Estoppel

GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner,

vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131282; January 4, 2002]
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS

PR Bernardo Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land which had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner demanded Eradel to
vacate the premises but the latter refused to leave. Duero filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership against Eradel and two others, the Ruenas. Duero and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement wherein Ruenas
recognized the ownership and possession of Duero of the land. Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in
default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Duero presented his evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in his favor, and Eradel was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the
lot to Duero, among others. Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio
Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as
landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court
denied the motion for new trial.

An administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the
DENR

Eradel filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the
land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Such petition was denied by the trial court.

Eradel then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land
was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the MTC. The MR was denied.

Duero filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Subsequently, the Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of
execution was issued by the RTC. Eradel filed petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA ruled in Eradel’s favor maintaining that
Eradel is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the MTC had jurisdiction, and that private respondent
was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it.

HELD

NO. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense
that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence,
estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when
the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from
judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of
private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by
their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared
itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of
acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to
confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Error of Judgment | Error of Jurisdiction

ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, Et. Al., repondents
[G.R. No. 129638; December 8, 2003]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Donato, registered owner of the land in dispute located at Manila, filed a complaint before the MeTC of Manila for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and "all unknown occupants" of the subject property.

He alleged that private respondents had oral contracts of lease. Sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; Petitioner sent them a
written demand to vacate but private respondents refused to do so. Thus, petitioner filed the ejectment case against them.

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 private respondents filed a consolidated Answer wherein they denied non-payment of rentals.
They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to
purchase the subject property; and that there was a pending negotiation for the purchase and they had initiated a petition for
consignation of the rentals.

The MeTC rendered judgment against the non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises among others. As to
the 20 private respondents, the MeTC sustained their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioner’s cause of action as
not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.

Petitioner appealed to the RTC (47) of Manila. The RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA which dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner himself; and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of
the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition are not annexed.

Petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself and
the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five days later, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR submitting the duly
authenticated original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.

The CA denied petitioner’s MR and its supplement, ruling that "petitioner’s subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the
instant petition." Hence, this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUES

Whether or not the petitioner filed a proper recourse of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

HELD

NO. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the
rules of court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is
a petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the said rules. As enunciated by the court in Fortich vs. Corona: Anent the first issue, in order
to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an
error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the
jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under rule 65 of the
rules of court.
Estoppel

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth
Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager, respondents.
[0G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002]
CORONA, J.:

FACTS

Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot
No. 19 and was mortgaged to the SSS as security for their housing loan. Petitioners erroneously constructed their house on Lot 18.
Upon realizing its error, petitioners offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Petitioners continued with the
construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19
was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot
No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of
sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18. However, private respondent refused. Sps.
Gonzaga then filed an action for reformation of contract and damages with the RTC of Iloilo City.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Sps. Gonzaga filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution,
alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the HLURB pursuant to PD 957. Sps. Gonzaga
filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. They also filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment
on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.

The CA denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel.

Their subsequent MR having been denied, petitioners filed this instant petition, contending that the CA erred in dismissing the
petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if the RTC, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No.
17115.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners are estopped to assail the jurisdiction of RTC Branch 36 of Iloilo City over Civil Case no. 17115 (Petition
for Reformation of Contract and Damages) they filed before it.

HELD

YES. As [the Court] held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:

"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in
pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice cannot be tolerated –– obviously for reasons of public policy."

[The] Court affirmed the rule that a party’s active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking
the court’s authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same court’s jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously
asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against
them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them.
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan: in relation to Office

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,

vs HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Et. Al. respondents
[G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS

The Escobal is a member of the Intelligence Group of the PNP. While Escobal was conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking in Naga City he got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of a person. An amended Information was filed
with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21 charging Escobal of the crime of murder.

When arraigned, Escobal entered a not guilty plea. He filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by CA No.
408, in relation to Section 1, PD No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.

Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. He then
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case arguing that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, a preliminary hearing was conducted wherein the trial court found that the
petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the
offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by
Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information. The amendment
consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of
his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.

The petitioner filed a MR asserting that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.

The RTC reversed its decision and ruled that Escobal was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It likewise ordered the
transfer of the case as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan,
however, remanded the case to the RTC ruling that since Escobal had a salary grade of “23”, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.

Hence, Escobal filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Sandiganbayan’s ruling.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

HELD

NO. xxx for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of
official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.The amended Information filed with the
RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the
Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it
ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a
salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with
homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No.
7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.
Hierarchy of Courts

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR. Et. Al vs.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., (PIATCO), Et. Al.
[G.R. No. 155001; January 21, 2004]
PUNO, J.:

FACTS

The Philippine Government through the DOTC and MIAA issued a notice of award for the construction and development of the NAIA
IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement to PIATCO. The Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile,
and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). The 1997 Concession Agreement was
superseded by the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing certain revisions and modifications from the
original contract. A series of supplemental agreements was also entered into by the Government and PIATCO.

Various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements and to
prohibit the public respondents DOTC and MIAA from implementing them.

The Court granted the said petitions and declared the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements null and void.

Respondents claim that the cases raise factual issues, thus not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further, they allege that
although designated as petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the cases at bar are actually actions for nullity of contracts over which
the trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Even assuming that the cases at bar are special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
they contend that the principle of hierarchy of courts precludes this Court from taking primary jurisdiction over them.

ISSUE

Whether or not the filing of the petition for Certitiori and Prohibition by the petitioners directly to the Supreme Court violated the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.

HELD

NO. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts generally
applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first
instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which
depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.

It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. As the cases at bar merely concern the construction of the
Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations on undisputed contractual provisions
and government actions, and as the cases concern public interest, this Court resolved to take primary jurisdiction over them. This
choice of action follows the consistent stance of this Court to settle any controversy with a high public interest component in a single
proceeding and to leave no root or branch that could bear the seeds of future litigation. The suggested remand of the cases at bar to
the trial court will stray away from this policy.7
Hierarchy of Courts

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner,

vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 154599; January 21, 2004]

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which
pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160 constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

The Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code which provides that: There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the
provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of
representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the
barangay elections.

Respondent Mayor, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to
implement the ordinance.

Hence, this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by the Liga. The Liga assailed the enactment of Ordinance No. 8039 and
E.O. No. 011 for being contrary to the LGU which grants the Liga the power to enact rules on the conduct of the election of the Liga
members.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent city council of manila and City Mayor of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, when it enacted city ordinance no. 8039 s. 2002 and issued executive order no. 011, respectively.

HELD

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be
invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly
pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by
respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of
the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the
petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
Estoppel

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.
[G.R. No. 139791; December 12, 2003]

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS

Respondent purchased condominium unit (Unit 703) from petitioner Manila Bankers. Consequently, petitioner, through its President
executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that Unit 703 "shall substantially be completed
and delivered" to the respondent "within fifteen (15) months" from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990.

However, petitioner failed to complete the unit on May 8, 1990. Subsequent notices to move in by respondent were not complied
with by the petitioner as the unit remain unliveable. On October 1990, respondent then sent a demand letter to petitioner for the
payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages.

On April 12, 1991, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit. Thus, respondent’s cause of
action has been limited to his claim for damages.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. Petitioner MR was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petitioner for review on Certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court’s finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case of specific performance filed against it by the respondent.

HELD

YES. While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed
and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s
jurisdiction.

On petitioner’s claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that "the
factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals." Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are
indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record
or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. These exceptions are not present here.
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court: Criminal Cases Against Judges

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent.
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370; April 25, 2003]

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

A case for falsification of public document against Judge Hurtado was filed in the MTC of of Koronadal, South Cotabato wherein
respondent Judge Sardido was the presiding judge.

Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court claiming that
Circular No. 3-89 requires "all cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts
apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and
property, etc." to be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado asserted that since the case against him is one involving a
judge of a lower court, the same should be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-89.

The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtado’s motion, arguing that the case against Judge Hurtado is not within the scope of
Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an IBP-initiated case. Moreover, the offense charged was committed in 1993 when Judge Hurtado
was still a clerk of court and ex-officio notary public.

Judge Sardido issued an Order forwarding to the Supreme Court the case of Judge Hurtado.

Then Court Administrator issued a Memorandum stating that Circular No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the
IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such
justices and judges.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Falsification case against Judge Hurtado is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

HELD

NO. All administrative cases against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.

However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is administrative and not criminal in nature. The cases
referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys, including justices of
appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. The Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute administrative
cases against erring lawyers. However, under Circular No. 3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action all administrative cases filed with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. As
mandated by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power to discipline administratively justices of appellate courts and
judges of lower courts.

Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial courts
retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts. This is
clear from the Circular directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed against justices of appellate
courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an administrative case filed
with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law.