10. Rimando vs. Naguilan Em. Test Center, GR No.

198860, 23 July 2012

FACTS
1. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. was operating an emission testing center in Naguilian, La
Union (surprise!) on land owned by the government, but was subsequently declared alienable and
disposable by the DENR.
2. From 2005 to 2007, the business operated without any problem. In 2008, the business applied for a
renewal of its business license and paid the fees therefor.
3. Abraham Rimando, mayor of Naguilian, La Union, refused to issue the license until the
business executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian.
4. The business was amenable to this condition, subject to some proposed revisions. (What these
revisions were was not mentioned in the case.) However, these revisions were not acceptable to the
Mayor.
5. A petition for mandamus was filed by the business with the RTC against the Mayor.
6. The RTC denied the petition, based on the following findings:
a. That the Municipality of Naguilian was the declared owner of the subject property as evidenced
by the tax declaration over the property;
b. Under Sec. 6A.01 of the Revenue Code, the municipality has the right to require petitioner to
sign a contract of lease; and
c. A mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature.
7. The Court of Appeals, while declaring the issue moot and academic since the period for which the
business permit was sought (year 2008) had already lapsed, and Mayor Rimando’s term had already
ended. Nonetheless, it proceeded to rule on the merits and found that the issuance of a write of
mandamus was justified. It reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
a. The CA held that the tax declaration was insufficient basis to require the execution of a
contract of lease as a sine qua non condition for the issuance of a business permit.
b. Also, the resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2007-81), upon which the mayor
anchored his imposition of rental fees, was void for its failure to comply with the
requirements of the Local Government Code. (the case fails to mention which requirements)
c. The mayor, however, may not be held liable for damages as his refusal was done in the
performance of official duties.

ISSUE :
1. W/N a writ of mandamus to compel Mayor Rimando to issue a business license to Naguilian
Emission Testing Center should have been issued by the court.

RATIO:
No. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of
the same is a delegated police power, hence discretionary in nature.
i. This was the pronouncement of the Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, where a
determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under
the Local Government Code.
ii. The Court in that case held that such power to grant permits is a manifestation of delegated
police power. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.
iii. The proper remedy is a writ of certiorari, not mandamus.
iv. The grant of such power under the Local Government Code is found in Sec. 444. Such section
states that the municipal mayor’s power to issue licenses is pursuant to Sec. 16 of the
same law. Section 16 of the LGC is the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments. This is exercised through their respective legislative
bodies.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-
industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance.

SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

22. Silva v. Ocampo, 90 Phil. 777 (1952)

Facts:
Belen Cabrera filed in the Public Service Commission an application for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate in the City of Lipa an ice plant. Eliseo Silva opposed the
application on the ground that his ice plant was adequate to meet the needs of the public and that public
convenience did not require the operation of another ice plant. Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo
commissioned Attorney Antonio H. Aspillera, chief of the legal division, to receive the evidence. Based on
the evidence received by Aspillera, the Commission granted the application.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that the proceedings had before Attorney Aspillera
were null and void being in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act, as amended, and set
aside the decision of the Commission and ordered that the case returned for re-hearing.

At the re-hearing before the Commission, Commissioner Ocampo opined that the applicant has the right
either to re-submit her former evidence or to present evidence de novo and that it is not intended by the
decision of this Court to curtail her right to choose between these two alternatives. Based on this
evidence, Commissioner Ocampo granted to the applicant a provisional permit subject to the condition
that it may be cancelled or revoked at any time and without prejudice to whatever final decision may be
rendered in the case. The motion for reconsideration of oppositor having been denied, he filed this
petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Commissioner Ocampo acted in a manner contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court
when he allowed the re-submission of the evidence of the applicant.

Held:
NO. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence presented by the applicant has been
admitted in violation of the directive of this Court, however, such evidence may serve as
justification, if the Commission so finds it, to warrant the issuance of a provisional permit. There is
nothing in the law which prohibits the Commission from receiving any pertinent evidence for the purpose
of acting on a petition for the provisional permit. The law is silent as to the procedure to be followed with
regard to provisional permit. The law even empowers the Commission to act, without hearing, on certain
matters of public interest, "subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions, to the
contrary" (section 17, Com. Act 146, as amended). There being no express prohibition in the law, nor any
provision to the contrary, SC hold that the re-submitted evidence may serve as basis for the issuance of a
provisional permit to the applicant.

The Commission found that the applicant had made considerable investment to acquire and install her
10-ton ice plant in the city of Lipa and that there was an urgent need for ice not only by the people of that
city but also of the towns of Cuenca, Alitagtag and Ibaan, which condition had existed and continued to
exist since the original decision in this case had been rendered, for which reasons the Commission found
sufficient warrant the issuance of a provisional permit. In so granting such provisional permit, the
Commission partly said: "If the best interests and convenience of the public are to be subserved,
applicant should be granted a provisional permit, to continue operating her plant while this case is being
litigated. To order the closing down of applicant's plant in the face of the evidence showing that the public
needs her service would be a disservice to the public. This provisional authority should be granted
because the public's need for the service is urgent and the hearing and final determination of this case
will necessarily take time."

34. Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, GR No. 211362 (February 24. 2015)

Petition: Petition for Mandamus

Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, The Honor Committee of 2014 of
the PMA and HC members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date: February 24, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine
Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412
class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical
Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation.
Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code.
Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class
ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on
the honor report. The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and
upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer
announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and
checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and
pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the
Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR
issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter
disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs
Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education, and
property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were
exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest
for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and
punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.

2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII of the
Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the
courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in
violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed.