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A constitutional provision is self-executing when it can be given effect

without the aid of legislation, and there is nothing to indicate that legislation
is intended to make it operative. For example, a constitutional provision that
anymunicipality by vote of four-sevenths of its qualified electors may issue
and sell revenue bonds in order to pay for the cost of purchasing a
municipally owned public utility is self-executing and effective without a
legislative enactment.
Constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely set forth a line
of policy or principles without supplying the means by which they are to be
effectuated, or if the language of the constitution is directed to the
legislature.As a result, a constitutional provision that the legislature shall
direct by law in what manner and in what court suits may be brought against
the state is not self-executing.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions


have been generally ed upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be


considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[49]

In further discussing self-executing provisions, this Court


stated that:
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from
a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing
a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.[50]

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and


security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense
that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without
need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the
constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of
ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic.
The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of
being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of full
protection to labor and security of tenure, when examined in
isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation
possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any
form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation
implies an unimpeachable right to continued employmenta
utopian notion, doubtlessbut still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still
needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to
ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the
labor sector, but of the employers as well. Without specific and
pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.

Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own,


be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the
dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to
serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers
of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require
legislative enactments for their enforceability.

An employer is free to manage and regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all
phases of employment, which includes hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and
manner of work, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, lay-off of
workers, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. While the law recognizes and safeguards
this right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives, such right should
not be abused and used as a tool of oppression against labor. The company’s prerogatives must be
exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. A priori, they are not absolute
prerogatives but are subject to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements and the general
principles of fair play and justice. The power to dismiss an employee is a recognized prerogative that
is inherent in the employer’s right to freely manage and regulate his business. x x x. Such right,
however, is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.
Thus, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of the law and pursuant to
the basic tenets of equity, justice and fair play. It must not be done arbitrarily and without just cause."

Labor; as Property Right (2006)


What property right is conferred upon an employee once there is an employer-employee
relationship? Discuss briefly. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

His employment is not merely a contractual relationship. One’s employment is a property right
within the mantle of constitutional protection (Callanta v. Carnation Phil., No. L-70615, October
28, 1986). Hence, the employee enjoys security of tenure and he cannot be dismissed except for
cause and only after due process. The worker is thus protected and insulated against any
arbitrary deprivation of his job (Philips Semi Conductors [Phils.] v. Fadriquela, G.R. No. 141717,
April 14, 2004).

E-E Relationship; Workers paid by Results (2004)

B. TRX, a local shipping firm, maintains a fleet of motorized boats plying the island barangays of
AP, a coastal town. At day’s end the boat operators/crew members turn over to the boat owner
their cash collections from cargo fees and passenger fares, less the expenses for diesel fuel,
food, landing fees and spare parts. Fifty percent (50%) of the monthly income or earnings
derived from the operations of the boats are given to the boatmen by way of compensation.
Deducted from the individual shares of the boatmen are their cash advance and peso value of
their absences, if any. Are these boatmen entitled to overtime pay,

holiday pay, and 13th month pay? (5%)


SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If the boatmen are considered employees, like jeepney drivers paid on a boundary system, the
boatmen are not entitled to overtime and holiday pay because they are workers who are paid
by results. Said workers, under the Labor Code are not entitled, among others, to overtime pay
and holiday pay. In accordance with the Rules and Regulations implementing the 13th month
pay law, however, the boatmen are entitled to the 13th month pay. Workers who are paid by
results are to be paid

their 13th month pay.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The arrangement between the boat owner and the boat operators/crew members partook
of the nature of a joint venture. The boatmen did not receive fixed compensation as they shared
only in the cash collections from cargo fees and passenger fares, less expenses for fuel, food,
landing fees and spare parts. It appears that there was neither right of control nor actual
exercise of such right on the part of the boat owner over the boatmen. It is clear that there was
no employer employee

relationship between the boat owner and the boatmen. As such, these boatmen are not
entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay.
E-E Relationship; Working Student & School (1997)

Ruben Padilla entered into a written agreement win Gomburza College to work for the latter in
exchange for the privilege of studying in said institution. Ruben’s work was confined to keeping
clean the lavatory facilities of the school. One school day, Ruben got into a fist fight with a

classmate, Victor Monteverde, as a result of which the latter sustained a fractured arm. Victor
Monteverde filed a civil case for damages against Ruben Padilla, impleading Gomburza College
due to the latter’s alleged liability as an employer of Ruben Padilla. Under the circumstances,
could Gomburza College be held liable by Victor Monteverde as an employer of Ruben Padilla?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Gomburza College is not liable for the acts of Ruben Padilla because there is no employer
employee relationship between them. As provided in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code “there is no employer-employee relationship between students on one hand,
and schools, colleges, or universities on the other, where students work with the latter in
exchange for the privilege to study free of charge, provided the students are given real
opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable and necessary to finish their chosen
courses under such arrangement.”

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;

Gomburza College can be held liable by Victor Monteverde as an employer of Ruben Padilla.
Applying the control test, the College is the employer of Padilla because in the latter’s work of
keeping clean the lavatory facilities of the school, he is under the control of the College as
regards his employment. However, Ruben Padilla was not acting within his assigned tasks. Art.
2180. New Civil Code provides: The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 (Quasi-delicts) is
demandable xxx (also from) employers (who) shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees xxx acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.” It could be argued that Ruben Padilla was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks; thus, his employer, Gomburza College is not liable.

Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived
of property without due process of law. Protected property includes the right to
work and the right to earn a living. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[3] the Court held that:

A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning


of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right
to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which
normally constitutes an actionable wrong. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the right to
bargain for better terms in an employment contract and the right to enforce those
terms. If protected property does not include these rights, then the right to work
and the right to earn a living would become empty civil liberties the State can
deprive persons of their right to work and their right to earn a living by depriving
them of the right to negotiate for better terms and the right to enforce those terms.

Social Justice as Guiding Principles in Labor (2003)

May social justice as a guiding principle in labor law be so used by the courts in sympathy with
the working man if it collides with the equal protection clause of the Constitution? Explain. 5%

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The State is bound under the Constitution to afford full protection to Labor; and when
conflicting interests collide and they are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the law
should accord more sympathy and compassion to the less privileged workingman. (Fuentes v.
NLRC. 266 SCRA 24 f 19971) However, it should be borne in mind that social justice ceases to be
an effective instrument for the “equalization of the social and economic forces” by the State
when it is used to shield wrongdoing. (Corazon Jamer v. NLRC. 278 SCRA 632 F1 99711).

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:


No, social justice as a guiding principle in law may not be used by the courts if it collides with
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Social justice is not a magic wand applicable in
all circumstances. Not all labor cases will be automatically decided in favor of the worker.
Management has also rights which are entitled to recognition and protection; justice must be
dispensed according to facts and law; and social justice is not designed to destroy or oppress
the employer.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

E-E Relationship; Workers paid by Results (2004)

B. TRX, a local shipping firm, maintains a fleet of motorized boats plying the island barangays of
AP, a coastal town. At day’s end the boat operators/crew members turn over to the boat owner
their cash collections from cargo fees and passenger fares, less the expenses for diesel fuel,
food, landing fees and spare parts. Fifty percent (50%) of the monthly income or earnings
derived from the operations of the boats are given to the boatmen by way of compensation.
Deducted from the individual shares of the boatmen are their cash advance and peso value of
their absences, if any. Are these boatmen entitled to overtime pay,

holiday pay, and 13th month pay? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the boatmen are considered employees, like jeepney drivers paid on a boundary system, the
boatmen are not entitled to overtime and holiday pay because they are workers who are paid
by results. Said workers, under the Labor Code are not entitled, among others, to overtime pay
and holiday pay. In accordance with the Rules and Regulations implementing the 13th month
pay law, however, the boatmen are entitled to the 13th month pay. Workers who are paid by
results are to be paid

their 13th month pay.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The arrangement between the boat owner and the boat operators/crew members partook
of the nature of a joint venture. The boatmen did not receive fixed compensation as they shared
only in the cash collections from cargo fees and passenger fares, less expenses for fuel, food,
landing fees and spare parts. It appears that there was neither right of control nor actual
exercise of such right on the part of the boat owner over the boatmen. It is clear that there was
no employer employee

relationship between the boat owner and the boatmen. As such, these boatmen are not
entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay.
E-E Relationship; Working Student & School (1997)

Ruben Padilla entered into a written agreement win Gomburza College to work for the latter in
exchange for the privilege of studying in said institution. Ruben’s work was confined to keeping
clean the lavatory facilities of the school. One school day, Ruben got into a fist fight with a

classmate, Victor Monteverde, as a result of which the latter sustained a fractured arm. Victor
Monteverde filed a civil case for damages against Ruben Padilla, impleading Gomburza College
due to the latter’s alleged liability as an employer of Ruben Padilla. Under the circumstances,
could Gomburza College be held liable by Victor Monteverde as an employer of Ruben Padilla?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Gomburza College is not liable for the acts of Ruben Padilla because there is no employer
employee relationship between them. As provided in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code “there is no employer-employee relationship between students on one hand,
and schools, colleges, or universities on the other, where students work with the latter in
exchange for the privilege to study free of charge, provided the students are given real
opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable and necessary to finish their chosen
courses under such arrangement.”

https://subaylawco23.weebly.com/labor-bqa.html
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
Gomburza College can be held liable by Victor Monteverde as an employer of Ruben Padilla.
Applying the control test, the College is the employer of Padilla because in the latter’s work of
keeping clean the lavatory facilities of the school, he is under the control of the College as
regards his employment. However, Ruben Padilla was not acting within his assigned tasks. Art.
2180. New Civil Code provides: The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 (Quasi-delicts) is
demandable xxx (also from) employers (who) shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees xxx acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.” It could be argued that Ruben Padilla was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks; thus, his employer, Gomburza College is not liable.

Social justice as a guiding principle in Labor Law can be implemented side by side with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. In implementation of the principle of social justice, the
Constitution commands that the State shall afford protection to labor. Thus Labor Law may be
pro-labor in the sense that labor is given certain benefits not given to management. But this is
not necessarily violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because said clause
allows reasonable classification.

Interpretation of Labor Laws (1998)

3. Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that in case of doubt in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
doubt shall be resolved in favor of labor. Article 1702 of the Civil Code also provides that in case
of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer. Mica-Mara company assails the validity of these statutes on the
ground that they violate its constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Is the contention
of Mica Mara Company tenable? Discuss fully
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the Constitution provides that the state shall afford full protection to labor. Furthermore,
the State affirms labor as a primary economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

a) No, because a law which promotes a constitutional mandate does not violate the equal
protection clause. The constitutional mandate is for the State to afford full protection to labor
such that, when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced by the sympathy the law
should accord the underprivileged.

b) The contention of Mica-Mara Company is not tenable. The constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws is not violated by reasonable classification. Thus, it is constitutionally
possible to treat workers differently from employers. The social justice principle embodied in
the Constitution could be the basis for treating workers more favorably than employers, in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and of its implementing
rules and regulations.

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