Calub v.

CA
G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000

FACTS: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor
vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to
present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles
and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers
from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The
vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio

Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the
vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer
Calub.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of

impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

HELD: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit
against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the
protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness,
malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts
in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A
and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within
the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence,
a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

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 Lalican v. Vergara
G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner was charged for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.
Petitioner then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No.
705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and
asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams,
planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'"
He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the
authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations.
Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated
his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The
prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the
courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the
legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include
"lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut."

ISSUE: Whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from

the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705

HELD: No. The legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is

clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under EO
No. 277, are to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos and to
penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present
situations and realities. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts
penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be
so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so
interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms,
create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the
phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would
merely result in tautology.

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 Pallada v. People
G.R. No. 131270 March 17, 2000
FACTS: Pallada, as general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, a
rice milling company, was convicted of possessing 29,299.25 board feet of
lumber, worth P488,334.45 in total, which were confiscated during a raid by
police and DENR officers. On the scene, the company provided 2 receipts issued
by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard, whose permit to operate had already been suspended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “timber” includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered
in establishing the legality of the company’s possession of the lumber.

HELD: No, the statement in the Mustang Lumber case that lumber is merely
processed timber and, therefore, the word “timber” embraces lumber, was made
in answer to the lower court’s ruling in that case that the phrase “posses timber
or other forest products” in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who
possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are
criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable.
On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates
of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of
origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.

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 People v. Dator
GR No. 136142 October 24, 2000
FACTS: Police officers confiscated pieces of lumber from an Isuzu cargo for failure of the
driver, accused Benito Genol, to show the required documents for the proper
transport of the pieces of lumber consisting of forty-one
(41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber with a totalvolu
me of 1,560.16 board feet. Pastor Telen, owner of lumber, testified that the lumber will
be used in renovating his residence. Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO
Maasin, Southern Leyte allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to
Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he
could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his
mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his
house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by
planting Gemelina seedlings.The trial court convicted Pastor Telen of violation of Sec 68 of
PD No. 705 which Telen appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal documents or permit is still required for cutting or
transporting the soft lumber.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The fact of possession by the
appellant of the subject lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute
criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, Section 68. The
appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, a
special statutory law, and which crime is
consideredmala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala p
rohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated. The motive
or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that
his mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his
criminal liability.

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 PICOP v. Calo
GR No. 161798 October 20, 2004
FACTS: PICOP, a pulp and manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte
held a Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated
Forest Management (IFMA) No. 35 covering 130,000 hectares of forest land
within Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Three DENR Memoranda dated
1997, February 2001, and April 2001 designated the petitioner as a DENR
depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances with
its concession. Thereafter, private respondents, Casia et al, were arrested by
PICOP security officers transporting falcata logs. PICOP refused to release the
confiscated forest products.
ISSUE: Whether or not a depository can retain possession of conveyances.
Held: No, the petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated
forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as
borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling
the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. Also, the petitioner also cannot
claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and conveyances by
virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed
Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated
products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or
criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
The Memorandum dated February 16, 2001, which designated petitioner as
a DENR depository, had been revoked by the Memorandum of January 21, 2002.
As of the filing of the petition for review before this Court on March 11, 2004,
petitioner no longer had any right, as a depository, to retain possession of the
conveyances.

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 Ysmael v. The Deputy Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
FACTS: In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration,
petitioner sent letters to the Office of the President and to the Ministry of Natural
Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA
No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions,
during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled
without being given the opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded
to other logging concessionaires without a formal award or license, as these
entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Marcos. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the
due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner
was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.It also emphasized the fact
that there was currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas. After
the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but
the petition was denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the
matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative
orders issued by their predecessors.

HELD: The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory

administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

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 Bon v. People
GR No. 152160 January 13, 2004
FACTS: Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section
68 of PD 705, as amended, together with Rosalio Bon under Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay

Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, the accused, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1)
cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315
bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first
obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal
supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the
owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution witnesses had credibility and sufficiency of
the evidence proving their guilt.

HELD: It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of

evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its
conclusions and findings of guilt.1[33] Conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary
that the following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,2[30] provides:

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SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other
forest products without the legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with the first offense.3[32] It was thus necessary for
the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of
lumber from the trees.

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 Chu v. Tamin
AM No. RTJ-03-1786 August 28, 2003
FACTS: Judge Tamin issued a search warrant ordering the seizure of several
pieces of mangrove lumber from Chu’s fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga
del Sur. CENRO Officer dela Cruz and the police, seized 576 pieces of pagatpat
lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183,790. These certified
copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judge’s examination of CENRO
dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Chu claims that was the fifth time that Judge Tamin
issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation
of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge
issued four search warrants against him. Judge Tamin replied that the failure to
give the transcript was through “pure inadvertence,” by the office legal
researcher to recopy such transcript, and that he conducted searching questions
on Cuaresma, the witness of CENRO.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Tamin acted in gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: Yes, because omissions bolster complainant’s claim and weaken the
respondent’s defense. As respondent judge claims, he personally examined a
Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit
of Cuaresma. Respondent should also have secured the affidavit of the unnamed
“legal researcher” who allegedly prepared the copies of the records obtained by
complainant.

Lastly, respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas,

during the latter’s investigation, the magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript
allegedly stored in his office computer. These omissions bolster complainant’s
claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judge’s defense.

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 Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
3. and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State
in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to

“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and

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healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
People v. CFI of Quezon
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of
logs, under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They entered the privately-
owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, then illegally cut, gather, take, steal and
carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any
authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, 60 logs of different
species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of P50,205.52
including government charges. The trial court dismissed the information.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the information charged an offense.

2. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned
by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint
were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the
name of complainant’s deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the
state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the
owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including
those produced in private woodlands.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section
60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of
the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking
was without any authority or license from the government.

Yes, with the exception of the so-called “private crimes” and in election
offenses, prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an
information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section
80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the
said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations.

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 People v. Que
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
FACTS: The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received information that a
ten-wheeler truck with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Que’s
truck was spotted and discovered to contain cocounut slabs with sawn lumber
inserted in between. He failed to give the cargo’s supporting documents: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary
invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. All he could show was a
certification 7 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there are no existing forest laws and regulations which
required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest
products.
2. Whether or not the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products
and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.

HELD:
1. No, appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations”
to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of
the enactment of E.O. 277. However, the suggested interpretation is strained and
would render the law inutile. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products.
DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents
required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides that the movement of logs, lumber, non-timber
forest products and wood-based or wood based shall be covered with the
appropriate Certificates of Origin. The transport of lumber shall be accompanied
by CLO (Certificate of Lumber Origin).

2. No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality
of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second
offense, however, mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a
legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum
prohibitum.

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 Roldan v. Madrona
G.R. No. 152989 September 4, 2002
FACTS: Pending the application in the DENR for a Private Land Timber Permit on
his own land, Roldan was allegedly informed by some DENR employees that he
could proceed with the cutting of trees. Later, petitioner cut trees, bulldozed the
roadway and used cut logs as materials to build chicken cages. The CENRO group
confiscated 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled
timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner’s penalty for cutting trees in his own land
should not be equated with that for qualified theft.
2. Whether or not the owner of a private property is administratively liable
under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the
fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for
his own agricultural purposes.
3. Whether or not the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to
petitioner.

HELD:
1. No, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the
violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft; hence
his ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does not even distinguish
whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the
aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in
determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity
involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or
authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or
other forest products.

2. No, the administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any
wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is
subject to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that
he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that such is a
factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine.

3. No, any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the

guilt of the petitioner has not been legally established. The records of the case
indicate that trial on the merits is still in progress.

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