Aff

I affirm and value morality, defined as the principles concerning the

distinction between right and wrong and good and bad behavior.
Governments must be pragmatic. They cannot concern themselves
with purely metaphysical questions because that would avoid
consideration of what is required to achieve their ends.
Rhonheimer 05:[1]
Political philosophy belongs to
It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy.

ethics, which is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore, it is not
only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of

political institutions and action must be understood as embedded in concrete cultural

and, therefore, historical contexts and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A

normative political philosophy which would abstract [political considerations]

from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato,
in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such a purely metaphysical view, however, is [are] doomed to
failure. As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical
experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is
not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with
partly contingent matters and aims at action. Moreover, unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which

rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of the political is characterized by acts like

framing institutions and establishing legal rules by which not only personal actions but the actions of a multitude of persons are

regulated by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. Political
actions are, thus, both actions of the whole of the body politic and referring to the whole of the
community of citizens. Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while
others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule 16
: unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good despotism and,
free persons who
therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” political rule is exercised over
represent a plurality of interests and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different
goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those
who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

The impossibility to attain knowledge of every outcome or abuse

means the best way to make decisions in the public sphere is by
maximizing the best outcomes
Goodin 95 – Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University
(Robert E., Cambridge University Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special

about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible
for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we
would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that
larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public
officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more
desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider,
first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their
choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All
choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of
course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more
complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the
ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public
officials, in contrast, at [are] relatively poorly informed as to the effects that
their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do
know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will
happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.
But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the
utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of
conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the
utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But
they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any
particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages
is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.
Thus, the value criterion is political justice. Now I can move on to my
contentions.
Contention 1: Useless Assistance
The U.S has poured billions of dollars into military assistance and it has
brought us , and nothing.
Miller, Andrew, and Richard Sokolsky. “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military
Aid Bought Us? Not Much.” The American Conservative,
www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-
military-aid-bought-us-not-much/. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.
It’s a scene right out of the movie Groundhog Day. Every year around this time, the administration submits its annual request to
Congress to appropriate billions of dollars for America’s allies and partners in the Middle East to finance their purchase of U.S.
military training and equipment. Congress rubber stamps these requests with little regard for whether this assistance achieves U.S.
foreign policy objectives. It does the same when the executive branch requests congressional approval of arms sales for cold hard
cash. Such docility might be good industrial policy—after all, it creates jobs in key congressional districts, provides corporate welfare
for America’s defense companies, and helps maintain the defense industrial base. But it makes for lousy foreign policy. The
United States will continue to pour money down a rat hole until Congress and the
executive branch better understand why these problems keep recurring and muster the political will to fix them. Based on our
experience in the State Department, here is our diagnosis of the problem and some remedies for what ails U.S. military
assistance in the Middle East. In the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, security assistance and arms transfers have become the
instruments of choice for American diplomats and soldiers. Grant assistance and weapons sales are treated as Swiss Army Knives,
the U.S.
all-purpose tools appropriate for use in virtually any scenario. According to the prevailing view in

government, security assistance works wonders: it builds the capabilities of partner countries, provides influence
over their policies, and guarantees access to influential institutions and personalities in capitals across the globe. If true, this would
$48.7 billion the U.S. has spent on security assistance to the
seem to more than justify the
Middle East over the past decade. In reality, U.S. military assistance promises more than it delivers. There
is scant evidence outside of a few isolated cases that U.S. material support to Middle Eastern countries has fulfilled any of these
purposes. Recipients of U.S. funding and weapons have largely failed to make major strides in their capabilities and, in some
instances, may have even regressed. Despite $47 billion in U.S. military assistance over 40
years, the Egyptian military has struggled mightily to contain an ISIS-affiliate
numbering no more than 1,200 militants. The Saudis barely used their
American-made advanced combat aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS operation in Syria, and $89
billion in arms sales to the kingdom over the last 10 years has not prevented Riyadh from getting bogged down
in an increasingly costly quagmire in Yemen with U.S.-supplied weapons. The U.S. has sold hundreds of

billions of dollars in military hardware to Persian Gulf countries and yet collectively they are not capable of

defending the free flow of oil from the Gulf against a militarily weaker Iran without U.S. assistance.
Likewise, the track record of using security assistance to increase U.S. influence in the region is no more encouraging. While

recipient countries are happy to utter platitudes about increased cooperation,

they generally—and successfully—resist Washington’s requests to modify their policies in
exchange for assistance. Ongoing U.S. assistance to Egypt did not leave Cairo open to American pleas to desist
from forcibly dispersing two largely non-violent sit-ins in the capital, in which over 800 people were massacred. Meanwhile, U.S.
attempts to explicitly link military assistance and arms sales to a recipient country’s domestic political behavior have not borne much
fruit. For instance, the Obama administration’s suspension of some types of military assistance to Egypt in 2013 did not lead to
“credible progress” toward democratic reforms. Nor did putting a $4 billion arms package for Bahrain on hold yield an improvement
in that country’s human rights environment. Importantly, these failures have more to do with a lack of political will in Washington, in
which the U.S. capitulated before its coercive measures could have the desired effect, than any inherent limitation in what
withholding weapons shipments can accomplish. But the frequency with which the United States folds in these standoffs suggests a
structural problem in U.S. assistance mechanisms that undermines its efficacy as a tool of influence. U.S. officials have excellent
access in Middle Eastern capitals, but it is hard to attribute this to military assistance and arms sales. The United States remains a
predominant international player and most countries do not have the luxury of ignoring Washington for long. Pentagon officials
argue that the provision of material support increases their contacts with foreign militaries, creating opportunities to learn more about
partner armed forces. In practice, however, recipient countries take great precautions to limit and regulate U.S. access to their
troops. As an example, most Egyptian military personnel are prohibited from interacting with U.S. officials, while a small core of
vetted senior officers are entrusted with managing Egypt’s military relationship with the United States. Under existing conditions,
U.S. interests and taxpayers are not the primary beneficiaries of military assistance and arms sales. Instead, it is U.S. defense
contractors and regional militaries that often prioritize domestic political influence over operational capabilities. In recent years, the
U.S. arms industry has registered record profits, a pattern likely to continue given President Trump’s initiative to expedite
government approval of weapons sales. Indeed, the State Department cleared a record number of arms sales in Fiscal Year 2017
($75.9 billion). While champions of the U.S. arms industry defend it as an engine of job growth, economists have found that
investments in other industries are more efficient job generators. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern militaries have exploited arms sales to
buttress their prestige and to support local patronage networks, both of which help to sustain their dominant position in domestic
politics. Egypt’s procurement of over 1,000 M1A1 Abrams tanks, for instance, has less to do with their military value than with the
Egyptian jobs supported by a co-production plant in country. The Egyptian Armed Forces have so far opted not to deploy M1A1s in
combat in the restive Sinai Peninsula. In his State of the Union address, President Trump endorsed “legislation to help ensure
American foreign-assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to America’s friends.” But even when this
assistance goes to America’s friends, it rarely serves American interests. Decisions to sell weapons to allies, friends, and partners
often involve hand-waving and intellectual laziness. It is unusual when clear objectives with measurable benchmarks of progress are
identified for weapons sales and assistance levels. Instead, proponents of these sales invoke tired bromides about how assistance
will provide access to the recipient’s military leadership or further cement the bilateral relationship. But access should not be
confused with influence—and “relationship maintenance” should not be treated as an end in itself. Washington has become so
fixated on doling out billions of dollars for this purpose that it often forgets what this assistance is for in the first place: securing U.S.
interests. More often than not, our allies and client states take the money and use their weapons in pursuit of policies inimical to
U.S. interests or kvetch about American unreliability. Saudi Arabia, which has used American-supplied weapons to visit ruin on
Yemen and strengthen Jihadist groups there, is a poster child for this phenomenon. So, too, is the UAE, which is an accomplice in
Riyadh’s immoral and strategically disastrous campaign in Yemen and used American-supplied weapons in Libya in support of a
renegade general. A second and related problem is that the U.S. government does a poor job of holding allies and clients to account
for behavior that runs counter to American interests. There is no systematic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes.
The key questions that rarely get asked, let alone answered, are what does the U.S. want and expect from the assistance we
provide and how does this aid help or hurt America’s ability to achieve these goals? If the U.S. cannot identify actions that the
recipient would not have otherwise taken as a result of this assistance, then it is nothing more than a welfare program, and has two
pernicious effects. First, it encourages “moral hazard”—recipients to do whatever they want with the assistance without having to
fear the consequences of their actions. Second, it creates “reverse leverage”— Washington bends over backwards to keep relations
smooth and the assistance flowing, rather than leverage the recipient’s dependence on U.S. military support and political
commitments. Both of these pathologies are, in part, a legacy of the Middle East peace process. The Arab countries at peace with
Israel (Egypt and Jordan) view their U.S. military aid packages as an entitlement owed to them in exchange for burying the hatchet
with the Jewish state, which supersedes U.S. concerns about military capacity or influence. What Washington gets for providing this
aid is confidence that two of Israel’s neighbors will remain at peace with it. But this is a misrepresentation of history; Washington did
not make a formal aid commitment to either country when they signed peace treaties with Israel. And, most importantly, the future of
the peace treaties is no longer dependent on U.S. assistance. Egypt and Jordan find it in their own interests to preserve peace with
Israel, with or without American support. U.S. military assistance in the Middle East (and more broadly) is in need of serious reform.
Here are four major innovations to help fix it: Before allocating security assistance, recipients should first have to demonstrate their
commitment to a set of norms, standards, and rules of good security-sector governance. The State Department and Congress
should create new mechanisms to rigorously assess, monitor, and evaluate security assistance against performance benchmarks
that are linked to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The sale of weapons should be linked to new training commitments that the host
country would have to fulfill in advance before taking delivery of the weapons and equipment. To demonstrate its commitment to
performance and results, all contracts for the supply of weapons and training should include “sunset” provisions based on mutually
agreed upon performance milestones. Most in the American defense establishment would agree in principle that introducing more
accountability for U.S. military assistance and arms sales is a worthy goal. But they would also express concern that the measures
we recommend would prompt Middle Eastern countries to turn to Russia or China for easier terms. However, for many of our
security partners, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, integrating Russian and Chinese weapons into their force structure would
create serious operational and logistical problems. Moreover, neither Moscow nor Beijing offers grant assistance, which means they
are not viable substitutes for countries that depend on U.S. financial help to buy equipment. Even for countries that use their own
money, their strong preference for U.S. equipment, which they view as both superior to the alternatives and a sign of American
support, suggests they would be willing to submit to more rigorous oversight if that is the price of obtaining American weapons. U.S.
military assistance in the Middle East could magnify our influence and help build local military forces that reduce the burden on U.S.
By
forces. Unfortunately, billions in American taxpayer money have been spent for unclear purposes without sufficient oversight.

learning from past mistakes and implementing our recommended reforms, the U.S. government
can begin to break this cycle of waste and missed opportunities.
Besides this, the ultimate goal of military assistance is to bring peace to
the country. However, this may actually be counter intuitive, as arms
acquisition increases both willingness, and opportunity for war.
Shannon Lindsey Blanton (Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University). “Instruments of Security or Tools of

Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.” 1999 Journal of Peace Research vol 36, no.2,
1999, pp. 233–244. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433990360 02006

In the literature on arms and war, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the relationship between arms acquisitions and
repression. Nevertheless,studies of war and internal conflict do provide some clues. A
country’s participation in conflict may be based on opportunity and
willingness (Siverson & Starr, 1991). Without willingness, arms acquisitions by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient to
induce a country to engage in warfare. However, arms are likely to be a contributing factor to conflict

as they enhance opportunity by providing the capability to engage in

violent confrontation. In other words, in response to both external and internal threats, arms acquisitions may be a
proximate or permissive factor that aggravates the likelihood of conflict as it makes ‘the recourse to military means easy and more
likely’ (Spear, 1996: 380). By providing the means for violence, arms enable groups to choose brutal forms of political action.

As we can see, the U.S.’s current aid that we give to authoritarian regimes is just
wasted money. The results of aid are
a) Billions of dollars are wasted each year on authoritarian regimes that are
too incompetent to properly use the resources.
b) These billions of dollars are a significant hit against a country that is
already 21.6 trillion dollars in debt.
AND
c) We are not gaining anything significant back from all of this military aid that
we are giving to all of these regimes.
If we cut off military aid to authoritarian regimes, we save a lot money that we
can then use on our own country, which provides infinitely more benefits than the
few to no benefits that giving money to authoritarian regimes gives.
 Contention 2: Arms Sales Decreases
Stability

Aid causes entanglement by increasing adventurism and raising tensions –

tons of empirics – that risks great power war.
Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy
Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey,
Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms
Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” Cato Institute. 13 March 2018.

Arms sales raise the risk of entanglement in two ways. First, they can
Entanglement.
represent early steps down the slippery slope to unwise military intervention.
Consider a case like the Syrian civil war or the many cases during the Cold War in which the United States wanted to support rebels and freedom
fighters against oppressive governments.74 In the majority of those cases, American leaders were wary of intervening directly. Instead,
the United States tended to rely on money, training, and arms sales. But by taking concrete steps like arms sales to support
rebel groups, Washington’s psychological investment in the outcome tends to rise, as do the
political stakes for the president, who will be judged on whether his efforts at support are successful or not. As we saw in the Syrian
civil war, for example, Barack Obama’s early efforts to arm Syrian rebels were roundly criticized as
feckless, increasing pressure on him to intervene more seriously.75 History does not provide
much guidance about how serious the risk of this form of entanglement might be. During the Cold War, presidents from Nixon onward
viewed arms sales as a substitute for sending American troops to do battle with communist forces around the world. The result was an astonishing
amount of weaponry transferred or sold to Third World nations, many of which were engaged in active conflicts both external and internal The .
risk of superpower conflict made it dangerous to intervene directly; accordingly, the Cold War-era risk of entanglement from arms
sales was low.76 Today, however, the United States does not face nearly as many constraints on its behavior, as its track record of near-constant
military intervention since the end of the Cold War indicates. As a result, the risk of arms sales helping trigger future military intervention is real,
even if it cannot be measured precisely. The second way in which arms sales might entangle
the United States is by creating new disputes or exacerbating existing tensions.
U.S. arms sales to Kurdish units fighting in Syria against the Islamic State, for example, have ignited
tensions between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, which sees the Kurds as a serious threat to
Turkish sovereignty and stability.77 Meanwhile, ongoing arms sales to NATO nations and to other allies like South Korea and
Taiwan have exacerbated tensions with Russia, China, and North Korea, raising
the risk of escalation and the possibility that the United States might wind up involved in a direct conflict.78

The best studies confirm – military aid increases the probability, duration,
and intensity of wars.
Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy
Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey,
Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms
Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” Cato Institute. 13 March 2018.

Instability, Violence, and Conflict.First, arms sales can make conflict more likely.79 This may occur
because recipients of new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in the local
balance of power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, for
example, found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-power allies, they had the opposite effect
concluded that “increased arms transfers
in other cases, and from major powers make states
significantlymore likely to be militarized dispute initiators.”80 Another study focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967
to 1997 found that “arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war.”81 Recent history provides supporting
evidence for these findings: since 2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen,
Second, arms sales can also prolong and intensify ongoing conflicts
Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar.
and erode rather than promote regional stability. Few governments, and fewer insurgencies, have large enough
weapons stocks to fight for long without resupply.82 The tendency of external powers to arm the side they
support, however understandable strategically, has the inevitable result of allowing the conflict to continue at a higher level of intensity
one study of arms sales to Africa notes, “Weapons
than would otherwise be the case. As
imports are essential additives in this recipe for armed conflict and carnage.”83
Arms sales do not promote stability – unpredictability, offensive
capabilities, arms races, and other suppliers – the best evidence and
majority of scholars conclude aff.
Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy
Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey,
Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms
Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” Cato Institute. 13 March 2018.

The hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the
United States will be able to predict accurately what the impact of its arms
sales will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that an arms sale will be sufficient to deter the adversary
without spawning an arms race. If the goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that an arms sale will in fact reduce tensions and
inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate conflict. These assumptions, in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and
these are often poor
that nation’s neighbors and adversaries acting in ways that don’t make things worse. As it turns out,
assumptions. Although arms sales certainly enhance the military capability of the recipient nation, the fundamental
problem is that arms sales often initiate a long chain of responses that the
United States generally cannot control. The United States, after all, is not the only country with interests in
regional balances, especially where the survival and security of local actors is at stake. The United States is neither
the only major power with a keen interest in critical regions like Asia and the Middle East,
nor the only source of weapons and other forms of assistance. Nor can it
dictate the perceptions, interests, or actions of the other nations involved in
a given region. For example, though a nation receiving arms from the United States may enjoy enhanced defensive capabilities, it
is also likely to enjoy enhanced offensive capabilities. With these, a nation’s calculations about the potential benefits of war, intervention
abroad, or even the use of force against its own population may shift decisively. Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior illustrates this dynamic.
Though the Saudis explain their arms purchases as necessary for defense against Iranian pressure, Saudi Arabia has also spent the past two years
Likewise, arms sales can heighten regional security
embroiled in a military intervention in Yemen.
dilemmas. Neighbors of nations buying major conventional weapons will also
worry about what this enhanced military capability will mean. This raises the chances that they
too will seek to arm themselves further, or take other steps to shift the balance of power
back in their favor, or, in the extreme case, to launch a preventive war before they are attacked. Given these dynamics, the
consequences of arms sales to manage regional balances of power are far less predictable and often much less positive than advocates
assume.54 This unpredictability characterizes even straightforward-seeming efforts to manage the balance of power. The most basic
claim of arms sales advocates is that U.S. arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better able to deter adversaries .
The best available evidence, however, suggests a more complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995,
major-power arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that
the recipient would be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S.
arms that were not treaty allies were significantly more likely to become
targets.55 Nor is there much evidence that arms sales can help the United States promote peace and regional stability by calibrating the
local balance of power. On this score, in fact, the evidence suggests that the default assumption should be the opposite. Most
scholarly work concludes that arms sales exacerbate instability and
increase the likelihood of conflict.56 One study, for example, found that during the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arms
sales to hostile dyads (e.g., India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, Ethiopia/Somalia) “contributed to hostile political relations and imbalanced military
relationships” and were “profoundly destabilizing.”57 There is also good reason to believe that several factors are making the promotion of
regional stability through arms sales more difficult. The shrinking U.S. military advantage over other powers such as China and the increasingly
competitive global arms market both make it less likely that U.S. arms sales can make a decisive difference. As William Hartung argued as early
as 1990, “the notion of using arms transfers to maintain a carefully calibrated regional balance of power seems increasingly archaic in today’s
arms market, in which a potential U.S. adversary is as likely to be receiving weapons from U.S. allies like Italy or France as it is from former or
current adversaries.”58 In sum, the academic and historical evidence indicates that although the United States can use arms sales to enhance
the military capabilities of other nations and thereby shift the local and regional balance of power, its ability to dictate specific outcomes through
such efforts is severely limited.

The evidence is clear, the United States cannot continue to give military aid when
it worsens wars. Military aid is not only useless, it actually worsens conflict.
Military aid is a harm for everyone involved and the AFF solves these harms by
cutting it off.
 Advantage: Increased Budget for
Internal Spending
The United States gains more money to be used for internal spending.
While the United States continues to pour in hundreds of billions of dollars
on military spending, it ignores the problems that are inside the country.
McCarthy, Tom. “Does the US Really Need a Huge Boost in Military Spending?” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 9
Feb. 2018, www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/09/senate-budget-deal-us-military-spending. Accessed 2 Jan. 2019.

Donald Trump’s new idea for a grand military parade has been met with an outcry from critics, who warn that in addition to its strong
despotic whiff, such a stunt would waste millions of taxpayer dollars. But the Pentagon might soon find itself with more flexibility to
The
satisfy that presidential whim and more, if a budget deal expected to be struck in the Senate this week goes through.

bipartisan budget was expected to include $716bn for military spending in

2019, up 13% from 2017 spending levels and a solid 7% rise from what the White House had
requested. The increase would be achieved by temporarily removing caps imposed by the so-called sequester of 2013 and by
additional “emergency” funding tagged for “overseas contingency operations”. Critics, including Stephen Miles, director of the
Washington DC-based Win Without War advocacy group, said the new military spending numbers were a symptom of misplaced
national priorities. “ When our nation can’t manage to turn the lights on for the
people of Puerto Rico, when we can’t help those suffering from opioid
addiction get treatment, and when we can’t ensure education and
healthcare to all of our citizens, how is it possible we can justify spending
billions more on weapons that don’t work to fight enemies that don’t
exist?” Miles said in a statement issued on Wednesday. The Senate’s top Democrat, Chuck Schumer, supported the deal,
calling it a “win for the American people”. In 2016, as the world’s biggest military spender, the
United States racked up a larger outlay ($611bn) than the next eight
countries combined, according tothe Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The potential
$80bn leap in military spending in 2018 would itself surpass the total
annual military budget of any other country apart from China. The extraordinary levels
of US defense expenditure were highlighted in a recent report by the United Nations special rapporteur on extreme poverty and
. The US “spends more on national defense than China, Saudi
human rights

Arabia, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, France and Japan combined”, the
report said, and ”. Military leaders and elected officials from both major parties have for years been calling for an increase in
military budgets, arguing that the United States has a unique role in contributing to international order and a unique challenge in
securing its citizens. “It is incumbent upon us to field a more lethal force if our nation is to retain the ability to defend ourselves and
what we stand for,” the defense secretary, Jim Mattis, said in outlining a new national defense strategy last month. The new US
strategy states that “inter-state strategic competition”, especially with China and Russia, and “not terrorism, is now the primary
concern in US national security”. The strategy called for funding to build “a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force”.
Mattis has lobbied Trump to support a larger US military footprint in Afghanistan, where US troops have been stationed continuously
for more than 16 years, and elsewhere overseas. Trump seized on the proposed bump in military spending as a key to selling the
budget deal, which must be passed through both houses of Congress before he can sign it. “The Budget Agreement today is so
important for our great Military,” Trump tweeted on Wednesday. “It ends the dangerous sequester and gives Secretary Mattis what
he needs to keep America Great. Republicans and Democrats must support our troops and support this Bill!” The public sense that
the defense department needs more money may have been damaged earlier this week, however, by the revelation that one of the
Pentagon’s largest agencies had lost track of more than $800m in construction projects, according to an internal audit by the
accounting giant Ernst & Young. Politico first obtained the report. The prospect of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars going down a
similar hole prompted grumbling among Democrats. “The last thing we should be doing is approving another increase in defense
spending without first determining how the Department of Defense is spending our tax dollars,” tweeted the congressman Ro
Khanna of California. Other elected officials warned that free military spending would contribute to an explosion in the national
deficit, on top of trillions in projected shortfalls from Trump’s tax plan, disaster relief spending and, possibly, infrastructure spending.
The House speaker, Paul Ryan, dismissed that criticism on Thursday. “We could get rid of the military and we still would have a
deficit,” he said. Paul Krugman, the Nobel laureate economist, mocked the newfound conservative sanguinity about deficits. “Why,
it’s almost as if all those deficit hawks were phonies from the beginning, using fake fiscal concerns to hobble a Democratic
president,” Krugman tweeted.

Cutting off the military aid would save billions of dollars which would then,
be able to be put in to improving America.
Puentes, Robert. “Why Infrastructure Matters: Rotten Roads, Bum Economy.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 28
July 2016, www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-infrastructure-matters-rotten-roads-bum-economy/. Accessed 3 Jan. 2019.

Cities, states and metropolitan areas throughout America face an unprecedented economic, demographic, fiscal and environmental
challenges that make it imperative for the public and private sectors to rethink the way they do business. These new forces are
incredibly diverse, but they share an underlying need for modern, efficient and reliable infrastructure. Concrete, steel and fiber-optic
Infrastructure enables trade, powers
cable are the essential building blocks of the economy.

businesses, connects workers to their jobs, creates opportunities for

struggling communities and protects the nation from an increasingly
unpredictable natural environment. From private investment in telecommunication systems, broadband
networks, freight railroads, energy projects and pipelines, to publicly spending on transportation, water, buildings and parks,
infrastructure is the backbone of a healthy economy. It also supports
workers, providing millions of jobs each year in building and maintenance.
A Brookings Institution analysis Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveals
that 14 million people have jobs in fields directly related to infrastructure.
From locomotive engineers and electrical power line installers, to truck drivers and airline pilots, to construction laborers and meter
, infrastructure jobs account for nearly 11 percent of the nation’s
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workforce, offering employment opportunities that have low barriers of entry and are projected to grow over the next decade.
Important national goals also depend on it. The economy needs reliable infrastructure to connect supply chains and efficiently move
goods and services across borders. Infrastructure connects households across metropolitan areas to higher quality opportunities for
employment, healthcare and education. Clean energy and public transit can reduce greenhouse gases. This same economic logic
applies to broadband networks, water systems and energy production and distribution. Big demographic and cultural changes, such
as the aging and diversification of our society, shrinking households and domestic migration, underscore the need for new
transportation and telecommunications to connect people and communities. The percentage of licensed drivers among the young is
the lowest in three decades, as more of them use public transit and many others use new services for sharing cars and bikes. The
prototypical family of the suburban era, a married couple with school-age children, now represents only 20 percent of households,
down from over 40 percent in 1970. Some 55 percent of millennials say living close to public transportation is important to them,
according to a recent survey by the Urban Land Institute. Yet unlike Western Europe and parts of Asia, the United States still has a
growing population. We’ve added 25 million people in the past 10 years. This tremendous growth, concentrated in the 50 largest
metropolitan areas, will place new demands on already overtaxed infrastructure. Metropolitan areas must be ready to adapt not only
to serve millions of new customers but also to help poorer residents, many of whom are jobless, have the best chance possible to
find work. A recent Brookings analysis found that only a quarter of jobs in low-skill and middle-skill industries can be reached within
90 minutes by a typical metropolitan commuter. Successful cities will be those that connect workers to jobs and close the digital
divide between high-income and low-income neighborhoods. The White House notes that broadband speeds have doubled since
2009 and that more than four out of five people now have high-speed wireless broadband, adoption rates for low-income and
minority households remains low (about 43 and 56 percent, respectively.) Our economy is changing as fast as our society. Over 83
percent of world economic growth in the next five years is expected to occur outside the United States, and because of rapid
globalization, it will be concentrated in cities. This offers an unprecedented opportunity for American businesses to export more
goods and services and to create high-quality jobs at home. It also amplifies the importance of our seaports, air hubs, freight rail,
border crossings and truck routes, which move $51 billion worth of goods quickly and efficiently each day in the complex supply
chains of the modern economy. The diverse energy boom also disrupts our infrastructure. Natural gas needs new truck, pipeline and
rail networks. Rooftop solar panels have rattled electric utilities, which are scrambling to find ways to incorporate and store the
, finding the money to pay for the
energy they produce while keeping the grid operating. At the same time
development of a smart electricity grid and for clean energy presents
challenges, as hundreds of thousands of small and large projects are projected to come online in coming decades.
High-profile natural disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, drew attention to
problems with water infrastructure. Overwhelmed waste water systems,
washed-out roads, shorted electrical circuitry and flooded train stations not
only highlighted the economy’s reliance on these networks, but also
revealed their poor condition. The nation’s water systems are now being rebuilt. Cities are working to capture
storm and rain water rather than building costly pipes to sluice it away. The Center for an Urban Future recently described how New
York City plans to spend $2.4 billion over 18 years in so-called “green” infrastructure such as rooftop vegetation, porous pavements,
and soils to soak up rain. Over and above the new types of needed infrastructure is a big change in how projects are financed.
Despite the importance of infrastructure, the U.S. has not spent enough for
decades to maintain and improve it. It accounts for about 2.5 percent of the economy, compared to about
3.9 percent spent in Canada, Australia and South Korea, 5 percent for Europe and 9-12 percent in China. The McKinsey Global
the U.S. must spend at least $150 billion more a year on
Institute estimates that

infrastructure through 2020 to meet its needs. This would add about 1.5
percent to annual economic growth and create at least 1.8 million jobs. Split
between Republicans and Democrats, the federal government appears incapable of doing this. For the foreseeable future, the
Highway Trust Fund, the State Revolving Funds for water and others will face cuts and squeezed budgets. Other experiments, such
as a National Infrastructure Bank, seem prohibitively complex in the current political environment. And of course, rising interest costs
on federal debt, increases in entitlement spending and declining traditional revenue sources such as the gasoline tax mean that
competition for limited resources is fiercer than ever. Some cities and states are enjoying budget surpluses because property and
sales tax revenues. But most localities will take years to build back their reserves, repay additional debt incurred during the
recession and pay for deferred maintenance on infrastructure. Unfunded pension obligations and other debts facing all levels of
government mean there just aren’t the public funds to pay for necessary infrastructure. And though interest rates remain at
historically low levels, the ability of many governments to borrow from capital markets is hindered by debt caps and weak credit
ratings. Despite gradual acceptance in the past decade that infrastructure is vital to economic growth, debate of spending remains
an amorphous and simplistic. Infrastructure is made up of interrelated sectors as diverse as a water treatment plant is from an
airport, a wind farm, a gas line or a broadband network. The focus on infrastructure in the abstract led to unrealistic silver-bullet
policy solutions that fail to capture the unique and economically critical attributes of each. In reality, each infrastructure sector
involves fundamentally different design frameworks and market attributes. And they are owned, regulated, governed and operated
by different public and private entities. The federal role should not be exaggerated. American infrastructure in selected, built,
maintained, operates and paid for in a diverse and fragmentary fashion. For certain sectors, such as transportation and water,
federal spending is relatively high, averaging $92.15 billion each year from 2000 to 2007. But even there, according to the
Congressional Budget Office, Washington’s share of spending never topped 27 percent. For other sectors, such as freight rail,
telecommunications, and clean energy, the federal role is more limited. So what does all this mean and how are we going to pay for
what we need? Roads, bridges and transit must be paid for largely from public funds. Ballot measures have been important for fund
raising, particularly at the local level, because general obligation bonds require popular approval. That’s how regions and
municipalities pay for public transit systems, bridges, road construction, water and sewer improvements and a host of other
infrastructure projects. Many cities are following this trend. Those places, especially in Westerns cities such as Los Angeles,
Phoenix and Salt Lake City, are taxing themselves, dedicating substantial local money and effectively contributing to the
construction of the nation’s infrastructure. Metropolitan transportation initiatives are popular among voters. According to the Center
for Transportation Excellence, 71 percent of measures were passed in 2014 as were 73 percent in 2013. While state level ballot
measures on infrastructure spending are far less common, in 2013, eight states voted to raise taxes for such projects. This includes
both conservative strongholds such as Wyoming and Democrat-controlled legislatures in states such as Maryland. A number of
cities are using market mechanisms that capture the increased value in land that accrues from infrastructure. This provides a more
targeted way to finance new or existing transportation projects by matching the benefit from infrastructure with its cost. These
techniques include impact fees where land developers are assessed a charge to support associated public infrastructure
improvements, generally local roads and public works like sidewalks. The lease or sale of air rights is another practice that has been
used by to finance development around transit stations for decades, famously around Grand Central Station in New York, and more
recently in Boston and Dallas. Another growing trend is the use of tax increment financing districts. These TIFs support
infrastructure projects by borrowing against the future stream of additional tax revenue the project is expected to generate.
Examples include a TIF used to pay for improvements at the Atlantic Station project in Atlanta and Portland, Ore.,’s similar strategy
to fund its streetcar by creating a local improvement district that leveraged the economic gains of nearby property owners. For its
part, the federal government can allow greater flexibility for states and cities to innovate on projects that connect metros. Passenger
Facility Charges used to fund airport modernization are artificially capped at $4.50 and do not begin to cover the airport’s operating
and long-term investment costs. Busy airports could be freed to meet congestion and investment costs by removing the caps.
Archaic restrictions on interstate highways tolls could also be lifted. Metropolitan and local leaders, with the states, are in the best
position to determine which segments of road could best raise revenue. Other infrastructures could be public-private partnerships.
These often complex agreements allow the public sector to bring in private enterprises to take an active role during the life of the
infrastructure asset. At their heart, these partnerships share risk and costs of design, construction, maintenance, financing and
operations. The public-sector interest in partnerships is propelled by the shortage of money. Ever since the recession, many states
and local governments have been plagued by high debt, low credit ratings and limited options to borrow. PPPs are not “free money,”
but they can offer benefits such as better and faster completion of the project, more budgetary accountability and overall savings.
Partnerships with the private sector are not appropriate for all infrastructure sectors or projects. Some may not be profitable enough
to attract investors. Green infrastructure or public parks, for example, may lack a revenue stream. Private conservancies maintain
and oversee parks in New York, Pittsburgh, Houston and St. Louis, but they are all nonprofit organizations set up solely for that
purpose and do not help spread risk. The best infrastructure projects for private sector involvement are those with a clear revenue
stream from rate-payers, such as water infrastructure and toll roads. The private sector can bring in new technologies for metering
and billing that can improve services. Thoughtful procurement can also facilitate projects that do not include ratepayers. Nearly any
project can be suitable for a private partnership as long as there is a mechanism to spread risk among all parties, even without user
fees. So-called availability payment models allow the public sector to pay a recurring user fee for the use of an asset based on its
condition and accessibility. These payments are a form of debt since but require continuous public expenditure and a binding
budgetary obligation. It would help spur public-private partnerships if there were standard contracts and pricing, risk sharing and
returns. In the past, Washington has set these kinds of standards for such vast areas of the consumer market as housing and small
business. But the federal government appears unlikely to do so for infrastructure investment. A mix of public, private and civic
bodies will have to do so instead. An emerging example is the West Coast Infrastructure Exchange, a collaboration between
California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia standardizing transparency, contracts, labor and risk allocation. The goal is to
build a market for projects. By sharing details, project finance and delivery methods can be scaled and replicated. If successful, the
WCX could be a model for other state, city and metro infrastructure exchanges. Each exchange could focus on the infrastructure
delivery and finance strategies suited to the culture, traditions and needs of the region it serves. An East Coast or Mid-Atlantic
Exchange could focus on rebuilding coastlines and climate resiliency after Hurricane Sandy, or on transportation projects that cross
state borders. A Midwestern Exchange might focus on water infrastructure in a largely slow growth environment or on projects with
Canada. A Southern Exchange might facilitate new infrastructure to accommodate fast growth and new manufacturing, supply
chains and movement of goods. Regardless of their focus, exchanges could be linked through a project clearinghouse to share
data, information and best practices. Energy, telecommunications and freight rail will remain dominated by the private sector
typically with federal and state regulatory oversight. But there will also be new types of public and private relationships in these
sectors, too. For example, while broadband networks are still delivered by private companies, local governments recognize that this
kind of network access is equally important to the future economic success of households as well as businesses. So as cities such
as Los Angeles explore ways to extend broadband to all homes, they also are working to figure out the financing arrangements and
business opportunities for firms interested in developing those networks. The trade and logistics industry is highly decentralized,
with private operators owning almost all trucks and rails, and the public sector owning roads, airports, and waterway rights. Unlike
such countries as Germany, Canada and Australia, the U.S. does not have a unified strategy that aligns disparate owners and
interests around national economic objectives. Innovative partnerships are therefore necessary to make freight movements in and
around big cities more efficient and reliable. The CREATE program in Chicago aligns several such interests in a citywide effort to
relieve freight and passenger bottlenecks that cause delays. The $2.5 billion for the program will come from a mix of traditional
sources (federal grants), private investments (railroads), state loans (bonds) and existing local sources. It is clear that projects are
becoming more complex. There is not one-size-fits-all form of financing for them. It very much depends on the place, time and
particulars of each project. The level of private engagement will depend on market and business opportunities. In many respects,
America’s ability to realize its competitive potential depends on making
smart infrastructure choices. These must respond to economic,
demographic, fiscal, and environmental changes if they are to help people,
places and firms thrive and prosper.
For these reasons, I strongly urge an affirmative ballot.