returned to his hotel escorted by Tomio and Nakajima and a
policeman, who didn’t allow him to leave the hotel and demanded that he
call his parents in Japan for the money allegedly advanced.
3. They transferred hotels several times, then to Nakajima’s Makati condo.
When Nagao called his dad, he learned that his father had already remitted
the money to the RCBC main branch in Makati. On May 12, the accused
brought him there where he withdrew the $1,850 and gave it to them. When
they exited the bank, the police from the Western Police District who was
called by the Japanese assembly arrested the accused. Tomio and Nakajima
were charged and convicted of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
w/ the penalty of death.
4. The accused claim that they were merely guarding Nagao, the money they
demanded was not ransom but payment of a loan, and that he could’ve left
them any time since they did not physically restrain him.
ISSUE: WON Nagao was deprived of his liberty despite lack of physical
restraint – YES.
WON the money demanded by the accused is ransom – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED. Tomio and Nakami guilty under A267.
RATIO:
1. It was true that between May 2-12. the accused never lost sight of Nagao
except for 1 time where he accompanied a girl out of the hotel to send her
off for 5-10 minutes. But Nagao was in a foreign country, with no relatives
nor close friends. He couldn’t speak English or Tagalog, all his money was
confiscated by the police, and his passport was held by the accused.
Besides, he sincerely believed that he was merely on a temporary leash
from the police who were poised to arrest him anytime if he didn’t pay the
bribe money. Besides the 6-12 years imprisonment, he’d suffer adverse
publicity as a Buddhist priest. Nagao knew that the only way he could
prevent any further restraint on his person was to pay the accused from the
remittance of his father in Japan. Even if the accused were not armed and
did not physically restrain his movements, all these circumstances taken
together created such fear which actually restrained him from doing what he
freely wanted to do and resulted in a deprivation of liberty.
2. The accused’s claim that the money involved wasn’t ransom money but
merely payment of hotel bills (accdg to Nakajima) or reimbursement of the
sum they advanced to pay the policemen and hotel accommodations
(Tomio) has no merit. And even if there really was just a simple loan
contract between the accused and Mr. Nagao, the fact that Nagao was
deprived of his liberty until the amount would’ve been fully paid to them is
still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. Ransom is defined as
money, price, or consideration paid or demanded from redemption of a
captured person, a payment that released from captivity. Hence as long as
the accused demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a
person from captivity, money is still ransom under the law.
3. On Jurisdiction: The court has jurisdiction. The essential ingredients of the
crime charged were committed in various places in Manila. Besides, the
accused’s active participation in the proceedings necessarily carried an
unqualified invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and authority.
 PEOPLE v. MERCADO
August 30, 1984 | Relova, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Kidnapping and
Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: Mercado dragged Yvonne Baylon into different places while
pointing a knife to her, demanding that they produce Susan, Yvonne’s sister
and Mercado’s girlfriend/common-law wife. The RTC convicted him for
illegal detention. SC affirmed the judgment.
DOCTRINE: Elements of illegal detention (See Ratio No. 1)
The crime cannot be of grave coercion if the victim was actually restrained or
deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of the accused
under Article 267 of the RPC.
FACTS:
1. Prosecution: Mercado grabbed Yvonne Baylon while the latter was
walking on the road at 8:30 am (Sept. 2, 1979) and pointed a knife to her,
dragging her to the house of his friend. When asked why he was acting that
way, he said that he was angry and he wanted to see Susan, Yvonne’s
younger sister and Mercado’s girlfriend who left for an unknown place. He
was of the belief that Yvonne was responsible for Susan’s leaving.
Yvonne’s brothers and some neighbors asked Mercado to let go of Yvonne
but the latter refused and even pointed the knife to Yvonne’s chest and
dragged her to a store where the police tried to talk to him. He demanded to
see Susan and some money and transportation. They were only able to free
Yvonne at about 12 noon after Mercado was subdued by the barrio captain.
Yvonne suffered certain injuries and wounds and because of the traumatic
experience, she lost consciousness and was taken to the hospital.
2. Defense: Mercado claims that Susan was his common-law wife and they
were living with her relatives. One day, Susan left and did not return home,
after which Yvonne asked Mercado to leave the house as well, which he
did. On Sept. 2, 1979 (8:30 am), Mercado saw Yvonne sitting in a store and
was holding a knife. A friend then warned him that Yvonne was about to
stab him from behind, so he grabbed the knife from her. When Mercado
why she wants to stab him, Yvonne told him that Susan was complaining
about him. It was when she was holding Yvonne and pointing the knife to
her that the barrio captain arrived. He said that he only wanted see and talk
to Susan and asked for transportation, but denied having asked for money.
The people ganged up on him when he lost the knife.
3. The trial court convicted Mercado of illegal detention under Article 267 of
the RPC. Mercado, argues among others, that he should have been
convicted of grave coercion only.
ISSUE/S: Whether the crime committed was illegal detention or grave coercion
– ILLEGAL DETENTION
RULING: CFI judgment affirmed. Mercado is credited with the period of his
preventive detention to be deducted from his sentence.
RATIO:
1. Elements of illegal detention (Article 267): (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present:
(1) That the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or
(2) That it is committed simulating public authority; or
(3) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(4) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.
2. In this case, the records are convincing enough that Mercado forcibly
brought Yvonne from place to place so that the latter would reveal the
whereabouts of Susan, his common-law wife. For almost five (5) hours, he
held Yvonne in a store before he was subdued. If it was true that it was
Yvonne who tried to stab Mercado and the latter succeeded in subduing the
same, the incident could not have lasted for several hours and attracted the
attention of people.
3. The crime cannot be of grave coercion only because the victim was actually
restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the
prosecution of the accused under Article 267 of the RPC.
4. Obfuscation arising from desire to compel Susan to live with Mercado
cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused since their relationship was
illegitimate (it must arise from lawful sentiments).
 PEOPLE v. DEL SOCORRO
February 15, 1990 | Padilla, J. | Appeal from RTC judgment | Kidnapping and
Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: Del Socorro took Clairea 4-year old child while the latter was
playing outside their house without permission from the parents. She then gave
Claire to a doctor in exchange for a sum of money. The RTC convicted her for
kidnapping. SC affirmed the judgment.
DOCTRINE: Kidnapping is committed by a private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed if the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
See also RA 7610 on child trafficking.
FACTS:
1. On Feb. 11, 1984, Claire Sanchez, the 4-year old daughter of Evelyn
Sanchez, disappeared while playing with other children in their
neighborhood. During that time, Claire’s mother was inside the house
cooking lunch. After cooking, she called Claire but there was no response,
so she went outside but Claire was nowhere to be found. The children in the
neighborhood, when asked, told that a woman (later identified to be Leticia
de Del Socorro) took Claire, who resisted, and got on board a jeepney.
Evelyn then informed the Mandaluyong police about this.
2. Several days after, Evelyn got information that a child was sold to a doctor
(identified to be Dr. ApoloniaVillamayor) in Angono, Rizal which fitted the
description of Claire. Dr. Villamayor declared that Del Socorro went to her
(11:30 pm of Feb. 11, 1984) and said that the child was her (Del Socorro)
daughter and she had to give her away because she was already widowed
and cannot take care of her four children. Del Socorro asked for Php 700 as
a donation to enable her to open a small sari-sari store. Out of pity, the
doctor gave her Php 400 and asked her to come back some other day for the
balance. Villamayor then gave the child to her aunt Lourdes Saguinsin.
3. Evelyn, together with policemen, went to the doctor who told them that the
child was with her aunt. The child was then taken from Villamayor’s aunt
and brought back to Evelyn. Villamayor also advised Evelyn and the police
not to leave immediately since Del Socorro will be coming back to collect
some money.
4. Del Socorro, as expected, went back to the doctor and was arrested by the
police. She admitted having brought the child to the doctor out of pity
because the child was crying and the child did not point to particular place
or direction when asked where she lived. She also argues that the child went
with her voluntarily and denied that she asked for a sum of money. She was
charged and convicted for kidnapping. On appeal, Del Socorro mainly
questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies of the witnesses affect their credibility – NO
RULING: RTC judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
1. While there may be inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, such are not substantial as to destroy their
credibility. The alleged variance refers to minor details which would tend to
show the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between
them. Furthermore, these witnesses had no motive to falsify the truth and
impute Del Socorro, whom they met only on the occasion complained of,
the commission of an offense as grave as kidnapping of a minor child.
2. Del Socorro’s claim that Claire went with voluntarily is not credible since
Claire herself told her mother Evelyn (upon their reunion) that she did not
go with Del Socorro. Furthermore, when Evelyn asked the children in the
neighborhood whether Claire resisted the woman who took her, the children
answered the in affirmative that Del Socorro had to carry Claire to the jeep.
3. Furthermore, if Del Socorro was really sincere and pitied the child she
described as crying on the sidewalk, she should have brought the child to
the police station at once.
4. Obiter: The Court urges the prosecution of those persons to whom children
are being sold for a valuable consideration. Normally, it is only the
kidnapper who is prosecuted, yet those to whom the child is given go scot-
free even if they wittingly or unwittingly provided the motivation for
kidnappers, even for good intentions. The Court argues that these people
may be held liable for serious illegal detention.
NOTE:
The accused was found guilty of kidnapping under the RPC. However, the crime
committed would be child trafficking under RA 7610, also known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
(approved June 17, 1992)
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with
children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money,
or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age.
 PEOPLE v. LIM
October 18, 1990 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. | Appeal from RTC Decision | Kidnapping
and Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: Carmen Lim allegedly illegally detained the complainant’s
daughters. TC found her guilty but SC reversed, holding that the prosecution
failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: The fact of detention, where physical restraint or restraint from
communication is imposed, is an essential element in kidnapping.
FACTS:
1. The TC found Carmen Lim guilty of kidnapping and sentenced her to
reclusion perpetua. The court relied on the prosecution’s version: On July
1, 1986, Aida and Avelyn Villanueva, 10 and 7 yo, were sent on an errand
by their father in Masbate, Masbate. They stayed there until noon to meet
their mother who they thought would arrive by boat from Manila. When she
did not arrive, they watched a movie at Helen Theatre, and at 2pm, Carmen
Lim called them over, fed them and let them bathe. For 2 weeks, Aida did
household chores for Carmen while Avelyn was brought to Cebu by
Carmen’s co-accused. On July 15, the father demanded return of the
children but Carmen refused. The next day, he brought Sgt. Ariate of the PC
with him and was able to get Aida. He filed a complaint for kidnapping on
July 23.
2. Appellant claims that the children were driven away by their father and she
took them in out of pity and offered shelter.
a 10yo girl who was detained against her will for 2 weeks and tried to
escape. The best test for measuring the value of a witness is its conformity
with the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
3. There was also an unexplained delay in lodging the complaint against the
accused (1 week).
4. Furthermore, Carmen had no motive to kidnap the 2 children—she was a
woman of sufficient means who employed 2 maids and so she could easily
afford to hire another without going to the extent of committing a crime as
serious as kidnapping. Though proof of motive is not indispensable to
conviction, a void in the evidence in this respect discloses a weakness in the
case for the prosecution.
5. The father also filed an affidavit of desistance admitting that his daughters
were not detained after all. While desistance by the complainant does not
necessarily operate to acquit the accused, it might create serious doubts as
to the liability of the accused.

ISSUE/S: Won Lim is guilty of kidnapping—NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Lim ACQUITTED.

RATIO: The evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a

conviction:
1. There is no kidnapping in this case, the 2 minors having voluntarily entered
her residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention is an
essential element in kidnapping. Here, there was no showing of actual
confinement or restriction of the person. The residence had a store fronting
a busy street and there was no indication that she was physically restrained
or unable to communicate with anyone. Also, Sgt. Ariate’s testimony saying
that Aida went inside when he saw her, shows that she had free access to go
in and out of the house; and could’ve ran.
2. Aida’s testimony, where she claims that she attempted to escape 3x, is also
doubtful. When Aida saw her father, she did not inexplicably shout or cling
to him, rather, she observed him quietly. This was not a natural reaction for
 PEOPLE v. PADICA
April 7, 1993 | Regalado, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Kidnapping and
Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: The Marajas brothers killed Banaga in a sugarcane plantation,
and afterwards demanded ransom from the victim’s father. The RTC convicted
Leon Marajas of kidnapping for ransom with murder. The SC held that he is
only liable for murder.
DOCTRINE: Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic
purpose to kill, the crime is only murder even if, before the killing but for
purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another.
Mere fact of demanding ransom does not qualify the crime to kidnapping. It is
essential that the element of deprivation or restraint of victim’s liberty must be
present.
FACTS:
1. Francis went to a trip with Eddie Boy Marajas, a classmate and playmate.
Along with them on the said trip was Eddie Boy’s brothers, Leopoldo and
Leon, Jr. The car was being driven by Romeo Padica.
2. Upon reaching Calamba at 12 noon of Feb. 8, 1978, the group stopped at a
sugarcane plantation and the Marajas brothers forced Banaga out of the car
when the latter refused to get down. They then brought Banaga inside the
plantation (almost 10 m away from the car), where Leopoldo stabbed
Banaga several times after which Leon shot him with a handgun. While the
incident was happening, Padica remained inside the car.
3. After the incident, the Marajas brothers went back to the car and Leopoldo
drove the same back to Muntinlupa, where they left Padica with a warning
(“Isang bala ka lang”).
4. Later in the afternoon of the same day, Tomas Banaga, Francis’ father,
received a phone call demanding Php 500K for Francis’ release. He then
reported this to the Philippine Constabulary in Camp Crame. Tomas
subsequently received two more phone calls in the next two days, lowering
the amount demanded to Php 200K and then Php 23K. He was also given
instructions on the delivery of the money.
5. Norma Camello, Tomas’ sister-in-law, volunteered to deliver the money
and went to the place pursuant to the caller’s instructions. When Leon
showed up to get the money, he told Norma to wait for Francis at their
house, and when he was about to leave with the money, the police officers
who accompanied Norma apprehended and arrested Leon. The next day, the
P.C., together with Leon, went to the plantation where Francis’ body was
left, and Leon pointed to them where they dumped the cadaver.
6. After 3 years of hiding for fear of his life, Padica surrendered to the
authorities after revealing that he witnessed the killing of Francis Banaga.
Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, FlorentinoFabrigas, Romeo
Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and LeopoldoMarajas were originally charged
with kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms.
Padica was later discharged from the information to be utilized as state
witness. Leon, on the other hand, entered a plea of guilty after arraignment
upon amended information, for which he was found guilty for kidnapping
for ransom with murder. Separate charges for illegal possession of firearms
were filed in the Makati RTC but were later archived sometime in 1985.
7. As a defense, Leon argues that he was in Batangas when the victim
disappeared and that he is a victim of frame-up by people tasked to
investigate the case.
ISSUE/S: Whether the crime committed is kidnapping for ransom with murder
or murder only – MURDER only
RULING: RTC judgment set aside. Marajas is guilty of murder only.
RATIO:
1. Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill,
the crime is only murder even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof,
the victim was taken from one place to another.
2. Mere fact that the accused demanded ransom does not qualify the crime to
kidnapping. It is essential that the element of deprivation or restraint of
victim’s liberty must be present. Absent the primary intent to deprive or
restrain the victim’s liberty and the duration of such restraint for an
appreciable period of time, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement
would at most constitute coercion.
3. In this case, the demand for ransom appears to be an afterthought on the
part of the accused since it was only done hours after the killing. There is no
evidence that can show that they intended to exchange Francis’ freedom for
money. It appears that even from the start, what they intended was to kill
Francis and not to confine or detain him for any length of time.
4. Furthermore, Francis was not unlawfully coerced nor forced to go with his
would-be killers. He voluntarily went with them to Calamba, since he had
every reason to trust them since the Marajases were their neighbors and
Eddie Boy was a classmate and playmate.
5. The killing was aggravated by treachery, abuse of superior strength (but this
will be absorbed in treachery) and uninhabited place (although this final
circumstance was not alleged in the information but nonetheless duly
proved). There was a sudden and unexpected attack on the victim rendering
the latter unable to resist and escape, and it was committed in an isolated
place (sugarcane plantation) at a time of the day (12 noon) when no
passersby and assistance would be expected.
6. The defense of alibi cannot prosper because Leon was not able to establish
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the
crime happened. It is not enough to show that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed. His statement that he was more or less in
Batangas is uncorroborated and he is not even sure of his whereabouts.
7. Furthermore, as to his denial that he was entrapped, the police report
clearly states the fact that Leon was caught in an entrapment operation
prepared for the purpose, and the veracity of such record further enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which Leon
failed to rebut. Also, Norma and the police officer who was with her clearly
identified Leon as the one they saw at Luneta.
 PEOPLE v. RAMOS
October 12, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Review of CA decision | Kidnapping and
Illegal Detention
SUMMARY: Alicia was kidnapped by appellant Ramos and was subsequently
killed by the appellant. Court held that appellant was guilty of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and not of two separate
crimes (Kidnapping for Ransom, Murder) or one complexed under Art 48. As
such the maximum penalty is imposed.
DOCTRINE: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. Where the person kidnapped is killed in
the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide
can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
FACTS
1. The victim, Alicia Abanilla, was the godmother of the accused, Ramos,
during his wedding. On 13 July 1994, Alicia was kidnapped by Ramos for
money and was subsequently killed.
2. At around 6:30AM of 13 July 1994, Alicia was seen by Malcolm Bradshaw
– an American pastor taking his daughter Michele to school – struggling to
break away from Ramos. Bradshaw tried to help Alicia but both Alicia and
Ramos were able to enter his car. When the car was flagged by a policeman,
Ramos pulled out a gun and ordered Bradshaw to go straight ahead. Upon
arriving at Project 4, Ramos got off and pulled Alicia out of the car. Alicia
clung to Michelle muttering, “God bless you. Pray for me and notify my
family.” and to Bradshaw that, “I will probably not get out of this with my
life. Tell my family my situation.” Bradshaw later found a receipt dropped
by Alicia on his car's floor containing her contact information to inform her
family of the situation. Sometime later at 7:15AM, Atty. Del Rosario
received a call from Alicia asking for P200k and telling him to give it to
Inday to be delivered to her at Glori Supermart in Sikatuna.
3. At around 7:30 AM, Ramos and Alicia boarded a cab driven by Pineda. For
P700 Pineda agreed to wait for them at GloriSupermart so he could take
them later to Norzagaray, Bulacan. Inday arrived at Glori Supermart and
gave an envelope with the money to Pineda upon seeing Alicia in the car.
Ramos then told Pineda to go to Norzagaray. Along Commonwealth, the
destination changed to Bocaue instead. At Bocaue, Pineda found out that
Ramos had a gun. Upon seeing Ramos straggling Alicia, he told them to take
another ride because “bakamapadamayakodiyan”. Ramos then ordered
Pineda to take them to MacArthur HW to get another ride. Upon reaching
MacArthur HW, Pineda stopped his cab upon seeing Gil Domanias, a traffic
aide with a gun, and reported to the traffic aide what has transpired.
4. When Domanias approached the car, Alicia told him that Ramos was armed
with a revolver and was hurting her. At that moment Ramos pulled out his
gun prompting Domanais and Pineda to run away and take cover. Ramos
then transferred to the driver's seat and drove the cab away. Alicia tried to
jump out of the cab but her blouse got caught and she got dragged. Ramos
suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Alicia attempted to rise, he aimed his gun
at the back of his hapless victim, fired at her twice, hitting her just above her
nape. Domanais, who was armed with a .38 caliber pistol and witnessing the
shooting, fired at Ramos; but he missed him. Then he called for police
assistance as Ramos fled on foot. Later, Ramos was apprehended by the
police who confiscated his .22 caliber Smith and Wesson Magnum with four
(4) live ammunitions and two (2) spent shells, and recovered a bag
containing – P138,630.00 consisting of 1k and 500 bills.
5. Prior to being killed, there were three instances showing that Alicia wanted
to escape from Ramos – (1) when she was found by Bradshaw struggling, (2)
when Pineda saw that she was opening and closing the doors to the cab, and
(3) when she jumped out of the cab after Ramos took the wheel. There were
also instances showing that she feared for her life – (1) when she told
Bradshaw she may not get out of the ordeal alive, (2) when she told Atty.
Del Rosario that she may not be able to go home anymore without the
money, (3) during the trip to Bulacan when Pineda noticed that she was very
pale and seemed afraid, and (4) when she told Pineda not to leave her with
Ramos because Ramos will kill her.
6. Ramos was charged with the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder. He was found guilty by the trial court of two crimes – (1)
kidnapping for ransom, and (2) murder – holding that there was no proof that
the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to make the
offense a complex crime.
7. Ramos appealed arguing that kidnapping was never sufficiently established,
that the victim was not under detention at any moment nor was she deprived
in any manner of her liberty, and that if there was pressure or force on the
victim it did not amount to a deprivation of liberty but was merely a matter
of persuasion that moved the victim to go with him voluntarily.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the accused is guilty of kidnapping – YES
2. WON the accused is guilty of murder – YES
3. WON the accused is guilty of two separate crimes – NO
RULING: Accused is found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE COMPLEX CRIME of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER
under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH with damages.

RATIO:
1. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art.
267 of RPC, as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659 is the actual deprivation
of the victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part
of the malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended party's liberty. The
term "actual deprivation of liberty" consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure but also of detaining a person or depriving him in any manner
of his liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended
party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is
enough that, as in the instant case, she was in any manner deprived of her
liberty, unable to move and get out as she pleased, proven by the instances
when she wanted to escape from Ramos. The argument that Ramos did not
ask for ransom but was only borrowing money with a request from the
victim to accompany him to Bulacan is untenable since from all indications,
no other logical meaning can be ascribed to the victim's statement to Atty.
Del Rosario than that the money was intended as ransom, i.e., as
consideration for her release from captivity.
2. However, the accused is not guilty of two separate crimes as the trial court
decided but rather of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER as provided by RA 7659 amending Art 267
RPC by adding that “When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.” This means that where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be
treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime.
Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already consummated
with the mere demand by the accused for ransom - even before the ransom
was delivered - the deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and
continued to persist until such time that she was killed by accused-appellant
while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be considered "a
consequence of the kidnapping for ransom." The imposition of the death
penalty is warranted.
 PEOPLE v. VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY
October 30, 1996 | Kapunan, J. | Appeal | Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor
SUMMARY: Doctors Vicente and Carmen Ty were charged with kidnapping
and failure to return a minor after entrusting a baby who was confined in their
hospital to persons other than the baby's parents. The court acquitted the
doctors after finding out that the doctors gave up the child for guardianship
because of their earnest desire to help the child.
DOCTRINE: Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor
under Article 270 of the RPC can be had, two elements must concur: a) that the
offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor and b) the offender
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential
element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor
but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title
of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said
failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be
persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid
of the courts in order to obtain custody.
FACTS:
1. On November 18, 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her sick 7-month old
baby, Arabella, to the clinic owned by doctors Vicente and Carmen Ty. The
doctors advised the mother to confine the baby, to which the mother
acceded. The mother however, did not have enough money to pay the
hospital bill and confided that no one would take care of the child at home
because she was working. The child was left to the care of the clinic nursery
but the bills started accumulating so the mother hired a 'yaya' instead. From
then on, nothing was heard of the mother.
2. In 1989, Dr. Mallonga suggested that the child be entrusted to a guardian.
The child was given to Dr. Mallonga's aunt, LilibethNeri.
3. In 1992, 5 years after she abandoned her child, Johanna came back to claim
her daughter. When her pleas went unanswered, she filed a petition for
habeas corpus against the Tys. The petition was denied so she filed a
criminal case which was also denied. She then filed a petition for habeas
corpus against the alleged guardians of the child. The TC ordered the
guardians to return the child—named Cristina Grace-- but the decision was
reversed when the CA found that the child Johanna was claiming was not
her daughter.
4. The Tys appealed to resolve the issue of WoN they were guilty of
kidnapping
ISSUE/S: WoN Doctors Vicente and Carmen Ty were guilty of kidnapping and
failing to return the minor child Arabella – NO
RULING: Vicente and Carmen Ty are ACQUITTED and ordered released
unless they are being detained for other lawful causes.
RATIO:
1. The child Johanna was claiming, Cristina, was already under the custody of
the guardians in 1988. Arabella was still at the clinic in 1989 when Johanna
visited. Since Johanna has not been established by evidence to be entitled to
the custody of Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said
that the Tys unlawfully withheld from Johanna the rightful custody over
Cristina.
2. Even if Cristina and Arabella were one and the same person, the two
elements of kidnapping and failure to return a minor must concur: that the
offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor and b) the
offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians.
The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the
custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping
of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians. By the use of the word deliberate, the
idea is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives for the act and its
consequences, the nature of the crime, or other things connected with his
intentions, with a view to a decision thereon; that he carefully considers all
these, and that the act is not suddenly committed. It implies that the
perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are
called into use by deliberation and the consideration and weighing of
motives and consequences.
3. In the case at bar, there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant’s child to her.
When the Dr. Carmen Ty learned that Johanna wanted her daughter back
after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to
help Johanna find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic’s
care. Dr. Carmen Ty contacted Dr. Mallonga who was already in Bahrain to
ask for the whereabouts of the child. Dr. Ty in fact found the child and
asked the child's guardians to return the child to her mother. The guardians
refused.
4. The efforts taken by the doctors to help the Johanna in finding the child
clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on
their part to restore the child to her mother. It is worthy to note that the
doctors' conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic’s care up
to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by
 nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for
her welfare and well-being.
LAMERA v. CA
June 5, 1991 | Davide, Jr, J. | Review of CA decision | Abandonment of One’s
Victim
SUMMARY: Lamera hit and bumped Reyes causing injuries to the latter and
to Gonzal as well as damage to Reyes’ tricycle. He was separately charged for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries (Art. 365) and abandonment of one’s victim (Art. 275 (2)). Lamera
argues that his prosecution to the former will bar prosecution to the latter,
invoking plea of double jeopardy. SC denied petition for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE: Protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or
more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of lawand if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does notan
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.
FACTS:
1. On March 14, 1985 (8:30 pm), Antonio Lamera was driving an owner-type
jeep and allegedly “hit and bumped” a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and
PaulinoGonzal. Lamera was also said to have failed to render assistance to
Gonzal and Reyes.
2. Two informations were filed against Lamera. One was for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries
under Article 365 of the RPC (filed on Sept. 10, 1985); and another for
violation of par. 2 of Article 275 (abandonment of one’s victim) (filed on
Nov. 14, 1985).
3. On June 29, 1987, Lamera was found guilty of the charge under Article 275
by the Pasig MTC. On appeal decided to the Pasig RTC on July 31, 1987,
the MTC decision was affirmed with a reduction as to the penalty. On the
other hand, on Apr. 27, 1989, Lamera was arraigned for the charge for
reckless imprudence, to which he pleaded not guilty.
4. Still unsatisfied with the ruling on the case of abandonment of one’s victim,
Lamera appealed to the CA, which the appellate court dismissed along with
the subsequent MR in its Resolution. Lamera files this petition to the SC on
the grounds of double jeopardy, that he cannot be prosecuted for two
offenses arising from a single act, and that his prosecution for reckless
imprudence will bar the prosecution for abandonment of one’s victim.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner’s contention regarding double jeopardy is
meritorious – NO
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
1. Double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused
The information for reckless imprudence was filed first before that for
abandonment of one’s victim. Lamera, however, was convicted for
abandonment of one’s victim on June 29, 1987, and he was only arraigned
for the charge of reckless imprudence on April 27, 1989. Double jeopardy
will not attach since he was not yet arraigned for the first offense charged
when he was convicted for the second offense.
2. Protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more)
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other.
3. Lamera is being charged for two separate offenses under the RPC. Reckless
imprudence falls under Quasi-Offenses (Book II RPC) and is committed by
means of culpa. Abandonment of one’s victim falls under Crime Against
Personal Liberty and Security and is committed by means of dolo.
4. Under Article 365 of the RPC, failure to help one’s victim is not an offense
in itself or an element of the crime being penalized by the provision. It
merely increases the penalty for criminal imprudence or negligence by one
degree.
NOTE:
The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the ‘same offense’ (1) where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or (2)
where the second offense is an attempt to commit the firstor a frustration thereof. Thus,
for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical
elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the
second offense (People v. Relova et al).
 PEOPLE v. TIMBOL can’t be considered separate and independent from the crime of acts of
April 8, 1949 | Endencia, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Grave Threats lasciviousness.

SUMMARY:Timbol misrepresented himself as a CID Officer to be left alone

with Francisca, and threatened that he or his companion would kill her husband
downstairs if he didn’t comply with his lewd designs. 2 criminal complaints
were filed against him for acts of lasciviousness and grave threats. SC: Acts of
lasciviousness only.
DOCTRINE: Grave threats, when committed merely as an element of
intimidation to succeed in the accused’s lewd designs, is absorbed under Acts
of Lasciviousness.

FACTS:
1. Nicolas Timbol went with Rufino Flores to the latter’s house, where Rufino
introduced his wife Francisca Garcia. The accused then falsely identified
himself as a member of the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) and
asked Flores to leave so he could ask her some question.
2. When they were alone, Timbol asked her if her husband Rufino is a
member of the Huks, which she denied. Timbol then insisted that Rufino
was a Huk and then came near her with the intention of kissing her.
Francisca pushed him and was about to shout, but Tomio warned her that if
she did, Francisco would be killed by his companion. He tried to lift her
skirt and touch her private parts, but the girl relentlessly struggled and then
shouted. Tomio threatened to kill her husband but said that if she acceded to
his desire, no harm will come to Rufino. Due to her resistance, Tomio
instead proposed that he’d leave them alone if Francisca meets with him the
next day at Cine Illusion.
3. Two criminal complaints were filed against Timbol, one for lasciviousness
and another for grave threats. However, later on Rufino (but not Francisca)
pardoned Timbol. Timbol now alleges that he should be acquitted because
of the alleged pardon by the offended party.

ISSUE/S: WON Timbol is liable for the the felony of Grave threats – NO.

RULING: MODIFIED. Timbol guilty of acts of lasciviousness, acquitted from

criminal complaint of grave threats.

RATIO:
1. Timbol was forgiven by the offended party’s husband, not Francisca
herself. Besides, a pardon given after the presentation of the complaint will
not exonerate the accused.
2. The threats employed by Timbol were merely an element of intimidation he
used to succeed in his lewd designs against Francisca. Hence, said threats
 REYES v. PEOPLE
March 28, 1969 | Makalintal, J. | Certiorari | Grave Threats
SUMMARY: Rosauro Reyes led a demonstration against the person who
caused his dismissal from service. He also threatened to kill the person. The
court held that Reyes was guilty of grave threats but not of oral defamation.
DOCTRINE: All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were
present as shown by the facts of the case: (1) that the offender threatened
another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such
wrong amounted to crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Also, the particular manner in which the threat is made is not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word “orally”
did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally.
FACTS:
1. Rosauro Reyes was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange in
Cavite whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. He led a
demonstration in front of the Naval Station against the persons who caused
his dismissal, Agustin Hallare and Frank Nolan. They brought placards
bearing statements such as, “Agustin, mamatay ka”, “Frank do not be such a
common funk”, “Agustin, mamamatay ka rin” and others.
2. Col Patricio Monzon, the Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley
point, talked to Reyes and learned that the demonstration was not directed at
the naval station but at Hallare and Nolan. Monzon suggested that Reyes
demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence but Reyes assured Monzon that
they only wanted to let the people in the station know how they felt about
Hallare and Nolan and “they just wanted to blow off steam”.
3. At that time, Hallare was in his office. When he learned about the
demonstration, he became apprehensive of his safety and sought Col.
Monzon's protection. Monzon escorted them home in his car but
purposefully slowed down in front of Reyes and company to show Hallare
the placards. When the demonstrators saw Hallare, they shouted “Mabuhay
si Agustin”, boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One overtook the car
and two trailed behind. When Hallare alighted at his residence, Monzon
sped away. The jeeps parked in front of Hallare's residence. Rosauro went
out of his jeep, went to Hallare's gate and shouted repeatedly, “Agustin,
putangina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin, papatayin kita.” Agustin,
fearing for his life, stayed in the house. After that, Reyes and company left
the premises.
4. Reyes was charged with grave threats and oral defamation. He pleaded not
guilty to both charges. Hallare's counsel amended the information for grave
threats by deleting the word “orally” to which Reyes' counsel objected on
the ground that it would materially affect Reyes' interest. The amendment
was allowed. The TC and the CA convicted Reyes.
ISSUE/S: WoN Reyes committed the crimes of grave threats and oral
defamation – YES for grave threats, NO for oral defamation
RULING: Reyes is acquitted for oral defamation but is GUILTY of grave
threats.
RATIO:
1. All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were present as
shown by the facts of the case: (1) that the offender threatened another
person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong
amounted to crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. It
is to be noted that under Art. 282, the particular manner in which the threat
is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of
the word “orally” did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as
charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution
that the accused threatened to kill Hallare so as to require Reyes to undergo
any material change or modification in his defense. The amendment did not
make Reyes liable under paragraph 1 of Art 282 because there was no
allegation that the threats were subject to a condition. The deletion of the
word “orally” was effected in order to make the information conformable to
the evidence to be presented during the trial.
2. The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in front of the
main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by
petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats
were made “with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the
person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." The
threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger.
Hence, the CA was correct in convicting Reyes of grave threats.
3. The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words,
“Agustin, putangina mo”. This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case,
it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
 TIMONER v. PEOPLE
November 25, 1983 | Escolin, J. | Petition to Review CA Decision | Grave 2. Additionally, even without judicial abatement, the mayor is empowered by
Coercion Art 699 of the Civil Code to do so. Art 699: Remedies against a public
nuisance: 1) prosecution under the RPC or any local ordinance, 2) civil
SUMMARY: Timoner, accompanied by 2 uniformed policemen and 6 action, 3) abatement, without judicial proceedings. Here, the mayor merely
laborers, barricaded stalls along Maharlika highway upon recommendation by implemented the recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having
the Municipal Health Officer. They were convicted of grave coercion—SC acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, he incurred no criminal
reversed. liability.
DOCTRINE:3 elements of grave coercion: 1) a person is prevented from 3. The three elements of grave coercion are: 1) that any person be prevented
doing something not prohibited by law, 2) effected by violence to control the by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
will of the offended party, and 3) that the person who restrained had no right to something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or
do so. compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display
of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended
FACTS: party, and 3) that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another
1. At 10 pm, Jose Timoner, mayor of Daet, accompanied by 2 uniformed had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made
policemen and 6 laborers, arrived in the front of the stalls along Maharlika under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
highway. The mayor ordered the laborers to nail together lumber slabs to In the present case, the third element is missing because the mayor had the
fence off the stalls w/c protruded into the sidewalk of the highway. Among authority and duty to maintain peace and order within his jurisdiction. Thus,
the structures barricaded were the barbershop of complainant Dayaon and he cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
the store of Rebustillos.
2. These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal
Health Officer for noncompliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements.
3. Thereafter, Timoner filed a complaint against Rebustillos and others in the
CFI for judicial abatement of their stalls, alleging that these constituted
public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. The court agreed and declared
the stalls, constructed on the highway, as nuisances per se for being a
menace to the general public passing through the street, being unsanitary,
and unsightly and ugly structures.
4. Subsequently, Dayaon charged them with grave coercion in the MTC, and
the mayor was convicted as principal by inducement.

ISSUE/S: WoNTimoner is guilty of grave coercion—NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Timoner is ACQUITTED.

RATIO:
1. The Court held that the stalls constituted nuisance as defined in the Civil
Code: Art 694: A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property w/c 1) injures or endangers health of safety, 2) annoys
or offends the senses, 3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality, 4)
obstructs or interferes with free passage of any highway or street, 5) hinders
or impairs the use of property.
 LEE v. CA and PELAGIA DE CHIN
September 6, 1991 | Medialdea, J. | Certiorari | Grave Coercion
SUMMARY: Francis Lee shouted and threatened to file charges against Maria
Chin unless and until she returned the money she swindled from Pacific
banking corporation. Chin was allegedly threatened to sign several documents.
The court held that grave coercion did not exist in the case.
DOCTRINE: The force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct
against the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and threaten
grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being committed.
That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened in praesenti. It must be a force
threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of
the unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from which he
cannot then withdraw in safety.
FACTS:
1. Maria Chin was fetched from her house by an employee of Pacific Banking
Corporation under the instructions of its Manager, Francis Lee. Upon
arriving at the bank, Lee did not attend to Chin immediately. An hour later,
Lee confronted Chin about a forged Midland National Check which Chin
deposited in the account of her uncle. During the said confrontation, Lee
was shouting at Chin and with piercing looks threatened to file charges
against Chin unless and until Chin returned all the money equivalent of the
subject check. Chin was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip and an
affidavit where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and
had her return the money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay
at the bank, Chin who was 5 mos pregnant was watched by the bank's
employees and guards.
2. Lee averred that Chin's version of the story was wrong. He said that he
failed to immediately attend to Chin because he had other clients to attend
to and that Chin was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip but that
she acted freely and voluntarily in executing the affidavit and in returning
the money equivalent of the check.
ISSUE/S: WoN the acts of Lee in shouting at Chin with piercing looks and
threats to file charges against her are sufficient to convict him of the crime of
grave coercion – NO
RULING: Lee is ACQUITTED of the crime of grave coercion.
RATIO:
1. Art. 286 of the RPC provides that “The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his
will whether it be right or wrong. If the coercion is committed for the
purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent
him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.” The
present case however does not involve violence but intimidation so the
court cited Art 1335 of the Civil Code.
2. The CA emphasized the pregnancy and the gender of Chin but it overlooked
that Chin is a Business Administration graduate and finished a semester in
graduate school. The CA also overlooked Chin's active participation in the
deposit and withdrawal of funds of the controversial check. It was found
that Chin, using her connections had the check cleared and the proceeds
credited to her uncle's account. She later withdrew the money. In light of
these circumstances, Lee's demand that Chin return the proceeds of the
check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not improper as
it is a practice to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress
so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do so.
3. The court also distinguished between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and against his good judgement and where he gives no
consent at all. The circumstances revealed that Chin, despite her
protestations, voluntarily, albeit reluctantly consented to disclose her time
deposit, sign the withdrawal slip and the affidavit. Chin's lengthy stay at the
bank was not due to Lee's threat but was due to her desire to prove her
innocence. She disclosed her time deposit account and grudgingly returned
the money to show good faith. It was also not Lee who suggested the
encashment of her time deposit but her sister and it was not Lee who agreed
to the sister's suggestion but the PRO Manager of the Foreign Department
of the bank.
4. Chin also claimed that her freedom of movement was restrained. She
however, was able to move about freely and the guards made no overt acts
of preventing her from leaving despite Lee's loud threats.
5. The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that Chin
refused to sign the promissory note in spite of Lee's threats. American
authorities have declared that the force threatening great bodily harm must
remain constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant. In the
case at bar, Chin's acts were geared towards proving her good faith. She was
willing to return the money she took up to the amount where her
involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have to
reimburse the full amount, she refused to cooperate further.
Notwithstanding Lee's threats, Chin did not budge. Also, Chin merely asked
for the receipt of the amount she deposited rather than the cancellation of
her earlier withdrawal. She also claims that she did not insist on the return
of the money because she felt that it was the only way for her to leave. This
 however, was belied by Chin's later actuations where they went out
unescorted to eat their snack and Lee asked them to return but they did not.
PEOPLE v. REYES
August 23, 1934 | Hull, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Unjust Vexation
SUMMARY: Appellants constructed a fence late at night in front of a chapel
where a pabasa was being held, such that the pabasa was disrupted and
property was broken and disturbed. They were charged and convicted of
offending religious feelings. The SC held that they were not guilty of offending
religious feelings, but rather unjust vexation.
DOCTRINE: The circumstances under which the act is committed may be
determinative as to whether or not there was unjust vexation.
RATIO:
1. Art 133 punishes acts “notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful”.
Constructing a fence, although irritating and vexatious under the
circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as
“notoriously offensive to the faithful”. Normally such an act would be a
matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter how
religious they might be. The offense, if any, committed by appellants is
“unjust vexation” under Art 287.
2. While appellants argue that the act of building a fence was innocent and
simply to protect property rights, it is clearly a mere pretense, as shown by
the circumstances under which the fence was constructed, i.e. late at night
and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to
celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the
appellants saw fit to introduce as a false alibi as their defense.

FACTS:
1. During the pabasa (chanting the life, passion and death of Christ in an
assembly during Lent) on the evening of 10 April 1933, appellants Procopio
Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari,
Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio and Rufino Matias arrived at the chapel
where the pabasa was being held and started constructing a barbed wire
fence in front of the chapel.
2. The chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, Alfonso Castillo,
tried to stop them by reminding them that it was Holy Week and their
actions were highly improper. A verbal altercation ensued. The people
attending the pabasa and those eating in the yard became excited and left
the place in such hurry and confusion that dishes and saucers were broken
and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and not resumed
until an investigation was conducted by the police the following morning.
3. Appellants were charged with and convicted for violating Art 133
(Offending Religious Feelings). The appellants were partisans of the
Clemente family, who had informally donated the land on which the old
chapel was erected; when it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected
and there was then a dispute as to whether or not the new chapel was
impinging on the land belonging to the Clemente family.

ISSUE/S: WoN the appellants were correctly charged and convicted for
offending religious feelings – NO

RULING: Judgment modified.

 PEOPLE v. AŇONUEVO aggravating circumstance of committing it in a place dedicated to religious
January 25, 1937 | Bengzon, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Unjust Vexation worship.

SUMMARY: Appellant forcibly embraced, kissed and fondled 16 y/o Rosita

during a salve in church. He denied committing such acts and claimed that the
suit was merely filed against him because Rosita’s lover, Augusto Ibarbia, was
trying to stop him from courting Rosita. He was convicted of abusos
deshonestos. The Court held that absent clear proof as to motive and
considering the circumstances, he should be held liable for unjust vexation
with aggravating circumstance of committing it in a place dedicated to
religious worship.
DOCTRINE: The circumstances under which the act is committed may be
determinative as to whether or not there was unjust vexation.

FACTS:
1. Immediately after the Flores de Mayo procession on the night of 30 May
1935, 16-year-old Rosita Tabia attended a salve in church and sat on one of
the benches farthest from the altar, the other end occupied by two little girls.
After the service had begun, appellant Teodulo Aňonuevo approached
Rosita from behind and forcibly embraced and kissed her on the left cheek
and held her breasts.
2. Rosita struggled to free herself and in a low voice rebuked him, calling him
a “sinvergüenza” (shameless cad). He grabbed her by the arm and attempted
to drag her towards a small door leading to the convent, but left quickly
when he failed.
3. Aňonuevo was charged and convicted of abusos deshonestos (abuse against
chastity) despite his attempts to deny committing the acts and to attribute
the action to Rosita and her alleged lover, Augusto Ibarbia, trying to stop
him from courting Rosita.

ISSUE/S: WoN Aňonuevo should be convicted of abusos deshonetos - NO

RULING: Judgment affirmed with modification.

RATIO:
1. The Court held that considering the then prevailing religious atmosphere
and the presence of many people, it would be error, absent clear proof as to
motive, to ascribe the appellant’s conduct to lustful designs or purposes.
2. Instead, they adopted the view that in kissing and embracing Rosita, he
either performed a bravado in defiance of Ibarbia’s alleged threats, or
wished to force Rosita to accept him as a lover, for some men mistakenly
believe that the hand of a young lady may be won thru abuses of such
nature. Thus, appellant should be declared guilty of unjust vexation with the
 NAPOLIS v. CA
February 28, 1972 | Concepcion, C.J. | Appeal from CA decision | Robbery
SUMMARY: TC & CA found Napolis and his cohorts to have committed acts
where elements of robbery under A294 (5) [under robbery w/ violence &
intimidation upon persons] and 299 (a) [robbery in an inhabited house, etc] exist.
However, they convicted them of Article 299 (a) only since it had a heavier
penalty. SC modifies such, establishing a new doctrine that…
DOCTRINE:. If the elements for both A294 and 299 exist, by applying Article
48, the crime becomes a complex one. The penalty to be imposed would then be
the maximum period of penalty provided by the more serious offense of the two.
FACTS:
1. At about 1am, Mrs. Casimira Penaflor, the owner of a store located at the
new highway in Bataan, heard a dog barking nearby. She then woke up her
husband, Ignacio who got his flashlight and revolver then went down to the
store to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly
gave way after being forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, 1 of whom was
holding and pointing a machinegun. Later on, reports from the police
showed that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of
the store to pass through.
2. Ignacio then fired his revolver but missed. One of the men then gave a
stunning blow to Ignacio’s head, the latter falling down and pretending to
be dead while he was being hogtied. One of the men (Napolis) then went up
the house then threatened Mrs. Penaflor to give them money, telling her that
they were people from the mountain. Mrs. Pennaflor gave them a bag
containing P2k cash and 2 rings worth P350, after which Napolis opened
and ransacked the wardrobe. Mrs. Penaflor and her 2 sons’ hands were then
tied, they were made to lie down, and they were covered by blankets.
Ignacio’s cun worth P150 was also taken.
3. TC & CA: although both elements of robbery under A294 (5) [under
robbery w/ violence & intimidation upon persons] and 299 (a) [robbery in
an inhabited house, etc] were present, they convicted them of Article 299
(a) only since it had a heavier penalty.
ISSUE: WON Mrs. Penaflor sufficiently identified Napolis – YES.
WON TC & CA correctly convicted the accused under 299 (a) only
despite the elements of robbery under both 294 (5) and 299 were
present – NO.
RULING: MODIFIED as to penalty. To all other respects, affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Napolis contends that there was no way Mrs. Penaflor could’ve identified
him since it was dark at the time of the robbery, and the flashlights faced
away from the robbers. He alleges that Mrs. Penaflor only identified him
when a picture was presented to her by Lt. Sacramento from police files.
But this is without merit – Mrs. Penaflor had ample opportunity to
recognize Napolis and have her eyes adjust to the lighting within the 10-20
minutes Napolis ordered her to get the valuables. And the fact that there
were 2 individuals who were apprehended before Napolis, but were not
recognized by Mrs. Penaflor as the robbers, shows that Mrs. Penaflor
wouldn’t have identified Napolis as the robber if she wasn’t sure.
2. Old Doctrine: Under past precedents, SC ruled that is that if robbery is
committed in an inhabited house and characterized by intimidation and
violence, the use of violence or intimidation against a person supplies the
controlling qualification so that the applicable provision is A294. This is
b/c the use of violence and intimidation makes the crime graver compared
to robbery committed by force upon things.
3. Old Doctrine As Applied in this Case is Illogical: However, in this case
although it was committed with violence against persons, the violence did
not produce any of the situations specified in Art 294 (1) and (4), so the old
rule of applying A294 would in effect make the imposable penalty lighter.
And it’s illogical that a robber who enters a house and lays a hand upon any
person is punished with a lighter penalty than when the robber just enters
the house. It’s more plausible to believe that A294 applies only when
robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without
entering an inhabited house under the circumstances found in A299.
4. New Doctrine: Hence, the SC ruled that: If the elements for both A294 and
299 exist, by applying Article 48, the crime becomes a complex one. The
penalty to be imposed would then be the maximum period of penalty
provided by the more serious offense of the two.
 PEOPLE v. BIRUAR
July 25, 1984 | Concepcion, Jr., J. | Review of CFI decision | Robbery
SUMMARY: Accused committed two robberies in neighboring houses on the
same night. In one of the houses, they injured and killed people, and burned in
down after. The accused contended, among others, that the robberies were one
continuing offense. The Court held that they were separate crimes, one for
robbery in band, and another for arson and robbery with homicide and physical
injuries.
DOCTRINE: Successive robberies may constitute a single continuing offense
or separate crimes, depending on the circumstances.
FACTS:
1. At about 10 pm on 2 July 1966, while Gorgonio and Fausta Mosende were
preparing to go to sleep in their house, several persons arrived and called
“Good evening, tiyo”. Thinking they were Fausta’s relatives, Mosende
invited the callers to come up.
2. Two men armed with .45 cal. pistols, later identified as the accused
Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Seňeres came up and demanded “where is
your firearm?” Gorgonio denied having a firearm, but Fausta was so
frightened that she lifted the mosquito net covering their sleeping mat and
pointed to their shotgun. Seňeres took the gun and asked for money. Fausta
opened their aparador, which Seňeres ransacked, taking P170. Seňeres and
Mosende then left, taking with them the shotgun valued at P550. A few
minutes later, Gorgonio saw George Kalitas’s house burn down.
3. The people within Kalitas’s house had been asleep when the fire started and
were awakened by the gunfire. Two people were shot; one of them,
Kalitas’s 11 y/o granddaughter Jessie Renopal, saw five robbers enter the
house while two remained by the door.
4. Kalitas’s nephew, Narciso Baluyot, ran to the kitchen upon hearing the
gunfire and hid in an aparador. But when the toilet in the main house was
set on fire, he left the house via a kitchen window, only to encounter
accused Romualdo Raboy who pointed a gun at his abdomen and told him
to surrender on pain of death. Seňeres also told him to surrender and raise
his hands. Narcisco complied. Accused Saturnino Galliano threatened to
pour kerosene on him, but after Narcisco pleaded with him, spared him.
Instead, Galliano poured the kerosene on the kitchen walls and ignited it.
5. The robbers then started breaking open the main door with an axe. When
they gained entrance, Kalitas fired at them with his gun and hit one. The
robbers fired back and hit Kalitas, who dropped his gun. Kalitas’s grandson
Bebot picked it up, but when the robbers shouted for him to surrender and
throw the gun down to them, he panicked and complied.
6. Accused Angel Dy, Raboy, Gallano, and Abraham Lim then rushed them.
Dy held Mrs. Kalitas by the neck and kicked the wounded Kalitas, while the
others went inside Kalitas’s bedroom and forcibly opened a trunk under the
bed which contained P40,000. They also took some old coins in the trunk.
Gallano and Dy also got Jessie Renopal’s money. They then left the house.
The victims went to the hospital, but Kalitas died before they reached it.
7. The fire continued spread until the house and all of its contents, and a trunk,
all valued at P34, 545.00, were completely destroyed.
ISSUE: WoN the accused should be convicted of robbery – YES
WoN the robberies in the houses of Mosende and Kalitas constituted
one continuing offense - NO
RULING: Judgment affirmed with modification.
RATIO:
1. The claim that there was no positive evidence showing the existence and
taking of the money from Kalitas is devoid of merit. It was positively
established by the testimonies of Martillana Kalitas, Jessie Renopal, and
Silvia Mingming Kalitas. Defense counsel erroneously thought that Silvia’s
testimony was that the money burned in the trunk, when the testimony
clearly showed the the accused opened the trunk and took the money before
it was burned.
2. The argument that the amount stolen or a portion thereof should have been
presented in evidence to make the transportation credible is untenable. The
property was not recovered; hence it would be impossible to present in
evidence. Besides, no law or jurisprudence requires the presentation of the
thing stolen to prove it had been taken away.
3. Appellants claim that the robberies were one continuing offense, committed
at the same time and occasion, arising out of one criminal resolution, and
that the burning of Kalitas’s house was the means to commit the robbery.
But in this case, the accused, after committing robbery in band in
Mosende’s house, went to Kalitas’s neighboring house where they
committed arson and robbery with homicide and physical injuries. Herein
accused performed different acts with distinct purposes which resulted in
juridically independent crimes. Also, the burning of Kalitas’s house was not
the means in committing the robbery. Evidence shows that the accused
gained entry into Kalitas’s house by breaking down the door with an axe,
not by burning it.
 PEOPLE v. MANGULABNAN RATIO:
September 28, 1961 | Felix, J. | Robbery with homicide 1. The malefactors came together to the house of the offended parties to
commit the robbery perpetuated therein and afterwards went away together
SUMMARY: While appellant Agustin Mangulabnan and two unknowns were from the scene of the crime. This shows conspiracy among the offenders,
committing a robbery, one of the unknowns stood on a table and fired at the rendering each liable for the acts of the others.
ceiling, where Vicente Pacson was hiding. Vicente died from the gunshots. The 2. It may be argued that Vicente’s killing was unpremeditated and surged on
Court held that appellant were guilty of robbery with homicide, and it was the spur of the moment, possibly without any idea that Vicente was hiding
immaterial that death should supervene by accident. in the ceiling. The English translation of Art 294, No.1 of the RPC which
DOCTRINE: To determine the existence of robbery with homicide, it is enough defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide
that a homicide would result by reason of or on the occasion of robbery, only punishes persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence or
inasmuch as it is the result obtained, without considering the circumstances intimidation of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by
thereof. reason or occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. But based on the Spanish text of Art 294, to determine the
FACTS: existence of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would
1. At about 11 p.m. on 5 Nov 1953, spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana result by reason of or on the occasion of robbery, inasmuch as it is the result
Tadeo, their four minor children, and Cirpiana’s mother Monica del Mundo obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
were awakened in their house by gunfire. Vicente crossed the room and modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime. It is
shouted that persons were going up their house; he then hid in the ceiling. immaterial that the death should supervene by mere accident.
2. Someone broke the kitchen wall at the back of the house, and a person
entered the dining room and shouted for the door leading to the living room
be opened. None of the house members obeyed. The intruder removed three
boards from the wall and thus entered the living room. He was armed with a
hunting knife and recognized by Cipriana as Agustin Mangulabnan.
3. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door leading to the balcony,
allowing two unknown persons to enter. Agustin then snatched from
Cipriana’s neck a P50 necklace and took from her person P50 in paper bills
and P20 in silver coins. One of the unknowns took P200 in cash and a P200
gold necklace from Monica, then asked her for her diamond ring, which she
could not produce, prompting him to strike her on the face twice with the
butt of his gun.
4. One of Vicente’s children, terrified, called to his mother. The unknown,
irked by the boy’s impudence, moved to strike him, but Monica warded off
the blow with her arm. The second unknown put his companion aside,
climbing the table, and fired his gun at the ceiling. The robbers then left.
Vicente was found dead from wounds caused by gunshots in the ceiling.

ISSUE/S: WoN appellant and the unknowns were liable for robbery with
homicide - YES

RULING: Decision appealed from affirmed.

 PEOPLE v. CALIXTRO RULING: MODIFIED in that appellants shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
July 15, 1983 | Abad Santos, J. | Automatic Review | Robbery with Homicide perpetua and shall jointly and severally indemnify heirs of Pio Cuevas the sum
of 12k.
SUMMARY: One of the robbers was shot during the robbery by his
companions and died. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: It is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the 1. On band: Totality of evidence leaves no doubt that the accused conspired
occasion of the robbery. and participated in the perpetration of the crime. Facts show a unity of
purpose and a concerted action. Version of accused is too crude to be
FACTS: convincing – that they all happened to ride the same vehicle and found
1. Feb 16, 1970: 7 men aboard a jeep stopped in front of the Rural Bank of themselves at a common destination.
San Luis, Batangas. 6 men alighted, 3 of whom entered the bank, while the 2. On homicide: Ante Mortem is credible. Cuevas affixed his thumbmark.
other 3 took positions in front of the bank. Pio Cuevas, one of the men who Chief Razon and Dr. Abjelina testified that Cuevas answered in a clear
entered the bank, who was in a PC uniform, grabbed the service carbine of manner. Based on the ante mortem statement, as well as the evidence, the
security guard Julian Agojo, poked it at him and shouted, “dapa kayo, accused are liable for Cuevas’ death. Agojo could not have shot Cuevas
holdup ito, mamamatay kayo”. since he was grappling with him while the accused were firing at them.
2. Calixtro took money from the cashier’s table (150), while Agojo grappled Regarding Obrador’s death, accused are not liable since such was not
with Cuevas for the carbine. Cuevas shouted to his companions for help. alleged in the information.
The 3 men posted outside were seen firing at the bank while Calixtro and 3. Robbery with Homicide: It is enough that a homicide would result by
Mercado were shooting at Agojo as he struggled with Cuevas. Cuevas was reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial that the death
hit and staggered out towards the jeep, his back smeared with blood. Agojo would supervene by mere accident.
ran after him but was fired at by Cuevas’ companions. He fell flat on the
ground and exchanged shots with them. The robbers then boarded the jeep
and fled.
3. The bank management gave chase, and saw the jeep stop at a dead end
street. The occupants scampered off in different directions, leaving 1 dead.
Agojo fired his carbine in the air to attract attention and to call the
policemen to their aid. Cuevas and his 5 other companions were
apprehended.
4. Cuevas and Mercado were brought to the Hospital for treatment while the
others were brought to jail and were investigated. Chief of Police Razon
took Cuevas’ ante mortem statement, witnessed by Dr. Abjelina, that they
robbed a bank and that he was shot by his companions. He died 2 days after
of severe hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds on the chest.
5. Defendants: No knowledge of the robbery; it was all Cuevas. Met up by
chance and were offered a lift to San Luis. Went into the bank for Cuevas to
borrow money in order to pay Calixtro (manager of a mightclub). They
denied any participation in the robbery and that they were mere accidental
by-stander.

ISSUE/S: WoN the accused are guilty of robbery in band with homicide,
considering that the people killed were part of the band – YES.
 PEOPLE v. PECATO
June 18, 1987 | Sarmiento, J.| Automatic Review | Robbery with Homicide
SUMMARY: The accused went inside the Larong’s house, demanded money
from Felix, was denied, and then killed Felix. They manhandled Felix’s
daughter until she gave them money, then left.
DOCTRINE: As long as homicide resulted during or because of, the robbery,
even if the killing is by mere accident robbery with homicide is committed.
FACTS:
1. Nov 1, 1971, 9:00 PM; Lahi: Felix Larong and his family were preparing to
sleep when several men called from outside the house, requesting that they
be allowed inside. Felix opened the door and thereupon, 4 armed men
entered. They then ordered the Larongs to face down on the floor and
demanded money from Felix. When he replied that he had none, he was
ordered to produce his pistol which he said he did not have as well.
2. One of the intruders asked Felix if he knew them. He answered in the
affirmative and said that they were still his relatives. While lying face
down, Arturo Pecato shot him, causing his death.
3. They next turned their attention on Felix’s daughter, Uldarica and
demanded money from her. When she refused, she was manhandled and hit
with a gun butt on different parts of her body. Luciana, Felix’s wife,
ordered Uldarica to give them money, to which she gave 300. When they
demanded for more, she gave an additional 50, after which the intruders
left.
4. Fearing that the men would come back, Luciana and Uldarica hid among
the bushes nearby. True enough, the men returned, but left after an hour
when they found no one around.
5. The robbery was reported the morning after. The two positively identified
Arturo and Felix Pecato, VictorianoLeyros and EreneoPeruda as the
criminals who robbed them and killed Felix. The Pecatos and Peruda were
arrested, while Leyros was nowhere to be found.
6. Felix: He was at home, suffering from fever and chills that night.
Corroborated by his mother.Ereneo: He was at home, as there was a small
party for his younger sister’s birthday. Corroborated by 2 witnesses who
said they met up with him after a cock fight and went straight to the party. 1
even stayed over and slept side by side with the accused. Encarnacion
Peruda, Ereneo’s aunt, said she went to the Larong’s after hearing Felix
died and that Uldarica told her that they were unable to recognize the
malefactors whose faces were covered and were wearing hats.
ISSUE/S: WoN accused are liable for robbery with homicide – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED with Modifications. Indemnity increased to 30k.
RATIO:
1. As long as homicide resulted during or because of, the robbery, even if the
killing is by mere accident robbery with homicide is committed, - it is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration.
2. Further, whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or
on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.
3. “Homicide” should be understood to be a generic term which includes
murder.
4. Aggravating circumstances:1) Treachery: Felix shot while lying face down,
2) Band: all 4 were armed, 3) Abuse of superior strength: Felix was 70
years old while the accused are much younger, 4) Nighttime: had flashlights
which shows they sought nocturnity to facilitate the crime, 5) dwelling:
committed inside victim’s house. – Disregard of rank not appreciated:
Robbery is primarily against property, not persons. With the death penalty
abolished, penalty is reclusion perpetua.
5. Sub-issues: positive identification > alibi. Their alibis were weak: mother:
tainted with bias – natural desire to exculpate son from criminal liability.
No physical impossibility to commit crime: 2 hrs away.
6. Inculpatory testimonies due to bad blood. Arturo testified against Felix’s
grandson in trial: not proven. Considering their close blood relations, it
would take more than this for the Larongs to falsely impute a capital offense
on the accused.
 PEOPLE v. TAPALES
September 10, 1979 | Per Curiam | Automatic Review | Robbery with Homicide
SUMMARY: Ang and Kalaykay were robbed after which the latter was killed
and the former was sexually harassed and raped. The accused questions the
appreciation of rape as an aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide.
The SC affirmed the doctrine that rape is aggravating circumstance to robbery
with homicide.
DOCTRINE: Where the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape the
legal definition of the crime is robbery with homicide with rape considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
Despite appreciable interval of time between the commission of the robbery and
the killing and the commission of the rape it was by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery that the homicide and rape were committed.
FACTS:
1. At about 11:45 PM (Oct. 27, 1971), Diana Ang and her boyfriend Eugenio
Kalaykay were on their way home from Jai Alai Bamboo Room, Taft
Avenue, Manila, when they were robbed while the taxi they were riding
was at a stop at the middle of Jones Bridge.
2. The accused, Pedro Corañez (armed with a knife) and Jesse Tapales (armed
with a gun) alighted from a taxi immediately just behind the taxi where the
victims were riding after the driver of the latter opened and closed the right
front door four times. They entered the taxi and divested Kalaykay of his
wrist watch and Ang of her bag, ballpen and Mexican money.
3. While the two were being robbed, the driver continued driving down to the
foot of Jones Bridge and made a U-turn to Bonifacio Drive until they
reached the Fire Dept. at Intramuros. At that point, Kalaykay was stabbed
and shot by the robbers after he tried to shout about the hold-up. Kalaykay
then squeezed himself out of the window and fell in the middle of Del Pan
Bridge (he was later found dead) while Ang was grappling for the
possession of the knife from Corañez. Later Diana, who was still inside the
taxi, was sexually harassed by Corañez and Tapales by touching her private
parts and kissing her while poking a knife to her side.
4. When the taxi passed by a vacant lot in Quezon City, Corañez, Tapales and
Ang went out of the car and went to the vacant lot, after which the taxi left.
The two accused made Ang lie down on the wet cogon grass and proceeded
to take turns raping her. At this point, Ang admitted that the two accused
were not using their weapons but claims that she was too weak and terribly
scared to resist the rape.
5. After that, the taxi that took them to the vacant lot returned and they finally
dropped Ang at the Carbungco restaurant. The accused gave her money but
threatened her not to tell the police or else they would kill her.
6. The two were arrested and were charged with robbery with homicide
aggravated by multiple rape. Corañez contends that there was no rape,
arguing that Ang consented to it (not believed by the trial court stating that
it’s improbable for one to still have the sexual urge after being robbed and
seeing one’s boyfriend get killed). He also revealed on cross-examination
that they conspired with two taxi drivers Pintong (driver of the taxi taken by
the victims), and Bruno Borja (driver of the taxi used by accused in
following the taxi of the victims).
7. The accused contend that there is no statutory basis for appreciating rape as
an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not rape may be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide – YES
RULING: Judgment of death penalty affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Where the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape the legal
definition of the crime is robbery with homicide with rape considered as an
aggravating circumstance. While the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 does not specifically contemplate rape as a generic
aggravating circumstance, it cannot also be said that such doctrine laid
down by the court is without statutory basis. While Article 14 of the RPC
does not specifically list rape as one of the generic aggravating
circumstances, it cannot be denied that rape increases the moral evil of the
crime such that it can be considered as an act constituting ignominy and
cruelty (deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main criminal
objective) under the said article.
2. Also, in this case, rape cannot be charged as a separate offense even if it
happened in Quezon City while the robbery in Jones Bridge and homicide
in Intramuros, the last two being both in Manila. Even though there was
appreciable time interval and distance between the commissions of the
robbery, homicide and rape, there was an intimate connection between them
that it can be said it was by reason or on occasion of the robbery that
Homicide and Rape were committed.
3. Nighttime was also aggravating in this case since it was purposively sought
by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime and avoid
discovery. While the crime happened between 11:45 PM – 1 AM, the
accused planned the robbery as early as 6PM. They took advantage of the
darkness to sexually harass Ang while inside the taxi. Kalaykay was not
able to seek help from anyone since there were no people around during that
time. They were also able to find a vacant lot while leisurely travelling
around Manila to Quezon City during the wee hours of the morning. Other
 aggravating circumstances are use of motor vehicle and employment of
craft. Taken all the aggravating circumstances, this would overwhelmingly
offset the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt.
2.
PEOPLE v. QUINONES, CANABA, CONDA, CIVICO,
ABAN
March 28, 1990| J. Cruz | Appeal from RTC Decision | Robbery with Homicide
SUMMARY: The accused blocked off the highway, took the 3 passengers to the
nearby woods, killed them after taking their money and weapon, and drove away
in the victims’ car. They were convicted with Robbery with Multiple Homicide
and sentenced to 3 counts of reclusion perpetua. SC held there was no such thing.
DOCTRINE: Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime which makes a
person liable so long as killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, regardless of the number of victims.
blocking the road, killing and robbing in the woods, distribution of loot,
escape in the stolen car—show that they were acting in concert and in
accordance w/ their common plan. Because of this conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all in equal degree.
SC however held that they were incorrectly convicted with robbery w/
multiple homicide, for there is no such crime in the RPC. The charge should
have only been robbery with homicide regardless of the fact that 3 persons
were killed in the commission of robbery. In this special complex crime, the
number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty
prescribed in Art 294. This is because the general concept of this crime does
not limit the taking of human life to a single victim, making the excess of
victims killed punishable as separate individual offenses. All homicides and
murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with
homicide so long as killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery.

FACTS:
1. At around 7pm on June 27 or 28, 1986, Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabi, and
Frisco Marcellana were riding a Mitsubishi when they were intercepted
along Maharlika highway by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road
to block the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they
were killed. At that time, Alexander was carrying P300K cask, a necklace
with a pendant worth P20K, a P10K diamond ring, and a licensed .22
calibre handgun. The accused also took the car as they fled, and left it to be
found w/o the stereo and spare tire.
2. They initially entered a plea of not guilty but withdrew it. TC found all of
them guilty of robbery with multiple homicide and sentenced them to the
triple penalty of reclusion perpetua. They were convicted mainly on their
own extrajudicial confessions made in the presence of counsel which
corroborated in large part each other’s version. Witnesses also testified to
being shown weapons (grenade and guns) that were used in the commission
of the crime.

ISSUE/S: WoN they were guilty of robbery with multiple homicide—NO

RULING: Judgment MODIFIED. Robbery with homicide ONLY, punishable

by the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

RATIO:
1. Conspiracy—the Court established that there was conspiracy among the
accused, thereby not absolving Quinones despite the fact that he stayed in
the car when the killing happened. The series of acts done by the accused—
 PEOPLE v. PATOLA accused were charged with a crime against property and not a crime against
February 27, 1986 | Aquino,C.J. | Robbery with Rape chastity. Article 335 is used only when an accused is charged with qualified
rape alone.
SUMMARY: Four men, including Patola and Sangayon were accused of robbery
with rape. They were caught six days after the crime was committed and three of
them were convicted, aggravated by three circumstances. Death penalty was
imposed by the TC which the SC did not affirm for the lack of ten votes.
DOCTRINE: Robbery with rape can be charged based from Article 335 or
Article 294(2) of the RPC. The former is a crime against chastity which punishes
the charge of rape alone and the latter is a crime against property where robbery is
qualified by rape.

FACTS:
1. One evening at the store of Conado, sales girls Mila and Elena were piling
up the goods as it was closing time. The accused together with two
unidentified persons were still at the store drinking beer.
2. Sangayon then closed the door of the store while Patola pointed his gun to
Mila and told her to keep quiet. Mila and Elena, both virgins, and the
Conado family were brought to an adjoining room where they were also
tied.
3. The accused ransacked the store and took away P1700 together with other
things totaling to P4500. After the robbery, Sangayon raped Elena who was
also raped by the former’s companion. Patola then took Mila to another
room where he ravished her. The rape was also concluded by the rural
physician after physical examination the next day.
4. The accused were captured six days after the crime was committed. Patola
and Sangayon’s defense was that at the time of the robbery with rape was
committed, they were in other barrios. Only Dalogdog was acquitted. TC
convicted the remaining three and sentenced them of the death penalty.

ISSUE/S: WON TC imposed the correct penalty? – NO.

RULING: AFFIRMED. Death penalty is not imposed for lack of the necessary
10 votes.

RATIO:
1. Oral evidence against the accused is sufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The victims were able to positively identify the
perpetrators and the alibis afford less weight than testimonies of offended
parties. Positive identification should prevail over alibis.
2. The TC imposed the death penalty after finding that nocturnity, dwelling
and abuse of superior strength aggravated the crime. It imposed the death
penalty because it applied Art 335 of the RPC rather than Art 294 (2). The
 PEOPLE v. DINOLA opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two
March 22, 1990 | Cortes, J. | Appeal from Circuit Criminal Court judgment | distinct offenses.
Robbery with Rape
SUMMARY: Dinola raped Caldosa. After raping her, he saw her watch and
forcibly took it from her. He was convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape. SC modified, convicting him of 2 independent crimes of
robbery and rape.
DOCTRINE: Intent to commit robbery is essential. If the original design was to
commit rape, but the accused also committed robbery, the criminal acts should be
viewed as two distinct offenses.

FACTS:
1. Marilyn Caldosa was at home sleeping in her aunt’s house, who was then in
Tacloban, when she was awakened by a voice saying, “Do not make a noise
or I will kill you. If you will not accede to a carnal knowledge I will count
from one to three and I will kill you”.
2. While pointing a small bolo towards her breast, the person placed himself
on top of her and proceeded to have carnal knowledge with her. She did not
resist for he is big while she is small and could not overcome him.
3. After the act, the person lighted a candle, whom she identified as
EmeterioDinola,and when he saw her “Citizen” watch (P300), he grabbed it
from her and then left. Feeling dirty, she went to the bathroom and washed
herself.When morning came, she went to her cousin’s house and together
they went to the hospital to get physically examined by Dr. SherlitoSiao.
4. The examination found the following: no signs of external physical injuries,
there was an incomplete laceration of the hymen which could have been
caused by a blunt instrument, perhaps a male organ, caused by forcible
intrusion, no spermatozoa perhaps due to no ejaculation, recent washing or
no penetration, and that the victim was possibly raped.

ISSUE/S: WoN the crime committed was Robbery with rape – NO.

RULING: MODIFIED. Guilty of 2 independent crimes of rape and robbery.

RATIO:
1. It does not appear that when the accused entered the house of complainant,
he already had the intention to rob the complainant. It was only after the
accused saw the watch, after she was raped, that he forcibly took it from
her. Hence the taking of that watch was a mere afterthought.
2. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also
committed even before the robbery, the crime of rape with robbery is
committed. However, if the original design was to commit rape but the
accused, after committing rape, also committed robbery because the
 PEOPLE v. MORENO RULING: AFFIRMED. Maniquez ordered to pay P30k damages to Galedo.
March 22 1993 | Campos, Jr., J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Robbery w/ Rape
RATIO:
SUMMARY: Moreno, Deloria, and Maniquez rob the Mohnani’s house while 1. While it’s true that Galedo’s affidavit would be hearsay evidence if she
Deloria and Maniquez raped 1 maid each (Sumayo and Galedo, respectively). didn’t testify as to its contents at the trial, it falls under the exception of res
Moreno convicted for robbery while Deloria & Maniquez are convicted for gestae since it’s a statement made by a person immediately subsequent to a
robbery with rape. Maniquez appeals as to the conviction for rape, which was startling occurrence. Such statements are trustworthy because they are made
allegedly only on the basis of Galedo’s affidavit without the latter testifying in instinctively and are reflex products of immediate sensual impressions,
Court. SC: Affirmed. Conviction for rape also based on other considerations. unaided by retrospective mental action. In this case, Galedo and Narcisa
DOCTRINE: The crime of robbery with rape is appreciated only against those immediately confessed to the Mohnani spouses that they were raped right
who committed the rape, and not to the other conspirators of robbery who didn’t after the three accused left.
participate with such act. 2. Besides, there were other considerations in convicting Maniquez and
Deloria for robbery w/ rape besides Galedo’s affidavit:
FACTS: a. Sundri Mohnani ‘s testimony about them going to the bathroom,
1. Around 4am, the accused Moreno, Deloria, and Maniquez broke into the Maniquez’ open zipper, etc
Mohnani’s family home (where the Sps Mohnani, their 3 kids, and 2 maids b. Galedo’s statement to her employers that she was raped
Galedo and Sumayo lived) by destroying the grills of a window. The c. Maniquez admission that he went to the bathroom with Galedo
accused entered into the spouses’ bedroom while threatening them with a d. It’s not often that there’s direct evidence for rape.
gun, scissors, and a knife. The accused store several appliances, jewelry, e. Rupturing/laceration on hymen not indispensable for rape
and other personal effects worth P98, 550. 3. Aggravating circumstance of dwelling, nocturnity, and se of motor vehicle
2. Deloria also asked Sundri Mohnani where the maid’s room was. Sundri present. But since only Maniquez appealed, it’d be appreciated only against
brought Deloria and Maniquez to the room, where Sundri asked them to go him.
to their room. However, Deloria and Maniquez told the maids to go with
them. Maniquez brought Galedo to the bathroom while Deloria brought
Sumayo to the sala, both for 4 minutes. Then the 2 maids and Maniquez,
Deloria went back to the spouses’ room. Maniquez’ zipper was still open,
Sumayo was crying, while Galedo was lying in bed, quiet. Sundri asked
Sumayo why she was crying, but they didn’t respond. Deloria then told
Sumayo to stop crying.
3. Right after the accused left, Sumayo and Galedo told the spouses that they
were raped. After giving their statements to the police, they left for their
provinces and never came back. This was also included in the Police report.
The Medico-Legal report showed that Galedo was a woman who had
already given birth while Sumayo’s hymen was intact.
4. TC: Moreno guilty for robbery, Maniquez convicted for robbery with rape
(victim was Galedo), Deloria convicted for robbery w/ rape (victim was
Sumayo). Maniquez appeals, alleging that the trial court convicted him on
the basis of Galedo’s affidavit which was merely hearsay evidence, without
hearing her testimony in open court.

ISSUE: WON CA & TC correctly convicted Maniquez of robbery w/ rape

despite victim Galedo not testifying in Court – YES.
 PEOPLE v. BALACANAO those who raped her can be attributed to the difficulty for a victim of such a
February 28, 2003 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Robbery with Rape horrible crime to clearly and accurately to recall and express the details of
the experience.
SUMMARY: 15 men robbed the Calata home, 4 of which raped Mrs. Calata in 2. And besides, since there was a conspiracy among the accused, the issue of
the process. 1 of them, Cabana, was discharged as a state witness. 5 eluded arrest. identity (e.g. who raped Estelita and who didn’t) is inconsequential to their
TC convicted all of the 9 remaining for robbery with rape. SC affirms. liability. Since conspiracy was proven and rape was committed as a
DOCTRINE: Instead of convicting only the sexual offenders of robbery with consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all the conspirators or
rape, their co-conspirators will also be made liable to the same offense even if participants are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape.
they didn’t actually rape any of the victims. 3. Since AC of superior strength and ignominy weren’t alleged in the
information, it can’t be appreciated in the case at bar.
FACTS:
1. Between 530-6pm, Camayaang (leader of Solana group) and his henchman
Agana went to state witness Cabana’s house and invited him to join them
for an unspecified purpose. Cabana joined and they were later joined by 7
other Solana group members as well as the Amulung group led by
Balacanao. While 3 worked as lookouts, 4 others armed with guns entered
the Calata House through the backdoor and into the kitchen, surprising
Estelita and her 2 kids. Husband Manuel was made to lie face down and
was tied while the rest of the accused came in. They demanded money from
the Calatas, saying they were subversives who needed money for their
comrade’s treatment. Some neighbors who heard the ruckus entered the
house but was also tied down.
2. Camayang dragged Estelita & her daughter Claudette to the room beside the
sale, the entrance of which was only covered by a curtain, and then ripped
their clothes up. Camayang let the naked Claudette go back to her father
because she kept crying. Estelita was then raped by Camayang, then
Acorda, then Caronan, then Balacanao. Manuel and the 3 neigbors were
untied and made to remove their clothes, then Gorospe was ordered by
Caronan to dance around naked.
3. When one of them spotted a group of 30 men from the other barangay, they
fled with their loot amounting to P11.15k (cash, jewelry, assorted goods,
appliances, a samurai sword, bank books, a wallet, keys, etc).

ISSUE: WON robbery w/ rape may be appreciated against all the co-
conspirators of robbery despite some of them not committing rape – YES.

RULING: AFFIRMED. Conspirators ordered to pay Estelita P50k civil

indemnity and P50k moral damages for each count of rape.

RATIO:
1. State witness Cabana’s testimony was clear and it was corroborated by the
victim-spouses Manuel and Estelita’s own testimony of those who entered
their house and raped her. And the discrepancy to Estelita’s testimony about
 PEOPLE v. SALVILLA ISSUE/S: Whether serious illegal detention may be complexed with robbery
April 26, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Robbery with serious physical injuries – YES
with Serious Physical Injuries
RULING: Judgment of reclusion perpetua affirmed.
SUMMARY: Salvilla and 3 others robbed Severino and took him, his children
RATIO:
and his employee as hostages after he failed to give an additional amount of
1. In robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property
money. They also extorted money from the authorities that came to the rescue.
belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation, which is
The 2 children suffered injuries after the policemen and soldiers launched an
the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity
attack on the compound in order to force the hostage takers to surrender. The
and consent and without the animus revertendi. From the moment the
Court affirmed the trial court decision charging the accused with a complex
offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
crime of robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention.
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
DOCTRINE: Serious illegal detention may be complexed with robbery with
2. In this case, the taking has been sufficiently proven by Habiero who
serious physical injuries if the detention of the victims was a necessary means to
testified that the accused took the wallet, wrist watch, and money from
commit the robbery.
Severino, as well as the Php 50K offer of the Mayor after Habiero was
made to get the money and hand it over to the accused.
FACTS:
3. In this case, the crime committed was robbery with serious physical injuries
1. Bienvenido Salvilla together with the Ronaldo, Reynaldo and Simplicio (all
and serious illegal detention (Article 295 (3) with Article 267, RPC), such
surnamed Canasares), armed with homemade guns and hand grenade,
that the penalty for the more serious offense of serious illegal detention
staged a robbery at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at noon on Apr. 12, 1986.
(reclusion perpetua to death) will be imposed instead of that for robbery
The robbers first demanded Php 20K (Php 5K according to the accused)
with serious physical injuries (reclusion temporal).
which was given by the owner Severino Choco after Salvilla pointed a gun
4. The complexing is under Article 48 since the detention of the victims was
at the latter and his children. The accused also took Severino’s watch and
not mere incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to commit the
wallet. Later, they demanded Php 100K. Severino stated that he could not
latter. This is so because the detention was made to extort more money from
produce the amount since it was a Saturday and banks were closed. Due to
the authorities, and not just because the accused were trapped by the police
his failure to give the money, the robbers then took Severino, his two
nor were the victims held as security against the latter. The detention was
daughters Mary and Mimie, and employee Rodita Habiero as hostages.
not merely a matter of restraint to enable the offenders to escape.
2. Later in the afternoon, the policemen and soldiers surrounded the area and
5. Furthermore, the elements of serious illegal detention are also present. The
pleaded with the hostage takers to surrender, but the latter refused. Later,
victims were illegally deprived of their liberty, among them were 2 females
OIC Mayor Caram arrived and offered them Php 50K instead, to which the
(Mary and Mimie) and a minor (Mimie, 15 y/o). The continuing detention
hostage takers agreed. They then sent Rodita Habiero (an employee of the
was also for extorting ransom both from the detained persons and the
lumber mill also taken hostage) together with Mary to get the money for
authorities who came to their rescue.
them. Habiero was later set free but Mary was taken back inside the
compound after the money was taken.
NOTE: “Necessary means” does not connote indispensable means but merely
3. Despite repeated pleas and ultimatums, the hostage takers refused to
signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of
surrender prompting the soldiers and policemen to launch an attack on the
the other.
compound. The resulting altercation resulted to injuries to Mary (right leg
Surrender of the accused was not to be mitigating when he gave up only after he
was badly injured that it had to be amputated) and Mimie as well as
was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces. Their surrender was not
Salvilla.
spontaneous as it was motivated more by intent to insure their safety.
4. Salvilla and his co-accused were charged and convicted with robbery with
serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention. Among the errors
assigned, the accused contend that there robbery was not consummated
since the element of asportation (carrying away) is not present.
 PEOPLE v. APDUHAN
August 30, 1968 | Castro, J. | Automatic Review | Robbery in Band
SUMMARY: Accused, with seven others, armed with various unlicensed
firearms and other deadly weapons, entered a house, killed two persons and took
money. He was sentenced to death. On automatic review, the SC ruled on the
applicability of Arts 295 and 296 to the instant case, and found both to be
inapplicable.
DOCTRINE: There is no crime of “robbery with homicide in band”. It is still
“robbery with homicide” under Art 294(1), with the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of band. / The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance as provided by Art 296 is explicitly limited in scope to Art 294 (3),
(4) and (5), and thus cannot be appreciated in robbery with homicide.
FACTS:
1. At 7 pm of 23 May 1961, The accused Apolonio Apduhan Jr., his co-
accused Rodolfo Huiso, Felipe Quimson, and five others known only by
aliases, all armed with different unlicensed firearms, and other deadly
weapons, entered the house wherein the spouses Honorato and Antonia
Miano and the spouses Geronimo and Herminigilda Miano. They attacked
and shot Geronimo Miano and one Norberto Aton, who happened to be in
the house, resulting in their deaths. The accused and their five companions
took P322 belonging to Honorato and Geronimo and left the house.
2. They were charged and convicted for robbery with homicide, with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms, and other
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and superior strength. The
accused voluntarily pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death, hence the
automatic review.
ISSUE/S: WoN Art 295 and Art 296 apply to the instant case - NO
RULING: Judgment modified (reduced to reclusion perpetua).
RATIO:
1. Art 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons and provides the corresponding penalties. The
instant case falls under Art 294 par(1): robbery with homicide, punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death.
2. Art 295 provides that when the offenses described in Art 294 pars (3), (4)
and (5)—physical injuries inflicted by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
unnecessary degree of violence or intimidation, and other cases,
respectively—are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be
imposed in their maximum periods. Thus, the circumstance of band
qualifies only robbery punished by Art 294 pars (3), (4) and (5).
Consequently, Art 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, and lesions graves resulting in insanity.
3. Hence, if the robbery falls under Art 294(1) or (2) and is perpetrated by the
band, it is not punishable under Art 295. Instead, cuadrilla would be a
generic aggravating circumstance. There is no crime of “robbery with
homicide in band”. It is still “robbery with homicide” under Art 294(1),
with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band.
4. Art 296 defines band in robbery, and provides that when any of the arms
used in the offense be an unlicensed firearm (special aggravating
circumstance), the penalty imposed on all the malefactors shall be the
maximum corresponding penalty provided by the law. Art 296 is
exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent
provision, Art 295, which is explicitly limited in scope to Art 294(3), (4)
and (5). Thus, although use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance under Art 296 as amended by RA 12, it cannot be appreciated
as such in relation to robbery with homicide, which is in Art 294 par(1).
5. The legislative intent of making Art 296 corollary to Art 295 with respect to
robbery in band was evident in Congressman Albano’s sponsorship speech
on HB No. 124, which was subsequently enacted as RA 12, in which he
stated that “Article 296 as a corollary to Article 295 would change the
definition heretofore known as the term ‘band’ under the law. The purpose
of this amendment is to inject therein the element of aggravation, when any
member of the band carries an unlicensed firearm...” The SC also declared
in People v Bersamin that in robbery with homicide, use of unlicensed
firearm is not a special aggravating circumstance when the offense is not
committed by a band. But with the passage of RA 373, which excluded Art
294(1) and (2) from the scope of Art 295, it also removed said subdivisions
from the scope of Art 296.
 PEOPLE v. JARANILLA
February 22, 1974 | Aquino, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Robbery by Use of
Force upon Things
SUMMARY: Jaranilla Suyo and Brillantes stole Baylon’s roosters stored in a
coop. While they were on their way home Jabatan a policeman tried to
apprehend them but Jaranilla shot him. The trial court convicted them for
robbery with homicide. SC held that that what were committed were theft and
a separate crime of direct assault with homicide.
DOCTRINE: Article 302 pertains to any structure not mentioned in article
299 (meaning not an “inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
worship” or any dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping of
personal property. One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things
these articles is that the offender should enter the building or dependency
where the object to be taken is found. If the culprit did not enter the building
there would be no robbery with force upon things.
FACTS:
1. Heman Gorriceta was on his way home driving a truck when the accused
when Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes requested him to
take the latter to Mandurriao. Upon arriving there, Jaranilla and his two
companions went to the house of Valentin Baylon and stole a total of 6
fighting cocks being kept in a coop. They then hurriedly went back to the
truck as they were being chased and went to Jaro.
2. While traversing the detour road near Mandurriao airport, patrolman
Ramonito Jabatan fired a warning shot and gave a signal with his flashlight
for the truck to stop and for the passengers to go down. The four did not
listen to Jabatan’s order, and later, Jaranilla shot Jabatan with a revolver.
3. Out of fear due to the shooting, Gorriceta hurriedly started the truck and
drove straight home to La Paz while Jaranilla continued firing towards
Jabatan. Upon arriving home, Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not tell anyone
about the incident before the four of them went separate ways.
4. Gorriceta at first refused but upon his uncle’s advice, however, he
surrendered to the police and told them about what happened.
5. Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robbery with
homicide with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle,
nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and
recidivism (for Suyo and Brillantes). The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state
witness so the case was dismissed as to him. Jaranilla claims that it was
Gorriceta who shot Jabatan and he (Jaranilla) was the one driving because
the Gorriceta was drunk (Court did not believe this).
ISSUE/S: Whether Art. 302 of the RPC (robbery by use of force upon things) is
applicable to this case – NO
Whether the crime committed was robbery or theft - THEFT
RULING: Judgment of conviction for robbery with homicide reversed.
RATIO:
1. In this case, Articles 294, 299 and 301 are inapplicable:
 294: No violence or intimidation on persons was employed
 299 (robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public building or
edifice devoted to worship): The coop was not inside Baylon’s house.
 301: The coop is also not a dependency of an inhabited house, public
building or edifice devoted to worship.
2. The original Spanish text of Art. 302 contains the word “lugar no
habitado”, which was erroneously translated as “uninhabited place” in
English. The phrase is in reality an antonym of casa habitada (inhabited
house) under 299. One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things
under 299 and 302 is that the offender should enter the building or
dependency where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302
clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building. If the
culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force
upon things.
3. In this case, the coop is not a building within the scope of 302 since it’s not
intended to be entered into by a person or to accommodate one. The term
“building” in article 302, formerly 512 of the Old Penal Code, was
construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning
not an “inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship” or
any dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping of personal
property. Even though there was a breaking into it by the culprits, the crime
committed will just be theft, which was consummated from the moment
they took possession of the roosters.
4. Conspiracy between Brillantes, Suyo and Jaranilla was only to the extent of
the theft of the fighting cocks, but to not the killing of Jabatan. However,
stealing multiple chickens at the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to separate crimes of theft, since it is assumed that the
accused were animated by a single criminal impulse. Furthermore, their
acts show that they conspired to steal the roosters.
5. There was no proof that the killing was part of their plan and even if Suyo
and Brillantes were with Jaranilla at the time of the shooting. Mere presence
at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-principal
thereof. Therefore, they are equally liable for the theft, but only Jaranilla
will be liable for killing Jabatan, and the crime is direct assault with
homicide (Jabatan, a police officer in uniform, being an agent of authority).
 No treachery existed since the attack was made at the spur of the moment, Banzon. This aroused Pat. De la Rosa’s suspicion for earlier, it was
and was not consciously or deliberately adopted. Salvador who claimed to be Banzon. The two were then brought in for
questioning.On the same day, Suarez, a boarder of De la Cruz, found the
boarding house unlocked, with lights on, a dead man w/ a gunshot wound
PEOPLE v. DE LA CRUZ on the forehead in the kitchen. De La Cruz claimed the house had been
March 29, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera | Appeal from RTC judgment | Carnapping ransacked by someone, but the policeheld De la Cruz for questioning and it
(RA 6539) was later found out that the dead body was Banson
5. They all pleaded innocent. Beloso and Salvador claimed only to follow
instructions of De la Cruz and were not aware of any carnapping; they were
SUMMARY: De La Cruz, Salvador, and Beloso were involved in the ‘business
in a regular business transaction to sell a car with promise of a commission;
of buying cars’ and advertised in the newspapers. Victim Banzon was one of
and they were unaware of the killing of Banzon. TC found them all guilty of
those who responded to their ads, who was killed on the occasion of the
robbery with homicide.
carnapping. SC: All guilty of carnapping w/ homicide.
DOCTRINE: Carnapping is taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
ISSUE: WON the accused are liable for carnapping w/ homicide – YES.
belonging to another without the latter’s consent. // All co-conspirators to the
carnapping, when homicide is committed on the occasion thereto, will all be
RULING: AFFIRMED. Life imprisonment to death.
guilty of carnapping w/ homicide.
RATIO:
FACTS:
1. Salvador and Beloso’s claim of innocence is inconsistent w/ the fact that
1. The accused De la Cruz, Salvador, and Beloso were involved in the
they both posed as Banzon, the former during his negotiations with Pat. De
business of ‘buying cars’ and they advertised the same in the newspapers.
la Rosa, and the latter when they were approached by the QC anti-
The victim, 23-year old Anthony Banzon, was among those who responded
carnapping unit. Furthermore, Beloso’s claim that he was Banzon and
to the advertisement and signified selling his 1983 Ford Telstar. A day
Salvador’s silence in the face of such claim, despite his earlier
before the ‘car deal’, the 3 met at a restaurant to discuss the deal next day.
misrepresentation, reveal that both of them were one in keeping secret the
2. Banzon’mom, Dionisia, received a call from a certain Mike Garcia (who
true ownership of the car.
later turns out to be Beloso) who informed ther that he was the buyer of her
2. The victim was killed “in the commission of the carnapping”. He was killed
son’s car, so when Banzon got home they both went to Centrum
in the house of De la Cruz between 1:30 and 2 p.m. De la Cruz tried to
Condominium where Garcia’s office was located, on board the Telstar.
camouflage the killing by reporting to the police that his place had been
Dionisia then went to SM in a taxi, leaving Anthony in Centrum.
ransacked and a person had been killed.Beloso and Salvador were found
3. Garcia aka Beloso discussed the price with Anthony, waiting for De la Cruz
positive for nitrates, indicating that they were within the vicinity when the
to arrive so they could allegedly make a decision on WON to buy the car.
gun was fired. The fact that De la Cruz was found negative for powder
De La Cruz arrived, and left with Anthony to De la Cruz’s house where
burns, although he was identified by Salvador as the trigger man, can only
Salvador was waiting. De la Cruz shot Anthony, and afterwards Salvador
mean that he knew how to sufficiently protect himself from such burns.
took the car and the papers, pretended to be Anthony, and met up with
3. Although the participations of Beloso and Salvador in the killing is not clear
Hernandez, an interested buyer, and his contact and actual buyer Patrolman
cut, to determine the existence of the crime of carnapping with homicide, it
de la Rosa. Salvador offered it for P130k, but Pat. De La Rosa became
is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of
suspicious because of the low price and insisted that it would be paid the
robbery. Conspiracy having been proven in their shared purpose of
next day. Salvador insisted that he be paid on the same day because he was
carnapping the vehicle w/ a view to sell it at a low price, all are liable as co-
very badly in need of money. When Pat. De la Rosa declined, Salvador left
principals.
the car behind. The former reported his suspicions to Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan.
4. The police w/ De la Rosa waited for Salvador and who arrived at 8:00 p.m.
with Beloso. They got inside the car. The policemen then approached and
asked them to alight. Beloso started shouting that he was Banzon, the
owner, and showed the pertinent documents of the car, all in the name of
 IZON v. PEOPLE
August 31, 1981 | De Castro, J. | Petition for Review | Carnapping
SUMMARY: The petitioners were charged with robbery with violence against
a person after they stabbed and mauled Togorio and thereafter stole his
motorized tricycle. The penalty imposed, however, was the one for carnapping
under RA 6539. The SC denied the petition stating that although the
information charged them with robbery with violence against a person the facts
alleged sufficiently proved a case of carnapping.
DOCTRINE: Any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are
public not exclusively for private use comes within the concept of “motor
vehicle” under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. A tricycle which is not
included in the exception is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as
defined in the anti-carnapping law the stealing of which comes within its penal
sanction
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Izon and Milla, together with Pedro Divino, were charged with
robbery with violence against a person after Divino and Milla stabbed
Reynaldo Togorio and Izon mauled him resulting to certain physical
injuries on Oct. 8 1977 at Olongapo City. After that, they stole Togorio’s
motorized tricycle, which was later recovered.
2. The accused pleaded guilty to the charge, but was sentenced to a penalty
provided for under RA 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972). The said law
defines motor vehicle as “any vehicle propelled by any power other than
muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars,
street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, forklifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails
or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle shall be classified as
separate motor vehicle with no power rating.”
3. Petitioners questioned the ruling of the lower court since it was not alleged
that the motorized vehicle stolen was running on public highway and that
they were denied their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them when they were sentenced for a crime
different from that alleged in the information.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the act of stealing a motorized tricycle falls within the
definition of carnapping under RA 6539 – YES
RULING: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. Contrary to petitioner’s submission that a motorized vehicle must be
licensed to use a public highway in order to make it fall within the
definition of “motor vehicle” under the anti-carnapping law, there is nothing
in the law that states that only licensed vehicles fall within its definition.
Such could not have the intention of the law. Otherwise, stealing of
unlicensed cars would just be punishable as simple robbery under the RPC.
2. Also, public highways are to be construed as free and public road way, or
street; one which every person has the right to use, not just national road
connecting towns as the petitioners submit. If the limited interpretation of
the petitioners was to be adopted, this would also have the effect of not
protecting motor vehicles only operating within roads inside towns. Where
the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
3. As such, any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public,
not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of “motor
vehicle”. A tricycle which is not included in the exception is thus deemed to
be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the anti-carnapping law the
stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
4. As to the right to be informed of the charges against them, this was not
violated since the information, although it charges them with robbery with
violence against a person, makes out a case for carnapping under RA 6539.
It was alleged that one motorized tricycle belonging to another was taken
with intent to gain without the owner’s consent and by means of violence
and intimidation, and this falls squarely within the definition of carnapping
under RA 6539. As such they could not allege that they were misled to
pleading guilty to the charges.
5. It is not necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused,
nor the effective preparation of his defense, that he be informed of the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to
the facts alleged.
NOTE: Carnapping - the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things (RA 6539)
 PEOPLE v. PUNO and AMURAO
February 17, 1993| Regalado, J. | Appeal from RTC Decision | Highway
Robbery
SUMMARY: Puno and his nephew, with the use of a gun, took money and a
check for P100K from Mrs. Sarmiento while she was inside the vehicle as it was
cruising along the highway. They were charged with kidnapping for ransom, but
the TC convicted them for violating PD 532, or the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law. SC held that they were guilty of simple robbery.
DOCTRINE:The essence of brigandage lies in the fact that unlawful acts are
directed against all prospective victims anywhere on the highway, as opposed to
simple robbery upon a predetermined or particular victim.
FACTS:
1. Maria Mutuc-Sarmiento owned a bakeshop along Araneta Ave, QC and
hadher own personal driver. At 5pm of Jan. 13, 1988, her husband’s driver
Isabelo Puno arrived thereat and told he was taking the place of her own
driver as the latter had to attend to an emergency.
2. On the way home, the car stopped at the corner and Enrique Amurao,
Puno’s nephew, boarded the car, pointed a gun to her and was told by Puno
that they needed money (allegedly to cure his ulcer). Mrs. Sarmiento gave
them P7K, which she had on hand. They then asked for an additional
P100K, and as they sped along North superhighway, Sarmiento wrote 3
checks to cover the amount.Accdg to Sarmiento, she jumped out of the car
while it was moving and got injured. The accused however, maintain that
they let her go freely and that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.
3. Puno and Amurao were arrested while the latter was attempting to encash
the check at PCI Bank. They were charged with kidnapping for ransom; but
the TC found them guilty of violating PD 532, the anti-piracy and anti-
highway robbery law of 1974.
ISSUE/S: Whether the accused are guilty of kidnapping for ransom, violating
PD 532, or simple robbery—SIMPLE ROBBERY
RULING: TC Judgment SET ASIDE. Guilty of Robbery as punished under
paragraph 5 of Art 294, in relation to Art 295.
RATIO:
1. Kidnapping for ransom—No. In determining the nature of the crime for
which an accused should be liable for in those instances where the acts
partake of the nature of distinct offenses, his motive and specific intent shall
be considered. For one to be liable for kidnapping for ransom, there must be
actual intent to deprive the victim of her liberty, and not where such
restraint was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the parties. In this case, there was no showing that the
accused had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
crime, other than the extortion of money under compulsion of threats or
intimidation.
2. PD 532—No. PD 532 is a modification of Arts 306 and 307, on brigandage.
The law on brigandage refers to a band of brigands as more than a band of
ordinary robbers. These were roving bands organized for robbery and
pillage, which were perpetrated indiscriminately against any persons on the
highway.On the other hand, robbery, when committed against a
predetermined or particular victim by a band whose members were not
primarily organized for the purpose of robbing or kidnapping, the crime is
robbery and not brigandage. This is clear from the provisions in PD 532,
which states that the law punishes acts of depredation upon “persons or
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another”, with the purpose of “eliminating all obstacles to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people”. It
would thus be unimaginable that punishing simple act of robbery,
incidentally committed on a highway, would serve the purpose of the law.
3. The offense committed is simple robbery defined in Art 293 and punished
by paragraph 5 of Art 294. The accused acted in conspiracy, with
aggravating circumstances of craft and abuse of confidence. At any rate, the
intimidation having been made with the use of firearm, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed, pursuant to Art 295. There is no procedural
obstacle to the sentence, as all elements have been proven anyway, even
under the initial charge. For robbery, it is sufficient that the elements of 1)
unlawful taking, 2) intent to gain of personal property, and 3) with the use
of intimidation on the owner or possessor, are present. Intent to gain is
presumed alleged in the information when there was unlawful taking and
appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.
 PEOPLE v. PULUSAN
May 21, 1998 | Kapunan, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Highway Robbery
SUMMARY: Pulusan and his companions robbed the passengers of a jeepney.
Afterwards they took turns in raping the only female passenger and killed the
four other male passengers. The crime charged was highway robbery, but they
were found guilty of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The SC
affirmed the ruling of trial court with modification as to award of damages.
DOCTRINE: A conviction for highway robbery under P.D. 532 requires proof
that the accused were organized for the purpose of indiscriminate robbery on
any Philippine highway.
. person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the
FACTS:
1. On Jan. 20, 1986 (9 PM), a group of four men (Eduardo Pulusan, Rolando
Rodriguez, Rolando Tayag, John Doe) boarded a jeepney at Brgy. Tikay,
Malolos going through the MacArthur Highway from Balagtas, Bulacan.
Aside from these four men, the jeepney had for its passengers Marilyn
Martinez (17-year old student), Cresenciano Pagtalunan and other four male
passengers (Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando
Cundangan).
2. Upon riding the jeepney, one of these four men (Eduardo Pulusan) later
declared a hold-up and poked the driver (Constancio Gomez) with a knife.
Pulusan’s companions (armed with knives and “sumpak”) followed suit and
divested the other passengers of their personal belongings. Pulusan then
took over the wheels and drove to Pampanga.
3. Upon reaching San Simon, Pampanga, Pulusan stopped at a talahiban
where Marilyn was brought and repeatedly raped, each of the four accused
taking turns in raping her. Subsequently, the accused proceeded to kill the
four other male passengers one by one. Gomez was boxed while Pagtalunan
was clubbed and hit with a pipe. Gomez was later ordered to drive the
jeepney and boarded Marilyn inside the jeep, threatening her not to tell the
police. The four accused then dispersed to different directions.
4. Pulusan and Rodriguez were later arrested and apprehended, and items were
recovered from them including some items stolen from the passengers and
the weapons used for the robbery. They were charged of highway robbery
but found them guilty of robbery with multiple homicide and multiple rape.
Rolando Tayag and John Doe (alias Ramon/Efren) remained at large. The
accused set up the defense of alibi.
ISSUE/S: Whether the crime committed is highway robbery with multiple
homicide and multiple rape or robbery with homicide aggravated by rape –
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY RAPE
RULING: RTC judgment affirmed. Award of damages modified.
RATIO:
1. The defense of alibi will not prosper considering that the survivors
identified the accused. Furthermore, the contradictions in the testimonies of
the eyewitnesses are too trivial to affect their credibility. On the contrary,
they are indicative of veracity. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not
required as long as the witnesses concur on material points.
2. The crime charged in the information was highway robbery attended with
multiple homicide with multiple rape. Highway robbery, under P.D. 532,
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) is “the seizure of any
property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force
upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway”.
3. A conviction for highway robbery requires proof that the accused were
organized for the purpose of indiscriminate robbery. In this case, no such
proof exists and neither there is proof that the four men previously
attempted to commit similar robberies indiscriminately.
4. The trial court was correct in finding the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape.
 Regardless of the number of homicides committed during the occasion of
the robbery, the crime is still robbery with homicide. Number of persons
killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty.
 The crime is still robbery with homicide even if rape and physical injuries
are committed on the occasion of the same crime. Rape is only aggravating
if it is not the original intention of the offenders.
 Whenever the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to
have been committed, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as
principals therein although they did not actually take part in the homicide.
5. Conspiracy has also been established through the acts of the accused and
the manner in which they committed the crime. They boarded the jeep all at
the same time, took turns in raping Marilyn, and killed the other four male
passengers after repeated clubbing and stabbing, and went to the same
northerly direction after the crime. As such the act of one may be imputed
to all the conspirators.
 TAER v. CA
June 18, 1990 | Sarmiento, J. | Certiorari | Cattle Rustling
SUMMARY: The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Jorge Taer guilty
of the crime of Cattle Rustling. The SC held however that Taer was only guilty as
an accessory.
DOCTRINE: The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308,
309, and 310, as amended by “The Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.” At most,
the facts establish Taer’s knowledge of the crime. And yet without having
participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in
the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of
taking by profiting himself by its effects, Taer is thus only an accessory after the
fact.
FACTS:
1. On December 15, 1981, CiriloSaludes, Jorge Taer'scompadre, slept at Taer's
house. At about 2 o'clock in the morning, Emilio Namocatcat and Mario
Cago arrived at Taer's house with 2 male carabaos allegedly owned by
Namocatcat and which he entrusted the care of to Taer.
2. On December 6, TirsoDalde and EladioPalanca found that their carabaos
were missing and reported the matter to the police. After 9 days, Felipe
Reyes informed them of the whereabouts of the carabaos.
3. They found the carabaos tied near Taer's house. At that time, Taer was
cooking at Saludes' house. When Taer was asked by the owners why the
carabaos were at his place, he told them that the carabaos reached his place
tied together without any person tending to them. Taer claims that what he
told the owners was that the carabaos were brought to his place by
Namocatcat who told him to tell anybody who asks that the carabaos just
strayed.
4. The TC and the CA found Taer and Namocatcat guilty of cattle rustling and
acquitted Saludes and Cirilo. The CA also found that there was conspiracy
between Taer and Namocatcat on the grounds that it was unbelievable for
Taer who have not seen Namocatcat for a long time to have not suspected
where the carabaos came from when they were delivered to him at such an
unholy hour and that Taer, when told that the carabaos merely strayed, did
not appraise the barangay captain about the matter. Only Taer appealed
from both the CA and the TC decisions.
ISSUE/S: WoN Taer was liable as a principal by direct participation or as an
accessory in the theft of large cattle – ACCESSORY
RULING: The TC and CA decisions are modified insofar as Taer is found
guilty as an ACCESSORY to the crime of cattle rustling. He will serve the
minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium, at 4 months
imprisonment and the maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum at 2
years.
RATIO:
1. The CA's findings that there was conspiracy was not established as their
bases were mere speculations and suspicions. There is conspiracy when two
or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of an
offense and decide to commit it. Although the facts may show a unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective, essential
however is an agreement to commit the crime and a decision to commit it.
Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. At most
the facts establish Taer’s knowledge of the crime. And yet without having
participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not
participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the
commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is
thus only an accessory after the fact under Art 19 of the RPC. Since the
most cogent proof that the prosecution could raise was Namocatcat's
uncorroborated implication of Taer, Taer cannot be convicted.
2. Inasmuch as Taer’s culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact,
under Art. 53 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed.
The penalty two degrees lower than that imposed under the first sentence of
Section 8 of PD No. 533 is arresto mayor maximum or 4 months and one
day to 6 months to prisioncorreccionalmedium or 2 years 4 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months. In addition, the Revised Penal Code provides
that when the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it
be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, the
courts shall observe the rule that when there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in
its medium period. The imposable penalty would be prisioncorreccional
minimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months imprisonment.
Since the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year, the court
applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This law provides that the
maximum term of imprisonment shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said code which is prisioncorreccionalminimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The
penalty next lower would be in the range of destierro maximum or 4 years 2
 months and 1 day to 6 years to arresto mayor medium or 2 months and 1
day to 4 months.
2.
ORDONIO v. CA
July 31, 1991 | Sandoval, J. | Certiorari | Cattle Rustling
SUMMARY: When cow owner Pajunar couldn’t find his cow and found it in
Ordonio’s property, Ordonio denies that it was Pajunar’s twice, claiming it to be
his brother’s. He claimed the same in front of the barangay captain. SC: Ordonio
guilty. Act of denying possession = a ‘scheme’ contemplated under PD 533
DOCTRINE:. Cattle rustling is taking away by any means, methods, or schemes,
without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above mentioned animals
WON for profit or gain, or whether committed with or w/o violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things. (Section 2c, PD 533)
when the lost calf was found in his possession – his consistent denial that it
was Pajunar’s, his claim that it was his brother’s, and the fact that the calf
ran to Pajunar’s milking cow, indicating that it was his mom.
Taking Away by Means, Methods, Schemes: This phrase indicates that
intent to gain may be inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost
property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property doesn’t
belong to him. In this case, the unbroken chain of events shows that
Ordonio took the calf with the intent to appropriate it, stubbornly insisting
all the way that it was his brother’s despite knowing fully well that it
wasn’t.

FACTS:
1. Anastacio Pajunar found out that his 11 month old cow was gone, so he
searcherd for it and asked his neighbor Ordonio. Ordonio denies that he saw
it, but Pajunar hears the mooing of a cow which Ordonio quickly says that it
was a cow he was tending to. When Pajunar saw that it was his lost cow,
Ordonio insisted that it was his brother’s, so Pajunar sought the help of the
barangay authorities since Ordonio refused to return the calf. Again,
Ordonio insisted that the cow was his brother’s, but then his wife pleaded
that he just return the cow to the real owner & pay damages. When the PC
soldiers let the calf loose, it ran to the milking cow (mom) to get milk
2. TC & CA finds him guilty of cattle rustling under PD 533. Ordonio appeals
such, claiming that the actual taking of the calf wasn’t proven, and just
because Pajunar found it in the accused’s property doesn’t make him a
cattle rustler, nor did his failure/refusal to tell the complainant where it was
even if he knew where it was, nor did the mere stepping on the rope to
which the calf was tied when complainant towed it. He also claims that
Pajunar just filed the case against him because of their land dispute.

ISSUE/S: WON Ordonio’s act of denying possession and insisting his brother’s
ownership of the cow constitutes cattle rustling – YES.

RULING: AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. Basis of Conviction: TC & CA didn’t convict him on the basis of the calf
being found on his property nor his failure/refusal to tell the owner the
whereabouts of the calf. He was convicted on the basis of his actuations
 PEOPLE v. GULINAO RATIO:
December 4, 1989 | Paras, J. | Appeal from RTC | Theft 1. Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Art. 308
and not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person.
SUMMARY: Accused Gulinao was the bodyguard of the victim. The former shot As the trial court noted on the basis of Patino’s testimony, the taking of the
the latter in a disco bar then attempted to escape. When he was about to leave, he ring of victim Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in
returned to the victim’s body and took possession of the victim’s ring then ran the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of the ring.
outside to take the victim’s car. He was charged with Illegal possession of firearm 2. Accused’s assignment of error raising a question of double jeopardy cannot
with murder, robbery and carnapping and found was guilty by the RTC. SC stand. Although he was already charged with illegal possession of firearm
affirmed the decision but modified robbery into theft because the taking of the in a different court, involving the same weapon in the murder case, there is
ring was merely an afterthought after the murder was committed. no identity of the crime charged. The possession had taken place in two
DOCTRINE: In robbery, the force employed should have been used to gain separate and distinct places and jurisdiction and the two informations state
unlawful possession of the property. Taking of such property as an afterthought of different dates of commission.
murder only constitutes theft. 3. Gulinao’s contention that there was no intent to gain in the taking of Chua’s
car is likewise untenable. Intent to gain, being an internal act, is presumed
FACTS: from the unlawful taking of the car. The presumption was not rebutted.
1. Gulinao is the driver-bodyguard of victim Dr. Chua. In 1987, Chua was in a
caucus with his secretary, vice-mayor of Malabon, Dante Reyes, and other
politicians. After the caucus, the group of Chua and Vice Mayor Reyes
went to Bar-Bar Disco House.
2. Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an
Ingram machine pistol, swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in
possession of Dante Reyes. Later, Gulinao went to the comfort room and
cocked the .45 caliber pistol. He then returned to his seat beside Chua.
3. While Chua was watching the floor chow, Gulinao stood up and shot him
on the head at close range. When the accused was about to leave, he turned
back and took the victim’s ring embedded with 12 diamonds then rushed
outside.
4. Poking the gun at the secretary who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered him
to leave the car. As the latter was escaping, Dante Reyes tried to fire at
Gulinao with the Ingram but said gun jammed
5. Accused Gulinao was charged in three separate informations namely: (1)
Illegal possession of firearms with Murder; (2) Robbery; and (3)
Carnapping. He pleaded not guilty in the 2 nd and 3rd charges but refused to
enter any plea in the 1st charge. He refused to take the witness stand during
trial and refused to be interviewed by his lawyers who later on withdrew
from the cases. He was found guilty in all three charges.

ISSUE/S: Whether the crime committed is robbery or theft? - THEFT

RULING: Judgment is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED with respect to the crime

of Robbery.
 SANTOS v. PEOPLE
January 29, 1990 | Cruz, J. | Appeal from RTC | Theft
SUMMARY: Penalosa had her car repairs done by the accused who later
convinced her to have the same repainted. When she returned to get her car,
accused was already gone and nowhere to be found. She then filed a complaint
for carnapping which was dismissed by the presentation of a spurious deed of
absolute sale by the accused. She filed another complaint for estafa which
convicted the accused. CA affirmed the conviction but for the crime of qualified
theft. SC held that the crime committed was only of theft and not estafa or
qualified theft.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 1.
FACTS:
1. Complaining witness Penalosa entrusted her card to petitioner Santos for
repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300. A week later, Santos
persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6500 within a period of
two months.
2. After two months, Penalosa went to petitioner’s repair shop to retrieve her
car. Santos refused to deliver the car unless she paid P634 for the repairs.
As she did not have the money then, she left the shop to get the needed
payment. Upon her return, she could not find Santos although she waited 5
hours for him. She went back to the shop several times was later learned
that Santos had abandoned the same.
3. Unable to recover her car, she filed complaint for carnapping. The case was
dismissed when petitioner convinced the authorities that the complainant
had sold the vehicle to him by submitting a Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase in his favor.
4. Penalosa again filed a case but this time for estafa. Trial ensued the accused
was found guilty by the trial court. On appeal, conviction was affirmed but
Santos was held guilty of qualified theft instead of estafa.
2. Theft should not be confused with estafa. The principal distinction between
the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However,
there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he
was entrusted only with the material or physical possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes estafa.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of
the vehicle and so no crime was committed. This is untenable since
subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to
him already supplies the third element that made that crime theft instead of
estafa.
4. It was erroneous for respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of
qualified theft because of the fact that the object of the crime was a car was
not alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Convicting
Santos of such a crime would give rise to the defense that he was not
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
since qualified theft carries a higher penalty. But although not pleaded and
so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be considered as
aggravating having been proved at the trial.

ISSUE/S: WoN the crime committed is theft, estafa, qualified theft? - THEFT

RULING: Conviction is AFFIRMED but for the crime of theft only.

RATIO:
1. The essential elements of theft include: (1) that there be a taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
 LAUREL v. J. ABROGAR, PEOPLE, PLDT
st
February 27, 2006 | Callejo, Sr., J. (1 Division) | Review on Certiorari | Theft
SUMMARY: Baynet was charged for stealing international long distance calls
from PLDT by means of international simple resale w/ the use of PLDT’s own
facilities. Laurel filed motion to quash the information as the factual allegations
did not constitute theft under the RPC. SC granted.
DOCTRINE: Personal property to be the proper subject of theft must be capable
of being taken (appropriation and asportation), and does not cover intangible
property like services (use of facilities).
FACTS:
1. PLDT is the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and intl.
communication services. It is authorized to operate telecomm systems for
both domestic and intl. calls, for which it maintains an Intl. Gateway
Facility (IGF). PLDT alleges that one of the alternative calling patterns that
constitute network fraud is Intl Simple Resale (ISR), w/c is a method of
routing and completing intl long distance calls using Intl Private Lease
Lines (IPL). The IPLs are linked to switching equipment, w/c is connected
to a PLDT telephone number, thus bypassing the IGF of PLDT.
2. Baynet offers ISR (selling at a lower rate) through their “Bay Super Orient
Card” phone cards to people in Japan who wish to make calls to the Phils.
Baynet is able to do so as an IPL subscriber of PLDT, and uses such line to
make it appear that calls originate in Metro Manila, thus bypassing
payment of access through the IGF. PLDT discovered that Baynet
subscribed to 123 PLDT lines, but the volume of calls passing through it
w/c bypass the IGF toll center incurred an estimated monthly cause of
P10,185,325.96. SEC also revealed that Baynet was not authorizes to
provide long distance service in the country.
3. PLDT filed a complaint against Baynet for network fraud, search warrants
were issued, and the prosecutor found probable cause for theft under Art
308 of the RPC. The information stated that Baynet stole “intl. long
distance calls belonging to PLDT” by means of conducting ISR, effectively
stealing business from PLDT while using its facilities.
4. Laurel filed a Motion to Quash contending that the factual allegations do
not constitute theft under the RPC and raised the ff. principal arguments:
. Telephone calls w/ the use of PLDT lines, whether domestic or intl,
belong to the persons making the call, not the PLDT. What PLDT
owns are infrastructures, and is compensated by way of rental.
a. There is no kinship between telephone calls and electricity because
the telephone business is not a form of energy (w/c may be
appropriated), but is an activity (w/c may not be appropriated).
b. In any case, he was charged w/ stealing the calls, not the business.
c. The RPC was legislated before technological advances were
conceived and from a previous case, the Court held that RPC is
inadequate to address the novel means of stealing.
5. PLDT argues that Laurel unlawfully took personal property belonging to it,
1) intangible telephone services, 2) use of facilities, 3) revenues derived.
Also, such service, although an intangible property, may be appropriated
and be the subject of theft, like electricity; and the ISR is akin to the use of
a “jumper” by a consumer deflecting the current from the electric meter.
ISSUE: WoN Baynet’s ISR service is covered by Art 308, RPC—NO
RULING: RTC directed to order granting the motion to quash.
RATIO:
1. The construction that Art 308 includes, w/in its coverage, intl telephone
calls and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law. Penal laws
are to be construed strictly. For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must
have intent to steal personal property (to deprive another of his ownership/
lawful possession of personal property). Standing alone, personal property
under the RPC covers both tangible and intangible properties; but “personal
property” must be considered with the word “take” in the law. The general
rule is that only movable properties w/c have physical and material
existence and may be taken and carried from the place where they are found
are proper subjects of theft. In addition, it has been held that electrical
energy and gas are proper subjects of theft, for these are susceptible of
being severed from a mass or larger quantity, and of being transported
(asportation). However, intangible property such as rights and ideas (ie right
to engage in business) cannot be taken or occupied. Thus, merchandise may
be taken, but businesses or services may not.
2. In defining theft under Art 308 (1930), the Philippine Legislature could not
have contemplated the human voice, w/c is converted into electronic
impulses or electrical current w/c are transmitted to the party through
PLDT or ISR within its coverage. PLDT does not acquire ownership or
possession of the voices, electronic voice signals, and current emanating
from such calls; rather, it merely transmits the signals through its facilities
and equipment. Baynet merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and passes
them to its toll center. But Baynet is not charged with theft of telecomm or
telephone services; and even if he is, personal property in the RPC cannot
be interpreted to include services, w/c are not generally considered as
property. RA 8484, the Access Devices Regulation Act actually punishes
obtaining value through the unauthorized use of telecomm services by
means of a card. But he is neither charged for violation of this law.
 LAUREL v. J. ABROGAR, PEOPLE, PLDT
January 13, 2009 | Ynares-Santiago, J. (En Banc) | Motion for Reconsideration |
Theft
SUMMARY: PLDT filed an MR contending that its business or service are
personal property under the Civil Code definition and may be the subject of theft,
thus the Information is valid and sufficient. SC found for PLDT.
DOCTRINE: Personal property is anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the chapter on real property; and taking does not require asportation.
*A phone call is electrical energy (force of nature) and thus a personal property.
FACTS:
1. PLDT filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to refer the case to
the Supreme Court en banc in connection with the 2006 decision granting
the motion to quash. PLDT posits the following arguments:
 The information is valid and sufficient
 The RPC should be interpreted in the context of the CC’s definition
of real and personal property—CC 415 as the exclusive list of real
properties and those not included are considered personal property.
 Taking does not require asportation, the sole requisite being that the
object should be capable of appropriation.
 As early as 1930, intl telephone calls were in existence and there was
no basis for holding that the Legislature could not have contemplated
the theft of intl phone calls and unlawful transmission and rerouting
of electronic voice signals and impulses w/in the coverage of RPC.
 Intl phone calls are sets of electric impulses that are transmitted
through a medium and carry a pattern representing the human voice to
a receiver. It is a “force of nature” under CC416, which are brought
under the control by science, and may be the subject of theft.
2. On the other hand, Laurel avers that a telephone call is a conversation and
is not synonymous to electric current or impulses, mainly because PLDT
does not produce these calls and only provides services for transmission.
Further, business is not personal property, and what is protected is the
right to carry on a business—thus business may not be the subject of theft.
3. The OSG sided with PLDT and adds that the charge of theft as alleged in
the Information must be taken in relation to special laws ie RA 8484,
because it is the elements and not the designation of the crime, that control.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the definition of personal property must be in relation to the Civil
Code—YES
2. WoNBaynet may be prosecuted under theft as defined in the RPC—YES
RULING: MR GRANTED. Prosecutor DIRECTED to amend the Information
to show that what was taken were the services/business, not the calls.
RATIO:
1. Prior to the passage of the RPC, the definition of personal property has
been established in Phil jurisprudence as “any personal property, tangible
or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation.”
Moreover, personal property has had a generally accepted definition in
civil law—“anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the
foregoing chapter on real property.” Despite this, the legislature did not
qualify or limit the definition of personal property in the RPC, showing its
intent to retain an extensive and unqualified interpretation for the term.
Thus, asportation is not an essential element. Jurisprudence is settled that
to take under the RPC does not require asportation or carrying away. To
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing; which may be
done by tampering with apparatus, wrongfully directing such forces of
nature to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
2. It had been ruled that acts of subtraction of gas, fluid used for lighting,
electricity, etc are covered by the provisions on theft under the Penal Code.
The acts of subtraction include, 1) tampering w/ any wire, meter, or
apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; 2) tapping or
otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such
apparatus; 3) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of w/c
one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or
telephone service. In this case, the acts of conducting ISR operations by
illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT’s telephone
system, reselling and rerouting intl long distance phone calls using PLDT’s
facilities for the purpose of generating profit that should have otherwise
belonged to PLDT, constitute subtraction, and thus theft.
3. Combining Ratios 1&2, an interest in business is personal property that can
be the object of theft, since it is capable of appropriation and not in the
enumeration of real properties. In this regard, the Information inaccurately
describes the offense by making it appear that what was taken was the intl
long distance calls and not PLDT’s business. PLDT explained that the
process is where human voice is converted to electrical impulses or electric
current w/c are transmitted to the party called; thus, a telephone call is
electrical energy falling under “forces of nature” definition of personal
property. It is clear that PLDT does not have ownership over these calls,
what it has are facilities, and it is the use of PLDT’s facilities w/o its
consent (an act of subtraction), that constitutes the crime of theft.

HIZON v. CA
December 13, 1996 | Puno, J. | Certiorari | Illegal Fishing
SUMMARY: Petitioners were fishermen and were part of a company engaged in
permitted fishing. They were apprehended after reports of illegal fishing were
delivered to the PNP Maritime Command in Puerto Princesa. They were accused
of using sodium cyanide in fishing and were found guilty by the trial court. SC
reversed the decision.
DOCTRINE: In illegal fishing, possession of explosives and poisonous
substances in the boat already raises the presumption of guilt in violating fishing
laws. This constitutes prima facie evidence which can be rebutted by the accused
with sufficient evidence.
FACTS:
1. In 1992, PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, Palawan received
reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters if the city. In
response to these, the city mayor organized Task Force BantayDagat (Task
Force) to assist police in the detection and apprehension of violators of laws
on fishing.
2. In Sept 1992, Task Force reported to PNP Command that a boat and several
small crafts were fishing by “muroami” within the shoreline of Puerto
Princesa. Police headed by Enriquez immediately proceeded to the area and
found several men fishing in a boat identified as F/B Robinson (Robinson).
They boarded the boat and inspected it with the acquiescence of boat
captain Gargar. In the course of their inspection, police saw two foreigners
who were only able to present photocopies of their passports. Police also
saw an aquarium of live lapu-lapu weighing approximately one ton. They
also checked the license of the board and its fishermen which were found to
be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the captain and the crew
to back to the shore.
3. After further investigation, violations for fishing without permit, employing
excess fishermen in a boat and boarding two foreigners without passports
were charged by the police. Enriquez also instructed petitioner Andaya to
get samples of the lapu-lapu in the boat and have it delivered to the
Maritime office. Enriquez received the fish and sealed the plastic bag with
heat from a lighter.
4. Specimens were brought to the NBI for examination. The forensic chemist
conducted two tests on the fish samples and they found that the specimens
contained sodium cyanide. In light of the findings, PNP Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa filed the complaint at bar against the owner of
F/B Robinson represented by Hizon and the other petitioners.
5. Petitioners contended that they catch fish only by hook and line method.
That PNP and Task Force suddenly approached them on the day of
apprehension and Enriquez was enraged even if it was explained that the
original passports of the foreigners were in the main office. They likewise
threatened petitioners if they attempted to escape. They also alleged that the
original passports were presented by representatives from Manila and that
other pertinent documents of Robinson were in order.
6. TC found all the petitioners guilty which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: WoN the accused may be held liable for illegal fishing due to the
presence of fish with sodium cyanide in the boat - NO
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO:
1. Accused were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and
38 of PD 704. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person
catches or gathers aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates
a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives
or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are
found in a fishing boat; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing
boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are
presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
2. Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt violates the presumption
of innocence guaranteed by the constitution. This is incorrect since it is
generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof
of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused. However, the
presumption is merely prima facie. It can’t operate to preclude the accused
from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed.
3. In the case at bar, when another sample was taken from Robinson to be
reexamined, this time at the presence of petitioners and NBI, tests show
negative results for sodium cyanide. It is noted that the Robinson never left
the custody of PNP Maritime. Moreover, the prosecution failed to explain
the contradictory findings of the NBI tests which raised a reasonable doubt
of the petitioners’ guilt. Furthermore, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution testified that when they boarded the Robinson, they didn’t find
any sodium cyanide but only assorted hooks and lines. This is the reason
why apprehending officers were not able to file charges of illegal fishing
immediately. It was only when test results from the NBI came out positive
that they filed the charges. The time interval of the taking of the fish
 samples and their actual examination also fails to assure the integrity of the
specimens tested. Reports on the day of apprehension also indicated illegal
fishing by “muroami”, a method which needs about 200 fishermen to be
executed. This is far from the number of people in the Robinson which was
only 28.
EMPELIS v. IAC
September 28, 1984 | Relova, J. | Appeal from IAC | Qualified Theft
SUMMARY: Catarining caught Empelis and three others stealing coconut from
his plantation. The accused were convicted for qualified theft since they were
caught while inside the plantation. SC sustained the conviction but averred that it
was only frustrated qualified theft since petitioners were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the higher penalty is to encourage and protect the
development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national
economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms, coconut groves cannot be efficiently
watched because of the nature of the growth of the coconut trees
deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft. When the
coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is simple theft.
2. Stated differently, if the coconuts were taken in front of a house along the
highway outside the coconut plantation, it would be simple theft only. The
purpose of the higher penalty is to encourage and protect the development
of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed,
coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched because of the nature of the
growth of the coconut trees. This fact entails the need of a special measure
to protect this kind of property as it will be the favorite resort of thieves.
3. In this case, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because
petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.
NOTE: The Supreme Court has held in Valenzuela v. People (2007) that
theft has no frustrated stage. (See also II Reyes pp. 735-36)

FACTS:
1. Catarining, owner of a coconut plantation, was frequently losing coconuts
due to thievery. So one early morning, while he stayed in his plantation to
keep watch, he saw four men within the premises of his plantation gathering
and trying some coconuts. He then went home, fetched his neighbors and
took along a flashlight.
2. Upon reaching the plantation with his companions, Catarining beamed his
flashlight on the four persons who turned out to be the herein appellants.
Empelis and Carbungco were seen carrying coconuts on a piece of wood on
their shoulders while the two others were carrying some with their bare
hands. As the four noticed the presence of Catarining, they dropped the
coconuts there were carrying and fled leaving about P50 worth of coconuts.

ISSUE/S: WoN the crime committed is simple theft? - NO

RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED but modified in the sense that the crime is
only frustrated qualified theft.

RATIO:
1. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of theft shall “be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively expressed in the next preceding article x xx if the property
stolen x xx consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. x
xx.” Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or
 ROQUE v. PEOPLE
November 25, 2004 | Azcuna, J. | Certiorari | Qualified Theft
SUMMARY: Roque, teller of BABSLA, was charged with qualified theft for
allegedly taking, among others, 10k from Salazar’s account. Primary
evidence used was her initial on the withdrawal slips. SC held that the first
and basic element of qualified theft was not proven, acquitting her of said
crime.
DOCTRINE: Ratio 2.
FACTS:
1. Antonio Salazar: Salazar, a member/depositor of Basa Air Savings and
Loan Association Inc., deposited 2k on Nov. 16, 1989, but did not make a
withdrawal nor authorize anyone to do so for the whole month of
November. On July 1990, he heard that other depositors’ funds were
missing inside BABSLA, and that it was supposedly being circulated
illicitly at the base. He went to BABSLA to withdraw 40k (he had 46k) but
was told that his funds were insufficient since 3 withdrawals were already
made on his account, amounting to 30,500. Salazar claimed that the
signature in one of the withdrawal slips, (dated Nov. 16, 1989: 10k) was not
his, and assumed that the one in control of the funds made such withdrawal.
2. General Manager Rosalinda de Lazo: BABSLA only had one teller,
Asuncion Galang Roque who held the job from 1989-June 1990. That 3
withdrawals appearing in the bank’s ledger do not appear in Salazar’s
passbook. That Roque’s customary initial was found in the Nov. 16
withdrawal slip, beside 11-17-89 (bank policy: transactions done after 3 pm
are entered in the book the next day). That before Roque went on forced
leave, she admitted to taking some money from the depositors, including
Salazar’s account. BABSLA president and Chairman Col. Dunilayan told
her to return the money immediately which she failed to do. She also
prepared a list of the members from whom she took money from. Lazo also
claimed that she was aware of the taking of the 10k, but did not ask Roque
for the presentation of the passbook (bank practice) in order to avoid any
discrepancy with the ledger, nor did she notify Salazar, since she had full
trust and confidence in Roque.
3. Treasurer Reynaldo Manlulu: On Nov 17, 1989, Roque made her Teller’s
Daily Report, which included transactions that occurred after 3 pm of the
preceding day, as well as an Abstract of Payment which were signed in his
presence. Roque paid the withdrawal of 16,300, evidenced by the
withdrawal slips attached to the abstract.
4. Defense: She does not discharge any memorandums or withdrawals without
prior approval of the manager and treasurer. Depositors cannot withdraw
after 3 pm unless they talk to the manager or treasurer. That she did not
prepare the withdrawal slip dated Nov. 16, 1989 which involves Salazar’s
account, and that she did not forge Salazar’s signature nor affix her initial.
She contended that Lazo is the guilty one since she was only used by the
president.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the
lawful possession of accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony
– YES.
2. WoN the elements of qualified theft were proven – NO.
RULING: ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. Roque contends that she cannot be guilty of theft since, by virtue of her
position, the money was already in her possession – theft presumes that the
personal property is in the possession of another. SC held that what she had
was merely material possession. The teller is only an agent of the bank, and
the act of transferring does not pass the juridical possession to the teller:
Juridical possession remains with the bank.
2. To be convicted of qualified theft, the following elements should be proven:
1) Taking of personal property; 2) Said property belongs to another; 3)
Taking is done with intent to gain; 4) Taking is without the owner’s
consent; 5) Accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons nor of force upon things; and 6) Done with grave abuse of
confidence. – 1st element lacking.
3. Prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took the
10k on 16.11.89. 1) Salazar did not know who made the withdrawal, 2)
Lazo did not intimate the significance of petitioner’s initial on the
withdrawal slip. Roque’s initial only indicates that the transactions passed
through her in her capacity as a teller. It does not in any manner show that
she prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds increased her
patrimony.
4. TC and CA’s presumption that petitioner, being in the possession of the
withdrawal slip before its delivery to Manlulu, was the one who prepared
the slip is without basis in law. There are only a fixed number of
presumptions and courts of law should not be too ready to generate other
presumptions. The closest presumption to the one the lower courts relied on
is par. 3, Sec. 3, Rule 131: “a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act”
– applied to a situation where property was stolen and said property was in
the possession of the accused. In the case at bar, the presumption was
applied to the withdrawal slip which was not stolen property.
5. Roque’s alleged extrajudicial confession merely admitted that she took
sums of money from accounts of several depositors. However, the
testimony did not mention the exact date when she took the money nor the
amount she took from Salazar. – information was for a theft of 10k that
occurred on 16.11.89 – verbal confession and the list she prepared do not
adduce that she confessed to said specific crime. Furthermore, the Teller’s
Daily Report and Abstract of Payment merely corroborate the withdrawal
slip which neither proves that Roque prepared the withdrawal slip nor took
the 10k on that date.
 MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
June 18, 1996 | Davide, Jr., J. | Review of CA decision | Illegal Logging
SUMMARY: Petitioner was found in possession of lumber without the required
documents under the law. Their lumber-dealer permit was suspended. They were
caught again after said suspension, with lumber without the required documents,
which they were going to sell. Petitioner argued that lumber was not under the
coverage of Sec 78 of PD 705, and that the searches and seizures were invalid.
The Court held that lumber was under the coverage of the same, and that the
searches and seizures were valid.
DOCTRINE: Possession of timber without the legal documents required under
existing laws and regulations is a violation Sec 68, PD 705. Lumber falls under
the scope of said section.
FACTS:
1. On 1 April 1990, the DENR’s Special Actions and Investigation Division
(SAID) organized a team to conduct surveillance at petitioner’s lumberyard
and saw petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber exiting therefrom. Since the
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the
team seized the truck and cargo and impounded it. However, they could not
enter the lumberyard because of the owner’s refusal.
2. On 3 April 1990, upon obtaining a warrant, the team returned to the
lumberyard and seized lumber therefrom. The next day, they placed under
administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession but cannot
dispose of them) the remaining because petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices,
tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering
the lumber to prove the source and origin’s legitimacy.
3. On 23 April 1990, Sec Factoran issued an order immediately suspending
petitioner’s lumber-dealer’s permit. Although petitioner through counsel
stated they had secured the required documents and was ready to submit
them, none were submitted. On 3 May 1990, Sec Factoran issued an order
declaring the 311,000 board feet confiscated in the government’s favour.
4. On 17 Sept 1990, in response to reports that violations of the Revised
Forestry Code were being committed, a team of DENR agents went to
petitioner’s premises in Tondo and caught petitioner operating as a lumber
dealer despite the suspension of its permit. Since the lumberyard’s gate was
open, the team entered and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded
with lumber, which was to be delivered to petitioner’s customer and had an
accompanying sales invoice covering the transaction. The team effected a
constructive seizure of the stockpiled lumber by issuing a receipt therefor.
5. Petitioner filed two certiorari and prohibition cases. The DOJ filed a
complaint against petitioner’s president for violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 as
amended, i.e. possession without legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
ISSUE/S: WoN lumber is included in the scope of Sec 68, PD 705 – YES
WoN the searches and confiscations were valid - YES
RULING: (1) Petition granted, RTC order annulled and set aside; criminal
information reinstated, case to be heard and decided by respondent judge or
successor; (2) Petition denied. (two cases filed)
RATIO:
1. Sec 68 of PD 705, amended by EO No. 277, punishes (a) cutting, gathering,
collection or removal of timber or other forest products from any forest
land, alienable or disposable public land, or private land, without any
authority; and (b) possession of timber without the legal documents as
required under existing laws and regulations.
2. Petitioner argues that they carried lumber, not timber, and thus are not in
violation of the law. The term lumber does not appear in Sec 68. But
conceding ex gratia that that this omission amounts to an exclusion of
lumber from its scope, the information in the criminal case does not have
lumber as its sole subject matter; it alleged that what was in possession
without legal documents were “almaciga and lauan” and “approximately
200,000 bd. Ft. Of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa”. The former are not described as lumber. The prosecution’s
investigation also used the term “illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan”.
Thus, lumber is only one of the items covered by the information, and even
if lumber is not in Sec 68’s scope, the other items fall within its ambit.
3. Moreover, lumber is actually included in Sec 68’s coverage, since lumber is
found in par(aa) of Sec 3, in the definition of processing plant. That, and the
definition in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, simply mean
that lumber is a processed log or timber. As the law does not distinguish
between raw and processed timber, it qualifies.
4. The searches were valid because (1) search of a moving vehicle is one of
the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the requirement of warrants for
searches and seizures, (2) the search with the warrant was done within the
10-day lifetime of the warrant, and (3) since lumber is included in the term
forest product, possession of the same requires legal documents.
 DIZON-PAMINTUAN v. PEOPLE
July 11, 1994 | Davide, Jr, J. | Certiorari | Fencing
SUMMARY: Encarnacion was robbed when he arrived home from the airport.
He sought the help of the police who were later able to identify where the stolen
items were at. Displayed on the stall owned by Dizon-Pamintuan, the police
apprehended the seller and was convicted of violating the Anti-Fencing law. SC
held that she was properly convicted and that the value of the items lost to
determine the penalty was correctly identified by the court.
DOCTRINE: Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Encarnacion arrived at his residence at 9:45 in the evening coming
from the airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving his
driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from
his case.
2. Then five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy
portion of the lot beside the house and dragged them all inside his home.
The robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other
personal properties.
3. After the incident, Teodoro reported to the police what happened and
sought the help of the Western Police District. A group of WPD operatives
then came to his house and asked a list of all items lost and the sketch of the
items.
4. There was a tip by an informer of the WPD that the lost items were at the
Chinatown area. Entrapment was then planned that involves him and his
wife posing as a buyer. The Encarnacion spouses were able to identify the
stolen jewelry when they saw it displayed at the stall of Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan. Then the latter was invited to the precinct for investigation but
she averred that he had no prior knowledge that the jewelries were stolen.
This statement of the accused was corroborated by his brother’s testimony.
5. The trial court convicted the petitioner for violating the Anti Fencing law
which the CA affirmed
ISSUE: WoN accused is deemed to have known that the items were stolen such
that she may be held liable for fencing? - YES
RULING: Conviction affirmed with the modification that the amount of
jewelries was correctly determined by the TC.
RATIO:
1. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (AntiFencingLaw), is
“the act of any person who, with intent togain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess,keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy andsell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object oranything of
value which he knows, or should be known tohim, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”
2. The elements of the crime of fencing are: (1) A crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice
in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, possesses,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, any itemwhich has been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the said item has been derived from the proceeds of the crime ofrobbery
or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another.
3. In the case at bar, all the elements are present. The only element that
presented difficulty in proving the charge is if the accused knew or should
have known that the items recovered were proceeds of the crime of theft or
robbery. PD 1612 expressly provides that mere possession of any goods,
article, item object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. So petitioner
herein is presumed to have knowledge that the jewelries in her possession
were stolen unless he provides strong evidence to the contrary.
Unfortunately, the only evidence she presented was the testimony of her
brother and nothing else.
4. Petitioner also disclosed that she was engaged in the purchase and sale of
jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo. However, Fredo was
not presented as a witness and she was not able to prove that Fredo is a
licensed dealer as mandated by the law.
5. The court does not agree with the decision of the CA that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the actual value of the recovered articles
since it was already determined by the trial court.
 TAN v. PEOPLE
August 26, 1999 | Pardo, J. | Certiorari | Fencing
SUMMARY: Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, allegedly
stole spare parts from boats and sold them to Tan. While Lim forgave Mendez
and didn’t file a case against them for theft/robbery, she files against Tan for
violation of PD 1612. SC: Not guilty. Evidence of theft not established
independently of fencing, and knowledge that goods were stolen not proven.
DOCTRINE:.In order to convict someone of fencing under PD 1612, evidence
of theft must be separately established. Theft is a public crime – if no loss is
reported, Court can’t hold for certain that there was a crime of theft committed.
FACTS:
1. Rosita Lim, the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries who’s engaged in the
business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats, finds out that
Mendez, one of her former employees, had stolen some of the welding
roads, propellers, and boat spare parts amounting to P48k. Lim sought the
help of Sy, Mendez’ uncle.
2. Mendez was arrested in Visayas and he admitted that he and his co-
employee Dayop stole such from the complainant’s warehouse. He asked
for Lim’s forgiveness, and claimed that Ramon Tan (accused) bought the
stolen items and paid P13K for them, which Dayop and Mendez split
amongst themselves. Lim never filed a case against the two, but filed a case
against Tan through an Assistant City Prosecutor filed an information
against Tan for violating PD 1612.
3. It was established that Tan and Lim had an existing business relationship
since Tan bought propellers from them while they bought brass woods from
them; hence she had no reason to frame the accused. Mendez also testified
that while usually it was Tan’s secretary who accepted the items delivered
in Ramon Hardware, Mendez called Tan first over the phone and then Tan
himself accepted the stolen items in the morning for P13k. Tan denies such.
4. RTC and CA: Guilty. Tan appeals.
ISSUE/S: WON prosecution established elements of fencing – NO.
RULING: REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Tan acquitted. .
RATIO:
1. PD 1612: Under PD 1612, accused need not participate in the robbery or
theft. Before PD 1612 was enacted, the fence could only be prosecuted as
an accessory. After PD 1612, the latter becomes a principal in the crime of
fencing. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under RPC or
PD 1612. And the preference for the latter is inevitable, since fencing under
the PD is malum prohibitum and creates a presumption of fencing.
2. Fencing, Elements: (1) A crime of robbery/theft has been committed, (2)
The accused, who is not a principal/accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery/theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article,
item, object, or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime (3) accused knows or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery/theft (4) There is on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.
3. 1st Element (Evidence of Theft) not Established: Evidence of theft
independent of fencing wasn’t established. In theft, corpus delicti has 2
elements: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost
by felonious taking. The 2nd element is not present. Lim never reported the
theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Mendez confessed to
the unlawful taking, she didn’t prosecute him. And theft is a public crime –
since Lim reported no loss, the Court can’t hold for certain that there was a
crime of theft committed. Neither can Mendez’ confession be enough, since
such is extrajudicial and without assistance of counsel. And besides, a
confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence
only against the person admitting or confessing it.
4. 3rd element (Knowledge that Goods were Stolen) not Present: There was
no showing that the accused knew or should have known that the very
stolen articles were the ones sold by him. The Court must determine such
knowledge carefully from the overt’s acts. And given two equally plausible
states or cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one
which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.
 MANAHAN v CA
March 20, 1996 | Vitug, J. | Certiorari | Estafa
SUMMARY: Petitioner failed to return a leased truck to complainant IFC
because it was lost after the former leased it to another person who dismantled
said truck. He was convicted for estafa by the lower courts but was acquitted by
the Supreme Court for lack in intent to misappropriate or convert the property
subject of the case.
DOCTRINE: Estafa requires refusal to comply with an undertaking to return
property on account of misappropriation or conversion. Criminal intent to
perform such conversion or misappropriation must always be present.
FACTS:
1. On 10 May 1976 Petitioner Manuel L. Manahan, Jr. and IFC Leasing and
Acceptance Corporation (IFC) entered into an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) over an Isuzu dump truck for a period of 36 months.
2. On 15 March 1977, IFC filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal for a sum of money, with replevin and damages, against petitioner
for “several defaults” and owed, in rentals and expenses, the sum of
P160,110.18 as of 20 February 1977 on the lease of the dump truck.
3. On 3 April 1978 CFI Rizal granted the action sought by IFC, but instead of
executing the decision, IFC sought for the settlement of the accounts under
the ELA.
4. Failing to settle the accounts, IFC charged petitioner with estafa.
5. Apparently, the truck was subleased to one Mr. Gorospe. However, upon
the termination of the sublease, petitioner failed to retake possession of the
unit. This is because the truck was dismantled by men of Gorospe and
Espino who loaded the parts into another truck and left only its chassis.
6. RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal petitioner
contends that fourth element of the crime of estafa, namely, the
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the thing received to the
prejudice of another, was not present in this case.
7. On 21 May 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision which
affirmed, except for the penalty which was modified, the trial court’s
judgment. Hence the case.
(a) That personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(b) That there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(c) That such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another;
and
(d) That there be demand for the return of the property.
2. Before the offense can be considered committed, the refusal or failure to
deliver or return is, in turn, predicated on misappropriation or conversion by
the accused of the subject of the obligation.
3. Although petitioner has incurred default in his obligation to return the
leased unit, it is, nonetheless, unrebutted that he did exert all efforts to
recover and retrieve, albeit belatedly and to no avail, the dump truck from
Gorospe.
4. Estafa falls within the category of mala in se offenses which requires the
attendance of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for
it to be a felony. In this case, petitioner might have been an inept
businessman in failing to promptly obtain possession of the dump truck in
Tarlac following the expiration of the sublease in favor of Gorospe; such
ineptitude, nevertheless, should not be confused with criminal intent.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is guilty of estafa with abuse of confidence? - NO

RULING: Petitioner acquitted but must pay IFC the value of the truck with
interest.

RATIO:
1. The elements of this crime are:
 SADDUL v. CA
December 10, 1990 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Certiorari | Estafa
SUMMARY: Petitioner was tasked to sell spare parts owned by Land Rover with
20% of the value going to complainant. After petitioner left the company, he did
not deposit the 20% allegedly due to the instructions of Land Rover which led to
the filing of the case and his eventual conviction. SC reversed the decision and
acquitted the petitioner on the ground that all the elements for the crime of estafa
were absent.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 2.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Saddul used to be an executive vice-president and general
manager of complainant Cuevas’ company called AMPI which was the
former sole distributor of spare parts, heavy equipment, etc. of Land Rover
International in the Philippines.
2. As a former member of AMPI, Saddul sold the spare parts returned by the
AFP to a company as authorized by the Land Rover International with 20%
of such sales going to the credit of AMPI.But petitioner did not deposit the
proceeds of the sales in AMPI’s account but held them in trust for Land
Rover.
3. After Saddul left AMPI, he built Multipart Motors International which
became the new sole distributor of Land Rover. This caused AMPI to
demand from Saddul the 20% revenue from the sold spare parts and to file a
criminal case against the latter.
4. In an exchange of communication between AMPI and Land Rover, the
latter requested that all remaining parts in possession of AMPI be delivered
to Multipart Motors and advice was given that AMPI will not be liable
anymore for the 80% proceeds from the spare parts. It was also stated that
the 20% that was supposed to go to AMPI will be settled by Land Rover
after being furnished an accounting sales made by the former distributor.
5. Despite this, AMPI pursued the case against Saddul that led to his
conviction for estafa by the trial court which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: WoN Saddul is guilty of estafa? - NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. Estafa can be committed by appropriating or converting money or property
received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's own use includes, not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right. Conversion is an unauthorized
assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal
chattels belonging to another, resulting in the alteration of their condition or
the exclusion of the owner's rights. It takes place when a person actually
appropriates the property of another to his own benefit, use, and enjoyment.
2. The elements of the crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of
confidence are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion
of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part
that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the
injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the
property.
3. In the case at bar, all elements are absent. For the first element, Saddul
received the spare parts from the AFP in trust for Land Rover and not
AMPI. Also, he did not have any obligation to deliver or return the same to
AMPI.
4. For the second element, Saddul sold the property under the authority given
by Land Rover, so it cannot be said that he converted or diverted the
property.
5. The third element is also absent since Saddul’s failure to deliver the
proceeds of the sale did not constitute a conversion or diversion to the
injury of AMPI since the latter is not the owner of the spare parts.
Moreover, Saddul simply complied with a directive of Land Rover to put
the money from the sales in a separate account from AMPI’s, implicit that
the proceeds is not to be delivered to AMPI.
6. The last element of demand was also not present. While it is true that under
Land Rover’s letter, AMPI was entitled to a handling commission of 20%
of the sale value of the spare partswhich Saddul failed to deliver to AMPI,
Saddul explained that he subsequently received instructions from Land
Rover to hold the 20% commission until AMPI shall have given an
accounting of the remaining spare parts still held by AMPI. This was never
controverted by complainant and no demand was declared after such
explanation.
7. What complainant should have done is to file a civil action to collect the
20% from Saddul and not to pursue a criminal action for estafa.
 ALLIED BANKING CORP v. ORDOÑEZ
December 10, 1990 | Padilla, J. | Certiorari (Special Civil Action) | Estafa – PD
115
SUMMARY: PBM as entrustee through Ching executed four Trust Receipt
Agreements, under which they were to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
certain goods, or to return the goods if unsold within a stated period. They failed
to comply with the agreement. The Court held that violation of a Trust Receipt
constitutes estafa under Sec 13, PD 115.
DOCTRINE: The violation of an entrustee’s undertaking to sell or otherwise
dispose of the entrusted goods and to turn over the proceeds if sold, or return the
goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the trust
receipt’s terms and conditions, is estafa under Sec 13, PD 115.
FACTS:
1. Philippine Blooming Mills, through Alfredo Ching, applied for commercial
letters of credit with petitioner Allied Banking Corp to finance purchase of
dolomites and bricks. ABC issued an irrevocable letter of credit in Nikko
Industry Co., Ltd’s favor by virtue of which the latter drew four drafts
accepted by PBM and duly honored and paid by ABC.
2. To secure payment of the drafts and in consideration of the transfer by ABC
of the possession of the goods to PBM, PBM as entrustee through Ching
executed four Trust Receipt Agreements acknowledging ABC’s ownership
of the goods and PBM’s obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods if sold, or if not, to return the same within the stated period.
3. P1,475,274.09 was overdue. Despite repeated demands, PBM failed and
refused to either turn over the sale’s proceeds or return the goods. Thus,
ABC filed a criminal complaint against Ching for violation of PD 115.
ISSUE/S: WoN a violation of PD 115 is criminally punishable – YES
WoN goods covered by trust receipts are outside PD 115’s scope -
NO
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO:
1. Sec 4, PD 115 defines a trust receipt transaction, which provides therein
that the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the
goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the
entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or
instruments themselves, if they are unsold or otherwise disposed of xxx.
2. Ching contends that PBM is not in the business of selling Magtar Branch
Dolomites or High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks. But PBM, as
entrustee under the trust receipts, has under Sec 9 of PD 115, these
obligations: (a) receive the sale’s proceeds, in trust for the entruster and turn
them over to the entruster to the extent of the amount owing to him or as
appears in the trust receipt; (b) keep said goods or proceeds whether in
money or other form, separate and capable of identification as entruster’s
property; (c) return the goods, documents or instruments in the event of
non-sale or upon entruster’s demand; and (d) observe all other terms and
conditions of the trust receipt not contrary to PD 115’s provisions.
3. In trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster, and they are
interpreted in accordance with the general rules on contracts. The entrustee
binds himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods and to turn
over the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise
disposed of, in accordance with the trust receipt’s terms and conditions. A
violation of this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec 13, PD 115.
4. Even assuming the absence of a clear provision in the trust receipt
agreement binding the entrustee to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted
goods or return the goods if unsold, acts involving the violation of trust
receipt agreements occurring after 29 Jan 1973 (issuance of PD 115) would
render the accused criminally liable for estafa under Art 315 par 1(b),
pursuant to Sec 13, PD 115. The act punishable is malum prohibitum.
5. The wording of Sec 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
entrusted goods or return said goods if unsold or disposed of in accordance
with the terms of the trust receipts. Non-payment of the amount covered by
the trust receipt is an act violative of the trustee’s obligation to pay, even if
the goods are for use in manufacture and not for sale. The law applies to all
transactions covered by trust receipts except those expressly excluded.
 LEE v. RODIL
July 5, 1989 | Guttierez Jr., J. | Review of RTC orders | Estafa – Trust Receipts
(PD 115)
SUMMARY: Lee seeks to dismiss the information against her for estafa, by
claiming that PD 115 (which states that violation of a trust receipt agreement
constitutes estafa) is unconstitutional. SC: PD 115 is constitutional.
DOCTRINE: A trust receipt agreement involves a loan feature (represented by
the letter of credit) which is separate and distinct from the security feature (which
is in the covering trust receipt). Hence the claim that the trust receipt is a purely
commercial loan which should be subject only to civil liability will not prosper.
FACTS:
1. Rosemarie Lee, the duly authorized representative of CS Lee Enterprises
and entrustee in the subject trust receipt agreement, opened a Letter of
Credit with PBCOM for P154, 711 (covering the purchase price of certain
merchandise consisting of 23 ctns. Lab Culture Media) in favor of PBCOM.
She received the necessary document and the merchandise, after which, she
executed the trust receipt for the merchandise. In the trust receipt, she
obligated herself to hold the merchandise in trust, with the liberty to sell the
same in cash for the account of PBCOM and to account for the proceeds of
the sale (if sold) or of returning the same (if not sold).
2. However, she failed to comply with her obligation despite repeated
demands and a lapse of long period of time. An information for estafa was
filed against her. She moved to quash the information on the ground that
violation of a trust receipt agreement doesn’t constitute estafa despite the
express provision in PD 115/ Trust Receipts Law characterizing such
violation as estafa. She also assails PD 115 for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON violation of a trust receipt agreement is estafa – YES
WON PD 115 is unconstitutional - NO
RULING: AFFIRMED. Case REMANDED ofr further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. PD 115, Section 13: “The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of the goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust
receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in
the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents, or instruments if they
were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa.”
2. Trust Receipt Agreement – A Purely Commercial Loan? Petitioner cites
People v Cuevo & Sia v People. In the dissents of de Castro and Teehankee
under Cuevo, they claimed that a trust receipt agreement is a purely
commercial transaction that could give rise only to civil liability. A trust
receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing
importers and retailers who lack sufficient funds to finance the
importation/purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire
credit except through utilization of their merchandise as collateral. They
said that to consider the bank as the true owner of the merchandise from the
inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature of the
trust receipt agreement. In Sia, the Court said that the trust receipt
transaction is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, and that one as
giving rise only to civil liability for the violation thereof should be chosen
since it’s more favorable to the offender
3. Cuevo & Sia before PD 115 Promulgation: However, in Cuevo, the
majority clearly believed that the violation of a trust receipt constitutes
estafa under article 315 (1b) (they just lacked 1 vote so the dissenters won).
Even in de Castro’s dissent, he admitted that PD 115 clearly defines and
clarifies that such violation amounts to estafa. And besides, the Cuevo &
Sia cases involved violations of trust receipt agreements in the 1960s, which
was way before PD 115 was promulgated in 1973. In this case, the accused
was charged in 1985 for an act committed in 1982. Hence, all violations of
trust receipt agreements after Jan 29 1973 would make the accused
criminally liable for estafa under RPC A315 (1b), pursuant to PD 115.
4. Lack of Convincing Evidence on Unconstitutionality: Petitioner contends
that the statute is violative of the right that no person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of poll tax. But she failed to overcome the
presumption of the validity of an existing statute.
5. Naute of Trust Receipt Agreement: In a trust receipt agreement, the bank
extends a loan covered by the letter of credit, with the trust receipt as a
security for the loan. Hence, the transaction involves a loan feature
(represented by the letter of credit) which is separate and distinct from the
security feature (which is in the covering trust receipt). Hence the claim that
the trust receipt is a purely commercial loan which should be subject only to
civil liability will not prosper.
6. Bank Need Not Be Owner: The fact that the bank doesn’t become the
factual owner of the goods doesn’t make the law unconstitutional. The
language of RPC Art 315 (1b) was clarified by PD 115. The person who is
prejudiced through the misappropriation or conversion of the goods need
not be the owner; otherwise, the phrase “to the prejudice of another” would
have been “to the prejudice of the owner”.
7. PD 115’s Policy: As a valid exercise of police power, PD 115 merely
addresses the growing importance of trust receipts in Philippines business,
abd the need to provide for the rights and obligations of parties to a trust
receipt transaction.
 CELINO v. CA possess power to find hidden treasure to fleece complainant of his hard-
June 29, 1988 | Cortes, J. | Certiorari | Estafa – Through false pretenses, earned money.
fraudulent acts or means 2. No evidence adduced by petitioner supports his contention that he and
complainant were partners in a “joint venture” transaction. Contrary to
SUMMARY: Petitioner and his sons repeatedly obtained money from Jose Tan petitioner’s allegation, the TC and CA correctly applied the law and
Kapoe by telling him that a dwarf was giving them instructions regarding jurisprudence on this matter. People v Scott and US v de los Reyes had
treasure hidden on Kapoe’s property. The Court held that they were liable for similar facts to the instant case; in line with these, the acts petitioner
estafa under Art 315 2(a). committed constitute a classic case of swindling under Art 315 2(a).
DOCTRINE: Estafa may be committed by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by: x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses of fraudulent acts executed
FACTS: prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
1. On 17 March 1978, accused Zosimo Celino and Ricardo Celino, with two (a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely prctending to possess power, influence,
others, went to Jose Tan Kapoe’s house and told him there was hidden qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
treasure under his lot in Laguna. Zosimo and Ricardo told him that a certain means of other similar deceits.
dwarf entering Zosimo’s body was giving the latter instructions as to the xxx
digging operations, and that he would be given millions of pesos. Because
Jose and Ricardo, as well as their fathers, were close friends, he believed
them. They dug a hole in his ricemill up to 31 May 1978, whereupon they
told him they discovered a jar full of gold which they covered with a sack
and white cloth and would not allow him to see.
2. On multiple occasions, Ricardo, Zosimo, and Requerido Celino, asked for
sums of money from Jose. He would give it to them in a white envelope,
which they would take into the room under the stairs of Jose’s house, where
they had placed the jar. They told Jose that they were placing the money on
the treasure in accordance with the dwarf’s instructions, and that he was
forbidden from entering the room or touching the treasure because the
dwarf would be angry. All in all, the money Jose gave totaled P50,230.
3. When Jose’s savings with BPI were exhausted, he asked the Celinos to set
a deadline and he was told 30 May 1979. But as they did not fulfill their
promise, he opened the jar and discovered that it contained only newspaper,
comics, rocks and soil.

ISSUE/S: What was the crime committed by the petitioner? – Estafa under Art
315 2(a).

RULING: Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Under the abovestated facts, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner committed estafa, defined and punished under Art 315 2(a) of the
RPC. The facts clearly show that petitioner and his sons pretended to
 ABEJUELA v. PEOPLE
August 19, 1991 | Fernan, C.J. | Estafa through false pretenses, fraudulent acts
or means
SUMMARY: Abejuela reluctantly agreed to let Balo use his passbook to
deposit checks totaling 176,145 in his Banco Filipino account. He also withdrew
a total amount of 175,607 in behalf of Balo. The Bank found that
DOCTRINE: Knowledge of criminal intention of the principal is indispensable
in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice in estafa. However, acquittal
does not extinguish the accused’s civil liability when he unwittingly contributed
to the consummation of the crime.
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Abejuela had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino. Sometime in
April/May of 1978, he befriended an employee of said bank, Glicerio Balo,
Jr. On Aug 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela’s welding shop to borrow his
passbook. Balo showed him some checks purporting to be the proceeds
from his father’s insurance company and wanted to deposit them in
Abejuela’s account with Banco Filipino. Abejuela suggested that he open
his own account with Banco Filipino or with a different bank. Balo said he
was prohibited from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was
employed as savings bookkeeper and that he wanted the checks deposited in
said bank to facilitate their immediate encashment. Balo assured him that
there was nothing wrong with using his passbook and that he would
accompany him to the bank to make the deposit.
2. Accepting Balo’s assurances, Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. On
Aug 8, Balo returned his passbook with the deposit of 20k reflected on it.
Balo requested him to withdraw money on his behalf and Abejuela
reluctantly agreed, withdrawing 15k which he gave to Balo at Felisa’s Café.
This practice continued for quite some time. Abejuela’s account for August
reflected total deposits of 176,145 and a total withdrawal of 175,607.96
3. Abejuela borrowed 20k from Balo, payable within 90 days from Aug 9,
1978. However, feeling apprehensive over Balo’s constant use of his
passbook, he decided to pay his loan on Aug 31 and closed his account with
Banco Filipino and withdrawing the balance of his deposit.
4. The bank’s accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered the discrepancy
between the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger
balance. He noticed that 4 large deposits were made in Abejuela’s account
but the deposit slips could not be located. They were convinced that Balo,
who was the savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to
Abejuela’s savings account ledger, was able to manipulate the ledger by
posting fictitious deposits after banking hours when the posting machine
was already closed and cleared.
5. Balo and Abejuela were accused of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents. A writ of attachment was ordered by the trial court, wherein
goods taken from the accused were placed in the custody of NBI. However,
Balo was reportedly killed by the NPA so his case was dismissed. Abejuela
was found guilty as an accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document under 315, par. 2(a).
6. Petitioner: had neither knowledge of Balo’s criminal intent nor benefit from
the effects of the crime: no conspiracy. He cannot be convicted as a
principal, accomplice or accessory. Lending of passbook was made in good
faith and after he was deceived by Balo. Presumption of innocence.
ISSUE/S: WoN Abejuela was guilty as an accomplice – NO.
RULING: Petitioner ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner was completely unaware of Balo’s scheme. He was deceived and
cajoled into giving his consent. Also, Balo had the perfect alibi – his late
father’s insurance proceeds. Considering that they were close friends,
Abejuela’s acquiescence to Balo’s overtures is understandable.
Furthermore, the bank allows anyone to deposit even without the owner’s
passbook as long as the account number is known – Balo could have still
posted the false deposits in Abejeula’s account ledger even without
Abejuela’s passbook, since the ledger is the bank’s record while the
passbook is the depositor’s record, and the ledger is more often than not,
more accurate and up-to-date. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela
was his negligence and utter gullibility in lending his passbook.
2. Knowledge of criminal intent of the principal is indispensable in order to
convict Abejuela as an accomplice. Abejuela’s guilty has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt for which reason he must be acquitted.
However, his civil liability is not extinguished since his acquittal is merely
based on reasonable doubt. Civil liability arises because the crime caused
damage to another. Since Banco Filipino suffered damages, and Abejuela
unwittingly contributed to the consummation of the crime, he must be held
civilly accountable.
 KOH TIECK HENG v. PEOPLE
December 21, 1990 | Regalado, J. | Estafa through false pretenses, fraudulent
acts or means
SUMMARY: Koh Tieck Heng deposited 2 checks, both in the amount of
18,060, issued by F. Dycaico. Dycaico said he never issued said checks. He
was able to withdraw a total of 15,500 for the first one but was apprehended
before he was able to withdraw for the 2nd check.
DOCTRINE: Absence of proof of damage or prejudice to offended party
would make the accused guilty of attempted estafa.
FACTS:
1. Accused Koh Tieck Heng, alias Tomas Flores, opened a Savings Account
with the Security Bank and Savings Trust Company with an initial deposit
of 500 made on Feb 21, 1973. He made a 2 nd deposit of 400 then withdrew
500, then deposited 775, then withdrew 1k.
2. On August 13, he went to SBTC to deposit a Philippine Bank of
Communications check of 18,060, signed and issued by F. Dycaico. Said
sum was posted in his passbook upon deposit. On Aug 16, he withdrew 10k.
He again withdrew the next day an amount of 5,500. On Aug 18, he went
again to SBTC to deposit another PBC check dated Aug 11, 1973 for
18,060, signed by F. Dycaico.
3. Sometime in Aug. 10, 1973, Florencio Dycaico saw his Statement of
Account with PBC and complained that he never issued an 18,060 check.
PBC informed SBTC that the check was spurious. SBTC tellers were
instructed to watch for Tomas Flores.
4. On Aug 22, accused filled up a withdrawal slip for 15,500. Forewarned to
watch for accused, she asked the latter to sign his name, for which he signed
his name of Koh Tieck Heng. After he signed, NBI Agent Espartero
apprehended him. Accused was charged with the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document (altering the date and amount –
alterations in genuine document which changed its meaning): 1 st check, and
attempted estafa thru falsification of a commercial document: 2nd check.
5. Defense: On Aug 9, he went to Supersonic Auto Supply to buy auto spare
parts as he is engaged in buying and selling of such. A certain Jimmy Go
was also buying 24 tires but since the store did not have any tires for sale,
the salesman pointed to accused who sold such stuff. Go said that he can
issue the check and accused can deliver the tires only after encashing the
same. Go brought out a check and signed as F. Dycaico. Accused claims
that except for the signature, all other handwritten portions of the check
were already there. Since the cost of the tires was only about 3k, Go told
him to just deliver the difference after he encashed it. After depositing the
check, he withdrew 10k and delivered it to Go, who asked for the balance of
5,500 which he also delivered. Go again delivered another check, ordering
another 50 tires so he took the check, deposited it with SBTC but could not
get the proceeds since he was apprehended.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN respondent court erred in convicting him on the basis of a new
accusation without having informed him of the cause and nature of the same
– NO.
2. WoN attempted estafa was committed – YES.
3. WoN the court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged despite the
absence of evidence that appellant committed or had knowledge of the
crimes charged – NO.
RULING: Petition DENIED. Guilty of estafa and attempted estafa.
RATIO:
1. Appellant avers that there is a variance between the allegations in the
information and the evidence adduced, thereby depriving him of the right to
be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him
(different modes of falsification) – Information: mode: alteration in genuine
documents changing its meaning. Evidence: counterfeiting handwriting or
signature and causing it to appear persons participated in an act when they
did not do so – Forgeries in toto [original checks issued (P225 and P2,030)
and their forgeries (both 18,060)]. SC held that with respect to estafa and
attempted estafa, conviction would still be proper, with the 2 essential
requisites of estafa (fraud or deceit and damage to another) having been
charged and proven.
2. The 2 essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be
established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of
estafa may be established – The use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud
or deceit: Appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks and he
benefited and attempted to gain from it by trying to withdraw an amount.
The inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified the
checks. Absence of proof of damage or prejudice to offended party would
make the accused guilty of attempted estafa, since he has commenced the
crime but failed to perform all acts by reason other than his own
spontaneous desistance. Since intent to cause damage and not actual
damage is shown, he was correctly convicted of attempted estafa.
3. Checks were undeniably spurious. Dycaico testified that he only issued
checks in the amount of 225 and 2,030. His disclaimer of his alleged
signatures in the spurious checks is prima facie evidence of falsification.
Burden of proof shifts to appellant to prove otherwise. Furthermore,
 possessor of a falsified document who makes use of said document is
presumed to be the author thereof.
PEOPLE v. ONG
December 20, 1991 | Medialdea, J. | Appeal | Estafa through false pretenses,
fraudulent acts or means
SUMMARY: Ong deposited 11 checks with Home Savings Bank and Trust
Company and was allowed to withdraw certain amounts therefrom on the
same day without clearance. Said checks were dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. Ong contends that he is merely an indorser of said
checks and he could not have known that said checks were insufficient. SC
ruled in favor of Ong, but made him civilly liable to pay Php 575,704 as
damages that the Bank suffered.
DOCTRINE: In estafa by postdating a bad check, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense and must be established with satisfactory
proof to warrant conviction.
FACTS:
1. Dick Ong opened a savings account on Dec 6, 1978 with Home Savings
Bank and Trust Company, with an initial deposit of 22.14 in cash and 10k
in check. He was allowed to withdraw 5k on the same day without the usual
reglementary clearance (5 working days). The withdrawal slip was signed
and approved by Branch Manager Lino Morfe and accused Lucila Talabis,
Branch Cashier.
2. Similar transactions followed, where Ong, upon depositing checks, was
allowed to withdraw against the uncleared checks and uncollected deposits.
Withdrawals were authorized and approved by accused Ricardo Villaran
and Talabis. All uncleared checks prior to Jan 30, 1979 were honored and
paid by the drawee banks.
3. On Jan 30, Ong deposited 4 checks and was allowed to withdraw before
check clearance. He also deposited 7 more checks the next day and was
allowed again to withdraw before clearance. Both were authorized by
Talabis. However, all 11 checks were dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds.
4. Ong was charged with estafa by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations to the effect that the checks totaling 575,504, are
good and covered with sufficient funds. Morfe, Talabis and Villaran were
accused as co-conspirators.
5. Appellant: no deceit or fraud on the bank because the practice of deposit
and withdrawal against uncleared checks and uncollected deposits was
tolerated by it (based on his co-accused’s testimonies); he offered to pay the
amounts and put up as security his property, as soon as he learned of the
dishonored checks; checks were not in payment of an obligation; he was
merely a general indorser of the checks, his obligations, if any, should be
governed by Sec 66 of Negotiable Instruments Law; the checks were issued
by his customers so he could not have had any knowledge as to the
sufficiency of their funds.
ISSUE/S: WoN Ong is guilty of estafa – NO.
RULING: Accused-appellant ACQUITTED, but civilly liable for 575,504.
RATIO:
1. Art, 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC (estafa by post-dating a check when offender
lacks or has insufficiency of funds) has the following elements: 1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check was issued; 2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and 3) damage to payee. – 2 and 3 present.
2. Element 1(a): postdating or issuance of checks: an accused, which only
negotiated the check drawn by another, is guilty of estafa, PROVIDED that
he had guilty knowledge of the fact that the drawer had no funds in the bank
when he negotiated the subject check. – Prosecution failed to prove that
Ong had any knowledge with respect to the subject checks he indorsed.
With respect to the check wherein Ong was the drawee, the 1 st element is
applicable (Ong was the drawee of 1 check, but a mere indorser in the
others). Element 1(b): payment of obligation: Bank deposits are in the
nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest.
All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings or current are to be
treated as loans and are governed by the law on loans.
3. Elements of estafa in general: 1) Accused defrauded another a) by abuse of
confidence, or b) by means of deceit; and 2) Damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party.
4. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense of estafa by
postdating a bad check, and must be established with satisfactory proof to
warrant conviction. Evidence proved that the Bank on its own accorded him
a drawn against uncollected deposit privilege (DAUD) without need of any
pretensions on his part. The bank relaxed its rules and internal policies
against uncleared checks when a depositor is an important client – accused
was such. Granting that he had in fact acted fraudulently, he could not have
done so without the Bank employee’s active cooperation. Since Talabis and
Villaran were declared innocent, the same should be said for the accused.
5. Lastly, RA 4885 has eliminated the requirement for the drawer of a check to
inform the payee that he lacked or has insufficient funds in the bank to
cover the amount of the check. Therefore, inability to inform said payee
will not make one sufficiently liable for estafa.
 NIERRAS v. DACUYCUY
January 11, 1990 | Paras, J. | Certiorari | Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22)
SUMMARY: Nierras seeks to dismiss 9 cases for estafa under RPC Art 315 (2-
d) against him on the ground of double jeopardy, since there were 9 pending cases
for violation of BP22 which referred to the same act/s. SC: No double jeopardy.
DOCTRINE: Where the check was issued in payment of a preexisting
obligation, there is no estafa since the issuance of the check doesn’t cause damage
to the payee. But if he issued a check to induce another to part with a valuable
consideration and it bounces, then he does inflict an injury to the payee of the
check apart from violating BP 22, and he may be prosecuted further under estafa.
FACTS:
1. Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp, purchased oil
products from the latter and issued 9 checks in payment thereof. However,
upon presentation of the checks, they were dishonored since his account
was already closed. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay Shell.
2. 9 cases for estafa and 9 cases for violation of BP 22 were filed against him.
He filed a motion to quash the 9 estafa cases on the ground of double
jeopardy since these offenses were already included in the 9 pending cases
for violation of BP 22. He argues that all the elements of estafa under
Article 315 (2-d) are also present in the crime under BP 22, namely “(1) the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contract at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check and (3) damage to the payee”. Judge Dacuycuy denied his motion to
quash, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON double jeopardy is present in this case – NO.
RULING: Petition for certiorari DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. Differences between estafa under RPC Art 315 (2-d) and BP22:
 Deceit and damages are essential elements for estafa but aren’t required
in BP 22. Under BP 22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored
gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the drawer’s part that he
issued the check without sufficient funds
 A drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP22 even if
he issued the check for a pre-existing obligation, but for estafa under
Art 315 (2-d), criminal liability will be negated
 Specific and different penalties imposed
 Estafa a crime against property while BP 22 crime against public
interest since it does injury to the entire banking system
 RPC Art 315 are mala in se, while BP 22 is mala prohibita
2. As the author of the bill, Estelito Mendoza’s discussions on BP 22 clearly
show that the 2 offenses are different. Mendoza states that there may still be
further prosecution under the RPC. Where the check was issued in payment
of a preexisting obligation, there is no case for estafa since the issuance of
the check doesn’t cause damage to the payee. But if he issued a check to
induce another to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces,
then he does inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating
BP 22, and he may be prosecuted further under estafa.
3. Besides, BP 22 Sec 5 clearly states that “Prosecution under this Act shall be
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the RPC”
4. And even if the filing of the 2 sets of Information (BP 22 & estafa under
RPC) refers to identical acts, a single criminal act may still give rise to
several offenses. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense, and
not for the same act. When there is variance or differences between the
elements of an offense in one law and another law, there is no double
jeopardy since this rule prohibits only the identity of elements in the 2
offenses.
BP22, Section 1: “Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment…”
Article 315: Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another xxx (2)
by means of any of the ff false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud xxx (d) by postdating a check or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check.
 PEOPLE v. J. GROSPE and PARULAN
January 20, 1988 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari (Special Civil Action) |
Bouncing Checks
SUMMARY: Parulan was charged with violation of B.P. 22 and estafa for two
checks he issued in favor of SMC which were later dishonored. Judge Grospe of
the Pampanga RTC (Branch 44) dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction and
that the element of deceit and damage was not sufficiently proven. SC held that:
DOCTRINE:
 The elements of deceit and damage are not essential or required for a
conviction for violation of B.P. 22, but under estafa by postdating or issuing
a bad check (2d), deceit and damage are essential elements and must be
satisfactorily proven to warrant conviction.
 Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or
continuing offense, and the elements of deceit and damage may arise
independently at several places.
 While the place of the issuance of the check is the determinative factor for
violation of B.P. 22, the knowledge of the insufficiency of funds on the part
of the maker or drawer of the check, which is an essential element of the
offense, is by itself a continuing eventuality, regardless whether the accused
be within one territory or another. As such the offense may also be
transitory or continuing in nature.
.
FACTS:
1. Manuel Parulan was charged with violation of B.P. 22 and estafa .The B.P.
22 case involved a Planters Development Bank (PDB) check issued on June
13, 1983 for Php 86,071.20, while the estafa case (by postdating or issuing a
bad check) was for the issuance of another PDB check dated June 18, 1983
for Php 11,918.80 direct payment for the spot sale of beer. Both checks
were issued in favor of San Miguel Corp. (SMC) and received by the SMC
Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The checks were then delivered to and
received by the SMC Finance Officer who deposited them at BPI San
Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8, 1983, however, SMC was notified by PDB
(the drawee bank) at Santa Maria, Bulacan of dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds.
2. Respondent Judge Grospe of Branch 44 of Pampanga RTC, in whose sala
the two cases were tried jointly, dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC stated in its findings that while it has been proven that Parulan
issued the checks which were subsequently dishonored, the element of
deceit and damage were not proven and were not committed within the
RTC’s jurisdiction, since the checks were issued and subsequently
dishonored at Bulacan.
3. Prosecution argues that while the checks were dishonored at Bulacan, such
is inconsequential since SMC deposited the same checks at its account with
BPI San Fernando, Pampanga.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Pampanga RTC had jurisdiction over the cases – YES
WoN estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check as well as violation
of B.P. 22 may be continuing offenses – YES
WoN deceit or damage is an essential element of violation of B.P. 22
– NO
RULING: RTC decision set aside. Pampanga RTC ordered to reassume
jurisdiction over the cases and render judgment based on evidence presented
during trial.
RATIO:
1. Violation of B.P. 22: The elements of deceit and damage are not essential
or required for a conviction for violation of B.P. 22. An essential element of
such offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check
of the insufficiency of his funds. The law makes the mere act of issuing a
worthless check a special offense punishable, and being malum prohibitum,
malice and intent are immaterial. The gravamen of the offense is the
issuance of the check and not the non-payment of an obligation.
It should be noted, however, that this offense may be continuing in nature as
well, and that B.P. 22 penalizes both the fact of dishonor of a check and the
act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. Following Que
v. People, the determinative factor is the place of the issuance of the check,
thus, the case could have also been filed in Bulacan.
However, it is also true that that knowledge of the insufficiency of funds on
the part of the maker or drawer of the check, which is an essential element
of the offense, is by itself a continuing eventuality, regardless whether the
accused be within one territory or another (People v. Hon. Manzanilla). As
such, the Pampanga RTC also has jurisdiction over the B.P. 22 case.
Furthermore, jurisdiction or venue as determined by the allegations in the
Information is controlling. In this case, the Information specifically stated
that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and thereby
within the jurisdiction of the Pampanga RTC.
2. Estafa: Under estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check (2d), deceit and
damage are essential elements and must be satisfactorily proven to warrant
conviction. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory
or continuing offense. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some
acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
 cognizance of the Case will exclude the others. However, if all the acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or
territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.
The elements of deceit and damage in estafa may arise independently at
several places. In this case, the deceit took place at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where the check was uttered and delivered. It has been held that
the delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation
as an obligation. Thus, while the check was received at Bulacan by the
SMC Supervisor, the issuance to him is not the delivery contemplated by
law. Under Sec. 190 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the issuance as
well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a
holder with the intent to transfer title thereto, which means “the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof”.
The said representative of SMC is not the person who could take it as a
holder. He had to deliver it first to SMC Regional Office (San Fernando,
Pampanga), after which the Finance Officer deposited the check at BPI San
Fernando Pampanga.
On the other hand, the damage was inflicted at Santa Maria, Bulacan upon
dishonor of the check. As such, both the Pampanga and Bulacan courts have
jurisdiction.
3. Res judicata and Double Jeopardy: The effect of res judicata only applies
to judgment rendered based on the merits of the case. A case dismissed not
based on merits will not bar a subsequent case based on the same offense.
Since the dismissal of the cases was based on the erroneous conclusion on
jurisdictional matters, it is null and void such that it may be said that it was
not lawfully terminated. Therefore, there is no second proceeding to speak
of that would subject the accused to double jeopardy.

Note: Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check requires that the check was issued for
the payment of an obligation.
 QUE v. PEOPLE and IAC
September 21, 1987 | Paras, J. | Certiorari (Resolution) | Bouncing Checks
SUMMARY: Que was convicted on 2 counts of violation of B.P. 22. He
challenges the jurisdiction of the RTC which convicted him and argues that B.P.
22 does not apply to checks issued as mere guarantee. SC held:
DOCTRINE: The determinative factor is the place of issuance of the check, not
the place where the complainant deposited the same.
B.P. 22 makes the issuance of bouncing checks malum prohibitum and it applies
regardless of the purpose of the issuance thereof.
contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued
as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by
the Committee on Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted such qualifying
proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act
more effective.
In this case, Que had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover
accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless
of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.

FACTS:
1. Victor Que was convicted of 2 counts of violation of B.P. 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law). The IAC affirmed his conviction in its decision and
resolution. He now files an MR of the SC’s minute resolution denying his
petition for certiorari to review the IAC decision and resolution.
2. Among the errors assigned by Que is that the Quezon City RTC trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case since the checks were deposited by the
complainant in a bank outside Q.C. and that the issuance of the check was
for the guarantee of the purchases made by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of
which Que is the Manager.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Q.C. had jurisdiction over the case – YES
WoN B.P. applies to bouncing checks issued as a mere guarantee YES

RULING: Petition denied.

RATIO:
1. It is immaterial that the checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank
located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of
issuance, pursuant to Sec. 10 and 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the RTC and as admitted by Que in his answer to the
complainant’s suit for civil liability, the checks were issued at Francis Hill
Supply, No. 194 Speaker Perez Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and
thus within the court's jurisdiction.
2. B.P. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in
the form of a deposit or a guarantee. It does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation.
3. The legislative intent, as shown in the statement of the sponsorship for the
bill, is to make the issuance of bouncing checks malum prohibitum and the
prohibition all-embracing regardless of the purpose for issuing the check.
This is even made clearer by the fact that while the original bill had
 PEOPLE v. NITAFAN
October 22, 1992 | Bellosillo, J. | Certiorari | Bouncing Checks
SUMMARY: Private respondent argues that the bouncing check he issued, a
memorandum check, is in the nature of a promissory note, hence, outside the
purview of BP 22. The SC held that a memorandum check comes within the
meaning of “check” as defined in Sec 185 of the Negotiable Instrument's Law and
should be distinguished from a promissory note. What the law punishes is the
issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
DOCTRINE: The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as
a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum .
FACTS:
1. On January 10, 1985 in the City of Manila, private respondent K.T. Lim
issued to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383
dated February 9, 1985 for P143,000.00, well knowing that at the time of
issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.
2. The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
petitioner failed to pay the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice.
3. On 18 July 1986, private respondent moved to quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was
unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check
which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature.
4. On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the
Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order
quashing the Information. Thus, the SolGen, in behalf or the Philippine
government filed the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S: WON a memorandum check issued post-dated in partial payment of a
pre-existing obligation is within the coverage of B.P. 22 – YES
RULING: Petition is GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 1
September 1986 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever
presides over the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, is hereby directed
forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until terminated.
RATIO:
1. The constitutionality of the “Bouncing Check Law” was already sustained
by the Court in Lozano v. Martinez and the seven (7) other cases decided
jointly with it. In relation to whether or not a memorandum check is within
the coverage of BP 22. The court holds that a memorandum check is simply
an ordinary check with the word “memorandum” written on its face
signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder
absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. It is an
evidence of debt against the drawer, has the same effect as an ordinary
check, and if passed to a third person, will be valid like any other check. It
is in the form of an ordinary check, is still drawn on a bank, and should
therefore be distinguished from a promissory note which is a mere promise
to pay.
2. A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check as “a bill of exchange
drawn on a bank payable on demand.” A check is also defined as “a written
order or request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking,
by a party having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on
presentment, to a person therein named or bearer, or to such person or
order, a named sum of money,” It must therefore fall within the ambit of
B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that “any person
who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which
check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
3. Retracing the enactment of the “Bouncing Check Law” to determine the
parameters of its concept of “check” shows that the members of the then
Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include all checks
drawn against banks evidenced by the ratiocination of Mr. Estelito P.
Mendoza, co-sponsor of Cabinet Bill No. 9 which later became B.P. 22, that
the “draft or order” in the bill must be addressed to a bank or depository,
and accepted the proposed amendment that the words “draft or order”, and
certain terms which technically meant promissory notes, wherever they
were found in the text of the bill, should be deleted since the bill was
mainly directed against the pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient or no funds, and not to drafts which were not drawn against
banks .
4. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the
bank. Hence, it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of
a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued in
partial fulfillment of a preexisting obligation, for what the law punishes is
the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as
an evidence of a preexisting debt, is malum prohibitum .
5. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of checks be first
 looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive
provisions of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding
would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted–—to stem
the proliferation of unfunded checks. The country will once again
experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of
memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from BP 22.
LIM LAO v. CA
June 20, 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Bouncing Checks
SUMMARY: Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was an employee of Premiere Investment
House who co-signed checks, without actual knowledge of whether such checks
are funded, in favor of Fr. Palijo which bounced. The RTC found her guilty of
violing BP 22 and the CA affirmed the RTC's decision. The SC held that she
should be acquitted since (1) she had no actual knowledge of the insufficiency of
the funds, and (2) no notice of dishonor was actually sent to her.
DOCTRINE: The elements of the offense penalized under BP 22 are “(1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was a junior officer at Premiere Investment House
(Corporation). As part of her job, she co-signed blank checks with Teudolo
Asprec who was head of operations. Through the course of business, she met
Fr. Artelio Artelijo Pelijo, the provincial treasurer of the Society of the
Divine Word . Fr. Pelijo was investing Society's money with the Corporation
and was issued 3 checks with amounts of 150k, 150k, and ~26k which were
all signed by petitioner and Asprec.
2. When Fr. Pelijo presented the checks for encashment, they were dishonored
for insufficient funds. After which, he filed a complaint against petitioner
and Asprec for violation of BP 22 resulting in 3 informations.
3. Petitioner argues that as part of the normal business of the Corporation, she
signed blank checks without knowledge of the actual funds available in the
corporate account and that it was Mr. Asprec, as head of office, who alone
decided to whom the checks were to be ultimately issued and delivered . She
argued that she was not in any way involved in the completion, and the
subsequent delivery of the check to private complainant Palijo and that when
the checks were dishonored, Fr. Pelijo sent a notice to the Corporation and
not to her personally.
4. The RTC found the petitioner guilty, sentencing her to suffer the aggregate
penalty of two (2) years and to pay a fine in the total amount of P300,000.00.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA erred in holding that lack of actual knowledge of
insufficiency of funds was not a defense in a prosecution for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 – YES
2. WON the notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the corporation, and
not to petitioner herself who holds office in that corporation’s branch office,
constitutes the notice mandated in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 – NO
RULING: CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Lina Lim
Lao is ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the
payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the
offense . There is a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element
from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check whose payment was
subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. However, this is not a
conclusive presumption that denies the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. In the present case, the fact that the petitioner co-signed the checks
engenders the presumption of this knowledge but it does not render her
automatically guilty under B.P. Blg. 22. Although the offense charged is a
malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not excused from its responsibility of
proving beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense, including
the acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption. Meanwhile the
petitioner has the right to rebut the prima facie presumption. Since
petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to
possess under the organizational structure of the corporation, she may not
be held liable under B.P. Blg. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes
such as B.P. Blg. 22 “must be construed with such strictness as to carefully
safeguard the rights of the defendant” The element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds having been proven to be absent, petitioner is
therefore entitled to an acquittal.
2. Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the
petitioner, the prima facie presumption that she knew about the
insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing,
making and issuing a bum check but there must also be a showing that,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker
or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check or make arrangements for its
payment. The full payment of the amount in the check withing 5 banking
days constitutes a “complete defense” such that the absence of such notice
deprives an accused the opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. As
such, petitioner has the right to demand that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. In relation to this, the CA erred in holding
that the demand on the Corporation constituted a demand on Lim Lao. The
Corporation was under no obligation to forward the notice to Lim Lao
especially since the Corporation incurs no criminal liability under BP 22.
Responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22 is personal to the accused; hence,
personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor is necessary. Constructive
notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process.
 VILLAFLOR v. COURT of APPEALS
December 26, 1990 | Regalado, J. | Certiorari | Other Deceits
SUMMARY: Villaflor obtained a loan from Locsin, executing a chattel
mortgage over a car which was already mortgaged. The court affirmed the TC
and CA decisions which held Villaflor guilty of the crime of estafa by means of
deceit which is penalized under Art 318 of the RPC.
DOCTRINE: The appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when,
knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still he told
the complainant that the car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at
the time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad
faith in the obtention of said loan under such deliberate pretenses.
FACTS:
1. Mariano Locsin, a businessman, had known Ricardo Villaflor for some time
and had in fact extended 2 small loans to the latter before.
2. On June 1967, Villaflor went to Locsin's house and to secure a loan in the
amount of 1,000 pesos. Villaflor offered his Opel car as a collateral. A
chattel mortgage contract was then executed where Villaflor promised to
pay after 8 days.
3. Villaflor failed to pay the loan on time so Locsin tried to take possession of
the car. When Locsin went to Northern Motors Inc., he found out that the
same car had been repossessed by the same firm for Villaflor's failure to pay
the installments.
4. Locsin made demands on Villaflor to pay, but to no avail. On Sep 1967
Locsin sent a formal demand letter giving Villaflor 10 days to settle his
obligations or Locsin would pursue legal remedies. An information for
estafa was filed against Villaflor.
5. Villaflor offered to settle his obligation by giving Locsin 2 sewing
machines. Under the terms of the agreement, Locsin bound himself to return
the machines once the 1000 pesos was paid on Jul 30, 1968. Villaflor failed
to pay so the trial proceeded.
6. The TC and later on the CA found Villaflor guilty of estafa by means of
deceit as defined and penalized under Article 318 of the RPC.
RULING: Assailed CA decision AFFIRMED in toto.
RATIO:
1. a. Villaflor contended that the court erred in holding that he employed
deceit because the mortgage was executed at the instance of Locsin. This is
untenable because even if the mortgage was executed at the instance of
Locsin, Locsin being a businessman, it is normal for him to require some
form of security to protect his interests in lending money to other persons.
Villaflor's assurance that the car offered as security had never been
encumbered and his failure to disclose to Locsin that the car was previously
mortgaged to Northern Motors constitute deceit.
2. Villaflor also contends that the CA erred in declaring that he did not own
the car. Villaflor cites Arts 1496 and 1497 of the Civil Code to prove his
point:
"The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Article 1497 to
1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.”
“The thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in the
control and possession of the vendee.”
The court held however that these provisions are irrelevant to the issue on
deceit and what is material is that Villaflor is guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation when knowing that the car was owned by Northern
Motors he told Locsin that the car was owned by him for the purposes of
obtaining the loan.
3. The sewing machines do not amount to payment because a debt shall not be
understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the
obligation consists has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case
may be. Also, Article 1244 of the Civil Code states that the debtor of a thing
cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one, although the latter
may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.

ISSUE/S:
1. WoN appellant employed false representations and false pretenses in
obtaining the loan from the complainant, thus making him guilty of estafa
by means of deceit under Article 318 of the RPC - YES
2. WoN the receipt of the two (2) sewing machines by the private respondent
amounts to the payment of the loan, thus extinguishing the obligation in
question – NO

JOSE VELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
July 16, 1990 | Cortes, J. | Review | Other Deceits
SUMMARY: The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan found Jose Veloso
guilty as co-principal in the complex crimes of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents, as defined and penalized under Article 318and 171, paragraph 4,in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and sought to have his case
reviewed. The SC affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision.
DOCTRINE: Veloso should have known or realized by mere scrutiny of the
documents or by the exercise of ordinary diligence that there were irregularities
or anomalies reflected on their very faces. Neither can he claim good faith and
reliance on the actuations of his co-accused public officials since he knew fully
well that his participation in the transactions under question was a farce, and that
his name, business standing and signature was only utilized, with his whole-
hearted cooperation, in seeking the consummation of the plans to defraud the
government.
FACTS:
1. Veloso, an auditor and several other people were found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan of the complex crimes of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents, as defined and penalized under Article 318and 171, paragraph
4,in relation to Article 48 of the RPC. Veloso does not dispute the finding
that there were anomalies in the Siquijor Highway Engineering District
(SHED). Neither does he dispute the existence of a conspiracy between the
suppliers and certain government officials and employees. What he
vehemently denies is the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he was a conspirator.
2. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner’s liability, as District Auditor,
emanated from his irregular and improper processing, pre-audit and
approval of all the general vouchers and checks in question, based on
irregular or fake supporting papers. The graft court found that he also
signed and passed in audit the vouchers and checks knowing that these were
illegally funded and improperly charged to “Fund 81-400” (the prior year’s
obligations), and engaged in “splitting,” so that he would be the one to pass
the vouchers in audit when such should have been forwarded to the COA
Regional Auditor for action or review since “Resident Auditors of bureaus,
offices and agencies of the National Government in Metropolitan Manila, as
well as other Auditors for District/City Highway, Public Works/School,
State Colleges and Universities, Military Areas and Zones outside
Metropolitan Manila, are authorized to countersign checks and warrants in
amounts not exceeding P50,000.00 in each case”. Veloso split the amounts
in 48,000 peso denominations. Veloso claims that what he did was
ministerial since the supporting documents were attached to the vouchers
that he signed and the vouchers would have been cleared even without his
signature as they were supported by the required documents and signatures.
ISSUE/S: WoN Veloso's participation in the conspiracy to defraud the
government has been established beyond reasonable doubt – YES
RULING: Sandiganbayan's decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Clearly, given his acts and omissions in auditing the documents, which
related not only to one but to several transactions, petitioner’s participation
in the conspiracy to defraud the Government has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Veloso was tasked with ensuring the regularity of all
transactions that are subject to his review. In these cases, he had before him,
for his signature, vouchers that were patently irregular, supported by
similarly irregularly issued documents, which he should not have passed in
audit. Instead of refusing to affix his signature and reporting the
irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty bound to do, he turned a blind
eye and signed the documents, completing the process that led to the
consummation of the crime. He can not rely on the excuse that his
subordinates have already initialed the documents for his signature because
his function, as their superior, is to check on their work and to ensure that
they do it correctly. Otherwise, if his signature was a superfluity, petitioner
would be serving no useful purpose in occupying his position of resident
auditor. The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved and the
magnitude of the amount involved also prevent a reasonable mind from
accepting the proposition that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in
the performance of his functions. He passed in audit twenty-four (24)
general vouchers which resulted in the issuance of twenty-three (23) checks
amounting to Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Seven
Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60). Moreover, the irregularities were
not of the kind that could have gone unnoticed by the trained eyes of an
auditor.
 CATIIS v. CA
February 9, 2006 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Certiorari | Swindling by Syndicate
SUMMARY: Petitioner argues that CA erred in holding that since only 4 persons
are charged in the Information, the crime alleged cannot be one of “estafa by a
syndicate” and that since there were no aggravating or qualifying circumstances in
the said Information, the maximum penalty that can be imposed is reclusion
temporal and, thus, the accused are bailable as a matter of right. The SC affirmed
the CA's decision.
DOCTRINE: When estafa is committed by a syndicate, it shall be punished by
life imprisonment to death. A syndicate consists of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise
or scheme. (Section 1, PD 1689)
Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is
left to the judiciary—it must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed a letter complaint against private respondents and a certain
Tafalla for syndicated estafa at the Office of the Prosecutor QC. A
resolution finding probable cause for syndicated estafa with no bail
recommended was approved and an Information was filed at the QC RTC.
2. On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding
probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation
of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable.
3. On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his
earlier Order by declaring that the offense charged is bailable since only
four persons are actually charged and that in order to impose the penalty of
life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, the estafa or
swindling must be committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more
persons.
4. On December 26, 2001, CA issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against Bersamin's
order. However, private respondents had already filed or posted their
surety bonds on December 21, 2001 with the Office of Executive Judge
Monina A. Zenarosa who approved the same on the same day and ordered
the immediate release of private respondents unless held for other lawful
cause .
5. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the CA on January 14, 2002
assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa. On June 14, 2002, the CA
issued its assailed decision denying due course to the petition and
dismissed the same after it found no grave abuse of discretion committed
by Judge Bersamin and Judge Zenarosa in issuing the assailed orders.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the ruling that there should be at least five (5) persons that must be
charged under Section 1, PD. 1689 is not in accordance with law or with
applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court – NO
2. WoN the decision sanctioning the grant of bai l violated Section 7, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and actually departed from the
accepted and usual course in the determination of bailability of criminal
offenses – NO
3. WoN thr decision sustaining the order of release violated Section 17, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure – NO
RULING: The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
1. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of
swindling or estafa, penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death
regardless of the amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the
crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as “consisting of five or more
persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme.” Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined
what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a
requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left
to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed . In this case, the
Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any
other person who had participated in the commission of the crime charged,
thus, based on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged
was not committed by a syndicate. The wordings in the information that the
accused conspired with each other “in a syndicated manner consisting of
five (5) or more persons...” is not sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. Petitioner’s reliance
in People v. Romero to support his argument is misleading. First, the issue
of whether only one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa was not an
issue in the Romero case. Secondly, the Court did not impose the penalty of
life imprisonment to death on the accused since the prosecution failed to
clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate as defined under the
law.
2. Under the second paragraph, it is provided that if the offenders are not
members of a syndicate, shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than P100,000.00 .
Such is the case here. However, Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
provide as a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying
 circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or
information or they cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment
even if they are proved during trial. A reading of the Information shows that
there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus Judge
Bersamin was correct when he found that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion
temporal, is imposable in case of conviction. Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are
bailable. Since the imposable penalty on private respondents, in case of
conviction, is reclusion temporal, they are entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
3. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
another branch of the same court within the province or city. While Branch
96 is open and available on the day private respondents posted their bail
with Judge Zenarosa, it does not necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin
was available at that precise moment. Moreover, it is not specifically stated
in the supplemental petition that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved
the bail, Judge Bersamin was available. Thus, petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption that official duty had been regularly performed by Judge
Zenarosa under the rules.
 CABALLES v. DAR
December 5, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Review | Malicious Mischief ISSUE/S:
1. WoN Abajon is a tenant – NO
2. WoN Abajon is guilty of Malicious Mischief – NO
SUMMARY: Abajon, after being reprimanded by Caballes, the owner of the lot
where he resides, indiscriminately cut down the banana trees in the land and was
RULING: DAR decision DISMISSED, criminal case SET ASIDE.
charged of Malicious Mischief. The SC held that he was not guilty of the crime
as he planted the trees and hence he owned them.
RATIO:
DOCTRINE: The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are: (1) The
1. The requisites to create a tenancy relationship between the parties were not
offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) The damage
fulfilled. The land is not agricultural nor for agricultural production as it is
caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction; (3) The damage
in the heart of a commercial zone. The circumstances of this case indicate
was caused maliciously by the offender. An essential element of the crime of
that the private respondent’s status is more of a caretaker who was allowed
malicious mischief, which is “damage deliberately caused to the property of
by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and
another,” is absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own
to have a garden of some sort.
plantings.
2. Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since
Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious
FACTS: mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that
1. Andrea Millenes sold to the Spouses Caballes a 60 sqm landholding which proceedings in the lower court can resume. The elements of the crime of
was part of a 500 sqm lot. The remainder of the lot was subsequently sold to malicious mischief are: (1) The offender deliberately caused damage to the
the spouses by Mariano Alicaba and the rest of the Millenes family. property of another; (2) The damage caused did not constitute arson or
2. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent crimes involving destruction; (3) The damage was caused maliciously by
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said the offender. However, Abajon cannot be held criminally liable for
landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized
Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he
the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a owns said crops including the fruits thereof. Abajon's possession of the land
fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the is not illegal or in bad faith because he was allowed by the previous owners
landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, Abajon worked the land
bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Consequently, whatever Abajon planted and cultivated on that piece of
Millenes. property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential
3. When the property was sold to the Caballeses, Yolanda Caballes told element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is “damage deliberately
Abajon that they intended to build a poultry and asked him to vacate the caused to the property of another,” is absent because Abajon merely cut
premises. Abajon refused to leave. down his own plantings.
4. On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit
stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property
worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed
against Abajon.
5. The Regional Director of MAR Region VII, issued a certificationstating that
said criminal case was not proper for hearing as Abajon was a tenant the
case is filed to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which is
prohibited by law. This was reversed by the DAR Minister. The reversal
was reversed by the new DAR minister.
 PEOPLE v. FAMULARCANO
February 28, 1947 | Felix, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Acts of
Lasciviousness
SUMMARY: Famularcano hugged and held Navarro with the intention of
kissing her and touching her breast and private parts. CFI found him guilty of
frustrated acts of lasciviousness. SC held him liable for consummated acts of
lasciviousness
DOCTRINE: In acts of lasciviousness, as in all crimes against chastity, there
can be no frustrated stage since no matter how far the offender may have gone
towards the realization of his purpose, the felony is necessarily produced if his
participation amounts to performing all the acts of execution.
Motive of the accused is not important since the essence of lewdness is in the act
itself.
FACTS:
1. Fernando Famularcano was a driver of Camp John Hay Motor Pool at
Baguio City and one of his duties was to drive home the employees of the
Camp in a truck. On the rainy evening of Apr. 4, 1946, Famularcano was
driving home a group of employees, among them was Dionisia Navarro (19
yrs. old, single and a cashier of the Post Exchange of the U.S. Army). At
about 10 pm in the evening after passing the Lukban Bridge, when all the
other employees have been taken to their respective homes, except for
Navarro, Famularcano stopped the truck and told Navarro (who was sitting
beside the driver’s seat) that it was out of gas.
2. Navarro then stepped out of the truck and told Famularcano that she will
just walk to her house since it was just ½ km away. Famularcano then
followed and approached her. After that, he hugged her and held her to his
chest. Navarro struggled to break free from Famularcano. Her dress was
torn from the collar to waistline in his attempt to touch her breast and
private parts. After she was able to break free from him, she started walking
towards the house of a friend, and Famularcano did not follow her anymore
and drove the truck away. She first took a short rest at the porch of one
house, and then proceeded to the house of a friend. She was only able to go
home the next morning and told her mother about the incident.
3. CFI found Famularcano guilty of frustrated acts of lasciviousness, with the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Famularcano argued that he did not
intend to rape Navarro (accdg to Famularcano, her real surname is
Florague). He just wanted to take revenge for the sexual abuse that
Navarro’s father (Antonio Florague, a spy for the Japanese during the war)
committed against his wife during the Japanese occupation.
ISSUE/S: WoN there is a frustrated stage of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
– NO
WoN the offender’s motive is important in the crime of acts of lasciviousness –
NO
RULING: Judgment modified. Famularcano guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness but penalty reduced due to a mitigating circumstance analogous
to passion or obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense committed against
his spouse.
RATIO:
1. From the moment the offender performs all the acts necessary for the
existence of the felony, he actually attains his purpose and all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. In acts of lasciviousness,
as in all crimes against chastity, there can be no frustrated stage since no
matter how far the offender may have gone towards the realization of his
purpose, the felony is necessarily produced if his participation amounts to
performing all the acts of execution.
Famularcano hugged Navarro and held her to his chest with the intention of
kissing her and touching her private parts, but did not succeed in such
intention. He, however, must have touched her breast as shown by the fact
that Navarro’s dress was torn from collar to waistline. Such could not have
been possible just by the mere friction of their bodies when she was being
hugged and held by Famularcano. Even if there was no touching of the
breast, the act of taking and hugging by force and against Navarro’s will
were already acts of abuse against her chastity.
2. Famularcano’s motive doesn’t matter since the essence of lewdness is in the
act itself. Art. 336 of the RPC comprises of all acts of lasciviousness
performed upon a person of either sex short of lying with a woman and
anything leading up to it, independent of the wrongdoer’s intention.
3. Aggravating circumstance of nighttime can’t be appreciated since evidence
doesn’t show that offender purposely sought the cover of nighttime to
facilitate the commission of the offense and avoid detection. On the other
hand, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance analogous (Art. 13, par. 10)
to passion or obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense committed
against his spouse (Art. 13, par. 5 and 6).
 PEOPLE v. FONTANILLA
June 28, 1968 | Castro, J. | Appeal from Municipal Court judgment | Qualified
Seduction
SUMMARY: Fontanilla was accused to have had carnal knowledge,
repeatedly, with Fe Castro, his then 16 year old helper and niece-in-law. SC
gave credence to Castro’s testimony and found accused guilty of qualified
seduction.
DOCTRINE: When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister,
home-servant, domestic, guardian, tutor, teacher, or any person who is
entrusted with the custody or education of the woman seduced (12-18 yo
virgin), the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been
employed or proved. | Ratio 1.
FACTS:
1. On September 1960, Fe Castro, a 16-year old virgin, was brought to her
aunt’s house, Mariano Fontanilla’s wife, to serve as a helper. Castro
testified that from September to shortly before Christmas of 1960,
Fontanilla succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly. She
declared that accused made amorous advances toward her and that a week
after her arrival, accused intruded into her bedroom, placed himself on top
of her and fondled her nipples. He also gave her money and repeatedly
promised to abandon his wife to live with her.
2. She stated that she yielded to the accused because she was induced by his
promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. They would
make love during the day when his wife was away and at night when the
latter was asleep. This lasted for 3 months until his wife caught them in
flagrante on the kitchen floor.
3. Accused: could not have taken advantage of her chastity because her room
was locked at night (complainant: lock is a wooden bar. But the door can
still be opened when pushed from the outside) and he was out in the farm
during the day. Also, his sexual capabilities have waned considerably due to
his old age (52). He contends that Castro’s uncle, Avelino Gapasin
malevolently instigated Castro to file the case (corroborated by Mayor
Aquino’s testimony: Gapasin refused the proposed P50 settlement and
asked for 2k for the “honor destroyed”. She mistakenly thought that she
conceived a child due to the carnal acts), and that she was envious of his
children’s independence (by 1 st marriage; he and Magdalena are childless).
4. Magdalena Copio, wife of accused, denied having caught them in flagrante.
She also testified that she slept from 7 pm to 12 am and seldom could go
back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the slightest noise.
5. On jurisdiction: 1) crime was committed in San Juan- outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court a quo, 2) original jurisdiction for qualified
seduction belongs exclusively to CFI.
ISSUE/S: WoN the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of qualified
seduction in relying heavily on Castro’s testimony and credibility despite the
lack of evidence of the carnal act – NO.
RULING: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Moral damages increased from
500 to 2500.
RATIO:
1. “The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the commission of
crimes against chastity, coupled with the consequent dearth or even absence
of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no small measure upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose testimonial and
personal credibility assumes pivotal importance”.
2. Uncle’s inducement:Gapasin was merely protecting his niece’s interests.
Also, Mayor Aquino admitted that he requested the Fiscal to postpone the
filing of the complaint to enable him to settle the case – filing of the case
preceded, and was not due to the failure of the proposed compromise.
(Settlement was also the reason for the delay in the filing of the complaint).
3. On promise of marriage: Deceit (an essential element in simple seduction)
does not need to be proved in qualified seduction: replaced by abuse of
confidence. The seduction of a 12-18 year old virgin, committed by any of
the persons enumerated in Art 337, constitutes qualified seduction even
though there is no deceit or even when the carnal act was voluntary.
4. Inconsistencies in her testimony: could be attributed to minority (16), lack
of education (Grade 3), perceptively low IQ, and to the understandable
partiality of a litigant to her cause.
5. Declining virility: “day and night” refers to the time when they engaged in
carnal intercourse, not to the frequency. Also, there is a presumption that an
adult male has normal powers of virility. Presumption was not sufficiently
rebutted – must provide clinical evidence with aid of an expert witness.
6. Medical evidence of incompletely healed lacerations in the hymen: injury
happened 6 months prior to the medical examination (Feb 12 1961) –
corresponds to the time Castro stayed as a helper in their house. Moreover,
there is no evidence that Castro was unchaste prior to her stay with the
Fontanillas. Presumption of virginity arises when it is shown that she is
single, and continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary.
7. Jurisdiction: Justice of the peace and judges of municipal courts have like
jurisdiction as the CFI in all offenses committed within the province,
provided that the penalty did not exceed prisioncorreccional or a fine of
 3000 or both – penalty for qualified seduction is prision correccional min-
med.
8. Moral Damages: recoverable by both the offended and her parents: both
suffer besmirched reputation, social humiliation, mental anguish and
wounded feelings.
BABANTO v. ZOSA
February 28, 1983 | Gutierrez Jr., J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Qualified
Seduction
SUMMARY: Petitioner was accused of rape but was convicted for qualified
seduction by the trial court instead. SC held that the lack of force or
intimidation as seen by the lower court is erroneous since such requirement is
very relative. Qualified seduction also cannot be sustained since the virginity of
the victim was not alleged in the information and convicting the petitioner for
the same would be violative of his right to due process.
DOCTRINE: Elements of qualified seduction: (1) the offended party is a
virgin; (2) she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age; (3) the offender has
sexual intercourse with her; and (4) the offender is a person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, one entrusted with the
education or custody of the offended party, or a brother or ascendant of the
latter.
FACTS:
1. Complainant Leonida Dagohoy was a 13 year old girl at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape by petitioner Babanto. Leonida was not
normal because she was considerably of low mentality and had a peculiar
trait of going out during nighttime with the consent of her parents.
2. At the dawn of 24 Oct 1969, Leonida was seated in the market located at
Oroquieta City when the accused, policeman Babanto, approached her and
told her that she will be brought to the municipal building. However, she
was brought to the ABC Hall where there were no people and was very
dark.
3. When they arrived at the Hall, Babanto laid on top of the victim and
commenced the sexual act. She felt pain in her vagina as his penis
penetrated but she could not shout since Babanto covered her mouth.
4. The following morning, she took a bath and washed her panty smeared with
blood. Her mother found about the incident after asking the victim several
times why the latter was feeling weak and feverish.
5. A complaint was filed against Babanto for rape but was convicted for a
lesser offense of qualified seduction. TC opined that evidence on record
proved that accused had sexual intercourse with the complainant but said
intercourse was not committed through use of violence or intimidation.
6. The accused filed an appeal which was denied but the SolGen filed
manifestation sharing the petitioner’s view that under the complaint, the
former cannot be convicted of the offense of qualified seduction since there
was no allegation of virginity in the information. But considering the merits
of the case, he asked to sustain a finding of guilt of the crime of rape.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner is guilty of rape and not qualified seduction? – YES
RULING: Decision by lower court is set aside. Petitioner is found guilty of the
crime of rape.
RATIO:
1. Qualified seduction requires an offended party who is a virgin over 12 but
under 18 years of age. The offender must have had sexual intercourse with
her through abuse of authority, confidence or relationship. If force or
intimidation is alleged, it will be classified as rape.
2. In the case at bar, it is indubitable that sexual intercourse happened between
the petitioner and the victim. It is inconceivable that a 13 year old mentally
deficient girl could create such a story and implicate the petitioner who at
that time was a police officer and the father of a friend. There is no evidence
on record which could show evil motive on her part that she could, despite
her mental incapacity, accuse the petitioner of such a heinous crime as rape.
3. Moreover, trial court erred in not convicting for rape because of the lack of
force or intimidation applied by the accused during the intercourse. Force or
intimidation in rape does not need to be so blatant and excessive to warrant
a conviction. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation used by the
culprit be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in mind. As
evinced by the facts of the case, the mental abnormality and deficiency of
the complainant plus the fact that the accused was in uniform was sufficient
intimidation to convict for rape.
4. The accused’s last defense that he was castrated long before the incident
happened thus disabling him to rape and impregnate a person is untenable.
The fact that the victim became pregnant after the alleged rape and the
petitioner not able to present sufficient evidence or documentation that he
did undergo surgery will render his defense less meritable than that of the
accusation.
 PEREZ v. CA
November 29, 1988 | Cortes, J. | Petition to Review | Qualified Seduction
SUMMARY: Petitioner was acquitted after being charged with Consented
Abduction. Complainant then filed another case for Seduction which
petitioner challenged as violative of the constitutional right against double
jeopardy. SC held that there is no double jeopardy since the two offenses do
not have identical elements and that pardon by the accused must be express to
bar a complaint for seduction.
DOCTRINE: In cases of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party must be expressly given.
FACTS:
1. Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for
Consented Abduction wherein the accused was convicted. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision and acquitted the accused. The appellate court opined
that appellant may have been guilty for a different crime. Specifically, with
promises of marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
the woman, twice, that night before they returned. She was seduced by the
appellant but it turned out that he made those promises just to accomplish
his lewd designs. That was seduction and not abduction.
2. Subsequent to this acquittal, Yolanda filed another complaint for qualified
seduction. Petitioner moved to quash the complaint invoking double
jeopardy but was denied. Hence, this petition.
that she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age. However, two elements
differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction requires that: (1) the
taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the
offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an
information for Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be
committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the
offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
3. Petitioner also avers that Yolanda is barred by waiver and/or estoppel for
having considered the case as Consented Abduction and that her delay of
more than 9 years before filing the second case is tantamount to pardon by
the offended party. This is unmeritorious since the act of filing the second
case within the prescriptive period of 10 years belies the allegation the she
has waived or is estopped from filing the second charge. Neither could she
be deemed to have pardoned him for the rules require that in cases of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the
offended party must be expressly given.

ISSUE/S: WoN the complaint for qualified seduction could prosper against
petitioner? - YES

RULING: Petition is denied. CA decision is AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. The rule on double jeopardy is that, “No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” The term “same offense”
means identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
2. In the case at bar, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would
support charges for both offenses, a trial and conviction for one, after he
was acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. But an
examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although
they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not identical
offenses. There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and
Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2)
 PEOPLE v. SUNPONGCO and that he jumped bail because Dr. Angeles told him that "I am ready to
June 30, 1988 | Cortes, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Forcible Abduction with spend even how much just to put you in jail". The two other accused gave
Rape similar versions that Benjamin and Silvestre were the ones who took Juanita
out of the jeep and that upon reaching the hotel, it was Silvestre and
Benjamin who led Juanita Angeles inside while they left for Hagonoy.
SUMMARY: Complainant was forcibly abducted by the four accused-
5. The Bulacan CFI rendered a decision convicting the three accused-appellants
appellants and raped by one of them. After the incident, she had herself tested,
of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape with the penalty of “life
gave her testimony, and filed her complaint. One of the four accused was
imprisonment”.
discharged and made a state witness. The three appellants were convicted of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced to life
ISSUE/S:
imprisonment. The appellants argue that the court had no jurisdiction since the
1. WON the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case – YES
sworn complaint was not offered to the court, that there was no forcible
2. WON the accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
abduction or rape that happened, and that there was no conspiracy between
forcible abduction with rape – YES
them. SC held that the court had jurisdiction to decide the case, that the
3. WON there was conspiracy among the accused – YES
elements of both forcible abduction and rape were present and that the
discharge of one of the accused as state witness and his testimonies regarding
RULING: CFI decision AFFIRMED with the modification of the indemnity
conspiracy between them were valid.
awarded.
DOCTRINE: (Procedure) The court can take judicial notice of a sworn
complaint for cases which cannot be tried de oficio that are forwarded to them
RATIO:
without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence for the prosecution.
1. The alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is assailed by virtue of
(Rape) In rape cases, the judgment hinges on whose version is more credible,
Article 344 of the RPC and Rule 110 section 5 of the 1985 Rules on
plausible and trustworthy considering the circumstances. In this event,
Criminal Procedure require that the offenses of abduction and rape …
"Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order.”
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall not be prosecuted except upon
complaint filed by the offended party. Compliance of which is a
FACTS: jurisdictional and not merely a formal requirement. The rule further
1. Complainant Juanita Angeles accused four men – namely, Silvestre provides that evidence which has not been formally offered shall not be
Sunpungco, Benjamin Gabriel, Herminigildo Sunpungco and Arsenio considered by the court. The sworn complaint of Juanita Angeles was not
Calayag – of forcible abduction and rape when, conspiring with one another, formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, this did not oust
the four men forcibly took her out of the jeep she was riding, loaded her to the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Jurisprudence
an automobile, and took her to Hill Top Hotel in Tagaytay where Silvestre reveals that if the complaint in such cases is forwarded to the trial court as
Sunpongco had carnal knowledge of her. She was 43 years of age, single, a part of the records of the preliminary investigation of the case, the court
registered pharmacist by profession and a rice merchant doing business in can take judicial notice of the same without the necessity of its formal
Hagonoy, Bulacan at the time the alleged crime was committed. introduction as evidence for the prosecution. The records forwarded to the
2. The next day, she underwent physical examination by Dr. Ramon Pascual, Bulacan CFI included the sworn complaint of Angeles.
captain in the Medical Corps of the Philippine Constabulary, with findings 2. The elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any
that are compatible with recent sexual contact. woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the
3. On June 9, 1965, the accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. abduction is against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd
Subsequently, accused Benjamin Gabriel was discharged by the court to designs. (Art 342, RPC). The abduction being against the will of the
become a state witness. complainant is shown in the testimonies the two accused-appellants
4. During the trial, Silvestre jumped bail and it was only six years later that the Arsenio and Herminigildo who admitted to having seen the complainant
trial resumed. His version of the story was that he was courting the resisting as she was forced to board the car. The argument that Angeles
complainant and that he went to Malolos, on previous agreement with her, could have made a summoned assistance is explained by her fear and the
for the express purpose of eloping with her, that complainant filed this case fact that she was practically powerless during the drive to Tagaytay. The
against him because she was threatened and forced to do so by her brother,
 presence of the lewd design is manifested by the subsequent rape that
occurred. The elements of rape pertinent to the case are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation (Art 355, RPC). The final
resolution in a rape case hinges on whose version is more credible,
plausible and trustworthy considering the circumstances. In this instance,
the circumstance of force, intimidation, and rape is manifested not only by
the testimony of the complainant but the medico-legal report filed by Capt.
Ramon Pascual. Moreover the conduct of the complainant after the
incident further strengthens her case. She lost no time to have herself
examined, give her testimony, and file her complaint while the Silvestre
jumped bail. It is also improbable that she was merely threatened by her
brother to file the complaint without having been wronged considering her
age, status, reputation and educational attainment.
3. In denying that there was conspiracy, the accused-appellant question the
discharge of Benjamin Gabriel to become a state witness saying that his
testimonies cannot be corroborated. However, coupled with the
testimonies of Angeles and Benita Fabian who was with Angeles at the
time corroborates Gabriel's testimonies. Herminigildo questions Gabriel's
discharge because it was him who was least guilty but “all that the law
requires, in order to discharge an accused and to use him as a state witness
is that the defendant whose exclusion is required does not appear to be the
most guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty.”
 PEOPLE v. JOSE et al
February 6, 1971 | Per Curiam | Appeal and Automatic Review | Forcible
Abduction with Rape
SUMMARY: The 4 accused grabbed Maggie from her car and brought her to
Swanky Hotel, where they succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
despite her struggles. SC held that they were guilty of forcible abduction with
rape and 3 counts of simple rape with aggravating circumstances.
DOCTRINE:Forcible abduction as a necessary means to commit rape is
consummated at the first act of rape, so that each of the succeeding crimes of the
same nature can no longer be legally complexed with forcible abduction.
FACTS:
1. At about 4:30 am of June 26, 1967, actress Magdalena de la Riva was
driving her car home, accompanied by her maid. She almost collided with
the Pontiac driven by Pineda and was forced to stop as she arrived at her
own gate in New Manila. When Pineda went down and approached her car,
she screamed and tooted the horn of her car continuously. But he succeeded
in grabbing her and forcing her into the Pontiac. Cañal sat on the passenger
seat. His other co-accused, Jose and Aquino, tried to kiss her and caress her
thighs while inside the car. They drove to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay,
blindfolded her, and led her to the 2nd floor.
2. At the hotel, they made her disrobe, asked her to “burlesque”, and forced
her to turn around twice and exhibit herself 10 minutes. They then had
carnal knowledge with her in turns, and in her struggles they hit her on
different parts of the body. When she went into shock, they poured water
on her face and slapped her several times, saying that they had to revive
her so that she would know what was happening. All the while when each
man was struggling with her, the other three were just outside the room,
threatening the complainant and telling her to give in.
3. They later released her after making her clean herself up, and threatened
her so that she would not report it. She later reported the matter. They were
charged with, and the TC found them guilty of forcible abduction with
rape. Pineda pled guilty, but here on appeal, he contends that being a
capital crime, his presence was indispensable at trial.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Pineda’s presence was indispensable at trial—NO
2. WoN there was conspiracy among the accused—YES
3. WoN the crime committed was forcible abduction with rape—Not only.
RULING: GUILTY of forcible abduction with rape (Death) AND 3 counts of
simple rape with aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior
strength, ignominy, and use of a motor vehicle = 4 death penalties EACH.
RATIO:
1. Pineda was well aware that the offense charged was a capital offense, the
complaint even citing aggravating circumstances, and having been
consulted three times by counsel. Thus, in pleading guilty, he admitted to all
the material facts in the complaint and it was not incumbent anymore upon
the trial court to receive his evidence.
2. The 4 appellants conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them.
All appellants participated in the 1) forcible abduction: helped one another
in dragging her into the car against her will, securing her inside the vehicle,
and bringing her up to the Swanky hotel; 2) rape: they all forced the victim
to “burlesque”, took turns raping her while the rest stood guard and
continually threatened her. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is
attributable to all, regardless of the nature and severity of the penalties.
3. The forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house was a
necessary if not indispensable means which enables them to commit
various and successive acts of rape upon her person. The imposable penalty
here, applying Article 48, is that of the more serious crime (rape) in its
maximum period (death). >> But it bears noting that even while the first
act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had
already been consummated, so that each of the 3 succeeding crimes of the
same nature cannot legally be considered as still connected with the
abduction. Thus, 3 separate crimes of simple rape was committed by using
force or intimidation. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of
superior strength, ignominy, and use of a motor vehicle were also proven,
making the imposable penalty for each count of rape also that of death.
4. The SC here noted that the trial court refused to impose as many death
penalties as there are offenses committed, relying on Article 70 “the
maximum duration of all the penalties imposed shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties”. The trial court argued that a man has only one life to pay for a
wrong. The SC held that the imposition of multiple death penalties, while
decried by some as a useless formality and an exercise in futility, is valid
under law. The imposition of a penalty and the service of the sentence are
distinct; and even so, the multiple death penalties may be served
simultaneously. There is also a practical importance to such practice, which
serves as an indelible badge of extreme criminal perversity, and thus
reduces the possibility of a grant of executive clemency.
 PEOPLE v. ALBURO
April 26, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Appeal from RTC judgment | Forcible
Abduction with Rape
SUMMARY: Evelyn was prevented by Alburo, a jeepney driver, from alighting
from the vehicle threatening her with a knife. He later took her to an isolated
place and rendered her unconscious then proceeded to rape her. Alburo was
convicted of forcible abduction with rape. SC affirmed conviction
DOCTRINE: The complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed
if the offender took the woman against her will with lewd designs and
subsequently had carnal knowledge with her while she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious.
FACTS:
1. At about 5 pm (Jan. 27, 1986), Evelyn Cantina, Priscilla Atillo and Aniceta
Bringuila were walking towards Colon Street, Cebu City, to buy some
medicine when a passenger jeepney driven by Ronilo Alburo stopped by
and Alburo invited the three to ride on the jeepney. Cantina first declined
but was persuaded in the end to ride along with her two companions.
Evelyn took the seat beside the driver. At that time, Zaldy Rodriguez and
Dionisio Sumalinog were already seated at passengers’ area at the back.
2. Bringuila and Atillo disembarked upon reaching the corner of Jones Ave.
and Colon St. Alburo prevented Evelyn from alighting and threatened to
raise her skirt if she insists on leaving. Bringuila and Atillo tried to pull
Evelyn out but the green light turned on and the jeepney sped off towards
Juan Luna St. They made a 2nd attempt to rescue her when the jeepney
stopped at the corner of Colon and Juan Luna Streets after making U-turn to
Guadalupe, but also failed when Rodriguez (who has transferred to the front
seat beside Evelyn) placed his leg as barricade preventing Evelyn from
disembarking. Alburo then sped off to Jones Ave.
3. Rodriguez and Sumalinog later disembarked at Southern Medical Center.
Evelyn begged that she be allowed to disembark but Alburo pointed a knife
at her threatening to slash her side. They then proceeded to Beverly Hills.
4. Alburo then went to an isolated area at barangay OPPRA (Capitol Hills).
She threatened Evelyn not to shout and pushed her head towards the
steering wheel rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness,
her underwear was already removed, blood was in her vagina, and her
stomach was in pain. Alburo was silent when asked about what happened.
5. Alburo then drove back to the city with Evelyn seated beside her under
threat of death. To make it appear normal, Alburo picked up some
passengers. At about 7 pm, the jeep was spotted by Evelyn’s mother
Lourdes and Ester Dakay (wife of a jeepney driver who knew Alburo) at
Jones Ave. They saw her in tears and very weak. Evelyn told Ester not to let
Alburo abscond because he raped her.
6. After a commotion b/w Lourdes and Alburo, Alburo then acceded to
Lourdes’ demand to take Ester and Evelyn (accompanied by a Brgy. Tanod)
to Fuente Osmeña police station. Alburo parked at Visitacion St. and left
them with his belongings under pretext of fetching a friend to accompany
him (he never returned). With Alburo gone, Evelyn told Ester about the
rape and showed her the knife he used to threaten her.
7. Medical examination revealed presence of fresh lacerations and
spermatozoa on the complainant’s vagina.
8. Alburo was charged and convicted for forcible abduction with rape. The
complaints against Rodriguez and Sumalinog were dismissed. Alburo
denied the rape and insisted that they were lovers and Evelyn’s filing of the
case was due to her fear of her parents who disapproved of their
relationship. He presented witnesses testifying that they saw Evelyn going
to Alburo’s place and saw her riding Alburo’s jeepney on several occasions.
ISSUE/S: WoN crime committed is forcible abduction with rape – YES
RULING: Judgment affirmed with modification as to the indemnity for Evelyn.
RATIO:
1. Evaluation of the evidence in its totality rules out the assertion that Alburo
and Evelyn were lovers.
 Evelyn’s picture in the Alburo’s possession was actually given to Evelyn’s former boyfriend,
and Evelyn emphatically denies having the same to Alburo as remembrance of their
relationship.
 Alburo has shown no other proof like love letters, notes and other symbols of affection
 It’s unbelievable that Evelyn is just filing the suit against Alburo out of fear of her parents. If
this was the case, she could have just said that nothing untoward happened b/w them as a cover
up for their supposed affair. Instead, she immediately told them about the rape committed by
Alburo.
 If they were really lovers, Evelyn could have boarded the jeepney voluntarily w/o her
companions. If she really wanted to go with him voluntarily, her companions could not have
shown so much concern for her safety and welfare as to attempt to rescue her twice out of the
jeepney when she was restrained by Alburo and his companions.
2. Appellate Courts will not generally disturb the factual findings of Trial
Courts which are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial unless it is found that the Trial Courts
have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.
3. Alburo took Evelyn against her will with lewd designs and subsequently
raped her by rendering her unconscious. Thus, the crime committed is a
complex crime of forcible abduction w/ rape under Art. 48.
Note:
Forcible Abduction: (1) Person abducted is any woman regardless of her age, civil status
or reputation; (2) Abduction is against her will; (3) Abduction is with lewd designs.

Guidelines in reviewing evidence for rape:

(1) That an accusation of rape can be made with facility, is difficult to prove, but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) That in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;
(3) That the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weaknesses of the evidence for defense
 PEOPLE v. GODINES
May 7, 1991 | Gancayco, J. | Appeal from RTC | Forcible Abduction with Rape
SUMMARY: Godines and Moreno, at night, enter the Vilaksi’s house, kills
the Vilaksi couple, and forcibly abducts Ancajas, each raping her once in a
nearby lot. Both charged for forcible abduction w rape. TC: Crime of forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the accused
is to rape the victim. SC: Modified. (As conspirators, each of them guilty of 2
rapes)
DOCTRINE: Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main
objective of the appellant is to rape the victim // The material factor for a
conviction is that there is positive identification of the accused as the authors
of the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
FACTS:
1. Esther Ancajas, the private complainant, testified that she and her child was
sleeping at Alejandro Vilaksi’s house in Masbate when she was awakened
by a commotion from the adjacent room occupied by Vilaksi and his wife
Milagros. She saw Godines hack Milagros while Moreno stood by the
window as a lookout, after which they got some money and prepared to
leave. Ancajas tried to escape with her kid, but Godines and Moreno, both
armed, dragged the two of them out of the house and brought them to a
nearby vacant lot with tall grass. They threatened to kill Ancajas if she
resisted, then they took turns in raping her. While one was raping her, the
other held the kid down while both of them threatened her to not resist.
2. Suspecting that Ancajas recognized them, they threatened her to not report
the incident to the authorities, but Ancajas lied and said she didn’t know
them. When they left, she took refuge in the house of a neighbor, Elpidio
Aballe, where she fainted. When she woke up, she informed her parents and
the authorities, then undergoing a medical exam showing abrasions and the
municipal health officer concluding that it’s possible she was raped.
3. Godines’ alibi was that he was recuperating from his illness at Felomino
Moreno’s house (2km away) and he went home the next day. Moreno’s
alibi is that he stayed at Umpad’s house, 3km away from Valiksi’s house.
Both were charged with forcible abduction with rape. TC: Crime of forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the
accused is to rape the victim.
ISSUE/S: WON TC correctly held that forcible abduction is absorbed in rape if
main purpose of the accused is to rape the victim – YES.
RULING: Judgment MODIFIED. Godines and Moreno each guilty of 2 rapes.
RATIO:
1. Medical Exam not Indispensable: A medical examination isn’t
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; and besides, the medical evidence
showed that the victim suffered abrasions on her body, confirming that she
had been physically violated through force.
2. Testimony for Crimes against Chastity: More often than not, only the
victim and the accused are in a position to testify so that the
conviction/acquittal of the accused hinges solely upon the witnesses’
credibility. And Ancajas categorically and consistently identified the
authors of the crime. She had no motive to conjure up a serious charge
against the appellants whom she had no unpleasant relationship with before
the incident; and it’s difficult to believe that a woman would be willing to
undergo a public prosecution for rape if her intention was not to bring the
rapists to justice. Trial court findings on witness credibility in a prosecution
of a crime against chastity commands the highest respect from the Supreme
Court, in absence of valid reasons for holding otherwise.
3. Positive Identification over Alibi: The defense of alibi must show that it
was impossible for them to have been present at the place where the crime
was committed at the time of the commission of the same. And in this case,
their alibis don’t preclude such a possibility – Godines wasn’t too ill to
preclude his moving about the premises. As stated earlier, the material
factor is that there is positive identification of the accused as the authors of
the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
4. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of
the appellant is to rape the victim. And since they were in a conspiracy, they
are to be both held liable as principles for 2 rapes they conspired to commit,
namely the rape he himself committed and the rape which his co=accused
committed with his active and indispensable cooperation.
 PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
June 30, 1989 | Regalado, J. | Certiorari & Prohibition | Prosecution of Private RATIO:
Offenses 1. Under RPC Art 344, the crime of adultery, as well as 4 other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
SUMMARY:Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Geiling, a German National are by the offended spouse, and no one else, not even the State. Art 344
married. Geiling obtained a German divorce decree on Jan 1986, but presupposes that the marital relationship subsists at the time of the
subsequently filed 2 adultery cases against Pilapil in the Philippines on June institution of the complaint. Compliance with this is a jurisdictional, and not
1986. Pilapil files a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, since merely a formal, requirement. Such requirement is essential since it’s what
they were no longer married at the time of the filing of the adultery cases. SC: starts the prosecutory proceeding and without with the court can’t exercise
Criminal case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Geiling has no legal standing. its jurisdiction to try the case. This policy was adopted out of consideration
DOCTRINE:.Under RPC Art 344, the crime of adultery, as well as 4 other for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
complaint filed by the offended spouse, and no one else, not even the State. 2. In this case, the divorce Geiling procured in his country and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned based on
FACTS: the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Hence,
1. Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent, Erich Geiling has no legal standing to commence the adultery case since he’s no
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, before the Registrar of Births, longer Pilapil’s husband.
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Germany Their marriage
eventually soured & Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. In turn,
Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
2. The divorce decree was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. However, despite the divorce decree, On
June 27, 1986Geiling filed 2 complaints for adultery before the Manila City
Fiscal alleging that while still married to Imelda, she had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
3. Pilapil files a motion to quash the complaints, on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that can’t be prosecuted de officio, since Geiling (the complainant
and a foreigner) doesn’t qualify as an offended spouse (since he already
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of
the criminal complaint.

ISSUE/S: WON Geiling can prosecute Pilapil for adultery even though they
weren’t husband & wife anymore upon his filing the complaint – NO.

RULING: Order denying Pilapil’s motion to quash is set aside. Criminal case
for adultery dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
 PEOPLE v. SANGALANG
February 8, 1977 | Gaviola Jr., J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Simulation of
Births
SUMMARY: According to the information, the Sangalang spouses allegedly
received a child from Dr. Santos and had it registered with the local civil
registrar by Wilwayco. The case against Wilwayco was dismissed, while Santos
was acquitted. The spouses appealed since the information merely alleged that
they conspired with Santos and Wilwayco. The SC acquitted them, holding that
there was no evidence that they registered or caused the registration of the child
or were motivated by a desire to cause the loss of its filiation, to its detriment.
DOCTRINE: It is a requisite that by reason of such simulation of birth the
supposed child loses its real status and acquires a new one. / The operative act
in the crime of simulation of birth is the registration of the child by the
pretending parent in the registry of births as his child, when in truth and fact that
is not the case.
FACTS:
1. An information was filed alleging that Dr. Gloria Uson Santos, sister of Flor
Sangalang, furnished the spouses Jose and Flor Sangalang with a child they
named Arnel Sangalang, making it appear that the child was born to them.
BienvendioWilwayco registered the birth of the child with the office of the
local civil registrar of Guimba and supplied all the information required for
the certificate of live birth, creating a false civil status of the crime. At the
time, the spouses had a daughter named Alicia.
2. The case against Wilwayco was dismissed, and Dr. Santos was acquitted
due to insufficient evidence. Only the accused spouses were found guilty.
3. How the child came into the spouses’ physical custody differed according to
the prosecution and the defense. According to the prosecution, the child was
brought by Dr. Uson on 5 Oct 1962. But Jose Sangalang testified that it was
his late father who brought the child to his house on 1 Nov 1962 and told
him to take care of the child, treat him as a son and name him Arnel.
4. The ff pieces of evidence were introduced: (1) an undated entry in the
registry of births stating that Arnel Uson Sangalang was born on 3 Oct 1962
to the accused spouses; (2) a certificate of live brith registered with the
office of the local civil registrar on 29 March 1965, showing the signature
of BienvenidoWilwayco as informant; (3) an affidavit subscribed by the
spouses before the mayor reciting that they were the child’s parents; and (4)
a baptismal certificate showing that the spouses were the child’s parents.
5. According to the spouses, the information filed against them did not contain
any specific allegation as to what they did, except that they had conspired
with Santos and Wilwayco in making it appear that the child was born to
them and gave it the name ArnelUsonSangalang, and through the
registration perfected by Wilwayco created a false status for the child.
ISSUE/S: WoN the spouses should be acquitted for lack of evidence that they
caused the registration of the child as their own with the Registry of Births -
YES
RULING: Judgment reversed.
RATIO:
1. In the crime of simulation of births under Art 347, it is a requisite that by
reason of such simulation of birth the supposed child loses its real status and
acquires a new one. A mere simulation of birth is not a crime; the object of
the crime is the creation of a false status to the detriment of the rights of the
family unto which the newly born child is deceitfully introduced, i.e. to
cause the loss of any trace as to the filiation of the child.
2. Appellants proposed six essential elements of the crime: (1) there must be a
feigned pregnancy; (2) there must be a pretended delivery; (3) a chid not
hers, is presented as her own; (4) the child is baptized or registered with the
Registry of Births as hers; (5) the child loses its real status and acquires a
new one; and (6) the actor’s purpose was to cause the loss of any trace as to
the child’s true filiation. However, the OSG contended that only the last
three elements were essential.
3. Based on such premise, the OSG accordingly states that the “operative act”
to hold someone liable under Art 347 is the registration of the child by the
pretending parent in the registry of births as his child, when in truth and fact
that is not the case.
4. There was no evidence to support the TC’s finding that the registration,
which is the operative act to hold them liable, was effected by the accused-
appellants. The clerk from the office of the Local Civil Registrar, Arsenio
Pisco, admitted that he did not know who presented the Certificate of Live
Birth to their office when it was registered on 2 June 1966, as Pisco had
joined said office only on 16 Jan 1968. As for the second birth certificate, a
retired bookkeeper testified that it was the daughter, Alicia, who presented
the certificate for registration and obtained a receipt for the same. There was
no evidence that the spouses caused Alicia to register the certificate. Absent
any evidence that they registered or caused the registration of the child was
their own with the Registry of Births, or that in doing so they were
motivated by a desire to cause the loss of any trace of the child’s true
filiation, to his prejudice, the spouses are acquitted.
 PEOPLE v. ARAGON
February 28, 1957 | Labrador, J.| Appeal from a CFI Judgment | Bigamy RATIO:
1. Aragon cited the case of People v. Mendoza, which held that “the statutory
SUMMARY: Proceso married Gorrea in Cebu, Faicol in Iloilo. After Gorrea provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
died, he married Maglasang. Faicol filed a case of bigamy against him. SC during the lifetime of his 1st spouse illegal and void from its performance,
held that Proceso’s marriage with Faicol was void ab initio without need of a and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
judicial declaration of nullity, and thus his marriage with Maglasang was not distinguished from annullable marriages.” This stand is justified by the
illegal. principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused. The
DOCTRINE: Art 349: Bigamy: The penalty of prision mayor shall be Court held that had the legislature contemplated the requirement of JDAN,
imposed upon any person who shall contract a 2 nd or subsequent marriage they would have enacted an express provision to that effect.
before the former marriage has been dissolved, or before the absent spouse 2. The action was initiated by the 2nd “wife”, whose marriage with Proceso
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the was not renewed after the death of the 1st wife and before the 3rd marriage
proper proceedings. with Maglasang was entered into. Thus, the last marriage was a valid one,
and the prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.
FACTS:
1. The accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, married Maria Gorrea in Reyes, DISSENT:
the Philippine Independent Church of Cebu on Sept 28, 1925. While his The construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would
marriage with Gorrea was subsisting, he contracted a canonical marriage frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.
with Maria Faicol under the name Proceso Aragon on Aug 27 1934 in
Iloilo, where they established residence. As he was a traveling salesman, he
commuted between Iloilo and Cebu to his two “wives”.
2. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu on Aug 5, 1939. After her death, and “seeing
that the coast was clear in Cebu”, he brought Faicol there. In 1949 or 1950,
Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment by
Proceso; and he sent her to Iloilo allegedly to undergo treatment. While she
was there, he contracted another marriage with JesusaMaglasang on Oct 3,
1953 in Cebu.
3. Faicol filed a complaint against Proceso for bigamy. During the trial, he
denied his previous marriage with Faicol. But the trial court judge gave
weight to the marriage certificate and testimonies of the witnesses and
established the fact of the second marriage. The trial court further held that
even without an express provision in Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity (JDAN)
of a marriage void ab initio, he could not legally contract marriage with
Maglasang prior to the dissolution of his marriage with Faicol, either
through death or JDAN.

ISSUE/S: WoN Proceso Aragon is guilty of bigamy—NO

RULING: Appellant is ACQUITTED.

 CAPILI v. PEOPLE
July 3, 2013 | Peralta, J. | Certiorari | Bigamy
SUMMARY: Petitioner was charged with bigamy by the private respondent at
the Pasig RTC during which there was a pending case for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between them at the Antipolo RTC filed by the petitioner's
wife. The Antipolo RTC declared the second marriage void and on this ground,
the petitioner asked the Pasig RTC to dismiss the case to which the RTC
obliged. The private respondent appealed to the respondent court which
reversed the decision of the RTC and denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner. SC held that the elements of the crime of bigamy were all
present in the information filed against the petitioner and that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of his second marriage did not prevent him from being
charged with bigamy or extinguish his criminal liability.
DOCTRINE: What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage.
FACTS
1. On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information that on or
about December 8, 1999, the petitioner being in a lawful marriage with Karla
Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or
annulled, contracted a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.
2. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging (1) that here is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the
RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) that the possible
declaration of nullity would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and
(3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
3. The RTC of Antipolo rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy on the ground that
the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the Antipolo RTC which the RTC of Pasig granted.
5. The private defendant filed an appeal before the CA which reversed the
decision of the RTC. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the CA.
ISSUES: WON a subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of a criminal case for bigamy – NO
RULING:
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
(Art 349, RPC). In the present case, all elements for bigamy was present in the
information filed on June 28, 2004. In fact, it is the RTC of Antipolo itself
which declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent when it held that the said marriage was void.
Jurisprudence tells us that accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated. In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the conviction
for bigamy and ruled that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void. The Court also recently upheld the ruling in
the said case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage. It also held that only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared by a competent court can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Finally, it is a settled rule that
the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. It is clear that the crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy
against him.
 MALIT v. PEOPLE witnesses may speak freely and exercise their respective functions without
May 31, 1982 | Relova, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Libel incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or action for damages.
3. Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial
SUMMARY: Petitioner, who was counsel in an administrative case, uttered the proceedings are connected with, or are relevant, pertinent or material to, the
statement “I doubt how did you become a Doctor” while cross-examining Dr. cause in hand or subject of inquiry, they may be considered privileged
Macaspac, who then filed a case for slander against petitioner. The Court held communication, and the counsel, parties or witnesses are exempt from
that the statement was absolutely privileged since it was uttered in the course of liability.
judicial proceedings, and thus petitioner could not be held liable. 4. The courts are inclined to be liberal as tot he degree of relevancy or
DOCTRINE: Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of pertinence required to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged. For it
judicial proceedings are connected with, or are relevant, pertinent or material to, not to be covered by privilege, it must be so palpably wanting in relation to
the cause in hand or subject of inquiry, they may be considered privileged the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
communication, and the counsel, parties or witnesses are exempt from liability. irrelevance and impropriety. In the instant case, the utterance was made
when Dr. Macaspac would not answer and repeatedly evaded the question
FACTS: posed to her and thus is relevant.
1. Petitioner Alfredo Malit was Ruth Fernandez’s counsel in an administrative
case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. During the hearing, Dr. Macaspac
identified certain exhibits on the witness stand.
2. On cross-examination, petitioner asked Dr. Macaspac if she knew who
‘made’ a certain exhibit, to which she replied that she did not understand
the word ‘made’. Petitioner tried to explain that it meant ‘prepared’, but Dr.
Macaspac would not answer and instead asked for clarification. Petitioner
then said, “I doubt how did you become a Doctor.” Dr. Macaspac thus
instituted a complaint for slander against petitioner.
3. Petitioner contended that the statement did not constitute an offense since it
was uttered during cross-examination, and that utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged.

ISSUE/S: WoN statements uttered in the course of judicial proceedings are

absolutely privileged and exempt from liability in libel or slander cases – YES

RULING: TC orders reversed. Respondent ordered to desist and refrain from

proceeding with the trial of the criminal case.

RATIO:
1. Absolute privilege is defined as “In this class of cases it is considered in the
interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their
sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and
subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even
if it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly
and with express malice.”
2. Utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings are
absolutely privileged in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
justice, so that members of the legislature, judges, jurors, lawyers and
 MERCADO v. CFI RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
August 25, 1982 | Fernando, C.J. | Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus | Libel
RATIO:
SUMMARY: Petitioner Rafael Mercado sent a telegram to DPWC Sec. 1. Libel prosecution must survive the test of WoN the offending publication is
Consunji alleging that respondent Virginia Mercado was involved in corrupt within the guarantees of free speech and free press. However, qualified
practices. Aside from the administrative complaint, various complaints were privilege may be lost by proof of malice.
filed by petitioner against respondent. SC held that petitioner’s conduct casts 2. A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the
doubt on his good faith, and that prosecution is entitled to go to trial and party communicating has an interest or duty, is privileged, if made to a
present necessary evidence to prove malice. person with a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
DOCTRINE: Qualified privilege may be lost by proof of malice. The burden incriminatory matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if
to do so is merely put on the prosecution. there is probable cause for belief on their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the privilege may still cover the mistake of an
FACTS: individual. However, the statements must be made under an honest sense of
1. In line with Pres. Marcos’ appeal to give information on undesirable duty (sufficient if social or moral in nature and the person in good faith
employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of the New believes he is acting in pursuance thereof).
Society, petitioner Rafael Mercado sent a telegram to DPWC Sec. David 3. A summary of petitioner’s conduct casts doubt on his good faith. The
Consunji imputing private respondent Virginia Mercado to have “enriched tenacity with which he pursued a course of conduct on its face indicates that
herself thru corrupt practices, considering that she has properties and doubt as to his good faith can be reasonably be entertained.
spending above what her salary can afford with the husband jobless”. –
subject libelous telegram.
2. Petitioner: privileged communication.
3. Respondent’s documentary evidence:
a. Oct 14, 1972: petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman
of the Board of Transportation, alleging that respondent violated
RA 2260 and civil service laws.
b. 14 days after: Subject libelous telegram was sent to Sec. Consunji,
which was indorsed for investigation to the Board of
Transportation.
c. Nov 23, 1972: petitioner filed an amended complaint, charging
respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt
practices, and misconduct or discourtesy.
d. June 26, 1973: respondent found innocent. Case dismissed.
Petitioner filed an MR but was dismissed for lack of merit.
e. While abovementioned case was pending, petitioner filed a
complaint with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group against
respondent and her husband Lorenzo Mercado, accusing them of
selling a carnapped Ford Willys engine – closed for lack of
evidence.
f. Again, while admin complaint was pending, petitioner filed with
Criminal Investigation Service a complaint against respondent for
corrupt practices – closed for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE/S: WoN telegram constitutes privileged communication – NO.
 AGBAYANI v. SAYO ISSUE/S: Whether the venue of the criminal action should be Nueva Vizcaya or
April 30, 1979 | Aquino, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Libel Isabela—Isabela.

SUMMARY: At the time of the alleged malicious defamation, Mahinan was a RULING:Petition GRANTED, w/o prejudice to filing another criminal action is
GSIS manager in Isabela, but he filed a criminal action for written defamation Isabela within the prescriptive period.
against his subordinates in Nueva Vizcaya. SC held that the venue was wrong.
DOCTRINE:The offended party in defamation cases may choose where to file RATIO:
the criminal action, subject to the rules in Art. 360. 1) If he is a public officer 1. SC first held that as a GSIS branch manager, Mahinan is unquestionably a
or private individual, in the province/city where the libelous article is printed or public officer.
first published; 2) if he is a private individual, where he actually resided at the 2. Mahinan argues that the trial court’s jurisdiction is determined by the
time of commission of the offense; 3) if he is a public officer whose office is in allegations in the information, which alleged that libel was committed in
Manila at time of the commission of the offense, in the CFI of Manila; 4) if he Nueva Vizcaya; as such, the trial court prima facie has jurisdiction to hear
is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, in the province/city where the case. SC held that the information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. with the Nueva Vizcaya CFI. Based on the rules on venue in Article 360, #1
and #4 are applicable. The allegation in the information that libel was
FACTS: committed in Nueva Vizcaya is insufficient—it did not allege that the
1. Conrado Mahinan was manager of the GSIS Cagayan Valley branch libelous article was printed or first published there. In fact, the documents
stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. He filed a criminal action for written that formed basis for the action were executed in Isabela and Manila. On
defamation against his subordinates Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual, and rule #4, he was still in service as a GSIS branch manager in Isabela at the
Dugay on Mar. 8, 1976 with the fiscal in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. time the alleged libel was committed, making Isabela the proper venue.
2. This was on the basis of 1) affidavits by Pascual and Bautista, signed in 3. The Court explained that before the amendment by RA 4363 on venue, the
Cauayan, Isabela on Oct. 8, 1975; 2) Bautista’s undated letter asking criminal action may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
Mahinan to resign; 3) Agbayani’s “unusual incident report” on Oct. 3, 1975 article was published or circulated. Under that rule, the criminal action is
subscribed before a notary in Manila to support his charges of malversation transitory and the injured party has a choice in venue. But experience
and falsification against Mahinan, and praying for his separation from the showed that the offended party could harass the accused by laying the
service. criminal action in remote and distant places; thus rules on venue were
3. On Jul. 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed an established.
information in the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya charging the accused with having
maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan in Bambang.
The 4 accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the CFI had no
jurisdiction to hear the case. RPC Article 360 provides the rules on venue:
1) where the offended party is a public officer or a private individual,
criminal action may be instituted in the province/city where the libelous
article is printed or is first published; 2) if the offended party is a private
individual, where he actually resided at the time of commission of the
offense; 3) if offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at
time of commission, in the CFI of Manila; 4) if the offended party is a
public officer holding office outside of Manila, in the province/city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. The CFI denied
the motion on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the
meaning of 203 (GSIS w/c is in the insurance business); and his residence
was in Nueva Vizcaya.
 NEWSWEEK v. IAC 3. In the case at bar, although it was filed as a class suit, it is not one of that
May 30, 1986 | Feria, J. | Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary Injunction | Libel type. This is because it is not a case where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all. This is just a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate
SUMMARY: Respondents filed a suit against petitioners for publishing an and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or
article in Newsweek which allegedly displayed the former as cruel plantation general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
owners and objects of hatred for agricultural workers. The accused filed a 4. Moreover, the controversial portion of the article never referred to one of
petition requesting to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action. SC granted the plaintiffs, Sola, specifically. The article merely reported that the victim
the petition stating that no individual or class group was positively identified to had been arrested by special forces of Mayor Pablo Sola.Hence, the report,
have been harmed by the Newsweek article. referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official,
DOCTRINE:Ratio 1 is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner’s weekly news magazine Newsweek released an article titled “An
Island of Fear” portraying Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished
and underpaid sugarcane workers, but also brutalized and killed them with
impunity.
2. Months after, respondents who are incorporated associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members filed a case
for libel against petitioners. Complainants alleged that the said article, taken
as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood intended to
put them in bad light and make them objects of hatred and contempt of
agricultural workers.
3. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed
article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint
is bereft of allegations that state a cause of action. TC decided to deny the
petition which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE/S: WoN petitioners are guilty of libel? - NO

RULING: Petition granted. CA decision reversed.

RATIO:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable,
although it is not necessary that he be named. Defamatory matter which
does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast,
affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel
could have identified the personality of the individual defamed.
2. If defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that group or class, or very specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately.
 LACSA v. IAC
May 23, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Certiorari | Libel
SUMMARY: Petitioner called Marquez, president of the Philippine Columbian
Association, a ‘de facto president’ and merely an associate member, and caused
the publication of a letter and an item in a newsletter circulated to the
association’s membership. He was charged and found guilty of slander. The SC
upheld the IAC’s ruling, stating that using the term ‘de facto president’ and
branding Marquez as merely an associate member were tantamount to calling
Marquez a fraud, and that the letter and article were not privileged.
DOCTRINE: Allegedly libelous matter must be construed as a whole and given
such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense which
the public would naturally understand. / To be classified as privileged
communication, private communication should be absolutely free from any taint
of malice.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Pedro Lacsa, a CPA and former member of the Philippine
Columbian Association’s Board of Directos, had access to the association’s
members’ records as their volunteer auditor, including the personal folder of
private complainant Ponciano Marquez, then the President.
2. According to petitioner, he discovered in the course of his work that
Marquez was merely an associate member of the association, and he
questioned Marquez’s qualification to hold the presidency inasmuch as only
proprietary members can be voted to said position. He thus wrote a letter to
the Board of Directors impugning Marquez’s status as proprietary member
and president of the association, contending that the issuance of a certificate
of proprietary membership to Marquez without the Board’s prior knowledge
and authority was erroneous.
3. He also sent a letter to Marquez asking him to yield the presidency for
having failed to show he was entitled to a proprietary certificate
membership, which was one of the position’s qualifications. He also
branded him a ‘de facto president’. Petitioner eventually caused the letter to
be published and circulated among the association’s members.
4. Subsequently, petitioner again caused the publication of an item entitled
‘Doubt As to the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President’ in a newsletter
circulated to the association’s members.
5. Based on the above, petitioner was charged with libel. Petitioner insists that
the term ‘de facto president’ is not libellous per se, and assuming arguendo
that it is, that the letter and newsletter in which it appeared are privileged
communication and cannot give rise to a libel conviction, and that he wrote
them pursuant to his moral, social and legal responsibility as one of the
association’s members.
ISSUE/S: WoN calling Marquez de facto president was libelous – YES
WoN the letter and the publication were privileged communication - NO
RULING: Petition denied. IAC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The test of libelous meanings it not the analysis of a sentence into
component phrases, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language
to the ordinary reader. The allegedly libelous matter must be construed as a
whole and given such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense which the public would naturally understand.
2. Considering that there are two classes of membership in the association—
associate and proprietary—and only the latter are qualified to be voted as
president of the association, the act of branding Marquez as a mere de facto
president and insinuating imperfection in his status as a proprietary member
most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. It was
equivalent to saying that he is a pretender, fraud and imposter, and
arrogating unto himself certain powers, rights and privileges to which he
was not entitled.
3. To be classified as privileged communication, the letter and article should
be absolutely free from any taint of malice. But in the instant case,
petitioner had prior knowledge that Marquez was a proprietary member of
the association, since he had personal knowledge of the issuance and
existence of the certificate of membership for proprietary membership in
Marquez’s name, on which petitioner had placed his initials and the date,
and he marked the pages on which the document could be found.
4. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the letter was privileged
communication, it lost such character when it was published and circulated
among the association’s general membership. As the association’s auditor,
he was under the obligation to keep his findings in strict confidence
between him and the Board of Directors. Immediately going public with his
alleged findings was unpardonable, particularly as did not verify these.
5. Petitioner’s allegation that the charges filed against him were pure
harassment was unsupported by evidence, whereas his motive to malign
Marquez’s reputation was amply established. It was apparent that petitioner
was not extended appointment to position as member of the club’s steering
committee, but merely as chairman of the finance committee which Lacsa
rejected. The accused then felt aggrieved and began taking steps to find
cause criticizing Marquez’s actuations as the association’s president.
 SORIANO v. IAC
November 9, 1988 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. |Review of IAC decision and resolution|
Libel
SUMMARY: The Guardian published a libelous article imputing to then COA
Chairman Francisco Tantuico, Jr., the tampering of the election returns in the
May 1984 Batasan Elections. Tantuico filed a libel case against Soriano, editor
publisher of The Guardian, and 6 others. Soriano moved to quash the action on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. SC held that the libel case should be filed in
QC where Tantuico held office and where the newspaper is published.
DOCTRINE: Criminal liability of an editor must be deemed as commencing
with the publication of the alleged libelous material in his newspaper, not with
the mimeographing of the press releases by interested persons in different
areas.
FACTS:
1. Francisco Tantuico, Jr., Chairman of COA, filed an information for libel
against Marcelo Soriano and 6 others concerning press releases and articles
imputing to the former the tampering by COA personnel of election returns
in the May 14, 1984 Batasan Elections at his residence in Tacloban City,
and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte.
2. The press release of accused Cesar Villegas was 1 st published in Tacloban
City, dated May 19, 1984, publicly imputing the crime of falsification of
documents and/or violation of election laws to Tantuico. It was published
and republished in “The Guardian”, captioned “IMPEACH TANTUICO
CASE LOOMS” from May 26-June 1, 1984, a weekly newspaper/magazine
circulated in Tacloban and nationwide, wherein petitioner was the Editor
Publisher. It portrayed Tantuico as the one who directed and orchestrated
the tampering of the election returns to assure the victory of certain
candidates, when in truth, he alleges, he has no knowledge of the
wrongdoing imputed to him as he was in Quezon City, holding office at
said time.
3. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground of improper
venue, contending that under Art 360 of the RPC, the libel case should have
been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and where the
publication house of “The Guardian” is located.
ISSUE/S: WoN the RTC of Leyte may try the libel case – NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. RTC Leyte directed to dismiss criminal case
6136 insofar as petitioner Marcelo Soriano is concerned.
RATIO:
1. RPC, Art 360, par 3: “… where one of the offended parties is a public
officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action shall be filed in the CFI of the City of Manila or of
the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published…” This was reiterated in Agbayani v Sayo:
a. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the CFI of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first published.
b. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may
also be filed in the CFI of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense.
c. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the
CFI of Manila
d. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of
Manila, the action may be filed in the CFI of the province of city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. Multiple publication rule: each and every publication of the same libel
constitutes a distinct offense.
3. Art 360, RPC provides that “the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine… shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof”. Soriano’s
criminal liability, as editor publisher, stems from the press release prepared
in Tacloban City, and mailed or delivered to various newspapers. As far as
Soriano is concerned, the requirement as regards the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published must be construed as
referring to the publication of the press release in HIS newspaper, and not
with the typing or mimeographing of press releases by interested persons in
different municipalities or cities. The purpose of the law is to free media
persons from the intimidating harassment of libel suits filed in any place
where a newspaper happens to be sold or circulated.
4. There is no indication from the records that Soriano had a hand in the
preparation and distribution of the press release from Tacloban City. As
respondent COA Chairman held office in Quezon City and the offending
newspaper is published in Quezon City, the case should be filed with a
Quezon City court.
5. Moreover, the information does not state that the libelous article was
printed and first published in Tacloban City by the Guardian. In fact, what
was clearly asserted as having been first published in Tacloban was the
press release of Cesar Villegas. Soriano’s only involvement in the imputed
offense refers to the publication of the Guardian, not to the press release of
Villegas. Furthermore, a recall of the copy of said issue will yield the fact
 that said newspaper was printed and first published in QC. As such, the
publication in the Guardian constitutes a separate offense which should be
filed in QC.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP v. NOEL
November 9, 1988 | Feliciano, J. | Certiorari and prohibition | Libel
SUMMARY: Private respondents sued petitioner for libel. In response,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which the respondent judge denied.
Petitioners filed the action assailing the decision of the respondent judge
reiterating the arguments they raised in their motion to dismiss. SC held that the
venue was properly laid in the case but no libel was committed.
DOCTRINE:(Venue) The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations, …, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance (now RTC) of the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense . (Art 360, RPC)
(Libel) In actions for damages for libel, the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. Personal hurt or
embarrassment or offense is not automatically equivalent to defamation. It is to
community standards – not personal or family standards – that a court must
refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory.
FACTS
1. The 21 private respondents, claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late
Amir Mindalano, sued petitioner for libel based on a feature article entitled
"A Changing of the Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of
Philippine Panorama, a publication the petitioner which stated that the late
Amir Mindalano was not of any royal house and that he lived with an
American family. They allege that contrary to what is stated in the article the
Mindalanos "belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao
del Sur" and that the statement that the late Amir Mindalano lived with an
American family was false and "has a distinct repugnant connotation in
Maranao society." Contending that petitioners had with malice inflicted "so
much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably
injure" the Mindalano name and reputation, they claimed an aggregate
amount of P2,350,000.00 for damages, fees, and expenses.
2. In response to the complaint, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that (a) venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, and (c) the complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit
which the respondent judge dismissed on 30 October 1986.
3. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
4. A TRO was issued by the SC enjoining the respondent judge from
proceeding with the case on 4 December 1986.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the venue was properly laid for the action by the respondents – YES
2. WON there as a cause for action (i.e. libel was committed) – NO
RULING: Petition GRANTED. The Order of respondent Judge is SET ASIDE,
and respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to dismiss the case. The TRO
issued by this Court is made permanent.
RATIO
1. Paragraph 2 of Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, provides in part that the criminal and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations, …, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the CFI (now RTC) of the province or city where the
libelous article was printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. In the
case, 9 of the 21 respondents were living in Marawi City at the time the
alleged article was published. Petitioners' argument that venue was
improperly laid simply because the 12 other complainants were non-
residents of Marawi at the time of publication is without merit.
2. In actions for damages for libel, the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. In the case, the
alledged article “A Changing of the Guard” is in essence a popular essay on
the general nature and character of Mindanao politics. It was not focused on
the late Amir Mindalano nor his family and there was no other mention the
Mindalano clan execpt in the excerpts complained about. The identification
of Amir Mindalano was merely illustrative or incidental to the article's
theme. There is no evidence of malevolent intent either on the part of the
author or the publisher of the article in the quoted excerpts.
The private respondents contended that the article falsely and maliciously
ascribed to the late Amir Mindalano and to his clan an inferior status or
condition (i.e. not belonging to any of the Royal Muslim houses in Lanao)
and that Amir Mindalano lived with an American family. To this, the Court
takes notice that nobility is not generally recognize d socially in the national
community and the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability.
The description that Amir Mindalano is a commoner or the failure to
ascribe to him membership in a Maranao royal house – a condition which
he shares with a majority of the population – cannot be regarded as
defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or defect," or as tending to cause
"dishonor, discredit or contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is
dead" in the eyes of an average person in our community. The same goes
 for the statement tha the late Amir Mindalano lived with an American
family. From the viewpoint of the average person in our present day
community, the statement complained of is not defamatory.
It is to community standards – not personal or family standards – that a
court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory. For
purposes of the law on libel the more general meaning of community must
be adopted in order to protect and promote free speech.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS v. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL
of the PHILIPPINES
January 28, 2003 | Bellosillo, J. | Certiorari | Libel
SUMMARY: ISDP sued MVRS for damages on behalf of all the Muslims due
to an article published in Bulgar allegedly defamatory against the Muslims. SC
dismissed the complaint for failure to identify specific persons allegedly
defamed by the article.
DOCTRINE: Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be
interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Defamation of a
large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual
unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
FACTS:
1. The Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phil., (ISDP) composed of more than 70
Muslim religious organizations, and individuals Abdul Rahman Linzag,
Ibrahim Arcilla, Abdul Rashid de Guzman, Alfared Da Silva and Ibrahim
Junio filed an action for damages on behalf of themselves and of all the
Muslims nationwide against MVRS Publications, Mars Laconsay, Myla
Aguja, and AgustinoBinegas for an article in the Aug. 1, 1992 issue of
Bulgar, stating that Muslims don’t eat pork because they worship the pig as
a god especially during Ramadan.
2. RTC dismissed the case for failure to identify specific persons allegedly
defamed by the article. CA reversed the decision, holding the imputation of
the article against the Muslims was libelous and that the Islamic Da’wah
Council, as an umbrella organization, had the requisite standing to sue in
behalf of all Muslims.
ISSUE/S:
WoN there is an identifiable victim of the alleged defamatory statement – NO
WoN ISDP has standing to sue on behalf of all Muslims – NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
1. Defamation is the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements, which tends to diminish
the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
2. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Defamation of a large
group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual
unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
3. There was no fairly identifiable person allegedly defamed by the Bulgar
article. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and
distinct from the community. Each Muslim belongs to a different trade and
profession and each has a varying interest and a divergent political and
religious view (i.e. conservative vs. liberal). One Muslim may find the
article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity
to strengthen their faith and educate the nonbelievers and the “infidels.”
There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who
constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel.
Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the
Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
4. An element of class suit action is the adequacy of representation. The ISDP
seeks in effect to represent the whole Muslim world, not only the Filipino
Muslims. The ff., however, must be considered:
 Proportion of Those Made Parties In Relation to Total Membership of Class:
They lack sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group
 Interests of Named Party Coextensive with Interests of Other Members of the
Class: They were not able to show identity of their interests w/ those they seek to
represent
 Ability of the Named Party to Speak for the Rest of the Class: They have not
shown that those absent will be adequately represented by those presented.
5. There is no award of moral damages to ISDP since the factual basis for
damages and its causal connection with acts complained of were not
sufficiently established. As to exemplary damages, there is also no award
since the right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages has
also not been adequately established.
Present case also is not an action for intentional tort causing emotional distress, which is
a civil action that is personal in nature. The purported damage falls under relational
harm, w/c includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm w/c includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of infliction of emotional distress. The
complaint specifically alleged damage against Muslims in the community, especially to
their faith-propagating activities in Metro Manila and other non-Muslim communities.
SANTOS v. CA and PEOPLE
October 21, 1991 | Fernan, C.J. | Petition for Review | Libel
SUMMARY: Santos, a columnist, published an article reproducing verbatim
an unverified complaint filed in the SEC against the CMS Stock Brokerage
Inc. SC held that the complaint was considered privileged communication;
and resolved the issue on malice in favor of Santos.
DOCTRINE: Generally, malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation;
but this presumption does not arise if the communication is privileged under
Article 354, w/c includes pleadings in judicial proceedings.
FACTS:
1. On Feb. 23, 1970, Nanerico Santos, a columnist of the Manila Daily
Bulletin, published in his column an article entitled “Charges Against CMS
Stock Brokerage, Inc.” The article quoted verbatim the unverified complaint
filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by Rosario Sison
Sandejas and her daughters charging CMS, particularly its board chairman
Carlos Moran Sison and president-general manager Luis Sison, of engaging
in fraudulent practices in the stock market. At the end of the article, Santos
wrote and added, “investors and Sison’s fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting
developments on these charges.”
2. On the day it was published, Carlos Sison sought a meeting with Santos
and they met at 6:15 in the evening, where Sison gave a reply. Santos
promised to publish it on Feb. 25 because the deadline for the next day’s
issue has passed. However, the reply was not published on Feb. 25. Sison
called up Santos telling him not to publish the reply anymore, as it would
do nothing but rekindle talks; he also said he would sue for libel. A week
later, they chanced upon each other at InterCon and Santos taunted Sison,
“When will you sue me?” Sison filed a complaint on March 4.
3. The trial court convicted Santos of libel, holding that the article was not
privileged communication because no judicial action has been taken
thereon; and that the act caused dishonor, discredit or contempt on the
offended parties.
4. Article 354 reads, “Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1) a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; 2) a fair and true report, made in good faith,
w/o any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are of a confidential nature, or of any statement, report
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.”
ISSUE/S: WoN the publication of a complaint filed with the SEC before any
judicial action is taken thereon in privileged—YES
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Santos ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. Generally, malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation; but this
presumption does not arise if the communication is privileged under Article
354. Even so, Article 362 of the RPC states that libelous remarks or
comments connected with the matter privileged under 354, if made with
malice, shall not exempt the author nor the editor or managing editor of a
newspaper from criminal liability.
2. The trial court in convicting Santos, relied on Barreto v. Phil Publishing Co
which ruled that the right to publish without liability for damages does not
extend to mere pleadings filed in court. It ratiocinated that the right of the
public to know comes from the necessity in knowing whether the judge is
properly performing his duty—and pleadings are addressed to the court for
facts to be tried, and no other readers. However the SC held that the case
has been overturned in 1976 by Cuenco v. Cuenco where the Court held
that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged because 1)
they have become part of the public record open to the public to scrutinize,
2) pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and
legal in nature, and the disposition of issues is connected with the
administration of justice and therefore of general concern, 3) pleadings are
presumed substantially true because they can be supported by evidence
presented in good faith. In addition, the contents would subject to be
purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein under
the scrutiny of the courts. This is also sanctioned by Rule 135, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court, where the complaint itself may be published unless the
court directs otherwise in the interest of morality and decency.
3. The Court held that there was no malice, for the article was a faithful
reproduction of the pleading, done simply to furnish the readers with
information that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm. In
any case, the Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused,
because excessive scrutiny to discover grounds of malice and falsehood
would defeat the protection w/c the law throws over privileged
communications.
 SAZON v. CA
March 26, 1996 | Hermosisima Jr. | Certiorari | Libel
SUMMARY: After losing in a homeowners’ association elections, Reyes
assails Sazon’s election. Leaflets entitled “Supalpal si Sazon” were circulated
w/ the homeowners (no proof who wrote them). Sazon then published
newsletters (where he was editor), describing Reyes as mandurugas, etc. SC:
Guilty of Libel.
DOCTRINE: Words are defamatory if such are calculated to induce the
hearers to suppose and understand that the person/s against whom they were
uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their
honestly, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person/s up to public ridicule.
FACTS:
1. The accused Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were
both members of the homeowners’ association of PML Homes in Marikina.
While both of them ran for the association’s board of directors, only Sazon
was elected as a director and was also elected by the new board as the
president of the homeowners’ association. Reyes lost. Unable to accept
defeat, Reyes wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home
Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting Sazon’s election, alleging
that the election was a nullity. He also wrote to his co-homeowners not to
recognize petitioner & other members who won the election.
2. EMO-HFC ordered the association to conduct a referendum. After the
meeting, several copies of a leaflet entitled “Supalpal si Sazon” were
received by the homeowners. Also, the phrase “Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng
simbahan?” was seen on the walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision.
There was no proof as to who was responsible for the writings.
3. Thinking that only Reyes was capable of those acts, Sazon started writing,
publishing, and circulating newsletters (PML-Homemakers wherein Sazon
was an editor) to his co-homeowners, with an article describing Reyes:
“mandurugas,” “mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,”
“may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang ating pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy
na kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirangpuri,” etc.
4. Reyes initiated the complaint charging Sazon with libel. RTC & CA:
Petitioner guilty of libel.
ISSUE/S: WON Sazon’s article (Fact 3) is libelous – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED. Sazon guilty of libel.
RATIO:
1. For an imputation to be libelous, it must be (a) defamatory; (b) malicious,
(c) it must be given publicity, (d) victim must be identifiable.
2. Words Used are Defamatory: Sazon alleges that the words aremere
epithets expressing Sazon’s dislike of Reyes, a form of non-actionable
opinion because they do not reflect adversely on his reputation. But in libel
cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what
the words used by him mean. Words are defamatory if such are calculated
to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person/s against
whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to
impeach their honestly, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person/s up to
public ridicule. In this case, branding Reyes as ‘mandarugas’ et al exposed
him to public contempt and ridicule, creating a negative impression of him
in the readers’ minds as a swindler.
3. Defamatory Imputation Presumed Malicious: Under Article 354, every
defamatory imputation is presumed malicious and the prosecution need not
prove malice in fact. The defendant has the burden to show good intention
and justificable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
4. Not Private Communications: Petition claims that the article is privileged
since he wrote the article not to malign Reyes but only to correct the
misinformation Reyes was circulating, as his ‘moral, social, or civil duty’ as
the President of the homeowners’ association and newsleteer editor. But the
1st exception under Article 354 requires that such complaints be addressed
solely to an official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or has
some duty to perform or interest therewith. None of the homeowners for
whom the newsletter was published had supervisory power over Reyes or
authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a
written letter containing libelous matter is not privileged when it’s
published and circulated among the public.
5. Not Fair & True Report: While Reyes was a DTI public relations
consultant when it was published, it had no reference whatsoever to Reyes’
performance in DTI. It merely attacked Reyes’ private character and delved
on matters completely unrelated to his official functions.
6. Malice in Fact Present: Even if it was privileged, malice in fact is still
present – such may be shown by extrinsic evidence of a grudge/rivalry/ill
feeling at time of publication of the imputation. In this case, Sazon was
animated solely by revenge on account of the leaflet entitled
“SupalpalsiSazon” earler circulated. And words used were mostly uncalled
for, strongly sending the message that Sazon’s objective wwwas merely to
maligh and injure Reyes’ reputation.
 VASQUEZ v. CA
September 15, 1999 | Mendoza, J. | Appeal | Libel
SUMMARY: Petitioner Vasquez, representing 37 families who lived in
Tondo Foreshore area, released statements in an interview which imputed
Olmeda as part of the irregular consolidation of lots in the contested land. SC
held that the petitioner was not guilty for malice was not proven.
DOCTRINE: If a defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach to the
accused if it relates to the official conduct of one who is being imputed.
Liability for such an act shall only arise if the public official concerned proves
that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was flase or not.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Vasquez, together with 37 families, was a resident of Tondo
Foreshore area who went to see NHA General Manager Lito Atienza
regarding their complaint against Brgy. Chairman Jaime Olmedo.
2. After the meeting, the petitioner and his companions were met and
interviewed by newspaper reporters. The next day, an article in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa came out imputing Olmedo as a co-
conspirator in a scam to takeover lots in the Foreshore area.
3. Olmedo then filed a complaint for libel based on the newspaper article
alleging that the petitioner’s statements damaged the latter’s reputation.
After entering a plea of not guilty, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner. Said decision was affirmed by the CA in toto.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner can be held liable for libel - NO
RULING: Petitioner is ACQUITTED. Lower court decision REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. It is true that petitioner did not directly admit that he was the source of the
statements in the questioned article which was affirmed by the direct and
cross-examination. But his defense claiming that what he had told the
reporter was made by him in the performance of a civic duty, petitioner in
effect admitted authorship of the article. He cannot claim that have been a
source of only a few statements and point to the other parties as the source
of the rest when he admits that he was identified as the spokesperson of the
other families.
2. Likewise, petitioner’s failure to object to the introduction of the article as
evidence, barred him from claiming that the he cannot be sued for liber
because information did not include the news article as published. Although
the general rules is that the information must set out the particular
defamatory words verbatim and as published and that a statement of their
substance is insufficient, this defect can be cured by evidence.
3. Despite the failure of the earlier defenses, it cannot be construed that the
petitioner was guilty of libel. Elements of libel that must be proved are: (a)
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
4. In the case at bar, the last element which is malice was not proven. Malice
is presumed when defamatory statements are released and it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to overcome such presumption. However, if the
defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation
is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends. The prosecution in this case failed to prove not only that
the charges made by the petitioner were false, but also that the petitioner
made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard if they
were false or not.
5. Contrary to the findings of the lower court, petitioner was able to prove the
truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that the
Olmeda and NHA representatives connived to obtain several lots at the
Tondo Foreshore area was based on a letter of NHA Inspector Fernandez to
petitioner’s counsel stating that some of the lots were titled to different
people. Moreover, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda of the
General Manager of NHA recommending the filing of administrative
charges against NHA officials involved.
6. Regarding the other imputations of the petitioner against the respondent, it
must be noted that what were stated were various charges already filed
against the barangay official but had been dismissed. It is of no moment if
the truth of the charges were not proven for the basis of the statements by
petitioner was the fact that such charges were filed.
7. The prosecution’s claim to prove malice by stating that the petitioner was
politically motivated in making the charges against complainant cannot
hold. On the contrary, complainant’s action of suing only the petitioner and
excluding the numerous families that the latter represents or the editor of
the newspaper show that Olmeda was the one who wanted to harass the
petitioner.
 GMA NETWORK INC v. BUSTOS
October 17, 2006 | Garcia, J. | Certiorari | Libel
SUMMARY: Vidal, GMA reporter, covered the medical board examinees’
filing of a mandamus petition to compel PRC to recheck their papers b/c of
alleged faulty checking. An unrelated 1982 footage of PGH doctors picketing
was inserted. CA awarded damages b/c of the insertion of the unrelated 1982
footage. SC: News report is qualifiedly privileged; 1982 footage not
malicious.
DOCTRINE: While absolutely privileged matters are not actionable
regardless of the existence of malice in fact, in qualified privileged matters
(those under Art 354), the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory
utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact.
FACTS:
1. The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
conducted the 1987 physicians’ licensure exam. Out of 2,835 examinees,
941 failed. Abello and 200 other unsuccessful examinees filed Mandamus
before RTC Manila to compel PRC to re-check the test papers because of
the alleged mistakes in the counting of scores and checking of answers.
2. Rey Vidal, news writer and reporter of GMA Network, covered the
examinees’ filing of mandamus. In the 10:00 evening show Headline News
aired on GMA 7, he inserted an unrelated 1982 footage depicting PGH
doctors picketing for wage and economic disputes, wearing black armbands.
The footage lacked the accompanying ‘file video’ in the broadcast.
3. Bustos, representing all physicians and former membersof the Board of
Medicine, filed a damage suit against Vidal and GMA. TC: Dismissed;
News report not actionable under law on libel. CA: Reversed, ordering
GMA to pay damages even if they affirmed TC’s ruling that the news report
wasn’t actionable under libel laws, since they found that insertion of the
1982 footage constitutes malice to warrant damages. CA further contended
that the insertion of the film footage created an impression that the
demonstration was related to the filing of the case by the board flunkers.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON news report is libelous – NO
2. WON insertion of the 1982 unrelated footage constitutes malice to warrant
damages – NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. TC decision reinstated.
RATIO:
1. Both TC & CA found that the news report was privileged since it was a fair
and true report and a qualified privileged communication (since it was
lifted/quoted from the contents and allegations in the said petition).
However, CA awarded damages on the ground that insertion of the footage
is malicious. But this doesn’t make sense – An award for damages
presupposes the commission of libel, which in turn presupposes malice.
2. News Report not Malicious: Malice is a term used to indicate that the
offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. It’s
present when the accused made the libelous remarks knowing it was false or
wih reckless disregard to its truth or falsity. In this case, the narration of the
news report only had for its subject the purported mistakes in paper
checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the Aug
1987 physicians’ licensure exams, attributable to the then chairman and
members of the Board of Medicine. Personal hurt is not automatically
equivalent to defamation. It is the community, not personal standards,
which shall be taken into account in evaluating any allegations of libel.
3. News Report is Privileged Communication: It was merely a simple
narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition, devoid of
any comment or remark. What Vidal & GMA did was simply to inform the
public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who
were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine.
4. 1982 Footage not Malicious:Contrary to CA’s findings, the phrase ‘file
video’ was actually superimposed on screen to disabuse the viewers’ minds
that a particular footage is current and to prevent misrepresentation so as
not to confuse the viewing public. And even if it were omitted, the absence
of “file video” would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged
nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. The
video footage was not libel in disguise – standing without accompanying
sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or at least, conveyed nothing
derogatory in nature. And even if arguendo the 1982 film footage contained
demeaning features, it was accompanied over by the narration of the news
report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. Nothing in the
footage, bet it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report,
can be viewed libelous since it didn’t contain any attack on any of the
respondents, who weren’t even named in the telecast.
5. One-Sided Report not Malicious: A reporter’s job is to report what the
public has the right to know. He may rely on statements made by a single
source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of
libel prosecution by a public official.
 REYES v. PEOPLE
March 28, 1969 | Makalintal, J.| Appeal from CA decision | Slander

SUMMARY: During a demonstration wherein they shouted death threats at

Hallare, Reyes shouted, “Agustin, putanginamo”. He was charged with grave
oral defamation for the statement. The Court acquitted him for the same since it
was merely an expression of anger and absorbed in the more serious crime of
grave threats.
DOCTRINE: Defamatory remarks which are part of a more serious offense do
not constitute an independent crime of slander |Putangina is merely to express
anger and should not be taken literally

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Rosauro Reyes, a former civilian employee of the Navy
Exchange, Sangley Point, was terminated.He led a demonstration in front of
the naval station. They carried placards bearing statements like
“Agustin,mamatayka” “To, alla boss con Nolan”, ”Frank do not be a
common funk”, “etc. They demonstrated outside the naval station and
assured that it was only against Agustin Hallare and Frank Nolan, and that
they only wanted to blow off steam. When Hallare went to his car, the
demonstrators shouted “Mabuhay si Agustin”, and they followed him to his
house. Reyes repeatedly shouted, "Agustin, putangina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
2. Reyes was charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation, the latter
due the statement “Agustin, putang ina mo” i.e. “Your mother is a whore”.

ISSUE/S: WoN ‘putangina’ counts as slander - NO

RULING: Decision appealed from reversed insofar as oral defamation charge;

affirmed with respect to grave threats.

RATIO:
1. The words “Putang ina mo” is a common expression in the dialect
employed not to slander but to express anger or displeasure. It is rarely, if
ever, taken literally, i.e. as a reflection on the virtues of one’s mother.
Rather, it was part of the threats voiced against Hallare, to make them more
emphatic.
2. Also, as they were uttered in the heat of passion and part of the more
important and serious offense committed by the accused (grave threats), the
statement did not constitute an independent crime of slander.
 VICTORIO v. CA
May 31, 1989 | Bidin, J. | Certiorari | Slander by Deed
SUMMARY: Petitioners were heard uttering the defamatory words against
Atty. Ruiz accusing him of being an estafador. They were separately charged
and jointly convicted with the crime of Grave Oral Defamation. The CA
affirmed the decision but modified the sentence. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied. In their appeal to the SC, petitioners argue that the
words they uttered constitutes merely light oral defamation citing decisions
where defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to
slight oral defamation . The SC disagreed holding that the decisions cited were
not of the SC and the fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the
petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by
the latter, renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.
DOCTRINE: Defamatory words will fall under grave or slight depending
upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time. (Viada)
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his
profession are libelous per se.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Vivencio Ruiz was a practicing lawyer since 1926 with impressive
credentials. He was has the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain
civil cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services
of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his
collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija. Exequiel Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative
charge against Judge Guiang, assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor
General.
2. During the hearing of the administrative case in the sala of Judge Avancena,
Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to
disqualify Judge Avancena to hear the administrative case while Atty. Ruiz,
as counsel for Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
3. After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down
the corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avancena, they were
heard uttering the following “Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz
naiyan, tunaw naman angutak, suwapang at estapador.” and “Mayabang
yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putanginang
iyan, suwapang at estapador.”.
4. They were separately charged and jointly convicted of Grave Oral
Defamation which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S: WON the crime was slight rather than grave oral defamation – NO
RULING: Petition DENIED and the appealed decision AFFIRMED in toto.
RATIO:
1. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as
the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in
his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
In deciding whether defamatory words fall under slight or grave oral
defamation, the Court adopted Viada's guidelines that defamatory words will fall
under one or the other, depending 'upon their sense and grammatical meaning
judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. As such, in a case
where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa, and in a
case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets
imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the
character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was
grave slander. Meanwhile, in a case where the accused, a priest, called the
offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the
conviction of the accused for slight slander as there was no imputation of a
crime nor a vice or immorality in said case. In the case at hand, petitioners
called Atty. Ruiz, “estapador”, which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a
serious and insulting imputation. At the same time, defamatory words uttered
specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se
from prevailing jurisprudence. In Pollard v Lyon, the Court mentioned that
slander is a cause of action when (1) Words falsely spoken of a person which
impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral
turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished
and (3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party
unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of
integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment. In the case,
the petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer and used
the words “kayabang”, “tunaw ang utak”, “swapang at estapador” charging Atty.
Ruiz with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties,
hence, ctionable per se.
Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila and People v. Modesto
ruled that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to
slight oral defamation but these decisions were not of the SC but by the CA and
the fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without
provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter, renders 2. Moreover, the words “hostess” has acquired a notorious connotation of one
inapplicable these cases. who works in clubs and ministers to the pleasures of men for fee. The
expression “any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina” definitely
describes and refers to the work of a prostitute and not that of a mere
PEOPLE v. ORCULLO adulteress.
January 30, 1982 | Fernandez, J. | Certiorari | Libel 3. Assuming arguendo that complainant is married and that the remarks
imputed are acts of prostitution and in effect charging her with adultery, the
SUMMARY: The accused uttered words against a person which resulted to information may still be filed without the complaint. To call a married
the filing of a libel case by a counsel of the City Fiscal. The accused alleged woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an adulteress, but also as a
that the words she said imputed the crime of adultery and not prostitution, violator of her marital vows. This in effect is charging her of having
thus prohibiting prosecution without the complaint of the offended party. TC committed an offense against public morals, that which involves the
ruled in favor of the respondent which was reversed by the SC. maintenance of adulterous relations.
DOCTRINE: Remarks or defamatory statements constituting the crime of 4. Furthermore, it is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically
slander may be prosecuted de oficio if it is shown that the crime imputed is reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by
one against public interest. the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution. In the case at
bar, the derogatory remarks indubitably impute the crime of prostitution.
FACTS:
1. In 1978, the accused Edat Peralta spoke and shouted the words “A hostess
and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina”, or
words of similar import, directed to Lydia Reyes in the presence and with
the hearing of many people.
2. Four months later, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal filed a
criminal case wherein the accused-respondent pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
crime alleged constituted an imputation of the crime of adultery and not
prostitution, which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
3. The respondent court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
offense alleged in the information is a private crime which can be instituted
only by the offended party.

ISSUE/S: WoN the crime imputed is adultery barring prosecution de oficio for
libel - NO

RULING: Petition granted. Dismissal of the criminal cases is set aside.

RATIO:
1. The defense that the remarks against Lydia imputed adultery because the
word “paramour” was mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a
married woman who was carrying on an affair with another man, is
untenable. The information does not allege the civil status of complainant as
married and therefore there is a presumption that she is single. Hence, the
remarks are to be understood as imputing prostitution.
 VILLANUEVA v. PEOPLE
April 10, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Review on Certiorari | Slander
SUMMARY: Sangguniang Bayan Member Villanueva uttered two statements
and did the ‘dirty finger’ at Vice-Mayor Castro. She filed complaints for grave
oral defamation and grave slander by deed against him. The SC modified it to
slight oral defamation and simple slander by deed.
DOCTRINE: The gravity of the slander depends upon (1) the expressions used,
(2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the case.
FACTS:
1. Prosecution version: Two utility men went to Municipal Vice Mayor
Yolanda Castro’s office with the application for monetized leave of
Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva. Castro did not immediately
attend to the application as she was dictating some matters to her secretary.
2. Villanueva entered her office with the application and sarcastically said to
the secretary, “Malou, pagatiu ne keng mood, papirma mu ne.” Castro took
the leave and filed it. While doing so, it fell on the floor. When she was
about to pick it up, Villanueva allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at
her face, though she was able to evade it. He then said, “Ibuat daka ken,
inabu daka keng awing, e baling masukul naku” (I will lift you from there
and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t care if I will go to jail).
3. Villanueva pointed a “dirty finger” (middle finger extended, the rest of his
fingers half-closed) at her, prompting her to stand and get an empty bottle to
shield her face. Because he was still frothing invectives, Castro purportedly
‘rolled’ the bottle towards him. About 20-30 people witnessed the incident.
4. While this was ongoing, Villanueva allegedly mouthed, “Nagmamalinis ca,
enaca man malinis, garapal ca” and “Balamu mansanas cang malatu, pero
queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat” (You are pretending to be clean and
honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red
apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty). Municipal
Atty. Pepito Torres intervened but was unable to pacify Villanueva.
5. Castro was persuaded to enter the office of the Sangguniang Bayan
Secretary. Villanueva followed her and again said, “Ibuat daka ken, inabu
daka keng awing, e baling masukul naku”, as well as “I Tata mu tinagal
yang kapitan pero masambut ya, pero ing kaputul ku sinambut ne man”
(Your father ran for barangay captain and lost but my brother won) and
again pointed a dirty finger at her.
6. Based on these acts, Castro filed complaints for grave oral defamation and
slander by deed against Villanueva. He was found guilty of both.
7. Defense’s version: When he was about to submit the application to the
Secretary, Castro grabbed the paper from him, which angered Villanueva to
which he said, “Is this the actuation of the high government official?”
Castro replied “Insane.” They squabbled, and Castro said “nung munta kayo
keng municipiyo ngayni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala nakong depatan
nunge gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau.” (When you go to the municipal
building as if you are a king, you did nothing except to make money, the
people no longer believe in you) and she threw a bottle of coke at him.
ISSUE/S: WoN the petitioner should be convicted for grave oral defamation and
grave slander by deed - NO
RULING: Decision modified.
RATIO:
1. Per Art 358, slander is libel committed by oral means instead of in writing.
Oral defamation, or slander, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood. There is grave slander when it is of a
serious and insulting nature. The gravity depends upon (1) the expressions
used, (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and
(3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Considering social standing
and position of the offended party, the SC had previously held that
slandering a high official constituted grave oral defamation. However,
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with provocation on the part
of the offended party, is only a light felony.
2. Villanueva, then a Councilor, was supposed to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language, particularly since the offended
party was a Vice-Mayor. However, the words were uttered out of anger
since Castro refused, without valid justification, to approve the
monetization of his accrued leave credits. Thus, he is guilty of only the light
felony of slight oral defamation, not grave oral defamation.
3. Following the same principle, Villanueva is guilty only of slight slander by
deed since the ‘poking finger’ incident was triggered by the unjust refusal
and the throwing of a coke bottle at him. The elements of slander by deed
are: (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime
against honor, and (2) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes
slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of
the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed,
the occasion, etc. Pointing a dirty finger is of less serious magnitude than
cases that the SC decided in the past (banging of chair, choking, slapping of
face), and it is equivalent to “Fuck You” or “Puta”, which is not really
employed to slander, but to express anger or displeasure. It is not to be
taken in the literal sense.
 PEOPLE v. MOTITA
September 11, 1962 | Capistrano, J. | Appeal | Slander by Deed
SUMMARY: While Pilar Letada was selecting fish in the public market,
Motita held a mirror between her legs, causing others to laugh at her. When
they were grappling for the mirror, he further threatened to slap her. The
Court held that he was guilty of slander by deed of a serious nature.
DOCTRINE:The Court set out formulations for similar offenses. Act that
causes annoyance or irritation without justification = unjust vexation. Unjust
vexation + publicity and dishonor = Slander by deed. Unjust vexation +
circumstances attendant in rape and lewd designs = acts of lasciviousness.
FACTS:
1. On Nov 17, 1960 at 8am, Mrs. Pilar Letada went to the public market in
Masbate to buy fish for family consumption. While there selecting fish in
one of the stalls, her attention was called to laughter of the crowd nearby
while looking at her. She immediately looked to her side and found
Benjamin Motita holding a mirror and placing it between her legs to see the
reflection of her private parts. She immediately took the mirror from him;
but Motita was able to grab it back, threatening to slap her.
2. Letada went home to her husband without getting to buy any fish. The
husband, enraged, went to the public market to get even with Motita but he
was nowhere to be found.
3. Motita was charged with and found guilty of slander by deed, and was
sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. Motita claims that the
trial court erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence. The
Assistant SolGen agreed with the court that he should be guilty of slander;
but argues that the act was not of a serious nature and the term of
imprisonment should only be 11 to 20 days.
or contempt, the offense would be slander by deed. If, on the other hand, in
addition to the annoyance, there was present any of the circumstances
provided for in rape (use of force or intimidation, deprivation of reason or
otherwise rendering the victim unconscious, offended party under 12 years
of age) together with lewd designs, the crime would be acts of
lasciviousness.
2. In this case, the act of placing a mirror between her legs irritated and
annoyed her. There was also the attendance of publicity, as it was
committed in a public place; as well as honor or contempt because the
people nearby looked at her with ridicule and laughed at her. The
subsequent threat to slap her also subjected her to humiliation and ridicule.
In addition, none of the attendant circumstances in rape were present; and
that it was done in a public place negates the presence of lewd designs.
3. The Court held that there is no fixed standard in determining whether a
slander is serious or not; and it is discretionary on the courts. Here, the
Court was moved by considerations of public policy and morals, of the
degeneration of the consideration and respect for Filipino womanhood, and
held that the slander was serious.

ISSUE/S: WoN he was guilty of slander by deed of a serious nature—YES

RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. The finding of guilt by the trial court is based upon direct and positive
evidence consisting of the complainant’s testimony. The offense committed
was correctly charged as slander by deed. The Court noted that under the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the crime could be, certain
factors concurring, 1) unjust vexation, 2) acts of lasciviousness, or 3)
slander by deed. Without any concurring factor, the offense would just be
unjust vexation, because it annoyed or irritated her without justification. But
if in addition to the annoyance, there was attendant publicity and dishonor,
 PEOPLE v. ALAGAO ISSUE: WON the information correctly alleged the complex crime of
April 30, 1966 | Zaldivar, J. | Certiorari | Incriminating an Innocent Person incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest – YES.

SUMMARY: Members of the Manila Police Department unlawfully arrested
Apolonio then upon the investigation, planted P1 on his person to impute
bribery against him. They were charged with the complex crime of
incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest. Motion to quash filed on
the ground that no such complex crime exists. SC ruled that
DOCTRINE: A complex crime of incriminatory machinations through
unlawful arrest exists if the latter was used as a necessary means to commit
the former.
FACTS:
1. City Fiscal of Manila charged the ff information against the accused for the
complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police
Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one
Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery thru
unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the
aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of
delivering said MarcialApolonio to the proper authorities, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest Apolonio; that after victim had been
arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being
investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place and
commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from Apolonio,
supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he
(Apolonio), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila,
would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of Apolonio’s duties, which was to expedite
the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to
said Apolonio the commission of the crime of bribery."
RULING: REVERSED & SET ASIDE. Remanded for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. For an information to charge the commission of a complex crime, the
allegations don’t necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined by
law. It’s sufficient that the information contains allegations which show that
tone offense was a necessary means to commit the other. Here, the
information contains allegations properly charging the commission of the
complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest. The use
of the phrase “though unlawful arrest” conveys the idea that unlawful arrest
was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in Apolonio’s
person, thereby incriminating him.
2. The statement in the information that Apolonio was investigated “after” the
unlawful arrest doesn’t necessarily convey the idea that the investigation
took place “long after” the arrest had been committed. Based on the
information, there is a close connection between the arrest and the
investigation – and it was during the investigation that they planted the
incriminatory evidence against him. The arrest was the only way they could
with detain him, search his person, and in the process place the marked peso
bill. If they didn’t, it would’ve been difficult to plant such because he
would’ve resisted or easily found out what they were up to.

2. Accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense since the two crimes
cannot be complexed. SolGen: Unlawful arrest was a necessary in order for
the planting of the evidence to have been committed. TC: Planting
happened long after the unlawful arrest; unlawful arrest not necessary
means.
 GAANAN v. IAC
October 16, 1986 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Certiorari | Wiretapping
SUMMARY: Gaanan, through Laconico’s request, secretly listened through
a telephone extension, to Pintor’s conversation with Laconico, discussing the
terms of the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed by Pintor’s
client, Montebon, against Laconico. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty
of violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act and were each sentenced to 1 year
imprisonment. SC held that:
DOCTRINE: Atelephone extension is not among the prohibited “devices
and arrangement”. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap, or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept or record spoken words.
FACTS:
1. Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor, after discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault they filed against Leonardo Laconico
with his client, Manuel Montebon, called Laconico. Laconico requested
appellant (Edgardo Gaanan) to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension to personally hear the proposed conditions
for the settlement, namely:
a. Settlement fee increased from 5k to 8k, 5k of which is to be paid to
Atty. Pintor for convincing client to withdraw
b. Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before Don
BoscoTechical High School students
c. 1k to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty Club
d. Transfer Laconico’s son to another school or another section
e. Affidavit of desistance by Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier
filed against Montebon
f. Allow Montebon to continue teaching at DBTHS
g. Not to divulge the truth of settlement to the mass media
h. 2k attorney’s fees for Atty. Pintor
2. After agreeing to the terms, Pintor instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the Dept of Public Highways. Laconico, who earlier
alerted Col. Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Costabulary, insisted that Pintor receive the money himself. When he
received such in Igloo Restaurant, Pintor was arrested by agents of the Phil
Constabulary.
3. Gaanan executed an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand 8k for the
withdrawal of the complaint, which was attached to a complaint for
robbery/extortion filed against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the
telephone conversation without Pintor’s consent, he and Laconico were
charged with the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act to which they were
each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment.
ISSUE/S: WoN an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec.
1 of RA 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act – NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. IAC decision SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
Gaanan ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
1. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a device or
arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap, or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept or record spoken words. A telephone
extension cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1, RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. A telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose.
2. It is a rule in statutory construction that particular clauses and phrases of a
statute must not be taken in isolation, but as an integrated whole. Hence, the
phrase “device or arrangement” although not exclusive to the enumeration
in Sec. 1, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature: instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation
cannot be presumed by the party being overheard because, by their very
nature, they are not common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. A telephone
extension is commonplace. A person should safely presume that the party
he is calling probably has an extension telephone and runs the risk of a 3 rd
party listening in.
3. Furthermore, penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. In case of doubt as to whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase “device or arrangement”, the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. Also, a perusal of the
Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited
device, but that they were more concerned with the recording rather than the
act of merely listening to a telephone conversation. The act was intended to
discourage persons, such as government authorities, from installing devices
in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, or blackmail the
telephone users. Consequently, for the mere act of listening to be
 punishable, it must strictly be with the use of the devices in RA 4200 or RULING: CA decision is AFFIRMED.
others of similar nature.
RATIO:
1. The language of the law is clear and unambiguous. Section 1 of RA 4200
RAMIREZ v. CA states that “it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
September 28, 1995 | Kapunan, J. | Petition to Review | Libel the parties to any private communication x xx, to secretly overhear,
intercept or record such communication x xx. ” This provision is very clear
SUMMARY: Petitioner was charged with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping that it prevents any person from such an act. The law makes no distinction
Law after secretly recording her conversation with the respondent, which was as to whether the party who violated the statute is a party or is different
the basis of the former’s libel suit against the latter. Petitioner claimed that from those involved in the communication. Moreover, a perusal of the
what is penalized under the said law are private communications and not congressional records shows that the legislature contemplated the same.
private conversations. SC did not agree with the petitioner. 2. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
DOCTRINE: RA 4200 punishes any person who secretly records private The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
communications which include conversations involving the offender. The law information. The mere allegation that the individual made a secret recording
does not distinguish between parties involved in the communication and third of private communications would suffice to constitute an offense.
persons, just as long as there was a secretive act of recording the same. 3. To take communication as something different from conversation is to
narrow the meaning of the words to a point of absurdity. The word
FACTS: communicate, in its ordinary signification, connotes the act of sharing or
1. Petitioner Ramirez filed a civil case for damages alleging that private imparting, as in a conversation. Furthermore, legislators who wrote the
respondent Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, vexed, insulted explanatory note to the bill used communication and conversation
and humiliated her in a furious mood and in a manner offensive to interchangeably.
petitioner’s dignity and personality (Garcia told Ramirez that she was
“bastos” for not honoring the help the former extended to her in getting
employed. At one point in the conversation, Garcia said that without her
help, Ramirez could not get the job the latter has because of the latter being
“bobo”). In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript
of the event based from a tape recording of the confrontation.
2. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event, respondent filed a criminal
case alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal
and a violation of RA 4200 or Anti-Wiretapping Law.
3. Upon arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the violation punished under RA 4200 refers to taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.
She also said that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information. Lastly, petitioner claimed that what RA 4200
penalized is the taping of a “private communication” and not a “private
conversation”, thus making her act of secretly taping their conversation
beyond the scope of the law.
4. Trial court granted the motion. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the
TC.

ISSUE/S: WoN the act of petitioner constituted a violation of RA 4200? - YES

 PEOPLE v. CANO
May 24, 1966 | Concepcion, J. | Appeal from CFI order | Criminal Negligence
SUMMARY: Cano was charged with two offenses: (1) slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to property and serious and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence and moved to quash
information alleging that the two crimes cannot be complexed which the CFI
granted. SC set the CFI order aside and ordered resumption of trial based on
merits.
DOCTRINE: Criminal negligence in the RPC is treated as a mere quasi-offense
and dealt separately from willful offenses. In intentional crimes the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight.
FACTS:
1. Ambrosio Cano was a driver of the La Mallorca Pambusco bus. On Sept.
21, 1960, while travelling along National Highway at San Isidro, San
Fernando, Pampanga, the bus he was driving hit and bumped a Philippine
Rabbit bus driven by Clemente Calixto. Said collision caused damages to
the Philippine Rabbit bus and physical injuries among the passengers of
both buses. Four passengers (Feliciano, Pasamonte, Ongria and Calixto)
sustained injuries which required medical attendance for a period of not less
than three (3) months (serious physical injuries). Some other passengers
sustained injuries which required medical attendance for a period of a week
to a month (less serious physical injuries); while the others sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period ranging
from seven to nine days (slight physical injuries), and incapacitated them
from customary labor for the same period.
2. He was charged with two offenses in one Information: (1) slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to property, and serious
and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence. He pleaded not
guilty and months later, filed a motion to quash information alleging,
among others, that the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to property, serious and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. The Pampanga CFI
granted the motion to quash and issued an order to amend the information
within ten (10) days from notice, by deleting all reference to slight physical
injuries, holding that misdemeanor cannot validly be complexed with grave
or less grave felonies.
3. With the MR denied by the CFI, the prosecution files the present appeal.
ISSUE/S:WoN the recklessness of the accused and not the effect of negligence
is punishable under the RPC – YES
RULING: CFI order set aside. Case remanded to lower court for trial on merits.
RATIO:
1. The information does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical
injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to property and
serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is
merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence of the
defendant, the bus driven by Cano hit another bus causing upon some of its
passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious physical
injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage
to property.
2. Cano and the CFI seemingly assumed that the two offenses charged (see
Fact No. 2) would be complexed based upon the premise that the effect or
consequence of negligence, and not the negligence itself, is the principal
factor in the offenses.
Such premise, however, is not accurate. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence (murder, treason,
robbery, malicious mischief, etc). Criminal negligence in the RPC is treated
as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from willful offenses. It is not
a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight. (Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor)
Note: (Criminal Procedure)
 Regardless of what should be the final disposition of the case, what the CFI should
have done was to reserve resolution of the case after hearing the same based on
merits, because there is no doubt that it had jurisdiction to hear the case for damage
to property and serious or less serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence.
 From the standpoint of practice and justice, the splitting of action by filing against
Cano several Informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious and less
serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence, before the CFI, and another for
slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace of
municipal court, would be unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of
justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the
presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts. Worse,
in the event of conviction in the municipal court and appeal to the CFI, said
evidence would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court.
 IBABAO v. PEOPLE
September 28, 1984 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari | Quasi-Offenses
SUMMARY:Ibabao was found guilty of Homicide thru Reckless
Imprudence. The lower courts increased the penalty due to his failure to lend
assistance to the injured party. SC held that the failure to lend assistance
constitutes a qualifying circumstance which cannot be considered since it was
not alleged in the information.
DOCTRINE: Failure to render assistance, as a qualifying circumstance, must
be alleged in the information in order to be considered.
FACTS:
1. Aniceto Ibabao was charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Jose
Patalinghog, Jr., a bystander, testified that on April 30, 1967, at about 11
pm, while he was at Bankerohan terminal, he saw an owner-type jeep bump
a person, and that said jeep did not stop; that upon request of a security
guard, he gave chase, wrote down the plate number 57675, overtook the
jeep and recognized the driver as the petitioner, and thereafter reported the
incident to the Matina Police Sub-Station.
2. The City Court found him guilty of the charged offense and imposed the
penalty next higher in degree (prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods) for his failure to lend aid to the victim. CA modified the
decision, increasing the penalty, stating that the penalty one degree higher is
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
3. Petitioner prays for the modification of the penalty since: 1) his failure to
lend aid was not alleged in the information, and should therefore not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance; and 2) Since Jose Patalinghog, Jr.,
gave an affidavit of recantation, a new trial should be granted. Petitioner
also alleges that the last paragraph of Art 365 of the RPC is not applicable
to paragraph 2, as of the same article because of the opening statement that
“the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable”.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the “failure to lend aid on the spot” does not apply to paragraph 2 –
NO.
2. WoN the increased penalty is inapplicable for failure to allege his failure to
render assistance in the information – YES.
3. WoN Patalinghog’s recantation merits a new trial – NO.
RULING: Penalty imposed by appellate court MODIFIED. Indeterminate
sentence of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 4
years and 2 months and 1 day of prission correccional as maximum.
RATIO:
1. Art. 365, RPC: “Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; xxxx
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: xxxx “2.
When, by imprudence or negligence with violation of the Automobile
Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant
shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods. xxxx
“The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give.”
2. The proviso that “the provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable” refers to the preceding paragraphs. The last paragraph on failure
to lend aid on the spot necessarily applies to all situations envisioned in said
article whenever there is an injured party.
3. The failure to render assistance constitutes a qualifying circumstance
because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree. The same
must be alleged in the information to apprise the defendant of this charge,
unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which can be taken into
account even if not alleged, if proven in trial without objection. Failure to
lend assistance cannot be considered a generic aggravating circumstance
since it is not among those enumerated in Art 14 of the RPC.
4. Patalinghog’s affidavit of recantation cannot be considered as newly
discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. Firstly, the affidavit was thought
of only after this petition was initially denied for lack of merit. Secondly,
recantations should be taken with great caution. If a new trial is granted at
such instance where an interested party succeeds in inducing some of the
witnesses to vary their testimony outside of court after trial, then there
would be no end to every litigation.
 BUERANO v. CA be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the negligent or careless
July 19, 1982 | Relova, J. | Review of CA decision | Criminal Negligence act, not the result thereof.
2. The gravity of the consequence is only considered to determine the penalty.
SUMMARY: Petitioner, who was the driver of a bus, hit a delivery panel and It does not qualify the substance of the offense. As the careless act is single,
injured three people. He was convicted for slight and less serious physical whether the injurious result would affect one or several persons remains one
injuries through reckless imprudence. Subsequently, he was charged with and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
damage to property through reckless imprudence. He moved to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The SC granted the same and acquitted him of the
second offense.
DOCTRINE: Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The law
penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Epitacio Buerano, the driver of an LTB bus, collided with the
Mabuhay Bakery delivery panel driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by
Chu Yu. Petitioner was charged with slight and serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, the complaint alleging that through his
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, the bus he drove and operated
collided with and damaged the truck, and caused the driver and two helpers
to suffer physical injuries requiring medical attention as follows: Vismonte
– 5 days; Virtudazo – 10 days; SyTian – 1 mo.
2. Petitioner was found guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence and sentenced to suffer imprisonment from 1
mo 1 day to 2 mos. and to pay costs. On appeal, this was affirmed and
modified to 4 mos. arresto mayor and costs.
3. A case was then filed against petitioner for the crime of damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy since he had already been convicted. The
Provincial Fiscal contended that the crime he was convicted for and the
crime he was being newly charged with were distinct offenses and that
more evidence was needed to sustain the first than the second.

ISSUE/S: WoN there is double jeopardy in the instant case - YES

RULING: Judgment of conviction set aside. Petitioner acquitted.

RATIO:
1. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The essence of the
quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Art 365, RPC lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
 GAN v. CA
September 19, 1988 | Fernan, C.J. | Review of CA judgment | Criminal
Negligence
SUMMARY: Gan, who was driving her car, hit and bumped Casino and caused
damage to two vehicles parked beside the road when she swerved her car to the
right to avoid collision with an overtaking vehicle running in the opposite
direction. CFI convicted her of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence (CA
modified this to Homicide thru Simple Imprudence). SC acquitted her holding
that she did not act with negligence.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio No. 1 (Negligence Test and Emergency Rule)
FACTS:
1. In the morning of July 4, 1972, HedyGan was driving a Toyota car along
North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles, a truck and
a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two
to three meters from each other.
2. As Gan’s car was approaching the place where the two vehicles were
parked, a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction, followed by
another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby
encroached the lane of Gan’s car.
3. To avoid collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man (later identified as Isidro
Casino) who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning
him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused
the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parked truck
ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on
its front, and the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and the
truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
4. Casino was later brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on
arrival. Gan was later charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence, for
which Gan was convicted. She appealed to the CA, who found her guilty of
Homicide thru Simple Imprudence, stating that she should have stepped
onthe brakes when she saw the two cars running in the opposite direction
(wherein the 2nd car overtook the first by passing towards its left). She
should not only have swerved her car to the right but should have also tried
to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into Casino who was
crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the
street.
ISSUE/S: WoN Gan acted with negligence that led to damage to property and to
Casino’s death – NO
RULING: Petitioner acquitted.
RATIO:
1. Test for Determining Negligence Resulting in Injury and Damages:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against
its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Corollary to this test is the emergency rule: one who suddenly finds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.
2. The suggestion made by the CA in its decision (see Fact No. 4) would be
reasonable if there was sufficient time for Gan to decide what course of
action to take that would result to the least possible harm. The prosecution,
however, presented no eyewitnesses to testify as to the distances between
Gan’s car and the overtaking vehicle to ascertain whether or not she had
sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to
swerve her car to the right without stepping on her brakes.
3. The evidence for the prosecution includes Gan’s statement that she was not
able to avoid hitting Casino, who suddenly crossed the road when she
swerved her car to the right to avoid collision with the overtaking vehicle.
The fact that this statement was introduced by the prosecution as evidence
means that they have admitted its veracity.
4. Gan could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under
normal conditions since the danger confronting her was real and imminent,
threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking
but only enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.
What the CA was asking her to have done was just too much, for she had to
exercise her best judgment at that instant to save herself from a difficult and
dangerous situation.
5. Furthermore, even the CA itself pronounced that Gan was driving her car
within the legal limits, thus calling for the application of the “emergency
rule” in Gan’s case and absolving her of liability for any criminal
negligence in connection with the incident.
 CARILLO v. PEOPLE
May 31, 1989 | Bidin, J. | Petition for certiorari | Criminal Negligence
SUMMARY: Petitioner Dr. Carillo was the anesthesiologist during the
apendectomy of Catherine Acosta. He was found, together with the surgeon Dr.
Madrid, guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide (the death of Catherine)
by the trial court and the CA. SC held that what's important is not the real cause
of death but rather if the set of circumstances constituted simple (as distinguished
from reckless) negligence on the part the petitioner and Dr. Madrid leading to the
death of Catherine to which the SC answered in the affirmative.
DOCTRINE: In cases of simple negligence, the prosecution needs only to
present the best evidence procurable under the circumstances, in order to shift the
burden of disproving the proof of the negative ingredient to the accused, provided
that such initial evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis the guilt of the
accused.
FACTS:
1. Catherine Acosta was suspected of having appendicitis and scheduled for
operation at 5PM of May 31, 1981. The operation was done at 5:45PM
because Dr. Madrid only arrived at that time. Dr. Madrid was the surgeon
and Dr. Leandro Carillo was the anesthesiologist.
2. Prior to the operation, Catherine was not weighed or X-rayed.
3. Catherine entered the operating room feeling well but at the end of the
operation at 7PM she was shivering, had an irregular heartbeat, and remained
asleep. Dr. Madrid suggested that she be put under an oxygen tank and after
reviving her heartbeat, the two doctors left the hospital. After 15 or 30
minutes, the child developed convulsion and stiffening of the body. Dr.
Madrid and the cardiologist examined her. The cardiologist told the mother,
Yolanda, that she suffered severe infection which went up to her head.
4. Dr.Carillo was then summoned but arrived only at 10:30PM seemingly
agitated. He told them it was nothing and that the child will regain
consciousness and if not he will resign as a doctor. Catherine was diagnosed
as comatose the next morning and died three days later.
5. It was found that 15 to 30 minutes after she was sent back to her hospital
room, the deceased had a heart attack depriving her brain of oxygen, leading
to hemorrhage. The CA identified such cardiac arrest as the immediate cause
of Catherine’s death. The CA held that this was caused by an adverse
reaction anesthesia, particularly to the arbitrary administration of Nubain, a
pain-killer whose dosage is determined by the weight of the patient.
6. The CA found petitioner and Dr. Madrid guilty of simple negligence in
failing to observe the required diligence expected of them in the situation.
7. Upon appeal to the SC, petitioner questions the soundness of the factual
conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA drastically “misapprehended” the relevant, operative facts of
the case – NO
2. WON the findings of fact support the conclusion that the petitioner and Dr.
Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide – YES
RULING: CA decision AFFIRMED and MODIFIED as to the amount of
indemnity.
RATIO:
1. After careful scrutiny of the records of the case, it was found that there was
no misapprehension of facts.
2. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in finding that an overdose of, or an
allergic reaction to, the anaesthetic drug Nubain led to the death of Catherine
Acosta and that the true cause of Catherine’s death was that set out in the
death certificate of Catherine: “Septicemia (or blood poisoning) due to
perforated appendix with peritonitis.” as per the testimonies of the expert
witnesses. However, what is important in the case is not so much the
identification of the “true or real cause” of death but rather the set of
circumstances which both the trial court and the CA found constituted simple
(as distinguished from reckless) negligence on the part of the two accused
Dr. Madrid and Dr. Carillo leading to the death of Catherine. These being:
(1) The failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the serious posturgery
condition of their patient, to monitor her condition and provide close patient
care to her – she was not put in a properly equipped recovery room which
the hospital lacked and the two doctors left immediately after reviving her
heartbeat.
(2) The summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist after the
patient’s heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was completed –
showing that Dr. Madrid felt that what the patient was feeling was related to
the petitioner.
(3) The low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to
correct Dr. Madrid’s prescription of Nubain for post-operative pain.
(4) The extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform
the parents of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in
disregard of the requirements of the Code of Medical Ethics.
(5) The failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact
exercised the necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to
prevent the sudden decline in the condition of Catherine Acosta and her
death three (3) days later.
In such a case, the burden is on the petitioner and Dr. Madrid to overturn the
prima facie case which the prosecution had established, by reciting what they
did to prevent or to counter the obviously serious condition of Catherine
Acosta post-surgery. This they failed or refused to do.
Their failure to exercise the diligence called for by the situation which was
not immediately life-destructive but which culminated in the death of a
human being three (3) days after proves them guilty of simple negligence
resulting to homicide.