planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . .
within the
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial
Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor
A. A. Torres for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled
case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein
issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial
Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled
"An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June
20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of
P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas —
Gen. Araneta — Gen. Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen.
Segundo — Gen. Delgado — Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)"; that, at
the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the
aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and
Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to
the tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near
Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the
latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads "do not
connect any government property or any important premises to
the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision
(as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be
construed) were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta,
who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a
member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953,
respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council
of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to
the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer
was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the
donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change
the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of
the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10,
1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council,
calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the
sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of
the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council
of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District
Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any
endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the projected feeder
roads in question were private property at the time of the passage
and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of
P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder
roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said
appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its
members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in
question were "public roads and not private streets of a private
subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when
there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation",
respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he
was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed
of donation — copy of which is annexed to the petition — of the
four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in
favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that
said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted
by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous
condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that,
such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law
prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and,
hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for
the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with
public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from
relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision
streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau
of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the
respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and
implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the
irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the
petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic
Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of
donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared
unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be
issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and
Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the
continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and
from making and securing any new and further releases on the
aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing
officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from
making any further payments out of said funds provided for in
Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the
merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
aforementioned parties respondent from making and securing
any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic
Act No. 920 and from making any further payments out of said
illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that
petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the petition did
"not state a cause of action". In support to this motion,
respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not
its provincial governor, should represent the Province of Rizal,
pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that
said respondent is " not aware of any law which makes illegal the
appropriation of public funds for the improvements of . . . private
property"; and that, the constitutional provision invoked by
petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same
being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other
respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could not assail
the appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona
fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is
necessarily involved" and petitioner "has not shown that he has a
personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its
enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury."
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the
aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953, holding that,
since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial
Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents
him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to question the
constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that
"the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for
anything but a public purpose", that the instructions and
improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads where
private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being
subject to the following condition:
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition
that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines will
use the parcels of land hereby donated for street
purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever; it
being expressly understood that should the Government
 of the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition
hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land hereby
donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the
DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said
donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution"
and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very
beginning contracts "whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to
law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation
may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his
"interest are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly,
the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case
dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a
decision granting the aforementioned motions to dismiss, which
as much, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the
allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein.
According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of
several parcels of residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and
known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had
been reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned,
which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was
approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further
alleges that the construction of said roads, to be undertaken with
the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have the
effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of
constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own
expenses, 1and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of
the subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that
under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was
"clearly for a private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which
is self-evident. 2However, respondent Zulueta contended, in his
motion to dismiss that:
A law passed by Congress and approved by the President
can never be illegal because Congress is the source of all
laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of
any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public
funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime,
may assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal,
p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being
inconsistent with the nature of the Government established under
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the system
of checks and balances underlying our political structure.
Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating
legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or
organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a
public purpose, the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is
this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity
as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp.
398-400; Emphasis supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following
language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, discussed suprasec.
14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for
public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris
Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the
constitution, public funds may be used only for public
purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds
is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of
state funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the
use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance
of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage
to individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81
C.J.S. pp. 1147; emphasis supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing
views which, apart from being patently sound, are a necessary
corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as
such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general welfare.
Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in
the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has
been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part
and parcel of our own constitutional law. lawphil.net
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold
the appropriation in question, upon the ground that petitioner may
not contest the legality of the donation above referred to because
the same does not affect him directly. This conclusion is,
presumably, based upon the following premises, namely: (1) that,
if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the
aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be
annulled without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of
the said donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of
the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no exception. We do not
agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at
the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or
acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of
an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective
operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder
roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether
said roads were public or private property when the bill, which,
latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or,
when said bill was approved by the President and the
disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953
(see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to
the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need
not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory
enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors
of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth
in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the
latter, except only those which are inherent in his person,
including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract,
even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are some decisions to the
contrary, 7the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to
give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of
a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the
U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar
as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government is
different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its
government. Indeed, under the composite system of government
existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the
Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the
limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same
was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of
the people of the U.S., except insofar as the former represented
the people of the respective States, and the people of each State
has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution.
In other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes
have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in
consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the
respective states of the Union of which they are citizens. The
peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the
Federal Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its
President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S.,
but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal
Constitution).lawphi 1.net
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its
taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic of the Philippines,
on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people
and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is
closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the
people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof,
except that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over
the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the
states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our
national government is not subject to limitations analogous to
those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the
Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the
interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the
right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds — which has been
upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie,
101 U.S. 601) — has greater application in the Philippines than
that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257),
involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas,
two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the
purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof,
as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the
Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the
Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of
an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However,
in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and
Barredo vs.Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz.,
4411), we entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the
validity of certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated
the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take
such position in said two (2) cases — the importance of the
issues therein raised — is present in the case at bar. Again, like
the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner
herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he
represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most
populated political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a
substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances

surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners action in
contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and
that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and

the records are remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of
this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-4817 May 26, 1954
SILVESTER M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Calanog and Alafriz for plaintiffs-appellants.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant Fiscal Eulogio S. Serreno
for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.:
This suit was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental
surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their own behalf and in
behalf of other professionals practising in the City of Manila who may
desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No.
3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila
charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the
ordinance but paid under protest.
The ordinance in question, which was approved by the municipal
board of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal
occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city
and penalizes non-payment of the tax "by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
Among the professions taxed were those to which plaintiffs belong.
The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by
Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of said
city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per
annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above
referred to.
Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to
pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same
under protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose
already stated. The lower court upheld the validity of the provision of
law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the
ordinance itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there
in provided for non-payment of the tax was not legally authorized.
From this decision both parties appealed to this Court, and the only
question they have presented for our determination is whether this
ruling is correct or not, for though the decision is silent on the refund
of taxes paid plaintiffs make no assignment of error on this point.
To begin with defendants' appeal, we find that the lower court was in
error in saying that the imposition of the penalty provided for in the
ordinance was without the authority of law. The last paragraph (kk) of
the very section that authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance
(section 18 of the Manila Charter) in express terms also empowers
the Municipal Board "to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances
which shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine or six months"
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense." Hence, the pronouncement below that the ordinance in
question is illegal and void because it imposes a penalty not
authorized by law is clearly without basis.
As to plaintiffs' appeal, the contention in substance is that this
ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are
unjust and oppressive, and authorize what amounts to double
taxation.
In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of
plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they
respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this
municipal occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in
its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation
certain classes and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley on Taxation,
Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393-3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the
law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has
withheld that authority from other chartered cities, not to mention
municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what
particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the National
Government. That matter is peculiarly within the domain of the
political departments and the courts would do well not to encroach
upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National Government and with a
population and volume of trade many times that of any other
Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more
lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair
that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation
tax than their brethren in the provinces.
Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they
say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders
who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein
are not subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not
found in the ordinance. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every
person "exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of Manila naturally —
any one of the occupations named, but does not say that such
person must have his office in Manila. What constitutes exercise or
pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of judicial determination.
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where
one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city
(1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized
that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that
license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof. (51 Am. Jur., 341.)
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed in
so far as it declares Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila illegal
and void and affirmed in so far as it holds the validity of the provision
of the Manila charter authorizing it. With costs against plaintiffs-
appellants.
Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the decision of the majority upon the ground
that the Municipal Board of Manila cannot outlaw what Congress of the
Philippines has already authorized. The plaintiffs-appellants — two lawyers,
a physician, an accountant, a dentist and a pharmacist — had already paid
the occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code
and are thereby duly licensed to practice their respective professions
throughout the Philippines; and yet they had been required to pay another
occupation tax under Ordinance No. 3398 for practising in the City of Manila.
This is a glaring example of contradiction — the license granted by the
National Government is in effect withdrawn by the City in case of non-
payment of the tax under the ordinance. I fit be argued that the national
occupation tax is collected to allow the professional residing in Manila to
pursue his calling in other places in the Philippines, it should then be exacted
only from professionals practising simultaneously in and outside of Manila.
At any rate, we are confronted with the following situation: Whereas the
professionals elsewhere pay only one occupation tax, in the City of Manila
they have to pay two, although all are on equal footing insofar as
opportunities for earning money out of their pursuits are concerned. The
statement that practice in Manila is more lucrative than in the provinces, may
be true perhaps with reference only to a limited few, but certainly not to the
general mass of practitioners in any field. Again, provincial residents who
have occasional or isolated practice in Manila may have to pay the city tax.
This obvious discrimination or lack of uniformity cannot be brushed aside or
justified by any trite pronouncement that double taxation is legitimate or that
legislation may validly affect certain classes.
My position is that a professional who has paid the occupation tax under the
National Internal Revenue Code should be allowed to practice in Manila
even without paying the similar tax imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The
City cannot give what said professional already has. I would not say that this
Ordinance, enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to paragraph 1 of
section 18 of the Revised Charter of Manila, as amended by Republic Act
No. 409, empowering the Board to impose a municipal occupation tax not to
exceed P50 per annum, is invalid; but that only one tax, either under the
Internal Revenue Code or under Ordinance No. 3398, should be imposed
upon a practitioner in Manila.
G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,
vs.
The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The
COURT of TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Hilado and Hilado for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein
petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose
intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's
gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for
donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted
to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from
May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late
filing of the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the
Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at the time
of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that
there is no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic
Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable
for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment
of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would
not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions
of the Constitution.
After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, the pertinent portions
of which are quoted below:
... . Parish priests of the Roman Catholic Church under
canon laws are similarly situated as its Archbishops and
Bishops with respect to the properties of the church within
their parish. They are the guardians, superintendents or
administrators of these properties, with the right of
succession and may sue and be sued.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner impugns the, fairness of the assessment
with the argument that he should not be held liable for gift
taxes on donation which he did not receive personally
since he was not yet the parish priest of Victorias in the
year 1957 when said donation was given. It is intimated
that if someone has to pay at all, it should be petitioner's
predecessor, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, who received the
donation in behalf of the Catholic parish of Victorias or the
Roman Catholic Church. Following petitioner's line of
thinking, we should be equally unfair to hold that the
assessment now in question should have been addressed
to, and collected from, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz to be paid
from income derived from his present parish where ever it
may be. It does not seem right to indirectly burden the
present parishioners of Rev. Fr. Ruiz for donee's gift tax
on a donation to which they were not benefited.
xxx xxx xxx
We saw no legal basis then as we see none now, to
include within the Constitutional exemption, taxes which
partake of the nature of an excise upon the use made of
the properties or upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. (Phipps vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 91 F [2d] 627; 1938, 302 U.S. 742.)
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from
payment thereof are highly disfavored by law, and the
party claiming exemption must justify his claim by a clear,
positive, or express grant of such privilege by law.
(Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club, G.R. No. L-8755,
March 23, 1956; 53 O.G. 3762.)
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in
Section 22(3), Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean exemption
from all kinds of taxes. Statutes exempting charitable and
religious property from taxation should be construed fairly
though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the
main intent of the lawmakers. (Roman Catholic Church
vs. Hastrings 5 Phil. 701.)
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
the decision of the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue appealed from, is hereby affirmed except with
regard to the imposition of the compromise penalty in the
amount of P20.00 (Collector of Internal Revenue v.
U.S.T., G.R. No. L-11274, Nov. 28, 1958); ..., and the
petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is hereby ordered
to pay to the respondent the amount of P900.00 as
donee's gift tax, plus the surcharge of five per
centum (5%) as ad valorem penalty under Section 119 (c)
of the Tax Code, and one per centum (1%) monthly
interest from May 15, 1958 to the date of actual payment.
The surcharge of 25% provided in Section 120 for failure
to file a return may not be imposed as the failure to file a
return was not due to willful neglect.( ... ) No costs.
The above judgment is now before us on appeal, petitioner
assigning two (2) errors allegedly committed by the Tax Court, all
of which converge on the singular issue of whether or not
petitioner should be liable for the assessed donee's gift tax on the
P10,000.00 donated for the construction of the Victorias Parish
Church.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines,
exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished
from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector
assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it
was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the
exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs.
Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within
the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax
is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on
property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by
the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation,"
as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted
to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no
clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor
of petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of petitioner's
thesis, and Our finding that a tax liability exists, is, who should be
called upon to pay the gift tax? Petitioner postulates that he
should not be liable, because at the time of the donation he was
not the priest of Victorias. We note the merit of the above claim,
and in order to put things in their proper light, this Court, in its
Resolution of March 15, 1965, ordered the parties to show cause
why the Head of the Diocese to which the parish of Victorias
pertains, should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such Diocese is the
real party in interest. The Solicitor General, in representation of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, interposed no objection to
such a substitution. Counsel for the petitioner did not also offer
objection thereto.

On April 30, 1965, in a resolution, We ordered the Head of the

Diocese to present whatever legal issues and/or defenses he
might wish to raise, to which resolution counsel for petitioner, who
also appeared as counsel for the Head of the Diocese, the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bacolod, manifested that it was
submitting itself to the jurisdiction and orders of this Court and
that it was presenting, by reference, the brief of petitioner Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc as its own and for all purposes.

In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated, the

assessment at bar had been properly made and the imposition of
the tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting
churches, parsonages or convents, etc. (Art VI, sec. 22 [3],
Constitution), the Head of the Diocese, to which the parish
Victorias Pertains, is liable for the payment thereof.

The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed

insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified, in the sense
that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax,
and that the Head of the Diocese, herein substitute petitioner,
should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax,
without special, pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V.
BORGONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra;
ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V.
BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF
PATERNO MILLARE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Abra, Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656, entitled
"Abra Valley Junior College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff vs. Armin M.
Cariaga as Provincial Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. Bosque as Municipal Treasurer of
Bangued, Abra and Paterno Millare, defendants," the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
hereby declares:
That the distraint seizure and sale by the
Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra, the
Provincial Treasurer of said province against the
lot and building of the Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc., represented by Director Pedro Borgonia
located at Bangued, Abra, is valid;
That since the school is not exempt from paying
taxes, it should therefore pay all back taxes in the
amount of P5,140.31 and back taxes and
penalties from the promulgation of this decision;
That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the
sum of P60,000.00 before the trial, be confiscated
to apply for the payment of the back taxes and for
the redemption of the property in question, if the
amount is less than P6,000.00, the remainder
must be returned to the Director of Pedro
Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff herein;
That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the
amount of P6,000.00 also before the trial must be
returned to said Municipal Treasurer of Bangued,
Abra;
And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed
with costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by
the respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on
July 10, 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
"Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of
the college lot and building covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff below,
on July 6, 1972, by respondents Municipal Treasurer and
Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was
caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent
treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said
college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date.
Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra,
offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now
deceased) filed through counstel a motion to dismiss the
complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and
Municipal Treasurer, through then Provincial Fiscal Loreto C.
Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the
respondents Heirs of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the
complaint. This was followed by an amended answer (Annex
"3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August 31, 1972.
On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his
answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo, pp. 106-108).
On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school
premises at public auction, the respondent Judge, Hon. Juan P.
Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered
(Annex "6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial
and municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the
proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, on December 14, 1972,
petitioner, through Director Borgonia, deposited with the trial court
the sum of P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. Said Stipulations reads:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels,
and to this Honorable Court respectfully enter into
the following agreed stipulation of facts:
1. That the personal circumstances of the parties
as stated in paragraph 1 of the complaint is
admitted; but the particular person of Mr. Armin M.
Cariaga is to be substituted, however, by anyone
who is actually holding the position of Provincial
Treasurer of the Province of Abra;
2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings thereon
located in Bangued, Abra under Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-83;
3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as
Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra caused to
be served upon the Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the property of said
school under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83
for the satisfaction of real property taxes thereon,
amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of Seizure
being the one attached to the complaint as Exhibit
A;
4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of
the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at
public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid
real property taxes thereon and the same was
sold to defendant Paterno Millare who offered the
highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale
in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal
Treasurer.
5. That all other matters not particularly and
specially covered by this stipulation of facts will be
the subject of evidence by the parties.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the
Honorable Court to consider and admit this
stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by
the parties.
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973.d)
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others,
found the following: (a) that the school is recognized by the
government and is offering Primary, High School and College
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand
students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town
of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters
from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary
pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d)
that the high school and college students are housed in the main
building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor
of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the
school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.
From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to
determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot
and building in question are used exclusively for educational
purposes. (Rollo, p. 20)
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his
Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for
the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based
on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and
jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for
educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
exempted from the payment of taxes." (Annexes "B," "B-1" of
Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the
second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential
purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the
assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from
August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal (Per Order
dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57)
petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review
on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this
Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974 (Rollo, p.2).
In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to
give DUE COURSE to the petition (Rollo, p. 58). Respondents
were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID THE
SEIZURE AND SALE OF THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING
USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF THE PETITIONER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE
NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES
MERELY BECAUSE THE COLLEGE PRESIDENT RESIDES IN
ONE ROOM OF THE COLLEGE BUILDING.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE
NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES AND IN ORDERING
PETITIONER TO PAY P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00 DEPOSIT MADE IN THE
COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31
REALTY TAXES. (See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)
The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the
phrase "used exclusively for educational purposes."
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for
educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof,
determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22
(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and
sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto
as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470,
otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis
and therefore void.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college
lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and
sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational
purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the
President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his
family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for
commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college
building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment,
the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as
Annex "8" (Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds
application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article
VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes ...
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act
No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known
as the Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax
under the Assessment Law:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school
lot and building is the basic and controlling guide, norm and
standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental
use thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal
Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court ruled that while it may be
true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and
maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not
constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an
institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and
educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted
from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of
Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court included in the
exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot
formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used
exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption
from payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes, not only
the land actually occupied by the building but also the adjacent
garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish priest. The lot
which is not used for commercial purposes but serves solely as a
sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption because this
constitutes incidental use in religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was
further clarified by this Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon
City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961]
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the
Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus —
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes
is 'not limited to property actually indispensable'
therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, "a
school for training nurses, a nurses' home,
property use to provide housing facilities for
interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and
other members of the hospital staff, and
recreational facilities for student nurses, interns,
and residents' (84 CJS 6621), such as "Athletic
fields" including "a firm used for the inmates of the
institution. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively
used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI,
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main
building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director
and his family, may find justification under the concept of
incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary
purpose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to
have been raised for the first time in this Court. That the matter
was not taken up in the to court is really apparent in the decision
of respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the
stipulation of facts, not even in the description of the school
building by the trial judge, both embodied in the decision nor as
one of the issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not
said properly may be exempted from payment of real estate taxes
(Rollo, pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that such
fact was not disputed even after it was raised in this Court.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court
cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal. Nonetheless, as
an exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a
factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a
pivotal factual matter. "The Supreme Court is clothed with ample
authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision."
(Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is
built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same
is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for
commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for
purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax
be returned to the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL ALBA,
Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commissioner on Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA, Minister
of Finance, respondents.
Antero Sison for petitioner and for his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory
relief or prohibition proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. The assailed provision
further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides
for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net
income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or
any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar
arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable
partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. 2 Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue
thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax
upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-visthose which are
imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. 4 He characterizes the above
sction as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character 5 For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and
due process clauses 6 of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in
taxation. 7
The Court, in a resolution of January 26, 1982, required
respondents to file an answer within 10 days from notice. Such an
answer, after two extensions were granted the Office of the
Solicitor General, was filed on May 28, 1982. 8The facts as
alleged were admitted but not the allegations which to their mind
are "mere arguments, opinions or conclusions on the part of the
petitioner, the truth [for them] being those stated [in their] Special
and Affirmative Defenses." 9 The answer then affirmed: "Batas
Pambansa Big. 135 is a valid exercise of the State's power to tax.
The authorities and cases cited while correctly quoted or
paraghraph do not support petitioner's stand." 10 The prayer is for the
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
This Court finds such a plea more than justified. The petition must
be dismissed.
1. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much
wider scope, The reason was so clearly set forth by retired Chief
Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times." 11 Hence the need
for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To
praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and
certain availability is of the essence. 12
2. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an attribute of
sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of government." 13 It is, of course, to be
admitted that for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions.
The Constitution sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does properly rights, both
the due process and equal protection clauses inay properly be invoked, all petitioner does,
to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be
truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy." 14 In a separate opinion in Graves v. New York, 15 Justice Frankfurter, after
referring to it as an 1, unfortunate remark characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric
[attributable to] the intellectual fashion of the times following] a free use of
absolutes." 16 This is merely to emphasize that it is riot and there cannot be such a
constitutional mandate. Justice Frankfurter could rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality
spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice
Holmess pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." 17 So it is
in the Philippines.
3. This Court then is left with no choice. The Constitution as the
fundamental law overrides any legislative or executive, act that
runs counter to it. In any case therefore where it can be
demonstrated that the challenged statutory provision — as
petitioner here alleges — fails to abide by its command, then this
Court must so declare and adjudge it null. The injury thus is
centered on the question of whether the imposition of a higher tax
rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession
than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
4, The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges
arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here. does not suffice. There
must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint.
Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision
as void or its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to
adhere to the authoritative doctrine that were the due process
and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they
arc not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for
of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion.
Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must
prevail. 18
5. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so
arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be
shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It
then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the
exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes
dictum. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction
of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and
unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds. 19
6. Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a
denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the lice
power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by
the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumtances which if not Identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest." 20 That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal
protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of
the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. There is, however,
wisdom, as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The equality at which the
'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment
enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do
not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific
difficulties, address to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The
Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the view that
classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of
Lutz V. Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any
rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" 23
7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity.
According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be
uniform and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to
Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in
1940, when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject may be found. " 26 He likewise
added: "The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity
or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable." 27 The
problem of classification did not present itself in that case. It did
not arise until nine years later, when the Supreme Court held:
"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28 As clarified
by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not
discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore
uniform." 29 There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal
protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to
all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation."30
8. Further on this point. Apparently, what misled petitioner is his
failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate
and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base
or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the
same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be
classified into different categories. To repeat, it. is enough that
the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that
make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation
embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the, discernible basis of
classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application
of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all
taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to
be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of
compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are e not
entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because
they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in
the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and
businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses
necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to
disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the
basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the
Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income
taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of
net income taxation as regards professional and business
income.

9. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is

without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to
show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; 31 (2) the
force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection,
and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the
distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect
classification,

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL ALBA,
Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commissioner on Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA, Minister
of Finance, respondents.
Antero Sison for petitioner and for his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory
relief or prohibition proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. The assailed provision
further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides
for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net
income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or
any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar
arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable
partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. 2 Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue
thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax
upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-visthose which are
imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. 4 He characterizes the above
sction as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character 5 For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and
due process clauses 6 of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in
taxation. 7
The Court, in a resolution of January 26, 1982, required
respondents to file an answer within 10 days from notice. Such an
answer, after two extensions were granted the Office of the
Solicitor General, was filed on May 28, 1982. 8The facts as
alleged were admitted but not the allegations which to their mind
are "mere arguments, opinions or conclusions on the part of the
petitioner, the truth [for them] being those stated [in their] Special
and Affirmative Defenses." 9 The answer then affirmed: "Batas
Pambansa Big. 135 is a valid exercise of the State's power to tax.
The authorities and cases cited while correctly quoted or
paraghraph do not support petitioner's stand." 10 The prayer is for the
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
This Court finds such a plea more than justified. The petition must
be dismissed.
1. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much
wider scope, The reason was so clearly set forth by retired Chief
Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times." 11 Hence the need
for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To
praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and
certain availability is of the essence. 12
2. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an attribute of
sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of government." 13 It is, of course, to be
admitted that for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions.
The Constitution sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does properly rights, both
the due process and equal protection clauses inay properly be invoked, all petitioner does,
to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be
truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy." 14 In a separate opinion in Graves v. New York, 15 Justice Frankfurter, after
referring to it as an 1, unfortunate remark characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric
[attributable to] the intellectual fashion of the times following] a free use of
absolutes." 16 This is merely to emphasize that it is riot and there cannot be such a
constitutional mandate. Justice Frankfurter could rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality
spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice
Holmess pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." 17 So it is
in the Philippines.
3. This Court then is left with no choice. The Constitution as the
fundamental law overrides any legislative or executive, act that
runs counter to it. In any case therefore where it can be
demonstrated that the challenged statutory provision — as
petitioner here alleges — fails to abide by its command, then this
Court must so declare and adjudge it null. The injury thus is
centered on the question of whether the imposition of a higher tax
rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession
than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
4, The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges
arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here. does not suffice. There
must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint.
Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision
as void or its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to
adhere to the authoritative doctrine that were the due process
and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they
arc not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for
of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion.
Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must
prevail. 18
5. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so
arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be
shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It
then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the
exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes
dictum. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction
of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and
unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds. 19
6. Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a
denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the lice
power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by
the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumtances which if not Identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest." 20 That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal
protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of
the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. There is, however,
wisdom, as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The equality at which the
'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment
enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do
not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific
difficulties, address to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The
Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the view that
classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of
Lutz V. Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any
rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" 23
7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity.
According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be
uniform and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to
Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in
1940, when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject may be found. " 26 He likewise
added: "The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity
or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable." 27 The
problem of classification did not present itself in that case. It did
not arise until nine years later, when the Supreme Court held:
"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28 As clarified
by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not
discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore
uniform." 29 There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal
protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to
all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation."30
8. Further on this point. Apparently, what misled petitioner is his
failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate
and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin,
or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be
classified into different categories. To repeat, it. is enough that Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that
make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation Plana, J., took no part.
embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the, discernible basis of
classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application
of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all
taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to
be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of
compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are e not Separate Opinions
entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because
they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in
the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and
businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses AQUINO, J., concurring:
necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to
disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the prohibition.
basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the
Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income
taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
net income taxation as regards professional and business
income. This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation
income are lower than those for net income such circumtance
9. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for these
without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to receiving compensation income. In fact, the reverse will most
show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; 31 (2) the likely be the case; those who file returns on the basis of net
force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection, income will pay less taxes because they claim all sort of
and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal.
distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect
classification,

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision
dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there
are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these
cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers
Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers,
petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a
consolidated comment, to which the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute,
Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner
in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor
General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills.
Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine
Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them
that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution.
Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and that
afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they
complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should
have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it
is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which
the Senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by
enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own
version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills
earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS
INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING FROM FIVE
(5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY
EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT)
which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act
is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which was approved
by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was
approved by the Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO
WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO
ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was
approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a
consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House
of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was
approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws
which were also the result of the consolidation of House and
Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates
on which the laws were approved by the President and dates the
separate bills of the two chambers of Congress were respectively
passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR
TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
(December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE THE
PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY
MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT
REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28,
1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE THE
PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February 24,
1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR
ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,
INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES
INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO
DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT
(3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE
PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT
(6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES
RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE,
BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF
STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE
LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, BY
INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING
CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5,
1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in
which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose
amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its
own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in
the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and
Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second
and third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner
urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a mere matter of form.
Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like
S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, "taking
into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
§68. Not more than one amendment to the
original amendment shall be considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be
entertained unless the text thereof is submitted in
writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn
before a vote is taken thereon.
§69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of
a legislative provision foreign to the subject matter
of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
 xxx xxx xxx
§70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended
by substituting it with another which covers a
subject distinct from that proposed in the original
bill or resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to
revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less power than
the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between
constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or
concur with amendments.
Art. I, §7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other
Bills.
Art. VI, §24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine
Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other
Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the
intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's
power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner
Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to
modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were
eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like other
bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The
supposed indicia of constitutional intent are nothing but the relics
of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will
be recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a
unicameral National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to
change to a bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide
for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the
Constitution was done by the National Assembly, acting as a
constituent assembly, some of whose members, jealous of
preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail
the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed
the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or
tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such
bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a
two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon,
the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and
may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action. In the event that the Senate
should fail to finally act on any such bills, the
Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening
of the next regular session of the same legislative
term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds
of all the members of the Assembly. And upon
such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second
National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It deleted everything
after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved
by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as
amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR
CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment was
submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held
on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, §18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from
which Art. VI, §24 of the present Constitution was derived. It
explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American
text from which the framers of the Philippine Constitution
borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied.
Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate
to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary
and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without
such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version
on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of
the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope
of the Senate's power to concur is clear from the following
commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments is apparently without restriction.
It would seem that by virtue of this power, the
Senate can practically re-write a bill required to
come from the House and leave only a trace of
the original bill. For example, a general revenue
bill passed by the lower house of the United
States Congress contained provisions for the
imposition of an inheritance tax . This was
changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The
amending authority of the Senate was declared by
the United States Supreme Court to be sufficiently
broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v.
Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed.
389].
(L. TAÑADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL
LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be
initiated by the House of Representatives because
it is more numerous in membership and therefore
also more representative of the people. Moreover,
its members are presumed to be more familiar
with the needs of the country in regard to the
enactment of the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in
the exercise of its power to propose or concur with
amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
was changed by the Senate to make a proposed
inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also
accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what
is known as an amendment by substitution, which
may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House
of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145
(1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this
power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school
text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the
following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to
make changes in the bill omitting or adding
sections or altering its language; (3) to make and
endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in
which case it will be known as a committee bill; or
(4) to make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are
required to originate in the House by prescribing that the number
of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause
must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment
may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to
insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule
prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is
therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which
the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners'
basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is
an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references
to its certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution
of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something
substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and
the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they conclude
that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate
and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither
H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of
Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630,
clearly appear to be mere amendments of the corresponding
provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the
provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as
Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while
showing differences between the two bills, at the same time
indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely
intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No.
1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the
House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that
after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S.
No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the
two bills could be referred to the Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H.
No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the House bill and Senate bill,
which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of
bank deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the
question was raised whether the two bills could be the subject of
such conference, considering that the bill from one house had not
been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman
Duran put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of
order as to procedure: If a House bill is passed by
the House but not passed by the Senate, and a
Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the
Senate but never passed in the House, can the
two bills be the subject of a conference, and can a
law be enacted from these two bills? I understand
that the Senate bill in this particular instance does
not refer to investments in government securities,
whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject
 matters: not only investigation of deposits in
banks but also investigation of investments in
government securities. Now, since the two bills
differ in their subject matter, I believe that no law
can be enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B.
Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference
committee is in order. It is precisely in cases like
this where a conference should be had. If the
House bill had been approved by the Senate,
there would have been no need of a conference;
but precisely because the Senate passed another
bill on the same subject matter, the conference
committee had to be created, and we are now
considering the report of that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-
42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and unrelated measures also
accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention
that because the President separately certified to the need for the
immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was
ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the
version of the same revenue bill which at the moment was being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be
necessary for the President to certify as many bills as are
presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are
merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough
that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the
certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the
Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to
be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had
earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it
was the one which at that time was being considered by the
House. This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by
H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have
already explained in the main decision that the phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, §26 (2) qualifies not only the
requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must
be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but
also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must
have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only
textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, §21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless
it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its
final form furnished its Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage, except when
the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed
and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art.
VIII, §19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to the Members three days before its
passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
 last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was
adopted in Art. VI, §26 (2) of the present Constitution, thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in
all cases three readings on separate days are required and a bill
has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need
for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the
very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not
an emergency, especially in a country like the Philippines where
budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case,
an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No.
7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any
less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the
petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an urgent
need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded
to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and
third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is
not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's
certification, the respect due coequal departments of the
government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and
the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
caution a stay of the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough
consideration in the Senate where it was discussed for six days.
Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was
actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third
readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient
time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on
second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed
before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is
required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of
Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice
that a measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus
enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare
their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §10.04, p. 282
(1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case
of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally
by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in
violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and
the people's right to know (Art. II, §28 and Art. III, §7) the
Conference Committee met for two days in executive session
with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it
was customary to hold such sessions with only the conferees and
their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule
was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American
counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule
prescribing open hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the
adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff members were present.
These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen,
however, who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not
stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the
conference were excluded. There is no showing that the
conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so
as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in
secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees
keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know
was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case
submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing
versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that
conference committee reports must contain "a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other
amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached to
the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses
could thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original
bills without the need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which
became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) was reported
by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a
point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out
of order to consider the report of the conference
committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by
reason of the provision of Section 11, Article XII,
of the Rules of this House which provides
specifically that the conference report must be
accompanied by a detailed statement of the
effects of the amendment on the bill of the House.
This conference committee report is not
accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr.
Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like
to say a few words in connection with the point of
order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the
Rule cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan,
but this provision applies to those cases where
only portions of the bill have been amended. In
this case before us an entire bill is
presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from
the reading of the bill what the provisions are.
Besides, this procedure has been an established
practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker,
we have to look into the reason for the provisions
of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement
in the provision cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan is when there are only certain words
or phrases inserted in or deleted from the
provisions of the bill included in the conference
report, and we cannot understand what those
words and phrases mean and their relation to the
bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will
affect the bill as a whole; but when the entire bill
itself is copied verbatim in the conference report,
that is not necessary. So when the reason for the
Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.
 (2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis
added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record
shows that when the ruling was appealed, it was upheld by viva
voce and when a division of the House was called, it was
sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference
committee to insert new provisions as long as these are germane
to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an
opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the
conference committee is not limited to resolving differences
between the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely
new provision. What is important is that its report is subsequently
approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled
that it would not entertain allegations that, because new
provisions had been added by the conference committee, there
was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference
committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free
or instructed. These committees may be given
instructions by their parent bodies or they may be
left without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is
why they are often critically referred to as "the little
legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them,
the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact
sometimes introduce new measures that were not
in the original legislation. No minutes are kept,
and members' activities on conference
committees are difficult to determine. One
congressman known for his idealism put it this
way: "I killed a bill on export incentives for my
interest group [copra] in the conference committee
but I could not have done so anywhere else." The
conference committee submits a report to both
houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is
not accepted, then the committee is discharged
and new members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine
Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of
conference committees. We cite it only to say that conference
committees here are no different from their counterparts in the
United States whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, §16(3)
each house has the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful
change in the method and procedures of Congress or its
committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that
R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, §26 (1) of the Constitution which
provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL
contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of
its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to §13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of
2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other taxes, duties,
royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any
kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established,
assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or national
authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other
entities by §103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which
provides as follows:
§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall
be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special
laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including
that granted to PAL, by amending §103, as follows:
§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall
be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special
laws, except those granted under Presidential
Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of §103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716
which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to
amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of
accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be
reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D. No.
1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the
constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title
that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC,
among which is §103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT.
Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to
express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to §103 of the
NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are
satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of
these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now
R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar
argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A. No. 7354
is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE
INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED
THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking
privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking
privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that
there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title,
including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for
the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not
only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly
explained:
The details of a legislative act
need not be specifically stated in
its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title,
and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in
the act. Thus, it is proper to create
in the same act the machinery by
which the act is to be enforced, to
prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove
obstacles in the way of its
execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the
subject as expressed in the title, it
is unnecessary that they should
also have special mention in the
title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine,
170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held
that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the
taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the
press or target a group belonging to the press for special
treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on
the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is
none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of
the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others,
the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
"even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that
since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take
back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution.
The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not
forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the
press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have
long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in
the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was
found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross
advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation
was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out
of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of
Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which
enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was
thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d
295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because
although it could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in
lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or
consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press
was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to
pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made
these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were
component of goods to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the
goal of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and
such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore
appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally
suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O.
No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No.
7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously
granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises
registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority, and many
more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions
which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of
the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is
highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit oriented,
continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An
enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show
that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are
granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such
exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural
production and, in other cases, for the personal benefit of the
end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in
their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state,
fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish,
prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay,
corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry
feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the
manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use
(household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) or for professional
use, like professional instruments and
implements, by persons coming to the Philippines
to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum
products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and
services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital
and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the
artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or
international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
 (h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or
receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the
Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does
not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom
is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the
following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87
L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory"
is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First
Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax
certainly does not acquire constitutional validity
because it classifies the privileges protected by
the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats
them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not
save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in preferred
position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which,
unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on
the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on
the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others,
such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to
religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection
with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing
to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society
v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city
ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in
the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not
be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society
without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a
tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its
payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to
make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation
is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although
it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales are used to
subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those
who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to
increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting
that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of
religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to
differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might
make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax
on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden
on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by
§107 of the NIRC, as amended by §7 of R.A. No. 7716, although
fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating
to accounting in §108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free
bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse
it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies.
At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be
decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and
contract clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA asserts that
R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable
basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system
of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the
application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real
property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result
in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid
because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out,
is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he
entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early
case: "Authorities from numerous sources are cited by the
plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new
subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a
contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the
Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular
contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen
the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon
one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must
be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said
that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true
legal sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-
Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but
also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is .
. . read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."
(Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA
135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as having been
made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority
of the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the
defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79
L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while §4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items,
petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential.
The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is
exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate
transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are
equally homeless, should likewise be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary
services, etc., which are essential goods and services was
already exempt under §103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before
the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming
that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while
subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT.
Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and
the "homeless less poor" in the example given by petitioner,
because the second group or middle class can afford to rent
houses in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own
homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life.
"It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select
the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord,
City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v.
Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A.
No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, §28(1) which provides that "The
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies
equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar
situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v.
Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long
before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716 merely
expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law
was questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds similar to
those made in these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive,
discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, §28(1)
of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law,
this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the
requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied
similarly on all goods and services sold to the
public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate
of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is
imposed only on sales of goods or services by
persons engaged in business with an aggregate
gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small
corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax
are sales of farm and marine products, so that the
costs of basic food and other necessities, spared
as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are
expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is
made by the Cooperative Union of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP),
while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes
the mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of
taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus
places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their
ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect
taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides
is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply
that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as
possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed.
(1977)). Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but
to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes,
which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have
been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, §17(1) of the
1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, §28(1) was
taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but
not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers'
ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the
regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of
certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of the
NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No.
7716, §4, amending §103 of the NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential
goods and services are exempted from the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in
their original state (agricultural, marine and forest
products, cotton seeds in their original state,
fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish,
prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay,
corn sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry
feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the
manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use
(household and personal effects of citizens
returning to the Philippines) and or professional
use, like professional instruments and
implements, by persons coming to the Philippines
to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum
products or to be used for manufacture of
petroleum products subject to excise tax and
services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital
and veterinary services, and services rendered
under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the
artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or
international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or
receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the
Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT
are those which involve goods and services which are used or
availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real
properties held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business, the right or privilege to use
patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the right or
privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
motion picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite
transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants and
similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility
cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services
of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad
claims of constitutional violations by tendering issues not at retail
but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed
record which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality.
There is no factual foundation to show in the concrete the
application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect
on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have
not even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made
concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no
different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus
apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere
allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must
be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional
taint. Considering that petitioner here would
condemn such a provision as void on its face, he
has not made out a case. This is merely to adhere
to the authoritative doctrine that where the due
process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather
broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
 persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of
a concrete case. It may be that postponement of adjudication
would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case,
however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A
test case, provided it is an actual case and not an abstract or
hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for
adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no
different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really
settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 to decide
whenever a claim is made that "there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can
only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us. Under Art
. VIII, §5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that
Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of
that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine questions
of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 is "judicial
power," which is "the power of a court to hear and decide cases
pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued
in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559
(1912)), as distinguished from legislative and executive power.
This power cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned
among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of
Art. VIII, §5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of
1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the
court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon
a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of
all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an
actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire
into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other
hand, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), after
briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives
that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore
be to infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in
1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated exempting cooperatives
from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984,
because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this
exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D.
No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and
sales taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O.
No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the
framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the
government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that
is, the repeated revocation of the tax exemption to
cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the
cooperatives by way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing
the following in Art. XII:
§1. The goals of the national economy are a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
for all, especially the underprivileged.
 The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources, and which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the
economy and all regions of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. Private
enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.
§15. The Congress shall create an agency to
promote the viability and growth of cooperatives
as instruments for social justice and economic
development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true
that P.D. No. 1955 singled out cooperatives by withdrawing their
exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, §5.
What P.D. No. 1955, §1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and
preferential treatments theretofore granted to private business
enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis which then
beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, §2 had
restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the
exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, §1, but then again
cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were
withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all,
including government and private entities. In the second place,
the Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be
granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and
viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that the
government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of
vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned,
and that it was to put an end to this indecision that the
constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter
of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that
is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant
exemption and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no
violation of any constitutional policy can be charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the
Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory
is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are
exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716
is that it denies cooperatives the equal protection of the law
because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The
classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers
cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives,
etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that there
is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many
people as possible, especially those living in the rural areas, than
there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We cannot
say that such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the
constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the
extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution
of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law
suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners
and that its enactment by the other branches of the government
does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as
to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to
Congress as the body which is electorally responsible,
remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are
the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973
(1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in
arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of
legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question
by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the
burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This
Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less
exercise a veto power over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with

finality and the temporary restraining order previously issued is
hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by
the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those
in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from
8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the
following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of
March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company:
(1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and
all department and section heads. For the PBMEO
(1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano.
In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the
2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss;
De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers
of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their
plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration
will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents
of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in
the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section
15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge
was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo
de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding
complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor
Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C",
pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they
did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by
the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September
15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were,
as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees
of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969,
the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969,
on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as
asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant
to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p.
63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27,
1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it
should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which
held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period
for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion
for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from
the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent
court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the
ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and
clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-
89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of
the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech,
or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness
of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by
which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set
the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right
to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of
one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies
for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy
of human rights over property rights is recognized.8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored
by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law
is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice
to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that
the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-
interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable
danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. —
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that
by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of
work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent
firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly
and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers
of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members
fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to
intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to
terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees
all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged
oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened
thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between
the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty,
if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who
toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial
Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe
regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers
the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the
workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the
freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction
would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers,
even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes
that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the
same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F",
p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely
the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action
on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished.
The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in
their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and
the company could have made arrangements to counteract or
prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of
its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated
in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work
for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as
it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was
for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses,
denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on
the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under
pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in
the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the
employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining
be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the
furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969,
the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the
Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave
of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA
and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III,
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could
happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence
from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet,
they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and
the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over
their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the
President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a
view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that
day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by
the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated
for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason
of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5
of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive
in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial
Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to
give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional
patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this
policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison
d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain
the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment
through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right
against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served
sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted
itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as
private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of
which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by
the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative
power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit
to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or
the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there
are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to
be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in
such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated
counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and
competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules
of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order
dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that
they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with
a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence
to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement
or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but
instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority
granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the
ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15)
days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of
the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by
the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73,
rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28,
1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for
by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision
subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But
in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue
is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case
without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of
the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right.
In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in
their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to
deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent
power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr.
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove
with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need
to do justice, in any case, without further loss of
 time, provided that the right of the parties to a full
day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this
Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-
versa. In other words, when all the material facts are
spread in the records before Us, and all the parties
have been duly heard, it matters little that the error
of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction.
We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine
that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or
in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave
abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of
its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a
quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not
entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are
short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it
choose to reverse said decision here and now even
if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes
of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of
jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of
this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of
their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage
has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience
to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the
application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor
union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances
revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-
stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970
case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules
of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that
such criterion is not binding upon the Court of
Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to
a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties
and power under this Act, the Court shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By
this provision the industrial court is disengaged from
 the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but may
issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb.
17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil.
Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe
that this provision is ample enough to have enabled
the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46
Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one
day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when
they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which
such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on
this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court
in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register
of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949];
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958]
and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p,
322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v.
Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind.
For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural
laws are no other than technicalities" view them in
their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts
have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the
law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical
language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated
technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to
the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-
15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the
latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan
v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.)
Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation
of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are
intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid.,
p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule
were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same
Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of
Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed
and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A",
"B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates
that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration,
for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20,
respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and
that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and
did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should
have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their
vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the
Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a
lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not
from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill —
good men who allow their proper concerns to blind
them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often
commendable. What we must remember, however,
is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw.
The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is
a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all
of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong
to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play
for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,
but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income
or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and
welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if
not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees
for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the
Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr.
Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this
admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of
this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining
in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as
such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be
sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does
not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of self
organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in
unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify
labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly
and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with
full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until
re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might
have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty
compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the
stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It
is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de
Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor
organization, and the respondents herein are either
officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March
4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company:
(1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon,
Jr. (3) and all department and section heads. For the
PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas,
(3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
 7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano.
In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the
2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV "NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's
warning that the officers shall be primarily liable
being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The
union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning;
and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents
of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration
did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners
herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation
of the existing collective bargaining agreement and
without filing the necessary notice as provided for by
law, failed to report for work, amounting to a
declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and
15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective
bargaining agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from further committing
the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for
perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby
considered to have lost their status as employees of
the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were
notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be
no serious question that they were actually served therewith on
September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice
in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and
filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five
(5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court
of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5)
days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the
same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised
by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of
petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also
their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively
fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted
correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned
order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable
to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc.
vs. Court of Industrial Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the
decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth
earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in
support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional
time to file its arguments in support of its motion to
reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in
support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to
dismiss the motion for reconsideration. Ground
therefor was that the arguments were filed out of
time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal
and at the same time lodged the present petition
with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's
brief (respondents did not file their brief), the case is
now before us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final
judgment — not merely an interlocutory order —
there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for
computation of respondent Perlado's overtime pay
would not render the decision incomplete. This in
effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American
World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus:
'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the
Examining Division or his representative to compute
the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly
delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered
an incomplete decision. We do not believe so.
Computation of the overtime pay involves a
mechanical function, at most. And the report would
still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for
its approval, by the very terms of the order itself.
That there was no specification of the amount of
overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be
made clear enough in the implementation of the
decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs.
CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality
in the sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the
jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question
in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who
seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge
must do so within five (5) days from the date on
which he received notice of the decision, subject of
the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that
the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not
be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the
same section commands the 'the movant shall file
the same within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of his motion for reconsideration.' Section 17 of
the same rules admonishes a movant that "(f)ailure
to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the enforceability
thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we
ruled that where a pro forma motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in
order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether
the arguments in support of said motion were or
were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees
Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) vs.
Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that
where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the
order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of
the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
ten-day reglementary period, the pre forma motion
for reconsideration although seasonably filed must
nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling
in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs.
Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where
the motion for reconsideration is denied upon the
ground that the arguments in support thereof were
filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules
and pronouncements of this Court in the case before
us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the
judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider — without
arguments in support thereof — of August 12 was
filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the
written arguments in support of the said motion were
submitted to the court on August 27. The period from
August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15)
days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out
of time — five (5) days late. And the judgment had
become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August
21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to
present its arguments in support of its motion.
Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that
the foregoing motion was grounded on the
'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel
which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments
were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as
aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner
any. It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of
time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day
before the due date which is August 22. It was
 petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this
motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It
merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to
speed up the disposition of cases", CIR "has a
standing rule against the extension of the ten-day
period for filing supporting arguments". That no-
extension policy should have placed petitioner on
guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit
by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments
only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by
that time the reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of
September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect
denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which
has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by
this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold
petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of
grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm
Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am
constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the
eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to
dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the
light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the
resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of
any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects
individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the
closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional
law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the
most valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the
courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure
consistent with substantive and procedural due process are
observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the
altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as
niceties but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set
aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial
of due process. I have not come across any instance, and none is
mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a
final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside
upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or
from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion
nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established
and accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is
mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct;
as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, in principle, served as its
precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the
accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution;
in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to
present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the
People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those
cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do
not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their
constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect
in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any
of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion
be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as
being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en
banc under the facts and circumstances, should
consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your
petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ
of certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to
treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules
of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the
Court en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules
of procedure without taking into account justice,
equity and substantial merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument
submitted by petitioners on this point in their brief
runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise
of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances
constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the
declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty
of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of
the persons allegedly responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the
respondent court refused to act one way or another
on the petition for relief from the resolution of
October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition
union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
consequently dismissing the persons allegedly
responsible therefor, because such conclusion is
country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal
of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of
freedom to assemble and petition the duly
constituted authorities for redress of their
grievances, the petitioners were charged and then
condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining
in bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was
not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has
been alleged and which the respondent company
tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted
to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of
the "no-lockout — no strike" clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and
proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the
same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the
walkout because of the
demonstration is tantamount to a
declaration of a strike. We do not
think so, as the same is not rooted
in any industrial dispute although
there is a concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4,
5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that
the petitioner union bargained in
bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the
respondent company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner
union and the respondent company convened twice
in a meeting to thresh out the matter of
demonstration. Petitioners requested that the
employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request
or even settling the matter so that the hours of work
will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the
employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the
request of the company that the first shift shall be
excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to
bargaining in bad faith because the company knew
that the officers of the union belonged to the first
shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the
demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its
officers to lead and join the demonstration because
most of them belonged to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the
union the right to change the working conditions
agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts,
opinionated and not borne by any evidence on
record. The demonstration did not practically change
the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew
about it before it went through. We can even say that
it was the company who bargained in bad faith,
when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor
not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the
company tacitly approved the same and yet while
the demonstration was in progress, the company
filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400
members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court
selected the eight officers to be dismissed from the
union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should
have taken into account that the company's action in
allowing the return of more or less three hundred
ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is
an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight
(8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines
Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R.
No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the
opinion stated in the decision by the court, while
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union
 cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because
it will change the terms and conditions of
employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the
CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a
man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a
union to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875.
This creates a bad precedent because it will appear
that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon
the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in proceedings before the Court of
Industrial Relations is that "the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce
Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights
to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that
there is no scintilla of evidence to support the
findings of the respondent court that the petitioner
union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the
dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis
either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners
have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
consequently lost their status as employees of the
respondent company did not meet the meaning and
comprehension of "substantial merits of the case."
Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during
the hearing of the can. The important and substantial
merit of the case is whether under the facts and
circumstances alleged in respondent company's
pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners
amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike — no lock out" clause of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners
respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the
respondent court had altogether opined and decided
that such demonstration does not amount to a strike.
Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have
been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court
disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by
declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in
faith." The stand of the respondent court is
fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-
siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that
the freedom to assemble peaceably to air
grievances against the duly constituted authorities
as guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the
limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of
the petitioners to free speech and assembly is
paramount to the provision in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override
the constitutional provision would be null and void.
These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the
case by the respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are
not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the
decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional
ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court for having
priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the
abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or
contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that
renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere
error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main
opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly condemn
private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental
law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join
the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been
duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and
unjust, for the simple reason that the manner this case was brought
to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such
supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed
an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in
bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was
for having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a
strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but
definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color.
Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial
judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still,
We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless
liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not,
become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property
would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen
them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept
not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an
overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his
individual, freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which
should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount
considerations that inform the principle of immutability of final
judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have already
noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision,
law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic
holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than
denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that
"it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that
unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar,
the petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much
less have they adequately argued the constitutional issues so
extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to
hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue
not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or
decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after
said judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have
actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the
distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid
dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go
along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally
irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of
the Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section
5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection
that the very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not
affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is
not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided
in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can
exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter
how important they may be, there must first be a showing of
compliance with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them,
those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the
industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be
devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter or modify
the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us
now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or
issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be
sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in
resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not
We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already
stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of
Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main opinion,
already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which
for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no
choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but even
their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the
judgment (against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality
and enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the
correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in
truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than
the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or
want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of
such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of
the law of respecting judgments once they have become final, even
as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence
of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic
and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set
aside,9and this only when the remedy is sought within the
prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin
Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt
to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay
v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The very object for which courts were instituted
was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were
allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power,
to determine and redetermine them term after term,
to bandy his judgments about from one party to the
other, and to change his conclusions as freely and
as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues,
then litigation might become more intolerable than
the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los
Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the
correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question
therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents
has not escaped my attention. Neither am I
overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding
the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling
that would authorize the revision, amendment or
alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want
to emphasize that my position in this opinion does
not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and
binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such
modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith
and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said
doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not
advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying
to put forth for execution a decision that I believe
should have been rather than what it is. All I am
doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco
but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950,
as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and,
by opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to
what, in my own view, is the true and correct
meaning and implications of decision of this Court,
not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving
cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be
constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those
decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however,
that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
already final and executory. It too obvious to require extended
elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that the
principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality,
and if it may considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one
that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the
ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to
hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long
existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this
case does not implement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said
Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the
ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of
the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the
instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that
there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view
of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six
copies, within five (5) days from the date on which
he receives notice of the order or decision, object of
the motion for reconsideration, the same to be
verified under oath with respect to the correctness of
the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof,
personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies,
duly verified under oath.
 Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be
submitted with arguments supporting the same. If
the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously
with said motions, upon notice Court, the movant
shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of
the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The
adverse party shall also file his answer within ten
(10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the
arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered,
or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the
arguments in support of said motion having been
filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for
resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in
which case the Court shall issue the corresponding
order or notice to that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall
be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As
amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial
Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as
everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well
knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no
more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any
argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of
the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with
citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be filed
(10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not
agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief
and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to
apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties
concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the
situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must
borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the
operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems
might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of
justice and concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports
juncture of the case be known to the other so that both avenues for
earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the
rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no
more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel,
to this Honorable Court most respectfully moves for
the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this
Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of
the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for
leave to file their respective arguments within ten
(10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as
amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this
Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period
for the filing of such a motion is to me simply
incomprehensible. What worse in this case is that
petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving
an explanation of their inability to comply with the
rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5)
 days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such
delay is that both the President of the Union and the
office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to
do what they were instructed to do by counsel,
which, according to this Court, as I shall explain
anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe
the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules
of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra).
And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would
want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and
indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the
rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more
substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant
to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that
the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction
or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive
character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating
rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On
the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is
unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or
cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party
may be lost by prescription, and be has no reason to complain
because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time,
as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident
principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt
the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case
the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I
have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other
courts, particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction,
being administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal,
if, in order to hasten the administration of substance justice, this
Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules,
I am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a
case in which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the
industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that
their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if not
seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and on
office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief,
consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the
said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the
work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these
allegations, for, under probably more justification circumstances, this
Court ruled out a similar explanation previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
respondent Santos as reason for his failure to
perfect in due time appeal from the judgment of the
Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand
him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe procedural requirements prescribed by the
Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind
of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are
neither credible nor constitutive of excusable
negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January
1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457,
December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of
discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA
300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court
sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final
and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is
already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer
company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift 1should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal,
the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the
eight individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the
mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor
practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration,
notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering
the dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse
of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor
practice since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and
the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram
to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the
demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective
bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the
union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being
no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers
to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police
excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after
expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due
to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president
should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due
to such negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court
— should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice
that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their
summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in
good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss
from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its
insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having included the
first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was
but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual
petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to
labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
deprived of such basic rights without due process — which is but
"responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness."2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set
forth in the main opinion.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty
compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the
stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It
is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de
Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor
organization, and the respondents herein are either
officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March
4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company:
(1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon,
Jr. (3) and all department and section heads. For the
PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas,
(3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano.
 In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the
2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV "NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's
warning that the officers shall be primarily liable
being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The
union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning;
and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents
of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration
did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners
herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation
of the existing collective bargaining agreement and
without filing the necessary notice as provided for by
law, failed to report for work, amounting to a
declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)
subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and
15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective
bargaining agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from further committing
the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for
perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby
considered to have lost their status as employees of
the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were
notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be
no serious question that they were actually served therewith on
September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice
in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and
filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five
(5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court
of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5)
days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the
same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised
by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of
petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also
their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively
fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted
correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned
order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable
to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc.
vs. Court of Industrial Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the
decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth
earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in
support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional
time to file its arguments in support of its motion to
reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in
support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to
dismiss the motion for reconsideration. Ground
therefor was that the arguments were filed out of
time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal
and at the same time lodged the present petition
with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's
brief (respondents did not file their brief), the case is
now before us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final
judgment — not merely an interlocutory order —
there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for
computation of respondent Perlado's overtime pay
would not render the decision incomplete. This in
effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American
World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus:
'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the
Examining Division or his representative to compute
the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly
delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered
an incomplete decision. We do not believe so.
Computation of the overtime pay involves a
mechanical function, at most. And the report would
still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for
its approval, by the very terms of the order itself.
That there was no specification of the amount of
overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be
made clear enough in the implementation of the
decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs.
CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality
in the sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the
jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question
in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who
seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge
must do so within five (5) days from the date on
which he received notice of the decision, subject of
the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that
the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not
be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the
same section commands the 'the movant shall file
the same within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of his motion for reconsideration.' Section 17 of
the same rules admonishes a movant that "(f)ailure
to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the enforceability
thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we
ruled that where a pro forma motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in
order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether
the arguments in support of said motion were or
were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees
Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) vs.
Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that
where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the
order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of
the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
ten-day reglementary period, the pre forma motion
for reconsideration although seasonably filed must
nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling
in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs.
Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where
the motion for reconsideration is denied upon the
ground that the arguments in support thereof were
filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules
and pronouncements of this Court in the case before
us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the
judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider — without
arguments in support thereof — of August 12 was
filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the
written arguments in support of the said motion were
submitted to the court on August 27. The period from
August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15)
days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out
of time — five (5) days late. And the judgment had
become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August
21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to
present its arguments in support of its motion.
Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that
the foregoing motion was grounded on the
'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel
which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments
were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as
aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner
any. It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of
time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day
before the due date which is August 22. It was
petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this
motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It
merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
 To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to
speed up the disposition of cases", CIR "has a
standing rule against the extension of the ten-day
period for filing supporting arguments". That no-
extension policy should have placed petitioner on
guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit
by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments
only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by
that time the reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of
September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect
denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which
has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by
this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold
petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of
grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm
Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am
constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the
eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to
dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the
light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the
resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of
any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects
individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the
closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional
law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the
most valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the
courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure
consistent with substantive and procedural due process are
observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the
altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as
niceties but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set
aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial
of due process. I have not come across any instance, and none is
mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a
final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside
upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or
from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion
nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established
and accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is
mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct;
as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, in principle, served as its
precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the
accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution;
in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to
present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the
People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those
cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do
not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their
constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect
in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any
of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion
be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as
being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en
banc under the facts and circumstances, should
consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your
petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ
of certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to
treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules
of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the
Court en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules
of procedure without taking into account justice,
equity and substantial merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument
submitted by petitioners on this point in their brief
runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise
of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances
constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the
declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty
of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of
the persons allegedly responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the
respondent court refused to act one way or another
on the petition for relief from the resolution of
October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition
union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
consequently dismissing the persons allegedly
responsible therefor, because such conclusion is
country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal
of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of
freedom to assemble and petition the duly
constituted authorities for redress of their
grievances, the petitioners were charged and then
condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining
in bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was
not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has
been alleged and which the respondent company
tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted
to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of
the "no-lockout — no strike" clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and
proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the
same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the
walkout because of the
demonstration is tantamount to a
declaration of a strike. We do not
think so, as the same is not rooted
in any industrial dispute although
there is a concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4,
5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that
the petitioner union bargained in
bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the
respondent company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner
union and the respondent company convened twice
in a meeting to thresh out the matter of
demonstration. Petitioners requested that the
employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request
or even settling the matter so that the hours of work
will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the
employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the
request of the company that the first shift shall be
excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to
bargaining in bad faith because the company knew
that the officers of the union belonged to the first
shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the
demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its
officers to lead and join the demonstration because
most of them belonged to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
demonstration if allowed will practically give the
union the right to change the working conditions
agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts,
opinionated and not borne by any evidence on
record. The demonstration did not practically change
the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew
about it before it went through. We can even say that
it was the company who bargained in bad faith,
when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor
not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the
company tacitly approved the same and yet while
the demonstration was in progress, the company
filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400
members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court
selected the eight officers to be dismissed from the
union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should
have taken into account that the company's action in
allowing the return of more or less three hundred
ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is
an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight
(8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines
Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R.
No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the
opinion stated in the decision by the court, while
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union
cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because
it will change the terms and conditions of
employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the
 CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a
man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a
union to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875.
This creates a bad precedent because it will appear
that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon
the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in proceedings before the Court of
Industrial Relations is that "the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce
Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights
to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that
there is no scintilla of evidence to support the
findings of the respondent court that the petitioner
union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the
dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis
either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners
have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
consequently lost their status as employees of the
respondent company did not meet the meaning and
comprehension of "substantial merits of the case."
Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during
the hearing of the can. The important and substantial
merit of the case is whether under the facts and
circumstances alleged in respondent company's
pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners
amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike — no lock out" clause of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners
respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the
respondent court had altogether opined and decided
that such demonstration does not amount to a strike.
Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have
been absolved of the charges against them.
Nevertheless, the same respondent court
disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by
declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in
faith." The stand of the respondent court is
fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-
siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that
the freedom to assemble peaceably to air
grievances against the duly constituted authorities
as guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the
limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of
the petitioners to free speech and assembly is
paramount to the provision in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override
the constitutional provision would be null and void.
These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the
case by the respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are
not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the
decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional
ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court for having
priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the
abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or
contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that
renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere
error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main
opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly condemn
private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental
law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join
the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been
duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and
unjust, for the simple reason that the manner this case was brought
to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such
supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed
an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in
bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was
for having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a
strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but
definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color.
Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial
judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still,
We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless
liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not,
become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property
would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen
them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept
not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an
overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his
individual, freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which
should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount
considerations that inform the principle of immutability of final
judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have already
noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision,
law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic
holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than
denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid
judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that
"it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that
unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar,
the petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much
less have they adequately argued the constitutional issues so
extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to
hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue
not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or
decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after
said judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have
actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the
distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid
dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go
along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally
irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of
the Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section
5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection
that the very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not
affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is
not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided
in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can
exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter
how important they may be, there must first be a showing of
compliance with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them,
those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the
industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be
devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter or modify
the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us
now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or
issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be
sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in
resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not
We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already
stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of
Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main opinion,
already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which
for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no
choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but even
their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the
judgment (against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality
and enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the
correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in
truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than
the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or
want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of
such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of
the law of respecting judgments once they have become final, even
as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence
of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic
and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set
aside,9and this only when the remedy is sought within the
prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin
Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt
to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay
v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The very object for which courts were instituted
was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were
allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power,
to determine and redetermine them term after term,
to bandy his judgments about from one party to the
other, and to change his conclusions as freely and
as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues,
then litigation might become more intolerable than
the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los
Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the
correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question
therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
 The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents
has not escaped my attention. Neither am I
overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding
the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling
that would authorize the revision, amendment or
alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want
to emphasize that my position in this opinion does
not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and
binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such
modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith
and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said
doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not
advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying
to put forth for execution a decision that I believe
should have been rather than what it is. All I am
doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco
but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950,
as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and,
by opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to
what, in my own view, is the true and correct
meaning and implications of decision of this Court,
not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving
cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be
constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those
decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however,
that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
already final and executory. It too obvious to require extended
elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that the
principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality,
and if it may considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one
that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the
ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to
hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long
existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this
case does not implement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said
Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the
ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of
the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the
instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that
there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view
of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six
copies, within five (5) days from the date on which
he receives notice of the order or decision, object of
the motion for reconsideration, the same to be
verified under oath with respect to the correctness of
the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof,
personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies,
duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be
submitted with arguments supporting the same. If
the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously
with said motions, upon notice Court, the movant
 shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of
the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The
adverse party shall also file his answer within ten
(10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the
arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered,
or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the
arguments in support of said motion having been
filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for
resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in
which case the Court shall issue the corresponding
order or notice to that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall
be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As
amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial
Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as
everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well
knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no
more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any
argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of
the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with
citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be filed
(10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not
agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief
and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to
apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties
concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the
situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must
borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the
operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems
might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of
justice and concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports
juncture of the case be known to the other so that both avenues for
earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the
rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no
more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel,
to this Honorable Court most respectfully moves for
the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this
Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of
the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for
leave to file their respective arguments within ten
(10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as
amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this
Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period
for the filing of such a motion is to me simply
incomprehensible. What worse in this case is that
petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving
an explanation of their inability to comply with the
rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5)
days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such
delay is that both the President of the Union and the
office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to
 do what they were instructed to do by counsel,
which, according to this Court, as I shall explain
anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe
the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules
of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra).
And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would
want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and
indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the
rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more
substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant
to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that
the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction
or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive
character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating
rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On
the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is
unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or
cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party
may be lost by prescription, and be has no reason to complain
because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time,
as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident
principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt
the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case
the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I
have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other
courts, particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction,
being administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal,
if, in order to hasten the administration of substance justice, this
Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules,
I am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a
case in which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the
industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that
their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if not
seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and on
office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief,
consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the
said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the
work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these
allegations, for, under probably more justification circumstances, this
Court ruled out a similar explanation previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
respondent Santos as reason for his failure to
perfect in due time appeal from the judgment of the
Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand
him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe procedural requirements prescribed by the
Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind
of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are
neither credible nor constitutive of excusable
negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January
1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457,
December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of
discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA
300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court
sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final
and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is
already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer
company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift 1should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal,
the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the
eight individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the
mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor
practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration,
notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering
the dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse
of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor
practice since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and
the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram
to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the
demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective
bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the
union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being
no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers
to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police
excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after
expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due
to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president
should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due
to such negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court
— should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice
that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their
summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in
good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss
from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its
insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having included the
first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was
but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual
petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to
labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
deprived of such basic rights without due process — which is but
"responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness."2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set
forth in the main opinion.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO
ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND
OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on
Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition
for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent
CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July
1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor,
was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to
vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their
receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed
to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group,
led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon,
Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-
1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters'
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners
to appear before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private
respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular
inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners
carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August
1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not
more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to
"desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of
said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned
CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things,
that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged
violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-
Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in
Metro-Manila;
 xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed)
that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of
poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not
poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the
complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying
government land, particularly the sidewalk of
EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the
sole and exclusive discretion and authority
whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the
jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly
specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for
postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was
filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation
of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights,
(but) their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and
submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously
objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to
dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the
petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist",
and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this
wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under
its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human
and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss
should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the
(Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited
only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be
(considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to
one's right to development, to life and to dignity.
All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard at
the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare.
Their actions have psychologically scarred and
 traumatized the children, who were witness and
exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June
1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our
resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from
further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of
the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General
was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR.
The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel
Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to
dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July
1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President
Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May
1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the
1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to provide
 for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of
the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by
this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication
or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now
proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to
determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so
generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have
tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe.
In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by
the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human
rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the
society, have given the following varied answers:
 Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in
man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same
in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or
England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United
States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right
to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the
rights of the accused to due process of law;
political rights, such as the right to elect public
officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the
individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply
because he is human. They are part of his natural
birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more
specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and
attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered
to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all
aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the
framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the
specific provisions on human rights and in creating an
independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of
value to look back at the country's experience under the martial
law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of
those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been
heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who,
in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of
1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the
human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon
the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September
1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to
arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and
held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The
right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass
media were subjected to censorship and short
term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They
were required to submit letters of resignation and
were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof.
 Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of
Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26
August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task
must be made clear in view of the importance of
human rights and also because civil and political
rights have been determined by many
international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover
such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence,
its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of
its tasks so that the commission can be most
effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty
because civil and political rights are very broad.
The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and
political rights. Every single right of an individual
involves his civil right or his political right. So,
where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political
rights have been made clear in the language of
human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
addresses a number of articles on the right to life,
the right against torture, the right to fair and public
hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights
that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say
civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the
other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there
are other violations of rights of citizens which can
be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the
commission to define its functions, and, therefore,
in doing that the commission will be authorized to
take under its wings cases which perhaps
heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned
earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing
the behavior of governments regarding the
particular political and civil rights of citizens,
especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during
martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question
that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to
say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could
specify all those rights stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we
envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman
saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights
covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil
and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on
the scope of human rights, I would like to state
that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the
violation of human rights, the Marcos regime
came out with the defense that, as a matter of
fact, they had defended the rights of people to
decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of
human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of
the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and
respond also to repeated points raised by the
previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this
Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political
detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4)
cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against
the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to
make the proposed Commission more effective,
delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to
future expansion. The coverage of the concept
and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights".
I was actually disturbed this morning when the
reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of
Human Rights, although later on, this was
qualified to refer to civil and political rights
contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right
with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona
referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the
commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is
the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a
copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite
possible that there are rights specified in that
other convention which may not be specified here.
I was wondering whether it would be wise to link
our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights
contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the
period of amendments, could specify to us which
of these articles in the Declaration will fall within
the concept of civil and political rights, not for the
purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later on,
if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would
be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a
civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat
the various specific civil and political rights that we
felt must be envisioned initially by this provision —
freedom from political detention and arrest
prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials,
as well as crimes involving disappearance,
salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related
crimes precisely to protect the civil and political
rights of a specific group of individuals, and
therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the
record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his
concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political
rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was
referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will
refer to each and every specific article therein, but
only to those that pertain to the civil and politically
related, as we understand it in this Commission
on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not
even clear as to the distinction between civil and
social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international
covenants: the International Covenant and Civil
and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the
right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the
moment the sense of the committee to those that
the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint
of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress
more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless.
They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept
clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones
more abused and oppressed. Another reason is,
the cases involved are very delicate — torture,
salvaging, picking up without any warrant of
arrest, massacre — and the persons who are
allegedly guilty are people in power like
politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must
be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much
we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of
help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations
because if we open this to land, housing and
health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the
1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of
the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.
They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil
action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary
servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to
the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate
Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection
of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration
has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more
than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did
not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are
sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is
not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical
that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance,
we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
"adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite
for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in
providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person
in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or
who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The
"order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in
the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character
but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on
Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
 injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution
or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ
of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may
seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue
the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and
for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for
appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of
P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition.
Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners
to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter
lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition
filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the
case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully
heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is
true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of
an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for
an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No.
90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other
things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED.
The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The
Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2
December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29
January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing
Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of
the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist
order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and
desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened
violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition

of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the
temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it
involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the
majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has
unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond
impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action
and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights
is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to
protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the
start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I
submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and
investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve
human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand

the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-
Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property
situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated June 16,
1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank.
Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing
interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each
quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the
value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in
excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the
mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native
country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning
to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the
present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding
to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained
from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the
city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in
the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint
directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of
Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the following
provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or
absent defendant is known, the judge must direct a copy of the
summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be
served, at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear.
There is, however, among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit,
dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee of the
attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the
Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's
affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing publication as
aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably
used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to
show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the
defendant not having appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken
against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been
properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having
been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness
of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31,
1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before
July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of
the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage
property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The
payment contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8,
1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon
July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of
P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon
June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set
aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon
July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the
action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was
denied, and from this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of
the estate of the original defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the
case is here under consideration than such as related to the action of the
court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed
in what appears to be the sequence of most convenient development. In the
first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that
the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in
the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the
defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether
the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the
foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether those proceedings were
conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power,
is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have
reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of
action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power
of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may
grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a
party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution
of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of
the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter
case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings,
where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the
litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control
over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate
the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said
to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it
is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of
admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim
or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem
differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the
property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form
of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well
known treaties, has said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens;
they proceed upon seizure; they treat property as primarily
indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they are
substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the
lien against the res; in the common law, they would be different in
chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a mere
hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in
both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and
seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for
the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom
publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an
action of attachment, concerning which the Supreme Court of the United
States has used the following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in
personam, with the added incident, that the property attached
remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any
demand which may be established against the defendant by the
final judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the
defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, in
its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is
to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant
which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs.
Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally
served, the preliminary seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the property is
acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the
property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage,
contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court
proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as
though the property had been seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176
U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in
an attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the
proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody
until the time comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental
principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here exercising a
jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its
authority to entertain the action primarily from the statutes organizing the
court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the
cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by
the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal service of
process upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however,
the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the
personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never
acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact
the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the
subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the
court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case.
The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive
object of such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and
considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2)
that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an
obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper
stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and
expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious
corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such
as can be enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following
proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding against the property of a
nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally to
the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived
from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction
over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief
granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the
property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended,
for there are many expressions in the American reports from which it might
be inferred that the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth the
proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be
acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the
American courts until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S.
714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which
have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition
that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication and
notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a
personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a
nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to
all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by
publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the
judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the case
where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the
mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also
50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is
that the process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States
or countries and that due process of law requires that the defendant shall be
brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State,
or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon
the question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the
Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based upon the
constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of
the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served
personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment
against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665;
Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.)
Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon
whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal
judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279;
Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the
court below offends against the principle just stated and that this judgment is
void because the court in fact entered a personal judgment against the
absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for
the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as
prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an
order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a
necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment
which was entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of
P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . .
therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc.,
etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended
merely as a compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be
ascertained and that the evidence of this it may be observed that according
to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for
the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and
the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the
effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance
to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity
could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our
opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be
supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign
country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully
aware that many reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the
question of the sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind is a
question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes
said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology was
undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between
service by the publication and personal service of process upon the
defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision of
Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of the two
forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes
of expression which had already been molded into legal tradition before that
case was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it is clear
that the legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language
in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed
irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of
that "due process of law" which was secured by the Act of Congress in force
in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1,
1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of
the United States has refrained from attempting to define with precision the
meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein
is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay
precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial
proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement
of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1)
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over
the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity
to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To
answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and
usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his
residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted
service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law
whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as
he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish
master of constitutional law has used the following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal
notice is provided for, it is rather from tenderness to their interests,
and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall
not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall
assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in
Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any
absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual
notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to
his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving
it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address
to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail
service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to
the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the
defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident
that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law,
to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a
means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person
or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to
take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his
property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails
to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been
required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the
consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process
upon the constructive notice, then our statutes were passed in vain,
and are mere empty legislative declarations, without either force, or
meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court,
no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot
operate upon the property, then no effective judgment at all can be
rendered, so that the result would be that the courts would be
powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a result
would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am.
Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to
publication or other form of notice against a nonresident owner should be
complied with; and in respect to the publication of notice in the newspaper it
may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements of the law has
been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc.,
Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper
publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the
publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of
notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be
deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared
that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be of some
significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles
upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the
mortgaged property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned,
take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty,
somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might
possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it
should reach its destination and be delivered to him. This idea seems to be
strengthened by the consideration that placing upon the clerk the duty of
sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put effectually beyond
the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so
much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending
of notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The
question as to what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to
show the proof of compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us
further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the
failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not
such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence
in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this
case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only
form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is
all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a
difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a
question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can
be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has
jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice
should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,
there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that
step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of
due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as
publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect
upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated
and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these
proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the
provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1)
that the failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not
destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such irregularity did not
infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these
conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its
potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a
simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that even in
this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view,
however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground
of the irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was
prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of
the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good defense
against the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however,
shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or
defect in the proceedings is usually required to be supported by an affidavit
showing the grounds on which the relief is sought, and in addition to this
showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general
statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The
necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its
face a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary.
(10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the
case. In this connection we quote the following passage from the
encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may
therefore be enforced if permitted to stand on the record, courts in
many instances refuse to exercise their quasi equitable powers to
vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and
where it appears that the party making the application is himself
without fault and has acted in good faith and with ordinary diligence.
Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise
be entitled. Something is due to the finality of judgments, and
acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this
character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with
judgments, and especially where they have been executed or
satisfied. The moving party has the burden of showing diligence,
and unless it is shown affirmatively the court will not ordinarily
exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng
y Limquingco, died January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the
property was sold was executed far back in 1906; and the proceedings in the
foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated
August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose
that a man who had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly
P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end
his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long remained in ignorance
of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold,
even supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they
were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
things that he should have acquired information as to what was transpiring in
his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational assumption we are
authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did
have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a
presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary habits of
life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of a situation more appropriate
than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In
support of this presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible
to consider the probability that the defendant may have received actual
notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to him in
Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's attorneys. Adopting
almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in
view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making
proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is
clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant, there being no proof
that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was
delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a
probability that the recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his affairs
to send it or communicate its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of
law depended upon the mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in
which we are now indulging would be idle and frivolous; but the
considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of
applying to this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been
made. Upon that presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case,
,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily
abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation which he
had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to
him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after
they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the
merit of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected in a
high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to
say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a
few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the
defendant himself existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected
until his death; and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the
administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance which is
imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if
the minor heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the
property, it would have been different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of
the fact that the bank became the purchaser of the property at the
foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which had been agreed upon
in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it
appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this
foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the
parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value therein
placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in
case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a
foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels
involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the appellant
that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated
that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo,
or upset price, does not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale
made in the foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy
Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and
Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was
purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a
third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a case where the
mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided
by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be
considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by
purchasing for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a
personal liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have
already demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject of adjudication
in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference
between the upset price and the price at which in bought in the property, that
liability remains unaffected by the disposition which the court made of this
case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation can in
no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First
Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a
meritorious defense to the action or that the defendant had suffered any
prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be permitted to add that
in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless
based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public
policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The maximum here
applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer,
afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that
titles obtained in those proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand
of collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged potent to
destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the
property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and
buying that title which he has reason to fear may years thereafter
be swept away through some occult and not readily discoverable
defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul
certain foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which
the order of publication was based erroneously stated that the State of
Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held that this
mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send
the notice by post as required by the order of the court. We now proceed to
consider whether this is a proper assumption; and the proposition which we
propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption
is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared
that there is a presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;"
and in subsection 18 it is declared that there is a presumption "that the
ordinary course of business has been followed." These presumptions are of
course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been
recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur
in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong
considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to
operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an
action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having
no control over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see
that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion
just stated. There is no principle of law better settled than that after
jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied
to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with
respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to
its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed.,
283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the
court are presumed to have adjudged every question necessary to
justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the owners; that the
petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of
Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional
power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the law as to
notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record
the evidence on which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton,
2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all this apply after long
lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255)
contains an instructive discussion in a case analogous to that which is now
before us. It there appeared that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the
State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time,
also be posted at the front door of the court house and be published on
some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church as the court
should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years
later the validity of the proceedings was called in question in another action.
It was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that publication had been
made in its columns as required by law; but no proof was offered to show the
publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of
the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the
court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general
jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not inconsistent with the
record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . . It is to be
presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to
 see that its order for constructive service, on which its right to make
the decree depended, had been obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral ,
or indirect attack, while in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment
is direct proceeding for relief against it. The same general presumption,
however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only
difference being that in case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively
presumed to be valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void,
while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in
certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made
its decree with the knowledge that the requirements of law had been
complied with appear to be amply sufficient to support the conclusion that
the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that there
ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as
required by section 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the
order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The
record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the
law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a
prior judgment in the face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the
judgment in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present in
the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the
future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before
us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such
affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be
destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think that no
court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and for the
interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to
favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this
kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty
still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the proper
proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice
prevailing in the Philippine Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and
broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of papers which contain the
history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally
deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It
is a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final
record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the
pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated;
and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure
which directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision
has, as a matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result
is that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the recitals of
such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and as
already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers
contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo
Chan y Garcia showing that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification
through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands,
should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his
duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the
mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is
by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively
appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and
had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to
Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact
terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the attorneys
for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken
address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the clerk
may not have sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the
record states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a
jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or different
evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to
give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons
was served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be
presumed that service was also made at another place or in a different
manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the
defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was
made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366;
Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that these
propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person
making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we
do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the
affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are
concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a
motion in the cause is admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a
case as this. If the motion prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all
subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed,
proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action
had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the
favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to
annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may
again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly
recognizes the authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final
judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the same cause. This is as
follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a
party or legal representative from the judgment, order, or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof
be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section
513 of the same Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as
pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon
default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of
First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived
of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within
sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and
not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment
set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to
supplement the remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the
conclusion irresistible that there is no other means recognized by law
whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in
civil causes, and it contains provisions describing with much fullness the
various steps to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it
defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and concluding
the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it
is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the
remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so
far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been
once concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of
either of these provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the
action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of
procedure, we cannot suppose that this proceeding would have taken the
form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error,
the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have
already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want
of jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is
that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way and
at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it were
shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be
something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it
may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely
regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its
face. It follows that even if the judgment could be shown to be void for want
of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby
is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under
accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts,
a proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has
passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if
not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed
of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an
appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken without due
process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old
that, assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent
of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not by
motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure
defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be
productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a proceeding as
proper under conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point
of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84
Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment
after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its
face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the
judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time,
when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for
that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be
required. It will be noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).

The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed
from is without error, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

I dissent. It will not make me long to state my reasons. An immutable

attribute — the fundamental idea — of due process of law is that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an
opportunity of being heard in his defense. Protection of the parties demands
a strict and an exact compliance with this constitutional provision in our
organic law and of the statutory provisions in amplification. Literally hundreds
of precedents could be cited in support of these axiomatic principles. Where
as in the instant case the defendant received no notice and had no
opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of
law. Resultantly, "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires
only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a
dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so
to do exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to
the defendant." (Mills vs. Dickons, 6 Rich [S. C.], 487.)
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON,
Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group, Camp
Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates; Juanito L. Andrade; and Lazaro Law Firm for
petitioners.
REGALADO, J.:
Submitted for resolution in the present special civil action are: (1) the basic
petition for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus, to
review the resolution issued by respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 18, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261; (2) the Urgent Motion and
1 2
Supplemental Urgent Motion for Immediate Action on Petition for Habeas
3
corpus; and (3) the Urgent Petition to Declare Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
and First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio for
Contempt and to Annul Proceedings (with Immediate Prayer for another
Cease and Desist Order). 4
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor
of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three
separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide
fot has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in
altering the nature of the charge so long as it Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-
93 to 3644-M-93. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and
5
were subsequently released from detention.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes
filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable
him "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper
crimes chargeable against the accused," which was granted by Judge
6
Villajuan in an order dated November 16, 1993. Thereafter, pursuant to
7
Department Order No. 369 of the Department of Justice, respondent
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the
aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein petitioners. 8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23,
1993 filed by respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered
9
suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for
change of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the former shall have been
terminated. It appears that on December 2, 1993, private complainants,
10
through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Change of Venue of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93, purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their
witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. This motion was
12
granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day,
13
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners
for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms which were
14
subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10,
Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were docketed therein as Criminal
Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. No bail having been recommended for
the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein
petitioners. On December 23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order
15
setting the arraignment of the accused for December 27, 1993. 16
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos
were reset due to the absence of respondent prosecutor. On even date,
petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration of his
order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the
original informations.17
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack
of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3,
1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January
18
24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash and,
at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners
when the latter refused to enter their plea.19
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before
Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge
Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and
setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On20
said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994
issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of
February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
I. On the Main Petition
The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set
of informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the
first set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for
murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. Several corollary but equally
important issues have likewise been addressed to us for resolution, to wit:
1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original
informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there
was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5
and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the
appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by
the prosecution was to amend the informations by
charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of
Rule 110;
2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original
informations was immediately final and executory;
3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the
motion to quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
new informations considering that (a) the designated
public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the
second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof
constituted forum shopping; and
4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January
24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93
was valid.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
1. It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve them a
copy of the motion to withdraw the original informations and to set said
motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of the
proceedings against them, as well as a violation of Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court. Hence, so they contend, the ex parte motion should
be considered as a worthless scrap of paper and Judge Villajuan had no
authority to act on it. Ergo, the order granting the same is null and void.
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have
amended the original informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing
new ones. They postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does not apply
in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed
solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court which has the option
to grant or deny it and the prosecution cannot impose its opinion on the
court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to change the nature
of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is
through the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the
withdrawal of an information is allowed only where the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not included in the
offense originally charged.
Normally, an accused would not object to the dismissal of an information
against him because it is to his best interest not to oppose the same.
Contrarily, if the accused should deem such conditional or provisional
dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him, he could object to such
dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on the
merits. However, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of
21
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex
parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.
In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the
original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of
which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had
these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no
cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the
supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and
granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress
us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the
consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is
too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact
that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital
offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail
once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not
be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It
really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under
either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and hearing does
not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has
been held that —
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss
despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It
cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
such cases is either to have the order set aside or the
irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed
the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and
not certiorari.22
Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to
file a motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural
infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was thereby
deemed cured. This is especially so in this case since, on his order, the
original informations were reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial court.
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in
court any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he
cannot impose
his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court, once the case had already been brought therein any
disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be addressed
to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that
23
the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People to due process of law.
We reiterate once again the doctrine we enunciated and explained in Crespo
vs. Mogul, etc., et al.:
24
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and
whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it
and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted
by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be
secured. And, if after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent
basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the
case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 25
It is not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of
respondent prosecutor for the suspension of the proceedings until the
re-investigation thereof shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the
prosecutor arrived at a finding that petitioners should have been charged
with murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms. This
prompted him to file an ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations
for homicide and frustrated homicide. Although the motion did not state the
reasons for the withdrawal of the informations, nevertheless, the court in the
exercise of its discretion granted the same, as a consequence of which a
new set of informations was thereafter filed and raffled to another branch of
the court. Petitioners now question the propriety of the procedure adopted by
the prosecution, insisting that an amendment, not a new information, was
required under the circumstances.
It must here be emphasized that respondent prosecutor sought, and was
subsequently granted, permission by the court to dismiss the original
informations. It cannot therefore be validly claimed that the prosecutor
exceeded his authority in withdrawing those informations because the same
bore the imprimatur of the court. The issue is thus focused on whether or not
under the given situation the court acted correctly in dismissing the original
informations rather than ordering the amendment thereof.
It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives the accused the
right to move for the quashal of the information, it is silent with respect to the
right of the prosecutor to ask for a dismissal or withdrawal thereof. A26
perusal of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure will show that there are
only two provisions concerning the dismissal of an information other than on
motion of the accused, namely, Section 14 of Rule 110 and Section 11 of
Rule 119. But then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a
dismissal by the court when there is a mistake in charging the proper
offense, but make no mention of a dismissal made upon application of the
prosecution. That is not necessarily so.
It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14,
Rule 110, providing as it does that:
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. — When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain
him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original
case upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is
necessarily being presented, hence the trial court is now in a better position
to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It would primarily be the
function of the court to motu proprio order the dismissal of the case and
direct the filing of the appropriate information. We do not discount the
possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal
and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that
would be a rare situation. This provision, therefore, is more directly and
principally directed to the trial court to invest it with the requisite authority to
direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations therein
contemplated.
Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the
prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its
second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a
defective information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of
Rule 119 the permissible stage for effecting that substitution is "at any time
before judgment," unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it appears . . .
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The
situation under said Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of
the period from the filing of the information up to and before trial. Since no
evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be
discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of
course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again,
realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same.
That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that
such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into
account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should
institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and
the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.
It is interesting to note that in the American jurisdiction, such right is
specifically recognized under Rule 48 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that the entry of a nolle prosequi by the
Government is a permissible right, although requiring in all cases the
approval of the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. As a matter of
27
fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad power, sole authority and
discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not act arbitrarily and
28
subject to the discretion of the court.
In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a
procedure particularly in those instances where the prosecution is allowed to
dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. We have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was
then called, the duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is
convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie,
the guilt of the accused.29
In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at the
instance of the prosecutor by reason of a mistake in charging the proper
offense, in order that new informations can be filed. The problem that may
be posited, and should now be resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed
to move to dismiss an information and when he should merely move to
amend it.
Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may
be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the
information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order
the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only
be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not
necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.
It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in
altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs.
Salcedo, the accused therein were originally charged with homicide and
30
were released on bail. However, the then provincial fiscal, after a review of
the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing
complained of was perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to
weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information for
murder was filed against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without
the amount of bail being fixed, the new charge being a capital offense.
The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to Section
13, Rule 106 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), thus:
Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that
the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the
competent court when the complaint for homicide was
amended so as to charge the crime of murder. Upon the
authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore be
made even as to substance in order that the proper charge
may be made. The claim that such amendment can only
refer to matters of specification affecting the elements
constituting the crime is not correct, for there is nothing in
the rule to show that the nature of the amendment should
only be limited to matters of specification. The change may
also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of
the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that,
instead of an amendment, an information for homicide may also be
dismissed before the accused pleads, to give way to the filing of a new
information for murder. This may be deduced from the pronouncement of the
Court in the aforecited case of Dimalibot, to wit:
This clearly appears from the second part of Section 13 of
Rule 106 which says that, if it appears before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original information and
order the filing of a new one provided the defendant may
not be placed in double jeopardy. If a new information may
be ordered at any time before judgment no reason is seen
why the court may not order the amendment of the
information if its purpose is to make it conformable to the
true nature of the crime committed. . . .
In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., however,
31
Section 14 of Rule 110 was clarified to mean as follows:
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or after
the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial
changes, while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no
need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking
of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense
charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
original charge, hence substantial amendments to the
information after the plea has been taken cannot be made
over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke
double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires
or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense
which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a
substitution is in order.
In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the
original informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in
consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted
before herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they were placed in
jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at such stage, petitioners
cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be
prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first
jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, we hold that although the
offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily include those
charged under the original informations, the substitution of informations was
not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to paraphrase from our former
pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for formal nuances on
the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right to speedy
trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately
after the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.
2. The controversy over the jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain and
act upon the new informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal
possession of firearms, is grounded on three points of disagreement.
Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were prematurely filed
considering that the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations
had not yet become final and executory and that, as a matter of fact, the
same was subsequently reconsidered and the case reinstated by Judge
Villajuan. Therefore, so petitioners postulate, Judge Pornillos could not
acquire jurisdiction over the same offense involving the same incident and
the same accused.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original informations
and the filing of new ones which were raffled to another branch of the court
constituted forum shopping, and was tainted with malice considering the
indecent haste with which the motion to withdraw the informations was filed,
the order granting the same was issued, and the new informations were
filed, all of which took place on the same day. Pursuant to the doctrinal ruling
that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts, it is
theorized that the cognizance of the case taken by Judge Villajuan barred
Judge Pornillos from assuming jurisdiction thereover.
Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio (who
was then First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal) as Acting
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and without any justifiable
reason. It follows, therefore, so petitioners vigorously argue, that in the
absence of such authority, the informations should be considered null and
void by reason of which Judge Pornillos did not acquire jurisdiction over the
same.
On the other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of
a petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals
against the order of the lower court denying petitioners' motion to quash,
claiming that the proper remedy was to proceed to trial on the merits and
thereafter raise on appeal, as special defenses, the grounds invoked in the
motion to quash.
It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the
accused is placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not
equivalent
to an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
32
offense. It is not a final disposition of the case. Rather, it partakes of the
33 34
nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the matter in
the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the
prosecution. 35
A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which is
actually an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
reconsidered. Furthermore, an acquittal is always based on the merits, that
36
is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals
terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance. For dismissal to
37
be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal.
All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein
petitioners. Consequently, the same did not immediately become final,
hence petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
Moreover, such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy. Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners
38
were not prejudiced by the filing of the new informations even though the
order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it
affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.
In American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle prosequi is
made, the only power to deny the motion would be based on failure of the
district attorney to judiciously exercise his discretion. In most cases, the
39
motion will be readily granted and should not be refused unless the court has
some knowledge that it is based on an improper reason or a corrupt motive.
But such a motion to dismiss will not also be approved unless the court is
satisfied that the administration of justice requires that the prosecution be
ended, or if there appears to be a clear violation of the law. Whatever may
40
be the reason therefor, a denial of the motion to withdraw should not be
construed as a denigration of the authority of the special prosecutor to
control and direct the prosecution of the case, since the disposition of the
41
case already rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of dismissal may
be subsequently set aside and the information reinstated. Again, in American
jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to whether a nolle
prosequi may be set aside and the cause reinstated. Some cases hold that
42
the nolle prosequi may be recalled and that the accused may be tried on the
same information, but before it can be retraced, set aside, cancelled, or
43
struck off, the permission or assent of the court must be had and obtained,
and such cancellation or retraction must be duly entered. According to other
authorities, however, the entry of an unconditional nolle prosequi, not on the
ground that the information is insufficient on its face, is an end to the
prosecution of that information, and such nolle prosequi cannot afterward be
vacated and further proceedings had in that case. 44
Still in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside
by leave of court, so as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or
unless it was entered by mistake. In our jurisdiction, we follow the rule
45
Of course, where the person who signed the information was disqualified
from appointment to such position, the information is invalid and the court
does not acquire jurisdiction to try the accused thereon. Such is not,
51

which allows an order of dismissal to be set aside by leave of court. In one
case, it was held that in the absence of any statutory provision to the
contrary, the court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case
provisionally, that is, without prejudice to reinstating it before the order
becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
offense. 46
however, the situation obtaining in the case at bar. It will be noted that
respondent prosecutor was designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle
the re-investigation
and prosecution of the case against petitioners pursuant to Department
Order No. 369. Petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the issuance of
said directive.

The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring
jurisdiction will retain it to the end to the exclusion of other tribunals, is not to
be given unyielding effect in all cases and it does not apply where the
jurisdiction of the first court has come to an end in any legal way, such as
by nolle prosequi. The rule on exclusions is intended to prevent confusion
47
At any rate, the power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of
Justice under Presidential Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the
confines of the old law, that is, Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative
Code, wherein the power of the Secretary was then limited only to certain
instances. Pertinently, in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., we said:
52

and conflicts in jurisdiction and to prevent a person from being twice tried for
the same offense, but no accused has a vested right to be tried in any The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice
particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of concurrent Order No. 85 was issued pursuant to, among others, P.D.
jurisdiction voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the No. 1275 issued on 11 April 1978 which provides:
case, there can be no legal or logical reason for preventing the other court
from proceeding. With much more reason will this rule apply where only
48

branches of the same court, and not different courts, are involved in the Sec. 1. Creation of the National
jurisdictional conflict. Prosecution Service; Supervision and
Control of the Secretary of Justice. —
There is hereby created and established
There was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case a National Prosecution Service under
involved. While the procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat the supervision and control of the
cumbersome, it was not in bad faith and, accordingly, it did not affect the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of
legality of the proceedings. There is no showing, and petitioners failed to the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
prove otherwise, that the assignment by raffle of the new informations to Secretary of Justice and such number of
another branch of the same court was intended to prejudice herein Regional State Prosecution Offices, and
petitioners, or to place them under less favorable circumstances, or to find a Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as
court which would act favorably on the prosecution's case. are hereinafter provided, which shall be
primarily responsible for the
The authority of the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice investigation and prosecution of all
to sign and file informations has long been recognized in this jurisdiction and cases involving violations of penal laws.
it has been held that such information cannot be quashed on that account.
There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, holding of The power of supervision and control
investigations, and conducting prosecutions that only an officer appointed by vested in the Secretary of Justice
the President or one expressly empowered by law be permitted to assume includes the authority to act directly on
these functions. And any irregularity in the appointment does not
49
any matter within the jurisdiction of the
necessarily invalidate the same if he may be considered a de facto officer. 50
Prosecution Staff, the Regional State
Prosecution Office or the Office of the
Provincial or City Fiscal and to review,
 modify or revoke any decision or action
of the Chief of said staff or office.
The power of supervision and control vested in the
Secretary of Justice under P.D. No. 1275 had thus been
broadened beyond the confines of the old law, i.e., Section
1679 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, where
the power of the Secretary of Justice to designate acting
fiscals or prosecutors to handle a particular case was
limited to instances "when a provincial fiscal shall be
disqualified by personal interest to act in a particular case
or when for any reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to
discharge any of the duties of his position." Indeed, the
limitation upon which petitioners rely no longer subsisted
under P.D. No. 1275.
Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the
panel of prosecutors had complete control of the
investigation and prosecution of the case. . . .
3. Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on January
24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them after
they refused to plead, without furnishing them copies of the information with
the list of witnesses, after merely reading the informations against them and
asking whether they understood the same, which were allegedly in palpable
violation of Section 1, Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting
for the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted to have a final copy of
the order of January 24, 1994 which was merely read in open court, and to
take the necessary steps to question the same by way of a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal.
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas
authorized by law, to plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged.
In that way and in that way only can an issue be created upon which the trial
shall proceed. Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the
53
accused refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
Hence, under such mandatory language, if the accused refuses to plead, the
court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and
unambiguous that no construction is necessary. It actually calls for a literal
application thereof. Any explanation or defense which petitioners would want
to invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to
enter their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in their arraignment on
January 24, 1994 is deemed to have been cured when they were again
arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, and
the information was read to them in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction
over the new informations which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners
may be prosecuted thereunder.
II. On the Petition for Habeas corpus
This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the court
which issued the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case,
hence their detention should be deemed illegal.
We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the new set of informations. Consequently, the warrant of
arrest issued on the bases of said informations filed therein and the
subsequent detention of herein petitioners pursuant thereto are valid. What
instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue of whether the petition
for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other
where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher
courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional
matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the
body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ
of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, habeas corpus does not lie
54
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not
be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the
purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a
court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 55
Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is
not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence
of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas
corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional
questions that may arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ
56
of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence
57
of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant
the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case
in court. In the case under consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to
58
adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant
the grant of the writ, hence their petition therefor has to be denied.
In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial. In the case of Enrile vs.
Salazar, etc., et al., we held that:
59
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to
invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if
appropriate relief was also available there.
III. On the Motion to Cite for Contempt
The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order, pursuant to its resolution in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-
13-RTC which is a petition for change of venue filed by the Vinculados,
requiring Judges Felipe N. Villajuan and Victoria Villalon-Pornillos to cease
and desist from hearing the criminal cases involving herein petitioners which
were pending before them. 60
Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated
March 1, 1994, with the following directive:
ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final
determination as to which of the two (2) sets of information
will be upheld or prevail, the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
directed to transfer all the aforementioned criminal cases
filed against Mayor Honorato Galvez, et al. now in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to the Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle as
one (1) single case among its branches and for the branch
concerned, after raffle, to proceed with all deliberate
dispatch after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261
have been resolved with finality. 61
As a consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-94-55481 to Q-94-55487 were assigned to and are now
pending trial on the merits before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now
assert that Judge Salazar and Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio proceeded with the
trial of the cases despite the aforestated directives in the above cited
resolutions. We find no merit in the motion to cite them for contempt.
The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated May 31, 1994 filed62
by the Solicitor General wherein the latter manifested his conformity to the
agreement made between the prosecution and the defense before Judge
Salazar, the pertinent part of which agreement is as follows:
1. During the hearing on May 26, 1994, the prosecution,
through Senior State Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the
defense through Justice Alfredo Lazaro, and this
Honorable Court agreed that the trial in these cases shall
proceed on condition that: (a) the defense shall not be
deemed to have waived any issue or objection it has
raised before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114046; and
(b) that the trial shall also be without prejudice to whatever
decision and resolution the Supreme Court may render in
the case before it.
Counsel for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue with said
agreement on the pretension that the same is not the true agreement of the
parties, but he failed to state what they actually agreed upon. Withal, the
resolutions of this Court in the petition for change of venue, as well as the
cease and desist order issued therein, are clearly directed against the two
aforenamed regional trial judges in Malolos, Bulacan. By no stretch of the
imagination can we interpret the same to include Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
of Quezon City.
For that matter, the issues involved in this petition for certiorari do not
necessarily require a suspension of the proceedings before the present trial
court considering that the main petition hinges only on a determination of
which set of informations shall constitute the indictments against petitioners
and for which charges they shall stand trial. Whichever set of informations
prevails, the evidence of the prosecution and defense will more or less be
the same and can be utilized for the charges therein. Hence, no cogent
reason exists for the suspension of the proceedings before the court below.

As a final word, while it may well be that both sets of information validly exist
for the nonce, to allow both of them to subsist will only serve to confuse and
complicate the proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing aside procedural
technicalities, therefore, it becomes exigent to now consider and declare the
four informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of
firearms as having amended and superseded the original three informations
for homicide and frustrated homicide, there being no substantial rights of
herein petitioners which may be affected thereby. Correspondingly, the three
informations for homicide and frustrated homicide should be ordered
withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's docket.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition

for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus;
DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and
prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the
withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a
magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has complied with
his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to
the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of
traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning
of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and
to the legal profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have
great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused
of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the
judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning
to end. 2
In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T.
3 Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same
Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged
by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-
an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01,
3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an
Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim.
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by
the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB
Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the
basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning
the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of
the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all
foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such
decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of
national circulation had the effect of repealing Central
Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme
Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was
deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had
to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to
do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over
which it has no more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992
on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board
Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been
officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made
by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing
foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted
prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or
provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had
pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of
Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously
issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture
in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public
knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President
had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions
as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly
irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent
judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is
officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows his
 precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled to
and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of
something which has not yet come into force and the
contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been
published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial
action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to
"endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at
bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the
prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution
on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary
Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing
the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to
due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge
acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact
that such precipitate action was undertaken despite
already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the
order of the court (the prosecution having started
presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit:
August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1,
1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen
disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the
Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing
his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in
dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion to
quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed
his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent
judge filed his comment, contending, inter alia, that there was no need to
4 announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention
await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law
on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the
basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules
rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which
was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on
August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of
dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his
advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they
chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent
judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President
which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB
Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations
involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases
dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under
which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge erred in
issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an
appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his
dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be
imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a
doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose
decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by
the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower
courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had
nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have
been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a
colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the
publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB
circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my
dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not
refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases
were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the
facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that
the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent
haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is
contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense
or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange
controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of
the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall be
private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the
newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he
emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure
legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for
speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply and supplemental reply, complainants aver that although the
5 6
saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific
reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to
that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960.
Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending
cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the
coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the
eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a
motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases
against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly
reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge
acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report
and recommendation, dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy
7
Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court
Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
The questioned order of respondent judge reads as follows:
8
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB
Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to
all these cases; apparently the other accused in some of
these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and
therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also
reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that
the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the
Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full
confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the
Executive Department, specially from the highest official of
that department; the Courts are charged with judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without
introduction of proof, the announcement published in at
least the two newspapers cited above which are reputable
and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People
vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil.
572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto
Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the
repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes
the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed
under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal
law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed
law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the
aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal
Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank
Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is
charged is considered as a penal law because violation
thereof is penalized with specific reference to the provision
of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes
violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the
effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since
according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court
of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the
eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to
do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over
which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T.
Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private
respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave
due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed
despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no
writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the order of August 13,
9
1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate
court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any
motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without
giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and
solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that
the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by
law in order that the enactment can become effective and
binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise
provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full
text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published
in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the
Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of
the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took
effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not
seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no
position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No.
960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged,
was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily
shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade
foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is
a provision that with respect to violations of former
regulations that are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal
cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of
a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity
for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his
resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
11
provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
12
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of
the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that
14
the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is
15
not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
17
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a
mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay
evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign
exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be
taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple. A law
19
which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is
one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not
proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the
same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was
issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992,
further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and
disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the
provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as
they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions
of this Circular, shall remain in full force and
effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade
foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed,
amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
not be considered repealed insofar as such pending
actions or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the
provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he
dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists,
Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more
basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant
a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly
provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has
been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered
repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations,
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern."
The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for
interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had
already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of
Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular
No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to
proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No.
1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully
the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily perceived and
known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving
clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former
provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of
Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of
Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing
Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this
Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly:
Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as
to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall
govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although
Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted
from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then
pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any
reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects
Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no
suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. This means that a judge
20
should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so
in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency
in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is
more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not
enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient
that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should
moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be
pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of
controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding of the case,
avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the
law. A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general
22
law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men,
and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if
he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding
on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to
the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
law. These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the
23
task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly
considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement
made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and
immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the
elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect.
It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different
and illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only
to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible
action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of
catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He
24
having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put
to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation
of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having
been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or
on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to
the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as
early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and
discretion, nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
25
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to
due process of
law.26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which
respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened
him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless
of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and
legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact
remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or
prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due
process. More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was
27
not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as
by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the
cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution
28
to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can
but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the
President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I
should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The
pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal
scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present
his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance
and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is
inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." At the very
29
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the
outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation
highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could
have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had
the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the
dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said
accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay
in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of
Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in
the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this
point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial
error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent,
a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction . . . .
30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never
submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition for certiorari as
required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her
defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of
dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering
that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence and
power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said
dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved
discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although
he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in
the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or
error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and
in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal
precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent
judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible
justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even
equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The
explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further
depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
unedited excerpts from his comment be quoted by way of graphic
32
illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is
said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11)
cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of
newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter
complaint without awaiting the official publication of the
Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the
lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced by
the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe,
August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign
exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government
yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both
quotations supplied) not only the President made the
announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose
Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the
Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how
the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was
no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of
the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of
laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to
inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs
and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this
particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is
no need to await publication. It would have been different if
the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular
No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the
cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or
modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not
yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should be
noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers
aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of
controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or
past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already been
lifted; the announcement did not say that the government
INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but
instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign
exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited
above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last
remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions".
The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations
effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly
announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations.
The President has within his control directly or indirectly
the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of
Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which
decides the policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's
announcement of August 10, published the following day,
nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls
do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17
(the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after
report of said order was published) and after the President
said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of
August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules
have nullified government cases against Imelda R.
Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the
widow of former President Marcos "have become moot
and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free
flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note,
parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules
still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A
few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle
Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He
had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the
Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all
criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall
stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10
announcement (published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17
announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on
the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to
conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-
SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no
one bothered to advise the President to correct his
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours
after the President had made another announcement as to
the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do,
and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist,
banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to
give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on
matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as
the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among
others to encourage the entry of foreign investments).
Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from
embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the
latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss
 the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who
only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief,
which had become of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that
respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and
qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of
Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the
nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would
want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted
thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the
accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the
accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for
Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to
violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return
of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken
interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure.
Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government
service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused
charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the
motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is
ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies,
exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law,
applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias
and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this
Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate
proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was
dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal
possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice or
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court
found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being
almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and
unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court
finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from
rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or
proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable
by way of either civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly
erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has been held
to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous
as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition,
absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case
against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the
extrinsic evidence requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work,
since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to
be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly
held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial
officer when required to exercise his judgment or
discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of
malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be
held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and
to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be
nothing short of harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally,
3
civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
4
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. It is a general
5
principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary." This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it
6
to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was
appointed on 6 November 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of
the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in
1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he
is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations
of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for 7
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of
Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for
Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President
Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports,
the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and imposes upon him the supreme penalty of dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to
the ponente who is a recognized authority on various fields of law, I cannot
help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been
reversed by the appellate court, which reversal has now become final for
failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been
caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct
the mistake. But, as adverted to, the overturned order alone does not
necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly
or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross
or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. Plainly said, fault in this
8
regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad
faith.
9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that
"there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason
that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers
of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute,
without qualification, and immediately effective," and, second, for
10
"dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an
honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. It implies breach
12
of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood
obligation. It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
13
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or
ill will.
14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious
intentions on his part. If he insists that there really is no need to await the
publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that he
sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication.
Whether his belief is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further,
dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it
may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal
of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary
principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a
penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a
violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer
exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had
and the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to
respondent judge. Good faith means that the motive that actuated the
conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what
he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. Hence, if he honestly
16
believes that the bases for the criminal charges against accused have been
eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently
dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or
even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration
are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of
the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable
for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.
17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the
prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy,
since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been
pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is
unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the
office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges
- which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted
the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper
and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge
Autajay, this Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of
18
the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction
against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the
case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court
for review and correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before
the appellate court, and consequently invoke the defense of double
jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, may be indulging in
19
needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a
prominent public figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne
out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered
as grossly erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be
erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision by the appellate
court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the
Republic, with his learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of
the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted as
saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign
exchange deregulation policy of his administration. Thus, President Fidel V.
20
Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to everybody . . . .
Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos, numbering
about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new
regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her
advantage." Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not
21
without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly
ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion. Ideally so. But the cold fact is that every overturned
23
decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful appellant who
feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to a particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and
not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such
system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice
in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard
to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law." As it
24
has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and
established jurisprudence, his own personality, character, convictions,
values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and
no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions and imperfections, as well as
the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his eventual
choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States
once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please.
None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own." Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the
25
Court of Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in
jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has been settled. yet,
whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure
from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of
everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt,
that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, said that
26
"[i]mpeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other
jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice
Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine
in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic
27
concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno
that proceedings of this character being in their nature highly penal, the
charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase
the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to
by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the
one challenging the same to prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting
standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to
prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge.
Consequently, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority
opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, respondent not only allowed the accused
29
to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief
against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00
to the accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross
ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently
dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier
administrative case, respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this time
erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal
possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge
is either grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." Unlike former Judge Dizon,
30
this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being administratively
charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, the Court found respondent guilty of
31
"serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an
unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was charged
with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a
compromise of the criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for
granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of
Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor.
Certainly, the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far
worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, he was charged with a
32
litany of administrative cases, six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to
gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all the
charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be
"ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due
process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
"[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge
demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge
the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the
extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the
records of the instant case which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant
and unaccepted theories which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, respondent aggravated her ignorance
33
of the law by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the appellate court and
later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open defiance of higher
courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, but also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest
of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, this Court merely imposed a fine of
34
P10,000.00 on respondent judge who entertained the petition for bail filed by
the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted
allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman
who "sponsored" the appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other
case, this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
35
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued
a warrant of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper
procedure. And, still in
another, this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent
36
ruled that a judge cannot be condemned unless his error is so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that he
knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of
respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt
intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is
uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the
respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a
reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of
respondent judge from the service is not proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail
the independence of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are
supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain
eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous
decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some
extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a
deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave the
loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may
slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to
a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to
defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace
not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As
champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this
Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges,
but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve
no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service,
the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for
exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials
which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial
service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It is
unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith
and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy
which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or discipline for their
official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected
official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological
condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is
consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic
evidence requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon
the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly
held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial
officer when required to exercise his judgment or
discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of
 malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be
held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and
to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be
nothing short of harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally,
3
civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
4 faith.
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. It is a general
5
principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary." This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it
6
to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was
appointed on 6 November 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of
the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in
1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he
is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations
of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for7
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of
Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for
Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President
Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports,
the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and imposes upon him the supreme penalty of dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to
the ponente who is a recognized authority on various fields of law, I cannot
help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been
reversed by the appellate court, which reversal has now become final for
failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been
caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct
the mistake. But, as adverted to, the overturned order alone does not
necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly
or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross
or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. Plainly said, fault in this
8
regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad
9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that
"there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason
that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers
of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute,
without qualification, and immediately effective," and, second, for
10
"dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an
honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. It implies breach
12
of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood
obligation. It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
13
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or
ill will.14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious
intentions on his part. If he insists that there really is no need to await the
publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that he
sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication.
Whether his belief is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further,
dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it
may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal
of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary
principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a
penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a
violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer
exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had
and the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to
respondent judge. Good faith means that the motive that actuated the
conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what
he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. Hence, if he honestly
16
believes that the bases for the criminal charges against accused have been
eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently
dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or
even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration
are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of
the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable
for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.
17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the
prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy,
since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been
pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is
unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the
office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges
- which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted
the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper
and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge
Autajay, this Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of
18
the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction
against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the
case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court
for review and correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before
the appellate court, and consequently invoke the defense of double
jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, may be indulging in
19
needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a
prominent public figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne
out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered
as grossly erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be
erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision by the appellate
court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the
Republic, with his learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of
the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted as
saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign
exchange deregulation policy of his administration. Thus, President Fidel V.
20
Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to everybody . . . .
Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos, numbering
about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new
regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her
advantage." Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not
21
without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly
ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion. Ideally so. But the cold fact is that every overturned
23
decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful appellant who
feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to a particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and
not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such
system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice
in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard
to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law." As it
24
has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and
established jurisprudence, his own personality, character, convictions,
values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and
no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions and imperfections, as well as
the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his eventual
choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States
once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please.
None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own." Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the
25
Court of Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in
jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has been settled. yet,
whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure
from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of
everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt,
that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, said that
26
"[i]mpeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other
jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice
Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine
in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic
27
concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno
that proceedings of this character being in their nature highly penal, the
charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase
the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to
by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the
one challenging the same to prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting
standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to
prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge.
Consequently, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority
opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, respondent not only allowed the accused
29
to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief
against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00
to the accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross
ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently
dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier
administrative case, respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this time
erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal
possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge
is either grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." Unlike former Judge Dizon,
30
this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being administratively
charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, the Court found respondent guilty of
31
"serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an
unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was charged
with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a
compromise of the criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for
granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of
Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor.
Certainly, the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far
worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, he was charged with a
32
litany of administrative cases, six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to
gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all the
charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be
"ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due
process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
"[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge
demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge
the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the
extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the
records of the instant case which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant
and unaccepted theories which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, respondent aggravated her ignorance
33
of the law by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the appellate court and
later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open defiance of higher
courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, but also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest
of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, this Court merely imposed a fine of
34
P10,000.00 on respondent judge who entertained the petition for bail filed by
the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted
allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman
who "sponsored" the appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other
case, this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
35
unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy
a warrant of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
procedure. And, still in
another, this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent
36
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
ruled that a judge cannot be condemned unless his error is so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that he
knowingly rendered an unjust decision.

In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of
respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt
intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is
uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the
respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a
reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of
respondent judge from the service is not proper. 37

Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail
the independence of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are
supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain
eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous
decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some
extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.

Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a

deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave the
loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may
slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to
a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to
defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace
not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As
champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this
Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges,
but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve
no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service,
the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for
exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.

Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials

which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial
service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It is
 [G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997]
JUAN C. CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and SOLID HOMES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration
is unable to testify? May a land registration court, after it is convinced
that the property subject of an application for registration under the
torrens system is already covered by an existing certificate, dismiss
such application and thus ignore petitioners insistence on submitting
further evidence of his alleged title? What constitutes sufficient
evidence to show identity of the land applied for with the land already
titled in favor of private respondent?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this petition for review
assailing the November 29, 1990 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
[1] [2]
CA-G.R. SP No. 18318, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be, as it is
hereby DISMISSED. [3]
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals
Resolution which denied reconsideration.
[4]
The Facts
The facts found by public respondent are as follows: [5]
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with
Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region
stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under
the operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is a 96,470
square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and
6846-D. Copies of the application were ordered by respondent Court
to be furnished (to) the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) which on March 18, 1987 submitted a
report recommending that applicant be order[ed] to amend his
petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of the
adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding the
boundary lot number along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-
005516-D. On order of respondent Court [trial court], the petition
was accordingly amended.
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for
hearing on December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, Docket Division of
the NLRDRA [sic] submitted another report recommending that
petitioner be ordered to refer to the Bureau of Lands for corrections
of the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of Lot
6846-D, Csd-04-005516-D. The technical descriptions as corrected
by the Bureau of Lands was [sic] submitted and the application was
initially set for hearing on April 26, 1988. The Notice of Initial
Hearing stating that the application was set forbe [sic] heard on April
26, 1988 was thereafter issued by the NLTDRA.
On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by
respondent Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie Jimenez
who filed an opposition to the application. On June 22, 1988, private
respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that a land
registered in its name under the Torrens System and covered by then
TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the property subject of the
application by petitioner. The opposition was not admitted
considering that no motion to set aside the order of general default
was filed by private respondent.
On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order
of general default and to admit its opposition on the ground that its
right would be adversely affected by the application. Acting on the
motion and in order to avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was directed to
make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by
LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873 and to submit
its plotting to the Court for its guidance. In the same order dated July
1, 1988, respondent Court in the interest of justice set aside the order
of general default in so far as private respondent was concerned and
admitted private respondents opposition.
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the
opposition of private respondent be dismissed for the reason that the
order issued by respondent court directing the NLRTDA [sic] to
make a plotting of the land in question on the basis of the title
submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila
released the private respondent from the duty and obligation of
presenting evidence to prove that the land applied for is private and
that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of private respondent
to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the lapse
of more than six months or to introduce evidence that will show that
the land in question is covered by the alleged torrens certificate of
title.
During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September
27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 18, 1988,
November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his
evidence on the question as to whether or not he had a registrable
right over the land in question.
Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA
to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered
by LRC Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land
Registration Authority submitted a report dated December 22, 1986
[should be 1988] recommending that, after due hearing, the
application for registration of petitioner be dismissed. The
application was thus dismissed by respondent court in an order dated
January 2, 1989. Considering, however, that the recommendation is
[sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent judge issued an
order dated January 10, 1989 setting for hearing on January 24, 1989
the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority. The
hearing proceeded on February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silverio G. Perez,
Chief, Department on Registration, Land Registration Authority
being presented in connection with his Report recommending the
dismissal of the application after due hearing. On February 28, 1989,
the petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the
February 28, 1989 dismissal of the application for registration to
which private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20,
1989. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated
March 4, 1989.
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the
dismissal of his petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent judge issued
an order requiring the parties as well as the engineers from the Land
Registration Commission and the DENR to appear before respondent
Court on June 5, 1989. The engineer from the Land Registration
Commission was likewise directed to inform the court whether the
property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the titled property
of private respondent.
After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing
that there was indeed an overlapping of the four (4) parcels of land
applied for by petitioner and the properties of Solid Homes under
TCT 7873 and considering that the properties applied for are [sic]
within the titled property and could not be the subject of an
application for registration, the second motion to reconsider the
dismissal of the application for registration was denied in an order
dated July 5, 1989.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the application for registration, and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues: [6]
1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to
establish the identity of the two parcels of land or whether TCT No.
7873 under Plan FP-1540 of Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay
Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal is identical or similar to Lots 6846-A to
6846-D inclusive Cad. 585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in
Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal applied for under LRC Case No. 414 (-
A), LRC Record No. N-60084;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the
opportunity to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in
the (proceeding) for Land Registration and (to) rest (his) case;
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is
reversible.
Petitioner alleges that the table survey made by the Land
Registration Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land
Management Bureau cannot serve as basis for identifying his
land. On the other hand, petitioner was able to establish the identity
of the land he applied for by actual ground survey which was
approved by the Director of Lands and reprocessed by the Land
Registration Authority. He claims that if said land is covered by
private respondents title, the Director of Lands and/or Regional
Director will no(t) approve the survey. Petitioner also argues that the
land in question is situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal while that
of private respondent is in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. Survey Plan
FP-1540, which served as basis of private respondents certificate of
title, cannot be found; hence, according to petitioner, the table survey
was anomalous. Petitioner adds that the matter entirely wanting in
this case (is) the identity or similarity of the realties. Petitioner
[7]
concludes that the trial court should have ordered actual ocular
inspection and ground verification survey of the properties involved.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process
when he, as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to
take the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel
hardly participated in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory
questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the
Land Registration Authority. [8]
Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this
wise:[9]
Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration
proceeding cannot again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a
subsequent conducted proceeding (Land Titles and Deeds by
Noblejas, 1968 Revised Edition, page 96). The Report submitted by
the Land Registration Authority (Annex B) and the Survey Division
of the DENR (Annex RR) both indicate an overlapping of the lot
applied for by petitioner and the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned
by private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. Even if petitioner were
allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end
result would still be the dismissal of his application for
registration. Respondent Judge was therefore justified in cutting
short the proceeding as the time to be spent in hearing petitioners
application could be used disposing the other cases pending with
respondent court.
Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not
actively participate in the trials conducted to hear his evidence,
suffice it to state that it is counsels prerogative to determine how he
intends to pursue his case.
 The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For
We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not
identical to private respondents land which was already covered by a
torrens certificate of title. The two reports prepared by the Land
Registration Authority and the DENR Survey Division clearly showed
that there was an overlapping between the two properties. Because
the futility of petitioners application was apparent, the trial court
deemed it unnecessary to hear further evidence. We agree.
At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the
order given by the trial court to the Land Registration Authority and the
Survey Division of the DENR to submit reports on the location of the
land covered by petitioners application and private respondents
certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to require
the filing of additional papers to aid it in its determination of the
propriety of the application was based on Section 21 of PD 1529: [10]
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular
inspection. -- The court may require facts to be stated in the
application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not
inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional
papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.
From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of
the property applied for was only discretionary, not
mandatory. Likewise, the land registration court was not obliged to
order the survey of the contested lot, especially when another
government agency had already submitted a report finding that the
contested lot was identical with that described in private respondents
certificate of title and recommending the dismissal of the application
for registration.
Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and
DENR to submit reports was in accordance with the purposes of the
Land Registration Law: [11]
The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: to ascertain
once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property; to
make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court
to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title; to quiet title to
the land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality to a title;
and to decree that land title to be final, irrevocable and, undisputable.
(citing Benen vs. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531.)
It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration
court has limited and special jurisdiction. It can not be denied,
however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective. (citing Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70
Phil. 388, 391.) The purpose of the applicant is to prove that he has
an absolute or simple title over the property sought to be registered,
otherwise his application will be denied. An absolute oppositor
claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant. If
successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor. As
to whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee simple
title over the property sought to be registered necessarily requires a
resolution of the question as to whether or not the oppositors had a
dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicants. x x x
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court
correctly dismissed the application for original land registration. An
application for registration of an already titled land constitutes a
collateral attack on the existing title. It behooves a land registration
court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing
in mind Section 46 of Act No. 496 which provides that (n)o title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The trial courts order
to the LRA and DENR was a mere cautionary measure in cognizance
of the well-settled rule that a torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked. In other words, the title may be challenged only in a
proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a
land already registered in the name of another person. After one year
from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open
to review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, is to institute
an ordinary action for reconveyance or -- if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value -- for damages. In
view of the nature of a torrens title, a land registration court has the
duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate alters a
valid and existing certificate of title.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the approval by the assistant
chief of the Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey conducted
on the land applied for by petitioner did not prove that the said land
was not covered by any title. It merely showed that such land has been
surveyed and its boundaries have been determined.
Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the
same order (issued by the land registration court) [which set] aside
the order (of) general default insofar as private respondent Solid
Homes, Inc. was concerned, directed the NLTDRA to make the
plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-
245998 and [that which was] embraced in TCT No. N-7873. The [13]
intention of the land registration court was to avoid duplicity, that is,
[14]
to rule out the possibility that the land he sought to register was
already covered by a certificate of title. In this case, the land he
applied for was found to be within the land described in private
respondents transfer certificate of title.
Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located
in Barangay Mambogan, while the registered land of private
respondent was in Barangay Mayamot. In his reply filed with public
respondent, however, he himself admitted that Barangay Mambogan
is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in Antipolo,
Rizal, and Mayamot covers a big parcel of land running from Antipolo
up to Marikina. In view of petitioners declaration, it was not
[15]
impossible for the land owned by private respondent to be located in
Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay Mambogan. At any rate,
whether the two lands are located in Mambogan or Mayamot or both
is a factual question, and its resolution by the trial and the appellate
courts is binding on this Court. Petitioner failed to provide a reason,
let alone an adequate one, to justify the reversal of such finding of
the lower courts.
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was
anomalous because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private
respondents title was based, could not be located. This argument
[12] lacks merit. The law does not require resorting to a survey plan to
prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of
title; the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realtys metes and
bounds. Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496,
provides that (t)he original certificates in the registration book, any
copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the
register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and
the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall
be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and
shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as
otherwise provided in this Act. It has been held that a certificate of title
is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein and other matters which can be litigated and
decided in land registration proceedings. Thus, this Court in Odsigue
[16]
vs. Court of Appeals ruled:
[17]
x x x. Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified
the property sought to be recovered as required by Art. 434 of the
Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is
located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and
Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay
May-Iba. He claims that the technical description in the title does not
sufficiently identify the property of private respondent and that a
geodetic survey to determine which of his improvements should be
demolished should first have been conducted by the private
respondent. x x x.
But private respondents title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the
property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the certification
issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal
stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at Barangay
Lagundi.
For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is
conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but
also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered
by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners required to demolish
only whatever is constructed within its boundaries. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The old case of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby explains the
[18]
nature of a torrens certificate of title, as follows:
x x x. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may
be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the
fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished
in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after
the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the
certificate of title instead of the survey plan; likewise, the appellate
court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision.
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he
was unable to take the witness stand. We disagree. The essence of
due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this
opportunity that is repugnant to due process. In this case, petitioner
[19]
was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present
three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness
stand even when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties
memoranda which signified the termination of the
proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case,
he forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own
counsel hardly participated in the proceedings. The records show that
said counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by
propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any event, the
client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not
shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly
negligent manner as to deprive him of effective representation, or of
due process. [20]
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs.
Naawa which held:
[21]
We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he
ordered the dismissal of the registration case over the objection of
the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider the order of
dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected to perform an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had
thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to which they are entitled.
Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent
Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration case) nor Petitioner
Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate of
title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration
court was ordered to act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496 [22] either by
dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title, or
by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN
NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying
petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live
the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the
petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the
right of the people to public information and the freedom of the
press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights,
it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the
press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates
his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the
ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media
coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at
pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or
the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. 1âw phi 1.nêt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this
important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to
alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president.
By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,1 the Court denies
the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the
vote of eight (8) Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-visual
recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority. law phil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance
of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there
should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The
master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of
TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may
decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be
included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The
audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and
control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the
1aw phil.net
hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of
our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he
is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases
involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third,
audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic
training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the
hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful
in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the
cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights
and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings,
or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes
necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for
broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will
be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The
possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar
of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court
of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of
the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those
opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will
be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public
showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of
the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the
trial can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing
the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production
of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V.
Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction
restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary
film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people
power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But,
at least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any
movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy
against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can
thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording
of celebrated cases or causes célèbres was made was made way
back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he
explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many
of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black
 Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments,
several months after the case was concluded --
concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of
profound respect for the painstaking way in which the
truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes
with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions
and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which
judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the
courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use
of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational experiment
that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction
of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could
have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by
our educational system, is now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was
made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the
serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV
and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high
on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings
of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to
be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may
determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity
of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made
for documentary purposes only and shall be made without
comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as
may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast,
the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
vs. JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Intimating as to what the ideals of a good judge should be, Sir
Francis Bacon wants judges to remember that their office is jus
dicere and not jus dare, to interpret law, and not to make law or give
law. They ought to be more learned than witty, more revered than
plausible, and more advised 3than confident. Above all things,
INTEGRITY is their portion and proper virtue. [1]
The Constitution and the statutes, however, limit the legal
qualifications of judges to only three bare essentials: citizenship, age
and experience. The virtues of probity, honesty, temperance,
impartiality and integrity, most often used to measure an aspirant to
the bench, lose their meaning in individual perception.
While people perceive judges to be above the ordinary run of
men, they know that a perfect judge, like a perfect priest, exists only
in fantasy.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the integrity of
respondent judge in this administrative case stands challenged for
committing acts of extortion or bribery.
The following antecedent facts appear on record:
Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a
letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau
of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and
corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to [2]
conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo,
HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They
proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the
letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In
view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of
Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward
[3]
Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No.
2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge,
after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that
the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent
judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was
made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable
action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of
P2,000.00.Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all
probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case
caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge
was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents
Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO
CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near
the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending
the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge
PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge
PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive
the money because according to him there were plenty of people
around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge
PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him
four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room
and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room
and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already
received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered
the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied
having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough
search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of
a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein
he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding
Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was
booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our
Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the
person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with
the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery
as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 47-48.)
On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this Court,
this case was referred to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for
investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a
Memorandum, dated July 28, 1995, wherein respondent presented his
version of the case:
Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a fictitious
person according to the NBI, wrote a letter to Court Administrator
Ernani Pao of the Supreme Court, alleging irregularities committed by
the accused. Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez
endorsed the letter to the NBI Director requesting `discreet
investigation of the Tigas letter. An NBI tandem of Agents Edward
Villarta and Reynaldo Olazo proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, to
investigate. Said tandems assignment was merely to conduct discreet
investigation supposedly, but it led to incriminatory machinations,
planting evidence, unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure. They
contacted Candido Cruz who was mentioned in the letter. They,
however, discovered that Ceferino Tigas, the alleged letter writer, was
an inexistent person, fictitious as shown by the synopsis report of the
NBI agents (Exhibit 8). Having contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI
agents persuaded him to participate in what they called `entrapment
operation. The NBI agents prepared an affidavit, then a
supplementary affidavit and had them signed by Candido Cruz. They
also went to the NBI Headquarters and had four (4) P500 bills dusted
with fluorescent powder which they used in theoperation against the
accused.
In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with Candido
Cruz, proceeded to the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan, where
the accused judge was holding office. However, they learned that the
accused judge was not in his office but was then attending the
graduation rites of his son at the nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and
so they decided to move their operation to the school grounds. The
ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz saw the accused in one
corner of the compound and approached him. He tried to give the
accused an envelope allegedly containing money, but the judge
refused to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed,
the NBI agents decided to reset their operation the following day.
At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI agents
and Candido Cruz arrived at the municipal building of Angat,
Bulacan. Cruz, as planned, entered the accused judges chambers
and placed an envelope, allegedly containing marked money, right on
his (judges) desk. He thought it was a pleading for filing and he told
Candido Cruz to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent
room. Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking
for. Upon hearing the reply, the accused suddenly erupted in anger,
he grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it to Cruz. The
envelope fell on the floor, the accused picked it up and inserted it
inside the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.
Just seconds thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered the
door of the chamber which door was open at that time. They
introduced themselves and told the accused that the money that Cruz
gave him was marked. Accused told them that he did not receive or
accept money from Cruz. But they proceeded to search the room, the
table, its drawers, and every nook and cranny of his room, including
the pockets of the accuseds pants. After scouring the place, the
agents failed to find the envelope with the marked money. And so, one
of the agents called for Candido Cruz who was waiting outside at a
waiting shed fronting the municipal building, and asked him where the
envelope was. Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent
Olazo, approached the cabinet and said heto pala.
 Then, the accuseds humiliating experience began. Thereafter,
despite the strident protestations of the accused, the envelope, which
came from the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt, was placed on top of the
table of the judge, pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested
by the NBI agents. [5]
On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon
submitted the following report and recommendation:
The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings based
on the evidence at hand.
As against the respondent judges denials, the undersigned
submits that the sworn affidavits of complainants and NBI Agents and
documentary proofs attached to the records are more convincing and
nearer to the truth. They have no motive for fabricating this charge,
except to bring justice. Credence should be given to the testimony of
the NBI Agents coming as it does from an unpolluted source. These
Agents had no reason to testify falsely against the respondent
judge. They were just doing their duty. On the other hand, the
respondent judge had to protect himself against the testimonial and
technical/scientific evidence that he had received the envelope and to
reject its implications of such evidence.
Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to commit a
crime is likewise untenable. The principle evolved from the cases
appears to be that in a prosecution for an offense against the public
welfare, such as accepting bribe, the defense of entrapment cannot
be successfully interposed; x x x.
One may well wonder over the manner the envelope containing
the money was proffered to the respondent judge as he narrated his
story on how he got mad at Candido Cruz when he proffered the said
envelope, how he threw, picked it up and placed it in the pocket of the
latter and how he drove him away. He even testified that it was just
planted by the NBI Agents when the latter allegedly placed the
envelope inside a directory which was placed on top of a cabinet.
x x x. Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into his
chamber or was he really accustomed with people directly dealing or
negotiating at his chamber, as what Cruz did, instead of dealing with
his staff. His angry words and his actuations, according to his
testimony, were not convincing at all to show that he was that fuming
mad at Candido Cruzs offer. More so, his claim that NBI Agents
connived with Candido Cruz just for their own personal glory was not
even persuasive. His excuse of the presence of fluorescent powder on
his hand was flimsy and incredible.
The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced by
monetary considerations. This act of the respondent of demanding
and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitutes
serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part
of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the
law that will surely erode the peoples respect for law and lose faith and
trust in the courts which are expected to render fair and equal justice
to all.
Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which state: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform
official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully recommends
that appropriate penalty be imposed upon the respondent.
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation
submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The
Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of
respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was,
therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can
confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his
defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
[6]
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after
due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence,
especially since the charge is penal in character. The above-quoted
[7]
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen
short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies
in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent
SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone
who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but
who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous
case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous
letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not
specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged
respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could
not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend
himself from such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised
of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a
discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused
an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having
found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists,
they sought out an accused before respondents court who could
possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the NBI
team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation
on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment
to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of
physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original
jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time
before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the
NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to bribe
the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz
criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe
was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the
date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict
having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted that, [8]
despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search
of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and
so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz
can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably
consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at
around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz,
along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat,
Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges
chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an
envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that
what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told
Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a
room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the
money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent
judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the
desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the
floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the
pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI
Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges
chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the
money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them
that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After
respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to
search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and
cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of
respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of
respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing
marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed, was
called for by one of the agents. Candido Cruz was asked as to the
whereabouts of the envelope containing money. Candido Cruz went
back to the judges chambers and made the motions of conducting a
search. Eventually, he went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the
manner of a magician, produced the envelope with marked money,
saying, heto pala.
 Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge who
was humiliated no end by the fact that the envelope with marked
money was placed on top of his desk with respondent judge in front of
it.
In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI
Reynaldo Olazo stated that the marked money used in their
entrapment operation actually came from Candido Cruz and not from
the NBI; and he was not able to see what actually transpired between
[9]
Candido Cruz and respondent judge inside the chambers of the
judge. He was outside the judges chambers and entered it only after
Candido Cruz gave the signal that the money was already delivered
by him to the respondent. Candido Cruz, on the other hand, testified
[10]
that the marked money used in the alleged entrapment operation was
given to him by the NBI and, when he went out of the judges
[11]
chambers after giving the money, he signaled to one, Col. Javier, who
was then positioned immediately outside the chambers. [12]
In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the acts
of the NBI agents which triggered the incident that transpired inside
respondent judges chambers constituted instigation and not
entrapment as claimed by the prosecution. It is evident that Candido
Cruz was induced to act as he did in order to place respondent judge
in a compromising situation, a situation which was not brought about
by any request of respondent judge. It is surprisingly strange that an
accused in a case would simply barge into the judges chambers
without rhyme or reason, place bribe money on top of the judges desk
without so much as explaining what the money was for. Respondent
judges action on Candido Cruzs case which favored Cruz was effected
long before. We can believe the fact that, under the circumstances,
respondent judge did react in anger and threw the envelope at the
accused Candido Cruz. The judge must have given back the money
to Candido Cruz and literally drove Cruz out of his chambers bringing
the money with him. This explains the reason why the NBI Agents
notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the money inside the
chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the search and they were
unable to find the envelope with the marked money in it. This fact NBI
Agent Olazo in effect admitted because he had to call back Candido
Cruz in order to make Cruz divulge as to where the bribe money was
placed. When, after all, Candido Cruz produced the money when he
went back to the judges chambers, it became obvious that the money
when offered to respondent judge was not received by the latter.
The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution and
planting of evidence amounting to persecution. It is reprehensible to
say the least that NBI agents should entrap the respondent judge by
illegal means, besmirch his reputation by the planting of evidence
against him and make public the foregoing charges of bribery against
him in the face of the unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations
perpetrated by the NBI agents in connivance with Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual blameless of
the charge of bribery against him.
It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had
participated in the alleged entrapment operation only because of the
fact that the NBI agents made him believe that there was an order
therefor from the Supreme Court. Considering that he is illiterate and
[13]
is already more than 70 years of age, it is understandable why he was
easily persuaded by the NBI agents to cooperate without need of any
threat whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his testimony is likewise
attributed to his aforesaid personal circumstances for it does not jibe
with practical experience that a person telling the truth will still have to
struggle to remember everything that transpired, he having been a
participant in the operation. Gross mistakes on very important points
not easily forgotten are very strong indicia of the falsity of the story
given by a witness. [14]
We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda,
Jr., that:
[15]
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful
neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole evidence. The principle of
[16]
reasonable doubt being applicable in the instant case, therefore, we find that the alleged
act of bribery committed by respondent has not been sufficiently and convincingly
proven to warrant the imposition of any penalty against respondent.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby exonerated
and the administrative case against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented
by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A.
Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable
APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T.
CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ
Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF
Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private
Respondent, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be
assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12,
1993. In view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by
DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-
Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-
complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with
malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to
September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts
of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a
vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the
shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing
job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was
reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that
Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office,
making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of
gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22,
1989,[2] private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and
October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total
amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the
government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash
advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not
to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-600
of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15,
1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment.
According to private respondent, her two previous complaints
prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as
Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20,
1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the
complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State
Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City
Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix
Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an
investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit
their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its
conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued
a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or
before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent
motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual
receipt of two of private respondents complaints. The committee
granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,[4] Lumiqued
alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort
money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of
Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent
weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondents
execution of an affidavit of desistance.[5]
 Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline
consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such
consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of
the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the
use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He added that
the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the
course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in
Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar.
Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for
reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and
accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his
signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly
issued by the establishments concerned in order that official
transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt,
Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along
Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service
vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the
help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them
with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own
receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the
gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop,
corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25,
1990.[6] With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement
in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued
submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error
committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office
was not his personal error or accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he violated COA
rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the
amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification[7] of
DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had
no outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against
him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not
terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due
to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent
filed the required applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued
claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of
her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her
second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file
the same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work.
He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application
for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that
private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA
examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private
respondent immediately returned the amount on January 18, 1990,
the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued
claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to
jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July
3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared
on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the
case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for
additional hearing,[8] alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10,
1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor
apparently because the investigation had already been
terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992,[9] State Prosecutor
Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was
discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992,
the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of
respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that
respondent advised the Investigating committee of his
confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either
by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show
that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of
respondents condition on any reasonable date after July 17,
1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992,
respondent was already being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted
reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the
counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence
annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case
based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as
far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed
much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating
committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992,[10] finding
Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following
findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by
the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the
complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent
for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in
claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses
were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox
Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the
certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show
that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is
about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast
to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average
of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed
of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming
reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he
actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were
ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and
the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the
government has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted
by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had
been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4
vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having
signed the receipts.
Respondents act in defrauding the government of a
considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes
not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal
offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official
Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have
(sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in
violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash
advances totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly
documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the
vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The
mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the
DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences
(sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that
the respondents act in relieving the complainant of her
functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an
act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two
weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on
Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after
the respondents order relieving the complainant was issued. His
act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a
complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no
help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is
capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him
dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino
III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended
Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the
filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum
to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that
the filing of the affidavit of desistance[11] would not prevent the
issuance of a resolution on the matter considering that what was at
stake was not only the violation of complainants (herein private
respondents) personal rights but also the competence and fitness of
the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He opined that,
in fact, the evidence on record could call for a punitive action against
the respondent on the initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for
reconsideration of the findings of the Committee with the
DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to
the investigating committee.[13] In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the
three-member investigating committee informed Undersecretary
Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to act on the
same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has
already been forwarded to the Office of the President and that their
authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they
transmitted their report to the DOJ.[14] Concurring with this view,
Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating
committee could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He
added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office
of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued
Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52),[16] finding Lumiqued
administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen
gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture
of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers
and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be
the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question
were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that
those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the
official business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the
drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want
us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and
harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances,
were not satisfactorily established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President Ramos,
Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be
reinstated to his former position with all the benefits accorded to him
by law and existing rules and regulations. This petition was basically
premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L.
Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having
authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to
petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition
that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were altered. [18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the
reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on
August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the
constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.[19] On May 19,
1994,[20] however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued
died. On September 28, 1994,[21] Secretary Quisumbing denied the
second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
 Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying
for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of
then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President
Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it
prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his
heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from
service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to
inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They
maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted
Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his
own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to
counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and
in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right
and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and,
with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to
have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee
created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law
for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting
Secretary of Justice Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal
investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression,
dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously
undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional
Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera
Autonomous Region, is hereby created x x x. [24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee
was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it
hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the
investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been
engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional
system,[26] conducting criminal investigations is not its sole
function. By its power to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law, [27] prosecutors may be called upon to conduct
administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating
committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules
therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may
at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
the respondents capacity to represent himself and no duty rests on
such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.[28] In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the
provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No.
2260[29] (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292[30] (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by
Lumiqued[31] clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and
so opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries
are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of
the Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the
Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in
an administrative complaint must be informed of his right to the
assistance of a counsel of his choice,[32] is inappropriate. In the first
place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before the
Civil Service Commission.[33]Secondly, said resolution, which is dated
January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation,[34] much later than the July 1992
hearings of the investigating committee created by Department
Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the
matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July
3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his option
to secure services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director
Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
complainant is present, Janet Obar-
Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a
copy of the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you
have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to
see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already set a
hearing, morning and afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your
counsel? You are willing to proceed with the hearing
even without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent
yourself?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern.[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In the course of private respondents damaging testimony, the
investigating committee once again reminded Lumiqued of his need
for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go
through with this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning
you to proceed with the assistance of counsel but you
said that you can take care of yourself so we have no
other alternative but to proceed.[36](Underscoring
supplied)
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting
for the supplemental affidavit you are going to present
to us. Do you have any request from the panel of
investigators, Director Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I
requested to assist me and was the one who prepared
my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing
and according to him he is engaged for the whole
month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why dont you engage the services of another counsel.
The charges against you are quite serious. We are not
saying you are guilty already. We are just
apprehensive that you will go through this
investigation without a counsel. We would like you to
be protected legally in the course of this investigation.
Why dont you get the services of another counsel.
There are plenty here in Baguio...
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one
month to finish the investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or
without counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document
which we asked for and Director Lumiqued, if you
have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce
their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can
expedite with the proceedings.[37]
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did
not avail of the services of counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said
hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not
being represented by a counsel. The last time he was
asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we
know if he has a lawyer to represent him in this
investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer,
he told me that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the
other court and he told me if there is a possibility of
having this case postponed anytime next week,
probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic)
of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I
throw this to the panel. The charges in this case are
quite serious and he should be given a chance to the
assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit
has been furnished him only now and this has several
documents attached to it so I think we could grant him
one last postponement considering that he has
already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart
ailment.[38]
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when
Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to said date,
however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his
confinement. Consequently, because the hearing could not push
through on said date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his
counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings.
This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his
right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the
executive branch of the government, graduated from the University
of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science
major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and
grants, and underwent training seminars both here and
abroad.[39] Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without
the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was
the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to
attend. In his statement, That is my concern, one could detect that it
had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt
or skepticism implicit in the question, You are confident that you will
be able to represent yourself? despite his having positively asserted
earlier, Yes, I am confident. He was obviously convinced that he
could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that
he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that
he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating
committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but
cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor
General,[40] the Court said:
x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party
in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored
or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more
creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings.[41] An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect
of due process.[42] As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process.[43] Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [44] Lumiqueds
appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the
committee.[45]
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.[46] In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and
Provincial Board of Rizal [47] the Court held that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential
pronoucement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under
Article XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as follows:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security
of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in
a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute.
Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that
all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[48] In this case, it has been clearly
shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as
shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were
founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-
settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of
administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or preponderant.[49] The quantum of proof necessary
for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[50]
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of
the committees recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be
deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their
functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut
that presumption,[51] which petitioners have not successfully disputed
in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under
Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same
Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The
instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement
benefits and other benefits plus backwages from the time of
Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the President is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., on leave.
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; DR. NILO ROSAS, in his
capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO
ICASIANO, in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON
CITY SCHOOLS and DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA, AURORA C.
VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON,
CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR,
VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES,
EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R.
FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU, MARISSA M.
SAMSON, HENEDINA B.CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F.
LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA.
VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO,
ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing,
on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent,
competent and impartial tribunal.
Statement of the Case
This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107
[1] [2]
which affirmed the trial courts decision, as follows:
[3]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the
appeal is DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as
respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cario and
henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case.
SO ORDERED. [4]
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-
to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in
talk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September
26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to
demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances
and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative
cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of
the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
civil service laws and regulations, to wit:
1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office
regulations;
4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
6. absence without leave (AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-
appellee to be placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR
Regional Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include
the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part
in the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20,
1990. Petitioner-appellees counsel objected to the procedure
adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished
a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit
(Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cario with
fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further
investigating them and from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it one for
certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating
committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because
its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them
by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring
Secretary Cario and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the
charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia
of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to
intervene, alleging that he was in the same situation as
petitioners since he had likewise been charged and preventively
suspended by respondent-appellant Cario for the same grounds
as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the
burden of proving his innocence under the committees
guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991
and allowed him to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the
petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent
DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance
with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not
interfere in the administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to
reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-
appellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a
decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees
guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-
appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was
denied on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a
resolution en banc declaring void the trial courts order of
dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees action, even as it
ordered the latters reinstatement pending decision of their case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case
for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:
As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for
pre-trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite
the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario,
as the principal respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY
APPEAR before this Court on said date and time, with a warning
that should he fail to show up on said date, the Court will declare
him as IN DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial
Conference, the Court will not recognize any representative of his.
By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset
on June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cario failed to appear in
court on the date set. It was explained that he had to attend a
conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the
court just the same declared them as in default. The Solicitor
General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cario
could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior
commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cario was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the
DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But
the Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied by
the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:
The Motion For Reconsideration dated July 3, 1992 filed by the
respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It
appears too obvious that respondents simply did not want to comply
with the lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the
Manifestation and Motion, dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial
court that Cario had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked
for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte
with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in
which it stated:
The Court is in full accord with petitioners contention that Rep. Act
No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation
in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with
Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. Respondents erred in
believing and contending that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already been
superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and
Exec. Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a
special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as
having been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless
the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. A perusal of Pres.
Decree No. 807 reveals no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No.
4670 stands. In the event that there is conflict between a special and
a general law, the former shall prevail since it evidences the
legislators intent more clearly than that of the general statute and
must be taken as an exception to the General Act. The provision of
Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in
the composition and selection of the members of the investigating
committee.Consequently, the committee tasked to investigate the
charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted, their
composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act.
No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color
whatsoever.
Anent petitioners claim that their dismissal was effected without any
formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim
meritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a
cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not sufficient
reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The manner of
dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. It is a dismissal
without due process. While there was a semblance of investigation
conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners
was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by
law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully
well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving
them cause to render judgment ex-parte.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being
arbitrary and violative of the teachers right to due process. Due
process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it
affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of the
respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby
SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their former positions
without loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby
ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners back salaries, allowances,
bonuses, and other benefits and emoluments which may have
accrued to them during the entire period of their preventive
suspension and/or dismissal from the service is hereby likewise
ORDERED.
SO ORDERED. [5]
From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
raising the following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in
default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper
substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No. 4670,
otherwise known as Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
should govern the conduct of the investigations conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of the
teachers are without due process.[6]
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents were
denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted
against them.
Hence, this petition for review. [7]
The Issues
Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
I
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private
respondents were denied due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
strictly the provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the
investigating committee.
III
 Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in
affirming the trial courts decision. [8]
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single
question: whether private respondents were denied due
process of law.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of
law.
Denial of Due Process
At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to
determine whether or not due process of law was observed in
the administrative proceedings against herein private
respondents. We note the Solicitor Generals extensive
disquisition that government employees do not have the right to
strike. On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan vs.
[9]
Court of Appeals, has recently pronounced, through Mr.
[10]
Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes
the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited
from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public services. The right of government employees
to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike.
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
[11]
explained the schoolteachers right to peaceful assembly vis-a-
vis their right to mass protest:
Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not
penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil
Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for having absented themselves without
proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in
order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably
resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of
students of education, for which they were responsible. Had
petitioners availed themselves of their free time -- recess, after
classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one
-- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court -- could have held them
liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from
their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil
sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by
government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the
Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must,
therefore, be made answerable. [12]
In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the
private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which
may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already
observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the
question of due process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but
whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged
proscribed activity, their right to due process has been
violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted
out any penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which
is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected. [13]
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every teacher shall
enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary
procedure and shall have:
a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative
of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate time being given
to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and
c. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity
shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher
during the pendency of his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a
division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the
Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where
the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party,
all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of
Policy of the statute; that is, to promote the terms of employment
and career prospects of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees formed by
DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly,
these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction.Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It
was this requirement that would have given substance and
meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the
essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. [14]
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of
RA 4670, because all the teachers who were members of the
various committees are members of either the Quezon City
Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary
Teachers Federation and are deemed to be the
[15]
representatives of a teachers organization as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make
them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be
usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in
said committee.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, RA 4670 is
[16]
applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by
the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it
been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental
rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two
laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they
cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws
and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-
existence. Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a
[17]
prior special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law. [18]
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore,
reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents right to due
process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid
down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court,
perceptively and correctly stated:
Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been
superseded by the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that
pursuant to the latter law the head of a department, like the DECS
secretary, or a regional director, like the respondent-appellant Nilo
Rosas, can file administrative charges against a subordinate,
investigate him and take disciplinary action against him if warranted
by his findings.Respondent-appellants cite in support of their
argument the following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D.
No. 807):
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. --
xxx xxx xxx
b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities xxx shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction xxx .
Sec. 38,. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-
Presidential Appointees. -
a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or
officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of
any other persons.
There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil
Service Decree gives the head of department or the regional director
jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is
that such power is exercised through committees. In cases involving
public school teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee
be constituted as follows:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a
division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The
committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of
the hearings: Provided, however, that where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the
DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation
but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor,
secondary and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But there
was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious
flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for
the representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for
the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way
inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for
investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service Decree,
[S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the
respondent in an administrative case may ask for a formal
investigation, which was what the teachers did in this case by
questioning the absence of a representative of a teachers organization
in the investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the teachers to have
waived their right to a hearing after the latters counsel walked out of
the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made such a
ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the
procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers
counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded its
investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without giving
the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against them and
the opportunity to defend themselves. Its predisposition to find
petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the
Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario
Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated:
The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in
Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No.
100206, August 22, 1961.
As in the Cario v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of SO ORDERED.
Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the
petitioners guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this case Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco,
Secretary Cario, without awaiting formal administrative procedures JJ., concur.
and on the basis of reports and implied admissions found the
petitioners guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service in
separate decisions dated May 16, 1991 and August 6, 1991. The
teachers went to court. The Court dismissed the case. [19]

Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard

the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It
is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide. [20]

It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals

committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and
ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents
and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and
other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire
duration of their suspension or dismissal. Because the [21]

administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no

delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on
them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a
consequence, be reinstated and awarded all monetary
[22]

benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of

their unjustified suspension or dismissal. This Court will never
[23]

countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process,

which is a cornerstone of our legal system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is
thus AFFIRMED.