 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 Marcos, petitioner VS.
VS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 1) 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to
prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
3.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision
are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of
the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
1. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s
responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
2. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to
die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
 Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not
 been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is
Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can
exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US).
This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation
whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/
that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
 Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
 Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as
it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within
the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include
the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean
that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of
RA 9189.
 Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s
petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President
under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme
Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential
and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
3.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
 PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004 EN BANC R E S O L U T I O N
Facts:
Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the
Joint Committee. The petition corollary prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint
Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die(w/o date fixed) on
June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said
day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth,
petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress.
ISSUE:
WON the Joint committee performing election canvass even after the termination of congress’ session is
constitutional.
RULING:
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as
it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to petitioner's argument,
however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of
the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner
does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day
recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special
session at any time).Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Similarly, Section 7 provides that"[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years. Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth
Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have “passed out of legal existence. “The
legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public
session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for
and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its
functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it
has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board of
Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and
canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio
 G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close
friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a
bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint.
The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered
by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as
well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of
protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first
time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the
impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. A heap of cases then
succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada
was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said
that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on
the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the
president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not
political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior
his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s
implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-
taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential
seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality
test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no
longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot
claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).
 Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO
averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices
or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
 DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No. 184740
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Bautista was
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated
October 23, 2006 On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as
taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those...
positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC
Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not
occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not require any "further warrant or appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to
be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
Administrator... respondents submit that the petition should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious considering
that Bautista's concurrent designation as MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was... constitutional. There
was no violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent Bautista was merely
designated acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not appointed
MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies
and assistants.
Ruling:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions
are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of
the civil service in general and members of... the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during... their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple... government offices or
employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another... office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is... hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Principles:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure,... directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including... government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or... their subsidiaries.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the... person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. It is said that... appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the... implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the... person
named.
 Funa vs Agra G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as
the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a
congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a
concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as
the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on
August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he
was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on
March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate
Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to
holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to
be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13,
supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to
hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the
language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important
constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power
of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the provision on
secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the
corporations. petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive
stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under the per diems.
Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7,
supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional Issue:
provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the
PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more
than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Held:
Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government 1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the
offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining
Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional
whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of
Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have
a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of
 Bitonio vs COA
Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, After
unless all,otherwise provided
the petitioner attendedin the
thisboard meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directlyasor hisindirectly, practice
representative. any other
If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
There is also no or merit
their insubsidiaries.
the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conductwhen it enacted
of theirNo. 7916,
R.A. office.
four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of
per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
entitledhis tenure be appointed as to receive.
members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the
Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute.
Facts: If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its
effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution.
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting
Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was increased from
meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions, 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board
the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the
Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the
government was declared unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with
Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and the proscription set by the Constitution.
to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an MR
but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.  PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC. v. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, GR NO. 138965
Facts:
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and This action seeks to declare as... null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma
categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal
at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, [2] Article VII and Section 7,... par. 2,[3] Article IX-B of the 1987
law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law Constitution.
be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the
COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of the PCGG.
the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC.
He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived any... remuneration that he may receive as
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was CPLC.[5]
promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings
The resolution of this case had already been overtaken by supervening events. In 2001, the appointees of
former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the appointees of the incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. The present PCGG Chairman is Camilo Sabio,... while the position vacated by the last CPLC, now
Solicitor General Antonio Nachura, has not yet been filled. There no longer exists an actual controversy that
needs to be resolved.
Issues:
However, this case raises a significant legal question as yet unresolved - whether the PCGG Chairman can
concurrently hold the position of CPLC.
The issue in this case is whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the
prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, which provide that: Art. VII .
xxxx
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. x x x
Art. IX-B.
xxxx
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Ruling:
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or... constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.[10]
To harmonize these two provisions, this Court, in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[11]
construed the prohibition against multiple offices contained in Section 7, Article IX-B and Section 13, Article VII
in this... manner:
[T]hus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies... and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is... meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more
than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of
the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review... investigations involving heads of executive departments and
agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the
Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As
CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and
review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as
PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his... impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation
that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
Having thus ruled that Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution enjoins the concurrent appointments of
respondent Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC inasmuch as they are incompatible offices It is clear from the
foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have... the same rank as the latter positions. It must be emphasized, however, that
despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains
covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with the
standard of... compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in
violation of the Constitution. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article
VII without additional compensation in an ex- officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said... officials' office. The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions.
Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which "denotes an... act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office. Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions
of the CPLC, and vice versa. And while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection
with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity The fact
that a separate appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC... negates the premise that
he is acting in an ex-officio capacity. In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo,... that Section 13, Article VII is
applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman
and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one
office do... not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7,
Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective... officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary
functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court partly GRANTS this petition and declares respondent
Magdangal B. Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
costs.
 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five
most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from
political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being
an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until
the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
 Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of
Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation
of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the
COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the
head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the
COA.
 Peter John Calderon vs Bartolome Carale
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA,
such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16,
Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
other officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the
other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.
“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase “and other
officers required by law” at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments” at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide
for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by
the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress
creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for
such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law.
 Jesus Armando Tarrosa vs Gabriel Singson
Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by then president Fidel
Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment and he argued that Singson
cannot perform such position without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the
confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation
by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
 Mary Concepcion-Bautista vs Senator Jovito Salonga
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting
Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista
permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit
certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA
Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR
does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the
acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as
“ad interim”. Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin
on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the
pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm
Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the
President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant
to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among
the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law which
authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it
has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the participation of
the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or
rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the chairman
(chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent
CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of
chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always
permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may be
removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the
earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The
Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is
guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance
of due process.
 RAMON P. BINAMIRA, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.,G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990.
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
Facts:
In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on
April 7, 1986. On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of
the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General
Manager, approved by the President on the same date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had
discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors. On January 2,
1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. On January 4,
1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating him concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a
permanent capacity. Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original
petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the
Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano
was impleaded as additional respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.
Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority
Held:
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for
cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been
appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume
the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the
power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to
him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. “
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when
“performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was true of the designation made by
Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as also happened in the case at bar.
With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation
being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the
position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a
temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a
different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being extended a
permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do
so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later
approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman
because of his position as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the
categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under
Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has
no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
 MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO (G.R. NO. 149036 )
Facts:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was
reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made
appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the
pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of
their appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing
petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the
right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issue:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character
Ruling: NO.
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also
run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not
provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away
with ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the year
except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935
Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government
services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad
interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President
to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify
and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment
which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to
nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or
designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were
extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed
by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that
take effect immediately.
 Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting
capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment
of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission
on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the
undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292
itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing
those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such
power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this
case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess,
GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to
make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose
the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot
impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity
 Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. Nos. 225973,
225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
 Ad Interim Appointments Appointments in an Acting Capacity
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land
It is a permanent appointment because it takes Acting appointments are a way of of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte
effect immediately and can no longer be temporarily filling important offices but, decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There
withdrawn by the President once the appointee if abused, they can also be a way of being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision
Description
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject circumventing the need for on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
to confirmation by the COA does not alter its confirmation by the Commission on
permanent character (Matibag vs Benipayo) Appointments. Locus standi
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because they
failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of
When Marcos at the LNMB.
Upon Acceptance by Appointee Upon Acceptance by Appointee
Effective
Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing
that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution,
the laws or jurisprudence.
When Made When Congress is in recess Any time when there is vacancy
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury which they may
suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups,
Submitted to such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal
Yes No standing.
the COA

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in time, the interment
("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections. of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine
On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that
Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed.
Bayani. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional
rights.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on the
Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos. As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the burial of Marcos
encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy,
Issues adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of
1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion when the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National
they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB? 375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated the of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to
Constitution, and domestic and international laws? determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision
the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former over the Department of National Defense (DND).
President to interment at the LNMB? Hierarchy of Courts
4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos at While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush
conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines? aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its
Ruling original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to
The Supreme Court denied the petitions. issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

Procedural issues Substantive issues

Political question
I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be
passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the
Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code
of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on
gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client feedback program
Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec.
3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and
nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or
freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions,
there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by
virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is
best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the
rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them.
There is no violation of RA 289.
Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the
National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and
separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's
Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different
from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date,
the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on
National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would
be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB
is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the
view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains.
The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer,
the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people
buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly,
petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of
burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment
have been finalized by public respondents.
No violation of RA 10639 .
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive
as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it
actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims
(HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not
there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into
the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the
law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory
powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the
benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not
amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G
161-375.
There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.
The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are
already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to
the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of
the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the
HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the
Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary
government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating to official
Philippine history.
II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105
P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB
was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is
implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines"
is erroneous because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon
of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has
been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.
Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a
place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does
not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual
or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and
reverence for her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86,
still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the
physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to
administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in
tum, is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in
Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements
entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment
and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific
public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or
executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally
intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a
Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public
use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to
compensate him for valuable public services rendered.
Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his
desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails
over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the
Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the
Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of
their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of
facts.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who
died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or
joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment
or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense;
and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel
who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be
the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even
if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who
were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefore, be sustained for having been
issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter
ego of the President.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that
it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be
considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification
for burial at the LNMB.
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in
the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national
shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to
those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and
historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that
only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."
In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of
eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related activities but also non-
military personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the
widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether
or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be
consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is
indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged
human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief,
but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he
received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as
a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP
Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard because even
if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be interred
therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally
demandable and enforceable.
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not met. 181 In
this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former President. The
conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military. There
is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB
(Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
In addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of
Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an
active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred therein.
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired
veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably
discharged from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is
incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.
The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a military person in
the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up
to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and
retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the
court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful
revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial
review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.
It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA
Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other
than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the
treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising from the
various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or
significance of the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in
public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes
emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear
constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the
people
 ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 189028
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the
National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final
deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro
Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents. Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco,
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as
National Artists. Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the
violation of the right to equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown
that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an
exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is
substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
 G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary
Facts of the Case
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail
the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379 both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of powers. It contends
that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or
attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in
the President who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices, it posits that this broad power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it
cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President to ensure that the
laws, including those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an extension of the
President, and the creation of the NCIP as an “independent agency under the Office of the President.” It thus
argues that since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct
mandates, the President should respect that legislative disposition. In fine, AMIN contends that any
reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.
AMIN argues that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can be no policy and program
coordination between conceptually different areas of reform (NCIP and DAR). It claims that the new framework
subsuming agrarian reform, urban land reform and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally incoherent in view
of the widely different contexts. And it posits that it is a substantive transformation or reorientation that runs
contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies.
AMIN argues that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to encompass
NCIP and PCUP, and that how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be undermined by mere executive
orders in the guise of administrative efficiency.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO
i. Whether or not the AMIN has locus standi
- Yes. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes that AMIN has the
requisite legal standing to file this suit as member of Congress. a member of the House of Representatives
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.
ii. Whether or not MDOI has locus standi
- No. MDOI, a registered people’s organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and
South Upi in the province of Maguindanao, alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIP’s
becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain claims. It fears that
transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the processing of ancestral domain claims filed by its
members. An examination of MDOI’s nebulous claims of “negative impact” and “probable setbacks” shows
that they are too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers
between the challenged action and alleged injury is too attenuated. Vague propositions that the
implementation of the assailed orders will work injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe
MDOI with the requisite standing. Neither would its status as a “people’s organization” vest it with the legal
standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.
iii. Whether or not it is legal to place the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the
supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under
the DAR as an attached agency
- Yes. The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to
carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
- In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws
and jurisprudence on the subject.[27] It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which
places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize.
- Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 31
- As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines, the challenged executive orders may not be said
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
- Finally, in transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President effectively tempered the
exercise of presidential authority and considerably recognized that degree of independence. The
Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into (1) supervision and control, (2)
administrative supervision, and (3) attachment. With respect to the third category, it has been held that an
attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than
one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by
the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for
“policy and program coordination.” Indeed, the essential autonomous character of a board is not negated by
its attachment to a commission.
Additional Notes:
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not something implausible or unlikely.
Their interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the
members of the President’s official family.
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Any reasonable doubt should, following the universal rule of legal hermeneutics, be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a law
 LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, GR No. 192935
Facts:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his
sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To
transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. In particular, it
shall:... a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;... b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it
has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch,
including government-owned or controlled... corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other
papers;... c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the Commission;
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers... and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in... disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it
is... a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions. Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to
a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their... work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered
by the State
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission"
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice... created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Main contention of the petitioners on the validity of the truth commission In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935,
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be
presumed[32] since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth... commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth
commission considering the aforesaid provision merely... uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer,"
"consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the
Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent... with the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional...
and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to... any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.
Ruling:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of... economy or redundancy of functions. These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected.
The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the...
answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
"restructure"- an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of... the structure of the
Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power of control. Control is essentially
the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the... former with that of the latter
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his... inherent duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public
office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then
President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the... administrative structure of the national government
including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree,
embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution.
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by
P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws... are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him
in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,... fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to
conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
or... in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain
to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds... it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that
do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's... foreign relations
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of... the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above,
the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that... all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the... former used the offices and facilities
of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief
Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption
and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in
the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of... persons who come before it.
It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering... the same law."
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be... considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and... definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that
the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]
The... function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman
At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit... trial courts.
The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991,
the Ombudsman retains concurrent... jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to
investigate complaints against local elective officials.
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC's
sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is... limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In
this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court
finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,... Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and... corruption during the previous administration"[87] only. The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal... protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is
of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under
the laws should not in any way be... circumvented.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered... in the future. Such expanded mandate of
the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include
them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive
Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."[
The president has the authority to create the committee; however EO1 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the constitution
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal
City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the
DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same.
 Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals
● Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but
merely those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the
courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
● Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure.
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in
1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent
of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to
security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and
not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner
to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications
and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject
reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned)
job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no
period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative
of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers
which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183
SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent,
it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away
from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in
the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the
order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.
 DADOLE VS COA
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to
RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be
reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from
the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X
of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials
were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can
be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
 DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN v. RONALDO PUNO, GR No. 190259
Facts:
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,[1] placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat... and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless... violence" in the named places.
Administrative Order 273 (AO 273 "transferring" supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to
issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A)
amending the former, by "delegating" instead of "transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG
PETITIONERS. The President... gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative
supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[
RESPONDENTS... to restore peace and order in subject places.[RESPONDENT... merely delegated through
AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way
Issues:
Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence... factual bases
Ruling:
We dismiss the petition.
DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
The calling out of the armed forces to... prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,... it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts
the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President's exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis.
OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President's decision to call out the armed forces, as
follows... the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
o pacify the people's fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.
Principles:
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on
her... wisdom
The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution... it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts
the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.