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Plaintiff King notes that he most definitely issued valid arguments that no Prejudice
occurred, and that is the entire gravamen of the Decision here. In case Defendants missed, it, here
it is again:

I. Defendants Incurred no Prejudice by the Form of Summons.

Defendant’s make an attempt to say that they were prejudiced in some way by the form
of Summons in that it states a responsive pleading is due in 20 days except in the case of a Tort.
In the case of a Tort of course Defendants have 45 days to issue a Responsive Pleading.
This Defense is silly and does not pass the proverbial giggle test. Defendants hold
themselves out as a Tort-based law firm. See for example on they are listed as a
“Brookfield Toxic Tort Law Firm.”
Further no Plaintiff has moved, nor have they implied that they would move for Default Judgment
so there’s no harm befallen anyone. The Complaint is headed “Personal Injury.” I believe a 1L
law student is aware that a Personal Injury is…. A Tort.
In asserting that the service of a 20 day summons does not confer personal jurisdiction in
a matter where a 45 day summons is required, the defense must invoke the ruling of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 167 Wis.
2d 524 (1992) concerning the “fundamental versus technical” dichotomy to be used in
Wisconsin in summons-defect cases. In American Family, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
said that a summons which contained a fundamental defect was insufficient for all
purposes to confer jurisdiction on a defendant, regardless of the circumstances of service
or other facts in the case. If the defect was merely technical, said the court in American
Family, a defect could be overlooked unless it was shown that the technical defect
actually prejudiced the defendant. This fundamental versus technical approach to
determining the effect of a defect in a summons has continued to be applied in cases
where the defect in the summons is the basis for a jurisdictional challenge.

Further, Attorney Rattan’s vast experience includes, per the LC website:

Mark practices in all areas of insurance coverage litigation and insurance defense
litigation. His insurance coverage litigation work includes comprehensive general
liability policies, professional liability policies, automobile policies, environmental
liability policies, homeowner policies, breach of contract, bad faith and regulatory issues.
His insurance defense litigation includes breach of contract, product liability, general
negligence, professional liability (including medical, legal and engineering malpractice),
directors and officers liability, and automobile accidents.

He has practiced for 38 years so he is well aware of his time to Respond.

Defendant Dykeman has vast experience (nearly two decades) as well in Tort-related

Stephanie focuses her practice on insurance coverage and the defense of complex
commercial litigation. She concentrates her insurance coverage practice in the areas of
construction defect, mold, uninsured and underinsured motorist, personal and advertising
injury, first-party property, bad faith and reformation. In addition, Stephanie defends
policyholders in complex litigation, including products liability, premises liability,
construction and professional liability matters.

Obviously she is aware of her time to respond but is attempting to hide behind any
scheme she can to avoid trial. She is not a trustworthy witness or deponent however as she has
sworn in a related proceeding that she was certain that Defendant Rattan did not make contact
with any part of Plaintiff King’s body during his maniacal walk across an entire room to grab
Plaintiff’s stationary camera.
Her assertion is completely without merit however because she was approximately ten
(10) feet away and trying to view a moving object that Plaintiff King was trying to hold whilst
Defendant Rattan approached him in a threatening, loud, disrespectful and menacing manner. It
must be noted that the camera in question fits in the palm of one’s hand and both men were
grabbing it and one can see the entire screen go black so of course their hands touched.
As such she is completely deceitful and everything she claims in this case must be taken
with a proverbial grain of salt. The pictures don’t lie, but she does.1
Counsel for Defendant blindly claims -- with absolutely nothing to substantiate such
claim -- that Defendant has been prejudiced. How? Where? When? This is nothing more than
pure subterfuge that must gain no purchase before this Honorable Court.

Attorney Dykeman’s penchant for deceit continues in Section II, infra and it colors her hysterical
defenses in the case.

“Don’t you touch my camera.”
“Oh I’m going to touch your camera.”
“I want him arrested!”

To add insult to injury, Defendant acknowledges that they are aware of Torts:
On the contrary, the only reference to “personal injury” is in the caption wherein
plaintiffs identify administrative case codes as required by Wis. Stat. § 802.04(1).
(Defendant Reply p5).

While plaintiff King argues that the First Amended Complaint sounds in tort to which the
45 day response time applies, the word “tort” appears only twice in the entire pleading, in
¶89 on p. 22, and in ¶174 on p. 38. …… (Id). However, no “torts” are “subsequently
pleaded” in the remainder of the First Amended Complaint. The First Amended
Complaint pleads 13 “counts,” claims for relief or causes of action, and they all assert
violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, or the Wisconsin
Organized Crime Control Act under ch. 946 of the Wisconsin Statutes. (Id).

So then, exactly how many times does it have to say “Tort” for Defendant to understand
“Tort?” It’s a ridiculous defense. Moreover, the very Constitutional citations that Defendants
acknowledge also sound as Constitutional Torts under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
There’s no material confusion here whatsoever. Defendants know they are entitled to the
full measure of time in which to respond and further there never was any Default Judgment
implicated or any potential harm to Defendants whatsoever.

II. B. Service on Defendant Dykeman is Valid.

Let’s return to Plaintiff’s “hysterical allegation that defendant Dykeman was attempting
to evade service would be irrelevant even if it were true, because there is nothing “illegal” or
“unconscionable” about a would be defendant evading service.
First of all the only “hysterical” actions in this case were clearly taken by Defendant
Rattan. That much is obvious and witnessed by the video and stills Plaintiff directed the Court to
in which the Court can clearly see Rattan traverse an entire room “in an angry and threatening
manner” in direct contravention of the Law of the Case and cuff his entire hand around the
camera that Plaintiff had been quietly, silently and professional operating.
To any neutral reviewer “angry and threatening” is tantamount to “hysterical” is it not?

Second, where have we devolved as people, much less licensed, registered attorneys
when it becomes anything other than unconscionable to hide from a licensed process server? The
hubris is so thick one could cut it with a knife.