MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.
, fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Laurel, J.:
Doctrine:
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation
of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State
Facts
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen
and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
against the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the
National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm
to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the director of
Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
the adoption
of.Themeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in p
ursuance of the provisions of thecommonwealth Act No. 548 w
hich authorizes said Director with the approval from thesecretar
y of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules
and regulations toregulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended
to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and
the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well
Issue
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion?
Held
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of
the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
*JUST IN CASE ATTY. LAVS ASK ABOUT SOCIAL JUSTICE
Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. Social
justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
U.S. Supreme Court
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
No. 70-18
Doctrine
Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Facts
Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished
to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly
situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas
statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to
save the life of the mother. Texas statutes made it a crime to
procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane
Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent
defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the
statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and
pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion
by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by
the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to
afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion.
Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women
similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal
privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue
Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right
possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal
marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the
people by the Ninth Amendment?
Held
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of
relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes
generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At
common law abortion performed before quickening (the first
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an
indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a
firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a
quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment
of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product
of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct,
but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the abortion
procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques
have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe
particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is
somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot
be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may
not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably
related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in
promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may
regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary
for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s
interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
Due process is required notwithstanding how seriousness of
the judgement and evidence of guilt
Winston F. Garcia V. Mario I. Molina And Albert M. Velasco
G.R. No. 157383 August 10, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts: Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of
the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda dated May 23,
2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
These acts, according to petitioner, were committed in
open betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in
outright defiance of the Rules and
Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the same
Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to submit their
verified answer within seventy two (72) hours. Considering the
gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the
preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days
without pay, effective immediately.The following day, a
committee was constituted to investigate the charges against
respondents.
In their Answer dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the
charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was
motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them
falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for
lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their
opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and
judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order. They contended that the acts they allegedly
committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct.
Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the
complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time,
respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer
Investigation to This Commission.
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to
submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and
required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.
Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve
respondents' motions.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special
civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking the annulment
and setting aside of petitioner's order directing the former to
submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and
investigate the administrative case filed against them and
prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be prohibited from
conducting the
scheduled hearing and from taking any action on the aforesaid
administrative case against respondents.
CA, rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.
Issue: W/O the respondents were fully adcorded the requisite
opportunity to be heard, were in fact heard and being heard,
and whether the conduct of preliminary investigation in
administrative proceedings is an essential requisite to the
conduct of adjudication.
Ruling: No, The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing
a formal charge against an erring employee, to wit:
First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official
or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in
cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the
complaint need not be under oath. Except when otherwise
provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at
anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities.
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit
Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from
receipt.
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation
involves the ex parte examination of records and documents
submitted by the complainant and the person complained of,
as well as documents readily available from other government
offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the
opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure
of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall
be considered as a waiver thereof.
Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the
termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating
officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete
records of the case to the disciplining authority.
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established
during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the
disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the
absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be
dismissed.
In this case, the CSC Rules may does not specifically provide
that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary
investigation is null and void. However, as clearly outlined
above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form
and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the
person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment
under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word
"shall" quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the
opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be
gleaned from the procedure set forth above, this is done prior
to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required
therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by
respondents. Contrary to petitioner's claim, no exception is
provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in
flagrante as claimed by petitioner.
It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative
cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before
the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the
formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the
petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima
facie case against respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an
unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act
complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We,
therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process
of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are
serious and evidence of their guilt is - in the opinion of their
superior - strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this
case. The filing by petitioner of
formal charges against the respondents without complying with
the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's
right to due process.
Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be
assailed directly or indirectly at any time.
Guiani v Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 146897-917, August 6, 2002
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay.
FACTS:
The Commission on Audit (ARMM) instituted a
complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act against regional officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-
ARMM. Subsequently, criminal informations were filed against
petitioners before the Sandiganbayan. However, the
Sandiganbayan, not being persuaded by the report, directed
the prosecution to submit adequate proof of the existence of
probable cause within sixty days.
After almost six years, in this petition thereof, petitioners argue
that the delay in the resolution of the complaint against them by
the Ombudsman violated their constitutional right to speedy
trial; hence, the criminal cases against them should be
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal cases should be
dismissed on the ground of a violation of right to speedy trial?
RULING:
No, the criminal cases should not be dismissed on the
ground of a violation of right to speedy trial.
Well-settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of
cases is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
As meticulously detailed by the Ombudsman above,
the period of time that elapsed during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in this case was warranted by the
sequence of events. Because of the complexity of the
transactions complained of which were contained in a two-
page report from the COA, the Graft Investigation Officer (GIO)
sought further substantiation of the allegations therein and
requested for the complete report of the COA Special Audit
Office.
The records of this case also show that petitioners raised their
objections to the resolution of the complaints against them only
on September 27, 1999 (almost a year) when they filed their
Omnibus Motion with the Sandiganbayan. It would appear,
therefore, that petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in
the proceedings.
Given the particular facts of this case, we find that there was
no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the
preliminary investigation.
Therefore, petitioners right to speedy disposition of the case
was not infringed and the criminal proceedings shall be further
conducted.