G.R. No.

145022 September 23, 2005

ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated 19 April 2000 that affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. 98-2288, dated
19 April 1999, admitting respondent Lucio Tan’s Amended Complaint for Damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
against him in two (2) articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution 2 dated 15 September 2000 denying petitioners Armand
Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious
and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998, wherein they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the
questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was
privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff’s or PAL’s side of the dispute
with the pilot’s union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31, 1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause
of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed
to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article
was printed and first published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This
article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature
was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous
order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that:
"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly
admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final. Besides, there is
no substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers. The Amendment
is merely formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial."
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP),
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants Umali and ALPAP which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54894. The two petitions
were consolidated.
On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the
court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution dated 15
September 2000.
Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this Court. Under consideration is the petition for review filed by petitioners.
On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to comment on the petition filed by petitioners. 3
Respondent filed his comment on 22 January 20014 to which petitioners filed a reply on 26 April 2001.5
In a Manifestation filed on 19 February 2001, respondent stated that the petition 6 filed by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already been
denied by the Court in a resolution dated 17 January 2001. 7
On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within thirty (30) days from notice.8 Both petitioners and respondent complied.9
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE
BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR ADMITTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED
PURPOSELY TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.10
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of
the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3)
where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of
respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published,
the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages?
We rule in the affirmative.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 11 In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action
is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it
is a Court of First Instance12 that is specifically designated to try a libel case.13
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, 14differentiated jurisdiction and venue
as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b)
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and
cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first published
in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer
jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,15 this Court construed the term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place
where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue."
In Escribano v. Avila,16 pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,17 we laid down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions
in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has always the
option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published.
We further restated18 the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where
originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue
has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was
instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the
herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue, instead of
a motion to dismiss.
...
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to
allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless,
before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a
quo’s jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.19
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of
jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. 20 It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place
of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court.21 It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. 22 In contrast, in criminal
actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction. 23
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the
libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original
complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
The cases24 cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on courts
over which they originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper
venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the case.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133240 November 15, 2000
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for review is filed on a pure question of law arising from the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Metro Manila, Branch 257, in LRC Case No. 97-0170.

Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. The Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 20, 1997.1

As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned
by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on
November 20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, docketed as LRC Case No. 97-
0170.2

The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended, namely,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 99446, 99447, 99448, 102486, 102487, 102488 and 102489,3 all state that they were issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject
titles are located in Pasay City.

Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City.4 Hence, on February
16, 1998, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.5 In the attached Amended Petition,6 petitioner impleaded instead
as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City.

In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper
venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.7
Before counsel for petitioner could receive an official copy of the aforesaid order of dismissal, he filed with the lower court a Motion for
Reconsideration.8 On February 20, 1998, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.9 On March 30, 1998, the lower court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.10

Petitioner, thus, is before this Court arguing that –

The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the following reasons:

1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;

2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a matter of right on petitioner’s part to amend its petition
in order to correct the wrong entries therein; and

3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in Parañaque City, so venue was properly laid despite that
erroneous allegation in the original petition.11

The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment.12 He contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res
because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque
court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.

On February 15, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply.13 It discussed the distinction between jurisdiction and venue, and maintained that the
trial court had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue appeared to be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on
the location of the properties.

The issue involved herein is simple. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue? This question
has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court,14 where this Court held that it may not.

While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that of improper venue,15 the Solicitor General
confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action
is conferred only by law.16 It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event,
the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access
to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.17

In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying
of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter.
Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.

xxx xxx x x x.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings,
particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and
allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge
the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly
laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for
the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent
trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his
cause.18

Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It
should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of
improper venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioner’s motion for leave to amend its petition.

Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines
shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one brought below, is provided for by
Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:

Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of
the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property,
or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court
upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an
omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has
been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which owned registered land
and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the
court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate,
or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx. (Emphasis
ours.)

In the case at bar, the lands are located in Parañaque City, as stated on the faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the
petition in the place where the lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule:

Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.19

Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, under the mistaken impression that it was still the
custodian of the titles to lands in Parañaque. Later, petitioner learned that a Register of Deeds for Parañaque City had taken over the
record and custody of titles therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its petition. This, to our mind, was
justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner likewise corrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved.

Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on improper venue. It relied on the
allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay City. However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the
petition, plainly show that the lands involved are situated in Parañaque City. The trial court should have considered these annexes, as
these form an integral part of the pleading.

At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for this was still a matter of right on its part.1ªvvph!1

Amendments as a matter of right. --- A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.20

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined
on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.21 The trial court,
therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case
to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.22
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality
is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the
case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 30, 1998, February 20, 1998, and March 30, 1998 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. LRC Case No. 97-0170 is ordered REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 14851 September 13, 1919

ANTONIA RIERA Y BOTELLAS, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE PALMAROLI, Consul General for Spain, VICENTE PALMAROLI, Administrator of the Estate of Juan Pons y Coll, and
the Honorable Pedro Concepcion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, respondents.

Wolfson and Wolfson for petitioner.

Antonio V. Herrero for respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an original petition filed in the Supreme Court under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Antonio Riera y Botellas, the
purpose of which is to vacate an order of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila admitting to probate the will of Juan Pons y Coll,
and to cause the application for probate to be set for rehearing in the Court of First Instance. The respondents having been required to
answer, the cause is now here heard on petition and answer, no formal proof having been as yet submitted.

For the purpose of the solution of the questions arising in this case, the facts may be taken to be as follows: Juan Pons y Coll, a Spanish
subject resident in the Philippine Islands, died on April 16, 1918, in the city of Manila. The petitioner is the widow of the deceased and
was at the time of her husband's death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands.

On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the Philippine Islands, produced in the Court of First
Instance in the city of Manila a document dated on March 16, 1918, purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and asked that it be
admitted to probate. Publication was accordingly made, and on May 20, 1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.

Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila and to the lack of adequate means of communication
between the two places — a difficulty then greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European War — the petitioner received no
information of the probate proceedings until after November 14, 1918. She had, however, received information of the fact of her husband's
death on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an attorney employed by her in Palma de Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson &
Wolfson, attorneys in the city of Manila, requesting them to look after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband.
Said communication was not received by the attorneys mentioned until November 11, 1918, when promptly began the investigations
necessary to enable them to act in the matter; and on November 29, 1918, they appeared in the Court of First Instance in behalf of the
petitioner and moved that the order of probate of May 20, 1918, be set aside in order to allow the petitioner to enter opposition. This
application was made under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was denied by the Court of First Instance on the ground that
more than six months had elapsed since the date of the order of probate and prior to the filing of the motion.

The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December 21, 1918, under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as already stated.

The will to which reference has been made purports, for reasons stated therein, to deprive the petitioner of participation in the testator's
estate — a step which the test at or says he was authorized to take under the foral regimen prevailing in the Balearic Islands. It is
therefore, apparent that the probate of the will was in fact prejudicial to the petitioner, as alleged; and the petitioner claims that, as a party
interested in the estate, she is entitled to be heard in the matter of the probate of the will, having been prevented from appearing and
contesting the original application by circumstances over which she had no control.

The order of the Court of First Instance of May 20, 1918, against which relief is sought, is attacked by the petitioner on grounds having
relation chiefly to the formalities incident to the execution of the will. In the first place it is said that if the will be considered with reference
to our statutes generally applicable to wills, it is void for failure to comply with the requirements of Act No. 2645 of the Philippine
Legislature. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that the will is not signed on the left margin of each page by the attesting
witnesses and the pages are not numbered as Act No. 2645 requires. In the second place it is said that if the will in question be considered
as the will of a Spanish subject, provable under the special provisions of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it must be
treated as void, for failure to comply with various requirements — unnecessary to be here stated in detail — of the Spanish laws in respect
to the manner of execution of wills. As will be at once apparent from an examination of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the
will was in fact provable as the will of a Spanish subject, under that section, and was admitted to probate as such, compliance with the
requirements of our local laws relative to the execution of wills was not necessary. In such case the provisions governing the execution
of the will are to be sought in the laws of the country of which the testator was a subject.

Another irregularity in the admission of the will in question to probate, as stated in the petition, is that the document produced in court and
actually proved as the will of the decedent was not the original but a copy certified by the Spanish Consul General in this city from the
records of his own office, the will having been executed before him on April 16, 1918, pursuant to authority contained in the Treaty
between the United States and Spain proclaimed on April 20, 1903.

The question here presented in therefore this: Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased person, and who has been
prevented by inevitable conditions from opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme Court, under section 513 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, an order for a rehearing in the Court of First Instance, it being alleged that she will was not executed with the formalities
required by law and hence was improperly admitted to probate?

In the case of the Estate of Johnson (39 Phil. Rep., 156),we held that a Court of First Instance has the power, under section 113 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside an order admitting a will to probate and to grant a rehearing of the application to admit the will, upon
a showing from a person interested in the estate to the effect that the order of probate was erroneous and that the applicant had been
prevented by conditions over which he had no control from appearing at the original hearing and opposing the probate of the will. It was
also suggested in Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921) that the remedy conceded in section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is supplementary to that conceded in section 113 of the same Code; and it was added that apart from these remedies there is
no other means recognized in our procedure whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment to
be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation.

We shall now proceed to consider somewhat more closely the effect of the two sections of the Code of Civil Procedure above cited, in
relation to each other and with special reference to the facts now before us. To this end it is desirable to confront the text of the provisions
in question:

SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be
made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.

SEC. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing
by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned
so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within
sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have such
judgment set aside. . . .

By comparing these two provisions it will be seen that the operative equity which is contemplated as the basis of relief is similar, if not
identical, in both cases, inasmuch as the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, "contemplated in section 113, is
substantially the same as the "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence" of section 513. It is true that fraud is not mentioned as
aground of relief in section 113; but as was indicated in Mortera and Eceiza vs. West of Scotland Insurance Office, Ltd. (36 Phil. Rep.,
994), if a judgment is procured by concealed fraudulent practices the party injured may sometimes at least be relieved on the ground that
there was an excusable neglect on his part in failing to discover and defeat such practice. With this prefatory observation we proceed to
consider the restrictions placed upon the use of the remedy conceded in section 513.
The first point to which we direct our comment has reference to the lack of an adequate remedy in the Court of First Instance. It is
expressly declared in section 513 that the remedy granted thereby is available only in case "the Court of First Instance which rendered
the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court." A moment's inspection of the entire section is
sufficient to show that the quoted words are not homogeneous with the remainder of the section, and moreover they are not well adjusted
to the sense and effect of section 113. The inference is plain that they were inserted in section 513 probably by way of amendment and
by a person other than the original author. The person who wrote these words evidently supposed that by the mere fact of adjournment
a Court of First Instance loses the power to entertain an application for relief of the character here contemplated. It is quite obvious,
however, that the power granted in section 113 continues for six months regardless of the adjournment of the court. In our judicial system
a Court of First Instance exists in each province, and a clerk is maintained at the place appointed for the holding of court, whose duty it
is to receive and file applications, petitions, and complaints of all sorts. Consequently when an application for relief against any judgment
is properly made under section 113, and filed in the court, the matter is before the judge for action upon the convening of the next session.
The mere fact of adjournment cannot really have the effect of shortening the period of six months allowed in section 113. In many
American jurisdictions, however, the ending of the term of court terminates absolutely the power of the court over its judgments. To a
person whose mind is imbued with this idea, the words "When . . . the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned" can only be understood as referring loosely to cases where the Court of First Instance has by the affluxion of time lost all
power to set aside or modify its judgment; and this we consider to be its true meaning. The consequence is that the remedy conceded in
section 513 is available, other conditions concurring, whenever the Court of First Instance is powerless to grant relief, without regard to
the six months limitation fixed in section 113. The sense of this construction may perhaps be further elucidated by saying that the
controlling idea is the want of adequate remedy in the Court of First Instance; and the reference to final adjournment in section 513 is to
be taken merely as explanatory of the want of remedy in that court and not as embodying any absolute restriction upon the remedy
conceded in section 513.

It may be argued that the words "and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate
remedy exists in that court" were intended to be applicable exclusively to the case where the Court of First Instance might, if not already
adjourned, grant relief under section 113, but is prevented from so doing solely by reason of the fact of adjournment. This would seem at
first blush to be the literal sense of the words used, but it gives to the provision an application so narrow as to defeat the manifest purpose
of the legislator; for under section 113 the power of the Court of First Instance to grant relief is limited to applications made within six
months after entry of the judgment against which relief is sought. If the meaning be as here suggested, the relief grantable by the Supreme
Court under section 513 would also be necessarily limited to applications made within six months, or at most, within sixty days after the
expiration of six months, and then only when it should appear that the lower court had finally adjourned before the six months within which
it could have granted relief had expired. In this view the sole function served by section 513 is to make sure that a person may obtain
relief in the Supreme Court whenever the Court of First Instance had adjourned before six months after judgment entered; and no relief
could be granted by the Supreme Court upon applications made after the expiration of eight months from the date of the judgment.

We consider this interpretation incorrect. It can hardly be supposed that section 513 would have been incorporated in the Code if the only
idea was to enable a party having a right to relief in the Court of First Instance under section 113 to direct his petition to the Supreme
Court only when the Court of First Instance has adjourned prior to the end of six months after judgment entered. If such were the idea,
the provision in question is, as we have already seen, superfluous. The real purpose of section 513 in our opinion is to enable an injured
party under the conditions stated to apply to the Supreme Court without reference to the six months limitation expressed in section 113;
and the expression "when the Court of First Instance . . . has finally adjourned," as used in section 513, must not be understood as
referring exclusively to adjournment within six months after judgment entered.

It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the words used
may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the legislature had in view. It is declared in
article 1281 of the Civil Code that if the words of a contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail. This rule is there stated with respect to the interpretation of contracts; but the same idea may be accepted, though
guardedly, as applicable in the interpretation of statutes, and more especially those of a remedial nature. Statutes of this kind are liberally
construed to promote the object which the legislature may be supposed to have had in view.

From what has been said it will be seen that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain a petition of the character of that now
before us begins in point of time when the period has passed within which it was competent for the Court of First Instance to entertain an
application under section 113; and apart from the requirement that the application must be made to the Supreme Court within two months
after the petitioner first learns of the rendition of judgment against which relief is sought, there is no absolute limit to the period within
which the application may be made. But of course if relief from a judgment is sought by timely application in the Court of First Instance,
and the application is there denied, no petition based on the same ground will thereafter be entertained in the Supreme Court under
section 513, as the proper remedy in that case would be to appeal from the action of the Court of First Instance. (Rabajante vs. Moir and
Rances, 28 Phil. Rep., 161.)

Proceeding now to a further comparison of sections 113 and 513, it is noteworthy that while the power of the Court of First Instance to
grant relief under section 113 extends to the setting aside of any judgment, order or proceeding whatever, the power of the Supreme
Court under section 513 is limited to granting a new trial upon judgments rendered upon default.

Now what is the meaning of "judgment rendered upon default," as used in section 513? The reference is of course to the default mentioned
in section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Simon vs. Castro and Castro, 6 Phil. Rep., 335,337.) A default, such as is there intended,
can only arise in contentious litigation where a party who has been impleaded as a defendant and served with process fails to appear at
the time required in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the rules of the court. The proceeding to probate a will is not a
contentious litigation in any sense, because nobody is impleaded or served with process. It is a special proceeding, and although notice
of the application is published, nobody is bound to appear and no order for judgment by default, is ever entered. If the application is not
opposed, the court may allow the will on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only (sec. 631, Code Civ. Proc.), provided
none of the reasons specified in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure for disallowing the will are found to exist. If any interested
person opposes the probate, the court hears the testimony and allows or disallows the will accordingly. From such judgment any interested
person may appeal to the Supreme Court within twenty days. (Sec. 781, Code Civ Proc.) Though the action taken by a Court of First
Instance in thus allowing or disallowing a will is properly denominated a judgment, it is not a judgment rendered upon default even though
no person appears to oppose the probate.

It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section 513 can have no application to the order of May 20, 1918, legalizing the will of
Juan Pons y Coll; and this is necessarily fatal to the petition before us. This consequence follows regardless of any irregularities that may
have occurred in the Court of First Instance in admitting the will to probate and regardless of any error which that court may have
committed in the action taken upon the proof submitted at the hearing. It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed,
or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his desires
with regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud had been charged — as, for instance, if it were alleged that the purported will is
forged document — the remedy, if any exists, would not be found in a proceeding under section 513, but in an original action in the Court
of First Instance. It thus becomes unneccessary to inquire whether the will in question was in fact executed in conformity with the
requirements of law — either of these Islands or of Spain.

As a result of this decision it cannot be denied that, without any fault on the part of the petitioner or her attorneys, she has been deprived
not only of the opportunity of opposing the will and appealing from the order of probate but also of the opportunity of applying to the Court
of First Instance for relief under section 113. Even assuming that she could have procured the disallowance of the will by either of those
methods — a point upon which no pronouncement can here be made — it is obvious that the impossibility of her thus obtaining relief was
due to circumstances peculiar to this case; and the possibility of occassional hardship cannot affect the validity of our procedure for the
probate of wills (Estate of Johnson, supra.)

A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control in a
certain degree the disposition of his property after his death. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution and
proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provisions that after death of the testator his will may
be judicially established in court. The action of the court in admitting a will to probate has all the effect of a judgment; and as such is
entitled to full faith and credit in other courts. The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to be in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, and upon this idea the decree of probate is held binding on all persons in interest, whether they appear to contest the
probate or not. The proceeding is not a contentious litigation; and though the persons in interest are given an opportunity to appear and
reasonable precautions are taken for publicity, they are not impleaded or required to answer.

As has been repeatedly stated in the decisions of this court, the probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise
involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons y Coll, it should appear that
any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition
made by law must prevail. The petitioner is therefore free to appear in the Court of First Instance at the proper juncture and discuss the
questions of the validity of such provisions of the will as affect her interests adversely; and so far as we can see, on the facts before us,
this is her only recourse. But if the will in question was in fact proved as the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to this testator.

After the resolution embodied in the preceding opinion had been adopted by the court, but before the decision had been promulgated,
the attorneys for the petitioner moved that an order be entered for the submission of evidence and that the clerk of this court be appointed
commissioner to take the same, upon designation by him of the time and place therefor.

The step indicated would be proper if the facts stated in the petition had been found sufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief, but inasmuch
as the petition is in our opinion insufficient, the making of the order suggested becomes unneccessary.

In this connection it may be well to estate that when a petition for relief in the exercise of our original jurisdiction is presented to this court,
we are accustomed to consider the case as being at all times before us for the purpose of determining the legal sufficiency of the petition;
and when it is found at any stage of the proceeding that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief of
any sort, it is our practice to enter an order upon our own motion dismissing the petition. Where the defect apparent in the petition is of a
sort that might be cured by amendment, the order of dismissal is made conditional upon the failure of the petitioner to amend within a
period stated. On the other hand where the defect is manifestly incurable it is proper to make the order of dismissal absolute, and such
appears to be the correct practice.

In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the purpose of explaining the situation more clearly, permitted ourselves to refer
to at least one detail not stated in the petition, as where we state that the will purports to disinherit the petitioner. This fact, however, if not
admitted, is incontrovertible and apparent from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point that no decisive influence
on the decision. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an expression of our opinion upon the legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively
upon the statements contained therein.

As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this court to grant relief in the case before us is really due to the fact that the remedy
conceded in section 513 admitting wills to probate. The defect from which the petition suffers is therefore not curable by amendment and
cannot be aided by the taking of proof. The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied, and judgment
absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Malcolm, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 180543 August 18, 2010

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as represented by JOVITO R. SALONGA, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY; GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the Court’s Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v.
Ermita,1 filed a petition2 under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the "amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry
on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.

Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four
Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.

As Ong’s petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28, 2007,3 petitioners-therein oppositors4 filed on August 6,
2007 a motion for voluntary inhibition, which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior to the hearing
on the motion.5 Despite the pendency of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ong’s petition on August 14
and 21, 2007. It was only by Order of September 17, 20076 that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on October 4, 2007.

Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007,7 the RTC declared petitioners in default. Petitioners’ motion to vacate the order of default was
likewise denied by Order of October 4, 2007,8 a copy of which was received by petitioners on October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the RTC
granted Ong’s petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, by Decision of October 24, 2007.9

In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public respondent "erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted;
and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong."10
The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment on the petition, with which Ong and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) complied on March 14, 2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted their Consolidated Reply on
December 10, 2008.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and the OSG claim that petitioners availed
themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification renders the petition
as unsigned pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules.

The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v. Tuazon,11 where the Court discussed the
various remedies available to a party declared in default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if
the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration. A party declared in default may thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default
and the judgment of default.12 On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners’ recourse procedurally allowable. The same, however,
cannot be said as to the choice of court forum.

The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs.13 The
rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it.
A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.14

The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule.
In fact, this valid objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If
petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.

Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating the basis thereof. In the Verification/ Certification
of the Petition, the affiant states that he "has read the same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct."15 The Rules clearly
state that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.16 Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in
the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.17
Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his identity before the notary public, as required
under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.18 The Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to the
notary public, for the jurat does not contain a statement to that effect.

Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the petition. The Rules require that the petition should
be filed with proof of service on all adverse parties, and that the failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.19

On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial
issues in the interest of justice.

In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public respondent are members of the San Beda Law
Alumni Association which, along with the school’s Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ong’s petition through
newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing the order of default without
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and
wholly unwarranted.

The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above. (underscoring supplied)

In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness, independence, impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived
to be the embodiment of such qualities, the Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in 1964. In outlining the genesis of the provision,
the Court narrated:
In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as
an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend
upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official
duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves
on grounds of prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an active part in the filing of the
case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v. Javelona paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification– those
that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.20

While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the
judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on
whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode
the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and
predilections are many and varied.21

In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently
and decided based on its peculiar circumstances.

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test,
the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The
discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as
they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.22

Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its reality, in order to provide "good, sound or
ethical grounds" or "just and valid reasons" for inhibition.23 Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence and without fear or favor.24 In Gochan v. Gochan,25 the Court elucidated further:

Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them
to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of
judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed,
especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably– both to
the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.26 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc.27 where the judge’s right to inhibit was weighed
against his duty to decide the case without fear of repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would
open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause,
and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice.28

A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in a case brought before him.29 In the
present case, petitioners cite public respondent’s affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their
motion for the voluntary inhibition of public respondent.

Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated
from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell partiality.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties,
however.30 In one case,31 the Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.

Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on
the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court
who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-
oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to
automatically inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come before him
or her for action.

A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity,
and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.32 (underscoring supplied)

The added fact that the law school’s alumni association published statements in support of Ong’s application cannot lend credence to the
imputation of bias on the part of pubic respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent
actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni association’s stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that
the alumni association’s statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.

Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved the motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was
filed. Since the personal process of "careful self-examination"33 is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as
the factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from there on the resolution of the motion enters the
subjective phase.

That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly
and early on established. Hence, this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer required a
hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not prejudice petitioners.

In one case,34 it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order the filing of comments or oppositions to the motion
before the motion is resolved. The parties may orally argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court may rule on the motion.

The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration and deferment) which basically reiterated their
previous arguments, they no longer set the motion for hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments,
thereby recognizing the non-litigious nature of their allegations.

Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to public respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot
be ousted from sitting in a case by sheer agreement of the parties.

Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and declared them in default without first resolving their
pending motion. Records show that petitioners filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion35 for reconsideration of the August 7, 2007
Order and for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not appear in the various settings,
they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they deem to be an "overriding consideration" partaking of a "highly prejudicial
matter," had yet to be resolved by the trial court.36

While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order
denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of
trial.37
The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the entry of the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007
making on record the denial of the Omnibus Motion.

During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the arguments and counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong] and the
Office of the Solicitor General, and finding no cogent reasons to reconsider its earlier position, denied in open court the motion seeking a
reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 2007 which denied movants’ "Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Presiding Judge". Corollarily,
for lack of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the instant case was similarly denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation
in the original)38

The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court on the given date, during which time petitioners failed
to appear. After hearing the arguments, the trial court ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:

COURT: That’s right, so there’s no basis to overturn our previous Order denying the motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong
Now, there’s another matter being raised here, counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the proceedings What the Supreme
Court wanted is to have an Order summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought at their level. Supreme Court was expecting
that they will do so again in our level, but in… since there’s seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary arguments, so, it will,
when it reaches the Supreme Court, it will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to litigate. They’re supposed to litigate because
if they believe they’re… for the denial of the petition, unless the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should do so
without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very… an active group and Bantay Katarungan, they should be a party to expeditious resolution
of cases, not to a delay. How many are we here from government. We are here to litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied,
and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings is also denied. The settings for August were all placed in the Order which was published in the
newspaper of general circulation. We have previously agreed that we will proceed to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or
would you agree to the suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial?39 (underscoring supplied)

The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered
of record as rendered.40 The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal
force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done.41 The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc is to make a present record
of an order that the court made in a previous term, but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered has
previously been made, but, by inadvertence, has not been entered.42

In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however, by mistake or inadvertence, not placed in proper form
on record. In any event, petitioners neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such confirmatory order nor
claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their non-appearance in the scheduled hearing.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.43 For one, the grant
of such is not a matter of right for it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.44 Parties have absolutely no right to assume that
their motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing, lest they pass the blame to no one but
themselves.

Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement and (2) the merits of the
case of the movant.45 In this case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. The
Omnibus Motion was, however, "submitted ex parte and without further arguments from Oppositors,"46 drawing public respondent to
promptly resolve it by denying it.

As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to assess since they did not file any Opposition to Ong’s
Petition despite the grant to them of extension of time for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial court all related to
peripheral issues.

No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare petitioners in default after resolving the pending
incidents. It is an equally important doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the
basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion – even if later found
to be erroneous – will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the decision
or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.47

Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the judge is not a proper ground for disqualification.
Opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and
conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases
for disqualification.48

As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the trial court even granted petitioners additional
period within which to file an Opposition and in view of the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders expediting
proceedings.49

In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned.50 In
this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and
pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the
merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.

In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit himself from hearing the case.

On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October 4, 2007 declaring them in default and denying their
motion to vacate order, respectively.

Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.51 Section 5, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[t]he civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto." Records show that the notice was last published on July 26, 2007.52

The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance53 without any attached Opposition to Ong’s petition and that,
despite the grant to them of additional five days from August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a submission. Petitioners do not contest the
trial court’s earlier observation that at the August 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners’ counsel undertook to submit the Opposition within the
extended period and to appear at the next hearing,54 where eventually both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming.

Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007 Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented
a prejudicial issue that should have been resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to
Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly waived other defenses or
grounds for the lifting of the default order.

For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one
who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.55

As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court,56 it noting, inter alia, that the motion was "not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed any
opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit."57
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default where such motion was not made under oath.58
Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect which caused the failure to answer.59

In this case, petitioners’ unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their failure to file an appropriate responsive pleading.
Petitioners’ persistent stance on the pendency of their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of the
nunc pro tunc order confirming the August 14, 2007 denial of such motion.

Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, for where
a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such a suspension.60 Despite the grant
of an extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ong’s Petition, even one ex abundante ad cautelam that would have
sufficiently dealt with their concern over the alleged pending incident.

Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any argument to protect whatever interest they may
have under the entry which they resist to be corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified motion
itself.61 Petitioners would later admit that they are "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" as they are acting as "judicial
monitors and observers."621âwphi1

Velayo-Fong v. Velayo63 discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:

Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that she has a meritorious defense or that something
would be gained by having the order of default set aside. The term meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of
proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually do not require such a strong showing. The test
employed appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, that is, whether there is enough evidence to
present an issue for submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the judgment is warranted
as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove to be a
useless exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she intends to present if the motion is
granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would probably be otherwise if a new trial is
granted.64 (emphasis in the original)

Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no intention to delay the case and that their defenses, if
any, deserve to see the light of day in court. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda65 did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic
requirements of a motion to lift an order of default. Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in default and deny their
motion to lift the order of default.

Respecting the trial court’s Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate their arguments against the inhibition and default orders
to conclude that the assailed decision is "insupportable."66 As lone ground, petitioners posit that the special proceedings under Rule 108
do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective adversaries since the Office of the Civil
Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the Solicitor General sided with Ong’s legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being
parties in interest in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense.67

The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,68 stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded
in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such
proceedings are adversarial in nature or "[o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it."69 In this
case, impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming an interest
under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while
petitioners’ "interest" was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading.

Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent insofar
as the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from making
a definitive pronouncement on the substantial aspect of the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation,
respondents.

G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation
, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG
KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of
Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the
Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied different periods for
appealing.

The facts are as follows:

I.Proceedings in the CB and the RTC

On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant
to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.

On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was
appointed by the Central Bank.

On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a
complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and
cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court
ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union.5

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the
Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December
10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another
Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.

In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more
than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and
executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in the
PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common
shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange
capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.

In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount
of their claim as preferred creditors.7

The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October
14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however,
the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank
and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the
Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

II.Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial
court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court
of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.

In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union
that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting
the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the
latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.

On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case
of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late.
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.

III.Present Proceedings

The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.

In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:

1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal
authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on time.

5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor
General is a superfluity.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which
allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose right to receive payment as such would accrue
only after all the creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.

3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign investment as it is understood
in law.

4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.

5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with grave abuse of discretion.

The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.

First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265
is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice
of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:

§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from: Provided, however,
that in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently
numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court.

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. —

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.

(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under
Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:

The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting claimants or several claims
upon the same subject matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel the claimants to
"interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves. (Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which
are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of
the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by
special proceeding."

To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding, the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation
of an asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner,
the petition is not intended to establish the fact of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to
liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.

It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court, nor among the special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.

We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:

§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact, shall be by special proceeding.

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is
but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file
an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the
fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a
party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims
in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant
right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action
for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of
payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the
Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of
the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit
of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration
of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As
the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-
phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking
the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the
liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the
other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order,
and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution
plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes
of the issue of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment
of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.

Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the
operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order
which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto
creates a situation where multiple appeals are allowed.

A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction
entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the insolvent are required to be
filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each
claim is considered separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing a
particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original
records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a
record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.

Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary in each and every
appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).

In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal
with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines
in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually
separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must
remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.
Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be
affirmed albeit for a different reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a
record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the
resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge
thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its
decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of
creditors, preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore,
as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the
Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the
payment of their claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the
implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority
to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith."
14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that
the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported
or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank
of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No.
265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation"
and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions
or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the
Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October
22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized
lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional
Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the
PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
(RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating
the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds
that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to
attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not
filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced
by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim
should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of
its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service
and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping,
a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far
as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This
means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of
non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of
filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent
estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case
in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a
cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim,
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate
even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court
had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money
claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the
Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or
other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever,
resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving
the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post
office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable,
Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing
were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever
practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is
the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service
or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged
for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of
Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable.
The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of
Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable
time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the
rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider
the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez,
Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other cases,
"the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the
assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the
failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the
RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of
substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled
to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the
rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng
Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and
April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to
give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO
ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA
JONGCO, respondents.

Tañada, Carreon & Tañada for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled
"Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de
Alberto, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees",
reversing the August 10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.

The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance
of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian,
against the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941
his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which, he
was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to
the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued
living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family
of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father
married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes
Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him
as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July
17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father,
docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of
the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among
themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81,
and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitles to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge
of the intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to
give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto;
that his one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and
the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).

On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and
(2) that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition
on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).

On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).

On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102).

On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104- 123). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim
is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968
(Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr.,
an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the
hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share
in said estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old
Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968
(Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.

This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 91).

Petitioners assigned the following errors:

I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL
COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

III ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET
PRESCRIBED.

IV ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING THE
INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.

V ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS
JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND
OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.

VII ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE
HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.

I. It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the
enactment of R.A. No. 1401 — creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall
beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance
of Manila over the subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and is
brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on appeal, they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.

This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court
of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners,
cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA
299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover,
there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]).

II. Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings
No. 9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the
instant case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order
to establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's
insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).

Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.

This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are
binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally
bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through
the publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar,
89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a
deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant
case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres 45 Phil. 895).

III.As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:

Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made.

Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period
expired on November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission
of the agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.

That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith
or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the
Civil Code as follows:

Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was
bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; ...

It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil
Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus,
in the case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9,
1953, had already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly
recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or
impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the
case at bar.

Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on the plea of minority under the New Civil Code
which provides:

Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents,
guardians or other legal representatives:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him,
falls squarely under the above-cited provision.

Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the
latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this
case, prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]).
In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for
acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.

Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of
prescription, for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first
rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners
is not possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, tills action
would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide that the action must be brought within four and five
years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues.
IV. Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto,
Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:

About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect
the interests of her child, Antonio, although she was already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of Antonio's infidelity and the
hallowness of his promises.

It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If
this was so, however, how can we explain her inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when
she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to have her child recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as well
as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony rendered it unworthy of belief.

... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long delay in bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate
enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most
strongly when they are threatened or invaded. (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).

This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho,
132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687
[1983]).

As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar
except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the
latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present
action to assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.'s death.

On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is prejudicial to them. Private respondents could have filed the
action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for
16 years when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become
too old to give coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:

The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from
the memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be
hopelessly lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the effect that
laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may,
according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David,
37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).

The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his supposed father's death. But such explanation
as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the
running of the prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.

Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them
to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does
not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he...
must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958; 104 PMI. 378).

V. Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals.
As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings went beyond the
issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the
Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593
[1986]).

It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate
Court are contrary to those of the trial court.

At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the view that the testimony alone of Andrea
Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the
merit of her claim being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her testimony is contradicted by the
testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no pecuniary interest
whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. They testified that during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived
with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army (Decision,
Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).

More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five children (aside from her son Antonio) with four
different men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the
trial court aptly ruled that his propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any
particular person is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).

Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father, since the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the
alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however,
found by the trial court to be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the
testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta
and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto
and Andrea Jongco which finds further proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).

In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of
Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil.
492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the
instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.

In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the Court of Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on
material points such as her claim that she was married to the deceased in 1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were
married in 1944.

The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal
while the second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of marriage certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court
of Appeals as an impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have
chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners
could have an apparent good reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.

As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides petitioners' reasons for the choice of that place, the
celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.

In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as
well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs.
Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco
vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).

After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify
the reversal of the findings of the trial court.

In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments of errors.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA
CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate
remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here,
a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein
respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon
City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth
₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner
herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed
that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of
letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not
being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the
law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita
on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10
Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.

Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no
claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate,"
considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a
joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a
hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this
regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine
‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s
unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title
or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters
which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to
inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act
is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
assignments of error:
"I RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED
EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT
HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is
merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title."

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on
respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or
probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included
in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly
adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November
4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."

Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or
considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on
the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory.
His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real
and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory,
excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows
that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be
included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership
over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:

"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor
had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there
is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that
oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor,
therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the
propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk
of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her
day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the
true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim
against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory,
however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-
off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question
arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21
Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate
forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership,
still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises
real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they
are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s
pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:

"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of
ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:

"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with
the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter
Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest
of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your
late husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen…

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?

A: Wala po."24

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad,
interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam
Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are
agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she
present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture.
Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not
strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and
that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that
if the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon
her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she
believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must
be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571
are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6476 November 18, 1955

FRANCISCO DE BORJA as Executor of the Estate of the deceased JOSEFA TANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and JOSE DE BORJA, respondents.

Alejo Mabanag and Luis Pangilinan, Jr. for petitioner.

David Guevara for respondents.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to approve and admit the record on appeal filed before
him and to give due course to the appeal. The facts involved as gathered from the record may be briefly stated as follows. On October
25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased
wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated on April 2, 1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One of the heirs who is
now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case to the Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the
appeal as granted. All the records of the case were destroyed or lost during the last Pacific war but were on January 1, 1946, reconstituted.
On March 26 of that year Francisco de Borja qualified as executor and administrator.

Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being quite weak and unable to see, on August 25,
1951, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one of the heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-administrator.
Crisanto qualified as co-administrator on August 29, 1951.

On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-
administrator, this, after holding in abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja's amended account dated March 25, 1952. Francisco,
Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja but by order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge
indirectly denied the motion for reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to
comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja.
On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja as co-administrator
and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the corresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27,
1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the
appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable. Hence, this petition for
mandamus, as already stated, to compel respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal.

An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable (See Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Liac Suy, 8 Phil., 594). On the other hand, according
to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator is
not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his
appointment is not subject to appeal. We cannot share this view. The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited.
Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator
is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator
thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a
claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a
regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to
appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all
the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances
obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one
only in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole
administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is
equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general administrator.

In view of the foregoing, holding that the appointment of a co-administrator, especially in the present case, is appealable, the petition for
mandamus is granted and respondent Judge is hereby directed to approve the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal.
No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court
of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all
of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac
including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and
at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita,
Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service
by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except
the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of
set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and
Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July
23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional
extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to
declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the
presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits
thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding,
said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP.
No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626;
(2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification
of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11 promulgated on September
30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of
the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement,
judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own
benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage
and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur
expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to
pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief
sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters
of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled
in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have
been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed
among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein
petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as
observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the
Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the
trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues
which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction
of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court
to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the
deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action
by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form
the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as
in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate
in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
court.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.