POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D.
Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
A. Fundamental Powers of the State
4. Delegation
CARLOS SUPREDRUG CORP vs. DSWD
FACTS:
 This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A.) No.
9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003."
 Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines.
 Public respondents, on the other hand, include, DSWD, DOH,
DOF, DOJ, and DILG, which have been specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.
 February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432,
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it
became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act
states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior
citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for
the death of senior citizens;
 October 1, 2004, A.O. No. 171 was issued by the DOH,
providing the grant of 20% discount in the purchase of unbranded
generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines
for the exclusive use of the senior citizens
 On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued AO No 177 amending
A.O. No. 171.
Under A.O. No. 177, the 20% discount shall not be limited to the
purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to
both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded
or generic. Thus, it stated that "[t]he grant of 20% discount shall be
provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens."
 Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional
because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will
result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a
mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly
compensated for the discount.
ISSUE(S):
W/N Sec. 4(a) of the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” is
constitutional?
RULING:
 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure
is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used
to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
 A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just
compensation.
 The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
 The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the
Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides:
SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. –
Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is
the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members
while the State may design programs of social security
for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides:
"The State shall provide social justice in all phases of
national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11,
provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and
children." Consonant with these constitutional principles
the following are the declared policies of this Act:
(f) To recognize the important role of the
private sector in the improvement of the
welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek
their partnership.
 To implement the above policy, the law grants a 20% discount
to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic
and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount
to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
 The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object.
 Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
 Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
P a g e 1 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
 For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
 It is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior
citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up
with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show
properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works
greatly to their disadvantage.
 The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical
industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
 Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly
on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public
utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property
can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the
promotion of public good.
 Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests
largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector,
in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental
to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
GR. No. 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City
Mayor of Marikina City, VS. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE
Facts: Respondent St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) is the owner of
4 parcels of land located in Marikina Heights. Located within the
property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed
by a tall concrete perimeter fence built. Abutting the fence along
the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
The Petitioner, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance 192 entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and
Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the
issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one
(1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter
shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%)
see-thru; (80% SEE-THRU FENCE REQUIREMENT)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built
within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located
between the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and
educational and religious institutions.(SET BACK
REQUIREMENT)
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the SSC
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move
it back about 6 meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park.
The RESPONDENTS, thus, asserted that the implementation of
the ordinance on their property specifically Section 3.1 and
Section 5 would be tantamount to an appropriation of property
without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their property through eminent domain.
They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter
lawless elements and criminality did not exist as the solid
concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection
for many years.
The PETITIONERS, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of
which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of
public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.13
Issue: WON Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are not
valid exercise of police power by the City Government of
Marikina on the ground that they are not reasonably necessary to
accomplish the City’s purpose
Held: YES.
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in
the apparent exercise of its police power. To successfully invoke
the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court – the
RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TEST and the STRICT SCRUTINY
TEST:
We ourselves have often applied the RATIONAL
RELATIONSHIP test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered. Applying STRICT
SCRUTINY, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of
less restrictive means for achieving that interest.27
Under the RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP, an ordinance must pass
the following requisites
As with the State, local governments may be considered
as having properly exercised their police power only if
the following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.29
P a g e 2 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights and a violation of the due process clause.30
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test,
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not
being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose.
More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Setback Requirement (Sec. 5)
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the
public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use
of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the
general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a
provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title
nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is
usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a
property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable
taking.32 The Court is of the view that the implementation of the
setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of
3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property for
public use without just compensation, in contravention to the
Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts
and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a parking
area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary
for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it
has long been settled that the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.33 The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to
be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for
aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is
invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was
properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, 34Series of 2000,
which classified the respondents’ property to be within an
institutional zone, under which a five-meter setback has been
required. The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series
of 2000, has no bearing to the case at hand. The Court notes with
displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first time on
appeal in this Court in the petitioners’ Reply. Furthermore, the two
ordinances have completely different purposes and subjects.
Ordinance No. 192 aims to regulate the construction of fences,
while Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning ordinance which classifies the
city into specific land uses.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement (Sec 3.1)
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners
must show the reasonable relation between the purpose of the
police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.36
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or
prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The
ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to
ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the
petitioners, however, is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to
private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it
does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru
fence would provide better protection and a higher level of
security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a
tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed
premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the
property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass
and breach. It also appears that the respondents’ concrete wall
has served as more than sufficient protection over the last 40
years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as
previously discussed, the State may not, under the guise of
police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the
aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court
cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness"
between members of a community.
Doctrines:
A. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people."
B. The State, through the legislature, has DELEGATED the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies
of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), known as the General Welfare Clause,23 which has two
branches.
1. General legislative power - authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make
regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law.
2. Police power proper - authorizes the municipality
to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper
for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
their property."24
C. Test of a valid ordinance:
It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and
(6) must not be unreasonable.26
G.R. No. 184203 November 26, 2014
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
In the exercise of his legislative powers, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring as
government policy the establishment of export processing zones
P a g e 3 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
in strategic locations in the Philippines. Presidential Decree No. 66
aimed "to encourage and promote foreign commerce as a means
of making the Philippines a center of international trade, of
strengthening our export trade and foreign exchange position, of
hastening industrialization, of reducing domestic unemployment,
and of accelerating the development of the country."
To carry out this policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA) was created to operate, administer, and manage the export
processing zones established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan and
such other export processing zones that may be created by virtue
of the decree.
The decree declared the EPZA non-profit in character with all its
revenues devoted to its development, improvement, and
maintenance. To maintain this non-profit character, the EPZA was
declared exempt from all taxes that may be due to the Republic of
the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities, and other
government agencies and instrumentalities.
In 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811,
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. Certain parcels
of land of the public domain located in the City of Lapu-Lapuin
Mactan, Cebu were reserved to serve as site of the Mactan Export
Processing Zone.
In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916
or "the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995" to operate, administer,
manage, and develop economic zones in the country. 14 The PEZA
was granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the
enterprises located in the economic zones. 15 By virtue of the law,
the export processing zone in Mariveles, Bataan became the
Bataan Economic Zone16 and the Mactan Export Processing Zone
the Mactan Economic Zone.17
As for the EPZA, the law required it to "evolve into the PEZA in
accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an
executive order issued for [the] purpose."18
On October 30, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 282, directing the PEZA to assume and exercise all of
the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities "as provided in
Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the powers, functions, and responsibilities of the
PEZA, as mandated under [the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995]."19 All of EPZA’s properties, equipment, and assets, among
others, were ordered transferred to the PEZA.20
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
The City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer,
demanded from the PEZA 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for
the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in
the Mactan Economic Zone. It cited Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real property
tax exemptions previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons. The City pointed out that no provision in the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from
payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential
Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since
no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA from payment of
real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA.
The City made subsequent demands on the PEZA. In its last
reminder24 dated May 13, 2002, the City assessed the PEZA
86,843,503.48 as real property taxes for the period from 1992 to
2002.
On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory
Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the
trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
Pursuant to Rule 63, Section 3 of Rules of Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a comment on the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief. It agreed that the PEZA is exempt from
payment of real property taxes, citing Sections 24 and 51 of the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
The trial court agreed with the Solicitor General. Section 24 of
the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 provides:
SEC. 24. Exemption from National and Local Taxes. – Except for
real property taxes on land owned by developers, no taxes, local
and national, shall be imposed on business establishments
operating within the ECOZONE. In lieu thereof, five percent (5%)
of the gross income earned by all business enterprises within the
ECOZONE shall be paid and remitted as follows:
a. Three percent (3%) to the National Government;
b. Two percent (2%) which shall be directly remitted by
the business establishments to the treasurer’s office of
the municipality or city where the enterprise is located.
Section 51 of the law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 51. Ipso-Facto Clause. – All privileges, benefits,
advantages or exemptions granted to special economic zones
under Republic Act No. 7227, shall ipso-facto be accorded to
special economic zones already created or to be created under
this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon new
special economic zones.
Based on Section 51, the trial court held that all privileges,
benefits, advantages, or exemptions granted tospecial economic
zones created under the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992 apply to special economic zones created under the
Special Economic ZoneAct of 1995.
Since these benefits include exemption from payment of national
or local taxes, these benefits apply to special economic zones
owned by the PEZA.
According to the trial court, the PEZA remained tax-exempt
regardless of Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995. It ruled that Section 24, which taxes real property owned
by developers of economic zones, only applies to private
developers of economic zones, not to public developers like the
PEZA. The PEZA, therefore, is not liable for real property taxes
on the land it owns.
Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National
Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to
tax the PEZA under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
DOCTRINE: Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real
property such as lands, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements not otherwise specifically exempted under the
Local Government Code. Real property taxes are ad valorem,
with the amount charged based on a fixed proportion of the value
of the property. Under the law, provinces, cities, and
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area have the
power to levy real property taxes within their respective
territories.
HELD: YES.
1. Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real
properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt
from real property taxes:
P a g e 4 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without belonging for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man.
These properties are exempt from "levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale." As this court explained
in Manila International Airport Authority:
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject
to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale.
Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public
policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale[.]On the other hand, all other properties of the state that are
not intended for public use or are not intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth are
patrimonial properties. Article 421 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:
In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in
publicly owned economic zones. These economic zones are
property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax properties
located within the Mactan Economic Zone, the site of which was
reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811,
Series of 1979. Reserved lands are lands of the public domain set
aside for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes
by virtue of a presidential proclamation.282 Reserved lands are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man,283 and remain
property of the Republic until withdrawn from publicuse either by
law or presidential proclamation.284 Since no law or presidential
proclamation has been issued withdrawing the site of the Mactan
Economic Zone from public use, the property remains reserved
land.
In Manila International Airport Authority, this court explained:
[The exemption under Section 234(a) of the Local Government
Code] should be read in relation with Section 133(o) of the same
Code, which prohibits local governments from imposing "[t]axes,
fess or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalitiesx x x." The real properties owned by
the Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic itself or in
the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the National
Government.The Administrative Code allows real property owned
by the Republic to be titled in the name of agencies or
instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties
remained owned by the Republic of the Philippines and continue to
be exempt from real estate tax.
2. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) is an
instrumentality of the national government. It is not integrated
within the department framework but is an agency attached to the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).—An instrumentality is
“any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter.” Examples of instrumentalities of the
national government are the Manila International Airport Authority,
the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority, the Government
Service Insurance System, and the Philippine Reclamation
Authority. These entities are not integrated within the department
framework but are nevertheless vested with special functions to
carry out a declared policy of the national government. Similarly,
the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. It is
not integrated within the department framework but is an agency
attached to the Department of Trade and Industry.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA
cannot be taxed by local government units. Although a body
corporate vested with some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a
government-owned or -controlled corporation taxable for real
property taxes.
3. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) is exempt from real property taxes by
virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act
of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary.—We rule
that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its
charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA
assumed the real property exemption of the EPZA under
Presidential Decree No. 66. Section 11 of the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995 mandated the EPZA “to evolve into the PEZA in
accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an
executive order issued for this purpose.” President Ramos then
issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering the PEZA to
assume the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities under
Presidential Decree No. 66 not inconsistent with the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995.
All told, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national
government. Furthermore, the lands owned by the PEZA are real
properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines. The City of
Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan cannot collect real
property taxes from the PEZA.
C. Due Process
6. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Facts: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction
materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2,
1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and
ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.
Petitioners’ Contentions: Petitioners assert that they were
dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them
assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis
when they reported for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not
agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits
as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners also
claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing.
Respondent’s Contentions: Private respondent, on the other
hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters
to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to
report for work. Private respondents manager even talked to
petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to
P a g e 5 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers
involving 40,000 square meters of cornice installation work.
However, petitioners did not report for work because they had
subcontracted to perform installation work for another company.
Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to
P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped
reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners dismissal was for a just
cause. They had abandoned their employment and were already
working for another employer. To dismiss an employee, the law
requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.
In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having
subcontracted for an installation work for another company.
Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship with private
respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January
1996, they did not report for work because they were working for
another company. Private respondent at that time warned
petitioners that they would be dismissed if this happened again.
Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention
to sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an
employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty
that should be meted out to him.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid termination of employment
on the ground of the failure of observing the twin notice
requirement. Yes, but subject to sanctions on the part of the
employer.
Ruling:
1989 Wenphil Doctrine (Belated Due Process Rule)
The dismissed employee, although not given any notice and
hearing, was not entitled to reinstatement and backwages because
the dismissal was for grave misconduct and insubordination, a just
ground for termination under Article 282.
2000 Serrano Doctrine
the rule on the extent of the sanction was changed. The violation
by the employer of the notice requirement in termination for just or
authorized causes was not a denial of due process that will nullify
the termination. However, the dismissal is ineffectual and the
employer must pay full backwages from the time of termination
until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause.
Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to dismiss now
and pay later by imposing full backwages. The ruling
in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the
Labor Code. The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness
and injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to
revisit the doctrine.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor
Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural
due process requirements for dismissal are found in the
Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as
amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10.[27] Breaches of
these due process requirements violate the Labor Code.
Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from
failure to comply with constitutional due process.
The court held that in cases involving dismissals for cause
but without observance of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing, the better rule is to abandon
the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that
the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than
that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be
able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to
employees, but to employers as well.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article
282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the
Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used
only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel
observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good
to the greatest number. This is not to say that the Court was
wrong when it ruled the way it did in Wenphil, Serrano and
related cases. Social justice is not based on rigid formulas
set in stone. It has to allow for changing times and
circumstances.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. vs Anti-
Terrorism Council
(Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine)
FACTS:
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the
Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts.
ISSUE:
Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on
the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines?
RULING: No.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech
cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the
doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A
statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
P a g e 6 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-
applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge
which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing
its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are
not applicable to penal laws. On the other hand, the allowance of a
facial challenge in free speech cases  is justified by the aim to
avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged.  This rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an
“in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct.  In fact,
the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered.  No prosecution would be possible. It is settled,
furthermore, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation.  Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In this case, since a
penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
“terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have
established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372.  Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible.
D. Equal Protection
3. Standards of Judicial Review
GARCIA vs. DRILON
Facts: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the private respondent and her children exists or
is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty (30)
days.
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial
support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte.
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.
Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO
issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
Issue:
1. Whether or not R.A. 9262 violates equal protection
clause
2. Whether or not R.A. 9262 violates due process
Held:
1. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union 69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find
that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
a. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
P a g e 7 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true equality."
Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men
otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse
and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners.
Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and
less seriously than other crimes.
b. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
c. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and
apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as
well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
children are threatened by violence and abuse.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of
Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position
of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on
their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to
stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months
or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the
finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the
sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in
case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the
LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of
illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC
ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA
skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed
the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the
NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total
of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine
months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at
the monthly rate of US$2,590.00
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article
III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
P a g e 8 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article
XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Held:
1. No.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly
enacted have only a prospective operation,58and cannot affect
acts or contracts already perfected;59 however, as to laws already
in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof.60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,
Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in
1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between
petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued
that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the
employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties
executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to
have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
2. Yes
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all
members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of
deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity:
all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by
them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the
laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others
in like circumstances.65
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of
Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification
into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must
comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial
distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged
classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest;67 b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest;68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right70 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is
upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.72
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered
by suspect classifications73 based on race74 or gender75 but
not when the classification is drawn along income categories.76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,77 the constitutionality of a provision
in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a
government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for
maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by
their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision
contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the
Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny
in its review of the constitutionality of said provision.
mbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to
labor," the Court in the present case also employs the standard
of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a
suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially
neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination
reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one
year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one
year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of
more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period
employment.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims:
they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector
protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether
it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the
scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.124 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
P a g e 9 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
state125 for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards,126 or in maintaining access to information on matters
of public concern.127
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found
no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly
serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure
"designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas
x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers
have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The
limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies,
which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in
"termination pay."128
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the
subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating
the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and
cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a
justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged
sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest
can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's
right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of
the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their
three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a
better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain
speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the
law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or
the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an
existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just
a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the
clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but
also her right to substantive due process under Section
1,137 Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to
his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23
days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
E. Searches and Seizures
1. AAA vs Carbonell
AAA vs. Carbonell
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and
Car Service. She alleged that she was raped by respondent
Arzadon. Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon
threatened to kill her and her family. But when she discovered that
she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the
incident to her parents. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for
rape against Arzadon.
Judge Carbonell dismissed the criminal case for lack of probable
cause on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed
to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probably cause “to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Issue: Whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack
of probable cause.
Held:
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983
for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her
witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness
stand.
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,[22] the
Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses. Thus:
The addition of the word personally after the word determined
and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution
to issue warrants to other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law, has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is
not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
=======
2. Del Castilo vs People
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
FACTS:
P a g e 10 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
Pursuant to a confidential information that Del Castillo was
engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of Del Castillo, secured a search warrant
from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September
13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to Del Castillo.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went
directly to Del Castillo's house and cordoned it. Del Castillo’s
house was a 2-storey and house and the latter was staying in the
2nd floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But
before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he
saw Del Castillo run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front
of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he
and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the
place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely
guarded the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3
Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the
elder sister of Del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo, searched the
house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the
petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4)
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently,
the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat-
sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An information was filed before the RTC against Del Castillo
charging him with violation of Section 16, Articl III of R.A. 6425, as
amended. During arraignment, Del Castillo, with the assistance of
his counsel, pleaded not guilty.
According to defense witnesses, on September 13, 1997, around 3
o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical
wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and
Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged
by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able
to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that
he learned from his wife that police operatives searched his house
and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters
away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was
owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his
father.
ISSUE:
WON Del Castillo is liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of
RA 6425 by mere presumption that he had dominion and control
over the place where the shabu was seized.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that while it is not necessary that the
property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or
possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of
regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner
owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used
the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician
by occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the
structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually
used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the
things found in said structure.
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
do not also provide proof as to the ownership of the structure
where the seized articles were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the
same structure was the shop of petitioner.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of
the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the
prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.
3. Luz vs People
LUZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Luz was flagged down by PO2 Alteza for violation of municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet.
PO2 Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-station. While
PO2 Alteza was issuing a citation ticket he told Luz to take out
the contents of Luz jacket. Luz obliged and put out the contents
of his jacket. Shabu were found in Luz jacket.
Petitioner entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Petitioner testified for himself
and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
CA affirmed the RTC's Decision.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
RULING
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or
she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It
is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest."
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
P a g e 11 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact,
as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was
only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search
that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop
and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this
case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner's pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to
the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not
suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his
pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was
in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It
is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was
that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that
a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
4. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870
Petitioner,
- versus -
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
November 3, 2008
Doctrine:
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
[30]
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated
intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest.[31]
FACTS:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they
are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
also breached by said provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory drug testing for students and
employers is constitutiona;
RULING:
YES.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into
ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are
agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise
of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is
the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
P a g e 12 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest
against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the
criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employeesand students for that matter under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was
referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary
procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves
as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation
in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree
of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly
embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she
may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the
law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods,
i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall
be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate
chain of custody.] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know
basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige
the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act received as a result of
the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion
into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.
5. Pollo vs Constantino-David
BRICCIO “RICKY” A. POLLO V. KARINA CONSTANTINO-
DAVID
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
 This case involves a search of office computer
assigned to a government employee who was
then charged administratively and was
eventually dismissed from the service. The
employee’s personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government
employer as evidence of his misconduct
FACTS: An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson
alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya
na division” of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV
(CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with pending
cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team
with background in IT and issued a memorandum directing them
“to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV]
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office
and backed up ALL files in the hard disk of computers at the
(PALD) and the Legal Services Division. It was found that most of
the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause
Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the
person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He
asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated
January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-
ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and
those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and
that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and
printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy
and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search
and seizure. He pointed out that though government property,
the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a
Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may
exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus
inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner
and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 Petitioner then filed an
Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to
Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied this omnibus motion.
P a g e 13 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
Petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of
Appeals (CA) assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause
Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total
absence of jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued a
Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA
by herein petitioner.
The CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of
petitioner’s personal files without his knowledge and lawful?
RULING
YES.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a
prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable”
searches and seizures.
Applying the analysis and principles announced
in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2)
Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer,
reasonable in its inception and scope?
(1) THE PETITIONER HAD NO REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS OFFICE AND COMPUTER
FILES.
The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office and computer files for he failed to prove that he had an
actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files. He did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. He did not use passwords nor
adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer
files. The CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-
spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
(2) THE SEARCH AUTHORIZED BY THE RESPONDENT
CSC CHAIR, WHICH INVOLVED THE COPYING OF THE
CONTENTS OF THE HARD DRIVE ON PETITIONER’S
COMPUTER, WAS REASONABLE IN ITS INCEPTION AND
SCOPE.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted
in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-
complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies
in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for
individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a
government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on
petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope. We
quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness
of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such
administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in
the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued
the search in its capacity as a government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the
inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that
a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for
parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in
the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee
was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering”
for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of
doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective
in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but
must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not
have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation,
the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same
date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned
regional office. That it was the computers that were
subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely
starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that
is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button,
necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to
impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement
would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related
investigation.
Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional
right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of
employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention
P a g e 14 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present
case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As
already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the
files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the
exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O’Connor.
6. Lucas vs Lucas
Lucas v. Lucas (2011)
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizures in relation to a paternity action
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order?
Facts
Jesse Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City. In 1967, Elsie Uy,
migrated to Manila and stayed with a certain Belen. At Belens
workplace, an intimate relationship developed with Jesus Lucas.
Elsie eventually got pregnant and gave birth to Jesse. The name of
petitioners’ father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live
birth. Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
Respondent allegedly extended support for a period of two years.
Elsie refused to accept support and decided to raise petitioner on
her own. Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Although
learning of it and obtaining a copy through his counsel. Petitioner
filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
The petition being sufficient in form and substance, the RTC
issued the Order setting the case for hearing. The court ordered
the publication and that the Solicitor General be furnished with
copies of the Order and the petition.
Respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He
manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and
a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and
therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3)
should the court agree that summons was required, he was
waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance;
and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was
improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Comment reiterating that the
petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should
be served with summons. Averring that the petition was not in due
form and substance arguing since DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation.
The RTC dismissed the case, in Herrera v. Alba, there are four
significant procedural aspects of a which the parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father
and the child. The petition did not show these procedural aspects
were present. Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration; the RTC resolved in his favor.
The court dismissed respondents arguments having no basis for
the taking of DNA test. It noted that the new Rule on DNA
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts
instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied; eventually,
he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the
petition.
It held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction as no summons
had been served on him. Respondents special appearance is not
voluntary appearance as it was filed only for the purpose of
questioning jurisdiction. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking DNA
testing. It noted that petitioner failed to show the significant
procedural aspects. The CA further held that a DNA testing
should not be allowed upon failure to establish a prima
facie case.
The Court stressed that it sees the danger of allowing an
absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the
plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. If at
anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can
indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition
cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society
will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause
at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger
years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous
women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be
taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in
a long past one-time encounter. An absolute taking of DNA test
for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for
extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009,
the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
Issues
Whether the service of summons is jurisdictional
Ruling
The assailed Orders were orders denying respondents motion to
dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Generally, it cannot be questioned
for certiorari, a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction;
not errors of judgment. Neither can it be the subject of an appeal
unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. The
extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to
dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the
present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
Was the service of summons jurisdictional? This would depend
on the nature of the action, whether it is an action in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's
interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A
petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the
birth certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
P a g e 15 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction
over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective.
A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. The
filing of the petition before the RTC, undoubtedly had jurisdiction
over the subject matter, thereby acquiring jurisdiction. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. All
interested parties thereby are deemed notified.
Service of summons or notice, is not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction, merely satisfies due process requirement; to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest. Failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction, the lack of summons may be excused where the
adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition.
The due process requirement has been satisfied, considering he
has participated in the proceedings and has the opportunity to file
his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
The petition is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a
plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon
which he bases his claim. A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
The inquiry, in a motion to dismiss, is confined to the four corners
of the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint.
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and
substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is
incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and
require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his
defense. The veracity of the assertions can be ascertained at the
trial of the case on the merits.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba has been misapplied. A party is
confronted by these procedural aspects during trial, when their
respective evidence has been presented. A prima facie case is
built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading. The CAs view that it would be dangerous to
allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and
deserves the Courts attention.
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order. The Rule on DNA Evidence provides
the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability
and validity, the possible sources of error, the available objections
to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is
utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public.
Section 4 thereof provides for conditions aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
DNA testing order will be issued, not as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established. To warrant the
issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing and the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these
states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search,
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded
by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was
imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana explained
“Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. As a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order
for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show reasonable possibility of paternity. In cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of
a court order for blood testing.”
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
suits. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
The issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary.
The court may consider whether there is absolute necessity
for the DNA testing. If there is preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
P a g e 16 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing. The CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
F. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
1. Salcedo-Ortanez vs CA
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding
Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ,
Facts:
Private Respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Tereista
Salcedo-Ortanez on the grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after
presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits “A” to “M”, among which were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversation between petitioner and unidentified
persons.
Petitioner submitted objection/comment to private respondent’s
oral offer of evidence but the trial court admitted all of private
respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration was
denied. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the Private Respondent
were admissible.
Ruling:
NO.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act
No. 4200.
The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to
consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing
that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Zulueta vs CA
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 107383 [253
SCRA 699]
Feb. 20,1996
DOCTRINE: The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained
from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there
is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order
require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
P a g e 17 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other.
3. Ople vs Torres
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES,
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA,
HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator
Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which
the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople prayed to invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on the following important constitutional
grounds:
a.) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate;
b.) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy.
He also contended that the appropriation of public funds by the
president for the implementation of AO308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to appropriate public
funds for expenditure.
AO 308 aims to establish a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security
and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations.
Then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, the respondents have the following
counter arguments:
a.) The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a
judicial review
b.) AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative
powers of congress. They also contend that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
1987.
c.)The funds necessary for the implementation of the ID reference
system may be sourced from the budgets of the concerned
agencies
d.) AO 308 protects an individual’s interest in privacy
Issue:
a.) Whether or not Senator Ople has the standing to sue and the
justiciability of the case at bar.
b.) Whether or not AO 308 is not merely an administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue
(encroachment of legislative power)
c.) Whether or not AO 308 violates the right to privacy.
Held:
a.) Petitioner Ople as a Senator has legal standing to bring suit
raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can
also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The
ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by
the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to
be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for
the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules
b.) An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government.
The respondent’s argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 was rejected
by the SC because the Administrative Code is a general law
which "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance" and
"embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures
designed to serve the people."
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought.
They also argue that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no
office. However, without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality,
the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.
c.) AO 308 is a violation to the right to privacy. The essence of
privacy is the "right to be let alone." The right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in several provisions of
the Bill of Rights, Civil Code and even the Revised Penal Code.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn.
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology"
and "computer application designs." It is noteworthy that A.O. No.
308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify
people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of
P a g e 18 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM

options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that GR No. 202666; 29 Sept 2014
it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless. It
also does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. The SG claims that FACTS:
the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute
to the "generation of population data for development planning."
This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St.
identification but for the generation of other data with remote Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his PRN. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students,
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
Identification Reference System" declared null and void for pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
being unconstitutional.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s
handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation
4. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Direcotr General, NEDA
ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director Genreal, NEDA
487 SCRA 623 (2006) The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining
order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from
FACTS: This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
Muna vs Ermita barred said students.
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other
harmonize and streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin against the school. They argued, among others, that:
the Director-General from implementing the EO because they
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was
allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the
set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation
right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of
of privacy which must be respected.
legislative power by the president.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional. used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the
to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all government Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws
are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their 3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
IDs. copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory;
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with
collection and format. The President may by executive or
the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have
administrative order direct the government entities under the
such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and
children’s right to privacy.
format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
“President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this
and offices.” The same Section also mandates the President to appeal.
“ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this
constitutional power of control the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under
existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to ISSUE:
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public.
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing
and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the
President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of HELD:
government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not
apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows
that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government. 1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if
this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance;
and
5. Vivares vs St. Threse's College
VIVARES, et al. vs. STC, et al.
P a g e 19 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it
is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or
storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be
applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that
the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses
of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing,
and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS)
like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such
privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy
must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students
concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show
that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as
“Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view
a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some
privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is
true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see them (as they
claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view
them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of
the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the
privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner
which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered
illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being
the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the
proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is,
to discipline their students according to the standards of the
school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in
the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
6. Lee vs Ilagan
-Assigned to Santos
G. Freedom of Expression
1. Chavez vs. Gonzalez
2. Disini vs Sec of Justice
DISINI JR. vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
(February 11, 2014)
FACTS:
 The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace.
 Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the
internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable
him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias
for all kinds of information that he needs for
research, study, amusement, upliftment, or
pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages,
including pictures and videos, for the general
public or for special audiences like associates,
classmates, or friends and read postings from
them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services
and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional
entities like government agencies, banks, stock
exchanges, trade houses, credit card
companies, public utilities, hospitals, and
schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any
person through his e-mail address or
telephone.
 This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and
billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and
uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the
current generation for greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the system since it could
not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use
cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them
can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the
reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory
statements against him that people can read.
 And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him
through false representations.
 Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to
wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of
indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop
or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals.
They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual
dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks,
programs, and memories.
 The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators,
hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
 Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime
law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights
ISSUES:
W/N Cybercrime Prevention Act is constitutional?
RULING:
P a g e 20 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
 Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an
American constitutional construct, useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.
Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well
as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.
 In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1)
that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
 Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in
that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into
the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling
and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does
not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying
without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message.
Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
documents.
 Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional
rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as
1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully
deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept
known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the
Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the
right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused
by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from
our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a)
the right against unreasonable searches16 and seizures, which is
the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his
name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number,
his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his
occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly
to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how
government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates
the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process of law.
 Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from
accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news
to secure information about him that could be published. But this
is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit
and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be
intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself
cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can
be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may
be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining
to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent
on the part of the perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in
quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to
fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to
gain which is required by this Section.
 Petitioners claim that the Act violates the freedom of
expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband
and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes
under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when
done "for favor" in cyberspace.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on
this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper
perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of
intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among
two private persons x x x although that may be a form of
obscenity to some." The understanding of those who drew up the
cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is
necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually
seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes
interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of the RPC
punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes
those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act,
P a g e 21 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by
another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange
for money, profit, or any other consideration.27
The Act also penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced
in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One
who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be
making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying
Circus scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam,
Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out
that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a
nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and
technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of
his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s
privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s
domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that
unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers."
Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have
already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person
the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but
is nonetheless entitled to protection.36
The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
 Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image
with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread
and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild
to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks
to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology
to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what
sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise
robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened
and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms
"aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a
facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully
delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must view these
statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only
insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to
penal statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation
of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground –
absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable
standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of
his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality
of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance
mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed
statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth
or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of
a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive
medium of communication.
It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment
regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on
the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of
interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers
such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the
law.
 Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as
libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
 Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting
the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the
tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it
is within the realm of reason that the government should be able
to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes.
 Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated
its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters
for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
P a g e 22 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
 Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed
the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave
sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets.104 This definition
serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with
the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses
by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both
the domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has
been considered as sufficient standard. Hence, Sections 24 and
26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175
that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the
collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that
authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected
Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes
accessing a computer system without
right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data
interference, including transmission of
viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-
squatting or acquiring domain name
over the internet in bad faith to the
prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity
theft or the use or misuse of identifying
information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes
cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity for
favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the
production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one
degree higher when crimes defined
under the Revised Penal Code are
committed with the use of information
and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the
penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law
enforcement authorities to require
service providers to preserve traffic
data and subscriber information as
well as specified content data for six
months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the
disclosure of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the
search, seizure, and examination of
computer data under a court-issued
warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the
destruction of previously preserved
computer data after the expiration of
the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes
obstruction of justice in relation to
cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a
Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the
CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of
the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others
who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting
and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes
as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in
relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4)
on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)
(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)
(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online
Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION
of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution
of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic
Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes
of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic
Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to
which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in
P a g e 23 | 24
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: VII. Bll of Rights – A. Fundamental Powers to D. Equal Protection
Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM

respect to these, is VOID and On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected
by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools
of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to
3. Osmena vs COMELEC freedom of expression.
4. SWS vs COMELEC
5. GMA Network vs COMELEC First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public
6. Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC affairs, including the right to criticize government actions. Speech
The Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances
and political discontent, should thus be protected and
encouraged.
FACTS:
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the a market place of ideas.
compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human
dignity.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance].”
Patay”.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from
the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”: as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the
possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to
violent means just to drive a point.
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren 7. 1-United vs COMELEC
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak 8. Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council
Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya 9. Pharmaceutical and Health Care vs Duque III
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of 10. Bayan vs Ermita
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials 11. IBP vs Atienza Jr.
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, 12. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense
against the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of

Religion and Freedom of Speech.

RULING:

On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the

tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears
to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH
Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of
religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to
candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay”
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

P a g e 24 | 24