CASE TOPIC: PRACTICE OF LAW BY A NON-MEMBER OF THE BAR

PARTIES: Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique

Entila & Victoriano Tenazas, COMPLAINANT; and

Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court Of Industrial

Relations, & Quintin Muning, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. L-23959 (November 29, 1971)

FACTS: The Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) in behalf of

its members; Enrique Entila & Victoriano Tenazas, filed a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in the Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." stating that
an attorney’s fee shall be rewarded to one Quinting Muning (a non-lawyer)
for his legal services.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, Quinting Muning (a non-lawyer) recover

attorney's fees for legal services rendered

HELD: No. First of all the collection of attorney’s fees can only be done when
there exists an attorney client relationship. In the case at hand, respondent
Muning is not a member of the bar, nor authorized by law to conduct legal
work.

Second, the law orders that legal work and representation should only be
conducted by persons who are qualified in accordance to public policy. The
state in promulgating such policy aims to protect the integrity of the legal
profession and for the protection of the courts, clients and public.

Thus the Court ruled that acting as an attorney in courts without authority,
even in a court with special jurisdiction, is classified as contempt of court.
Such act is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. The law does not
tolerate such acts and would not assist in the collection of the fruits of an act
that is contrary to law.
CASE TOPIC: The Quantum Meruit of a

PARTIES: Florencio A. Saladaga, COMPLAINANT

Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, RESPONDENT

A.C. No. 4697 (November 25, 2014)

FACTS: Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and Respondent Atty. B. Astorga

entered into a “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” on December 2,
1981. Under the said deed, the respondent as vendor a retro, had two (2)
years within which to repurchase the property and if not the parties shall
renew the agreement.

However, respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the

period provided even after a final demand was sent dated May 10, 1984.

December 1989, complainant received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera
(Leyte), Inc. – RBAI informing him that the property was mortgaged by the
respondent and should therefore vacate the property.

After conducting an investigation, the complainant filed a criminal complaint

– ESTAFA against the respondent stating that the possessor and owner of
the land at that time was Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto De Retro
Sale. Complainant likewise filed administrative cases by filing an Affidavit
Complaint on January 28, 1997.

The administrative cases filed by the complainant were referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

Respondent denied that their agreement was a pacto de retrosale and

claimed that it was an equitable mortgage.

In IBP’s report and recommendation, respondent was found guilty of deceit

and fraud when he represented in the Deed of Sale that the property was
covered by TCT No T-662 wherein the said title was already cancelled and
even worse putting the title under his name and his wife (TCT No. T-7235)
without informing the complainant. Thus, the investigation commissioner
recommended the respondent be suspended for two (2) years from the
practice of law and ordered to return the amount of P15,000.00 as
consideration for the pacto retrosale made with the complainant with legal
interest.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent is guilty of fraud and deceit on entering into a
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” agreement with the complainant.

HELD: Yes. The respondent is guilty of fraud and deceit of entering an

agreement of Deed of Sale with the Right to Repurchase as for the following
grounds:

1. The respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the said

agreement
2. Respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of
human relations as embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
3. Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood and
deceit.
4. Respondent breach Lawyer’s Oath

Wherefore, respondent is found guilty and is suspended for two (2) years in
practice of law.
CASE TOPIC: MISLEADING THE COURT AND THE CLIENT USING FRAUD

PARTIES: Henry Samonte, COMPLAINANTS

Atty. Gines Abellana, RESPONDENT

A.C. No. 3452 (June 23, 2014)

FACTS: Henry Samonte (Mr. Samonte) filed an administrative case against

Atty. Gines Abellana (Atty. Abellana) for the following actions:

 Falsification of Documents, Atty Abellana made it appear that he filed

the case of Mr. Samonte (Civil Case No. CEB-6970) on June 10, 1988
when in reality it was filed on June 14, 1988.


1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil
Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial
court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three
months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

Umaguing ran for the SK chairman position in 2007 but lost to her rival Jose
Gabriel Bungag by one vote. Complainants, lodged an election protest and
asked for Atty. De Vera’s services who asked for a total of P60,000.00 for
the acceptance and appearance fees.

However, Atty. De Vera moved in a very glacial pace that led to lack of time
to complete the necessary documents and affidavits needed for the said
protests – two material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera
failed to signed the documents because they are unavailable to be able to
submit the said documents on time, respondent looked for the nearest
kin/relative of the two material witness in the name of Christina Papin and
Elsa Almera-Almacen respectively then had them notarized.

Later then, Lachica discovered the falsification done by the respondent and
immediately disowned the affixed signature and submitted his own affidavit
to MeTC who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent should be held administratively liable.

HELD: Respondent is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s oath and Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is also
suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
 SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3452 June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the
status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This is
because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby
merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Antecedents

On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against
respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-
6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of
professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:

1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil
Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial
court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three
months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes, namely:

1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the
cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2
 2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued
on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that "[t]he formal offer of plaintiff’s exhibits
is rather very late;"3 and

3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the counsel.
In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the
reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4

On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on
June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other
charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their
agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing
fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply
on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2,
1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6and that it
was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his
nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the
arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival
in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time,
pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits
despite his request because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was
Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at
least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his
acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued
by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with
the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change counsel,8 stating
that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not
meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check
after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted
upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly
acknowledged the check.9

On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying additional
charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the
annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment
of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of
Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in
Samonte’s behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the
cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary
exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party
not even objecting to their authenticity.

Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12
Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he
gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s services after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and
fraudulent practices.

On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.

Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at 10:00 am
on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset
several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner
being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002,
with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until
further notice.19

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on
the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.

Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on February 9,
2005,21declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.

On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless,
the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24

Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.

On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.27

Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused
any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his work
as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying
his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil
case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the
above-stated replies.

On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling
certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make
it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of
exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It
observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his client’s
case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and
deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first
being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite
the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the
second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by
producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial
court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had
explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainant’s
failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without
presenting proof of his having actually filed such in court.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana, observing as
follows:

x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has shown a
facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of
diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the respondent’s acts are
nothing short of deplorable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Gines

Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for
failure to exercise honesty and trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis
supplied)

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to
falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)

On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following grounds:32

A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of
law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;

B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;

C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that
it is hearsay and self-serving.

In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated that
the "enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were
attached as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position Paper of respondent."33 It is noted, however, that
Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s position paper were different documents, namely: Annex
834 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex
935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the records of
the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute
any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that
Samonte had only said that both documents "seemed to be falsified documents" based on the
certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for reconsideration.36

In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty. Abellana;
insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and
motion for reconsideration.

On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit certified
true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38

On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.40

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.41

Ruling

We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in
the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide
member of the Law Profession, thus:

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means
a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his
dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright
falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had
already filed the complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the
date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the
belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance
fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was
not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He
ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the
Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in
explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the
Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he
knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP,
and represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His
intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two
documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the
rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by
the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that "court
personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp."44 In
these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely warranted. He
admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence
in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC
Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana
was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the
belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.

In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.

The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence
of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that
the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To
start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the "0" on "4" but justified himself by claiming that
he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees
required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually
filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp
imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He
defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without
necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement
did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings,
like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on
the filings conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the
papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his
comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he represented
them to be.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can
lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood
or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to
bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still,
the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his
client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his
counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper
sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., 46 the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from
the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit
when in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of
his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v.
Magat,47the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the
complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was
false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for
six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore,
suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a
repetition suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this
decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be
punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts
in the country.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for
one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of
the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On
October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if
there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based
on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at
11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence
on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced
the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a
lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate
filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and
thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the
exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant
confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one
who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent
merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy
of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences
in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of
conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was
not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request
and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount
be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for
the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the
case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office
staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a
reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and
to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from
him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same,
however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver
also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine
given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set
the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote
him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had
been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the
filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law
since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the
fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was
not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he
claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of
P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly
offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was
declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of
P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the
complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He
denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations.
Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a
loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that
the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead,
it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He
never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was
assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and
the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts.
Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered
in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in
her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint.
Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him.
While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he
was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest
Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she
extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated
June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against
respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty
of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest
had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified
the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant
amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and
private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of
the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to
overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of
P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was
complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would
further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an
exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have
accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of
filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the
values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.”28Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent
displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation
expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision.
Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he
subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been
dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme
penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a
bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the
height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of
judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The
denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any
liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise
violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested
from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in
her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend
to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the
authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced
to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records,
particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the
liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior.
The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same
are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet
paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately,
respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer
and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state,
a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a
lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition
against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties
after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to
which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to
having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case.
While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question
the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof
were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court
cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the
complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized
the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of
the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted
complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under
question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him
from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with
each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client
is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted
to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as
an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension
for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts
and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and
society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the
legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no
less than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money
to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no
bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are
filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from
the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court
has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are,
as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing
the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-
client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received
from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the
complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is
stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the
personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging
the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.