Art. 12 - Exempting Circumstances Ruling: Appeal DENIED.


 As to the criminal
Madali v. People
liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by
Facts:
the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel Madali and
years of age at the time he committed the crime,
Bernardino Maestro were charged with murder in
should be exempt from criminal liability and should
the RTC of Romblon for the death of a 15-yr old boy,
be released to the custody of his parents or guardian
AAA.
pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No.
On the evening of 13 April 1999, AAA, along
9344.
with his cousin Jovencio, Raymund (14 yrs old), Although the crime was committed on 13
Rodel (16 yrs old), Bernardino went atop the
April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
reservoir near beside a high school. Bernardino
only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given
blindfolded AAA and blurted out once blurted out,
retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not
"Join the rugby boys." AAA replied, "That's enough."
shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on
Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
hard coconut frond. AAA lost his balance and was
While Raymund is exempt from criminal
made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and
liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant
Bernardino. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA
to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act
at the back of his thighs with the same coconut
No. 9344.
frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he
As to Rodel's situation, it must be borne in
received punches to his head and body from Rodel,
mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the
who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments
commission of the crime. A determination of
proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness.
whether he acted with or without discernment is
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No.
handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends 9344.
tied to a dog chain. With the contraption, the three
Discernment is that mental capacity of a
malefactors pulled the body up a tree. Stunned at
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
could only muster a faint voice saying "Enough"
should be determined by taking into consideration
every single-time AAA received the painful blows.
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
Bernardino, who seemed to suggest finishing off the
records in each case.
victim, remarked, "Since we're all here, let's get on
The Court of Appeals could not have been
with it." Before leaving the scene, the three
more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with
assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the
discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts,
incident to anyone, or he would be next.
warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to
The RTC found the three guilty of homicide,
anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew,
applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of
therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act
minority in their favor, and sentenced them to suffer
and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) the consequences of his unlawful act.
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Bernardino
The penalty for homicide under Article 249
applied for probation while the Madalis appealed to
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
the CA.
Pursuant to Article 68, the maximum penalty should
The CA affirmed the conviction. However, it
be within prision mayor, which is a degree lower
applied RA 9344 and dismissed Raymund’s case.
than reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or
Rodel was sentenced to 6m1d of prision correctional
mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty
to 8y1d of prision mayor, but the imposition of the
should be in the medium period of prision mayor or
penalty was suspended pursuant to RA 9344.
8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the
Issue: Whether the testimony of Jovencio was
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should
credible to sustain a judgment of conviction.
be anywhere within the penalty next lower in
degree, that is, prision correccional. Therefore, the
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 6
months and one day of prision correccional to 8
years and one day of prision mayor, is in order.
However, the sentence to be imposed against
Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38
of Republic Act No. 9344 [end].
People v. Sarcia
Facts:
An information was filed in the RTC of Ligao
City, charging accused-appellant Richard Sarcia of
raping AAA, who was then 6 years old, sometime in
1996. The RTC found the prosecution evidence
credible and convicted Sarcia as charged, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction and
increased the penalty to death, holding that Sarcia
may not be considered a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, as he reached 18 years
of age in 1996.
Issue: Whether Sarcia may be deemed a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime.
Ruling: CA decision AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION: death penalty is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
 The guilt of Sarcia having
been established beyond reasonable doubt, we
discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on
him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was the
governing law at the time Sarcia committed the rape
in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death
shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child
below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of
AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape
was committed, was alleged in the information and
proven during trial by the presentation of her birth
certificate, which showed her date of birth as
January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be
imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for
modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We
cannot agree with the CA's conclusion that Sarcia
cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
When Sarcia testified on March 14, 2002, he
admitted that he was 24 years old, which means
that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the
trial court, the rape incident could have taken place
"in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date
and time when the rape was committed, it is not
certain that the crime of rape was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this
Court has appreciated this circumstance on the
basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding
his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code,
when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still
the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty for Sarcia is reclusion perpetua.
Meanwhile, when Sarcia was detained at the
New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his
appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision
and CA decision were promulgated on January 17,
2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of Sarcia
handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he
was about 25 years of age at that time, in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. Sarcia is now
approximately 31 years of age. He was previously
detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City
and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive
application xxx to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court
is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to
examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall
apply to Sarcia, who was below 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18
years of age or more at the time he/she is found
guilty of the offense charged.
The above-quoted provision makes no
distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with the law,
unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The
said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that
the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply
to a child in conflict with the law if, among others,
he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does
not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has
been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court
should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of
a heinous crime.
Nonetheless, while Sec, 38 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40
of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the said child reaches the maximum
age of 21.
To date, Sarcia is about 31 years of age, and
the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated,
even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus,
the application of Sees. 38 and 40 to the suspension
of sentence is now moot and academic. However,
Sarcia shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for
the confinement of convicted children [in
agricultural camp and other training facilities in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution]
[end].
People v. Mantalaba
Facts:
The police conducted a buy-bust operation
against a suspected shabu seller, 17-year old Allen
Mantalaba. The operation yielded 2 sachets of
shabu from Mantalaba. He was arrested, and two
informations for violation of Secs. 5 & 11 of RA 9165
were filed in the RTC of Butuan City against
Mantalaba.
The RTC convicted Mantalaba for illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu and sentenced him a
penalty of reclusion perpetua (for the sale) and 6y1d
min to 8y as max of prision mayor (for possession).
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt.
Ruling: CA decision AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION: the penalty that should be imposed
on Mantalaba’s conviction of violation of Section 5
of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Anent the age of Mantalaba when he was
arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss
the effect of his minority in his suspension of
sentence. Mantalaba was seventeen (17) years old
when the buy-bust operation took place or when
the said offense was committed, but was no longer
a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on
May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when
Mantalaba was no longer a minor. The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192
of The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32
of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the
laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable
penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that Mantalaba should
have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence
under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide
for its retroactive application.
However, this Court has already ruled in
People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the child reaches the maximum age
of 21.
Hence, Mantalaba, who is now beyond the
age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of
the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as
to his suspension of sentence, because such is
already moot and academic. It is highly noted that
this would not have happened if the CA, when this
case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of Mantalaba. The records show that the
appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19
(2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in
2006, Mantalaba was 20 years old, and the case
having been elevated to the CA, the latter should
have suspended the sentence of Mantalaba because
he was already entitled to the provisions of Section
38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the
penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603.
Nevertheless, he shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No.
9344 [end].
Hubilla v. People
Facts:
On the evening of March 30, 2000, Rosal
Hubilla stabbed Jason Espinola, while the latter was
watching the graduation ceremony of Dalupaon
Elementary School. The victim was brought to the
Bicol Medical Center, and stayed at the hospital for
more than a month. After being discharged, it was
discovered that the wound had a complication
which needed to be operated on. The victim died
after the operation. The medico-legal expert
testified that the cause of death was organ failure
due to overwhelming infection of the stab wound.
Petitioner in his defense said that while he
was walking home after watching the graduation on
March 30, 2000, he was ganged up on by 4 men.
After the incident, he proceeded home, however he
met somebody whom he thought was a member of
the group that ganged up on him, so he stabbed the
person with a knife. He said he was carrying a knife
because he used it in preparing food for his friend
who was graduating that day.
Hubilla was charged with Homicide at the
RTC of Naga. RTC convicted. CA affirmed the
conviction but modified the civil liability.
Hubilla now assails the CA decision for not
correctly imposing the penalty, and for not
suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with
the law pursuant to RA 9344.
Issue:
Ruling:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then
a minor at the time of the commission of the crime,
being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when
he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance
that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable
penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e.,
six months and one day to six years). For the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision
mayor in its medium period – eight years and one
day to 10 years – was proper because there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the
maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight
years and one day of prison mayor should be
reduced to only six years of prision correccional to
enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding
principles in the trial and judging in cases involving
a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that
found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section
5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal
liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.
Consistent with this principle, the amended decision
of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the
indeterminate penalty for homicide under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic
Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate
courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty
further, even for the sake of enabling the child in
conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of
Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from
probation an offender sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation.
For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to
remand the case to the trial court to determine if he
was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a
child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a
crime, the suspension is available only until the child
offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section
40 of Republic Act No. 9344. Petitioner was well
over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the
suspension of his sentence was no longer legally
feasible or permissible.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition
for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to
remand the judgment to the trial court for
implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of
Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service
of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities under its control, supervision and
management, in coordination with the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.
People v. Agacer
Facts:
On April 2, 1998, Cesario Agacer was killed
while he was tending to his rice farm/field. One of
the appellants set fire to the rice straws covering
Cesario’s seedlings. Another two (Franklin & Eric)
started throwing stones at him. Eddie then short
Cesario in the left chest. Elynor shot Cesario with a
bow and arrow, but missed. They fled thereafter on
board a tractor and tricycle. Cesario obtained 8
gunshot wounds.
On March 2, 1999, the five appellants
(Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, Eric; All Agacer)
were charged with Murder.
RTC convicted; that appellants acted in
conspiracy for having acted with treachery. No
evident premeditation for failure to establish
elements; no aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm since it was not presented in
evidence. CA affirmed.
SC affirmed the conviction in its Dec. 14,
2011 decision. May conspiracy. May treachery
because Cesario was surrounded and was shot
without warning. Defense of Relative set up by
accused without merit. Appellant filed MR with
respect to Franklin since he was allegedly 16 yo and
1 day at the time of incident supported by NSO birth
certificate.
Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance
of minority be appreciated in favor of Franklin
Agacer, who was 16 years and 106 days old at the
time of the incident.
Ruling:
Yes. Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minory embodied in Art. 68(2), RTC.
When the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed shall be
imposed. The rationale behind this leniency and
compassion is that the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment because of his age. This
is regardless of the fact that minority was not
proved during the trial and that his birth certificate
was belatedly presented.
Thus, the penalty imposed upon Franklin
must be accordingly modified. The penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A degree
lower is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance,
the penalty to be imposed on Franklin should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, which ranges from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower
in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of
which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness of the crime
and the manner it was committed, the penalty must
be imposed at its most severe range.
Ty v. People
Facts:
Seven informations for violation of BP 22
were filed against petitioner Vicky Ty before the RTC
of Manila. The prosecution alleged that the mother
and sister of Ty were patients of the Manila Doctor’s
Hospital. Ty executed a promissory note secured by
7 postdated checks payable to the hospital. They
were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds,
prompting the Hospital to send demand letters to Ty
but the letters went unheeded.
Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.
She was forced to do so to obtain the release of her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly
treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
bills are paid. The hospital deprived her mother of
room facilities, subjected the latter to
inconveniences, and suspended medical treatment.
The “debasing treatment” was so severe that her
mother contemplated suicide if she would not be
discharged from the hospital.
The RTC convicted Ty as charged, giving full
credence to the prosecution evidence and
disregarded Ty’s defense. On appeal, Ty reiterated
that she acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear, and claimed the absence of
valuable consideration for the issuance of the
checks, and that the hospital had knowledge that
her bank account lacked funds, but the CA rejected
all her defenses
Issue: Whether Ty was acting under the impulse of
an incontrollable fear of a greater injury when she
issued the 7 checks
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
 The Court finds the
petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain
Ty’s conviction.
The only question of law raised—whether
the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to
warrant her exemption from criminal liability—has
to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting
circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur:
1) existenceofanuncontrollablefear;
 2)
thefearmustberealandimminent;and
 3) the fear of
an injury is greater than or at least
equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused
the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb.
A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well. It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any,
harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims
that she was compelled to issue the checks—a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged—for fear
that her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or
worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the
mother’s illness was so life threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well- grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the
law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less Ty’s flimsy fear that her
mother might commit suicide. In other words, the
fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable
as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that
she was left with no choice but to commit a crime.
She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing
one. By her very own words, she admitted that the
collateral or security the hospital required prior to
the discharge of her mother may be in the form of
postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was
coerced to open an account with the bank and issue
the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, Ty had sufficient knowledge that
the issuance of checks without funds may result in a
violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account
nor issue postdated checks “because the moment I
will not have funds it will be a big problem.” Besides,
apart from Ty’s bare assertion, the record is bereft
of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim
that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate
with and give in to the hospital’s demands [end].
Art. 13 - Mitigating Circumstances
Rodel Urbano v. People (Velasco,, 2009)
Facts:
On September 28, 1993, Petitioner and
Brigido Tomelden (victim), while drinking at a
restaurant in Lingayen, Pangasinan, had a heated
exchange of words, which led to a fist fight.
Tomelden was hit on the face rendering him
unconscious. Tomelden spent the night at the
Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) office. When he
arrived home the next night, he complained of pain
in his nape, head and ear causing him to be brought
to the Lingayen Community Hospital. Tomelden
went back to the hospital on 2 more occasions
because of drowsiness and frequent vomiting. He
was then diagnosed with a brain injury, secondary
to mauling. On October 10, 1993, Tomelden was
rushed to the hospital, then died at 9pm due to
cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due
to mauling incident.
Urbano in his defense asserted lack of intent
to kill, and that hypertension was Tomelden’s cause
of death.
RTC convicted Urbano of Homicide, w/o any
modifying circumstance. CA affirmed. Urbano filed
Rule 45 petition assigning error on 1) the finding of
guilt; 2)CA’s non-appreciation of mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part
of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong.
Issue: W/N MC cited should be appreciated.
Ruling:
1. Homicide Proved. The “lucky punch” was
the proximate cause of Tomelden’s death. It was
after that incident that Tomelden was hospitalized
on several occasions until he died.
2. The mitigating circumstance that Urbano
had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should also be appreciated in his favor.
While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact
of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may
still be considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Urbano tried to avoid the fight, being very
much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the
blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the
scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the
fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped
carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD's general manager. Surely, such gesture
cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be
unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a
wrong as killing the victim. A bare- knuckle fight as a
means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden
was commensurate to the potential violence
petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that
Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an
eventuality that could have possibly been averted
had he had the financial means to get the proper
medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the
mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him
guilty of homicide. That Urbano landed a lucky
punch at Tomelden's face while their co-workers
were trying to separate them is a compelling
indicium that he never intended so grave a wrong as
to kill the victim [end].
People v. Ignas
Facts: In February 1996, appellant June Ignas
learned that his wife is having an affair with
Nemesio Lopate. On March 10, 1996, he shot to
death Lopate. Ignas voluntarily admitted to the
police that he shot Lopate. He was charged with
murder aggravated with the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, and was
found guilty of the same.
Issue: Whether the mitigating circumstances of the
immediate vindication of a grave offense and
passion and obfuscation should be appreciated in
Ignas’s favor.
Ruling: RTC decision MODIFIED, he is guilty only of
homicide.
 We agree with the Solicitor General
that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his
discovery of his wife's infidelity and the killing of
her supposed paramour could no longer be
considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is
more than sufficient time for appellant to have
recovered his composure and assuaged the unease
in his mind. The established rule is that there can be
no immediate vindication of a grave offense when
the accused had sufficient time to recover his
serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of
a grave offense cannot be considered in appellant's
favor [end].
George Bongalon v. People (Bersamin)
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10
(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying
of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be
intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse.
Facts:
On May 11, 2002, George Bongalon hit
Jayson dela Cruz (12y.o) at the back with his hand,
and slapped Jayson on the left cheek, uttered.
derogatory remarks at his family, and challenged
the latter’s father - Rolando - to a fight. Jayson
obtained contusions on the scapular area and left
cheek as per medical certificate from the Bicol
Regional Training and Teaching Hospital.
On June 26, George Bongalon was charged
with child abuse in violation of Sec. 10(a), RA7610.
Petitioner George Bongalon on his part
denied having physically abused or maltreated
Jayson, alleging that he only did so because Jayson
had been throwing stones at them, and that Jayson
had burned his daughter’s hair.
RTC convicted. CA affirmed, but modified
penalty.
Issue:
1. W/N Bongalon was guilty of child abuse
1. assuming he was guilty, W/N liability should
be mitigated because he was acting in protection of
his two daughters.
Ruling: NO.
Although Petitioner indeed struck Jayson, his
acts did not constitute child abuse within the
purview of RA7610.
The prosecution failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
was intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and
dignity” of Jayson as a human being or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
Based on the records, the laying of hands was done
at the spur of the moment and in anger because of
his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his
own minor daughters who had suffered harm from
Jayson and Roldan, thus such fact shows lack of
specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being - an essential requisite in the crime of child
abuse.
Petitioner is only liable for slight physical
injuries under Art. 266(1), RPC, since Jayson’s
injuries required 5-7 days of medical attention.
Nizurtado v. People
Facts:
Nizurtado, Barangay Captain of Brgy.
Panghulo, Malabon, received a check worth P10,000
from the Ministry of Human Settlements, Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) and the Kilusang
Kabuhayan and Kaunlaran under their Livelihood
Program for Barangays in Metro Manila, consisting
of P10,000 loans for each barangay. The check could
be encashed only upon submission of a resolution
approved by the barangay council identifying the
livelihood project in which the loan would be
invested. Petitioner Nizurtado, the Barangay
Captain of Brgy. Panghulo, Malabon, received the
P10,000 check for his barangay’s livelihood
program. He entrusted the check to Romero, the
Barangay Treasurer.
The Barangay Council of Panghulo could not
agree on any livelihood project, thus Nizurtado got
back the check from Romero to return the same to
the MMC. A few days later, Nizurtado asked Romero
to sign an unaccomplished resolution in
mimeograph form, saying that the MMC was
hurrying up the matter and the livelihood project to
be stated in the resolution was that proposed by
Romero-a barangay service center. The
unaccomplished resolution already bore the
signatures of 5 Council members. When Romero
signed, the blank resolution did not bear yet the
signatures of 2 councilmen-including Gomez. Upon
Nizurtado’s request Romero asked Gomez to sign,
and the latter did.
Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the
resolution was later on accomplished, and it stated
that the Council had identified T-Shirt
manufacturing as the livelihood project. The
resolution and other supporting documents for
encashment were submitted by Nizurtado.
Nizurtado was able to encash the check, and he re-
lent the cash proceeds to himself, the members of
the Barangay Council, Barangay Court Secretary and
Barangay Secretary.
Later, Romero and Gomez were informed
that they have not yet made any remittance on
account of their P1,000 loan from the P10,000
barangay livelihood fund. Since both had not
borrowed any amount of money from the barangay,
Romero and Gomez made inquiries. They learned
that the blank resolution was filled up to make it
appear that the Council met at a certain date and a
T-shirt manufacturing was decided as the livelihood
project. But there was no such meeting, and neither
was Nizurtado authorized by the council to submit
T-shirt manufacturing as the livelihood project.
Romero and Gomez filed a complaint against
Nizurtado in the Tanodbayan, and after
investigation the information against Nizurtado for
the complex crime of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public document was filed
before the Sandiganbayan. Afterwards, Nizurtado
remitted P8,000 to the MMC, and several years later
the remaining P2,000 was remitted by the acting
Barangay Captain. Also, Nizurtado surrendered to
the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Nizurtado as
charged, but appreciated two mitigating
circumstances-voluntary surrender and restitution
of funds-in his favor. The Sandiganbayan imposed
the penalties of imprisonment ranging from FOUR
(4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS, and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor as maximum; perpetual special
disqualification; and a fine of P10,000.00.
ISSUE: Did Nizurtado misappropriate the funds?
HELD.
Yes. Petitioner was able to encash the check on the
basis of a resolution of the Barangay Council,
submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that
a livelihood project, i.e., "T-shirt manufacturing,"
had already been identified by the council. The
money, however, instead of its being used for the
project, was later lent to, along with petitioner, the
members of the Barangay Council. Undoubtedly,
the act constituted "misappropriation" within the
meaning of the law.
Nizurtado was charged with having
committed the crime through the falsification of a
public document punishable under paragraph 2 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification
under the above-quoted paragraph, the document
need not be an authentic official paper since its
simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification. So,
also, the signatures appearing thereon need not
necessarily be forged. In concluding that the
Barangay Council resolution was a falsified
document for which petitioner should be held
responsible, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to
the testimonies of Barangay Councilman Gomez and
Barangay Treasurer Romero. The established rule is
that unless the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan
are bereft of substantial evidence to support it,
those findings are binding on this court.
The Sandiganbayan has considered the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution in favor of Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of
Court Luisabel Alfonso Cortez, on 17 January 1989,
has certified to the voluntary surrender of the
accused.
Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7,
Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be
treated as a modifying circumstance independent
and apart from restitution of the questioned funds
by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code).
We are convinced, furthermore, that petitioner
had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed. (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal
Code), entitling him to three distinct mitigating
circumstances.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same (the penalty) to be applied in the
maximum period. The penalty prescribed for the
offense of malversation of public funds, when the
amount involved exceeds six thousand pesos but
does not exceed twelve thousand pesos, is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period; in addition, the offender
shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual special
disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the
amount malversed (Art. 217[3], Revised Penal
Code). The penalty of prision mayor and a fine of five
thousand pesos is prescribed for the crime of
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. The former (that imposed for the
malversation), being more severe than the latter
(that imposed for the falsification), is then the
applicable prescribed penalty to be imposed in its
maximum period. The actual attendance of two
separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and restitution, also accused to the
penalty next lower in degree. For purposes of
determining that next lower degree, the full range
of the penalty prescribed by law for the offense, not
merely the imposable penalty because of its
complex nature, should, a priori, be considered. It is
our considered view that the ruling in People vs.
Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as opposed to that of People
vs. Fulgencio, 92 Phil. 1069, is the correct rule and it
is thus here reiterated. In fine, the one degree lower
than prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
minimum is prision mayor minimum to prision
mayor medium (being the next two periods in the
scale of penalties [see Art. 64, par. 5, in relation to
Art. 61, par. 5, Revised Penal Code]) the full range of
which is six years and one day to ten years. This one
degree lower penalty should, conformably with
Article 48 of the Code (the penalty for complex
crimes), be imposed in its maximum period or from
eight years, eight months and one day to ten years.
The presence of the third mitigating circumstance
of praeter intentionem (lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed) would result
in imposing a period the court may deem
applicable. Considering, however, that the penalty
has to be imposed in the maximum period, the only
effect of this additional mitigating circumstance is
to impose only the minimum portion of that
maximum period, that is, from eight years, eight
months and one day to nine years, six months and
ten days, from which range the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(which can apply since the maximum term of
imprisonment would exceed one year), the court is
to impose an indeterminate sentence, the minimum
of which shall be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree (i.e., prision
correccional in its medium period to prision
correccional in its maximum period or anywhere
from two years, four months and one day to six
years) and the maximum of which is that which the
law prescribes after considering the attendant
modifying circumstances. In view of the mitigating
circumstances present in this case, the fine of
P10,000.00 may also be reduced (Art. 66, Revised
Penal Code) and, since the principal penalty is higher
than prision correccional, subsidiary imprisonment
would not be warranted (Art. 39, par. 3, Revised
Penal Code).
The conviction by the Sandiganbayan is
affirmed, but the penalty is modified by imposing
on petitioner a reduced indeterminate sentence of
from two years, four months and one day to eight
years, eight months and one day, perpetual special
disqualification and a fine of P2,000.00 [end].
Mariano v. People
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Mariano was charged
with frustrated homicide in the RTC of Bulacan. He
hit and bumped the victim De Leon when Mariano
tried to overtake De Leon’s owner-type jeep. After
the incident Mariano dropped off his passengers
and turned himself over to the police. The RTC
convicted him as charged, but the CA held that
Mariano committed reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries.
Issue: Whether the MC of voluntary surrender
should have been appreciated in Mariano’s favor.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
Contrary to the Mariano’s insistence, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365,
Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
“The rationale of the law,” according to People v.
Medroso, Jr. can be found in the fact that “in quasi-
offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which
characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one
situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting
consequences, and in order that there may be a fair
and just application of the penalty, the courts must
have ample discretion in its imposition, without
being bound by what We may call the mathematical
formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision,
the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5
of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had
two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no
aggravating circumstance to offset them” [end].