Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Key points:
“And to prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick
State, all and every one of the Electors, Princes and States of the
Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd in their antient
Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial
Right, as well Ecclesiastick, as Politick Lordships, Regales, by virtue
of this present Transaction: that they never can or ought to be
molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of
pretence.”2
1
Marc Saxer, Security Governance in a post Sovereign World, in International Politics and
Society, Security Governance issue, 3/3008, 28.
2
Article LXIV, Treaty of Westphalia, International Relations and Security Network, 15.
1
In other words, anyone who paid loyalty to the state was in return protected
by the state.
b) 1948 UN Charter – Article 2:1 - 1. The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
Through their own volition, the people enter into a CONTRACT through
which they surrender some of their sovereignty to the government in
exchange for agreed services.
QUESTION 1: Use the example of post election violence. Why did the
government try to stop the violence – first with the police and then
the military?
2
war crimes – need a war, and can be committed by civilians or
military.
• Statute of the International Criminal Court in Rome, July 1998, after ad-
hoc courts International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia -
ICTY (1993) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - ICTR
(1994).
3
Genocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group:
killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
4
react to the situation in the event that prevention has failed, and
finally
Last resort (when all else fails and violence is imminent or occurring),
4
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness - http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf
5
the systematic physical removal of members of a particular group from a
particular geographical area; acts of terror designed to force people to
flee; and the systematic rape for political purposes of women of a
particular group (either as another form of terrorism, or as a means of
changing the ethnic composition of that group.
defeat of a state.
d. Rules of engagement
are precise;
reflect the principle of proportionality; and
involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
e. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal
objective. (MANDATE)
f. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.
a) Over the past decade, the UN has been talking about and moving
toward a ‘culture of protection’ and covers
rule of law,
6
respect for refugees,
sustainable livelihoods,
5
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection
of civilians in armed conflict, 30 March 2001 (available at
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAl.NSF/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/e8b5234d0339a2c
385256c8700549672!OpenDocument, downloaded 29 November 2007)
7
spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law,
international humanitarian law and refugee law.”
ICRC notes that during the 1990s, the civilian population represented an
estimated 80 percent of all victims of armed conflicts
6
Sylvie Giossi Caverzasio, Strengthening Protection in War: a Search for Professional
Standards. (Geneva: ICRC 2001) 19, quoted in Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick, Protection:
An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies, Overseas Development Institute (2005), 33.
7
Ibid.
8
It is very serious. No country is an island.
8
Though Cambodia one is different from all others as the ‘victim’ can actually come to court
and accuse the ‘perpetrator’ and ask them direct questions.
9
United Nations, UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004), 65, para 201. (available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/, downloaded 29 November 2007)
10
United Nations, UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004), 66, para 203. (available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/, downloaded 29 November 2007)
9
ii. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his 2005 report, In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.
He wrote: “I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to
protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This
responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual
State, whose primary raison d'être and duty is to protect its
population. But if national authorities are unable or
unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility
shifts to the international community to use diplomatic,
humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights
and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear
insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to
take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including
enforcement action, if so required.”11
iii. R2P was universally endorsed at the October 2005 World Summit,
the Outcome Document (of all General Assembly members) stating
that “the international community, through the United
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”12
11
United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for
All Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, (2005), 35, para 135. (available at
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/, downloaded 29 November 2007)
12
United Nations General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome, 15 September 2005, 30,
paras. 138-139.
(available at http://www.ony.unu.edu/seminars/2007/R2P/2005%20World%20Summit
%20Outcome.pdf) (downloaded 20 June 2008)
10
iv. 2006 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1674, whereby the Security
Council “reaffirm(ed) the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.
13
International Crisis Group, Responsibility to Protect website section
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1
14
United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York
11
2.4 BUT – What might be the challenges that a state may face in
implementing R2P?
Lack of capacity?
Didn’t know?
a) Policymakers know far more about emerging crises than the international
media do through their diplomatic dispatches. So NOT KNOWING IS
NOT AN EXCUSE.
c) This contrasts with the American diplomats who were still advocating
peace talks while the massacres were already taking place.17
16
Allan Thompson, The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, Plato Press, (2007), 146.
17
Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide”, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001, in
Gerald Caplan The Role of the Media in the Rwandan Genocide, Short Readings 3, University
for Peace and Institute for Media, Peace and Security, (2005) 162.
12
d) It is also now known that the Belgian diplomats and intelligence in
Kigali had been sending information on the increasing tensions to
Brussels for a year before the genocide.18
CHALLENGES:
a) Full R2P = regime change – Rwanda, Darfur. Holt argues that “full
scale interventions to protect civilians are likely to occur only in
extreme cases and only for a limited time period. They could involve
significant force and warlike tactics to eliminate the capacity of the
killers or to halt violence quickly. Yet such interventions are not to
defeat a designated enemy – although that may be the
strategy – but to stop violence against a civilian population.”21
18
Gerald Caplan, The Preventable Genocide, (2000) Chapter 9, 9.13.
19
House of Commons International Development Committee - Fifth
Report printed 16 March 2005 (available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/6706.htm#a4,
downloaded 17 June 2008)
20
Ibid.
21
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 185.
13
ICISS categorically says “the aim of the human protection operation is
to enforce compliance with human rights and the rule of law as quickly
and as comprehensively as possible, but it is not the defeat of a
state.”22
22
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect - Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
International Development Research Centre, (December 2001), 67.
23
Peggy Hicks, Principled Leadership - A Human Rights Agenda for UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon, Human Rights Watch World Report 2007, available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k7/essays/principled/index.htm
24
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations,The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 103.
14
by militaries such as forcible disarmament, maintaining safe
areas and protecting humanitarian efforts and staff.”25
25
Thomas G. Weiss, The Humanitarian Impulse in The UN Security Council: From the Cold
War to the 21st Century, David M. Malone, ed., Boulder: Lynn Reinner, (2004), 47-48, in
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 52.
26
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations,The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 165.
27
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations,The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 173.
15
unarmed humanitarian agencies afraid to lose their access to vulnerable
populations.28
28
Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The
Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations,The Henry L. Stimson Centre,
September 2006, 175.
16
3. R2P in Kenya - UN Security Council response
UN agencies, the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies were on the
ground engaged in protection work, and responding to the crisis from the
outset.
29
UN News Centre, “Secretary-General calls for restraint from all in Kenyan post-election
violence”, 31 December 2007
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=25189&Cr=kenya&Cr1=&Kw1=Kenya&Kw2=&Kw3=
17
1. On 11 January, with the death toll at 500, and 250,000 people
displaced, the Secretary General “urgently” calls on both parties to
resolve the differences through dialogue.31
31
UN News Centre, “As death toll rises, Ban Ki-moon calls for urgent solution to Kenya
crisis”, 11 January 2008 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=25272&Cr=kenya&Cr1=&Kw1=Kenya&Kw2=&Kw3= (downloaded 19 June 2008)
32
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, “Violence in Kenya (January 31, 2008),
Statement made by Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner”
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/kenya_209/situation-in-kenya-
2008_6019/violence-in-kenya-january-31-2008_10767.html (downloaded 19 June 2008)
18
country.33 More than 1000 people had lost their lives, and over
300,000 displaced.34
POINTS OF NOTE:
1. Being that the Secretary General and other envoys were already
engaging in talks with Mr Kibaki and Mr Odinga, these diplomatic
efforts must be considered R2P.
2. However, the fact that R2P was only verbally mentioned when
hundreds of people had lost their lives means that it has not yet
become grounded within the Security Council, the primary organ
that needs to be most attentive to it.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=25534&Cr=kenya&Cr1=&Kw1=Kenya&Kw2=&Kw3
(downloaded 19 June 2008)
34
Ibid.
19
Great Lakes Region (Great Lakes Pact) in Dec 2006, Protocol on Non-
Aggression and Mutual Defence says countries can act with notice to
the AU and SC.
QUESTIONS:
How many more people need to lose their lives before the Security
Council holds a discussion on halting the killings? (ICISS had
recommended the GA define one).
20
attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their
homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.
August 2008.
35
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary General, Geneva 25 January 2005, 4.
21
Resources:
http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?
serviceID=23&fileid=BD05098C-2A1C-A7AC-9796-
19E4BE38F0B8&lng=en
5. AU Constitutive Act -
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm
22
7. Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military
Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace
Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, September 2006.
(Downloadable for free at http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=346)
36
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
(ALNAP)
23
13. New ICC Prosecution: Opportunities and Risks for Peace in Sudan – ICG
website
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5572&m=1
16. ICRC fact sheets: Punishing War Crimes: International Tribunals; The
Statute of the International Criminal Court; International Humanitarian
Law and International Human Rights Law (attached).
24