PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

186227 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

Plaintiff-Appellee, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
Present: unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two
(0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
CARPIO,* J. known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA, CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A.
ABAD, and No. 9165).[3]
MENDOZA, JJ.
Criminal Case No. 10251
Promulgated: That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4,
Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Accused-Appellant. July 20, 2011
without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one
(0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
DECISION known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art.
II of R.A. No. 9165).[4]
FACTS:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response RTC RULING

(RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain
Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a
buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric
Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces
of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
An information was filed thereafter.
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4,
Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
In its Omnibus Judgment[5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC
found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged,
the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen
Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug,
as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where
the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As
such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced
 to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused
Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing
0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six
(6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as
maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it
appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of
sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust
operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no
longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in
accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law,[32] the laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a
suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which
provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted
and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
 However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that
while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still
be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt,
Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with
this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which
now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:[35]
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.
Sec. 10, 7610

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years
can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as
to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and
academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the
appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at ESTER MABUNOT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, Respondent.
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA,
the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he RESOLUTION

FACTS:
The Information indicting the petitioner reads:
That on or about Sept. 14, 2007, in the morning thereof, inside one of the
classrooms at the Paracelis National High School, Butigue, Paracelis,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
[petitioner,] with intent to physically abuse and with cruelty, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, box Shiva Baguiwan, a minor
who is 14 years and 5 months old, on the left side below her ribs[,] which
caused the latter to lose consciousness, to the damage and prejudice of the
said minor-victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty.”
In the course of the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) private
complainant Shiva Baguiwan (Shiva); (b) Mercy Baguiwan, Shiva's mother;
(c) Melanie Lipawen (Melanie)8 and James Aquino (James), students at
Butigue National High School (BNHS); (d) PO2 Naida Dumjalan, Women
and Children's Desk Officer assigned to handle Shiva's complaint; and (e) Dr.
Jessie Guimbatan, government doctor who provided with Shiva medical
treatment.9chanrobleslaw
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that Shiva and the
petitioner were classmates at BNHS. On September 14, 2007, at around 11:00
a.m., Shiva and her group were sewing inside the classroom when the
petitioner, who was then under the influence of alcohol, arrived. The
petitioner twisted the arm of Michael Fontanilla, strangled James and boxed
William Thomas (William). The rest of their classmates ran away, but the
petitioner went after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving the latter
with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was thereafter taken to Potia
District Hospital, where she stayed for two days. Before finally leaving, the
petitioner also boxed Dennis Kenept (Dennis). Back then, Shiva was 14 years
old, while the petitioner was 19. The petitioner dropped out from BNHS after
the incident.
On its part, the defense presented the following as witnesses: (a) the
petitioner; (b) Consolacion Saludo (Consolacion), teacher at BNHS; (c)
Dennis; and (d) Eva Joy Malindao (Eva), also a student at
BNHS.11chanrobleslaw
The testimonies of the defense witnesses tend to prove that on September 14,
2007, at around 10:30 a.m., the class, to which both Shiva and the petitioner
belonged, was doing its Technology Livelihood Education project. William
suddenly threw an object at the petitioner's back. The petitioner reacted by
boxing William. When the petitioner stepped out of the room, Dennis
followed him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva came to pacify
them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground. The petitioner
posited that since he and Dennis were grappling at that time, there cannot be
any certainty as to who actually injured Shiva.
Ruling of the RTC
On April 15, 2010, the RTC rendered its Judgment, the fallo of which reads
as follows:
Wherefore, the Court finds that the [petitioner] is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged as principal by direct participation and is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, 9 months, and 11 days of
prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and 4 months of prision
mayor as maximum, and to pay [Shiva] the amount of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC convicted the petitioner on the basis of the grounds cited below:
The evidence is positive and convincing that an act of cruelty and physical
abuse has been inflicted upon a female child of fourteen (14) years of age by
the [petitioner,] who was an adult of twenty (20) years of age. The credible
evidence clearly demonstrates that the [petitioner] boxed the left side of
[Shiva's] body causing excruciating pain[,] which made the latter feel dizzy
and lose consciousness. The medical findings confirm that a rib of [Shiva]
was fractured[,] which caused pain even long after the incident. It is not hard
to imagine that a bare fist of a twenty[-]year[-]old male could fracture a rib
of a frail fourteen[-]year[-]old female. The testimonies of [Shiva], [Melanie],
and [James] are found to be clear, candid and convincing narrations of what
happened, of how the [petitioner] maltreated and injured [Shiva].
x x x [T]here is nothing on record which shows any evil or improper motive
on [the part of the prosecution witnesses] to falsely testify or frame up the
[petitioner,] hence, said testimonies are given full faith and credence x x x.
The physical and medical evidence[,] which show that [Shiva] suffered rib
fracture that caused great pain[,] highly corroborate and confirm that [Shiva]
was hurt by the [petitioner] with a hard fist blow, which made her
unconscious and [led her to] be hospitalized.
x x x [T]he defense of the [petitioner] that he did not box [Shiva], but that the
latter fell to the ground when she was shoved as she tried to pacify the former
and [Dennis,] who were exchanging blows and grappling with each other, has
to be taken with a grain of salt. x x x [I]t is highly improbable that a young
lass[,] who is not even related to the combatants [,] would dare to put herself
at risk to serious and inevitable injury by trying to pacify two older male
persons[,] who were exchanging hard blows. That would not conform to
ordinary human experience; the natural thing for the young girl was to shout
or run[,] which [Shiva] did but the [petitioner] still got near and boxed her.
[It] is also highly indicated and very credibly established by the evidence that
the [petitioner] boxed and maltreated four other classmates. x x x All these
indicate that the [petitioner] was on a rampage and had no qualm[s] about
inflicting injury upon a helpless female classmate. At his age of twenty x x
x, and in addition to the fact that he was under the influence of liquor, the
[petitioner] easily terrorized and frightened his classmates. x x x The denial
of the [petitioner] can not be accorded greater evidentiary value than the
declarations of credible prosecution witnesses that the [petitioner] boxed
[Shiva] x x x.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the CA
In the appeal filed before the CA, the petitioner claimed that the injury
inflicted on Shiva was not intentional or deliberate. The petitioner insisted
that he could not have adopted a deliberate design to injure Shiva since he
was trading punches with Dennis. Further, Article 26515 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), and not R.A. No. 7610, should be the applicable provision. A
single and unintended act of shoving Shiva while the petitioner was engaged
in a fist fight with Dennis can hardly be considered as within the definition
of child abuse under R.A. No. 7610.16chanrobleslaw
On April 20, 2012, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty
imposed and the damages awarded. The CA instead sentenced the petitioner
to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay Shiva actual damages
in the amount of P18,428.00.
The CA explained its disquisition, viz:
[T]he [petitioner] wants Us to weigh the credibility of prosecution witnesses
vis-a-vis the defense witnesses, a task entrusted to the trial court. x x x [T]he
trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.

It is observed that although [Dennis], [Eva] and [Consolacion] testified for
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in the
herein assailed Resolution19 dated October 29, 2012.
Issues
Unperturbed, the petitioner presents for the Court's resolution the issues of
whether or not the CA committed reversible errors in (1) ruling that the injury
inflicted on Shiva was intentional and deliberate, and (2) applying the much
higher penalty provided for under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610, instead of
Article 265 of the RPC for slight physical injuries.
The petitioner claims that he and Dennis were trading punches when they saw
Shiva slump to the ground. In Dennis' testimony, he was uncertain as to who
actually shoved Shiva. Thus, the injury sustained by Shiva merely resulted
from an accident and is not within the contemplation of child abuse under
R.A. No. 7610.
The petitioner also posits that Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes acts of
child abuse which are not covered by the RPC. Assuming arguendo that the
petitioner caused Shiva's injury, Article 265 of the RPC should instead be
applied.
In its Comment,23 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
petitioner raises factual issues. Besides, even if the merits of the petition are
to be considered, the prosecution witnesses, namely, Melanie and James,
positively identified the petitioner as the one, who had boxed Shiva. The RTC
and CA properly accorded probative weight to the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the conviction and the sentence, but imposes interest on
the amount of actual damages awarded by the CA.
The foregoing argument is untenable.
"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala
in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise,
no crime is committed."
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently
wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the
offender.
In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were
to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to
harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He
clearly intended to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but
Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot
escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.27chanrobleslaw
On the application of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610
The petitioner avers that Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 only
penalizes acts of child abuse which are not covered by the RPC. He insists
that the acts complained of should fall under Article 265 of the RPC, which
imposes a lighter penalty.
The claim is unpersuasive.
Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other
hand, R.A. No. 7610 is intended to "provide special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions, prejudicial to their development."28 Child abuse refers to
the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual
abuse or exploitation of a child.29 Physical injury includes but is not limited
to lacerations, fractured bones, turns, internal injuries, severe injury or
serious bodily harm suffered by a child.30chanrobleslaw
It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which
fractured her rib. Being a child, she is under the protective mantle of R.A.
No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a child, whether the sam habitual
or not.31 Moreover, the Implementing Rules and Regulation R.A. No. 7610
even explicitly refer to fractured bones as falling within coverage of physical
injuries, which may be inflicted on a child, for which an accused shall be held
liable. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, s penalties are prescribed to deter and
prevent violations of its provisions.
On the penalties imposed by the courts a quo
The RTC imposed upon the petitioner an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as
maximum.
Subsequently, the CA modified the sentence to four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS Law)32
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
There are, however, instances when the penalties provided for in a special
law adopt the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC. In such cases, the
ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied
for those crimes punishable under the RPC.33chanrobleslaw
In Sanchez v. People, et al.,34 the Court is emphatic that:
[T]he penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum
period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the [RPC]. Although
R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the [RPC] for graduating penalties
by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where
the special law adopted penalties from the [RPC], the [IS Law] will apply just
as it would in felonies. In People v. Simon, the Court applied the first clause
of Section 1 of the [IS Law] to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of
Appeals, the Court applied the same principle to cases involving illegal
possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized
under special laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, a case involving
sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the [IS Law]. x
x x.35 (Citations omitted)
In the petitioner's case, the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor in
its minimum period. The minimum period is fuither subdivided into three, to
wit: (a) six (6) years and one (1) day to six (6) years and eight (8) months, as
minimum; (b) six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7)
years and four (4) months, as medium; and (c) seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to eight (8) years, as maximum.36 As there were no
established attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the CA
properly imposed the penalty of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.

As to the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, Section the IS Law

provides that it shall be within the range of the per next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. The penalty next to prision mayor in its minimum
period is prision correccional maximum period. The CA imposed four (4)
years, nine (9) months eleven (11) days of prision correccional, which falls
within the maximum range thereof. The CA imposed the minimum
indeterminate penalty w the allowable range, and the Court now finds no
compelling reaso modify the same.
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016
VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Jabalde pleaded "not guilty" in a criminal information dated October 14,
2002, for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, before the
RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 31,5 which reads:
That on December 13, 2000 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in
Barangay Cawitan, Santa Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, [Jabalde], with cruelty and with intent to
abuse, maltreat and injure one LIN J. BITOON, 8 years of age, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously slap and strike said Lin J. Bitoon,
hitting said Lin J. Bitoon on the latter's nape; and immediately thereafter[,]
[c]hoke the said offended party, causing the latter to sustain the following
injuries: Abrasions: Two (2), linear 1 cm in length at the base of the right
mandibular area; One (1), linear 1 inch at the right lateral neck; Two (2),
linear 1 cm in length at the anterior neck; and Four (4), minute circular at the
left lateral neck, which acts of sa[i]d accused caused the said offended part[y]
not only physical but also emotional harm prejudicial to his development.
CONTRARY to the aforesaid.
In its Judgment promulgated, the RTC found Jabalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610.
The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde] beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Article VI of R.A.
7610, as amended, [Jabalde] is Convicted. Appreciating in her favor the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obluscation, and applying the
provisions of the indeterminate sentence law, [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as
maximum
The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered release.
SO ORDERED.
Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde appealed to the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision with modification.19 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63,
Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
[Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on
January 4, 2011.
The Issues
Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or R.A. No. 7610.
Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in
appreciating the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute
they were, is punishable under the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which
defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be punished under the RPC
and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out in its Comment24 filed
on May 24, 2011 that since the issue was just raised for the first time on
appeal by Jabalde, this is already barred by estoppel citing the cases of People
v. Francisco25cralawred and People v. Lazaro, Jr.
The cases cited by the OSG do not apply in this case. In Francisco, the
appellant assailed the order of the trial court for failing to ascertain the
voluntariness of his plea of guilt for the records show neither proof nor a
transcript of the proceedings that the appellant indeed voluntarily made a
guilty plea and that he fully understood its import. The appellant also
maintained that he was not given the opportunity to present evidence and that
the case was submitted for decision immediately after the prosecution filed
its offer of evidence. In Lazaro, the appellant raised the buy-bust team's
alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In both
cases, this Court held that issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred
by estoppel.
However, the reliance on the foregoing cases is misplaced due to different
factual antecedents. Here, Jabalde postulates that the acts complained of do
not fall within the definition of R.A. No. 7610 and therefore, she should not
be convicted on the basis of the said law, to wit:
[Jabalde] postulates that other acts of child abuse falling under Section 10
(a), Art. II, R.A. 7610 is limited to acts not punishable under the [RPC]. As
the law is being defined in this section:
"Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
[RPC], as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period[."]
Needless to say, acts which are covered under the [RPC] will be dealt with
under the provisions of the [RPC] and definitely, out of the context of R.A.
7610, particularly Section 10 (a). In the case of [Jabalde], the act of inflicting
injuries, however minute they were, is punishable under the [RPC]
particularly Article 266 (1) which defines slight physical injuries. The act of
[Jabalde] in slapping, striking and choking [Lin], causing abrasions on the
different parts of his neck is absolutely covered within the realm of Article
266 (1). When the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period, shall be punished with
arresto menor.27 (Citations omitted)
Here, Jabalde questions the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual
circumstances of the case and is correct in claiming that the instant petition
raises pure question of law28 and not question of fact29 as being argued by
the OSG. In Cucueco v. CA,30 the Court discussed the distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact, to wit:
The distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact has long been settled. There is a "question of law" when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain
state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact"
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the
distinction is sometimes complicated. In a case involving a "question of law,"
the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires
a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance
of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual.
x x x The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing
or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise,
it is a question of fact.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
"The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is
a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the alleged falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them."
In the case on hand, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood
of the alleged facts nor the sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation
of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the case. Jabalde is simply
correct in raising the question of law in the instant petition.
Now, on the substantive issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the
case at bar, the Court agrees with the contention of Jabalde in her Reply to
OSG's Comment33 that the acts complained of do not fall within the
definition of the said law, to wit:
The [OSG] in his comment is correct in saying that the issues that could be
raised in a petition for review are purely questions of law. Guided by this
principle, [Jabalde] comes to this Court to raise a question of law. [Jabalde]
has been arguing when she availed of his right to appeal that the acts of the
[OSG] does not fall within the definition of R.A. 7610 and should not be
convicted on the basis of the said law. This is not a new matter that [Jabalde]
raised.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating
is Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(Emphasis ours)
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. -
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,35 the Court expounded the
definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case,
therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by the lower
courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court
held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to
be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse,
otherwise, it is punished under the RPC, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the
effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped
Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted
child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records
did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done
at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.36 (Emphasis ours and italics
in the original)
Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his
nape, and immediately thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the
latter to sustain injuries.37 However, the records of the case do not show that
Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Lin as a human being.
Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of reducing the value,
quality, or purity of something."38 Degradation, on the other hand, is "a
lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality."39 Webster's Third
New International Dictionary defined demean as "to lower in status,
condition, reputation, or character."40chanrobleslaw
The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage
after being informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she
thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted.
When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the
board for about five to ten minutes.41 Moreover, the testimony of the
examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the accusation that Jabalde, with
cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted.
She also testified that the linear abrasions were signs of fingernail marks. She
did not notice other injuries on the body of the victim except those on his
neck. Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color, signifying that they
were still fresh.42 (Emphasis ours)
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's
witness herself testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly
inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she
would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows.
As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the
flesh of her flesh, is the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain.
The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the
instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger
as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin,
thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the
strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was
so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent
was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a
successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?
Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party
from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.
xxxx
As found out by Dr. Muñoz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely: two linear
abrasions of 1 cm in length at the base of the right mandibular area; one linear
abrasion of 1 inch in length at the right lateral neck; two linear abrasions of
1 cm in length at the back of the neck; and four minute circular abrasions at
the left lateral neck.43 When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the
offended parly for labor or of the required medical attendance; or when there
is no proof as to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor or of
the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.44chanrobleslaw
Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde lacked the
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being as required under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610, her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element
of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
The case of Villareal v. People45 is instructing. In that case, the Court
discussed that the RPC belongs to the classical school of thought. The
criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.
The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration. In order for an
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of "dolo" or "malice".46chanrobleslaw
The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex
idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element
of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a
forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which
a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With
these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act.47
In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of
the [RPC], the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer —
iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being
of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies
the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde
slapped him on his neck and choked him,49 and that of Ray Ann that she saw
Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed it and then shouted, "Better that you
are able to free yourself because if not I should have killed you,"50 deserve
more credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin still
because the latter kept on jumping.51 The laying of the hands and the
utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the fact that Jabalde,
indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten
[10] days) when only mitigating circumstance is present in the case.57
Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to
the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,58 Jabalde shall suffer a penalty
of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution dated
January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00424 are SET
ASIDE; and a new judgment is ENTERED (a) finding petitioner Virginia
Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 2, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code, and (b) sentencing her to suffer the penalty of one (1)
day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.
one (1) day to thirty (30) days of imprisonment.52 In imposing the correct Jardeleza, J., on official business.
penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of Endnotes:
passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the RPC,53 because Jabalde
lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.54 There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due
to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.55
For passion and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it
must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was
committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the
unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind; and (3) the
passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit
of lawlessness or revenge.56 With her having acted under the belief that Lin
had killed her daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of THIRD DIVISION
passion and obfuscation.
G.R. No. 210798, September 14, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY
VILLANUEVA Y MANALILI @ BEBANG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On 18 May 2007, an Information for the violation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 9208 was
filed against accused-appellant. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That sometime during the period from April 25, 2007
up to May 17, 2007, in the city of Las Pinas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
the owner/manager of ON TAP VIDEOKE, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and hire [AAA],3 a 13- year old minor, to
work as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) of said
establishment, thereby exploiting and taking
advantage of her vulnerability as a child.
Accused-appellant challenged the RTC decision on appeal, alleging that the
lower court relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength
of the evidence for the prosecution. Accused-appellant argued that the same
set of evidence, which was the basis for granting the petition for bail, was
merely adopted in the main case. Thus, accused-appellant contends that there
can be no conclusion other than that the prosecution failed to substantiate the
allegations in the Information. Moreover, accused-appellant insisted that the
lower court erred in not giving the private complainant's Affidavit of
Desistance due weight and consideration.
The appellate court found the appeal bereft of merit. Enumerating the
different circumstantial evidence presented, the CA ruled that the conviction
was warranted. The appellate court held that the "[affidavit of desistance is]
not the sole consideration that can result to an acquittal"33 hence, in view of
the lack of circumstances to support the Affidavit of Desistance, acquittal was
not warranted. The pertinent and dispositive portions of the decision
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing upon accused-appellant the
penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P3,000,000.00. The order for the
cancellation of her permit to operate the ON TAP VIDEOKE BAR is also
correct, x x x
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated January 28, 2011 is
AFFIRMED.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution35 dated 3 October 2013, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal.
On 19 February 2014,36 we required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed a supplemental brief;37
whereas the Office of the Solicitor General adopted all the arguments raised
in its brief, in lieu of filing a supplemental brief.
Our Ruling
The crux of the controversy is whether the circumstantial pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution inexorably lead to the conclusion that accused-
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking. After a thorough review of the facts and evidence on record, we
rule for accused-appellant's acquittal.
Qualified Trafficking
The elements of trafficking in persons, derived from the expanded definition
found in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364, are
as follows:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person;" and
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
the purpose of exploitation shall still be considered "trafficking in persons"
even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the first paragraph of
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208.38 Given that the person allegedly trafficked in
the case at bar is a child, we may do away with discussions on whether or not
the second element was actually proven.
In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact that
accused-appellant is the registered owner of the On Tap Videoke Bar. The
prosecution insists that by merely being the registered owner, accused-
appellant necessarily committed the act of recruiting, maintaining or
harboring AAA. Such contention is misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or
maintaining a person for the purpose of exploitation are acts performed by
persons who may or may not be registered owners of establishments. Thus,
being the registered owner per se does not make one criminally liable for the
acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the prosecution
should have done was to prove the act of trafficking by other means, and not
by mere showing that accused-appellant was the registered owner. The
defense, on the other hand, countered the allegation by presenting testimonies
of Aquino, an employee of the videoke bar; Villanueva, Jr., manager of the
videoke bar and brother of accused-appellant; and accused-appellant herself.
The RTC found accused-appellant's denial and the corroborating testimonies
as unavailing and incredible, for the reason that such testimonies did not
come from disinterested witnesses. This Court is not unaware of the
longstanding doctrine that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses are matters best left to the trial court, which is in the best position
to observe the witnesses' demeanor while being examined.39 However, we
take exception from such rule, considering that there are facts and
circumstances which if properly appreciated, could alter the outcome of the
case. That the defense witnesses are closely related to accused-appellant —
one being the brother and manager of the videoke bar and the other being an
employee—is not a sufficient reason to disregard their testimonies. The
declaration of interested witnesses is not necessarily biased and incredible.40
More importantly, there was no evidence suggesting that the testimonies of
the witnesses were untruthful to begin with.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element—that the
recruiting, maintaining or harboring of persons is for the purpose of
exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the prosecution witnesses at the
videoke bar only on the day the rescue operation was conducted. That AAA
was exploited could not be proven by her mere presence at the videoke bar
during the rescue operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence
as to the nature of work done by AAA, if any. Testimonies as to how often
AAA was seen in the bar while entertaining customers could have also lent
credence to the prosecution's contention that she was in the videoke bar
because she was being exploited.
Lack of Direct Evidence
Since AAA was not presented in court, the prosecution was not able to offer
direct evidence showing that accused-appellant actually recruited, harbored
or maintained AAA in the videoke bar for the purpose of exploiting her.
Neither can private complainant's testimony which merely revolved around
the filing of the complaint be considered direct evidence. Private
complainant's testimony, if considered in light of all the other evidence, is
weak. Private complainant testified roughly a month after the Affidavit of
Desistance was executed and filed; thus, she had every opportunity to deny
the execution of the Affidavit during the cross-examination. Instead of
denying the veracity of such Affidavit, private complainant confirmed its
truthfulness and accuracy.41 Though it can be said that private complainant's
affirmative answers were only prompted by the leading questions asked by
the defense lawyer during cross-examination, it cannot be denied that the
prosecution did not even bother to rebuild its case during re-direct
examination. On re-direct examination, private complainant merely testified
as to matters regarding AAA's adoption.42 She also claimed that she came to
know of accused-appellant's trafficking activities through AAA's friends
whose identities she cannot remember.43 However, on re-cross examination,
private complainant admitted that she did not validate such information
before she reached out to the TV program and the
authorities.44chanrobleslaw
A review of the scarce jurisprudence on human trafficking would readily
show that a successful prosecution for human trafficking, to a certain extent,
relies greatly on the entrapment operation.45 In entrapment, ways and means
are resorted to by the authorities for the purpose of capturing the perpetrator
in flagrante delicto.46 Thus, it can be said that testimonies of the
apprehending officers regarding the entrapment operation are crucial for a
conviction, most especially in cases where the victim is unable to testify. In
People v. Casio,47 the conviction for Qualified Trafficking was brought
about by the categorical testimonies of the authorities who conducted the
entrapment, on top of the victim's testimony. In the said case, the police
operatives testified as to the actual unfolding of circumstances which led.
them to believe that a crime was being committed in flagrante delicto, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Velosa testified that their conversation
with accused went as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accused:
Chicks mo dongl (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo:
Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulal sa motel. (Are
they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel)
Accused:
Naa, hulal kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I'll get them)
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found
prospective subject.
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case.
Accused:
Kining duha kauyon mo anil? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso:
Maayo man na kaha na sila modala ug kayaf?(Well, are they good in sex?)
Similarly, the prosecution in the case at bar built their case around the
entrapment operation and the successful rescue of AAA; but unfortunately
for the prosecution, both PO2 Abas and PCI Balbontin are incompetent to
testify as to matters which occurred during the actual execution of the rescue
and entrapment because both witnesses were not present during the operation.
The testimonies of PO2 Abas and the Chief Inspector pale in comparison with
the testimonies of the police operatives in Casio.48 Oddly, the prosecution
failed to present witnesses who could testify as to the actual conversation that
transpired between the undercover authorities and AAA. The testimony of
defense witness Aquino, the waiter, is the only evidence on record which
narrated certain details surrounding the unfolding of the rescue operation.
Aquino merely observed that upon being called by the two men, who turned
out to be undercover policemen, AAA approached their table and after five
minutes, policemen announced the operation.49 AAA's act of approaching
the table of the customers after being called is not unequivocal enough as to
dispel any other possible scenarios that could have occurred during their 5-
minute conversation. In the absence of any evidence categorically showing
that a crime was being committed in flagrante delicto or that AAA was
performing the tasks of a GRO when she approached the table, this Court
cannot uphold accused-appellant's conviction based on the rescue operation
alone.
Circumstantial evidence did not
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt
While it is recognized that the lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar
the finding of guilt,50 we still hold that acquittal is in order for the reason
that the circumstantial evidence presented does not lead to the inescapable
conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime. Circumstantial
evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction only if: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.51 It is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
others, as the guilty person.52 The appellate court anchored accused-
appellant's conviction on the following circumstantial evidence:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirstly, AAA was at the On Tap Videoke when
the police, accompanied by private complainant and the crew of the TV
program XXX, conducted its rescue operation on May 16, 2007.
Secondly, while accused-appellant denied recruiting AAA, she was wearing
a sexy attire at the time of the rescue. Even defense witnesses Rosito
Villanueva, Jr. and Wilfred Aquino admitted that AAA wore sexy attires at
the videoke bar.
Notably, AAA's attire was similar to the uniform of the videoke bar's GROs.
xxx
xxxx
Thirdly, accused-appellant showed propensity of hiring workers without
permits. Although the purpose of the rescue operation was to recover AAA,
five other (5) workers of the videoke bar were also arrested and booked
because they were working thereat without the requisite Mayor's /Health
permits.
Fourthly, it appeared that AAA was doing some kind of work at the videoke
bar. As testified by defense witness Willfred Aquino and Rosito Villanueva,
Jr.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
What was she doing there aside from staying there, Mr. Witness?
A:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She was helping in the washing of the glasses in the kitchen, Sir.
xxxx
Q:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When the police arrived, AAA was there inside the Videoke Bar?
Witness:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She was at the back of the kitchen.
COURT:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
What was she doing at the kitchen wearing that seductive dress, washing
the dishes?
A:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
No, your honor. During that times she was just standing at the back and
whenever we needed something like glass, she would hand us the glass.53
We rule that the circumstantial evidence cited by the appellate court does not
lead to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the
crime, let alone that a crime was actually committed. As previously
mentioned, the mere presence of AAA at the videoke bar does not prove that
accused-appellant was maintaining or harboring her for the purpose of
exploitation. In fact, such was the holding of the RTC when it granted
accused-appellant's petition for bail. Nowhere in the text of R.A. No. 9208
can it be inferred that a presumption arises by the mere fact of presence of a
child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our survey of jurisprudence
likewise does not reveal such established presumption. More to the point, the
constitutive crime of trafficking through harboring or receipt of a person must
be specifically for purposes of exploitation. In other words, establishing mere
presence without establishing the purpose therefor cannot be considered as
an element of trafficking. In this case, the private complainant's affidavit of
desistance categorically explained the child's presence in the videoke bar—
for humanitarian reasons of providing shelter to a runaway minor.
That AAA was wearing skimpy clothing similar to those worn by the GROs
at the videoke bar during the rescue operation is not inconsistent with the
defense's position that AAA merely sought refuge and shelter at the bar after
she ran away from home. It is highly possible that AAA borrowed clothes
from the videoke bar employees, considering that she ran away from home
and was unable to take all her belongings with her. That accused-appellant
showed propensity for hiring workers without permits is irrelevant in the case
at bar. One may be equipped with the proper permits and yet still be guilty of
trafficking. Accused-appellant's propensity for not following ordinances does
not necessarily prove commission of the crime of human trafficking. Lastly,
even if it be conceded that AAA was washing dishes at the back of the
kitchen, such circumstance is still not inconsistent with the defense's position.
As a token of gratitude for allowing her to temporarily stay at the bar, AAA
could have voluntarily done the chores. From the foregoing, it is obvious that
the totality of circumstantial evidence will not lead to an inescapable
conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime charged. It bears
stressing that "where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction."54chanrobleslaw
Reproduction at trial of evidence
presented in the bail hearing
The prosecution manifested that they will adopt the evidence presented
during the hearing of the Petition for Bail as the same evidence in the main
case, with a further manifestation that other witnesses will be presented
during the trial. In fact, a side by side comparison of the RTC Order granting
accused-appellant's petition for bail and the RTC Decision convicting
accused-appellant would reveal that summaries of witnesses' testimonies
contained in the former were merely lifted and copied verbatim in the latter.
After an evaluation of the evidence and after hearing the testimonies of PO2
Abas and private complainant, the Petition for Bail was granted by the RTC,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At this moment the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations in the
information that accused recruited and hired minor [AAA] to work as Guest
Relations Officer (GRO) of her establishment, thereby exploiting and taking
advantage of her vulnerability as a child. The mere presence of the minor at
the establishment, cannot by itself, prove the fact of hiring and recruitment.
It is unfortunate at this juncture, none of the prosecution witnesses was able
to testify on this regard, and was only able to confirm the minor's presence at
the videoke bar. Even the alleged mother of the minor testified that she never
saw [AAA] drinking, smoking or singing at the establishment. She further
testified that the minor admitted to her that she was never hired to work at the
establishment and the she was only there in order for her to have a place to
stay and reside.
xxx This court is bound by the principle that in all criminal cases, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, xxx From the evidence presented
so far, without touching on the actual merits and proceedings of the instant
case, this court cannot at this point say that the evidence against the accused
is strong."55
It should be noted that when the prosecution witnesses were presented during
the bail hearing, they were subjected to cross, re-direct and re-cross-
examinations, as well as inquiries by the court; thus, as expected, the court
no longer recalled the witnesses for additional examination during the trial.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, they were only able to present one more
witness, PCI Balbontin, before they finally rested their case.
While the Court is aware that a bail hearing is merely for the purpose if
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong and that the same is not
an adjudication upon the merits, we note that in the case at bar, the RTC Order
granting the petition for bail casts doubt upon accused-appellant's conviction.
In its Order granting the petition for bail, the RTC noted that none of the
prosecution witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment.
Considering that the only additional witness the prosecution presented during
trial was PCI Balbontin, it baffles this Court why the RTC found accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt when the Chief Inspector's
testimony was limited to procedural details regarding the filing of the
complaint, forming of the task force and the interview conducted by the TV
crew. If the Chief Inspector's additional testimony was only limited to those
matters, it follows that when the prosecution rested its case, not one of their
witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment and neither did the
documentary evidence submitted establish the same. Before this Court is
essentially the same set of evidence that was evaluated by the RTC when it
ruled that the evidence of guilt was not strong; we thus see no reason why the
same set of evidence, only supplemented by a testimony regarding irrelevant
procedural matters, would warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ei incumbit probatio qui elicit,
non qui negat -- he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that the
Constitution presumes a person is innocent until he is proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.56 Countless times, this Court has elucidated that
the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on
the weakness of the defense. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. In this case, the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to pass the test of
moral certainty necessary to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. From
the foregoing, we rule that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 10 May 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI
@ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 6
of Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking. Her immediate
RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless she is being held for
another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional
Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for
immediate implementation. The Director shall submit to this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the jaction taken
thereon.
Carpio,*J., Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, ** and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
ORDER OF RELEASE
TO: The Director
Bureau of Corrections
1770 Muntinlupa City
Thru: Superintendent
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN
1550 Mandaluyong City
GREETINGS:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREAS, the Supreme Court on
September 14, 2016 promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case,
the dispositive portion of which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 10 May 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond breasonable doubt, BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y
MANALILI @ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation
of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking. Her
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless
she is being held for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Correctional
Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for
immediate implementation. The Director shall submit to this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the action taken
thereon.
SO ORDERED."
NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release
BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ BEBANG unless there are
other causes for which she should be further detained, and to return this Order
with the certificate of your proceedings within five (5) days from notice
hereof.
G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018
AAA*, Petitioner, v. BBB,* Respondent.
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify
the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468.
The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information5 which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as
follows:
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being
then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA]
mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit
relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by
his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel
Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his
mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the
damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the
aforecited law.
Contrary to law.
RULING OF THE COURT
There is merit in the petition.
"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may
be committed against women and their children:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

xxxx
As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential
elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In
Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the
elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as
follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:
xxxx
(i)
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.]
No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1)
The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2)
The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a
woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's
child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
(3)
The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
and
(4)
The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.
xxxx
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological
violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other
forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub- parts of Section 5.
xxxx
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is
the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is
the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is
necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes
is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing
mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital
infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which
psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on
the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential
and distinct element in the commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People,33 the
Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore,
the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the
original)
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As
correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the
perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal
to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous
to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses
employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been
perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal
action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and
damage are the basic elements of estafa.
The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing
offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that
a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction
where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses
in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either
province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.]35
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive
conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that
the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of
the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents
of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may
exercise jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the
information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable
cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the
same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains
imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A.
No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is
conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra- marital affair causing
the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the
same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond
the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIENVINIDO
UDANG, SR. Y SEVILLA,1 Accused-Appellant.
A single act may give rise to multiple offenses. Thus, charging an accused
with rape, under the Revised Penal Code, and with sexual abuse, under
Republic Act No. 7610, in case the offended party is a child 12 years old and
above, will not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses BIENVINIDO UDANG for the crime
of CHILD ABUSE, committed as follows:
That in the later of December, 2003, at more or less 9:00
o'clock in the evening, at Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and sexually abuse one
[AAA], 14 yrs. old, minor by committing the following
acts, to wit: accused together with Bienvinido Udang, Jr.,
Betty Udang and the offended party dr[a]nk three (3) bottles
of pocket size of [T]anduay rum in the house of the accused
and when offended party became intoxicated, accused
brought and carried her inside the room and undressed her
by removing her . . . clothes and panty and accused placed
himself on top of her and have sexual intercourse with
offended party herein, which acts of the accused had clearly
debased, degraded or demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the said minor as a human being.
Contrary to and in Violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A.
7610.4
The second Information, docketed as Family Case No. 2006-141, read:
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses BIENVINIDO UDANG for the crime
of CHILD ABUSE, committed as follows:
That in the later part of September, 2002, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and sexually abuse one [AAA], 14
yrs. old, minor by committing the following acts, to wit: accused together
with his [daughter] Betty Udang, Renate Yana and the offended party dr[a]nk
five (5) bottles of pocket size [T]anduay rum in the house of the accused and
when offended party became intoxicated, accused brought her inside his
room, her clothings (sic) were removed and then and there accused placed
himself on top of her and have sexual intercourse with the offended party
herein, which acts of the accused had clearly debased, degraded or demeaned
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said minor as a human being.
Contrary to and in Violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A.
7610.5
Udang pleaded not guilty to both charges during his arraignment on June 26,
2006.6 Joint trial then ensued.
Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City found for the
prosecution and convicted Udang of rape under Article 266-A(1) of the
Revised Penal Code,25 instead of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610.26 It ratiocinated that while the allegations in the first
and second Informations satisfied the elements of rape under the first and
third paragraphs of Article 266-A, respectively, the charges can only be one
(1) for rape under the first paragraph of Article 266-A because "[an] accused
cannot be prosecuted twice for a single criminal act."27
The trial court found that the prosecution "indubitably established"28
Udang's act of raping AAA since she "categorically narrated"29 how he took
advantage of her while she was intoxicated and that had she resisted his
advances, she would be mauled by Betty. That AAA was raped was also
supported by Dr. Revelo's finding of hymenal lacerations and excoriations on
AAA's thighs and genitalia.30
The trial court did not give credence to Udang's defense of denial and alibi,
stating that he could have requested his family members and fellow barangay
tanods, who were allegedly with him at the time of the incidents, to
corroborate his testimony but that he failed to do so. Without the
corroborating testimony of these alleged companions, his testimony was, for
the trial court, "self-serving and unworthy to be believed."31
The trial court likewise discounted Gandawali's and Orcales' testimonies for
being hearsay.32 As for Betty, the trial court found her testimony "bare"33
and "unsupported by evidence."34
In the Regional Trial Court March 12, 2012 Joint Decision,35 Udang was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both counts of rape
under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. He was
also ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages. The dispositive portion of this Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered[,] judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused BIENVINIDO UDANG y SEVILLA:
1. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code in FC-
Criminal Case No. 2006-140 and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay "AAA" P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code in FC-
Criminal Case No. 2006-141 and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay "AAA" P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.000 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)
Udang appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that he did not rape
AAA. He also claimed that the judge who penned the Decision, Judge
Richard D. Mordeno (Judge Mordeno), was not the judge who personally
heard the witnesses testify and was not able to observe their demeanor during
trial.37 Udang argued that Judge Mordeno, therefore, was not in the position
to rule on the credibility of AAA, given her "unbelievable story"38 of rape.
Udang emphasized that AAA's testimony was not credible for if she was
allegedly raped in his house in September 2002, she would not have gone to
the same house to have drinks with her supposed rapist a year after, in
December 2003, on the risk of being raped again.39 He highlighted AAA's
ill motive against him for having caused her detention in the Cagayan de Oro
City Jail for sniffing rugby in his house.40 Finally, he emphasized that Dr.
Revelo's testimony established that the lacerations found in AAA's genitalia
could have been caused by trauma other than rape.41
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals found that although Judge Mordeno was
not the one who conducted trial, Udang's guilt was nonetheless proven
beyond reasonable doubt based on the records of the case and AAA's
"categorical, convincing and consistent" testimony. 42
That AAA returned to Udang's house a year after she was allegedly raped
was, for the Court of Appeals, not as bizarre as Udang would make it appear.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that "there is no standard form of behavior
that can be expected of rape victims after they have been defiled because
people react differently to emotional stress."43

Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Udang's claim that AAA charged him
with rape as vengeance for her arrest for sniffing rugby. It explained that "ill
motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim which clearly established the liability of the
accused."44
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision in toto and
dismissed Udang's appeal in its October 9, 2013 Decision,45 the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March
12, 2012 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region,
Branch 22 of Cagayan de Oro City in FC Criminal Case Nos. 2006-140 and
2006-141 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)
The case was brought on appeal before this Court through a Notice of Appeal
filed on October 23, 2013.47 In its February 26, 2014 Resolution,48 this
Court directed the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.
In their respective manifestations, the Office of the Solicitor General,49
representing the People of the Philippines, and accused-appellant Udang50
requested this Court to treat their appeal briefs filed before the Court of
Appeals as their appeal briefs before this Court. This Court noted the parties'
respective manifestations in its July 7, 2014 Resolution51 and the case was
considered submitted for decision.
Udang denies ever raping AAA and maintains his innocence, just as he did
before the Court of Appeals. For him, AAA is not a credible witness and her
story of rape is unbelievable. He claims that AAA should not have returned
to his house a year after the alleged first incident to have drinks with him and
his son, Bienvinido, Jr., had he really raped her. He also emphasizes how the
rape charges were made only after he caused AAA's arrest for sniffing rugby
in his house. He points out how two (2) of AAA's fellow inmates in the
Cagayan de Oro City Jail, Gandawali and Orcales, even attested to his
innocence based on AAA's confession that he did not rape her. Thus, the
accused prays for his acquittal.
In its Brief for the Appellee,52 the Office of the Solicitor General argues that
Udang was correctly convicted of two (2) counts of rape punished under
Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. It claims that "testimonies of
child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and credence"53 because "a
girl of tender years,"54 like AAA at the time of the reported incidents, "is
unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims
is not true."55 It adds that "when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment."56
The principal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-
appellant, Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla, was correctly convicted of rape
punished under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
The appeal is affirmed with modification. Based on the Informations, Udang
was charged with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 7610. Hence, he could only be convicted of sexual abuse
under the Informations filed in this case and not for rape under the Revised
Penal Code. Furthermore, upon examination of the evidence presented, this
Court finds Udang guilty of two (2) counts of sexual abuse. Thus, the penalty
erroneously imposed on him—reclusion perpetua for each count of rape—
should be reduced accordingly.
I
Udang attempts to raise doubt in his conviction because the judge who
penned the trial court decision, Judge Mordeno, was not the judge who heard
the parties and their witnesses during trial. For Udang, Judge Mordeno was
in no position to rule on the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA,
not having observed the manner by which the witnesses testified.
Ideally, the same trial judge57 should preside over all the stages of the
proceedings, especially in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the
accused mainly relies on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge
enjoys the opportunity to observe, first hand, "the aids for an accurate
determination"58 of the credibility of a witness "such as the witness'
deportment and manner of testifying, the witness' furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the
scant or full realization of an oath."59
However, inevitable circumstances—the judge's death, retirement,
resignation, transfer, or removal from office—may intervene during the
pendency of the case.60 An example is the present case, where the trial judge
who heard the witnesses, Judge Francisco D. Calingin (Judge Calingin),
compulsorily retired pending trial.61 Judge Calingin was then replaced by
Judge Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing
the decision. Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that
every case where the judge had to be replaced pending decision would have
to be refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the witnesses testify and
the judge who writes the decision would be the same.62 What Udang
proposes is impracticable.
As early as 1915, this Court ruled in United States v. Abreu63 that in the
absence of a law expressly prohibiting a judge from deciding a case where
evidence was already taken, no such prohibition may be implied. In Abreu,
Judge Jose C. Abreu (Judge Abreu) refused to resolve a case where the
witnesses were already heard by the former presiding judge who had
resigned, arguing that the witnesses were heard by a judge whose authority
had been superseded by the then newly enacted Act No. 2347.
In rejecting Judge Abreu's argument, this Court held that the legislature could
not have intended to render void all the acts undertaken by judges prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2347.64 According to this Court, Act No. 2347's
purpose was "simply to change the personnel of the judges"65 and that it
specifically provided that all cases and judicial proceedings pending decision
or sentence under the jurisdiction of the old courts shall be continued until
their final decision.66
Further, this Court explained that with the existence of the transcript of
records, which are presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of
everything that transpires during the trial,"67 there is "little reason for
asserting that one qualified person may not be able to reach a just and fair
conclusion from [the] record as well as another."68 Thus, it compelled Judge
Abreu to proceed with deciding the cases where evidence was already taken
by the former presiding judge.
In People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. X,69 a decision acquitting
the accused was penned by a trial judge temporarily detailed to Branch 10 of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon. However, the decision was later on
promulgated by a different judge who was subsequently appointed
permanently. The People of the Philippines then opposed the judgment of
acquittal, arguing that it was void for being promulgated without authority as
the temporary detail of the judge who penned the decision had already
expired.
This Court rejected the reasoning that "[j]urisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one
branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of the judge alone,
to the exclusion of the others."70 Jurisdiction having attached with the court,
the judgment of acquittal was deemed valid, regardless of the fact that one
judge wrote it and another promulgated it.
Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting Udang is valid,
regardless of the fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the judge
who wrote the decision are different. With no showing of any irregularity in
the transcript of records, it is presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of
everything that transpire[d] during the trial,"71 sufficient for Judge Mordeno
to have evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA.
II
However, this Court disagrees with the trial court's ruling that charging
Udang with both rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
and sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, would violate
his right against double jeopardy.
The right against double jeopardy is provided in Article III, Section 21 of the
Constitution:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.72
The first sentence of the provision speaks of "the same offense," which this
Court has interpreted to mean offenses having identical essential elements.73
Further, the right against double jeopardy serves as a protection: first,
"against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal";74 second,
"against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction";75 and,
finally, "against multiple punishments for the same offense."76
Meanwhile, the second sentence of Article III, Section 21 speaks of "the same
act," which means that this act, punished by a law and an ordinance, may no
longer be prosecuted under either if a conviction or acquittal already resulted
from a previous prosecution involving the very same act.
For there to be double jeopardy, "a first jeopardy [must] ha[ve] attached prior
to the second; . . . the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and ... a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first."77
A first jeopardy has attached if: first, there was a "valid indictment";78
second, this indictment was made "before a competent court";79 third, "after
[the accused's] arraignment";80 fourth, "when a valid plea has been
entered";81 and lastly, "when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent."82
Lack of express consent is required because the accused's consent to dismiss
the case means that he or she actively prevented the court from proceeding to
trial based on merits and rendering a judgment of conviction or acquittal.83
In other words, there would be a waiver of the right against double jeopardy
if consent was given by the accused.84
To determine the essential elements of both crimes for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not there is double jeopardy in this case, below is a
comparison of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code punishing rape and
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishing sexual abuse:
Rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority[.]

SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge m
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
m prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape
or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] (Underscoring provided)
The provisions show that rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate crimes
with distinct elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or deprivation of
reason or unconsciousness required in Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
Code is not the same as the "coercion or influence" required in Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime of sexual abuse
because "the [mere] act of [having] sexual intercourse . . . with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to . . . sexual abuse"85 is already
punishable by law. However, consent exonerates an accused from a rape
charge as exhaustively explained in Malto v. People:86
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 (B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE
ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CRIMES
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished
by a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. They
have different elements. The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
INVOLVING VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented
to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual
love and affection. But may the "'sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of
child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article
III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies
committed against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the
theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused
and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse
or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter may
be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law
should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly
consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the
law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse.
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State
policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
being of the youth. This is consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a
program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations
of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person
having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child
against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the
child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having
care and custody of the same.
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best
interests in all actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort
shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life.87 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)
People v. Abay88 — insofar as it ruled that charging an accused with both
rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse,
under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her right against
double jeopardy89— must therefore be abandoned.90 As held in Nierras v.
Dacuycuy:91
[A] single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where
there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law
and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because
what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in
the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the
mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double
jeopardy.92
In People v. Judge Relova:93

[T]he constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where
the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts.94
The only time that double jeopardy arises is when the same act has already
been the subject of a previous prosecution under a law or an ordinance. This
is not the situation in the present case.
All told, the trial court erred in ruling that prosecuting an accused both for
rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse,
under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her right to
double jeopardy.
III
Moreover, contrary to the trial court's determination, the Informations
actually charged Udang with sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610, and not with rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Based on the Informations, the charge against Udang was "child abuse,"95
defined in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 as "the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of [a] child" and includes "any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being." The allegations in the Informations stated that Udang
"sexually abuse[d]"96 AAA by having sexual intercourse with her while she
was intoxicated, thus, "debas[ing], degrad[ing], or demean[ing] the intrinsic
worth of AAA."97 While the Informations stated that the acts were
"[c]ontrary to and in [v]iolation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of
R.A. 7610,"98 the factual allegations in the Informations determine the crime
being charged.99
Given that the charges against Udang were for sexual abuse, this Court
examines whether or not the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610 are present in this case. Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610 reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape
or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
To wit, the elements of sexual abuse are: first, "the accused commits the act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct";100 second, "the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution";101 and, finally, that "the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age."102
All the elements of sexual abuse are present in this case.
With AAA's categorical testimony, the prosecution discharged its burden of
proving Udang's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and has made a prima facie
case for two (2) counts of sexual abuse against him. In other words, the
prosecution presented the "amount of evidence which would be sufficient to
counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a
conviction."111 The burden of evidence then shifted to the defense to counter
the prosecution's prima facie case. Explaining the difference between "burden
of proof” and "burden of evidence," this Court in Bautista v. Sarmiento112
said:
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case
. . . the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout
the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the
burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the
exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward
with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.113 (Citation omitted)
Unfortunately Udang failed to present evidence sufficient to counter the
prosecution's prima facie case against him.
To destroy AAA's credibility, Udang capitalizes on the fact that he was
charged only after he had AAA arrested for sniffing rugby. However, given
AAA's affirmative and credible testimony, Udang's allegation of ill motive is
deemed inconsequential.
While prosecution witness Dr. Revelo testified that the lacerations found in
AAA's genitalia could have been "introduced by other operation"114 aside
from sexual intercourse, Udang had nothing but denials and alibis as
defenses. If, as Udang testified, he was with his mother, siblings, and some
barangay tanods during the alleged incidents, he could have presented them
as witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but he did not. Neither is Betty's
testimony that Udang never had drinks with AAA sufficient to acquit her
father. Udang's and Betty's testimonies are "self-serving"115 and were
correctly disregarded by the trial court.
As correctly held by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, the
testimonies of Gandawali and Orcales, AAA's fellow inmates at the Cagayan
de Oro City Jail, were hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence.116 This is
because Gandawali and Orcales had no personal knowledge of the incidents
as they were not there when the incidents happened.
In sum, this Court is morally convinced that Udang committed two (2) counts
of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, with each count
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law117 and absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the present case, the maximum imposable
penalty for each count should be the penalty prescribed by law in its medium
period118 which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period ranging from
17 years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to 20 years.119 On the other hand,
the minimum term of the imposable penalty shall be the next penalty lower
in degree than that prescribed by law which is prision mayor in its medium
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. This minimum term
ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 14 years and eight (8)
months.120 Udang shall serve the penalties successively.121
Further, AAA is entitled to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.122 The award of
moral damages is likewise retained at P50,000.00.123 However, the award
of exemplary damages is deleted given the absence of any aggravating
circumstance in this case.124
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals October 9,
2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01032 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of sexual abuse, under Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each
count. Furthermore, the accused shall pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of sexual abuse,
all amounts shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this Decision until full payment. The award of exemplary
damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Hirang, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons,
as defined and penalized under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and
(c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, via an Amended
Information2 that reads:
That on or about June 27, 2007, at Taguig City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruited, transported and provided in a large
scale minors [AAA],3 17 years old, [BBB], 17 years old, [CCC], 14 years old
and [DDD], 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution by taking advantage
of their vulnerability as young girls through promise of a good time or
"gimik" in a disco and good food if they would simply accompany him in
meeting and entertaining his Korean friends and to induce their full consent
further promise them Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Ten Thousand
Pesos (Php10,000.00) each afterwards when in truth and in fact peddled them
for sexual favors and pleasure in consideration of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) each and engaged' their services in prostitution as in fact he
already received Seven Thousand Pesos down payment from the Korean
national who engaged their services.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 25, 2011, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station
rendered its Decision24 convicting Hirang of the crime of human trafficking.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal via a Decision28 dated March 9, 2015, with
dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2011 of
the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case
No. 135682 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29
Hence, this appeal. 30
The Present Appeal
Based on the parties' contentions as raised before the CA, the Court is called
upon to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hirang for the crime charged; and
(2) whether Hirang should be acquitted in view of the failure of the arresting
officers to observe R.A. No. 7438.

Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms Hirang's conviction.
Hirang was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c)
of R.A. No. 9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any
person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered
as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking
is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer
or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons"
even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is
over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving
the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
In People v. Casio,33 the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons,
as derived from the aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."34 (Citation
omitted and italics in the original)
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and
transportation of the minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with
the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through
the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution
witnesses who testified during the trial.1âwphi1 The young victims
themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by
Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls
to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise
of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007
in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police
authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they
conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted
with the supposed customers and received payment therefor.
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies
pertained to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the recruitment of the
victims, how the IJM agents came to personally know of Hirang, and other
incidents that involved prior surveillance and the entrapment operation itself.
It is evident, however, that the supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses'
testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could not negate
Hirang's unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the
Court has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be
given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the
evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 35
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even
such defense deserves scant consideration.1âwphi1 It has been established by
the prosecution that Hirang has been engaged in the illegal activities leading
young women to prostitution, and the police officers merely employed means
for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he was merely
entrapped by authorities.36 Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a
wrongdoer. In People v. Bartolome,37the Court distinguished between
entrapment and instigation, as it explained:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission
of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand,
entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or
their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an
offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of
committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the
offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing
ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In
instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to
be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has
been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is
a "trap for the unwary criminal."38
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting
and deploying young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel
approached him for girls precisely because of his illicit activities. Also,
Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government
authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-
governmental organization. IJM only sought coordination with the police
officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had determined to meet on
June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean customers.
Clearly, there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak
of.
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police
officers to inform Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no
sufficient ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA correctly explained that
any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of
entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.39 In
People v. Vasquez,40the Court held:
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now
estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was
cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction. x x x.
41 (Citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse
Hirang's conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC
and CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of
₱2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions
are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million
pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also be awarded. In line
with prevailing jurisprudence,42 each victim is entitled to ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is supported
by Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in A1iicle 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
35.
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The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. When the
crime is aggravated, the award of exemplary damages is also justified.43

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 9,

2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05129 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that victims AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD are each
entitled to ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.