Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Timothy Brennan
Intellectual Labor
the intellectual’s role in the division of labor. A great deal is said in regard to
its speaking about but very little about its manner of being within the system
it diagnoses. Could it be that certain ideas rather than others have become
prominent in theory as a result of obscuring that role? But also can it be that
the ideas of moment and the styles of their delivery have a great deal to do
with labor-saving operations—to a simplicity masked as complexity, which
is a packaging that facilitates their circulation?
Before turning to these questions with examples, let me provide the
setting. There has been, of course, an ongoing reliance by cultural theo-
rists on terms and metaphors derived from economics: the “gift economy”
(Marcel Mauss), the “libidinal economy” (Sigmund Freud), “expenditure”
(Georges Bataille), “the spectacular commodity” (Guy Debord), “supple-
ment as excess” (Jacques Derrida), and the term value itself as the register
of an ambiguous middle realm between economics and aesthetics. But the
converse is also true—a persistent borrowing from cultural theory by dis-
ciplinary discourses relating to economics seen in the use, for example,
of the concept of “deterritorialization” in legal theories of sovereignty, of
“multiculturalism” in corporate training programs, and postmodern tropes
in chaos theory, which is now a large subfield in the usually less adventur-
ous economics journals.3
This compulsion toward the economic is forced on all of us and is larger
than any individual actor or position—part of a general inundation of
society by economics as an everyday obsession, a new culture of economic
forecasts, planning, and speculation, all following on the perceived new
conditions at the “end of history,” which has postulated that neoliberal-
ism is the only possible system. Never before has investing, for instance,
been such a populist activity; never before has charting the dips and rises
of the market occupied the free time of ordinary people. New sections of
daily newspapers on shopping, real estate speculation, home trading, and
innovative pension fund packages show that finance and investment have
become a form of entertainment and cultural curiosity that involve sub-
jects at levels that exceed any interest in their own security.
The idea of living in a shareholder democracy, the idea that neoliberal
ideology is not just popular in ruling circles but genuinely populist—this is
the ambience within which present cultural theory has assumed its recent
shape. Interestingly, and perhaps predictably, for a few years now there
has been a recoil in theoretical discussions from an earlier investment in
giving priority to the mediations of language and to vigorously emphasiz-
mologies drawn from classical Greece. These etymologies were not philo-
logical in the sense that they did not establish buried connotations in key
contemporary terminologies, thereby shedding light on present meanings.
Rather, they were, as Arendt presented them, verities inscribed in a pri-
mary, uniquely emulatable civilization—the Greece out of which all later
reality was (for her, and one might say also, for Heidegger and Nietzsche) a
mere unfolding. In The Human Condition (1958)—Arendt’s most profound
and influential book—she uses the term poiesis to considerable effect.12 In
ancient Greek, it means an active making or crafting; by relying on the
English homonym, Arendt summons poetry as productive labor: as the
labor productive of truth. Her painstaking goal throughout the volume is to
redefine politics by correcting our misconception of man as a “political ani-
mal.”13 The Greeks, she insists, preferred the vita contemplativa to the vita
activa, the small revelations of the private sphere of the home to the repel-
lent business of public affairs. The signal outrage of modernity for her is the
rise of political economy, which dragged the former sphere into the latter,
cheapening contemplation in the name of serving the grotesque bodily
wants of a new god called by the name “society.” Econo-poiesis, however, is
much more than an argumentative gesture in Arendt’s work. Her influence
is such that it has become a general principle of contemporary theory and
can be defined in the following way: the turning of economic categories into
aesthetic artifacts with the authority of the Greek classics (as Agamben, another
Arendtian, is doing with his appeals to the vocabulary of Roman law).
The project of The Human Condition is to dismantle the modern con-
ception of labor as it was received from political economy and to contra-
vene Hegel’s epochal efforts in The Philosophy of Right to bring social labor
squarely into the purview of philosophy, subjecting thought itself to a rela-
tionship of tension and debt to the physical labor that enables it. For Hegel
this meant, ultimately, to realize the intellect socially—in part by witnessing
the concrete form it had taken in governing institutions. Hegel’s goal had,
of course, already been revised, in its own way, by the Young Hegelians,
including Marx, who instead set out to demonstrate that the intellect was
the offspring, not the progenitor, of the world enveloping it. Alfred Sohn-
Rethel in Intellectual and Manual Labor, aptly describes Marx’s goal: “to dis-
pel the fetishism of the intellect,” a task Sohn-Rethel describes as requiring
“infinitely deeper theoretical effort” than “to continue its worship.”14
By drawing on distinctions she argued had prevailed in the Athens of
antiquity, Arendt sets out first of all to extinguish the modern recognition
and “depth” with the artifice of style standing in for the shoddy empiricism
of mere research and a repeatable (and, therefore, more easily transmis-
sible) form.
The chief symptom in this operation is that, in place of argument, there
emerges the virtual textual reading and the epigrammatic utterance. There
need not be grounds for a declaration, since the declaration justifies itself
by opening thought to new “potentialities.” Authority is not based on read-
ing, and reading need not correspond. In Arendt, who wrote at a time when
reading still mattered, this takes the form of employing etymologies as
splicing operations for complicated material processes, where the appeal to
the Olympian serenity of antiquity emboldens the precepts without having
to enter the messy world of plebeian documents such as international trade
figures, real-wage charts, and so on, or even to contain any sense whatso-
ever of a world of conflicting interests.15 We see this more generally today
in the desires of publishers, given production costs, for minimalist, small-
scale books—not unlike the compact discs in the recording industry on
which only one song is original while the rest are recyclings of earlier work.
Indeed, it is a common publishing practice today to parcel out an overall
thesis across a number of short monographs in which isolated insights by
major thinkers are blown up as programmatic statements that simulta-
neously maximize cover price. The semiroutine publications of Agamben,
Slavoj Žižek, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Derrida are all examples of this trend.
This labor-saving move is part of an overall valorization of the aesthetics
of complexity within contemporary criticism (which I will explore in the
closing section of this essay), where complexity is seen as an absolute and
unchallenged value: a physical sign, as it were, of immense critical labor
embodied in a tangible, finely wrought, verbal artifact.16 Such complexity
is, of course, partly to be understood as a welcome riposte to a milieu of
public discourse and propaganda in which ad copy proliferates and cynical
campaign slogans abound. But this return to the fetish of intricacy also has
an economic function unrelated to this element of protest. For complexity,
among other things, offers the critic an opportunity to declare politically
dissident ideas in the form of an ironic dissimulation—which is economic
to the degree that it is a form of job protection in a regime of risk. None-
theless, an idealization of complexity permits politically conformist ideas to
take the form of dissident declarations in which the labor of thought is itself
considered integral to oppositional modes of argument. Complexity thus
becomes a use-value: the content as form of theoretically oppositional labor
The challenge of her perspective is not simply its cold war dimension or the
not altogether ingenuous way in which she casts her arguments in an emo-
tional tone of faux insouciance toward Marx and Left Hegelianism (even
as she is involved throughout in a pitched battle with that philosophical
lineage whose central themes she hopes to appropriate while pretending to
include them in a long lineage in which they play a minor part). It is that
there is a profound Helleno-centrism that fits somewhat awkwardly with
the conventional wisdom of the U.S. 1950s, drawing on the same golden
age rhetoric mobilized by writers and scholars such as Richmond Latti-
more, Werner Jaeger, and, in the most egregious instance, Edith Hamilton.
The latter two were, like Arendt, German American, and their works were
used widely in the American school system for moral education.20
If Arendt follows Heidegger very closely in carrying on the proprietary
relationship Germans feel toward Attic Greece (only they are its proper
inheritors and interpreters), Arendt in effect creates a pop philosophical
version of Hamilton for American audiences, translating the conventional
American ideas of individualism (spelled out in her labor-work-action dis-
tinction) and the corruptness of all government as well as the purifying
privacy of the home and of noncommercial property in a venerated, already
established classical tradition. In short, she was making American political
clichés classical and sanctifying them by association with the high philo-
sophical tradition to which she belonged at one step removed.
Arendt’s vision of a gentlewoman’s circle of refined thinkers freed not
from labor so much as from the obsessions of bourgeois politics and the
degraded world of public affairs is shared by Derrida as well, who seeks
to return the intellectual to that immersion in the purity of the concept
characterized by an enticing bookishness in which text is venerated as an
object of delight—a secularization of text in which the sacred is now beheld
as an aesthetic aura (a move that conforms to the secularization of reli-
gion in Heidegger generally). He, like Arendt, is protesting against it. In
Arendt and Derrida, the rejection of market efficiency, which they associate
with the committed, participatory intellectual (who acts on and within civil
society), is fashioned into a new model based on the heroic self-sufficiency
of the poet and artistic amateur—aloof commentators on a society of which
they feel themselves not a part but about which they concede to be think-
ing. The peasant philosopher becomes the poet philosopher, just as the
radical critic becomes the aristocrat of the demimonde.
Complexity Is a Style
I begin this section with one last quotation in the spirit of our forgotten past
and this return to economic thought as econo-poiesis. Take this passage from
the Ludwig Feuerbach everyone knows from Marx’s famous theses, but
whom few actually take the time to read: “To have articulated what is such
as it is, in other words, to have truthfully articulated what truly is, appears
superficial. To have articulated what is such as it is not, in other words, to
have falsely and distortedly articulated what truly is, appears profound. . . .
Truthfulness, simplicity, and determinacy are the formal marks of the real
philosophy.”21 Regardless of what one achieves in philosophy today, one is
considered crude and reckless so long as one is unwilling to bow to a pre-
approved canon. The atmosphere is stifling, and the adversarial intellectual
of the academic humanities is required by unwritten laws to work accord-
ing to an imperious etiquette. Our valorized forms of theory operate only
on the basis of a set of rules that are seldom acknowledged, some of which
I have tried to describe above, while offering a story of how they came to
be. I would like to counterpose to these another set of rules that negatively
assess this particular version of theory as a mode of comportment (that is,
what theory must look like in the current setting in order to be recognized
as “theory” in the present division of labor). I hope it is clear that I am not
taking a stand against theory as such, only “theory” where the designated
scare quotes also intimate a self-arrogation. That is, I am making a case
against the tyrannical identification of all theory with what is, in fact, only
one currently hegemonic strand of it. I consider this itself a theoretical
effort that a certain vulgar response wishes to discount without engage-
ment, which would, again, require labor.
Rule 1: The work of “theory” is a mere prolegomenon to consequential
theoretical work, although it does not see itself this way, of course. Its oppo-
site—which is found in the symphonic sweep, the display of knowledge,
the powers of synthesis, the carefully toned-down prose, and the emphasis
on evidentiary argument of situated thinkers such as Giovanni Arrighi,
Edward Said, Nancy Fraser, David Harvey, Arundhati Roy, and Alexander
Kluge—does not register as “theory” because it has already internalized
its lessons and expressed them in the investigation of an immanent set of
unfolding social conflicts. The high theorists by contrast (and these can be
very dissimilar politically and aesthetically—for example, Jean-Luc Nancy,
Negri, Gilles Deleuze, Agamben, Badiou, and Gianni Vattimo) luxuriate in
immediately on the utterance of a newly evoked reality. This is, and must
be, a closed system, very much like a vacuum in which the laboratory spe-
cialist prevents a mote of dust or germ from infecting the carefully pre-
pared sterility of the experiment—hence, the Saidian effort to trace the
hidden fealty between the perennial modernism of beginnings and the dis-
avowal of the places from which one’s theory traveled.26
It would be inaccurate to say that these two discourses of situated and
prolegomenous theory fail to understand one another. The situated under-
stands the prolegomenous only too well, since the very act of situating itself
requires studying what has outmaneuvered it and forced it into a defen-
sive posture; whereas the prolegomenous ignores the situated with all the
power and prejudice of its hegemony. In the end, each sees the other as
simplistic.
In the struggle over interpretations, the situated theorist is at a structural
disadvantage. He or she is constrained to wrestle with concepts, compare
the shadings of views to eliminate inconsistencies, weigh not only his or
her topics’ conclusions but the environment of his or her composition. The
prolegomenous, on the other hand, is driven by an immanent methodology
in the service of a performative transcendence. He or she can move very
rapidly from position to position, modeling his or her language on needs
located in a fickle, flexible market. A quotation can stand for a corpus with
little guilt or pause. By the time the situated theorist has uttered a syl-
lable, the entire “debate” has shifted—although it never was a debate and is
instinctively set up this way to avoid competition, since the anachronisms
of historical thought, agency, will, and civic life are already “known” and no
longer need to be attacked.
Focusing on the problem of intellectual labor is, among other things,
to suggest that this bridging of fashions where antieconomisms effloresce
as new economic theories within the cultural field has often taken place
between radical political economic theory and some attempt to improve or
update Marx by way of motifs drawn from his holy texts or in a return to
anthropology, where the problematic essence of human character (usually
captioned as its fundamental perversity) is once again probed as it had been
in the earliest political economists with the goal of naturalizing the market.
The distinctions on which philosophy had always been based are now col-
lapsed into a single one: thinking is being, being is labor, labor is a poiesis
or making, and therefore, economics is aesthetics under the regime of the
general intellect.
Notes
1 Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich, “The Professional-Managerial Class,” in
Between Labor and Capital, ed. Pat Walker (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 5–45; Daniel
Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic
Books, 1973); and Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Morrow, 1980).
2 Examples of this in mainstream business circles would be Robert B. Reich, The Future
of Success (New York: Knopf, 2001); and Peter F. Drucker, The Essential Drucker: Selec-
tions from the Management Works of Peter F. Drucker (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
For cultural theory, see André Gorz, L’Immateriel—Connaissance, valeur et capital (The
Immaterial—Knowledge, Value, and Capital ) (Paris: Galilée, 2003); and Félix Guattari and
Toni Negri, Communists Like Us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance (New York:
Semiotext(e), 1990), 33–38.
3 On deterritorialization, see Martin Puchner, “Guantanamo Bay: A State of Exception,”
London Review of Books, December 16, 2004. On chaos theory in economics, see Tim Hay-
ward and Judith Preston, “Chaos Theory, Economics, and Information: The Implications
for Strategic Decision-Making,” Journal of Information Science 25.3 (1999): 173–82; and
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 1987).
4 For brevity’s sake, since the post-1970s reaction against economic explanations as repre-
senting an older “base/superstructure” model was so pervasive, one might consult only
the Routledge anthology on cultural studies from 1991, which captured the tone of the
next decade. Stuart Hall’s biting remarks on the “old mechanical economism” is paradig-
matic of the mood I am describing, which was general. Stuart Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance
for the Study of Race and Ethnicity,” in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies,
ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 1997), 411–40, 428. Apart
from its influence, the cultural studies volume is a particularly apt example of the allergic
response to economics in theory circles because of its identification with a tradition of
thought (Marxism) that had always paid close attention to economics and, indeed, forced
it into the discussion of early-twentieth-century social theory.
5 A sampling of the turn to “material culture” in cultural anthropology and cultural studies
can be found in Susanne Kuechler and Mike Rowlands, eds., Journal of Material Culture,
which according to the editors “explores the relationship of artefacts to social relations.”
For “real subsumption,” see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2000); for thing theory, see the special issue of Critical Inquiry
28.1 (Fall 2001); and for Kantian aesthetics as a model for political economy, see Kojin
Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
6 Paolo Virno, “The Ambivalence of Disenchantment,” in Radical Thought in Italy: A Poten-
tial Politics, ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996), 20, 26, 28. Virno is far from alone. Although not at all identical in his argu-
ments, a mainstream version of the same thesis can be found in Thomas L. Friedman,
The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2005), as well as in left cultural theory: Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor,”
in Radical Thought in Italy, 133–50; and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dio-
nysus: A Critique of the State Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994),
116–17, 277–79.
7 Andrew Downie, “Wanted: Skilled Workers for a Growing Economy in Brazil,” New York
Times, July 2, 2008.
8 Many of the premises of British cultural studies in its second-wave form set the stage for
this analysis by drawing on André Gorz’s Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-
Industrial Socialism (London: Pluto Press, 1982), for instance, or Scott Lash and John
Urry’s The End of Organized Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
Whether actually read and worked through by the humanists, these were nevertheless the
points of departure for the theorization of “new times,” from which the ideas of subver-
sive consumption, niche marketing, and postindustrialization were ushered into cultural
theory with a positive valence. The persistence of these ideas in academic humanities
circles is demonstrable. See, for instance, Gary Hall and Claire Birchall, introduction to
New Cultural Studies: Adventures in Theory (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007),
1–28.
9 Maurizio Lazzarato, Puissances de l’invention: La Psychologie économique de Gabriel Tarde
contre l’économie politique (The Powers of Invention: The Economic Psychology of Gabriel Tarde
against Political Economy) (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2002).
10 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973); and Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
11 The economic war over the price of ideas is explored outside the Marxist tradition in
Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (1900; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978). There Simmel describes how in a system of universal exchange (capitalism),
where all relationships are mediated by money, “abstraction” reigns. The interchange-
ability and indifference of all objects was precisely suited to the tyranny of the intellect,
now driven to “calculation” (that is, both in the sense of distinguishing among objects
based on numerical quantities, and engaging in interpersonal relations based solely on
a cost/benefit analysis. Simmel explicitly argues, in fact, that the one is the condition of
the other). A year earlier in his Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen reminded his
academic colleagues that their profession descended from the priestly classes trained “in
the service of a supernatural agent.” Intellectual work required “training for the domestic
service of a temporal master” (the “Lord”), and was based on “acquiring facility in sub-
servience.” In such circles it was always highly valued to acquire knowledge with a (as
Veblen put it) “spectacular effect, together with some sleight of hand”; “knowledge of the
‘unknowable,’ owed its serviceability for the sacerdotal purpose to its recondite charac-
ter.” Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (1899;
Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1994), 215–16.
12 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
13 Ibid., 28–37, 68–73, 79–92, 167–81.
14 Martin Sohn-Rethel, forward to Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology
(London: Macmillan, 1978), 3.
15 There is a revealing passage along these lines in Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film,
Typewriter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 202–3, where he relates that
when Nietzsche’s eyesight began to fail him in later life, he enlisted a typewriter designer
to fashion a type ball. It was at this moment that Nietzsche discovered the wisdom of
aphorisms. Although Kittler presents this as a sign of Nietzsche’s little-known effect on
technology, there is another moral. Truth, always malleable for Nietzsche, here coincides
apparently with whatever was less straining as activity for the philosopher.
16 I examine this problem of “complexity” (or, rather, one kind of claim to complexity) as a
philosophical ruse in more detail in At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 66–78.
17 That this complexity has generally taken the form of a poetics of the intellect (the dem-
onstration in language of its own plasticity and play) is not to say that there have not
been wars on other fronts—for instance, Alain Badiou’s effort to bridge continental and
analytic traditions in philosophy by appealing to the very emblem of the unintelligibly
complex, namely, math. This move may be seen as analogous to the decisive detour
within political economy represented by the neoclassical revolution, which in the work
of William Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall steered away from questions of value and
human nature to the mathematical operations of “equilibrium” and “marginal utility.”
18 For a full treatment of this remarkable moment in philosophy, see Susan Buck-Morss,
Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2008).
19 Arendt, The Human Condition, 119.
20 Richmond Lattimore was (and in many places still is) considered one of the best trans-
lators of the Greek classics into English, known above all for his translation of the Iliad,
which dates from 1951. Paideia (“education,” “instruction”), the three-volume magnum
opus of the German American classicist Werner Jaeger, although published earlier,
became a centerpiece of American college instruction in the 1950s. Edith Hamilton,
another German American, published The Greek Way (1930) and Mythology (1942); they
were both widely selling books that were (and are) used as introductory texts in U.S. col-
leges and high schools.
21 Ludwig Feuerbach, “Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy,” in The Young
Hegelians: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humani-
ties Press, 1983), 129–55.
22 Georg Lukács, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” in History and Class
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1968), 110.
23 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), 14–15,
123–29.
24 To the degree that complexity is a style, we cannot exempt Badiou and Slavoj Žižek from
these conclusions regarding thought’s sumptuousness, despite their guerrilla encounter
with and against the poetry of refuge and the linguistic attitude of “abstract objectivism”
(in V. N. Vološinov’s sense)—the structuralist normativity of language as pure langue.
Within this mode of comportment they seek to enter and make a name in—on this par-
ticular terrain they have chosen for their political intervention (that is, that of “theory”)—
the prolegomenous reigns.
25 The relationship of thinking to the body, affect, and feeling in feminist theory has been
well developed and has contributed to marking the hidden dimension of differential
rationality based on sexual difference (Luce Irigaray, Jane Gallop, and others). This is,
however, not the kind of problem I am addressing here. My focus is rather on the behold-
ing of thought not as concept that approximates or clarifies but as a sumptuous object of
consumption and display. This is, among other things, a by-product of a refinement and
sophistication of thought serving as a social marker for those who live and work outside
the need to reproduce themselves through physical labor.
26 Edward Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1975), 39–40, 354–57.
27 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 25–28, 60, 107.