Page 1 of 85

G.R. No. 91116 January 24, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONARDO GERONES, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Custodio P. Cañete for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

For the rape of Liliosa Gargantilla, a mental retardate, a complaint was filed on September 10, 1986 against Calixto Raga alias "Calix"
and Leonardo Gerones alias "Nanding or Narding". The complaint was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Palo, Leyte. After
preliminary investigation, the Municipal Trial Court, finding the existence of probable cause forwarded the records to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte.

An information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte charging Leonardo Gerones and Calixto Raga with the
crime of rape. The information reads:

That on or about the 30th day of August, 1986, in the Municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent and with lewd designs, and by means of threats and intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon which
Leonardo Gerones had provided himself for the purpose, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously dragged ( sic) and
pushed (sic) Liliosa Gargantilla to Calixto Raga who had carnal knowledge on said Liliosa Gargantilla, against her will and
consent. (p. 15, Original Records)

Both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial proceeded and a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds clear evidence convincing beyond reasonable doubt that the accused LEONARDO GERONES
and CALIXTO RAGA are guilty of the crime of rape and are hereby sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua and both are
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Liliosa Gargantilla the sum of P25,000.00 by way of damages. (p. 6, Decision)
Page 2 of 85

From the aforementioned decision, both the accused appealed. However, only accused Gerones filed his brief. He specifically assigns
the following as error allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT, LEONARDO GERONES GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE IN IMPOSING UPON SAID APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND ORDERING HIM TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE LATE LILIOSA GARGANTILLA THE SUM OF TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P25,000.00) BY WAY OF DAMAGES, AND ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING SAID APPELLANT INSTEAD.

It is a rule in rape cases that sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason constitutes rape. (People v. Estrebella, 164
SCRA 114 [1988]; People v. Asturias, 134 SCRA 405 [1985]). This is because while, as in this case, the woman may be 22 years old,
her mental capacity may be that of a nine or ten year old child. Hence, she is incapable of giving consent to the sexual intercourse
(People v. Sunga, 137 SCRA 131 [1985]). The necessity of proof beyond reasonable doubt of force or intimidation having been applied
is absent.

The accused-appellant contends that the complaint did not give jurisdiction to the trial court the same having been signed by a mentally
incompetent woman. Initially, a complaint was filed with the barangay captain by Francisco Gargantilla, the victim's father. Rule 110,
Section 5 also provides that in the case of a deceased or incapacitated person, the State may initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor, the complaint initiated by the father, and the complaint filed by the offended party
herself sufficiently confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

The records show that the victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and consistently. The trial court found Liliosa
to have the mental capacity of a ten year old. We are convinced that a ten year old girl can adequately narrate facts which show that
she has been raped. Thus, the trial court observed: ". . . In the overall, she was able to communicate that the man who is not blind and
the man without eyes helped each other in deflowering her thru force and intimidation. Her narration was crude but she managed to
communicate the traumatic incident" (p. 2, RTC Decision).

Hence, the trial court concluded:

. . . The court observed Liliosa closely when she took the witness stand and the court found that she comprehend ( sic) how the rape
was done to her which in the opinion of this court is sufficient in extent. (ibid)

The case of People v. Rizo, G.R. No. 86743, August 30, 1990 places the determination of the competency of witnesses to testify in the
hands of the trial court. As repeatedly held by this Court, the factual findings of the trial court as to the guilt of the accused, particularly
the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies are accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge who has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses as they present the same. (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, December 29, 1989; People v.
Ramos, 167 SCRA 476 [1988])
Page 3 of 85

Moreover, while the psychiatry report states that the victim cannot be expected to be a capable witness, at the same time it admitted
that Liliosa can comprehend the nature of her acts under a limited extent. The same report concludes that she is verbally productive
although she talks in incomplete sentences at times. What is required by the rules merely is that the witness is able to make her
perception known to others. Thus, Rule 130, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court states: "Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. . . .

Considering the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Liliosa Gargantilla is a competent witness. There is likewise no reason to
doubt her credibility as she had no motive to testify against the accused (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989] citing People v.
Ocampo, 143 SCRA [1986]). No motive can be ascribed to complainant or to her father and step-mother other than a desire for justice
and redress for a terrible wrong. (See People v. Cayago, 158 SCRA 586 [1988]). She was a poor barrio girl with the mental capacity of
a 10-year old, inexperienced to the ways of the world. It is highly improbable that she would fabricate matters and impute the crime
unless it was true (People v. Baao, 142 SCRA 476 [1986]).

The accused further claims that the evidence presented is against its commission. The finding was that she was negative for
spermatozoa and the laceration was old.

We held in the case of People v. Paringit, G.R. No. 83947, September 13, 1990 that "the presence or absence of traces of spermatozoa
is too immaterial, since it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that makes for rape (People v. Somera, 170 SCRA 428
[1989]).

As to the laceration, which the defense claims is old and could not have been inflicted on the date of the rape as it appears in the
Information, the same has been sufficiently explained by the findings of Dr. Perez that "Liliosa is disoriented as to time and person."
There is therefore, a great possibility that the rape was committed earlier than the date which Liliosa has given. The absence of
precision in stating the time of the crime is understandable (People v. Fajardo, 151 SCRA 696 [1987]).

What is decisive in the rape charge is the complainant's positive identification of the accused-appellants as the malefactors (People v.
Mustacisa, 159 SCRA 227 [1987]). The victim was even able to testify that only one actually had sexual intercourse with her and that
was the blind, man while the other man who was not blind held her and pointed a knife at her while the former was raping her.

Equally important in the consideration of the case are the subsequent actuations of the appellant and his co-accused which constitute
an admission of guilt on their part.

Accused Raga offered marriage to the victim which the latter, however, turned down. There was likewise an attempt to amicably settle
the case for the amount of P1,500.00.

Not a few number of cases have established that an offer of marriage is considered an admission of guilt of the accused (People v.
Valdez, 150 SCRA 405 [1987]; People v. Aragona, 138 SCRA 569 [1985]).
Page 4 of 85

The defense of alibi of the appellants is not worthy of belief. Gerones claims that he went to see a movie with a friend but neither of
them was able to remember the movie nor was able to narrate the same.

Raga, on the other hand, admitted that he worked for Gerones 2 days prior to the rape incident but that he was no longer in the vicinity
on August 30. This alibi does not likewise inspire belief As the Solicitor General pointed out, if there is need for cooking the coconuts to
copra the following day, he could have attended and helped in the last phase of the work which was on August 30.

The defense put up by the accused must fail. The Court has consistently held that the alibi of the accused that he was not at the rape
scene cannot stand against the positive identifications made by the complainant (People v. Soriano, 122 SCRA 740 [1983]; People v.
Deus, 136 SCRA 660 [1985]).

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the judgment of the court a quo by finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape and,
therefore, must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with the modification that the accused must indemnify the heirs of the late
Liliosa Gargantilla, as held in recent cases, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101208 July 3, 1992

Page 5 of 85

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HENRY TOMENTOS Y RUBIO, accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 43, Hon. Daniel B. Bernaldez, presiding, in
Criminal Case No. 8908 convicting the accused of the crime of Rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua "with
the accessory penalties provided for by law and to recognize and support the child Mary Joy until she reaches the age of majority.
Accused is further sentenced to pay Salvacion Cabahug P10,000.00 as moral damages and the cost of the proceedings."

A complaint dated September 11, 1989 was filed thru Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Rodrigo V. Icao, charging accused-appellant with
raping the aforementioned victim Salvacion Cabahug, as follows:

That the undersigned accuses Henry Tomentos y Rubio of the crime of Rape committed as follows:

That on the month of March, 1989 in Tampocon I. Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned (SALVACION
CABAHUG) against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dumaguete City, Philippines, September 11, 1989.

(SGD) SALVACION CABAHUG

(Complainant)

Upon arraignment on October 27, 1989, the accused pleaded NOT GUILTY, and trial commenced in the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete, Branch 30. Later, thru motion of the counsel for the accused, the presiding judge inhibited himself voluntarily from further
proceeding with the case and the case was reraffled to Branch 43.

During the trial, the prosecution adduced the testimonies of ten (10) witnesses: (1) Dr. Angel V. Somera, an expert who specialized in
UP-PGH
Page 6 of 85

repsychiatry and nervous disorders; (2) Dr. Julio L. Abella, the Municipal Health Officer; (3) Victoria Olaera, the auntie of the victim; (4)
Dominador Cabahug, the father of the victim; (5) Felicisima Jabellana, the owner of the house operation Betamax (films); (6) Salvacion
Cabahug, the victim; (7) Romulo Faburada, a cousin of the victim (8) Dalger Germodo, the police investigator; (9) Otilio Gimang, the
Court Interpreter of Branch 30 and relative of the accused; and (10) Patrolman Mariano Vergara III, the serving officer of the Ayungon
Police.

The prosecution has established that the accused is in his early fifties, married, with eight (8) children; the town bully and a notorious
police character with documented nine (9) settled and pending cases filed aside from those cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
ranging from Frustrated Homicides, Physical Injuries, Thefts, Trespass to Dwelling and Rape; that the accused and the victim are
neighbors; that the victim is a 21-year-old girl with the mind of an 8-10 years old girl, and an IQ of 55-69%; that the victim spent three
(3) years in grade I being really a mental retardee and able to pass Grade V with 75% average which was only made possible because
she was always present in school and with the teachers as her relatives; that she is not inclined to verbal communication and it sent to
buy something from the store, a list of things to buy is written in a piece of paper clipped together with the money; that she does not
comb her hair nor take a bath not even cleaning herself even during menstruation periods unless told to do so; that these and more
proofs of her being mentally-retarded were confirmed by a series of psychoneuroses examinations conducted by a medical expert (Dr.
Somera); that one evening, around March of 1989, the victim was viewing a Betamax film in the house of one Eniod; that she felt the
call of nature and she went outside the house to urinate, at the banana groves; that she was followed by the accused who threatened
her with a long stainless kitchen knife about 9 1/2 inches in length with which she was threatened with the knife; that she was forced to
lie down and her panty removed; that with the knife placed at her breast, she could not do anything but submit to the forced sexual
intercourse which the accused successfully carried on; that thereafter, she was told firmly never to tell anybody about the matter
otherwise, she will be killed by the accused; that the rape was repeated later on; that one day, a local "hilot" (midwife) called the auntie
of the victim and informed her that the victim is from five to six months pregnant; that the auntie immediately summoned the victim and
elicited the name of the person responsible for the pregnancy; that perhaps due to fear of the accused and the state of mind of the
mentally retarded victim, the auntie had a hard time persuading the former to confess as to what really transpired; that when it was
found out from the victim that it was the town bully who raped her, the auntie sent for the father of the victim and advised him not to
resort to any kind of violence due to the family shame brought about by the pregnancy of the victim who was mercilessly raped despite
her being deprived of a normal mind/reason; that the family lost no time in seeking help from the authorities and a complaint was filed
signed by the victim herself; that a subpoena was sent to the accused who just laughed it off and did not sign the paper he was
supposed to sign although requested by the police serving officer to do so; that one of the children of the accused, the midwife named
Irma Tomentos set a conference between the relatives of the accused — the father, (mother was long ago dead), the relative (uncle-
court interpreter), and others, with the victim herself, for the purpose of settling the case amicably; that the meeting/conference failed
because the accused vehemently denied raping the victim and did not apologize to the family; that the accused suggested a
confrontation with the three (3) other "boars"/barako or boys who were also neighbors of the victim but also her relatives; that the
accused told the investigating police officer that a paper with his name and the three (3) summoned boys be written and the list be
given to the victim who will check the name of the one who raped her since she would not utter verbally the name of the rapist during
the investigation but would merely look and gaze and stare at the accused-Henry Tomentos; that the name of the accused was the one
checked by the victim; that still the accused denied; that on October 30 or 31, 1989, a baby girl was delivered by the victim; after the
Page 7 of 85

baby was born, the victim was able to answer categorically and in a clear manner the circumstances of the rape committed on her
person and pointed at the accused inside the court session hall.

The defense merely denied participation and kept on insisting that perhaps one of the boys he requested to be summoned did it; that
when the victim kept merely looking, staring and gazing at him when they were investigated at the police headquarters, he requested
that a piece of paper be given to the victim with all their four (4) names in it; that his name was the one checked and pointed to as the
rapist by the victim when the list aforementioned was given to the accused; that he tried to make it appear that the meeting was
organized by his daughter Irma was set up by the father and relatives of the accused to extort money from him for the amicable
settlement of the case.

The counsel of the accused-appellant, in his futile attempt to exonerate the accused assigned the following errors in his brief, that the
lower court erred in: — (1) granting the prosecution the right to ask leading questions; (2) not giving significance to the testimony of the
prosecution witness Dr. Angel Somera that complainant's retardation is of the mild degree only; (3) appreciating that the revelation of
the identity of accused by complainant was voluntary, spontaneous, candid and innocent; (4) not acquitting accused despite failure of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt its unfounded claim of paternity; (5) pronouncing that the discrepancy between the
affidavit and testimony of complainant is insubstantial and immaterial; and (6) giving substantial credence to the highly improbable,
inconsistent and orchestrated testimony of complaint.

These will all be discussed all together being inevitably interlinked with one another.

There was no denial whatsoever on the part of the defense of all the other allegations established by the prosecution like the string of
cases the accused has with the regional trial court in their place which is aside from numerous other cases filed at the municipal trial
court, ranging from rape, physical injuries, frustrated homicides, robberies, and many others. With the kind of character the accused
has, even a maiden of normal mind and average intelligence quotient will definitely be intimidated. There should therefore be no more
question as to why the poor and miserable mentally retarded victim Salvacion Cabahug failed to report at once the violation of her
womanhood.

At this juncture, it is imperative that a reminder be made that this Court is not a trier of facts and that as to the credibility of the
witnesses, much respect and weight, are given the trial courts, the presiding judges there, having been given the opportunity and the
chances of having observed the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying and therefore are the ones with the best positions to
decide as to the truthfulness or falsity of any testimony in cases like this one (Peo v. Ancheta, 60 SCRA 333)

Anent some leading questions having been allowed by the court during the direct-examination of the victim, the same is allowed in
cases of "witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeblemind, or a deaf-mute" (Section 5, Rule 132, Rules of Court).
The victim has been convincingly, categorically and scientifically proven to be a mentally retarded woman, who is likened to that of a
mind of 8 to 10 years old, and a very dull girl ("kulang-kulang"), thus entitled to some leading questions.
Page 8 of 85

Immaterial and insubstantial lapses as to the exact date or dates and minor details in the victim's testimonies should not be
exaggerated and taken against the victim. These things are expected from a mental retardate (People v. Palma, 144 SCRA 236).

The medical expert on mental health, Dr. Angel Somera, has proven that the victim does not have hallucinations, is in touch with reality,
no fantasies but only has the tendency to convey thoughts through some body language like checking the name of the accused and
looking/gazing only at the accused for quite a time when he was seated side by side with the three (3) other suspected boys in the
locality. This makes her a competent witness as she can convey her ideas in many forms like signs, writings and body gestures, aside
from words (People v. Reglos, 118 SCRA 344).

The denial of the accused cannot be given credence. His house is very near the place where the rape was perpetrated. It would be
presposterous to assume that a guileless barrio woman and whose intelligence is admittedly low, could hove fabricated this grave
charge or that her father and relatives would go into the trouble of having her medically examined, physically and even mentally, for
several sessions and all the way — going to court, spending much time, effort and money, as they are very poor; and advertising to the
whole world that the victim Salvacion "Vacion" Cabahug had been raped, if the charge was merely invested" and if the supposed-father
(the accused) which is considered a shame to any family is not really the rapist (People v. Olmedillo, 11 SCRA 193).

It is not illogical to think that only a man of abnormal sexual appetite or a sadistic maniac like the accused, could have the nerve to rape
a mental-retardee. The pitiful victim, easily coerced and cowed into submission thru intimidation by the accused here is not far removed
from that of an eleven-year-old with whom voluntary carnal intercourse is considered rape (People v. Garcines alias Nene, No. L-32321,
June 28, 1974, 70 O.G. 43 9103).

A meticulous study of the whole record of this case including the transcripts of stenographic notes inevitably leads to the conclusion that
the guilt of the accused has been proven to be beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification of an award of civil indemnity which is hereby increased in
the amount of P50,000.00 in line with existing precedents.
Page 9 of 85

G.R. No. 94702 October 2, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLITO ACUÑA, JESUS RAMOS and ANTONIO (TONY) DIONISIO, defendants.

JESUS RAMOS and ANTONIO (TONY) DIONISIO, defendant-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners Jesus Ramos and Antonio (Tony) Dionisio appeal from the Decision of May 22, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 20,1 in Criminal Case No. 528-M convicting them of the crime of murder for the killing of Tranquilino Mariano and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ramos and Dionisio were charged together with one Carlito Acuña in an information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Calumpit, province of Bulacan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill one Tranquilino Mariano,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with a bladed instrument, and
use personal violence on the said Tranquilino Mariano hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing
him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Ramos and Dionisio were arrested and detained on April 17, 1989 while Acuña remains at large. The following day Ramos and Dionisio
filed an urgent motion for admission to bail. A hearing was conducted and on June 1, 1989, the trial court denied the motion. On June
28, 1989 Ramos and Dionisio were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. 2 Evidence presented at said hearing was
automatically reproduced at the trial on the merits of the case, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

The record shows that on November 20 and 21, 1988, Acuña, Ramos and Dionisio went to the house of Tranquilino Mariano in Pungo,
Calumpit, Bulacan. On both occasions, Mariano declined the invitation of the trio to go with them. Between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock in the
Page 10 of 85

evening of November 22, 1988, the three came back and Acuña asked the permission of Virginia, Mariano's wife, to allow Mariano to go
with them. Mariano then left the house with the three while Virginia went to sleep.

Around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Victoria Magaña and Luisa Blanco were on their way home from Monumento, Caloocan City. Since
they were the only passengers left, the jeepney driver took them to the point nearest their respective residences (" inihatid"). As they
alighted from the jeepney in front of the house of Ramos, they saw from a distance of two arms length, Ramos, Acuña, Dionisio and
Mariano quarelling at the "pasibi" of the house of Ramos. They both saw Acuña hit the head of Mariano with a "dos por dos" piece of
wood while Ramos and Dionisio were holding the right and left hands of Mariano, respectively. As Mariano fell, the three, all armed with
bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Mariano. Afraid, the two women went home.

On or about 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of November 23, 1988, while heeding the call of nature, Precy Bautista went out of her
house. As she was passing through the terrace on her way to the comfort room outside, she saw Ramos, Dionisio and another person
who was "small, thin and black," dragging a person whom she learned the following day to be Mariano.

Mariano's body was discovered by an unidentified person. It was brought to a funeral parlor where Dr. Juanito B. Sacdalan conducted
an autopsy. Dr. Sacdalan found that Mariano sustained twelve (12) stab wounds, six (6) in front of his body and six (6) at the back.
Mariano also had a hematoma on the left eye which might have been caused by a blow from a "hard" object. 3 He certified that 31-year-
old Mariano died from multiple stab wounds, punctured lungs and a cut carotid artery. 4

Virginia Mariano, the victim's wife, testified that she spent around P10,000 for the week-long wake for her deceased husband, P6,500
for his funeral service and P4,000 for his tomb and marker ("nitso" and "lapida"). In following up the prosecution of the case, she spent
around P5,000.5

The defense interposed simple denial. Dionisio, 24 years old, testified that on November 23, 1988, he saw the prone body of Mariano
with his face towards the field, his right hand on his back and his feet on the shoulder of the road. Mariano was wearing t-shirt, pants
and slippers. His body was found three Meralco posts away from the house of Ramos which was located on the left side of the highway
going to Pulilan, Bulacan.

For his part, 44-year-old Ramos testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 22, 1988, Mariano went to his house
inquiring whether or not his brother-in-law, Rodolfo Acuña, who was Mariano' s friend, had already been found. Mariano was riding a
bicycle when he left Ramos' house at about 8:00 o'clock. The next morning, he saw the lifeless body of Mariano by the side of the
highway. The bicycle was near Mariano's body, more or less fifty meters away from the house of Mariano's mother-in-law, Leoning
Sorbito.

On May 22, 1990, the trial court rendered the aforementioned decision convicting Ramos and Dionisio of the crime of murder for the
killing of Mariano. Hence, the instant appeal which hinges on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Page 11 of 85

This Court has always adhered to the rule that where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the
trial court unless certain facts have been overlooked which, if considered, would affect the result of the case. The trial judge is, after all,
in a better position to decide the question having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 6 A thorough poring over the records of the case at bench has not yielded any reason to depart from this rule
on credibility so as to warrant reversal of the trial court's findings and conclusions. However, in the interest of justice, the contentions of
appellants branding as contrary to human nature the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, shall be considered individually.

Appellants assert that, assuming the eyewitnesses' account to be true, it is highly incredible that they had not sensed the presence of
Luisa Blanco and Victoria Magaña at the crucial time that the crime was being committed considering the distance of two arms length
between them and said witnesses. However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be that appellants and Acuña
were so engrossed in the assault upon Mariano that they failed to notice the arrival and presence of other persons in the area.
Moreover, there was a "gumamela" plant between the appellants and the witnesses which had been planted in such a way that while
the witnesses could see the incident and observe what transpired, the appellants, preoccupied as they were in committing the criminal
act, failed to notice them in turn. 7

While it is true that Victoria Magaña and Luisa Blanco are first cousins (not sisters as alleged by appellants), and also first cousins of
the victim, their respective fathers being the brothers of the victim's mother, 8 such relationship alone need not affect their credibility.
There is nothing in our laws that disqualifies relatives of the victim from testifying in a criminal case involving said victim as long as said
relatives who were actually present at the scene of the crime, witnessed its execution. 9 Furthermore, the absence of evidence showing
possible ill motive on the part of prosecution eyewitnesses Victoria and Luisa in testifying against appellants raises the presumption that
they were not so moved. Therefore, their testimonies must be given full faith and credit. 10

That they failed to report the incident immediately to the victim's wife is explained by the fact that they feared for their lives because the
appellants were locally known troublemakers who would intimidate people once they fell under the influence of liquor. 11 Their initial
reluctance in getting involved in the criminal investigation and prosecution is understandable. We take judicial notice of the fact that
when their townmates are implicated in a criminal case, most people turn reticent. They do not promptly report the incident for fear of
reprisal. Such reticence has in fact been declared as not affecting credibility. 12

In the same manner, the credibility of prosecution witness Precy Bautista may not be affected. Failing to find a reason strong enough to
discredit her, appellants claim that her testimony is flawed by the six-month delay before she volunteered her testimony. However,
regardless of such testimony, the prosecution's case remains on solid ground relating as it does to a matter transpiring after the actual
commission of the crime and dovetailing with the account of the two eyewitnesses. One witness less on a circumstantial matter cannot
possibly reverse a finding of guilt inasmuch as the testimony of a lone credible eyewitness, absent signs of impropriety or falsehood,
suffices to convict an accused. 13

Appellants cite alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which they insist should be
considered in their favor. Thus, they point to the testimony of Dr. Sacdalan that the victim sustained stab wounds both in front and at the
Page 12 of 85

back of his body, which is allegedly contrary to the prosecution eyewitnesses' account that the victim was stabbed several times after
he had fallen on the ground. They believe that it would have been impossible for the victim to suffer stab wounds on his back unless his
body was rolled over before it was stabbed. We find, however, that this alleged inconsistency is a minor one that cannot detract from
the prosecution's evidence on the stabbing of the victim. The transcripts show that the eyewitnesses did not categorically state that after
he was hit by a piece of wood, the victim immediately collapsed. Rather, it was after the victim had been hit on the head several times
by Acuña that he fell. 14 As such, the possibility that even before the victim fell, the assailants had begun stabbing him, cannot be
discounted. After all, in the scuffle, the stabbing could not have been perpetrated in slow motion, such that each movement of the
protagonists could be delineated with precision. It is sufficient that the manner of stabbing is congruent to the stab wounds found on the
body of the victim.

The fact that Dr. Sacdalan found only one hematoma on the victim's left eye which could have been caused by the blow of a blunt
object is not contradictory to the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony that the victim's head was hit several times. There is no definitive
testimony that all the "several" blows of the "dos por dos" which were inflicted by Acuña landed on the victim. It is possible that while
Acuña swung the piece of wood a number of times, only one hit his left eye, producing the hematoma referred to in Dr. Sacdalan's
findings.

Appellants also capitalize on the testimony of Dr. Sacdalan that when he autopsied the body of the victim at around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of November 23, 1988, rigor mortis had not yet set in. According to Dr. Sacdalan, cadaveral rigidity or rigor mortis normally sets
in within three to six hours from death. Thus, appellants assert that the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony that the crime transpired
between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the evening of November 22, 1988 could not possibly be true. It should be remembered, however,
that while the testimony of Dr. Sacdalan was accepted by both the prosecution and the defense as that of an expert, his conclusions
were merely tentative. It devolved upon the defense to prove that the victim died instantaneously after the assault. Since there is no
proof regarding the exact time of expiration of the victim, it is possible that he might not have died immediately thereafter. Moreover,
even Dr. Sacdalan admitted that his opinion on the time rigor mortis sets in is not a hard and fast rule which applies in all cases of death
because several factors have to be taken into account. 15

As such, these alleged inconsistencies may be regarded as minor ones which do not affect appellants' guilt or innocence. On the
contrary, contradicting statements on minor details may very well be considered badges of candor instead of determinative of the
credibility of eyewitnesses. 16 Inconsistencies which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory tend to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses because they erase any suspicion of a prior rehearsal. What is important is that the testimonies
reenforce each other on the essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to
make a consistent and coherent
17
whole.

In their defense, appellants did not resort to alibi but on bare denial which constitutes self-serving negative evidence. This cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 18 Firm is the rule
Page 13 of 85

that an affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may not remember
exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial. 19

Appellants' reliance on the oft-quoted line that a "guilty man flees even if no one pursues him while the innocent stands bold as a lion,"
sounds more like a whimper of desperation than a strong assertion of innocence. That an accused proved that he stayed to watch
nonchalantly the outcome of his culpability does not negate his guilt. Although it is settled that flight of an accused is competent
evidence against him as tending to establish his guilt, non-flight, on the other hand, is not conclusive proof of innocence. 20

The trial court correctly convicted appellants of the crime of murder under Art. 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The killing is qualified
by abuse of superior strength which is alleged in the information. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 21 The collective strength of the three assailants,
even if they were all drunk, 22 was obviously disproportionate to that of the victim.

Like the trial court, we find that neither treachery nor evident premeditation attended the killing. There was no treachery because the
manner by which the initial assault was inflicted had not been clearly proved. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. 23Neither can there be evident premeditation as it was not established
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants deliberately planned and carried out their decision to kill Mariano. 24

In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the correct penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the medium period 25 of the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to death imposed for murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. We find, moreover, that the heirs of Tranquilino Mariano are entitled to civil indemnity which, pursuant to
jurisprudential pronouncements, 26 shall be in the amount of P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the herein questioned Decision convicting appellants Jesus Ramos and Antonio Dionisio of the crime of murder for the
killing of Tranquilino Mariano and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, appellants shall
solidarily indemnify the heirs of Tranquilino Mariano in the amount of P50,000.00. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Page 14 of 85

G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE" and "JOHN DOE" @ "OGANG," accused,

EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE," accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case at hand. However, the accused cannot be
convicted of murder attended by treachery, because the Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident premeditation.
This legal lapse of the prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution lapse — should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case,
the accused may be held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the crime necessarily included therein), and every doubt must
be resolved in his favor. Thus, we hold him guilty only of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim waived their claim through
an affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity should be included in this Decision finding the accused guilty of the homicide.

Statement of the Case

These postulate are explained in the Court's adjudication of this appeal from the Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bais City, Branch 45, 2 in Criminal Case No. 550-C convicting Accused Edelciano Amaca of murder and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua.

On December 17, 1990, an Information 3 was filed by Bais City Prosecutor Epifanio E. Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one
known only by his alias "Ogang," charging them as follows:

That on October 1, 1990 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Purok Liberty Hills, Barangay Mabigo,
Canlaon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused mutually helping
one another and with evident premeditation and at nighttime did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who, as a result thereof, suffered fatal gunshot wound as
reflected in the medical certificate issued on October 2, 1990 by the Guihulngan District Hospital which was the immediate
cause of his immediate death.
Page 15 of 85

Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16, 1991. 4 However, this was returned unserved on two different
occasions for the reason that the subject had already changed address and "his whereabouts [were] unknown." 5 A motion for
reinvestigation filed by appellant's Counsel de Oficio Marcelo Ondoy was denied in an Order dated April 15, 1991 on the ground that
the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the accused who was then still at large. 6 Jurisdiction over the person of appellant
was acquired by the said court only on July 1, 1991 when he was arrested by police authorities. 7 Thereafter, reinvestigation was
conducted but the prosecutor, reiterating his prima facie findings, resolved to continue the prosecution of the accused.

Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 8 Trial ensued in
due course. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused EDELCIANO AMACA alias "EDDIE" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences the said accused to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, without pronouncement as to civil liability, and
damages, and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED. 9

The Facts

The trial court synthesized the facts based on the testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution and the defense, as follows:

To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and his cause of death, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar
P. Pialago, a resident physician of the Guihulngan District Hospital, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, who testified that on
October 2, 1990, he was on duty at the aforesaid hospital, and was able to attend to victim Wilson Vergara who had just
undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor, Dr. Gonzaga. The major organs of the victim, namely, the
heart, lungs and kidney, were no longer functioning normally, and thus, he was suffering from multiple organ system
failure. Furthermore, there was injury in the pancreas, causing a leak of the pancreatic juice. Victim suffered two gunshot
wounds at the back, and x-ray revealed two (2) bullets inside the body, and there was no exit wound. The patient was
admitted at 10:45 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and died at 7:00 in the evening of the following day. He identified the
death certificate (Exh. "A"), and the data sheet of the victim and the final diagnosis. (Exh. "B") Even with immediate
medical attention, the victim could not have survived with the wounds he sustained.

Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified that as a police investigator one of
his companions in the force fetched him from his residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed
him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near his residence. Upon
Page 16 of 85

reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the
hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang.
Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his
condition, the victim said that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified
himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter
affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City
Mayor. (Exh. "C")

Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, Felix Ponting, and Alfredo
Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting and Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) with station at
Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the accused together with his companion Felix Ponting were on
duty at the said station from 6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock that same evening. After their duty at 8:00 o'clock,
they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo Gabutero, whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that
same evening. 10

Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution
of the case; the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had
already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." This notwithstanding, the Department of Justice found the existence of
a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement. 11

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively identifying Appellant Amaca, a dying declaration
sufficient to overcome the latter's defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further
prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.

The Issue

In his brief, the appellant filed a lone assignment of error, to wit:

The trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder on the
sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of the victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat. 12

The Court's Ruling

Page 17 of 85

The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder, and civil indemnity shall not be awarded to the heirs
of the deceased.

Dying Declaration
Sufficient to Identify Assailant

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or
even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive
for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of
such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a
competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4)
the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in
itself. 14 All these concur in the present case.

Declarant a Competent Witness

The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a competent witness to identify his assailant. He
emphasizes that
the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that ". . . the witness/victim based on the foregoing circumstance was not able to
see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But as the
prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement
clearly indicates that he was able to see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the
competency, of the victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as
well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth. 16 Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing and
recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, under the circumstances of this case, could
have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of the victim's ante mortem statement. We hold that the
serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause
the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion in the past to rule on a similar issue as
follows:

. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a given wound,(') according to
Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212), "is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a
particular case." They cited a case from Vibert's Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being shot in the
chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of
water from the courtyard. When the fire was extinguished, the man lay down in bed and died. Vibert performed the
autopsy, and found that the left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by the revolver's bullet. It is evident from the
Page 18 of 85

foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion that the victim of a gunshot wound would immediately lose consciousness, after
infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. . . . 17

Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because "the actual shooting occurred at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening." 18 This statement is bereft of factual basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat was fetched from his house at 7:00
p.m. to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the victim had already been brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus
be inferred that the shooting occurred sometime before the victim was found, brought to the clinic, and before Mangubat was fetched
from his house. Thus, a considerable period of time must have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until the policeman was
fetched from his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to the inference that it was pitch-black at
the time of the shooting. Indeed, from the foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that the crime was committed before nightfall and that
there was sufficient daylight to enable the victim to identify his assailant. At any rate, there are no indicia in the record that lighting
conditions made it impossible for declarant to identify his assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he did
recognize his shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation of the defense that he did not.

Genuineness of the Dying Declaration

The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by suggesting that since "the relationship between
CAFGU and the PNP is marred by jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another," 20Police Officer Mangubat had enough
motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The defense also asks: "Why was the alleged dying declaration of the
victim merely thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and very capable of writing his name at that
time?" 21 Additionally, the defense questions why Wagner Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not
presented as such by the prosecution. 22

The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not destroy the genuineness of the ante
mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the
circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to
frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police
Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him. 23 This dismal failure of the defense to show any
ill motive on the part of said police officer adds credence to Mangubat's testimony. 24

Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the
genuineness and veracity thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity and urgency required by the
attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly
ruled that an ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the declarant's thumbmark imprinted which his own blood, and
serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily, such declaration need not even be
in writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses who heard it.
Page 19 of 85

Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not fatal, as his testimony would have been merely
corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if presented does not
obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have been called to the witness stand by accused-appellant.
Besides, it is the prosecutor's prerogative to choose his own witnesses to prove the People's cause. 26

Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae

The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as part of the res gestae, another recognized exception
to the hearsay rule provided specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the admissibility of
statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling
occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence. 27 These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case
where the statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and, more important, the victim had
no time to fabricate.

An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is
not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the statement's appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or more
elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured. 28

Alibi Debunked

The defense also contests the trial court's finding that the
29
"alibi interposed by the accused miserably fall short of exculpation. (Decision, p. 7)" Appellant insists that, since the dying declaration
was unreliable and since there was no positive identification aside from this declaration, the defense of alibi gained strength. 30 There is
no basis for this contention for, as previously discussed, the ante mortem statement met all requirements for its admissibility either as a
dying declaration or as part of the res gestaeor both. 31 It must be remembered that alibi is inherently weak and the facts in the case at
hand show that it was not at all impossible, considering the circumstances of time and place, for the accused-appellant to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. 32 The military detachment at Barangay Lumapao, where appellant allegedly
slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the
able-bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle ride from the locus criminis. 33 As correctly argued by
the trial court, "(i)t would not have been impossible for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, and come back to
his detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified by the defense witness Gabutero as to going to and coming back
from these two places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)" 34 The alibi of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the very persuasive declaration
of the victim. 35

Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience rests easy with the moral certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed
the crime charged. His pretense at innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against him. Even his flight —
Page 20 of 85

eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the warrant for his arrest — clearly bespeaks his
guilt. 36

Murder or Homicide?

Finally, the defense posits that the appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the Information,
while evident premeditation and nighttime, although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. 37We agree. The Information readily
reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. The trial court however found that the killing was qualified by
treachery. Even assuming that this conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, we cannot appreciate treachery to qualify the
crime to murder for the simple reason that this was not alleged in the Information. Treachery is an element of the crime. The
Constitution requires that the accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him." 38 Obviously, this
failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution. Since every doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused, we cannot convict him of murder through treachery under an Information that charged him with murder qualified by evident
premeditation.

Moreover, in this case, treachery and nighttime may not be considered even as generic aggravating circumstances, because there is
nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely
adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the commission of the
crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture. This conclusion is further bolstered by the simple fact that not one of the
prosecution witnesses saw the commencement of the assault or even the actual assault itself. Hence, they are not competent to testify
on whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and nighttime attended the commission thereof. These circumstances cannot
be appreciated on the basis of mere presumptions or suppositions; they must be proven as clearly as the crime itself. 39

Appellant may therefore be held liable only for the crime of homicide defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Since there
are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion temporal provided under said article shall be imposed in its
medium period . Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should suffer imprisonment of prision mayor in its medium period
to reclusion temporal, also in its medium period.

Non-Award of Indemnity

The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of accused-appellant, reasoning that it was prevented from doing so by the
"unwillingness" of the victim's mother, Segundina Vergara, to further prosecute the case against the accused. 40 The trial court cited the
resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denying the motion for reinvestigation. The DOJ held that the ante mortem statement of
the victim testified to by Pfc. Mangubat accordedprima facie validity to the case against the accused, but it noted and confirmed the
desistance of the victim's mother and her son-in-law from further prosecuting the case. The salient portions of Segundina Vergara's
affidavit of desistance quoted in said resolution reads:
Page 21 of 85

That I am the complainant in a case which I filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor, Canlaon City and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 550-C of Regional Trial Court, Bais City for Murder against Eddie Amaca as the alleged accused;

That in the evaluation of our case against him, I have found out that the death of my son Wilson Vergara was purely
accidental that could be attributed to his fault;

That due to my compassion to the poor accused who is a family man, I have decided to drop the case against Eddie
Amaca for the reason that his family financially help (sic) us in our family problems due to the death of my late son;

That with our desire to have a mutual understanding and goodwill among ourselves, since we are neighbors and our
respective families are good friends, I have decided to drop the case against Eddie Amaca;
41
That when the said case was scheduled for hearing, I will not testify anymore as the complaining witness;

The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial court's reasoning and recommends that its decision be affirmed. 42 We agree.
The facts of this case show that the victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended
to her family by the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional
proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal
43
liability. Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death was an accident attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is
inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim's
complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue
civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also
waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil
liability. 45

The records, however, do not show whether the deceased had other compulsory heirs. Such heirs, if there are any, may file an
independent civil action to recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Edelciano Amaca is found
GUILTY of homicide and SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No civil indemnity is awarded. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Page 22 of 85
Page 23 of 85

G.R. No. 130331 November 22, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON PINEDA, JR. and SONNY TUANGCO, accused.
ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY TUANGCO, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In the morning of January 4, 1995, the naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by the Centro Escolar University
Credit Cooperative in Manila was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters away from the national highway in Apalit. Her body bore
multiple stab wounds and her private parts were bloodied and showed signs of sexual abuse.

On May 18, 1995 two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco y Dizon, Nelson Pineda Jr. alias "Jun Tattoo" 1 , and Sonny
Tuangco y Dizon alias "Baba" with the crimes of rape with homicide and theft.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M) states:

"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain which came
as an afterthought to them after executing their primordial intent to rape and kill victim AUREA EUGENIO, took and carried away her
wrist watch, three rings, earrings, P3,000.00 cash money and camera, the total value of which amounts to P20,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of her heirs.

The commission of this offense added ignominy to the natural effects of the crime."

whereas the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-1610 (M) reads:

"That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of
nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with lewd design dragged Aurea Eugenio, reclined her in a tree,
Page 24 of 85

opened wide her thighs, inserted a bottle of Pidol syrup in her vaginal canal and forcibly took turns in having sexual intercourse with her
against her will, after which, and by reason of such rape accused with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stabbed several times Aurea Eugenio in her neck which caused her death.

That the commission of this offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, use of superior strength,
nighttime which was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate and insure its commission.

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and Republic Act No. 411." 2

Adel Tuangco was arraigned on June 5, 1995; he pleaded not guilty to both charges. In the course of the trial accused Sonny Tuangco
was apprehended and also pleaded not guilty. Nelson Pineda, Jr. remains at large.

The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his
testimony through sign language, which was interpreted by a sign language expert. The court's summation of the evidence is as
follows:

"On January 3, 1995 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was inside a 'beer house' along the national highway. He had seven (7)
companions at that time. (TSN, July 10, 1995, pp. 55-57). The group consisting of eight (8) persons including the witness arrived at the
said place at day time. When nighttime came, witness Sanggalan together with three (3) of his companions left the place and
proceeded to a rice field near the highway. (Ibid, p. 58). Sanggalan described and identified the said three (3) other persons as a)
tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and scars on his arms; b) a person with a long chin and known as 'Baba' and c) accused Adel
Tuangco. Sanggalan stepped down from the witness stand and identified accused Adel Tuangco as one of the three (3) other persons
together with whom, he went to the rice field. (Ibid, pp. 58-59). The tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and the person with an
elongated chin were not inside the court room at the hearing of these cases on July 10, 1995. Accused Adel Tuangco and the person
with elongated chin are brothers. (Ibid, p. 60).

The group of eight (8) persons were drinking beer and gin inside the 'beer house'. When night time came, Sanggalan, accused Adel
Tuangco, the person with tatoos over his body and the one with elongated chin proceeded to the rice field where there was a waiting
shed in which they stayed for a while. Inside the waiting shed, the person with tatoos over his body, known as 'Tatoo', and the one with
elongated chin, known as 'Baba', took Pidol cough syrup. (Ibid, pp. 61-65). They went to the rice field because they were very drunk.
(Ibid, pp. 66). The four (4) stayed at the waiting shed until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. (TSN, July 21 , 1995, p. 12).

The three, accused Adel Tuangco, 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' later left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow a girl who was
wearing a long hair. Through photographs of the deceased Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan identified her to be the girl whom the
three followed into the rice field. (Ibid, pp. 14 and 27-28). As soon as they caught up with the deceased, ‘Tatoo' pushed her. Adel
Tuangco got hold of the shoulder bag which the deceased Aurea Eugenio was carrying at that time. 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' then pushed
Page 25 of 85

Aurea against a tree and stabbed her with a knife several times on the neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two and also
stabbed the deceased. The deceased fell down. (Ibid, pp. 15-19).

After the deceased fell down on the ground, 'Tatoo' inserted a bottle of Pidol cough syrup into her private parts. Then 'Baba' pushed the
bottle further into the private parts of the deceased. While the bottle was being pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the deceased who
at that time was still alive and resisting the assault. Together, the three removed the blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Adel
Tuangco raped the deceased. 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' likewise successively raped Aurea in that order. (Ibid, pp. 19-23). At the time that the
three accused were raping Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan was about three and one half (3½) meters away from them. While Adel
Tuangco was raping the victim, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' were beside them. When 'Baba' and 'Tatoo' took their respective turns in raping the
victim the other two were holding her hands. (Ibid, pp. 24-25).

After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, 'Tatoo' got her camera and cash money while 'Baba got her ring, earrings and
watch. (Ibid, pp. 25-26). After the incident, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba' went to the rice field while Adel Tuangco went to the other direction. (Ibid,
p. 29). Earlier, during the incident, Adel Tuangco, 'Tatoo' and 'Baba', on two occasions, asked witness Sanggalan to leave. However, the
witness merely hid behind the grasses and trees. (Ibid, p. 30 and TSN, August 7, 1995, p. 31). When recalled to the witness stand on
January 17, 1996, Sanggalan identified accused Sonny Tuangco as the one he referred to as 'Baba'. 3

Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico legal officer at the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy of the victim and made the
following findings:

"Pallor, marked and generalized

Hematoma- 7.0 x 5.0 cms. left frontal region, head; 3.0 x 2 cms. right frontal region head; 7.0 x 6.0 cms. right auricular region;
4.0 x 2.0 cms. right palm; 3.0 x 2.0 cms., left palm 2.0 x 2.0 cms. chest; 3.0 x 2.0 cms. chin

Abrasion- 3.0 x 2.0 cms., right chin; 2.0 x 1.0 cms. right breast 2.0 x 2.0 cms. left breast.

Lacerated wound. 2.5 cms. pre-auricular area, left

Stab Wounds-

1. Six (6) in number, gaping, within an area of 9.0 x 6.0 cms. located on the left side of the neck directed medially
involving the skin, blood vessels, lacerating the throat and esophagus, with depths from 2-5 cms. One end is contused the
other is sharp.
Page 26 of 85

2. Three (3) in number, gaping, within an area of 6.0 x 5.0 cms. one end is contused, the other is sharp, located on the
right side of the neck; directed medially involving the skin, blood vessels, hitting the trachea with depths from 2.4 cms.

Brain and visceral organs-very pale

Heart chambers- contain a very small amount of dark clotted blood.

Stomach- empty

Hymen- fresh lacerations on all sides with an opening of about 4.0 x 3.0 cms., massive blood clots accumulated within vaginal
canal.

Perineum- V- shaped median laceration measuring about 5.0 cms. (Exhibit "E")

Dr. Aguda explained the nature of the fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive blood clots accumulated
within the vaginal canal. He testified that these injuries were caused not only by human penis that penetrated the hymen but by a hard
foreign object like a bottle. (Ibid, p. 30). The abrasions on the left and right breast could have been caused by human bites. (Ibid, p. 25).
The stab wounds described as gaping and the stab wounds located within the neck area were inflicted on the victim by her assailant
using a single bladed weapon. (Ibid, p. 26). It is very possible that the victim was sexually abused. (Ibid, p. 31 ). The heart chambers of
the victim contained very small amount of dark clotted blood, which means there was not enough blood anymore in the heart as the
victim suffered massive bleeding. This was due to the nine (9) stabbed wounds inflicted on the neck of the victim. The proximate cause
of death of the deceased was severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. (Ibid, pp. 34-35). The abrasions and hematomas
on the body of the victim are indications of struggling during the sexual attack on the victim. (Ibid, p. 34). 4

Both accused denied the charges. Adel Tuangco testified that he was at home in the evening in question, a defense which was
corroborated by his common-law wife Liza Reyes Tuangco, 5 by his mother, Erlinda Dizon Tuangco6 and his sister Glessen. For his part
Sonny Tuangco claimed he was alone in his house at Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan in the evening of January 3, 1995. 7

The trial court made the following findings of facts:

"From the evidence adduced in these cases, it was established that-

The victim Aurea Eugenio, single and a resident of Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Apalit Pampanga was working as a bookkeeper
in Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative located at the City of Manila.
Page 27 of 85

On January 3, 1995, the first working day of the year, she reported to office bringing with her a Kodak camera to take pictures of her
officemates for souvenir. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, she told her officemates that she will go to their house
in Apalit, Pampanga although she was not scheduled to do so as it was an ordinary week day. She brought with her, the camera and
the P3,000.00 cash money to be spent on the occasion of their town fiesta. From the office, she proceeded to the terminal of Victory
Liner Bus at Caloocan City, where, at 6:00 o'clock in evening, she boarded Victory Liner Bus No. 272.

Between 7:00 and 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the bus stopped at Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Apalit, Pampanga where the
victim Aurea Eugenio alighted. From the national highway, the house of the victim was about three hundred (300) meters away.
Although lights can be seen from the said house, it was very dark and silent on the road going to the same and coming from the
highway. On either side of the road were tall grasses and trees. On the side of the highway was a waiting shed. Inside the waiting shed
were four (4) persons. They were three (3) accused, namely, Adel Tuangco y Dizon, his brother Sonny Tuangco y Dizon alias 'Baba'
and Nelson Pineda, Jr. alias 'Jun Tattoo' and the prosecution eye witness Silvestre Sanggalan alias 'Popoy, alias 'Pipi'.

Earlier, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the three (3) accused and witness Sanggalan were inside a 'beer house'
located along the national highway at Calumpit, Bulacan, drinking beer and gin. Together with four (4) other persons, they started their
drinking spree when it was still daytime. When nighttime came, the three (3) accused and witness Sanggalan left their companions and
proceeded to a rice field near the highway. They stayed in the waiting shed located at the opposite side of the road where the victim
Aurea Eugenio alighted. The four (4) went to the rice field because they were already drunk. While inside the waiting shed, accused
Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda took Pidol cough syrup.

The three (3) accused left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow the victim who had already crossed the national highway
and was walking towards her house. The three (3) accused asked Sanggalan to leave. However, instead of leaving, Sanggalan hid
behind the bushes and trees, thus, he was able to witness the incident in question.

As soon as the accused caught up with the victim, Nelson Pineda, Jr. pushed her while Adel Tuangco got hold of her shoulder bag.
Sonny Tuangco and Nelson Pineda pushed the victim Aurea Tuangco against a tree and stabbed her several times in the neck. At this
point, Adel Tuangco joined the two (2) and he also stabbed the victim until she fell down. As the victim was lying on the ground, Nelson
Pineda inserted the bottle of Pidol cough syrup in her private parts. Sonny Tuangco further pushed the bottle into the body of the victim.
While the bottle was being pushed, Adel Tuangco was hugging the victim who was still alive and resisting the assault being made
against her person. Together, the three (3) accused removed the blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Thereafter, Adel
Tuangco, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco, in that order, successively raped the victim. While Adel Tuangco was raping the
victim, the two (2) other accused were beside him. When Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco were taking their respective turns in
raping the victim, the two (2) other accused were holding her hands.

After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her bag, Pineda got her camera and cash money while Sonny Tuangco got her ring, earrings
and watch. Thereafter, Nelson Pineda, Jr. and Sonny Tuangco went to the rice field while Adel Tuangco proceeded to the opposite
direction.
Page 28 of 85

The body of the victim was already stiff when found by witness Michael Enriquez the following day lying on the rice field owned by his
grandfather, Ignacio Enriquez. The body was lying on its back with the hands upraised, the blouse raised upwards and naked from the
waist down. The private parts of the victim had an opening of about two (2) inches and with blood all over it.

The fresh lacerations on the hymen of the victim as well as the massive blood clots accumulated within the vaginal canal were caused
not only by human penis that penetrated her private parts but by hard foreign object like a bottle. The abrasions on the breast of the
victim could have been caused by human bites. The stab wounds located within the neck area of the victim were inflicted by her
assailant using a single bladed weapon. The nine (9) stab wounds in the neck induced severe hemorrhage which was the proximate
cause of the victim's death. The abrasions and hematomas on the body of the victim are indications of struggling during the sexual
attack on the victim."8

The trial court ruled that the guilt of the accused as charged was established with the required quantum of evidence and concluded that
the three accused conspired to commit the crimes charged. The accused were sentenced as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of theft defined in Article 309 in relation to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and of the crime of Rape with
Homicide defined in Article 335, as amended, of the same Code and hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 95-1609(M), the said accused are convicted of Theft and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of
prision correccional as maximum; the said accused are likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio,
jointly and severally, the amount of P3,000.00.

2. In Criminal Case No. 95-1610(M), the aforesaid accused are convicted of two (2) special complex crimes of Rape with
Homicide and each of them is hereby sentenced to two (2) death penalties; both of them are ordered, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Aurea Eugenio the sum of P105,150.00 as actual damages, and the further sums of a)
P50,000.00 for the victim's death, b) P100,000.00 as moral damages and c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a total of
P200,000, in each of the two (2) crimes which they have separately committed and each shall pay one-half (½) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

The case is before this Court on automatic review.

The Public Attorney's Office submits the following assignment of errors in the appellants' brief:

"I
Page 29 of 85

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF SILVESTRE SANGGALAN WHO IS A DEAF-MUTE AND UNSCHOOLED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND THEFT." 10

In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused- appellant points out that because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no
formal schooling in a special school for deaf-mutes, the possibility that resort to conjectures and surmises, brought about by
overzealousness to understand what his witness really wanted to say could not be discounted. Thus, accused-appellant cites certain
portions of Sanggalan's testimony which appeared unclear, e.g., the witness admitted that the place where the incident happened was
"very dark", and he was inconsistent as to who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first to rape the victim. Thus, his handicap
prevented a truthful narration of what really transpired.

The Solicitor General prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects. He asserts that a deaf-mute is qualified to testify, and the
interpreter explained that through sign language, Sanggalan demonstrated how Eugenio was raped and thereafter killed by appellants
and Pineda, Jr. It is claimed that the inconsistencies pointed out are minor and do not detract from the positive identification made by
witness Sanggalan of the accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects.

After a very careful examination of the evidence of record, we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction. We find no cogent
justification to disturb or set aside the finding of the trial court upholding the credibility of the deaf-mute witness, on the following
rationalization:

"This Court, cognizant of the physical handicap of the eyewitness Silvestre Sanggalan, carefully scrutinized his testimony and noted
that the same were made, on several occasions from July 10, 1995 when he was called for the first time to testify until July 5, 1996
when he was recalled for the purpose of cross-examination on behalf of accused Sonny Tuangco, in a candid and straightforward
manner. While the Court observes minor inconsistencies in his declarations, these are not reasons to render his testimony incredible.
On the contrary, it is well-established that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are indications that the same is not
rehearsed and all the more should be considered credible. Thus, discrepancies in minor details indicate veracity rather than
prevarication and only tend to bolster the probative value of such testimony. (People vs. Mocasa, 229 SCRA 422).

This Court likewise evaluated very carefully, the qualifications and competence of Eva Sangco, the sign language expert utilized by the
prosecution and found the same to be sufficient to put on record with accuracy, the declarations being made by witness Sanggalan on
the witness stand. According to Eva Sangco, sign language experts have different mode of communications. These are a) oral method
b) simultaneous method c) pantomine d) reverse interpretation e) speech reading f) natural signs and gestures and g) interactive
writings which are more on dramatization and drawing illustrations. In the interpretation of the declarations of witness Sanggalan, Eva
Page 30 of 85

Sangco employed the natural homemade sign method. Eva Sangco has undergone several trainings on this particular method. (TSN,
July 21, 1995, pp. 7-8).

In its futile attempt to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan, the defense attacked his character and present a witness in the
person of Merlita Baliber to show that he is a drunkard and a drug addict. Likewise the defense presented documentary evidence (Exh.
"3") to show that Sanggalan had been accused of rape in a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Rizal. These
evidence presented by the defense are unavailing. In People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170, it was held that even a fact of prior
criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness. And in People vs. Tanco, 218 SCRA 494, it was held that the mere
pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. For the test to measure the value of the
testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity to knowledge and consistent with experience of mankind. (People vs.
Morre, 217 SCRA 219). This Court finds it unnecessary to reiterate the earlier discussion as to why it gives credence to the testimony of
witness Sanggalan.

If at all, the evidence of the defense with respect to the character of Sanggalan substantiated the theory of the prosecution- that these
people, witness Sanggalan, and the three (3) accused were often times seen drinking liquor and taking prohibited drugs. No less than
defense witness Merlita Baliber testified that on one occasion, she saw witness Silvestre Sanggalan and accused Nelson Pineda, Jr.
going out of the 'beer house' to join their three (3) other companions walking along the highway.1ªvvph!1 That Baliber would deny that
accused Adel Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco were among those people, is expected. For, as admitted by Baliber, she was asked by the
mother of accused Adel Tuangco and accused Sonny Tuangco to testify in these proceedings to help the said accused. (TSN, February
7, 1996, p. 35). Then too, the demeanor by which Baliber was testifying immediately casts doubt on her motive for taking the witness
stand and renders incredible her testimony. Thus, on several times at the witness stand, she had been observed smiling and not candid
with her declarations. (TSN, February 7, 1996, p. 13). On one occasion, after stating that Adel Tuangco and Sonny Tuangco have
nothing to do with the rape-slay of Aurea Eugenio, witness Baliber immediately laughed. (Ibid, pp. 25-26). 11

The theory of the accused-appellant that Sanggalan "could not truthfully and convincingly convey what really transpired on that fateful
night" because he had no formal schooling in a school for special persons like him and the interpreter was not the one who had taught
him is not tenable.

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.12 Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2)
can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. 13 Thus, in People
vs. De Leon14 and People vs. Sasota,15 the accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. Although in People vs.
Bustos16 the testimony of a deaf-mute was rejected, this was because there were times during his testimony that the interpreter could
not make out what the witness meant by the signs she used. In the instant case, the interpreter was a certified sign language interpreter
with twenty-two (22) years teaching experience at the Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television programs and had
testified in five other previous court proceedings. She possessed special education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial
court evaluated her competence to put on record with accuracy the declaration made by witness Sanggalan on the witness stand, and
Page 31 of 85

she testified that she employed the natural or homemade sign method. 17 Needless to stress, the manner in which the examination of a
deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will
not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the
particular method adopted.18 The imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellants' brief arise from the fact that there is some difficulty
in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-mute, but these do not detract from the credibility of his testimony, much less justify the
total rejection of the same. What is material is that he knew personally the accused-appellants, was with them on the fateful night when
the incident happened, and had personally witnessed the rape-slay and theft three and ½ (3 ½) meters away from the scene. He did not
waver in the identification of the three accused despite rigorous cross-examination, and positively pointed to the accused-appellants as
the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects. 19 The trial court's assessment of the credibility of Sanggalan,
whose testimony was found to be candid and straightforward, deserves the highest respect of this Court.

Moreover, the testimony of Sanggalan was corroborated by the doctor who conducted the autopsy. Dr. Aguda testified that Eugenio had
nine (9) stab wounds on the neck, fresh hymenal lacerations and massive blood clots within the vaginal canal, caused, among others,
by the entry of a hard foreign object like a bottle and that the abrasions and hematomas on the cadaver indicated that Eugenio
struggled during the assault.20

The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused-appellants by Sanggalan, and the attempt of the mother of
the accused-appellants, Erlinda Tuangco, a sister, Glessen Tuangco, and the common-law wife of Adel Tuangco, Liza Reyes, to
corroborate such a defense must fail. Moreover, no proof was adduced to show the physical impossibility of the accused being at the
scene of the crime; the evidence shows that the rape-slay took place in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit,
Pampanga, which was ten to fifteen minutes from the residence of Adel Tuangco in Frances Bukid, Calumpit, Bulacan. 21 In the case of
Sonny Tuangco, who went into hiding after learning that his brother Adel was arrested, and who stayed with a relative in Caloocan City
for about one (1) year until he was apprehended by the police authorities, 22 his flight should be taken as an admission of his guilt.

We also find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of conspiracy among the accused-appellants as rationalized by the trial court thus:

"First, they were together drinking in a pubhouse from where they proceeded to the rice field and stayed inside a nearby waiting shed.

Second, as soon as the victim was seen walking towards her house, the three (3) accused immediately followed her.

Third, when they caught up with the victim, they simultaneously attacked her by stabbing her neck with bladed weapon. Thereafter,
when the victim fell down, the accused aided each other in raping the victim.

Fourth, before fleeing from the scene of the crimes, the accused took the victim's cash money and personal belongings." 23

The imposable penalty for the rape with homicide is death. Pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of the Republic Act No. 7659, "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death".
Page 32 of 85

Because of the finding of conspiracy in the commission of the complex crime of rape with homicide, the imposition of two death
penalties upon each of the accused-appellants is correct. 24

The imposable penalty for theft is prision correcional in its minimum and medium period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. In this case, the amount of P3,000.00 which is the cash taken from the victim, was the only
amount proven, as the value of the other objects taken was not established. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correcional as
maximum.

The civil indemnity must also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 25 Thus, the civil indemnity ex delicto should be
P100,000.00 for the victim's death. The award of exemplary damages is justified in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, as the insertion of the bottle into the private part of the victim caused unnecessary moral and physical pain
while the victim was still alive.

Four justices of this Court, however, have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon for the crimes of theft and rape with
homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 95-1609(M) and 95-1610(M) is hereby affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity ex delicto is
increased to P100,000.00.

Upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
Page 33 of 85

G.R. No. 138471 October 10, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom into a flower. Such is the case of Lizette Arabelle
Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been defiled at a very tender age. She was at the time voiding her body waste at their
neighbor’s backyard, but that did not deter herein appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed, lust is no respecter of time and
place.1

On 27 January 1995, an information 2 for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
(hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to
have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the will and consent of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.

Upon motion of PRUNA’s counsel, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the Information was amended changing the name of the accused
from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth certificate. 3 However, when he
testified in court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court proceedings, he signed the name Manuel
Pruna.

On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental Examination 4 filed by PRUNA’s counsel on the
ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a coherent answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that the accused be
brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental examination. 5 Accordingly, the trial was
suspended, and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong City.

On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram 6 from the NCMH stating that PRUNA was in "fair condition." The NCMH later
submitted to the trial court a report7 on the psychiatric evaluation of PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to jail for the
Page 34 of 85

resumption of court proceedings. The report also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends were under the bridge
sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl defecating in the river bank; that they called her; and, upon the order of
his friends he placed her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was not, however, offered in evidence by
the prosecution or the defense.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as follows:

Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m., she was fetching water from the artesian
well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino.
Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet, Jacqueline headed toward the
place where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was already
returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and appeared to be very frightened. When asked where
she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain "Boy" to the grassy area at the back of Gloria’s house where she
was sexually molested (or "kinantot" in the Tagalog dialect). LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which
was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community as "Boy," was not there. Jacqueline
forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial
Hospital.8

Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old, but at the time Jacqueline testified on 17
October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTE’s last birthday was on 19 April 1995. 9

LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called "Boy." She pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid
her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it is a sin
to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.10

Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted
a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The specimen was
sent to the laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for LIZETTE. 11 The Medico-Legal
Report12 prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings:

Essentially normal PE-Findings

Infantile areola & nipples

Flat breasts (-) hematoma

(-) pubic hair

Page 35 of 85

Labia minora and majora –well coaptated

Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration

(Vaginal Opening)

LABORATORY RESULT:

WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis

NSS- Negative for fungi

SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells

Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism

URINALYSIS: RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells –few.

WBC-0-2

Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report 13 includes a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr.
Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on
the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vaginal
opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger. 14

Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and prepared the corresponding
reports,15 testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE. 16

SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar Municipal Station, testified that on 3 January
1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer to have it blottered.
Upon his advise, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from the hospital, he took their statements.
Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be
photographed, which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the neighborhood, and one of them
answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their
station by four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but the former did not give any
reply.17
Page 36 of 85

On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.

Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well together with Jacqueline. After having drawn water
from the well, Jacqueline called her daughter, who was then defecating on the road near the river; and they both went home. After a
while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused
him of having raped the child. Carlito asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he (PRUNA) was in his house from
the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her mother went to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA
was at home because the former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to
the barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought PRUNA to the municipal building to prove that he was
innocent.18

PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for
Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latter’s friend then brought
him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail. There, the mother of
the child threw at him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat; then he was mauled.
Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to masturbate. Worse, his testes were burned with cigarette
butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was hit with a 2"x 2" piece of wood. 19

After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty
of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000, plus costs. 20 Hence, this automatic review.

In his Appellant’s Brief,21 PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors:

… IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD, THAT THE LATTER WAS
THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED WHEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF THE CHILD.

II

… IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE ALLEGED RAPE OF HER CHILD.

III
Page 37 of 85

… IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS ONLY THREE (3) YEARS OLD
WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS ONLY FIVE (5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.

IV

… IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE.

The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial court’s decision with the modification that an
additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be granted in favor of the offended party.

As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was allegedly only 3 years old when the
alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified;

(2) Whether Jacqueline’s testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;

(3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal;

(4) Whether appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

We shall resolve these issues in seriatim.

I. LIZETTE’s Competency and Credibility as a Witness

Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age. When LIZETTE was called to testify, his counsel
interposed a vigorous objection to the admission of her testimony because of her tender age. The trial court noted the objection and
allowed her to testify; thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

PROS. LUMABAS:

Do you know Manuel Pruna?

Page 38 of 85

A Yes, sir.

Q How do you call Manuel Pruna?

A Boy, sir.

Q Where is he?

A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave his name as Manuel Pruna)

PROS. LUMABAS:

What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you?

A "Inihiga niya ako" and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q And in what place did he do this to you?

A In the grassy area, sir.

Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?

ATTY. BALUYOT:

The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question.

PROS. LUMABAS:

I think that will be all for the witness. 22

After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that he intended to file a motion for her
disqualification as a witness.23 The court then proceeded to ask her a few questions, thus:

COURT :
Page 39 of 85

Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth?

A "Sa lupa."

Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will be filing a written motion for the striking out of
the testimony of the witness considering her tender age. 24

No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel cross-examined LIZETTE, as follows:

ATTY. BALUYOT:

On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you?

A I was in the grassy area, sir.

Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing?

A None, sir.

Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic]… a few meter[s] away from you, is it not?
Page 40 of 85

A Near, sir.

ATTY. BALUYOT:

Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is beside a street?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her pumping from the well, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel? Please demonstrate the distance?

A Up to that door, sir.

Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your bowel?

A For a short period of time, sir.

(Sandali lang po.)25

Page 41 of 85

As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The
court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency. 26

Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those
disqualified are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and relating them truthfully."lawphil.net

No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child
is the test of the competency as a witness. 27 It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive
and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.28

In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred
such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to
the court at the time he is offered as a witness. 29 The examination should show that the child has some understanding of the
punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that
he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to
saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. 30 A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity
renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. 31

The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge
sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligation of an oath. 32 Since many of the witness’ manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of
the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous. 33

In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her age. He failed to discharge the
burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of
observation, recollection, and communication 34 and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the
trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight.

We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape "when the
interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the person
responsible therefor.35
Page 42 of 85

In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full
credit,36 especially where no motive is attributed to the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. 37 Indeed, a girl of
such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo the expense,
trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped. 38

II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales

Contrary to appellant’s contention, Jacqueline’s testimony that LIZETTE told her that appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted
his penis into her vagina is not covered by the hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does not testify. This
rule, as enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which
the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that
fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination. 39If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not
sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. 40

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the
right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. 41Moreover, the court is without opportunity to
test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them. 42lavvphil.net

In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even
cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s
testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.

Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its non-admission would not save the day for the appellant.
Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA laid her down in the grass
and inserted his private organ into hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTE’s testimony, which was found to be credible by the trial court, is
sufficient basis for conviction.

At any rate, Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victim’s conduct immediately after the rape. It shows that LIZETTE immediately
revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks of
the truth of the charge of rape.

III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness

Page 43 of 85

Appellant harps on the prosecution’s failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino, who was listed as a witness and executed an
affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the appellant carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house.

It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar, Bataan,
and could not be found anymore. In any event, as opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only
be corroborative of LIZETTE’s testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.

IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence Against Appellant

When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their neighbor, as the one who defiled her. A rape
victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant
that enables her to have a good look at the latter’s physical features. 43

LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her
genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was truly
committed.44 She is not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her. 45 And when her testimony
passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof, for in most cases it is the only evidence that can be
offered to establish his guilt.46

Likewise, LIZETTE’s mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what happened to her and readily identified PRUNA
as the culprit. She even led her mother to the house of PRUNA. 47 Thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report the
incident, and then to the hospital for LIZETTE’s medical examination.

By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA inserted his penis into her vagina. The Medico-
Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who was
presented as an expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger. 48 The presence of
sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTE’s
claim of rape.

This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTE’s organ despite the fact that she was examined
immediately after she was raped. We have already ruled, however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding
of rape,49 especially when the victim is of tender age. 50 Well- settled is the rule that rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female. 51 The presence of hyperemia in LIZETTE’s vaginal opening and the existence of
sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that PRUNA’s organ indeed touched the labia or pudendum of LIZETTE.

In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE
of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c) her act of leading her
Page 44 of 85

mother to appellant’s house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the authorities; (e) LIZETTE’s
submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part; and (g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and
urine.

The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it
must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim. 52 We have also held that when alibi is established only by the
accused, his relatives, or close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny. 53

Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellant’s parents, corroborated PRUNA’s testimony that he (PRUNA) was in his house
during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the place where the rape occurred was just a few
meters away from the house of PRUNA. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in the grassy area to consummate
the crime of rape.

The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against PRUNA the charge of rape. According to him,
LIZETTE’s grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy the place of the PRUNA family, but the latter refused. 54 Aside from the fact that such
testimony was not corroborated, said motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No mother in her right mind would use her
offspring as an engine of malice. She would not subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even the stigma attendant to a
prosecution for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person responsible for her child’s defilement. 55

V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty

The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the prosecution, we now come to the question of the
penalty to be meted upon him.

Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death
penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a "child below seven (7) years old." We have held that in such a case
the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the
victim’s age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form. 56

A person’s age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victim’s birth certificate a sine qua non requirement
to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent
jurisprudence has conflicting pronouncements.

In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved by the
prosecution:
Page 45 of 85

1. In People v. Vargas,57 the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10 years old at the time of the rape were
not considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This Court also observed that the victim could easily be mistaken for a child
below 12 years of age, and hence it was not correct to judge the victim’s age by her appearance. We held: "The difference of two
or three years in age may not always be readily apparent by mere physical manifestations or appearance."

2. In People v. Javier,58 the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not contest her age. Ratiocinating that in
this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old one insofar as physical
features and attributes are concerned, this Court held that an independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim is vital and
essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 7659.

3. In People v. Brigildo,59 aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended party’s birth certificate or other equally
acceptable official document concerning her age, the testimonies on record were not clear as to her exact age. The victim
declared that she was 11 years old when she testified in court a year after the incident, while her mother claimed that she was
around 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The informations even alleged a different age. Hence, this Court
refused to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of minority because of the uncertainty regarding her age.

4. In People v. Tipay,60 the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16 years of age. No "independent" evidence
was presented to prove it. This Court recognized that the minority of a victim who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest
and may be taken judicial notice of by the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of 15 and 17 where minority
may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution should prove the fact of minority with certainty. The
lack of objection on the part of the accused concerning the victim’s age does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden.

5. In People v. Cula,61 the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the rape was committed, but no evidence
at all was presented to prove her age. We held that the failure of the accused to deny such allegation cannot make up for the
failure of the prosecution to prove with certainty the victim’s minority. Because of the lacuna in the prosecution’s evidence,
coupled with the trial court’s failure to make a categorical finding of minority of the victim, we declined to consider the qualifying
circumstance of minority.

6. In People v. Veloso,62 the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was raped. Citing People v. Vargas, 63 this Court
refused to consider the testimonies of the victim and her father as sufficient proof of her age.

7. In People v. Pecayo, 64 the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination that she was 14 years old and
that she was born on 13 January 1983. We held that the victim’s casual testimony as to her age is not enough, and that the lack
of denial on the part of the accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through competent evidence such as
a duly certified certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or some other authentic document showing her age.
Page 46 of 85

8. In People v. Tundag, 65 the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was raped, but she did not know exactly
when she was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth certificate, the prosecution moved that judicial notice be taken of the
fact that she was below 18 years old at the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of such fact, this Court held
that the age of the victim is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary. Under Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Rules on Evidence, a hearing is required before such fact can be taken judicial notice of by courts.

9. In People v. Geraban,66 the victim’s testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15, but her mother’s testimony
regarding her age was not clear. We thus declared that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving minority.

10. In People v. Liban67 and People v. Llandelar,68 the only evidence adduced to prove the minority of the victims was the victims’
bare testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old, respectively. This Court held that while the declaration of a victim as to her
age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative
weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. The prosecution should present the victim’s birth certificate or, in lieu thereof,
any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim. Neither the obvious minority of the victim nor the absence any
contrary assertion from the defense can exonerate the prosecution from its burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the
requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient compliance with the law.

11. In People v. Alvarado,69 the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape, and this was confirmed by the
accused, who was victim’s father. The victim’s mother, however, testified as to her date of birth which showed that she was 13
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. For this doubt as to the victim’s age, the accused was held guilty of
simple rape only and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the
prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age:

1. In People v. Rafales,70 the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only 10 years old when she was raped, which
was not denied by the accused, was deemed sufficient to prove her age for the purpose of determining whether the accused could be
held guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.

2. In People v. De la Cruz,71 the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were both 14 years old at the time of the rape
incidents was deemed sufficient because there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the mother, who had personal knowledge of
the ages of her children. Moreover, said testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood unrebutted by any other evidence.

3. In People v. Bali-balita,72 the victim’s testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by her half-sister, was deemed sufficient. We
noted that the victim testified in court four months after the rape, and hence it was not difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice
that she was under 18 years of age.
Page 47 of 85

4. In People v. Velasco,73 the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the complainant herself, who was held to be
competent to testify on her age, as it constituted family tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a 12-year-
old minor; and (c) the categorical finding of the trial court that she was "a minor of a little over twelve years."

5. In People v. Remudo,74 the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority on the strength of (a) the offended party’s
testimony as to the date of her birth, which showed that she was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the admission of said date
of birth by the accused who was the victim’s brother.

6. In People v. LLanita 75 the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 7 years old at the time of
the alleged rape was the victim’s own testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of the date of her
birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said testimony was held admissible for being an assertion
of family tradition regarding pedigree. Her testimony and the accused’s admission that she was 5 years old during the commission of
the crime were held sufficient to establish her age.

7. In People v. Agustin,76 the victim’s testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents, coupled with the express
admission of her age by the accused who was her father, sufficiently proved her minority.

8. In People v. Esuela,77 the testimony of the victim’s mother that the victim was 13 years of age at the time of the rape was held
sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a mother she was in the best position to know when she delivered her child. Also
considered were the victim’s own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court that she could not have been
more than 18 years old when she testified.

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
Page 48 of 85

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning
the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 78

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to
prove her age. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:

In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as alleged in the information and the defense did
not contest her age and as a matter of fact was questioning her qualification to testify because of her tender age when she testified two
(2) years later in Court. The victim’s Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 … established the fact that at the time of the
commission of the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only 3 years old. 79

It thus appears that the trial court’s finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was raped was based on the Medico-Legal Report
prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact that the defense did not contest her age and even questioned her qualification to testify
because of her tender age.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing
therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE’s age. Her mother, Jacqueline,
testified on 17 October 1995 as follows:

Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you were?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at that particular date and time?

A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir.
Page 49 of 85

Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water?

A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of our neighbor, sir.

How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales?

A. Three years old, sir.

Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she?

A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now.

Q. When was her last birthday?

A. April 19, 1995, sir.80

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. 81 However, when
the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old.
Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer. 82

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty
that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death
penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject
to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 83

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
authentic document should be introduced in evidence 84 in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not
necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA
cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.

However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s mother that she was 3 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
Page 50 of 85

age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having
carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA
should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court is not sufficient. In accordance
with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 without need of pleading or proof
because the mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious. 85

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal Case No. 6044 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the
sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Page 51 of 85

G.R. No. 137933 January 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.

BUENA, J.:

Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl in an information
that reads-

"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who is only seven (7) years old, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."1

On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting accused-appellant of rape,
to wit –

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accused-Valentin Baring Jr. is
sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages of another ₱50,000.00
plus the cost of this suit.

"SO ORDERED."2

In a sworn complaint, 3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmother’s common–law husband, of raping her on
several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was living with her grandmother in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She does not know her real father
since her mother and father were separated. 4 Since 1990, when she was about 8 months old 5 until 1997, she was left under her
grandmother’s care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as "Papa." 6
Page 52 of 85

According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left alone in the house.
Accused-appellant would touch her private parts, and on such occasions, accused-appellant would remove her panty, mount on her
and violate her. She informed her grandmother that accused-appellant sexually abused her. 7

On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She learned from her
daughter that the latter was sexually abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughter’s accounts of sexual abuse, she took
Jennifer to the National Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer
at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin state physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen
with shallow healing laceration at 9 o’clock position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner’s smallest finger." 8

For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. 9 According to accused-appellant, he has been living with
Jennifer’s grandmother for ten (10) 10 or eighteen (18) years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that Jennifer was not living with them during
the time the alleged rape occurred. 12 Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997, Jennifer was living with them since 1990. 13 However,
Jennifer was taken from them sometime in July 1997, but he does not know why. 14

The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the victim’s clear, trustworthy and positive testimony that she was
raped several times by accused-appellant. Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us on automatic review.

On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that is subject of our
automatic review because (i) the three-page double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the
conviction; (ii) the medico-legal certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the physician who conducted the examination was not
presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of his right to cross-examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by
the victim’s grandmother against accused-appellant was provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was merely a "fall guy" and
that another person is responsible for the commission of the crime charged against him. 15

In the appellant’s brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-appellant assigns the following errors-

"The lower court erred:

"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been omitted with no allusions to the transcripts of
records erroneous of tenses and grammar jotted by the Court Stenographer.

"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to determine that the blood found in the panty of the victim is not his
but of another man, Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer Donayre, the victim.
Page 53 of 85

"III. In not finding the accused as a ‘fall guy’ framed up to take the place of Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn,
mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the courtroom as a witness has been beyond normal." 16

The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 17 This vital requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies
are similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code 18 whose roots may
also be traced to the Constitutional mandate.

A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set
forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the
judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the
case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the
tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of
whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law
made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. 19 Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various
issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and
the law.

In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be engendered not by
the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight
or admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the
conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecution’s failure to present the
examining physician to appear in court depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. 20 However, a review of
the transcript of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus,
was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness, to wit-

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private complainant that the doctor is no longer connected with the Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City but was reassigned to the Eastern Police District at Mandaluyong City.

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the postponement.
Page 54 of 85

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

We can dispense with the testimony.

"COURT:

Provided this is admitted.

"COURT:

Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the report of the doctor?

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says.

"COURT:

Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?

ATTY. ABUBAKAR

Yes, your Honor.

"COURT:

No need to present the doctor

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of the medico legal report no. M-2831-97.

"COURT:

Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.

Page 55 of 85

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

Yes, your Honor.

"COURT:

Admitted.

You dispense the testimony of the doctor. 21

A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. 22 It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. 23 Besides, testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible, 24 and the
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit. 25

Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the victim by pointing out that the rape was filed one year after its commission,
which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real identity of the culprit.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be taken against
her.26 The following realities justified the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1) the victim was merely six years old
when she was sexually abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and was left under her grandmother’s care; and, (3) the
victim’s sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.

According to accused-appellant, he was simply ‘framed-up’ and that another person also raped the victim. 27 He avers that his allegation
is supported by the testimony of the victim’s mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise abused by the latter’s husband.

The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare denial and defense
of being ‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration pointing to
accused-appellant as the person who sexually ravaged her-

"Q: Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private complainant against the accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?

"A: Yes, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

Page 56 of 85

"Q: Who is your father?

"A: I do not know the name of my father because my father and mother are separated.

"Q: If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?

"A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this courtroom when asked given [sic] his name as Valentin Baring.)

"Q: Is he your true father?

"A: No sir. He is my stepfather.

"Q: You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know what things or particular things, if any, he did to you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What were those particular things your stepfather had done to you?

"A: He raped me.

"Q: When your stepfather raped you, what actually did your stepfather do to you?

"A: He removed my panty.

"Q: What did your stepfather do after removing your panty?

"A: He placed himself on top of me.

"Q: Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: When he was on top of you, did he place his penis inside your private parts?

"A: Yes, sir.

Page 57 of 85

"Q: What did you feel when his penis was inside your private parts, if any?

"A: I felt pain.

"Q: Was your private part bleeding as a result of the insertion of the penis of your stepfather into your private parts?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What parts of your body or face was kissed?

"A: My cheek.

"Q: Where did this happen?

"A: Dasmariñas, Cavite.

"Q: In whose house or place?

"A: In the house of my grandmother.

"Q: Who are the residents of that house at that time?

"A: At that time nobody was in the house because they were working.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us happened while you were 7 years old, 6 years old? What was your age
then if you can recall?

"A: 6 years old.

Page 58 of 85

"Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you these things you mentioned to us that is by placing (sic) on top of you and
inserting his penis into your private parts and kissing you?

"A: 10 times.

"Q: Do you know how to count?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers)

"A: Two, sir.

"Q: How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting five fingers).

"A: Five, sir.

"Q: How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)

"A: Ten, sir.28

Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the prosecution to establish the dates when the other alleged rapes were
committed justifies the outright dismissal of the case. 29

Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. 30 When
all the essential elements of the crime of rape are stated in the information, an accused is sufficiently apprised of the charged against
him. Moreover, the precise time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of rape. 31 Neither is the exact date of
commission of rape an element of the crime32 for the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse without consent. 33

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his right to subject the blood found on the victim’s panty for DNA testing.

The records reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel initially asked the court to subject the alleged blood found in the victim’s panty to a
DNA test for comparison with accused-appellant’s blood. 34 However, he voluntarily withdrew his proposition. 35 Obviously, accused-
appellant’s counsel is misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellant’s counsel who recalled the submission for DNA testing. The
alleged denial of accused’s right to avail of the DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the categorical
testimony of the victim pinning him down as the perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging evidence
Page 59 of 85

directly. It must be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the presentation of the bloodstained panty is not even essential. 36 The
victim’s credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-appellant.

Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of child sexual abuse, often involve victims of tender years. On account of
the increased number of children coming into the realm of the judicial system, we adopted the "Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness" to govern the examination of child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a crime. 37 This rule ensures
an environment that allows children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal
proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth. 38

In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we observed the peculiar physical examination performed by the doctor on the
seven-year-old victim in this wise-

"GENITAL

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in
between. On separating, the same disclosed a congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9 o'clock
position. External vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner’s smallest finger." 39 (emphasis ours)

This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination done on the seven-year-old victim. We noticed that in the examiner’s
effort to show the existence of abuse, the examining physician inserted his smallest finger, as shown in the medico-legal report that
the ‘external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner's finger.’

It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing evidence – by determining the diameter/hymenal opening in rape cases –
was a common practice in the past. With the passage of R.A. 7610, this Court has nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same kind
of evidence in the prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical developments and findings, specifically as to
the determination of the existence of child sexual abuse, this Court deems it necessary to firmly adopt a more "child sensitive" approach
in dealing with this specie or genre of crime.

In the international scientific community, recent medical studies have shown that measurement of hymenal opening is unreliable in
determining and/or proving child sexual abuse –

"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More recent studies have
shown this to be undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors affecting hymenal and anal diameter include the examination
position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and the degree of relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also affected by
the presence of stool in the ampulla. Hymenal diameter may increase with age and with the onset of pubertal development." 40
Page 60 of 85

In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies which show that enlarged hymenal opening diameter is any more common
in abused than in non-abused children." 41 Thus -

"In the latest revision of the classification system, ‘enlarged hymenal opening’ is also removed as a criterion that should be
considered suspicious for abuse. With labial traction, the hymenal opening may appear quite large, especially to the less
experienced clinician, and internal structures such as vaginal ridges, rugae, and vaginal columns may be visualized. This is
purely a matter of how much traction is applied, and the degree of patient relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past
sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not possible to obtain accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal opening, unless photographs
are taken at the point of maximal dilation and measurements are taken from the photographs using a calibrated measuring
device. Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces of certain types of colposcopes can be used to estimate diameter
size but not to obtain exact measurements." 42

Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the hymenal opening under the pretext of determining abuse is unnecessary
and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial Academy [PHILJA] training program for family court judges, 43 through the auspices of
the U.P.-P.G.H. Child Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without active bleeding, all that is needed is an external
examination with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it may, the physical findings alone will not be conclusive of child
sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear, consistent, detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested may still have
normal genital examination. Despite the physical or laboratory findings, however, a child’s clear and convincing description of the abuse
has a high rate of probability.

We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have consistently upheld the full weight of a young victim’s
unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which categorically states:

Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall
be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases.

What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to reiterate, is that forensic examination – inclusive of physical examination and
forensic interview – of sexually assaulted children [adolescents included] must be conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young
victim’s feelings of vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must be observed in order to make the examination less stressful lest
they be more traumatic to the victim than the very assault itself. The value of collecting evidence should always be weighed against the
emotional cost of the procedure and examination of the child.

We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. The single information filed against accused-appellant,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory Rape." 46 Even then, accused-appellant
cannot be held answerable for the other incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so
that each of the other rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 47
Page 61 of 85

Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
The allegation in the information specifically stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven years old" which clearly rules out the
application of this specific provision that can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the same article which
warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common–law spouse of the parent of the victim, 48 will not apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years old, the accused-
appellant is not the common-law husband of the victim’s mother. The trial court therefore erred in meting out the death penalty upon
accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus, accused-appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In line with our prevailing jurisprudence, 49 we sustain the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98, finding accused-
appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence
is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
Page 62 of 85

G.R. No. 139833 February 28, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEL GABAWA y BANGGAY, accused-appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the decision, dated January 12, 1999, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 30),
convicting accused Joel Gabawa y Banggay of rape in Criminal Case No. 46933, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

In a criminal complaint dated August 30, 1996, Eusebia Paloa, 35 years old, assisted by her mother Concordia F. Paloa, accused Joel
Gabawa y Banggay of rape, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in the Municipality of San Enrique, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of the mental derangement of the undersigned, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with her who could not freely consent to the sexual act on account of
her mental state.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."1

On January 8, 1997, accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses namely: Teresita C. Alarba, Dr. Sharon Faith B. Pagunsan, Dr. Mariano Hembra, private
complainant Eusebia Paloa and SPO2 Ma. Mae Palabrica.

Teresita C. Alarba of Barangay Paga, San Enrique, Iloilo testified that: on July 10, 1996, private complainant Eusebia Paloa spent the
day washing clothes for her; around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, her nephew, Randy Cabaging and accused Joel Gabawa came by
and drank coffee; Eusebia ate supper at her house; Eusebia complained of body aches, and the accused, a bone setter (hilot),
massaged Eusebia’s shoulders and chest; Eusebia and the accused left her house together at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening; the
following morning, she saw Eusebia in her kitchen which is separated from her house, lying in a fetal position and "bloody in her female
organ"; Eusebia’s underwear and short pants were bloody; she changed Eusebia‘s clothes before sending her home; she knew
Page 63 of 85

Eusebia even before the incident on July 10, 1996 because Eusebia used to roam around; Eusebia was not in a proper state of mind,
and she talked nonsense.2

Dr. Sharon Faith B. Pagunsan, the Rural Health Physician of San Enrique, Iloilo, testified as follows: On July 11, 1996 she examined
Eusebia on which basis, she issued a Medical Report with the following findings:

"Physical Findings:

"-came in ambulatory, oriented as to time, place and person

"-kempt, non-violent, non-agitated, inappropriate affect (apathetic)

"-(+) delusions – "na-apektuhan ang bata, nag-gua ang dugo, kag nagsakit ang kilid ko"; "santol man lang ang gin-kaon ko, ti
acid man na, paano mag-form sang human—ang dugo halin to ya sa likod ko nga bukol kag nag-gua sa obaryo"

"-(+) flight of ideas

"-Head and Extremities: no remarkable findings

"-Chest and Abdomen: no remarkable findings

"-Breasts: no remarkable findings

"-External Genitalia:-labia gape a little exposing the open hymen with single orifice (+) fresh blood coming from a lacerated
fourchette at 6 o’clock position, 1st-degree laceration extending from the rim outwards is about 1 cm. and from the rim inwards is
about 0.6 cm."3

When she examined Eusebia’s genitalia, she saw fresh blood coming from it. It is consistent with the injuries having been inflicted
within the first 24 hours and it is possible that the injury was caused by sexual intercourse with a man. 4 Four days later, or July 15, 1996,
she conducted further examination of Eusebia and issued a Medical Report, portions of which are herein quoted verbatim:

"-Genitalia:-Thick hymen with circular opening: (+) complete laceration at 7 o’clock position

"Internal examination: admits 2 fingers with ease Cervix firm, closed, posteriorly located, non-tender Vaginal wall slightly lax with
vaginal rugosities, smooth surface except on posterior portion proximal third of vaginal wall
Page 64 of 85

(+) blood on examining fingers

"Speculum examination: cervix, posteriorly located, slightly pinkish, non-violaceous, (-) erosions, (-) discharges (+) clotted blood
on the posterior vaginal vault (+) erythematous abrasions at the posterior wall proximal third of vaginal wall, triangular in shape
about 3.5 X 5 cm. diameter, which bled on pressure

"Diagnosis: Fist Degree Laceration of Fourchette at 6 o’clock position, Complete Laceration of Hymen at 7 o’clock position,
Abrasions at Proximal Third of Posterior Vaginal Wall." 5

Dr. Mariano Hembra, a psychiatrist of the Western Visayas Medical Center, testified: On July 16, 1996, he was on duty at the Pototan
Mental Health Unit and Eusebia was referred to him by Dr. Pagunsan for evaluation and complete psychiatry examination. The
psychiatry examination revealed that Eusebia was suffering from chronic schizophrenia on July 10, 1996, the date of the alleged rape
incident. Eusebia may be cured if treated and, in fact after undergoing treatment, Eusebia recovered from chronic schizophrenia
sometime in December, 1996. Patients with chronic schizophrenia have good memories and could remember what happened to them
after they were cured. The patient, if cured, would be able to remember if the allegation that she was raped is mere hallucination or
true.6

The prosecution presented Eusebia as a witness after she was evaluated by Dr. Hembra as capable and fit to testify in Court.

Eusebia testified as follows: At around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of July 10, 1996, she went to the house of Teresita Alarba in
Barangay Paga, San Enrique, Iloilo to help in washing clothes. Late in the afternoon, Randy Cabaging and accused Joel Gabawa
arrived at the house and drank coffee. At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, she and accused Joel went out of the house and proceeded
to a vacant lot at the back of the house. Despite her resistance, accused took off her pants and underwear and was able to rape her
because he applied force on her. She tried to resist but the accused was stronger than her. Accused raped her by inserting his penis
into her vagina. She felt pain when the penis of the accused was inside her vagina. She did not shout because she was afraid that the
accused might box her. Accused had sexual intercourse with her for about 5 minutes, after which, he left her without a word. Despite
feeling pain, she did not cry because the rape had already been done. She put on her panty and pants and proceeded to the kitchen of
Teresita located in the annex of the house and slept there until she was discovered by Teresita the following morning. She informed her
mother, Concordia F. Paloa, about what happened to her and she was brought to Dr. Sharon Faith B. Pagunsan at about 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of July 11, 1996 for examination. 7

When asked in open court to identify and point out the accused, Eusebia positively identified the accused, who was among other
detained accused, seated on a bench in the courtroom. 8

SPO2 Ma. Mae Palabrica, a member of the Philippine National Police of San Enrique, Iloilo, testified: While on duty on July 11, 1996,
she received a report from the mother of private complainant Eusebia that the latter was raped on the evening of July 10, 1996 by a
person who Eusebia could identify through his face only. She interviewed Eusebia who seemed incoherent and illogical and referred
Page 65 of 85

her to the Rural Health Physician for physical and mental examination. After her physical examination, SPO2 Palabrica and SPO1
Aquilino de Otoy brought Eusebia, along with her mother and a relative, to Hacienda Edma, Brgy. Paga, San Enrique, Iloilo, where the
incident allegedly took place for Eusebia to point to them the person who allegedly abused her. Before they arrived at Hacienda Edma,
they passed by a group of laborers from the sugarcane field and Eusebia pointed to a person, telling them that he was the perpetrator.
SPO1 de Otoy called the person and asked him if he knew Eusebia who was sitting at the back of the jeep and his answer was that he
did not rape her. The person pinpointed by Eusebia is the accused Joel Gabawa. 9

The prosecution rested its case after having offered its documentary evidence.

Thereafter, despite being given sufficient time to prepare for its evidence, the defense presented no witnesses but simply offered the
Medical Report of Dr. Pagunsan as its evidence.10

On January 12, 1999, the trial court rendered its verdict in this wise:

"IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds Joel Gabawa y Banggay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape committed under
paragraph 3, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity.

"SO ORDERED."11

Hence, herein appeal on a lone assignment of error:

"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE "CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE."12

Appellant assails the finding of the trial court that the prosecution has presented enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant is guilty of rape by having sexual intercourse with complainant Eusebia Paloa on July 10, 1996 on the following grounds:

(a) Complainant was suffering from chronic schizophrenia. Eusebia would have no capacity to remember later on what
happened several months back if she was then afflicted with chronic schizophrenia. Not only could she not state in detail how
she was raped but, worse, she failed to demonstrate that she put up any resistance to the alleged sexual assault committed
against her.

(b) Prosecution witness Teresita Alarba has no personal knowledge about the rape allegedly committed by appellant because
when the appellant and Eusebia left her house, Teresita did not see them anymore until she saw Eusebia in her kitchen at 7:00
o’clock in the morning.
Page 66 of 85

(c) Dr. Sharon Faith Pagunsan did not categorically conclude that the bleeding in the external genitalia of the complaining victim
was caused by a sexual intercourse with a man.

We find the appeal of Joel Gabawa to be devoid of merit.

The probative value of the testimony of Teresita Alarba lies not on whether she actually witnessed the alleged rape. It was simply meant
to show that the appellant was with the private complainant, Eusebia, on the night the alleged rape occurred; that the only person seen
with complainant before the crime in question was committed was appellant and that Teresita saw Eusebia in her kitchen the following
morning "bloody in her female organ".

Needless to stress, the crime of rape is essentially, at least almost always, one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy; hence, it
is usually only the victim who can testify in respect of the forced coitus.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

"(1) By using force or intimidation;

"(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

"(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua."

In rape, the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. To warrant a conviction for
rape under paragraph (2) of Article 335, a woman need not be proven as completely insane or deprived of reason. The phrase
"deprived of reason" has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency; or some form of mental
retardation; the feeble-minded but coherent; or even those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason. 13

Was Eusebia suffering from chronic schizophrenia when she was raped?

Schizophrenia has been defined as a psychotic disorder of unknown etiology, characterized by disturbance in thinking, involving a
distortion of the usual logical relations between ideas, a separation between the intellect and the emotions so that the patient’s feelings
and his or her manifestations seem inappropriate to his or her life situation, and a reduced tolerance for the stress of interpersonal
Page 67 of 85

relations so that the patient retreats from social intercourse into his or her own fantasy life and commonly into delusions and
hallucinations, and may, when untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked deterioration or regression in his or her behavior
though often unaccompanied by further intellectual loss. 14

That Eusebia was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape was established by the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Hembra.
However, the fact alone that Eusebia suffered from schizophrenia did not render her incompetent to testify on the rape incident. Mental
deficiency affects the weight accorded to the testimony, not its admissibility. Accordingly, an adjudication of feeblemindedness or
unsoundness of mind does not render a witness incompetent, as long as her mental condition or mental maturity is not impaired at the
time of her production for the examination. 15It is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness
and gross deficits of memory. 16 Though she may not have totally lost her memory, it was shown that Eusebia was suffering from an
impairment of judgment, which made her incapable of giving an intelligent consent to the sexual act. It has been held that where the
rape victim is feeble-minded, even if there may have been no physical force employed on the victim, the force required by the statute is
the sexual act itself.17

We find no reason to disregard the trial court’s appreciation of the competence of Eusebia to testify on the alleged rape since the same
is aptly based on the evaluation of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Hembra. There is nothing on record that would cast doubt on the
knowledge and integrity of Dr. Hembra as an expert witness. The qualifications and expertise of Dr. Hembra were admitted by the
defense.18 We reproduce verbatim the testimony of Dr. Hembra:

"Q Once a patient is treated from chronic schizophrenia shall we say, doctor, to be able to separate the truth and can distinguish
from what is not the truth?

"A Even the patient was already recovered from the illness, this patient has a good reality testing at least to be able to
understand what surrounds her or what is being asked of her.

"Q Meaning, she would know how to perceive what is the truth, doctor?

"A Yes, Ma’am.

"Q If hallucination stop whatever that she is telling if ever she is telling the truth, that is no longer hallucination, doctor?

"A Granting the patient has already recovered, if the things would be seen what the patient has perceived, she was not having
mental disorder.

"Q If the patient has already recovered from chronic schizophrenia and she would tell after recovery that she was raped, it is no
longer hallucination?
Page 68 of 85

"ATTY. CALANZA:

We object, your Honor.

"Court:

The Court would first clarify this matter before making any ruling, you testified that after the patient has recovered, she could be
in control of her faculties and whatever happens to her she would tell the truth and she could make proper judgment. The Court
would like to clarify whether the event that happened when the patient was still suffering from chronic schizophrenia could be
remembered by the patient and the judgment made by the patient clearly and objectively after she has recovered, we have no
question to any event after she recovered, how about those events which happened when she was suffering from chronic
schizophrenia?

"A Patient with chronic schizophrenia have good memory, the memory was not impaired, it means that it has anything to do with
the memory, the memory is still intact, secondly, if there is any impairment on the perception of judgment, definitely during the
time the patient is suffering from chronic schizophrenia there is impairment of patient’s judgment, as well as its perception from
the time the illness started.

"Once she was treated there the patient go back to what we call normal perception and normal judgment.

"Court:

She could remember what happened to her after she recovered from chronic schizophrenia, she could now remember what
happened to her as a normal person?

"A Yes, she could remember.

"COURT:

She could remember and distinguish events which happened to her?

"A She could distinguish if the patient was normal.

"COURT:

That would be all for the Court. Proceed.

Page 69 of 85

"Q Any hallucination which she had during the time when she was suffering from chronic schizophrenia, it would appear that she
has now forgotten as she has recovered, doctor?

"A I would not agree with the word "forgotten" that would not apply to this patient already remember whatever hallucination that
she have like for example, she can hear voices telling her to run, that she could still remember what voices before were telling,
what they were asking.

"Q On the other hand, if she may remember that hallucination but she would know that it is hallucination now that she has
recovered?

"A She can differentiate the hallucination from the reality.

"Q In this particular case, at that time when she first stated that she was raped and the alleged incident happened on July 20,
1996, she was then suffering from chronic schizophrenia?

"A Yes, Ma’am.

"Q But now that she has recovered, she will be able to remember that she was raped, her statement that she was raped is
hallucination or not?

"A Even the patient is presently in the normal stage, she can distinguish if that alleged rape was part of her mental illness though
or it is reality if it is true."19

Thus, the insanity or intellectual weakness of a witness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to her competency if, at
the time she is testifying, she has mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, so far as the facts in issue and her testimony
thereon are involved, understands the nature and obligation of an oath, and can give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the
matters about which she testifies.20

Hereunder is a material portion of the transcript of Eusebia’s testimony in open court:

"Q: And while you and Joel Gabawa were already there at the vacant lot at the backyard of the house of Teresita Alarba, was
there anything that happened to you?

"A: Yes, Sir.

"Q: What happened to you?

Page 70 of 85

"A: He raped me.

"Q: You said "he raped me", you mean Joel Gabawa raped you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: And when you said Joel Gabawa raped you, you are referring to this accused Joel Gabawa whom you earlier identified
before this Honorable Court?

"A: Yes, Sir.

"Q: When you said Joel Gabawa raped you, please tell the court how did Joel Gabawa rape you, what did he do to you?

"A: He took off my underwear, despite my resistance he was able to rape me because he applied force.

"Q: At that time what were you wearing then?

"A: I was wearing a long cotton black pants.

"Q: Now you said the accused Joel Gabawa removed your panty by applying force on you and he was able to remove your panty
despite your resistance, what about your long pants, what happened to your longpants?

"A: He also took my pants.

"Q: Which was removed first, a long pants?

"A: My long pants.

"Q: And while the accused Joel Gabawa was removing your long pants, what did you do?

"A: I was struggling.

"Q: You were struggling for the purpose of preventing him to remove your long pants?

"A: Yes, Sir.

Page 71 of 85

"Q: And after removing your long pants, that was the time that he removed your panty?

"A: Yes, Sir.

"Q: And while he was removing your panty you said you resisted, is that correct?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: Despite of your resistance you said he was able to remove your panty, can you tell the court why he was able to remove your
panty despite your resistance?

"A: Because he was stronger than me that’s why he was able to took(sic) off my panty.

"Q: And what happened after the accused was able to remove your panty?

"A: He raped me then.

"Q: When you said "he raped you", please tell the court what did the accused actually do to you?

"A: He applied force to me and then raped me.

xxx xxx xxx

"PROS. BARRIOS:

"Q: When you said the accused raped you, what was the situation of the accused?

"A: He had no clothes on.

"Q: What about brief or pants?

"A: He was only wearing shorts.

"Q: Because he was wearing short, can you tell the court how he was able to rape you?

"A: He took off his shorts and brief.

Page 72 of 85

"Q: And what did he do with his private parts when you said he raped you?

"A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.

"Q: And after inserting his penis or private part into your vagina, what action did he do?

"A: He was exerting force.

"Q: You mean to tell the court the accused Joel Gabawa was exerting force when his penis was already inside your vagina?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What about you, what did you feel?

"A: I moved and then Joel Gabawa left.

"Q: Did you feel pain when the penis of Joel Gabawa was inside your vagina?

"A: Yes, Sir.

"Q: How long did Joel Gabawa rape you by having his penis inside your vagina?

"A: Around 5 minutes.

"Q: Before when you were already naked because Joel Gabawa removed your panty and Joel Gabawa also removed his pants
and brief and you said you were resisting, did you shout?

"A: No, Sir.

"Q: Why were you not able to shout?

"A: Because I was afraid to shout.

"Q: Why were you afraid to shout?

"A: I’m afraid that he might box me."21

Page 73 of 85

Our own meticulous review of the testimony of private complainant Eusebia reveals that said testimony is plain, straightforward, to the
point and unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, thus deserving of full faith and credit. Her testimony indicates that she
could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them.

On the alleged lack of resistance on the part of Eusebia, it is clear from the above-quoted testimony that Eusebia categorically stated
that she tried to resist appellant’s assault but, due to his physical strength, her efforts to ward of his attack proved futile; and that
appellant inserted his penis in her vagina and exerted force inside for about five minutes. Tenacious resistance against rape is not
required; neither is a determined or a persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary. In fact, the law does not even
impose the burden of proving resistance on the part of the rape victim. 22

Appellant succeeded in penetrating Eusebia’s vagina and this fact was confirmed by the examination conducted by Dr. Pagunsan on
July 11, 1996, which is within 24 hours of the sexual assault of Eusebia on July 10, 1996. The examination disclosed "fresh blood
coming from a lacerated fourchette at 6 o’clock position, 1st-degree laceration extending from the rim outwards is about 1 cm. and from
the rim inwards is about 0.6 cm". 23 When the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is
sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. 24

It is further noteworthy that appellant was positively identified not only in open court during the trial but likewise on July 11, 1996, the
day after the rape, when Eusebia pointed to appellant as the one who raped her when appellant was chanced upon with a group of
laborers near Hacienda Edma. SPO2 Ma. Mae Palabrica testified that when appellant was simply asked if he knew Eusebia, appellant
instead replied that he did not rape her. Such testimony remains unrebutted.

As against the positive declaration of Eusebia and the physical evidence of forced coitus, appellant offered nary a defense. When a
rape victim’s account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is
sufficient to support a conviction for rape.25

And even assuming then that Eusebia consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant, the copulation would fall under the third
paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that the complainant was mentally ill. Sexual intercourse with an
insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple. 26

We note that in ruling upon appellant’s civil liability, the trial court only awarded indemnity ex delicto of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00). Moral damages are automatically awarded in rape cases, without need of proof, for it is assumed that the victim
sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering. 27 Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Eusebia should also be awarded moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). 28

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 30) dated January 12, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 46933,
finding appellant, Joel Gabawa y Banggay, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and ordering him to pay the victim Eusebia Paloa the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity
Page 74 of 85

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that appellant is also ordered to pay victim Paloa the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages and the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Page 75 of 85

G.R. No. 91734. March 30, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTOR BORMEO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVEN,
MUST BE UPHELD. — A mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven. This presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution. To overcome the same, proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, must be established by the prosecution. Short of this, it is not only
the right of the accused to be freed; it is, furthermore, the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him. The freedom of the accused is
forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; BURDEN OF PROOF REPOSED IN THE PROSECUTION; MUST STAND OR FALL ON ITS OWN MERIT AND
MUST NOT RELY ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE. — Save in certain instances as where, for example,
the accused admits the commission of the imputed criminal act but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden of showing the
necessary proof which is reposed in the prosecution is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense for
unless the prosecution discharges such burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Stated a little differently, the
prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.

3. CRIMINAL LAW; STATUTORY RAPE; CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, DEFINED. — Carnal knowledge has been defined as the act of a
man having sexual bodily connections with a woman; sexual intercourse. An essential ingredient thereof is the penetration of the female
sexual organ by the sexual organ of the male. In cases of rape, however, mere proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum or lips of the female organ is sufficient to constitute a basis for conviction. In this jurisdiction, when a man has carnal
knowledge of a woman who is under twelve (12) years of age, as in the case of Raylin, statutory rape is committed. Punished under the
Revised Penal Code, its elements are: 1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that such act is committed when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.

4. ID.; ID.; NOT A CASE OF. — There exists no credible and competent evidence to show carnal knowledge in this case. No one, save
perhaps Raylin, saw whatever it is the accused did to her. The fresh laceration of Raylin's hymen and the fact that she had lost her
virginity do not at once support a conclusion that they were caused by sexual intercourse. It is to be noted that Dr. Veneracion did not
Page 76 of 85

categorically testify that the injury in the hymen could have been caused by a male organ; as a matter of fact, the prosecutor did not
even ask him if it is possible that it could be caused by such an organ. The prosecutor did not proceed further by asking, hypothetically,
what that object could be or whether it is possible that an erect penis could have caused the laceration. Instead, it was the counsel for
the accused who recklessly suggested such a possibility when he cross-examined Dr. Veneracion; but then, the latter was forthright
enough to state that he could not pinpoint what particular object caused the laceration.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF A DECLARATION AS PART OF RES GESTAE. — We have already mentioned
the requisites for the admission of evidence as part of the res gestae. In People vs. Ner, Supra., at pages 1161-1162, citing authorities,
We ruled: "All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence
of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or
to contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in
question or its immediate attending circumstances."

6. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR, WARRANTED. — This Court concludes that the weakness of the accused's
defense of alibi, which the Solicitor General stresses to further bolster the case for the prosecution, is entirely irrelevant. Since the
prosecution has failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he is, as a matter of right, entitled to an acquittal.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 2 April 1989, in barangay San Fernando, Laur, Nueva Ecija, while Carmelita Galzote was
walking back to her home after peddling eggplants and tomatoes, she was met by her 2 1/2-year old granddaughter, Raylin, who was
running "pabisaklat" (with legs wide apart) and crying. Carmelita put her basket down and cradled Raylin on her lap. She then
discovered that the child's private organ was bleeding. when queried as to why it was bleeding, Raylin replied, "Tatay," referring to the
accused, the common-law husband of Carmelita Galzote.

The following morning, Carmelita brought Raylin to the Rural Health Unit in Laur, Nueva Ecija. The latter was examined by Dr. Felimon
V. Veneracion after Carmelita gave her written consent in the form of a "Salaysay". 1 Upon examination, Dr. Veneracion discovered a
fresh laceration of Raylin's hymen "at 3:00 to 9:00 o'clock position in the face of the clock" and some slight bleeding; there was,
however, no extra-genital, physical injury. The doctor concluded that Raylin's virginity was lost. Such findings are embodied in the
medical certificate which he subsequently issued. 2

Carmelita then proceeded to the Laur Police Headquarters where here statement, "Kusang loob na Salaysay", was taken by Pfc.
Bienvenido P. Carse and sworn to before P/Lt. Hipolito Bernardo. 3 In the afternoon of 3 April 1989, the accused was arrested and
detained at the Laur municipal jail. Being Raylin's only living relative, Carmelita filed on 7 April 1989 a criminal complaint for rape dated
— 4 April 1989 — against the accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. 4
Page 77 of 85

In due course, the records of the case were forwarded by the MCTC to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija. On 26 June
1989, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information 5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecja charging the accused
with the crime of rape allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1989, at Brgy. San Fernando, Municipality of Laur, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had (sic)
carnal knowledge of Raylin Galzote, a 2 1/2 year old girl, deprived of reason and who is the step-granddaughter of said accused, by
having sexual intercourse with her, to her damage and prejudice."

The information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0135-P, was raffled off to Branch 40 of the said court at Palayan City. No bail was
recommended for the accused's temporary liberty.

Arraigned on 12 July 1989, 6 the accused's pleaded not guilty; trial on the merits thereafter followed.

The prosecution presented Carmelita Galzote and Dr. Felimon V. Veneracion as its witnesses. It dispensed with the presentation of
Raylin Galzote on account of her tender age. The accused testified in his behalf with the prosecution not even attempting to cross-
examine him. 7

On 28 September 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision, dated 14 September 1989, 8 finding the accused guilty of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P50,000.00, without subsiding (sic) imprisonment in case of
insolvency, plus costs." 9

The conviction is anchored on the evidence for the prosecution which the trial court gave full faith and credit and which it summarized
as follows:

"The evidence of the prosecution tends to establish that on April 2, 1989, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Carmelita Galzote was
on her way home to Barangay San Fernando, Laur, Nueva Ecija, after selling tomatoes and eggplants. As she was nearing her house,
she was met on the shoulder of the road by her granddaughter Raylin Galzote, running 'pabisaklat' (with legs wide apart) and crying.
Earlier, she left her at the house with 4-year old Riva and the accused. The accused was no longer there having gone to a drinking
session.

Carmelita put her basket down and carried Raylin on her lap. The former noticed that her lap was smeared with blood so she started
examining the different parts of the body of the latter and found that her vagina was the one bleeding. Carmelita then asked Raylin,
'Bakit anak, bakit dumudugo ang kiki mo?' To which Raylin, replied, 'Tatay', she was referring to accused Victor Bormeo, common-law
Page 78 of 85

husband of Carmelita. 'Tatay' may also refer to grandfather. Forthwith, Carmelita brought Raylin to Barangay Captain Boy Paraiso but
(sic) who told them that he cannot solve the problem they brought before him. He advised them to go to town.

The following morning of April 3, 1989, Carmelita brought Raylin to the Rural Health Unit in Laur, Nueva Ecija. Before examining 2-year
old Raylin, Dr. Felimon V. Veneracion asked for Carmelita's consent which she gave by means of a 'Salaysay' (Exh. A). Dr. Veneracion
then performed the examination the result of which is embodied in a 'Medical Certificate' (Exh. A-1) with following statements:

'FINDINGS

1) External examination-negative for extra-genital, physical injury — Fairly nourished child, weighing 12.1 kilos.

2) Internal examination — absence of pubic hair.

Hymen-presence of fresh laceration of the hymen at 3:00 to 9:00 o'clock position in the face of the clock. Presence of slight bleeding.

Conclusion:

Physicial (sic) virginity loss.'

Dr. Veneracian informed Carmelita that Raylin was molested.

Immediately after coming from the doctor, Carmelita and Raylin went to the Police Headquarters of Laur, Nueva Ecija, where the former
gave a 'Kusang Loob na Salaysay' before PFC Bienvenido F. Carse (Exh. B) and then swore to (sic) (Exh. B-1) before P/LT Hipolito T.
Bernardo. And since Carmelita is the only relative living with Raylin, Carmelita was the one who personally filed a complaint against the
accused on April 4, 1989, before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Laur & Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.

Carmelita has been living with the accused for over 10 years. Her first husband was the late Julian Bastawa with whom she begot the
following children namely, Flordeliza, Victoria, the deceased Aurelia (mother of Raylin) and Anna.

The accused has been a problem to Carmelita. He attempted to rape her eldest daughter Flordeliza by entering thru a window and then
pulled (sic) out his belt. He molested Victoria by pulling out her skirt while dressing up. He entered the mosquito net of Aurelia when
they were in Bulacan. He also attempted to rape her youngest daughter 7-year old Anna when they were in Baler. She did not bother to
file cases against the accused because his actuations did not materialize. She admonished him though." 10

Although it considered as hearsay Carmelita's testimony with respect to Raylin's answer when asked why her private organ was
bleeding, the trial court nevertheless admitted the same as part of the res gestae. 11
Page 79 of 85

It rejected the version of the defense, which it condensed in this wise:

"On the other hand, the evidence of the defense tends to show that the accused is (sic) living with Carmelita Galzote without benefit of
marriage for more than 15 years. He knows Raylin, who is almost 3 years old, because she resides with them. She is a granddaughter
of Carmelita.

In the morning of April 2, 1989, he was at their house with his common-law wife Carmelita and 4 children, namely, Raylin, 2 l/2-year old
Oscar Bormeo, 7-year old Cesar and 4-year old Annabelle. At about 11:30 that same morning, Carmelita left the house to sell tomatoes.
The accused went to a drinking session at around 12: 00 o'clock in the store of his compadre, a place about 100 meters, more or less
away from their house. He left the 4 children playing. The drinking spree stopped at 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Carmelita was already
at their house when he arrived. He did not have any conversation with her.

The following day, he had a conversation with Carmelita about her going to town to borrow money. She left at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning and returned home without obtaining the loan at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less.

Prior to April 2, 1989, the accused had a misunderstanding with Carmelita. The argument was about his coming home after watching
TV when he saw a man coming out from their house. When he confronted her about it, she become angry at him.

Raylin calls the accused 'Tatay' and he treats her as if she is a daughter to him. She can talk but one cannot easily understand what
she is saying. However, when he communicates to her he could somehow understand what she is saying to him.

The accused was apprehended by policemen in the afternoon of April 3, 1989. He learned from them that his wife has lodge (sic) a
complaint for rape (sic) of his step-granddaughter Raylin. He told them that he did not do it. He was brought to the Municipal Hall and
detained in jail. Although he wanted to give a sworn statement about the alleged rape, the police did not bother to take the same.

The accused denies that he molested and/or attempted to rape her (sic) stepdaughters, Flordeliza, Victoria, Aurelia and Anna, at one
time or another." 12

because it "cannot make anything clear (sic) out of the same, whether it is one of alibi or imputing ill motive on Carmelita, his common-
law wife, whom he suspected of having relationship (sic) with a man he allegedly saw coming out of their house one evening before the
subject incident happened and that Carmelita got angry at him when confronted of (sic) the same." 13

Dissatisfied with the judgment, accused filed his Notice of Appeal on 11 October 1989. 14 This Court accepted the appeal in the
Resolution of 14 February 1990. 15

In his Appellant's Brief filed on 8 June 1990, accused insists that he should be acquitted and submits the following assignment of errors:
Page 80 of 85

"I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH IT CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT BASED ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF CARMELITA GALZOTE AND IN ADMITTING IT AS PART OF RES
GESTAE." 16

As regards the first assigned error, the appellant contends that there was no eyewitness to the alleged rape and that the testimony of
Carmelita Galzote is not conclusive as to the fact of carnal knowledge. Despite the finding that the victim had lost her virginity, it is
averred that the prosecution failed to establish carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse as its cause. It is his theory that such loss may
have been occasioned by the insertion of an object other than an erect male organ, a possibility which Dr. Veneracion himself admitted.
17 Moreover, the absence of any injury outside Raylin's private organ, as attested to by the medical certificate, indicates that the latter
was not molested. It is highly improbable that a girl of Raylin's age would not have suffered external injuries if she were indeed ravished
or sexually molested. The appellant therefore maintains that there is no positive and conclusive proof to show that someone had carnal
knowledge of Raylin.

Anent the second assigned error, appellant asserts that the evidence relied upon by the trial court to convict him consisted merely of
Carmelita Galzote's testimony regarding the declaration of the victim, which it considered as part of the res gestae, and the testimony of
Dr. Veneracion. He disagrees with the conclusion of the trial court that Carmelita's testimony is admissible as part of the res gestae —
an exception to the hearsay rule — and submits that such testimony should not be given credence because Raylin's utterance of
"Tatay" does not convey a categorical directness to the question asked by Carmelita, to wit: 'Bakit anak, bakit dumudugo ang kiki mo.' "
Such declaration cannot be considered as part of the res gestae since the same cannot be categorized within any of its two (2) types,
viz., spontaneous exclamation and verbal acts. 18 It likewise fails to meet the three (3) requisites for admissibility of a declaration as
part of the res gestae, namely: (a) there must be a startling occurrence, (b) it was made before the declarant could contrive or devise
and (c) it must refer to the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 19

Accused further maintains that the testimony of the doctor does not prove carnal knowledge; its probative value merely supports the
fact that Raylin had lost her virginity. Carmelita's declarations that the appellant had made advances to her daughters in the past do not
inspire belief; these are unsupported and do not stand on factual bases.

In the Appellee's Brief filed on 17 September 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects all the contentions of the appellant and
instead prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision in toto. It claims that the trial court was correct in giving full credit to the
testimony of complainant Carmelita Galzote which clearly, positively and convincingly proved carnal knowledge. It then cites several
Page 81 of 85

circumstances which further bolster the claim of the prosecution, to wit; "(1) the bleeding of the victim's vagina and her own word that it
was appellant who caused the injury; (2) appellant was in the house with the victim when Carmelita left the house; (3) appellant was no
longer in the house when Carmelita arrived only to see her granddaughter already molested; (4) appellant's past history shows his
lascivious tendency in his attempts to seduce or violate the daughters of his common-law wife; (5) appellant's unconvincing alibi, his
inability to give the name of his drinking partner or that of the storeowner where (sic) he allegedly had a drinking session, information
which in view of his reluctance to reveal them, undoubtedly would be unfavorable." 20

In refutation of the second assigned error, the Solicitor General cites the statement in People vs. Nartea 21 to the effect that the marked
trend of decisions is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of the res gestae. He
contends that the question of whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court; he asseverates that the latter's determination thereof is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal in the absence of
clear abuse of discretion. He finally concludes that there was full compliance with the requirement for the admission of the testimony of
Carmelita as part of the res gestae.

If rape was indeed committed on 2 1/2-year old Raylin, this Court would be the first to condemn the detestable act and would not
hesitate to impose the proper penalty. As We declared in People vs. Desuyo. 22 Defilers of women are an especially despicable ilk of
evil men, and more so those who would inflict their lasciviousness upon innocent and defenseless children. They are filthier that the
slime where they belong; whatever punishment is imposed on them can never expiate their loathsome offense for which forgiveness
itself, from a mortal court at least, would be a sin."

Our careful scrutiny of the records of this case and exacting evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses lead to nothing but an
unearthing of the scant and unreliable evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, Our minds cannot rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt of the accused. He may without doubt be an evil man, but for as long as the evidence against him is not enough to
satisfy the degree of proof required for conviction, Our feelings for Raylin and Our human prejudice against her defiler, who has
certainly descended to the level of a beast, must not color Our judgment.

A mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 23 Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. This presumption
is solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution. 24 To overcome the same, proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, 25 must be established by the prosecution. Short of this, it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed; it is, furthermore, the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him. 26 The freedom of the accused is forfeit only if
the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. 27 Save in certain instances as where, for example, the
accused admits the commission of the imputed criminal act but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden of showing the
necessary proof which is reposed in the prosecution is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense for
unless the prosecution discharges such burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Stated a little differently, the
prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 28
Page 82 of 85

In the instant case, the prosecution relied solely on the testimonies of Carmelita Galzote and Dr. Veneracion. The victim herself was
not, for obvious reasons, called to the witness stand to testify. Being only 2 1/2-years old at that time, she was disqualified from
testifying as a witness under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; by reason of her tender age, she was incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting her ordeal and intelligently making known such perceptions or narrating them truthfully.

In its decision, the court a quo stated that the prosecution opted to dispense with her testimony "on account of her tender age and
inability to communicate coherently." 29

Carmelita was not an eyewitness to the alleged rape. She frankly admitted that the only piece of evidence she has against the accused
is Raylin's response of "Tatay" to her question "Bakit anak, bakit dumudugo ang kiki mo?" Thus, upon being questioned by the trial
court, she offered the following answers:

"Q I would like to ask some clarificatory questions. In your early (sic) answer you stated you linked your husband to the alleged rape by
the word 'tatay,' is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Aside from that do you have any ether proofs that it was actually your husband who raped her?

A No more, sir.

Q By the word 'tatay' you would like to link your husband that he has done (sic) the crime of rape to (sic) your granddaughter?

A Yes, sir because my granddaughter will not state that if he did not do it.

Q What was your question? Is it 'Sino ba ang gumawa nito?'

A My question is, 'Why is your vagina bleeding' and she answered, 'Tatay.' " 30

It is clear from Carmelita's answers that she merely concluded that the bleeding of Raylin's private organ resulted from carnal
knowledge. Carnal knowledge has been defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman; sexual
intercourse. 31 An essential ingredient thereof is the penetration of the female sexual organ by the sexual organ of the male. In cases of
rape, however, mere proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum 32 or lips of the female organ 33 is
sufficient to constitute a basis for conviction. In this jurisdiction, when a man has carnal knowledge of a woman who is under twelve (12)
years of age, as in the case of Raylin, statutory rape is committed. 34 Punished under the Revised Penal Code, its elements are: 1) that
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and 2) that such act is committed when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. 35
Page 83 of 85

There exists no credible and competent evidence to show carnal knowledge in this case. No one, save perhaps Raylin, saw whatever it
is the accused did to her. The fresh laceration of Raylin's hymen and the fact that she had lost her virginity do not at once support a
conclusion that they were caused sexual intercourse. It is to be noted that Dr. Veneracion did not categorically testify that the injury in
the hymen could have been caused by a male organ; as a matter of fact, the prosecutor did not even ask him if it is possible that it
could be caused by such an organ. Thus:

"Q Could you tell us what are the reasons for such a laceration?

A An object which could have been inserted into the vagina of the patient but most probably the object was not fully inserted it was only
on the outside part but the object is big that to fully introduce the object would or could create an extensive laceration. It is anatomically
impossible without having extensive (sic) laceration, sir.

Q You said it could have been caused by an insertion of an object, could it be a result of bumping (sic) of some object?

A I think that would not be the cause of the laceration because the position of the laceration is on two parts of the hymen, sir." 36

The prosecutor did not proceed further by asking, hypothetically, what that object could be or whether it is possible that an erect penis
could have caused the laceration. Instead, it was the counsel for the accused who recklessly suggested such a possibility when he
cross-examined Dr. Veneracion: but then, the latter was forthright enough to state that he could not pinpoint what particular object
caused the laceration. Thus:

"CROSS-EXAMINATION BY

ATTY. DIONISIO LEDDA:

Q Doctor you mentioned in your findings that probably an object was inserted or introduced on the vagina of the patient could you tell to
(sic) this court if that object that could rather could you tell to (sic) this court would or could it be possible (sic) an erect male organ?

A That is possible, sir.

Q So it can not he alone an erect male organ which cause (sic) the laceration of the vagina of the patient?

A I can not say what kind of object but since you ask me the possibility it is possible, sir.

Q Like for example or instance (sic) a blunt object or instrument?

Page 84 of 85

A As I said a while ago, I cannot pinpoint what kind of object, sir.

Q So it is now possible if you cannot pinpoint what kind of object it may be an object with (sic) the size of an erect male organ is that
correct?

A That is possible, sir." 37

The trial court, however, gave undue weight to the word "Tatay" which Raylin uttered in answer to Carmelita's question — "Bakit anak,
bakit dumudugo ang kiki mo?" Although such a declaration is hearsay because Raylin was not presented as a witness and could not be
cross-examined, the trial court considered her alleged utterance as part of the res gestae and, therefore, admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. We have already mentioned the requisites for the
admission of evidence as part of the res gestae. In People vs. Ner, 38 We ruled:

"All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a
startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or to
contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in
question or its immediate attending circumstances."

The first two requisites of admissibility of a declaration as part of res gestae may be conceded in this case. There are, however, serious
doubts as to the existence of the third requirement. Due precisely to the incompetence of Raylin, which flows from her inability to
communicate coherently, it is unclear if her utterance of the word "Tatay" has reference to sexual intercourse. As earlier shown,
Carmelita Galzote admitted that this utterance was not in answer to the question "Sino ba ang gumawa nito ?" — which she did not
even ask — but to the question "Why is your vagina bleeding?" 39 Such bleeding need not necessarily have been caused by or through
sexual intercourse. The trial court's conclusion that it was so caused appears to be tenuous and speculative that it cannot convince a
reasonable mind of its soundness and the accused's alleged responsibility therefor.

Carmelita's declaration on the witness stand that the accused attempted to: (1) rape her eldest daughter, Flordeliza, by entering through
a window and pulling out his belt; (2) molest her other daughter, Victoria, by pulling out her skirt while she was dressing up; (3) rape her
third daughter, Aurelia, by entering the mosquito net while they were in Bulacan and; (4) rape her fourth daughter Anna while they were
in Baler, cannot sway Our judgment. While proof of such prior acts is admissible under Section 34, Rule 150 of the Revised Rules of
Court to prove, inter alia, a specific intent or habit, We are not prepared to give full faith to Carmelita's testimony on such acts. If the
accused truly committed such deeds, We are unable to understand why and how Carmelita continued to maintain her common-law
union with him for more than ten (10) years. Moreover, none of her daughters who were allegedly the victims of the lascivious advances
of the accused came out to denounce him.
Page 85 of 85

Finally, this Court concludes that the weakness of the accused's defense of alibi, which the Solicitor General stresses to further bolster
the case for the prosecution, is entirely irrelevant. Since the prosecution has failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, he is, as a matter of right, entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City in
Criminal Case No. 0135-P and ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the accused VICTOR BORMEO. His immediate
release from detention is hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.