IN RE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION
FACTS:
The Roman Catholic Archbishop Of Manila filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that “Catholic Charities and all
religious and charitable institutions and organizations which are
directly or indirectly, wholly or partially operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila be EXCEMPTED from compulsory
coverage of Social Security Law
The request was based on the claim that the said act is a labor law
and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited
to businesses and activities organized for profit. The Social Security
Commission DENIED the request
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila reiterating its arguments
requested for reconsideration, however was DENIED by the
Commission
The coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence
of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent
nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly
exclude
Appellant contends that the term employer as defined in the law
should – following the principle of ejusdem generis – be limited to
those who carry on undertakings or activities which have the element
of profit or gain or which are pursued for profit or gain because the
phrase activity or any kind in the definition is preceded by the words
any trade, business, industry, undertaing
ISSUE:
W/N THE RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS BE APPLIED
RULING:
No. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the
Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated.
RA1161 – Excluded in the coverage of religious and charitable
institutions or entities not organized for profits
RA1161 amended 1792 – specifically stated that it is included in the
coverage of religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit
CONTRIBUTION – not considered public funds, held in trust for the
members of SSS. SSS pays priest for sickness, accident, disability or
death... it is extended to him not as a priest but as a member of the
SSS.
W/N TAXING RELIGIOUS BELIEFS? No, this is for the protection of
labor, it is contribution to be held in trust and returned because of
disability, sickness or death
The definition of the term employer is sufficiently comprehensive as
to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it
contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not
included.
POBLETE CONSTRUCTION CO., petitioner, vs. JUDITH ASIAIN, SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, and BENITO MACRHON, in his capacity as
Sheriff of Rizal, respondents.
DOCTRINE:The collection of the employee's share is a duty imposed
by law, and his unwillingness to have it deducted from his salary does
not excuse the employer's failure to make the report aforesaid. It is
precisely in this situation that the employer is liable, and there is no
question as to the amount of such liability in this case.
FACTS:
Miguel Asiain was an employee of the Poblete Construction Company
from 1956 until his death on November 22, 1959, with a monthly
salary of P300.
Upon his death his widow, Judith Asiain, for herself and her minor
children, filed a petition before the Social Security Commission against
the company and its manager, Domingo Poblete, to recover the
following sums:
(1) P3,600.00 equivalent to one year's salary of the deceased;
(2) P600.00 representing his unpaid salary for two months;
(3) P288,00 "representing the cash received by respondents from
their laborers as contribution to the family of the deceased;" and
P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.

RESPONDENT: moved to dismiss the petitioner stating that SSS has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that Judith has no capacity to
sue
SSC: denied respondent's motion and ordered respondent to file his
answer. When no answer was filed, SSS declared respondent in
default and allowed petitioner to present evidence.
RESOLUTION: declared itself without jurisdiction to entertain the
claims in the petition except the one for the sum of P3,600, which it
awarded based on the evidences presented.
RESPONDENT: Motion for reconsideration was filed but the SSC
denied it.
RESPONDENT: Elevated the case for review before the CA which
issued a writ of preliminary injunction
Case was certified to this Court for the reason that when the
respondents below were declared in default they lost their standing
before the Commission, and not having regained the same by a
motion to set aside or petition for relief, they had no right to appeal
from the default judgment; and that in any event no questions of fact
are involved and hence, if at all appealable, the appeal should be
directly to this Court
ISSUE:
Whether or no the SSC has jurisdiction to decide and grant awards
when the employee himself refuses to have his share of the
corresponding monthly contributions deducted from his salary
HELD:
This claim was filed under Section 24 of the Social Security Act (R.A.
1161, as amended) – 'SEC. 24. Employment records and reports: a)
each employer shall report immediately to the System... Provided,
That if an employee subject to compulsory coverage should die or
become sick or disabled without the System having previously
received a report about him from his employer, the said employer
shall pay to the employee or his legal heirs damages equivalent to the
benefits to which said employee would have been entitled had his
name been reported on time by the employer to the System."
It appears that although the deceased Miguel Asiain had been
employed in the Poblete Construction Company since 1956 and had
accomplished SSS Form E-1 (Employees' Date Record) and transmitted
the same to the said company's Manila Office, it was never filed with
the Social Security System for the reason that he refused to have his
share of the corresponding monthly contributions deducted from his
salary.
The company maintains that the deceased was not a member of the
System when he died and hence the adjudication of the claim for
damages does not pertain to the Commission but to the courts of
justice.
We find the argument untenable – It was the duty of the employer to
comply with Section 24.
Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act provides that "the filing,
determination and settlement of claims shall be governed by the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission;" and the rules and
regulations thus promulgated state that "the effectivity of
membership in the System, as well as the final determination and
settlement of claims, shall be vested in the Commission."
CANO CHUA vs CA, SSC
This is a petition for Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
CA affirming the order of the SSC which held that the private
respondents were regular employees of the petitioner and ordered
petitioner to pay SSS for its unpaid contributions, as well as penalty
for the delayed remittance.
FACTS: On August 20, 1985 private respondents Paguio, Canale,
Pangan, Trinidad, Tapang and Maliwat filed a petition with the SSC for
SSS coverage and contributions against Chua, owner of Prime Mover
Construction Development, claiming that they were all regular
employees of the petitioner in his construction business. They also
alleged that they were dismissed without justifiable grounds and
without notice to them with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
They further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SSS for
compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social Security Act.
Chua in his answer claimed that private respondents had no cause of
action against him and assuming that there was any, they were barred
by prescription and laches. He also claimed that private respondents
were not regular employees but were project employees whose work
had been fixed for a specific project or undertaking which completion
is determined at the time of their engagement. He also concluded
that the said employees were not entitled to coverage under the SSA.
The SSS filed a petition in intervention and on February 1, 1995, the
SSC issued its Order which ruled in favor of private respondents,
stating that the petitioner should pay the SSS and the unpaid SS/EC
and contributions plus penalty for the delayed remittance. The SSC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner for lack
of merit. The petitioner then filed a Motion for Review to the CA,
claiming the same that the private respondents are project employees
whose period of employment are terminated upon completion of the
project and that no employer-employee relationship existed between
them. Thus, there no being employer-employee relationship, the
private respondents are not entitled to coverage under the SSA and
that their length of service did not change their status from project
employees to regular employees. Petitioner also questioned the
failure to apply the rules on prescription of actions and of laches for
filing six to eight later after they were taken in by the petitioner. The
CA, citing Article 280 of the Labor Code declared that the private
respondents were all regular employees in relation to certain activities
since they all worked either as masons, carpenters and fine graders in
the petioles various projects for at least one year, and that their work
was necessary desirable to petitioner's business which involved the
construction or roads and bridges. The CA rejected the claim of
prescription stating that the filing of private respondents claim was
well within the twenty year period provided by the SSA. Petitioner
then filed with the SC a Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents are regular employees and
thus entitled to claim for SSS.
Whether or not the private respondents claim to be covered by the
SSS already prescribed.
HELD:
1) YES. The SC affirmed the CA's decision and held that there is no
dispute that private respondents were employees of petitioner who
became regular employees by their being repeated re-hiring. There is
an employer-employee relationship existing between the parties
having control over the results of the work done by the private
respondents as well as the means and methods by which the same
were accomplished. The private respondents are subject of the
compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. (it is not required to
establish what kind of employee, in this case whether project or
regular, as long as there is employee-employer relationship. The
employee- employer relationship is what is required to be under the
Social Security System)
2) NO. Their claim for the SSS coverage has not prescribed and not
guilty of laches, their right to claim would only prescribe after the
period of 20 years
BEN STA. RITA , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
respondents.
Facts:
Sta. Rita was charged for violating the provisions of the Social Security
Law. It was alleged that he was a President/General manager of B. Sta.
Rita Co., Inc. a compulsorily covered employer under the Social
Security Law, as amended, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
fail, neglect and refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to
the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and
Employees Compensation for its covered employees." Petitioner Sta.
Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case alleging that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case.
WHY CRIMINAL? WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE CRIMINAL ASIDE
FROM ESTAFA WHEN IT IS NOT REMITTED? criminal liability for
violation of Section 22 (a) and (b) in relation to Section 28 (e) of RA
1161, as amended. Section 28 being the PENAL CLAUSE of the said
law
(e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Act
or with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission,
shall be punished by a ?ne of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more
than twelve (12) years or both, at the discretion of the court:
Provided, That where the violation consists in failure or refusal to
register employees or himself, in case of the covered self-employed,
or to deduct contributions from the employees' compensation and
remit the same to the SSS, the penalty shall be a fine of not less than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000) and imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day nor more than twelve (12) years.
The RTC sustained petitioner’s motion and dismiss the criminal case. It
ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the
Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social
Security System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security,
Medical Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino
seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered
into by the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the
Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, in
contravention of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended.
However, the people, through the OSG, filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari assailing the order of dismissal by the trial court.
Respondent CA granted the petition and ordered the reinstatement of
the criminal case.
In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the
Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board
foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage
of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof:
"Terms Defined
EMPLOYMENT — Any service performed by an employee for his
employer, except
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an
employee if he is employed when such vessel is outside the
Philippines
Issue: Whether or not Filipino seafarers on board vessels are
exempted from the SSS Law
Ruling:
No. What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the
understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the
other hand that the latter would include among the provisions of the
Standard Contract of Employment required in case of overseas
employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of the Filipino
seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement is not an
implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security Commission
which is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter
of strict law, the participation of the SSS in the establishment by the
DOLE of a uniform stipulation in the Standard Contract of
Employment for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the
Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the administrative
convenience of the two (2) agencies of government.
The Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 8 (j)
(5) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, absolutely exempts Filipino
seafarers on board foreign vessels from the coverage of the SSS
statute. Section 8 (j) (5) simply defines the term "employment" and
does not in any way relate to the scope of coverage of the Social
Security System. That coverage is, upon the other hand, set out in
Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of
SSS coverage in the following terms:
"SECTION 9. Compulsory Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be
compulsory upon all employees not over sixty years of age and their
employers; Provided, . . .
(b) Filipinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign-based employers
for employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary
basis."
(The SSS law coverage is written into the contract)
The extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to Filipino
seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of
employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract
binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily
liable with the foreign shipowners/employers.
It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of
the Social Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels,
the individual employment agreements entered into with the
stipulation for such coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS
Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to the constitutional
mandate to the State to afford protection to labor whether "local or
overseas. " Nullification of the SSS stipulation in those individual
employment contracts, through nullification of the Memorandum of
Agreement, constituted serious reversible error on the part of the trial
court. That petitioner should seek to deprive his countrymen of social
security protection after his foreign principal had agreed to such
protection, is cause for dismay and is to be deplored.
ELENA P. DYCAICO , petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycacio is a member of the SSS. He retired on June 1989.
A few months prior to his death, he married the petitioner. The
petitioner then filed with SSS an application of survivor’s pension but
was denied on the ground that under Sec. 12-B(d) of RA 8282 she
couldn’t be considered a primary beneficiary because they were not
yet married when Bonifacio, as conditioned in the mentioned
provision. Petitioner then filed with the SSC (Social Security
Commission) a petition alleging that the denial was unjustified for the
reason that the provision itself does not require that the primary
beneficiaries be legitimate. Furthermore, SSS is legally bound to
respect the deceased’s designation of them as his beneficiaries. SSC
promulgated its resolution affirming the denial of the petitioner’s
claim relying heavily on the definition of a “primary beneficiary found
in Sec. 8 of the same law.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review and the same
affirmed in toto the decision of the SSC. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration in the same court but was again denied.
The court required the parties as well as OSG to file their respective
comments on the issue. SSS and OSG have the same stance.
ISSUE/S:
WON Sec. 12-B(d) of RA 8282 violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution. - YES
HELD:
The purpose of the provision is to prevent sham marriages or those
contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits
upon the anticipated death of the other spouse. In this case, the
assailed provision effectively disqualifies form entitlement to
survivor’s pension all those dependent spouses whose respective
marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s
retirement irrespective of the duration of marriage. It is therefor,
arbitrary and discriminatory. It unfairly lumps all theses marriages as
sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of
acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The
proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse,
like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law "to
provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries
against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death,
and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden."
Furthermore, court holds that the sec. 12-B(d) of RA 8282 is
unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. In an analogous case (GSIS v.
Montesclaros) the court invalidated a presidential because the Court
characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the
pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which
denied a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the
three-year prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due
process clause. (he was not given the right to be heard)
NOTE:
For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted
anew below: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as
of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly
pension. . . .
Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the "primary
beneficiaries" are:
1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children.
Further, the "dependent spouse" and "dependent children"
are qualified under paragraph (e) of the same section as follows:
1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she
remarries; and
The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has
not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years
of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
[G.R. No. 165545. March 24, 2006.] SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,
petitioner, vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, respondent.
DOCTRINE:
The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with
orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine
the beneficiaries of the SSS.
SYNOPSIS
Clemente Bailon was allegedly married to 3 woman. His first marriage
was with Alice Diaz, Clemente later filed a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead (despite still being alive). His second marriage
was with Elisa. The third marriage was with Teresita Jarque who is the
respondent in this case. Teresita, upon the death of Clemente filed a
claim in the SSS as a beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, this was
approved by the SSS. Elisa together with her daughters opposed
Teresita's claim stating that since the 1st wife Alice was still alive
Teresita's marriage was void thus she cannot claim benefits under the
law. Elisa and Clemente's children filed claims for death benefits. The
SSS cancelled Teresita's claim and ordered a refund of the benefits
given to her, it also declared Alice as the legal beneficiary being the
legitimate wife thus entitled to the benefits. The court held that the
SSS has the power to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage,
benefits and contributions but the SSC is not given unfettered
discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its
authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS. The marriage was
contracted prior to the Family Code then the civil code would be the
prevailing law, since no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with
law, Bailon's and respondent's marriage prior to the former's death in
1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon,”
FACTS
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice)
contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later
or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a
petition to declare Alice presumptively dead – the CFI granted the
petition
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead
Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in
Casiguran, Sorsogon
Bailon a member of the SSS and a retiree pensioner DIED.
Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted
P12,000 by the SSS. Additional death benefits claimed were also
granted by SSS
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon
and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits.
She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the
first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings,
paid for Bailon's medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents
submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious.
Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an
Affidavit averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and
Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife with Clemente Bailon
Cecilia and Norma contest the marriage between Bailon and
respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much
alive."
Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P.
Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits, he further
attests in a sworn statement that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon's
funeral expenses.
Elisa (2nd wife) and seven of her children subsequently filed claims for
death benefits as Bailon's beneficiaries before the SSS.
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS recommended:
Cancellation of payment of death benefits to respondent and order
the refund of the benefits from respondent. Declared Alice as the
beneficiary and ordered the payment of Clemente Bailon Pension to
Alice.
The deceased member was the deserting spouse and who remarried,
thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it
was bigamous
SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, advised
respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed
Bailon's funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In another letter, SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered
by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it
was contracted while the latter's marriage with Alice was still
subsisting. It thus requested respondent to return the amount of
P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had
received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits by letter to the SSS – asserting that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or
unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents
and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, by letter to respondent denial of her claim. It advised her
that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition against the SSS before the SSC for the
restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension. In lieu of
such she informed SSS that she was returning under protest the
amount of P12,000 representing funeral benefits which she couldn't
spend because Norma and her siblings stopped her from spending.
After the SSS filed its Answer to respondent's petition, and the parties
filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an
Affidavit dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting
that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know
of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is
not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her,
she having stayed at her parents' residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon
after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and
Bailon used to visit her even after their separation
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of
respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a
common-law-wife." – Teresita was declared not a legitimate spouse,
not the primary beneficiary of Bailon and that she should refund all
the benefits she has received.
RESPONDENT: motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus a
petition for review was filed before the CA.
CA: reversed the SSC Resolution – the court held that the only
competent court can nullfy a marriage, in this case SSS cannot validly
declare the 2nd marriage null and void on the basis of its own
investigation. Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the
authority to review the decision of the regular courts under the
pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its
members.
SSC and SSS: separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37
which were both denied for lack of merit.
SSS: Filed a petitioner for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SSC gravely abused its discretion
HELD
Petition is denied
Yes, SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS
coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse,
decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it
declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through
fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own
findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice's marriage on
the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent's marriage
on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually
acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered
discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its
authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
Since the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the Civil Code would be the prevailing law.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such
absentee's mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the
spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage
is terminated as provided by law
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon
the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with
law, Bailon's and respondent's marriage prior to the former's death in
1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
REPUBLIC vs ASIAPRO COOPERATIVE
FACTS:
Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Its
primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to
develop other livelihood services for its owners-members. In the
discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives, respondent cooperative
entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-
members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent
cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the service surplus which
Asiapro earns from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the
income derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. In
order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997, the
owners-members of Asiapro in Stanfilco requested the services of the
latter to register them with SSS as self-employed and to remit their
contributions as such. Petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent
cooperative informing the latter that based on the Service Contracts it
executed with Stanfilco, Asiapro is actually a manpower contractor
supplying employees to Stanfilco and so, it is an employer of its
owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus, Asiapro should
register itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the
corresponding report and remittance of premium contributions.
Despite letters received, respondent cooperative continuously ignored
the demand of petitioner SSS. Respondent cooperative alleges that its
owners-members own the cooperative, thus, no employer-employee
relationship can arise between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between
Stanfilco and its owner-members.
HELD:
YES. An owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of the
latter and an employer-employee relationship can exist between
them. A cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration
with the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board of
Directors, which directs and supervises its business; meaning, its
Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and
management of its affairs. With that, a cooperative can be likened to a
corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its owners-
members. It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the
respondent cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide that there
shall be no employer-employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members. However, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly
repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and surrounding
circumstances show otherwise. The employment status of a person is
defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it
should be. It is settled that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, classes, terms and conditions as they want, and their
agreement would have the force of law between them. However, the
agreed terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals,
customs, public policy or public order. The Service Contract provision
in question must be struck down for being contrary to law and public
policy since it is apparently being used by the respondent cooperative
merely to circumvent the compulsory coverage of its employees, who
are also its owners-members, by the Social Security !aw. The four
elements in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship are all present in this case: First, it is expressly provided in
the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has
the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the
owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at
Stanfilco. Second, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the
service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-
members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an
amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor laws, rules
and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and
industry, they are also given to the owners-members as compensation
in rendering services to respondent cooperative’s client, Stanfilco.
Third, it is the respondent cooperative which has the power to
investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team
leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco. Fourth and most
importantly, it is the respondent cooperative which has the sole
control over the manner and means of performing the services under
the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods
of work. All these clearly prove that, indeed, there is an employer-
employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its
owners-members.
Eduardo Bughaw v Treasure Island Industrial
FACTS:
-Eduardo Bughaw (Bughaw) was employed as production worker by
Treasure Island Industrial (TII), respondent.
-Erlito Loberanes (Loberanes), an employee of TII was caught in
flagrante delicto by the police officers while in possession of shabu.
-In the course of police investigation, Loberanes admitted the
commission of the crime and implicated petitioner, Bughaw, by stating
that part of the money used for buying the illegal drugs was given by
Bughaw, and the illegal drugs purchased were for their consumption
for the rest of the month.
-TII sent a memo to Bughaw. The memo contains the ff: (1) notice of
the 30-day preventive suspension (2) An instruction requiring him to
explain within 120 hours why no disciplinary action should be
imposed against him for his alleged involvement in illegal drug
activities. (3) An instruction requiring him to appear at the office of
respondent's legal counsel for the hearing on the matter.
-Bughaw failed to appear before the TII's legal counsel on the
scheduled hearing date.
-TII sent a second letter to petitioner directing him to attend another
administrative hearing but petitioner once again failed to show up.
-In a third letter addressed to Bughaw, TII terminated the latter's
employment for using illegal drugs within company premises during
working hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative hearing
and submit written explanation on the charges hurled against him.
-Thereafter, Bughaw filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against TII
and its President, Emmanuel Ong, before the Labor Arbiter. He argues
that:
-He had been working for the respondent for 15 years and he was
very conscientious with his job.
-He was suspended for 30 days on the unfounded allegation of his co-
worker that he used illegal drugs within company premises.
-When he reported back to work after the expiration of his
suspension, he was no longer allowed by respondent to enter the
work premises and was told not to report back to work.
-LA: Rendered a Decision in favor of Bughaw based on the ff:
(1) TII failed to present substantial evidence to establish the charge
leveled against the Bughaw. Apart from Loberanes's statements on
petitioner's alleged illegal drug use, no other corroborating proof was
offered by respondent to justify petitioner's dismissal.
(2)TII failed to comply with due process when it immediately
suspended petitioner and eventually dismissed him from
employment. Bughaw’s immediate suspension was not justified since
no evidence was submitted by the TII to establish that Bughaw’s
continued employment pending investigation poses a serious and
imminent threat to respondent's life or property or to the life or
property of petitioner's co-workers.
(3)The notices of hearing sent by TII to Bughaw were not duly
received by the latter.
-NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
-CA: Reversed the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the
grounds of patent misappreciation of evidence and misapplication of
law. CA found that Bughaw was afforded the opportunity to explain
and defend himself from the accusations against him when TTI gave
him notices of hearing. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Due process is
not violated where one is given the opportunity to be heard but he
chooses not to explain his side
ISSUE:
WON Bughaw was illegally dimissed.
HELD:
No, but Bughaw is entitled to nominal damages.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise.
The law mandates that it is incumbent upon the employer to prove
the validity of the termination of employment.32 Failure to discharge
this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was not justified and, therefore, illegal.33 Unsubstantiated claims as
to alleged compliance with the mandatory provisions of law cannot be
favored by this Court. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved
in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor laws
and Constitution.34
The burden therefore is on respondent to present clear and
unmistakable proof that petitioner was duly served a copy of the
notice of termination but he refused receipt. Bare and vague
allegations as to the manner of service and the circumstances
surrounding the same would not suffice. A mere copy of the notice of
termination allegedly sent by respondent to petitioner, without proof
of receipt, or in the very least, actual service thereof upon petitioner,
does not constitute substantial evidence. It was unilaterally prepared
by the petitioner and, thus, evidently self-serving and insufficient to
convince even an unreasonable mind.

JEFFREY NACAGUE vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC.(2010)
Petitioner: Jeffrey Nacague
Respondent: Sulpicio Lines
FACTS:
Respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. hired Nacague as "hepe de viaje" or
the representative of Sulpicio Lines on board its vessel M/V Princess
of the World.
Sulpicio Lines received an anonymous letter reporting the use of
illegal drugs on board the ship.
Ceasar T. Chico, a housekeeper on the ship, submitted a report
regarding the drug paraphernalia found inside the Mopalla Suite
Room and the threat on his life made by Nacague and Chief Mate
Reynaldo Doroon after he found the drug paraphernalia.
Sulpicio Lines sent a notice of investigation to Nacague informing him
of the charges against him for use of illegal drugs and threatening a
co-employee.
When the ship docked in the port of Manila on, some crew members
of the ship, together with Nacague, were subjected to a random drug
test. They were taken to S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic and were required to
submit urine samples. Nacague was found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Sulpicio Lines subjected Nacague to a formal investigation. Nacague
denied using illegal drugs.
5 days after the random drug testing, Nacague went to Chong Hua
Hospital in Cebu City to undergo a voluntary drug test. The drug test
with Chong Hua Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted
this test result to Sulpicio Lines. However, Sulpicio Lines still
terminated him from the service for the reason of finding him
culpable of grave misconduct and loss of trust and confidence due to
his positive drug result.
Feeling aggrieved, Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with backwages.
LA rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and declared that Sulpicio
Lines illegally dismissed Nacague.
REASON OF LA: The drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was
questionable because the clinic is not accredited by the Dangerous
Drug Board and not under its supervision.
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
REASON OF NLRC: Nacague, who was performing a task involving trust
and confidence, was found positive for using illegal drugs, he was
guilty of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
MR denied.
CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.
REASON OF CA: Sulpicio Lines complied with both the procedural and
substantive requirements of the law when it terminated the
employment of Nacague.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination was valid.
RULING:
NO. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of
using illegal drugs. The lack of accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made
its drug test results doubtful.
Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be
performed only by authorized drug testing centers. Moreover, Section
36 also prescribes that drug testing shall consist of both the screening
test and the confirmatory test.
The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized
drug testing centers.In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that
S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio Lines did
not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not
accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if
Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not
confirm the positive result of the screening test with a confirmatory
test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty
of using illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of
trust and confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a
valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When
the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not
clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal.
PETITION is GRANTED.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. RIZAL POULTRY and
LIVESTOCK ASSOCIATION, INC., BSD AGRO INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and BENJAMIN SAN DIEGO,
respondents.
Facts:
Angeles filed a petition before the Social Security Commission (SSC) to
compel respondents Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc. (Rizal
Poultry) or BSD Agro Industrial Development Corporation (BSD Agro)
to remit to the Social Security System (SSS) all contributions due for
and in his behalf.
Prior to the filing of the petition, Angeles filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against BSD Agro and/or its owner, Benjamin San Diego (San
Diego). The Labor Arbiter initially found that Angeles was an
employee and that he was illegally dismissed. On appeal, however,
the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and held that no
employer-employee relationship existed between Angeles and
respondents. The ruling was anchored on the finding that the duties
performed by Angeles, such as carpentry, plumbing, painting and
electrical works, were not independent and integral steps in the
essential operations of the company, which is engaged in the poultry
business. Angeles elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari. The appellate court affirmed the NLRC ruling
and upheld the absence of employer-employee relationship. The SSC,
however, did not take into consideration the decision of the NLRC. It
ratiocinated that the decisions of the NLRC and other tribunals on the
issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship between
parties are not binding on the Commission.
The respondents sought recourse before the CA in which the latter
reversed the rulings of the SSC and held that there is a common issue
between the cases before the SSC and in the NLRC; and it is whether
there existed an employer-employee relationship between Angeles
and respondents.
SSC maintains that the prior judgment rendered by the NLRC and
Court of Appeals, that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties, does not have the force of res judicata by prior
judgment or as a rule on the conclusiveness of judgment. It contends
that the labor dispute and the SSC claim do not proceed from the
same cause of action in that the action before SSC is for non-
remittance of SSS contributions while the NLRC case was for illegal
dismissal.
Issue:
Whether the decision of NLRC on the existence of employer-employee
relationship binds upon the SSC case
Ruling:
Yes. The mandatory coverage under the Social Security Act is
premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This
is evident from Section 9 (a) which provides:
SEC. 9.Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon
all employees not over sixty (60) years of age and their employers:
Provided, That in the case of domestic helpers, their monthly income
shall not be less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) a month . . . .
Section 8 (d) of the same law defines an employee as any person who
performs services for an employer in which either or both mental or
physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such
services, where there is an employer-employee relationship. The
illegal dismissal case before the NLRC involved an inquiry into the
existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship. The
very same inquiry is needed in the SSC case. And there was no
indication therein that there is an essential conceptual difference
between the definition of "employee" under the Labor Code and the
Social Security Act.
In the instant case, therefore, res judicata in the concept of
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies. The judgment in the NLRC case
pertaining to a finding of an absence of employer-employee
relationship between Angeles and respondents is conclusive on the
SSC case. (know the elements of res judicata – same identity of
parties, cause of action, remedy/relief prayed for).
Case Digest: GSIS v. Alcaraz
G.R. No. 187474 : February 6, 2013
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. MARILOU
ALCARAZ, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Bernardo was employed by the Metro Manila Development Authority
in Makati City as laborer, Metro Aide and Metro Aide I for almost
twenty-nine years.
Sometime in February 2004, Bernardo was diagnosed with Pulmonary
Tuberculosis (PTB) and Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP). On
May 13, 2004, he was confined at the Ospital ng Makati. He was
discharged on May 19, 2004 with the following diagnosis: Acute
Diffuse Anterolateral Wall Myocardial Infarction, Killips IV-1, CAP High
Risk, PTB III and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2.
On January 15, 2005, Bernardo was found dead at the basement of
the MMDA building. It was found in the autopsy that Bernardo died of
Myocardial Infarction, old and recent. Bernardos widow, Marilou,
subsequently filed a claim for death benefits with the Govenment
Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The GSIS denied the claim for death benefits on the ground that
myocardial infarction, the cause of Bernardos death, was directly
related to diabetes which is not considered a work-connected illness;
hence, its complications, such as myocardial infarction, are not work-
related.
Marilou appealed to the ECC which affirmed the GSIS ruling.
Aggrieved, she sought relief from the CA through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, contending that (1) the ECC
misappreciated the facts. She argued that even if the underlying cause
of Bernardos death was diabetes, the illness was acquired in the
course of his employment and was further aggravated by the nature
of his work; and (2) the ECC gravely abused its discretion for giving
scant consideration to the medical findings on Bernardos true
condition prior to his death.
The GSIS, on the other hand, prayed that the petition be denied,
contending that in the absence of satisfactory evidence that
Bernardos nature of employment predisposed him to contract the
ailment, the widows claim must fail.
The CA granted the petition and set aside the ECC ruling. It opined
that while myocardial infarction is not among the occupational
diseases listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, the ECC, pursuant to Resolution No. 432, laid down
conditions under which cardio-vascular diseases can be considered as
work-related and therefore compensable.
The CA found sufficient proof of work-connection between Bernardos
ailment and his working conditions. It believed that his work as
laborer and metro aide must have substantially contributed to his
illness.
GSIS moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bernardos illness was work-related and/or the risk of
contracting the illness was increased by the nature of his work?
HELD:
PET.DENIED
The GSIS and the ECC denied the claim of his widow for death benefits
on the ground that his death was due to myocardial infarction which
they declared to be non-compensable; that it is not work-related as it
is simply a complication of diabetes mellitus; and that diabetes
mellitus is not in the list of occupational diseases and, for this reason,
its complications such as myocardial infarction, are not work-related.
The conclusions of the two agencies totally disregarded the stressful
and strenuous conditions under which Bernardo toiled for almost 29
long years as a laborer and as a metro aide. By so doing, they closed
the door to other influences that caused or contributed to Bernardos
fatal heart problem an ailment aggravated with the passage of time by
the risks present in the difficult working conditions that Bernardo had
to bear from day to day in his employment.
While diabetes mellitus was indeed a complicating factor in Bernardos
health condition and indisputably aggravated his heart problem, we
cannot discount other employment factors, mental and physical, that
had been indisputably present; they contributed, if not as a direct
cause of the heart condition itself, as aggravation that worsened and
hastened his fatal myocardial infarction.
For instance, it is undisputed that Bernardo was earlier diagnosed
with CAP which could also be a predisposing factor to myocardial
infarction. There is also stress due to the nature of Bernardos work.
Myocardial infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a
coronary, is a life threatening condition. Predisposing factors for
myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery
Disease, and these factors include stress. Stress appears to be
associated with elevated blood pressure. (Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846)
The CA, therefore, is correct in holding that there is substantial
evidence supporting the conclusion that myocardial infarction in
Bernardos case is work related.
LABOR LAW
The CAs conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the ECC itself, the
government agency tasked by law to implement the employees
compensation program
Included cardio-vascular diseases in the list of occupational diseases,
making them compensable, subject to any of the conditions stated in
its enabling Resolution No. 432.With the resolution, it should be
obvious that by itself, a heart disease, such as myocardial infarction,
can be considered work-related, with or without the complicating
factors of other non-occupational illnesses. Thus, the Court so ruled in
Rases v. ECC (504 Phil. 340, 345 (2005)) where it emphasized that the
incidence of acute myocardial infarction, whether or not associated
with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for compensation.
Resolution No. 432 provides (as one of the conditions) that a heart
disease is compensable if it was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was
clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of
his work. Based on the evidence on record, we find as the CA did, that
the nature of Bernardos duties and the conditions under which he
worked were such as to eventually cause the onset of his myocardial
infarction. The stresses, the strain, and the exposure to street
pollution and to the elements that Bernardo had to bear for almost 29
years all to real too be ignored. They cannot but lead to a
deterioration of health particularly with the contributing factors of
diabetes and pulmonary disease.
CA AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 188385 October 2, 2013
BENITO E. LORENZO, Petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
(DepEd), Respondents.
The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA,
Affirming the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, otherwise known as the
Employees' Compensation Law.
Facts
The case emanates from a claim for Employees’ Compensation death
benefits filed by the petitioner, who is surviving spouse of Rosario D.
Lorenzo (Rosario), a GSIS member who during her lifetime served as
Elementary Teacher I at the DepEd.
vRecords of the benefit claim show that on October 2001, Rosario was
admitted at the Medical City Hospital due to Hematoma on the
Tongue, Left Inner Lip and Right Cheek with Associated Gingival
Bleeding.
That prior to her hospitalization, she was previously diagnosed by the
same hospital for Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia and was confined
therein on July 2001 because of Pneumonia, which was a result of
immuno-compromise secondary to leukemia. Rosario’s health
condition was confirmed by means of a bone marrow examination.
On 27 December 2001,Rosario died of Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due
to Terminal Leukemia.
Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees
Compensation death benefits from the GSIS but was denied on the
ground that the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department
(MEUD) found Rosario’s ailments and cause of death, a non-
occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Unconvinced, Petitioner elevated claim to the ECC for Review.
ECC DECISION
Upon Review, the ECC found the denial of petitioner’s claim to be in
order. Under P.D. 626, as amended. Under, Annex "A," Item No. 15 of
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, Leukemia is
considered compensable among operating room personnel due to
exposure to anesthetics. The nature of the deceased’s occupation
does not increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous
Leukemia because the work does not show frequent and sufficient
exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors of the
disease.
Aggrieved, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the ECC Decision to
CA.
CA DECISION
¨The CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the ECC
Decision. It ruled that under the present law, leukemia, while listed as
an occupational disease, is compensable only among operating room
personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. Being a school teacher
who is not exposed to anesthetics, Rosario’s disease, though listed
under Annex "A" may not be compensable, unless, petitioner could
prove that his wife’s risk of contracting the disease was increased by
the latter’s working conditions, which the petitioner failed to do so.
ISSUE
Whether the ailment of Rosario Lorenzo is compensable under the
present law on employee’s compensation.
RULING
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Sickness refers to any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by employment,
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions, as defined under of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
In cases of death, such as in this case, the Rules Implementing P.D. No.
626, as amended, requires that for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must show:
(1) that it is the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex
"A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the
conditions set therein satisfied; or
(2) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
As stated in Annex A, for an occupational disease and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, all conditions must be satisfied:
(1) Employee’s work must involve the risks described herein;
(2) Disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to
the described risks;
(3) Disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
xxxx
Occupational Disease Nature of Employment
xxx
15. Leukemia and Lymphoma Among operating room
personnel due to anesthetics
Gauging from the above, the ECC was correct in stating that, Rosario’s
disease is occupational, which fact, however, does not thereby result
in compensability in view of the fact that petitioner’s wife was not an
operating room personnel. As correctly pointed out by the ECC, the
coverage of leukemia as an occupational disease relates to one’s
employment as an operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to
anesthetics.
In the case of petitioner’s wife, the nature of her occupation does
not indicate exposure to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of
developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. Thus, the need for the
petitioner to sufficiently establish that his wife’s job as a teacher
exposed her to substances similar to anesthetics in an environment
similar to an "operating room.“
This leans on the precept that the awards for compensation
cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.
The law requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness
was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies –
the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System
– under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to
pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive
reparation for work-connected death or disability. The open ended
Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A
covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.
The Court said, it is important to note that such sympathy to the
claimants must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law
ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths
occur.
DECISION
The Court declared the non-compensability of petitioner’s claim.
The petition is denied and the CA Decision and Resolution are
affirmed.
ESTRELLA D.S. BAÑEZ, Petitioner
Versus
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY,
Respondents
GR# 189574, JULY 18, 2014
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Estrella Bañez
(Petitioner) assails the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed her petition and affirmed
the denial of her claim for death benefits by the
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC).
Likewise, subject of the petition is the Court of
Appeal's Resolution which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Facts of the Case
• Baylon R. Bañez, the husband of petitioner, was
employed by De La Salle University (DLSU) on July
19, 1967. From January 25, 1991 to August 26, 2006
• Baylon worked as Laboratory technician at the
Chemistry Dept. of DLSU.
• Part of his duties and responsibilities was handling
the inventory of laboratory stocks (chemicals,
glassware, apparatus, laboratory consumables,
laboratory fixtures and furniture.
• On April 9 to 15, 2006, Baylon was confined in the
hospital and was diagnosed to be suffering from
urinary tract infection.
• A month later, he was confined again for 7 days for
functional dyspepsia. On June 9, 2006 he was
 confined again on complaints of vomiting and
weakness. He was diagnosed to be suffering from
Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE).
• On July 30, 2006, Dr. Castillo prepared a clinical
abstract/toxicologic assessment on Baylon and she
stated that “based on the occupational history of the
patient, the probability of a chemically induced
disease cannot be discounted.”
• On August 9, 2006, Baylon was again admitted in the
hospital and succumbed to the complications of his
disease on August 27, 2006. He died of SLE.
• His attending physician, Dr. Torres issued a medical
certificate stating that Baylon's death was
precipitated by the chronic exposure to chemicals
which is an occupational hazard in the performance
of his job as laboratory technician.
• Based on the medical opinions of the two doctors,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Law before the
Social Security System.
• SSS denied petitioner's claim on two grounds:
1. the cause of death, cardiac complication of SLE, is not
considered
work related; and
2. SLE is not included in the list of occupational diseases
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to
claim death benefits
2. Whether or not the dismissal of her petition for
review by the Court of Appeals is valid
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
impleading De La Salle University as
respondent
The petitioner is not entitled to claim
death benefits.
• In order for a beneficiary of an employee to be entitled
to death benefits under the SSS, the cause of death of
the employee must be a sickness listed as an
occupational disease by ECC or any other illness caused
by employment , subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working
conditions.
• It is undisputed that SLE is not listed as an
occupational disease under “Annex A” of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation. Thus, petitioner has to
prove by substantial evidence the causal relationship
between her husband's illness and his working conditions.
• Petitioner relied unqualifiedly on the toxicological
report which failed to prove the causal relationship
between Baylon's work and his illness.
• The Court reiterates in their holding that “while we
sympathize with the petitioner, it is important to note
that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally
vital interest of denying undeserving claims for
compensation. Compassion for the victims of diseases
not covered by the law ignores the need to show a
greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of
millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and
deaths occur.”
• Petitioner received a copy of the decision on May
16, 2008. Thus, she had until May 31, 2008 to file
her petition. Instead, petitioner filed a motion for
extension of 30 days within which to file her
petition.
• The Court of Appeals granted petitioner a mere
15-day extension pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner had until June 15,
2008 to file her petition. She filed her petition on
July 4, 2008.
 • Even if the reckoning point is the extended period, the
petition was filed out of time. CA simply applied the
rule.
• The rule is that failure to file or perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period will make the
judgment final and executory by operation of law.
• Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to
do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the decision/resolution, much less
to entertain an appeal.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, RESPONDENT
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] are 1) the October
30, 2009 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004 Decision[3] of the
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-
16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of disability benefits to the
herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23,
2011 Resolution4 denying reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.

The Court of Appeals erred in Factual Antecedents

impleading De La Salle University.
• The original case title before the ECC is “Estrella As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:
D.S. Bañez v Social Security System (De La Salle
University)” to emphazise that DLSU is Baylon's x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano[5] was employed as Court Stenographer at
employer. the then Court of First Instance of Samar from January 5, 1972 until
• DLSU was not furnished a copy of ECC's decision. her retirement on March 30, 2002.
When petitioner filed her motion for extension, as
well as petition for review, she did not implead On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed
DLSU, but the Court of Appeals in its Decision and before the Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on
Resolution added DLSU as a respondent, without account of her ailmentfs], Hypertensive Cardiovascular
however furnishing it copies of the Decision and Resolution. Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim,
The Court of Appeals erred in [respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her
impleading De La Salle University. attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of
• However, the erroneous inclusion made by the CA whom are Ophthalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital.
appears to be inadvertent and harmless. For She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test, [a
clarification purposes, the case against DLSU certificate of] which x x x was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30,
should be dismissed in this case for lack of cause 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondent's] application for
of action and jurisdiction. disability retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of
1997).

[ G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014 ] [Respondent's] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS,[6] but the
latter denied her claim for the reason that hypertension and
glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work[-]related. Her
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.
Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed
Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In dismissing respondent's appeal, the ECC held:
"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently
elevated to produce intraocular damage. The three major categories
of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure glaucoma, (2) open-angle
glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes that
develop primary angle glaucoma are anatomically predisposed to the
condition. In primary open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears open
[and] does not seem to function properly. The exact nature of
obstruction has not yet been elucidated. Congenital glaucoma and
juvenile glaucoma are thought to be hereditary in most cases,
although infectious causes are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis
of Disease by Corran, 6th edition, pages 1374-1375)
"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal
of less than 120/80 mm Hg as defined by the Joint National
Committee VII. Primary risk factor for developing hypertension is
smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body weight, high
salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical
inactivity and psychological factors, including stress." (Principles of
Internal Medicine)
To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness,
disability or death under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section l(b)
thereof, specifically provides that the ailment must be listed by the
Commission as an occupational disease with the conditions set forth
therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions imposed under the
Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.
Appellant[9] worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court
for thirty (30) years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same
may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension. However,
to make the same compensable, it is necessary that there must be
impairment of function of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An examination of the
appellant's records would show that she was not suffering from
end[-]organ damage. This was shown in the x x x report [of the ECG]
that was taken on the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same
cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.
Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered
work-connected. Medical science has explained that it is characterized
by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce intraocular
glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her duties that would cause or
increase her risk of contracting the said ailment.[10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Review[11] filed with the CA and docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 85908, respondent sought to set aside the above ECC
Decision, arguing that her illness is work-connected which thus
entitles her to disability compensation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision
containing the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for the payment of the disability benefits
due the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The CA held that while respondent's hypertension and glaucoma are
not listed as occupational diseases under the implementing rules of
the Employee Compensation Program under Presidential Decree No.
626[13] (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted and became
aggravated during her employment as court stenographer; that under
the "increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is
compensable as long as proof of a causal connection between the
work and the ailment is established;[14] that respondent's illnesses
are connected to her work, given the nature of and pressure involved
in her functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the
certifications issued by the attending physicians certifying to
respondent's illnesses should be given credence; that the ECC itself
conceded that respondent's duties were "no doubt stressful and the
same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;"
and that while the presumption of compensability has been
abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees' compensation
laws nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for
liberality in interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the
policy has always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as
many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[15]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the
same in its February 23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT'S DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING TFIE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC.[16]
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that
the June 24, 2004 Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues
in its Petition and Reply[17] that respondent's hypertension and
glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of increased risk;
that although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational
disease, it is not compensable per se as the conditions under Section
1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation[18] should be satisfied; that hypertension is
compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs
like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent
disability;"[19] that since respondent did not suffer "end-organ
damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which
resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that
respondent's other illness -glaucoma - is not compensable;[20] and
that the findings of the ECC should be accorded respect and finality, as
it has the expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized
jurisdiction over employee compensation cases.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment,[21] respondent seeks the denial of the Petition,
arguing relevantly that the "increased risk theory," which applies to
her, has been upheld in several decided cases;[22] that in disability
compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but
rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the
employee's earning capacity;"[23] and that while the ECC has the
expertise and knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA is not
precluded from making its own assessment of the case which goes
against that of the ECC's.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance
System v. Baul[24] comes into mind and lays the groundwork for a
similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered
as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex
"A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is
not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work
and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation.
In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease
is automatically paid benefits.
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their compensability
requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. In
short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular
accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a
history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head
specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental
strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2)
there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in
the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and
(3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage.
On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it
causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the
following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG
report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T
scan.
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the
above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial
evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is
a reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is
probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the
ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations, the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To
safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt as to the proper
interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of
respondent's attending physicians sufficiently support her claim for
disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny
their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part of
the record and there is no showing that they are false or erroneous,
or resorted to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court, hence, are
entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit
to a full medical examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate
her essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that
laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable
prerequisites to compensability, the reason being that the strict rules
of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation.
Medical findings of the attending physician may be received in
evidence and used as proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctor's
certification as to the nature of claimant's disability may be given
credence as he or she normally would not make untruthful
certification. Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware
of the far[-]reaching and serious effect that his or her statements
would cause on a money claim against a government agency would
vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and
protection.
Significantly, even medical authorities have established that the exact
etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those
cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis
cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a
mediator of other influences. Since even this latter relationship is not
entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category
of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply
by failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression
of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work.[25]
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the
etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a relationship
between the sickness and the nature and conditions of work, hi this
jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the strenuous
office of a public schoolteacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, which we have re-affirmed in the
subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, Antiporda v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, and
De la Torre v. Employees' Compensation Commission, amply
summarized, thus:
x x x x
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and
resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out of service is
inconsequential. The main consideration for its compensability is that
her illness was contracted during and by reason of her employment,
and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is
immaterial.
Indeed, an employee's disability may not manifest fully at one precise
moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an
injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on
become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes
totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The right to
compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon
and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury.
Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own
negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences
that flow from the primary injury are compensable.
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption
of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees'
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, that:
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability
established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees'1 compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.
Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the
Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and
sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public
servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to
extend the applicability of the law on employees' compensation to as
many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
[26] (Emphasis supplied)

Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro,[27] this
Court made the following pronouncement:
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is
the status of the ailments that precipitated De Castro's separation
from the military service - CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular
disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the ECC itself
confirmed the status of these ailments when it declared
that "Contrary to the ruling of the System CAD is a form of
cardiovascular disease which is included in the list of Occupational
Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex
"A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease.
Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and
the ECC found De Castro's CAD to be non-work related and, therefore,
non-compensable. To use the wording of the ECC decision, it denied
De Castro's claim "due to the presence of factors which are not work-
related, such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castro's own
military records triggered this conclusion as his Admitting Notes,
made when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest
pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker.
As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face
value because it considers only one side - the purely medical side - of
De Castro's case and even then may not be completely correct. The
ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused, among others, by
atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the
following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette
smoking; lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the
body: hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to
diabetes; family history of CAD. The minor factors are: obesity;
physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high
carbohydrate intake; and alcohol.
We find it strange that both the ECC and the GS1S singled out the
presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De
Castro's ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-
compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension that
the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking
and drinking are undeniably among these causes. Flowever, they are
not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under
the circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we fear for the
implication of the ECC ailing if it will prevail and be read as definitive
on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues, even
on diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling
raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves,
are factors that can bar compensability.
We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole
determinants of compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to
consider other factors such as age and gender from among those that
the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and,
ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are characteristics inherent
in the person (and thereby may be considered non-work related
factors), they also do affect a worker's job performance and may in
this sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly contribute to
illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some
workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the
lifting of heavy objects although these may simply be office files), and
when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments
and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity
may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECC's
listed factors should be disregarded to the exclusion of others in
determining compensability.
In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics
of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's
personal and social history. This is a basic legal reality in workers'
compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC and the
GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military
issued with respect to De Castro's disability, based mainly on their
primacy as the agencies with expertise on workers' compensation and
disability issues.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve
on its own, given that so many cases have been decided in the past
which should have provided it the guiding hand to decide disability
cases on its own rightly - instead of putting claimants in the
unfortunate position of having to chase the benefits they are clearly
entitled to, and waste years prosecuting their claims in spite of their
adverse circumstances in life. This Court should not have to parrot
over and over again what clearly has been the settled rule; in many
ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner has
either not learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.
Applying Baul and De Castro to the instant case and looking at the
factual milieu, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion and so
declares that respondent's illness is compensable.
Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the
ECC itself said, "[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same
may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension"[29] -
which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CA's
pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed occupational
disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply - again, contrary to
the CA's declaration; no proof of causation is required.
It can also be said that given respondent's age at the time, and taking
into account the nature, working conditions, and pressures of her
work as court stenographer which requires her to faithfully record
each and every day virtually all of the court's proceedings; transcribe
these notes immediately in order to malee them available to the court
or the parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge,
and transcribe them; and type in final form the judge's decisions,
which activities extend beyond office hours and without additional
compensation or overtime pay[30] - all these contributed to the
development of her hypertension -or hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, as petitioner would call it.[31] Consequently, her age, work,
and hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to
"advanced to late stage glaucoma", which rendered her "legally
blind."[32]
Contrary to petitioner's submissions, there appears to be a link
between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which
leads the Court to conclude that respondent's glaucoma developed as
a result of her hypertension.
Although intraocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor
for glaucoma, it is clear that other factors can also influence disease
development and progression. More recently, the role that blood
pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted attention,
as it represents a clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides the
potential for new treatment strategies beyond IOP reduction. The
interplay between blood pressure and IOP determines the ocular
perfusion pressure (OPP), which regulates blood flow to the optic
nerve. If OPP is a more important determinant of ganglion cell injury
than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental effects
of IOP elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection
against IOP elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some
conflicting outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the
development and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study
showed that patients at both extremes of the blood pressure
spectrum show an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with low
blood pressure would have low OPP and thus reduced blood flow;
however, that people with hypertension also show increased risk is
more difficult to reconcile. This finding may reflect an inherent blood
flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would
render retinal blood flow less able to resist changes in ocular
perfusion pressure.[33] x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In recent years, we've learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure
(OPP), i.e., the pressure difference between blood entering the eye
and IOP. It's clear that three forces OPP, IOP and blood pressure are
interconnected in the glaucoma disease process. The mechanics of
that relationship, however, remain ambiguous.
x x x x
The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established
but the data, in addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed
below), have convinced me they probably do exist. Therefore, I
believe potential hypertension, along with potential low blood
pressure, should be investigated in patients whose glaucoma
continues to progress despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.
x x x x
We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood
pressure and glaucoma, but the exact nature of these associations
remains elusive. Complicating matters is the physiological
phenomenon known as autoregulation.[34]
Abstract
Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma
might coexist more often than expected, with possible implications for
treatment.
Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database of
patients with glaucoma matched with controls for age and sex.
Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the 27[,]080
patients with glaucoma (odds ratio 1.29, 95% confidence intervals
1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in controls, x x x[35]
While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be
stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation cases."[36] It does not preclude the Court from
concluding that respondent's hypertension - apart from her age, work,
and working conditions - impaired her vision as a result.
The Court likewise disregards the ECC's finding, which petitioner relies
upon, that the primaiy and important risk factors for developing
hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high salt intake,
nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and
psychological factors, including stress. As the Court held in De Castro,
these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work
stress significantly contribute to its development, and the nature and
characteristics of the employment are as important as raw medical
findings and a claimant's personal and social history.
Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge
in compensation cases, its decision in respondent's case is
nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court cannot uphold
its findings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not
serve justice well in this case. The medical certificates and relevant
reports issued by respondent's attending physicians Drs. Alfred I. Lim,
Elmer Montes, and Salvador R. Salceda as well as hospital records,
[37] deserve credence. The identical findings of these three eye
specialists simply cannot be ignored.
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the
principles, declared in Baul and De Castro, that probability, not
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases; that the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare;
that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may
be received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that
in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics
of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's
personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to
have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment,
unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable
to claimant's own negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to
extend the application of the law on employees' compensation to as
many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2009
Decision and February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 181490 April 23, 2014
MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSELITO A. CARO, Respondent.
PRINCIPLE:
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers
and board of directors who may only be held personally liable for
damages if it is proven that they acted with malice or bad faith in the
dismissal of an employee. Absent any evidence on record that
petitioner Bautista acted maliciously or in bad faith in effecting the
termination of respondent, plus the apparent lack of allegation in the
pleadings of respondent that petitioner Bautista acted in such
manner, the doctrine of corporate fiction dictates that only petitioner
corporation should be held liable for the illegal dismissal of
respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edgardo A. Bautista (Bautista) was the President of
petitioner corporation when respondent was terminated from
employment.
Respondent was hired by Mirant Pagbilao on January 3, 1994 as its
Logistics Officer. In 2002, when Southern Company was sold to
Mirant, respondent was already a Supervisor of the Logistics and
Purchasing Department of petitioner. At the time of the severance of
his employment, respondent was the Procurement Supervisor of
Mirant Pagbilao assigned at petitioner corporations corporate office.
As Procurement Supervisor, his main task was to serve as the link
between the Materials Management Department of petitioner
corporation and its staff, and the suppliers and service contractors in
order to ensure that procurement is carried out in conformity with set
policies, procedures and practices. In addition, respondent was put in
charge of ensuring the timely, economical, safe and expeditious
delivery of materials at the right quality and quantity to petitioner
corporations plant. Respondent was also responsible for guiding and
overseeing the welfare and training needs of the staff of the Materials
Management Department. Due to the nature of respondents
functions, petitioner corporation considers his position as
confidential.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
for 13th and 14th month pay, bonuses and other benefits, as well as
the payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. It is
the contention of respondent that he was illegally dismissed by
petitioner corporation due to the latters non-compliance with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing. He asserts that while there
was a notice charging him of unjustified refusal to submit to random
drug testing, there was no notice of hearing and petitioner
corporations investigation was not the equivalent of the hearing
required under the law which should have accorded respondent the
opportunity to be heard.
In a decision dated August 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Aliman D.
Mangandog found respondent to have been illegally dismissed. The
Labor Arbiter also found that the quitclaim purportedly executed by
respondent was not a bona fide quitclaim which effectively discharged
petitioners of all the claims of respondent in the case at bar. If at all,
the Labor Arbiter considered the execution of the quitclaim as a clear
attempt on the part of petitioners to mislead its office into thinking
that respondent no longer had any cause of action against petitioner
corporation.
On appeal to the NLRC, petitioners alleged that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was rendered with grave abuse of discretion for being
contrary to law, rules and established jurisprudence, and contained
serious errors in the findings of facts which, if not corrected, would
cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to petitioners. The
NLRC, giving weight and emphasis to the inconsistencies in
respondents explanations, considered his omission as unjustified
refusal in violation of petitioner corporations drug policy. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioners filed a motion for
partial reconsideration of the NLRC decision. In a Resolution dated
June 30, 2006, the NLRC denied both motions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held that Edgardo A.
Bautista (President of petitioner corporation) should be personally
liable for respondent’s dismissal.
RULING:
NO.
First. The policy was not clear on what constitutes "unjustified refusal"
when the subject drug policy prescribed that an employee’s
"unjustified refusal" to submit to a random drug test shall be
punishable by the penalty of termination for the first offense. To be
sure, the term "unjustified refusal" could not possibly cover all forms
of "refusal" as the employee’s resistance, to be punishable by
termination, must be "unjustified." To the mind of the Court, it is on
this area where petitioner corporation had fallen short of making it
clear to its employees – as well as to management – as to what types
of acts would fall under the purview of "unjustified refusal." Even
petitioner corporation’s own Investigating Panel recognized this
ambiguity.
The fact that petitioner corporation’s own Investigating Panel and its
Vice President for Operations, Sliman, differed in their
recommendations regarding respondent’s case are first-hand proof
that there, indeed, is ambiguity in the interpretation and application
of the subject drug policy. The fact that petitioner corporation’s own
personnel had to dissect the intended meaning of "unjustified refusal"
is further proof that it is not clear on what context the term
"unjustified refusal" applies to. It is therefore not a surprise that the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA have perceived the term
"unjustified refusal" on different prisms due to the lack of parameters
as to what comes under its purview. To be sure, the fact that the
courts and entities involved in this case had to engage in semantics –
and come up with different constructions – is yet another glaring
proof that the subject policy is not clear creating doubt that
respondent’s dismissal was a result of petitioner corporation’s valid
exercise of its management prerogative.
Second. The penalty of termination imposed by petitioner corporation
upon respondent fell short of being reasonable. Company policies and
regulations are generally valid and binding between the employer and
the employee unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to
law50 – as in the case at bar. Recognizing the ambiguity in the subject
policy, the CA was more inclined to adopt the recommendation of
petitioner corporation’s own Investigating Panel over that of Sliman
and the NLRC.
To be sure, the unreasonableness of the penalty of termination as
imposed in this case is further highlighted by a fact admitted by
petitioner corporation itself: that for the ten-year period that
respondent had been employed by petitioner corporation, he did not
have any record of a violation of its company policies.
As to the other issue relentlessly being raised by petitioner
corporation that respondent’s petition for certiorari before the CA
should have been considered moot as respondent had already
previously executed a quitclaim discharging petitioner corporation
from all his monetary claims, we cannot agree. Quitclaims executed
by laborers are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of their
legal rights,52 especially in this case where the evidence on record
shows that the amount stated in the quitclaim exactly corresponds to
the amount claimed as unpaid wages by respondent under Annex
A53 of his Reply54 filed with the Labor Arbiter. Prima facie, this
creates a false impression that respondent’s claims have already been
settled by petitioner corporation – discharging the latter from all of
respondent’s monetary claims. In truth and in fact, however, the
amount paid under the subject quitclaim represented the salaries of
respondent that remained unpaid at the time of his termination – not
the amounts being claimed in the case at bar.
Finally, the petition avers that petitioner Bautista should not be held
personally liable for respondent’s dismissal as he acted in good faith
and within the scope of his official functions as then president of
petitioner corporation. We agree with petitioners. Both decisions of
the Labor Arbiter and the CA did not discuss the basis of the personal
liability of petitioner Bautista, and yet the dispositive portion of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter - which was affirmed by the appellate
court - held him jointly and severally liable with petitioner
corporation.
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers
and board of directors who may only be held personally liable for
damages if it is proven that they acted with malice or bad faith in the
dismissal of an employee.57 Absent any evidence on record that
petitioner Bautista acted maliciously or in bad faith in effecting the
termination of respondent, plus the apparent lack of allegation in the
pleadings of respondent that petitioner Bautista acted in such manner, the
doctrine of corporate fiction dictates that only petitioner corporation should
be held liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.
SSS v. Azote
April 15, 2015 : SC 2nd Division
Petitioner: Social Security Commission (SSC) Respondent: Edna A.
AzotePonente: J. Mendoza
Facts:1994: Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the Social Security System
(SSS) with Edna and
their 3 older children as designated bene ciaries. In 2001, Edgardo
submitted another
Form E-4 designating their 3 younger children as additional bene
ciaries.2005: Edgardo passed away. Thereafter, Edna led her claim for
death bene ts with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member.
However, SSS records showed the Edgardo had submitted another
Form E-4 in 1982 with a di erent set of bene ciaries, namely:
Rosemarie Azote, as spouse, and Elmer Azote, as dependent.
Consequently, Edna's
claim was denied, but her 6 children were adjudged as bene ciaries.
2007: Edna led a petition with the SSC to claim bene ts, insisting she
was the legitimate wife. Due to the con icting information in the
forms, summons was published in a newspaper of general circulation
directing the alleged 1st wife
Rosemarie to le her answer, but no one replied.2010: SSC dismissed
Edna's petition for lack of merit, because Edgardo did not revoke
the previous designation of Rosemarie as wife-bene ciary, and
Rosemarie was still presumed to be the legal wife. SSC also noted that
the NSO records revealed the marriage of Edgardo and Rosemarie was
registered in 1982. Hence, Edgardo's marriage with Edna was not valid
as there was no showing that his 1st marriage had been annulled or
dissolved.
2013: CA reversed and set aside the resolution & order of the SSC,
and held that the SSC could not make a determination of the validity
of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo. The CA also denied SSC's motion
for reconsideration. Thus, the present petition for review on certiorari
on the assailed CA decision.
Issue: W/N Edna Azote is entitled to the SSS death bene ts as the wife
of a deceased member.
Held: NO --> Edna cannot be the bene ciary because she is not
considered the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place
during the existence of a previously contracted marriage.
The law in force at the time of Edgardo's death was RA 8282[1]. Sec 8
(e) and (k) expressly provide that it is the legal spouse who would be
entitled to receive bene ts from an SSS deceased-member. In this
case, there is concrete proof (NSO certi cation) of Edgardo's earlier
contracted marriage with Rosemarie, making her the rst and legal
wife.
At the time of the celebration of the 2nd marriage of Edgardo with
Edna, the Family Code was already in force. Article 41 states "a
marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void..." In claiming bene ts, the
settled rule from Signey v. SSS [2] is that "whoever claims entitlement
bene ts provided by law should establish his or her right by substantial
evidence".
In the case, Edna failed to establish that there was no impediment at
the time of the celebration of their marriage.
1[] RA 8282 : An Act Further Strengthening the Social Security System
thereby Amending for this Purpose, RA 1161, as amended, otherwise
known as the Social Security Law.

2[] Signey v. Social Security System, 566 Phil, 617, 627 (2008).

Lastly, although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine

the validity of marriages, it is required by Sec 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to
examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that the
bene ts fall into the rightful bene ciaries. In the case, SSC's denial of
Edna's claim is correct as it determined Edna's eligibility on the basis
of available statistical data and database documents.
Petition: GRANTED. CA Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petition for entitlement of SS death bene ts led by
respondent is DENIED for lack of merit.