Vilfredo Pareto (1916)

Mind & Society

Source: Mind & Society, publ. Dover, 1935. First dozen

pages reproduced here.

1. Human society is the subject of many researches. Some of

them constitute specialised disciplines: law, political economy,
political history, the history of religions, and the like. Others have not
yet been distinguished by special names. To the synthesis of them all,
which aims at studying human society in general, we may give the
name of sociology.

2. That definition is very inadequate. It may perhaps be improved

upon - but not much; for, after all, of none of the sciences, not even of
the several mathematical sciences, have we strict definitions. Nor can
we have. Only for purposes of convenience do we divide the subject-
matter of our knowledge into various parts, and such divisions are
artificial and change in course of time. Who can mark the boundaries
between chemistry and physics, or between physics and mechanics?
And what are we to do with thermodynamics? If we locate that
science in physics, it will fit not badly there; if we put it with
mechanics, it will not seem out of place; if we prefer to make a
separate science of it, no one surely can find fault with us. Instead of
wasting time trying to discover the best classification for it, it will be
the wiser part to examine the facts with which it deals. Let us put
names aside and consider things.

In the same way, we have something better to do than to waste our

time deciding whether sociology is or is not an independent science -
whether it is anything but the "philosophy of history" under a
different name; or to debate at any great length the methods to be
followed in the study of sociology. Let us keep to our quest for the
relationships between social facts, and people may then give to that
inquiry any name they please. And let knowledge of such
relationships be obtained by any method that will serve. We are
interested in the end, and much less or not at all interested in the
means by which we attain it.

3. In considering the definition of sociology just above we found it

necessary to hint at one or two norms that we intend to follow in these
volumes. We might do the same in other connections as occasion
arises. On the other hand, we might very well set forth our norms
once and for all. Each of those procedures has its merits and its
defects. Here we prefer to follow the second.

4. The principles that a writer chooses to follow may be put forward

in two different ways. He may, in the first place, ask that his
principles be accepted as demonstrated truths. If they are so accepted,
all their logical implications must also be regarded as proved. On the
other hand, he may state his principles as mere indications of one
course that may be followed among the many possible. In that case
any logical implication which they may contain is in no sense
demonstrated in the concrete, but is merely hypothetical -
hypothetical in the same manner and to the same degree as the
premises from which it has been derived. It will therefore often be
necessary to abstain from drawing such inferences: the deductive
aspects of the subject will be ignored, and relationships be inferred
from the facts directly.

Let us consider an example. Suppose Euclid's postulate that a

straight line is the shortest distance between two points is set before
us as a theorem. We must give battle on the theorem; for if we
concede it, the whole system of Euclidean geometry stands
demonstrated, and we have nothing left to set against it. But suppose,
on the contrary, the postulate be put forward as a hypothesis. We are
no longer called upon to contest it. Let the mathematician develop the
logical consequences that follow from it. If they are in accord with the
concrete, we will accept them; if they seem not to be in such accord,
we will reject them. Our freedom of choice has not been fettered by
any anticipatory concession. Considering things from that point of
view, other geometries - non-Euclidean geometries - are possible, and
we may study them without in the least surrendering our freedom of
choice in the concrete.
If before proceeding with their researches mathematicians had
insisted upon deciding whether or not the postulate of Euclid
corresponded to concrete reality, geometry would not exist even
today. And that observation is of general bearing. All sciences have
advanced when, instead of quarrelling over first principles, people
have considered results. The science of celestial mechanics developed
as a result of the hypothesis of the law of universal gravitation. Today
we suspect that that attraction may be something different from what
it was once thought to be; but even if, in the light of new and better
observations of fact, our doubts should prove well founded, the results
attained by celestial mechanics on the whole would still stand. They
would simply have to be retouched and supplemented.

5. Profiting by such experience, we are here setting out to apply to the

study of sociology the methods that have proved so useful in the other
sciences. We do not posit any dogma as a premise to our research;
and our statement of principles serves merely as an indication of that
course, among the many courses that might be chosen, which we elect
to follow. Therefore anyone who joins us along such a course by no
means renounces his right to follow some other. From the first pages
of a treatise on geometry it is the part of the mathematician to make
clear whether he is expounding the geometry Of Euclid, or, let us say,
the geometry of Lobachevski. But that is just a hint; and if he goes on
and expounds the geometry of Lobachevski, it does not follow that he
rejects all other geometries. In that sense and in no other should the
statement of principles which we are here making be taken.
6. Hitherto sociology has nearly always been expounded
dogmatically. Let us not be deceived by the word "positive" that
Comte foisted upon his philosophy. His sociology is as dogmatic as
Bossuet's Discourse on Universal History. It is a case of two different
religions, but of religions nevertheless; and religions of the same sort
are to be seen in the writings of Spencer, De Greef, Letourneau, and
numberless other authors.

Faith by its very nature is exclusive. If one believes oneself

possessed of the absolute truth, one cannot admit that there are any
other truths in the world. So the enthusiastic Christian and the
pugnacious free-thinker are, and have to be, equally intolerant. For
the believer there is but one good course; all others are bad. The
Mohammedan will not take oath upon the Gospels, nor the Christian
upon the Koran. But those who have no faith whatever will take their
oath upon either Koran or Gospels - or, as a favour to our
humanitarians, on the Social Contract of Rousseau; nor even would
they scruple to swear on the Decameron of Boccaccio, were it only to
see the grimace Senator Berenger would make and the brethren of
that gentleman's persuasion.' We are by no means asserting that
sociologies derived from certain dogmatic principles are useless; just
as we in no sense deny utility to the geometries of Lobachevski or
Riemann. We simply ask of such sociologies that they use premises
and reasonings which are as clear and exact as possible.
"Humanitarian" sociologies we have to satiety - they are about the
only ones that are being published nowadays. Of metaphysical
sociologies (with which are to be classed all positive and
humanitarian sociologies) we suffer no dearth. Christian, Catholic,
and similar sociologies we have to some small extent. Without
disparagement of any of those estimable sociologies, we here venture
to expound a sociology that is purely experimental, after the fashion
of chemistry, physics, and other such sciences. In all that follows,
therefore, we intend to take only experience and observation as our
guides. So far as experience is not contrasted with observation, we
shall, for love of brevity, refer to experience alone. When we say that
a thing is attested "by experience," the reader must add "and by
observation." When we speak of "experimental sciences," the reader
must supply the adjective "observational," and so on.

7. Current in any given group of people are a number of propositions,

descriptive, preceptive, or otherwise. For example: "Youth lacks
discretion." "Covet not thy neighbour's goods, nor thy neighbour's
wife." "Love thy neighbour as thyself." "Learn to save if you would
not one day be in need." Such propositions, combined by logical or
pseudo-logical nexuses and amplified with factual narrations of
various sorts, constitute theories, theologies, cosmogonies, systems of
metaphysics, and so on. Viewed from the outside without regard to
any intrinsic merit with which they may be credited by faith, all such
propositions and theories are experimental facts and as experimental
facts we are here obliged to consider and examine them.

8. That examination is very useful to sociology; for the image of

social activity is stamped on the majority of such propositions and
theories, and often it is through them alone that we manage to gain
some knowledge of the forces which are at work in society - that is, of
the tendencies and inclinations of human beings. For that reason we
shall study them at great length in the course of these volumes.
Propositions and theories have to be classified at the very outset, for
classification is a first step that is almost indispensable if one would
have an adequate grasp of any great number of differing objects. To
avoid endless repetition of the words "proposition" and "theory," we
shall for the moment use only the latter term; but whatever we say of
"theories" should be taken as applying also to "propositions," barring
specification to the contrary.

9. For the man who lets himself be guided chiefly by sentiment for
the believer, that is - there are usually but two classes of theories:
there are theories that are true and theories that are false. The terms
"true" and "false" are left vaguely defined. They are felt rather than
explained.
10. Oftentimes three further axioms are present:

1. The axiom that every "honest" man, every

"intelligent" human being, must accept "true"
propositions and reject "false" ones. The
person who fails to do so is either not honest
or not rational. Theories, it follows, have an
absolute character, Independent of the minds
that produce or accept them.

2. The axiom that every proposition which is

"true" is also "beneficial," and vice
versa. When, accordingly, a theory has been
shown to be true, the study of it is complete,
and it is useless to inquire whether it be
beneficial or detrimental.

3. At any rate, it is inadmissible that a theory

may be beneficial to certain classes of society
and detrimental to others - yet that is an
axiom of modem currency, and many people
deny it without, however, daring to voice that
opinion.

11. Were we to meet those assertions with contrary ones, we too

would be reasoning a priori; and, experimentally, both sets of
assertions would have the same value - zero. If we would remain
within the realm of experience, we need simply determine first of all
whether the terms used in the assertions correspond to some
experimental reality, and then whether the assertions are or are not
corroborated by experimental facts. But in order to do that, we are
obliged to admit the possibility of both a positive and a negative
answer; for it is evident that if we bar one of those two possibilities a
priori, we shall be giving a solution likewise a priori to the problem
we have set ourselves, instead of leaving the solution of it to
experience as we proposed doing.
12. Let us try therefore to classify theories, using the method we
would use were we classifying insects, plants, or rocks. We perceive
at once that a theory is not a homogeneous entity, such as the
"element" known to chemistry. A theory, rather, is like a rock, which
is made up of a number of elements. In a theory one may detect
descriptive elements, axiomatic assertions, and functionings of certain
entities, now concrete, now abstract, now real, now imaginary; and all
such things may be said to constitute the matter of the theory. But
there are other things in a theory: there are logical or pseudo-logical
arguments, appeals to sentiment, "feelings," traces of religious and
ethical beliefs, and so on; and such things may be thought of as
constituting the instrumentalities whereby the "matter" mentioned
above is utilised in order to rear the structure that we call a theory.
Here, already, is one aspect under which theories may be considered.
It is sufficient for the moment to have called attention to it.

13. In the manner just described, the structure has been reared the
theory exists. It is now one of the objects that we are trying to
classify. We may consider it under various aspects:

1. Objective aspect. The theory may be

considered without reference to the person
who has produced it or to the person who
assents to it - "objectively," we say, but
without attaching any metaphysical sense to
the term. In order to take account of all
possible combinations that may arise from
the character of the matter and the character
of the nexus we must distinguish the
following classes and subclasses:

CLASS I. Experimental matter

Ia. Logical nexus

Ib. Non-logical nexus
 CLASS II. Non-experimental matter

IIa. Logical nexus

IIb. Non-logical nexus

The subclasses Ib and IIb comprise logical sophistries, or specious

reasonings calculated to deceive. For the study in which we are
engaged they are often far less important than the
subclasses Ia or IIa. The subclass Ia comprises all the experimental
sciences; we shall call it logico-experimental. Two other varieties
may be distinguished in it:

Ia1, comprising the type that is strictly pure,

with the matter strictly experimental and the
nexus logical. The abstractions and general
principles that are used within it are derived
exclusively from experience and are
subordinated to experience.

Ia2, comprising a deviation from the type,

which brings us closer to Class II. Explicitly
the matter is still experimental, and the nexus
logical; but the abstractions, the general
principles, acquire (implicitly or explicitly) a
significance transcending experience. This
variety might be called transitional.Others of
like nature might be considered, but they are
far less important than this one.

The classification just made, like any other that might be made, is
dependent upon the knowledge at our command. A person who
regards as experimental certain elements that another person regards
as non-experimental will locate in Class I a proposition that the other
person will place in Class II. The person who thinks he is using logic
and is mistaken will class among logical theories a proposition that a
person aware of the error will locate among the non-logical. The
classification above is a classification of types of theories. In reality, a
given theory may be a blend of such types - it may, that is, contain
experimental elements and non-experimental elements, logical
elements and non-logical elements.

2. Subjective aspect. Theories may be

considered with reference to the persons who
produce them and to the persons who assent
to them. We shall therefore have to consider
them under the following subjective aspects:

a. Causes in view of which a

given theory is devised by a
given person. Why does a
given person assert that A =
B? Conversely, if he makes
that assertion, why does he
do so?

b. Causes in view of which a

given person assents to a
given theory. Why does a
given person assent to the
propositionA = B?
Conversely, if he gives such
assent, why does he do so?

These inquiries are extensible from individuals to society at large.

3. Aspect of utility. In this connection, it is important to keep the

theory distinct from the state of mind, the sentiments, that it reflects.
Certain individuals evolve a theory because they have certain
sentiments; but then the theory reacts in turn upon them, as well as
upon other individuals to produce, intensify, or modify certain
sentiments.
 I. Utility or detriment resulting from the
sentiments reflected by a theory:

la. As regards the person

asserting the theory
Ib. As regards the person
assenting to the theory

II. Utility or detriment resulting from a given

theory:

IIa. As regards the person

asserting the theory
IIb. As regards the person
assenting to it.

These considerations, too, are extensible to society at large.

We may say, then, that we are to consider propositions and theories

under their objective and their subjective aspects, and also from the
standpoint of their individual or social utility. However, the meanings
of such terms must not be derived from their etymology, or from their
usage in common parlance, but exclusively in the manner designated
later.

14. To recapitulate: Given the proposition A = B, we must answer the

following questions:

1. Objective aspect. Is the proposition in

accord with experience, or is it not?

2. Subjective aspect. Why do certain

individuals assert that A = B? And why do
other individuals believe that A = B?

3. Aspect Of utility. What advantage (or

disadvantage) do the sentiments reflected by
 the proposition A = B have for the person
who states it, and for the person who accepts
it? What advantage (or disadvantage) does
the theory itself have for the person who puts
it forward, and for the person who accepts it?

In an extreme case the answer to the first question is yes; and then,
as regards the other question, one adds: "People say (people believe)
that A = B, because it istrue." "The sentiments reflected in the
proposition are beneficial because true." "The theory itself is
beneficial because true." In this extreme case, we may find that data
of logico-experimental science are present, and then "true" means in
accord with experience. But also present may be data that by no
means belong to logico-experimental science, and in such event "true"
signifies not accord with experience but something else - frequently
mere accord with the sentiments of the person defending the thesis.
We shall see, as we proceed with our experimental research in
chapters hereafter, that the following cases are of frequent occurrence
in social matters:

a. Propositions in accord with experience that

are asserted and accepted because of their
accord with sentiments, the latter being now
beneficial, now detrimental, to individuals or
society;

b. Propositions in accord with experience that

are rejected because they are not in accord
with sentiments, and which, if accepted,
would be detrimental to society;

c. Propositions not in accord with experience

that are asserted and accepted because of
their accord with sentiments, the latter being
beneficial, oftentimes exceedingly so, to
individuals or society;
 d. Propositions not in accord with experience
that are asserted and accepted because of
their accord with sentiments, and which are
beneficial to certain individuals, detrimental
to others, and now beneficial, now
detrimental, to society.

On all that we can know nothing a priori. Experience alone can

enlighten us.

Further Reading:
Biography | Spencer | Talcott Parsons | Weber | Comte

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