THIRD DIVISION Proceeding No.
5222, "In re: Guardianship of the Minors
[A.C. No. 6501. August 31, 2006.]
(CBD Case Nos. 03-1076, 03-1108, 03-1109, 03-1125)
ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A.
OLIVEROS, complainants, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO and ATTY. GINGER ANNE
CASTILLO, respondents.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, respondent.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, respondent.
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
PABLITO M. CASTILLO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Subject of the present Decision are four administrative
cases, docketed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-
1108,03-1109, and 03-1125.
I. CBD Case No. 03-1076
In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an
associate of the Laurel Law Offices of which Attorneys Leon
L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are partners,
endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case, Special
Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jerill Nonan ," which was pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch
59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the therein
petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of the
minors Nonan who appear to have inherited a sizeable amount
of US dollars.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and
Castillo as regards their sharing in the attorney's fees in the
guardianship case. HTSAEa
On page 6 of a pleading entitled "Reply to Petitioner-
Guardian's Comment/Opposition, 1 ETC." dated July 19, 2002
filed before Branch 59 of the Angeles RTC and signed by
Castillo's daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger Anne) as
"counsel" for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was
alleged that, inter alia, "Asa wants to be paid an additional
$75,000.00 for his services in providing coffee and opening
doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel Law
Offices." 2
Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger
Anne to be a brazen falsehood concocted to besmirch Asa's
reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before IBP an administrative
complaint 3 against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-
1076.
In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged
Castillo with machinations and deceit arising from the
following alleged incidents:
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to
January 20, 2000 attended by Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors'
counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III (Cassiday), Asa
and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to be received by
Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan heirs would be deposited at
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis
Square Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-
250-00043-0. Castillo, however, proposed that the funds be
deposited instead at the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee there who
could facilitate "the transaction." Dr. Laurel rejected this
proposition and instead instructed Castillo to file the
appropriate motion to have the funds deposited at the
RCBC. 4
Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was
instructed to prepare, Castillo filed the same with the Angeles
trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently received a copy of a March
2, 2000 RTC Order 5 signed by the then trial Judge Eliezer R.
De los Santos granting his motion and accordingly directing
that the funds to be held in trust for the Nonan children
be deposited at the Trust Department of the UCPB Head
Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed with the
Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 6 of the March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in
order to have the funds deposited at the RCBC transferred to
the RTC, as previously agreed upon. This motion was granted.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged
that in a "Reply to Answer" 7 dated June 25, 2001 filed by
Castillo with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 145 in Civil
Case No. 01-506, "Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez ,"
Castillo again committed a clear falsehood when he therein
stated that:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe
Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who personally
knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in
extolling his academic credentials and
accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M.
Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active
Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel
Law Offices, 8 (Underscoring
supplied),
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at
any time a lawyer at the Laurel Law Offices. In support of
this allegation, they appended to the complaint a certified
true copy of the Service Record 9 of Justice Kalalo which
does not show that he was ever connected with the Laurel
Law Office.
In their Answer 10 to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger
Anne declared:
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the
statement that Asa's services in the guardianship case
consisted in providing coffee and opening doors whenever
there was a conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was
in fact the truth, the comportment being "strictly in
accordance with long cherished Filipino hospitality," and "he
[Castillo] would have done the same with his own
visitors." 11 In any event, they claim that the assailed factual
narration was material and relevant to Castillo's question why
Asa was given the lion's share of attorney's fees when he had
not rendered any known material service which redounded to
the benefit of the Nonan children. SDIaHE
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the
Nonan funds at the UCPB was not attended with malice or bad
faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the funds could
only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive access to
all the information pertaining to the interest and benefits
accruing thereto.
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 "Reply to
Answer" filed with the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 01-506,
the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no control nor
influence over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of
retired Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings
adverted to. 12
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108
Castillo subsequently filed a complaint 13 against
Oliveros before the IBP, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for
gross violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in
embezzling US $950,000 representing the share adjudicated
to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a
certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum
shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the
Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros,
along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other
acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings; and (4)
Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed
a groundless administrative complaint against him and Ginger
Anne.
In his Answer 14 to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-
1108, Oliveros, decrying the allegations against him as
patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed that the
complaint was Castillo's way of retaliating against him for
having joined Asa in filing the administrative complaint
against him and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).
III. CBD Case No. 03-1109
Castillo also filed an administrative
complaint 15 against Asa before the IBP, charging him with
embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of
confidence and violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1109.
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel
scandalously mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the
bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa and
Oliveros filed a groundless administrative complaint against
him and Ginger Anne to compel him to withdraw his claim for
attorney's fees against Dr. Laurel and his bid to replace the
latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an
Agreement 16 dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa
that the latter would receive only 25% of whatever he
(Castillo) would receive as attorney's fees, Asa secretly
pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the
guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to
account for and turn over the amount of $130,000 in
attorney's fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa
embarked on a scheme to force him into resigning as counsel
for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over
the guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the
attorney's fees allocated for him.
In his Answer to the Complaint 17 in CBD Case No. 03-
1109, Asa alleged as follows: It was in fact Castillo who
reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter
had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that
he would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorney's fees
he would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo
reasoning that he was the therein counsel of record and had
endorsed the case to the Laurel Law Offices. He thus reported
the matter to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he "would
likewise not give Castillo's share in the attorney's fees he
[Asa] might receive because [Castillo] has no word of
honor." 18
As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly
pocketed, Asa explained that several days prior to April 18,
2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorney's fees of
both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount
to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first
heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on
April 18, 2000, he deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and
his wife's joint Dollar Account No. 247-702-9275 at the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ortigas Branch as his share in
the attorney's fees, while he opened a new account in the
name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of
$160,500. cSDIHT
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own
$25,000 plus interest amounting to $25,023.13 representing
full payment of his attorney's fees from Merceditas, as
evidenced by a Receipt 19 dated May 2, 2000 signed by
Castillo.
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500
belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000 represented partial payment
for his consenting to be the guardian ad litem of the Nonan
heirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for expenses
incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of which
was placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asa's) Dollar
Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however,
withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from RCBC and
placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account for which
$500.00 was spent for the purpose. A Certification 20 to this
effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager
Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to Asa's Answer.
Finally, Asa declared that Castillo's claim for $130,000
in attorney's fees is baseless and unconscionable, and that
Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in retaliation
for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed against him and
Ginger Anne.
IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125
On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another
administrative complaint, 21 against Castillo before the IBP,
for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-
1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in
light of his baseless, malicious and derogatory allegations in
CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and
deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and
unlawful suit.
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:
By Report and Recommendation 22 of February 27,
2004, the IBP CBD, through Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the
consolidated cases in this wise.
From the facts and evidence presented,
what have been shown by the counsels
are mutual bickerings, unjustified
recriminations and offensive personalities
between brother lawyers which detract from
the dignity of the legal profession and do not
deserve the attention of the Commission. The
voluminous case record contains but personal
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies hurled by the
counsels against each other which constitute
highly unprofessional conduct. A great part of
man's comfort, as well as of his success at the
bar, depends upon his relations with his
professional brethren. With them he is in daily
necessary intercourse, and he must have their
respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail
along in smooth waters. Hence, the parties are
advised to conduct themselves honorably,
fairly and candidly toward each other and try to
maintain the dignity of the legal
profession. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution 24 of April 16, 2004, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the February 27,
2004 Report and Recommendation and dismissed the
consolidated cases for lack of merit.
The records of the cases were then forwarded for final
action to this Court.
Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for
Reconsideration 25 in CBD Case No. 03-1125. He too, together
with Oliveros, filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion for
Reconsideration 26 in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated
Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration 27 dated August
9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and CBD Case No. 03-
1109. HECTaA
On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment 28 on
Castillo's Consolidated Omnibus Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while also Oliveros
filed his Comment on the same motion on February 28, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply
to the Comments of Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to
Appoint a Commissioner. 29
THIS COURT'S RULING
 In his questioned "Reply to Petitioner-Guardian's
Comment/Opposition," Castillo's statement reads:
. . . Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an
additional $75,000.00 for his services in
providing coffee and opening the doors
whenever there is a conference at the Laurel
Law Offices. He also conveniently provides
himself with the Nonan expediente to give
assistance to the parties during their so-called
conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to
appear before this Honorable Court was
repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros
because of his so-called failing health . . . 30
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule
8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe
honorable, candid and courteous dealing with other
lawyers 31and employ respectful and restrained language is
in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 32 It is
through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that
a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to
the courts and judicial officers. 33
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Anne's choice of
words manifestly falls short of this criterion. Their disparaging
statements in the pleading referred to above belie their
proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and
propriety. DIETcH
Castillo's claim that the statement about Asa's
services is relevant and pertinent to the claim for attorney's
fees and was, for all legal intents and purposes, a "privileged
communication" 34 deserves short shrift. Indulging
offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings
constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action, even if the publication thereof is privileged. 35
. . . this Court will not be inhibited from
exercising its supervisory authority over
lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that
standard expected of them as members of the
Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the
lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on
the statements made in the pleadings. But like
the member of the legislature who enjoys
immunity from civil and criminal liability arising
from any speech or debate delivered in the
Batasan or in any committee thereof, but
nevertheless remains subject to the
disciplinary authority of the legislature for said
speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains
subject to this Court's supervisory and
disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of his duty as a member of the
legal profession. 36 (Underscoring supplied)
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus admonished to
exercise greater care and circumspection in the preparation
of their pleadings and refrain from using offensive or
otherwise improper language.
In support of Asa and Oliveros' allegation that Castillo
employed deceit and falsehood in attempting to change the
depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust by Dr. Laurel
for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC
Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to
deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with
any and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March
14, 2000 RTC Order directing the deposit of the settlement
proceeds with the RCBC.
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 8, 2000 signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to
in
establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having filed
the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply stated that:
 Considering the present raging
controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Head Office at
Makati, may be seriously affected . . .
The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect
the deposits of the Nonan children if the
proceeds of the settlement will be deposited
with a solvent and more conservative bank like
the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION (RCBC) . . . 37
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an
administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious
character of the act done as well as the motivation
thereof. 38 In the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to
present clear and preponderant evidence to show that Castillo
willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and falsehood in
filing the Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
Respecting Castillo's June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in
the Makati RTC Civil Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe
Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who personally
knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling
his academic credentials and accomplishments
as a Trial lawyer, as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M.
Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active
Senior Trial lawyers at the Laurel
Law Offices. aEIADT
Q: How could you characterize and rate
the trial competency,
performance and expertise of
Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: He is highly competent, low key,
aggressive and very brilliant in
the conduct of trial, as well as, in
the formulation of courtroom
strategies. His pleadings are also
very well written, direct to the
point, convincing, scholarly and
exhaustive. To be sure, he is one
of the popular trial lawyers of our
firm (The Laurel Law Offices), not
only because he came from an
exclusive school, but also
because of his scholastic records
at Ateneo de Manila was also
impressive. That is why he was
taken in by former VP Salvador H.
Laurel even before the release of
the 1964 bar where he was
also No. 2 among the Ateneo bar
candidates for the year. He
was No. 15 among the bar
topnotchers. This is not to
mention his impressive and highly
(sic) batting average of winning
about 80% to 90% of his load
cases and work. He was also one
of the busy lawyers of our office,
until he went on private practice
and excelled as one of the more
successful and respected trial
practitioners. 39(Underscoring
supplied)
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed
clear falsehood for Justice Kalalo had never been a lawyer at
any time at the Laurel Law Offices.
Castillo explained, however, that he "can only say that
he has no control, nor influence on the voluntary and
spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired Justice
Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the
highly adversarial proceedings." 40
Castillo's explanation does not impress, however. The
records show that the above-quoted statements attributed by
Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an unsigned and
unsubscribed affidavit entitled "Question and Answer Format
in Lieu of Direct Testimony of Justice Felipe Kalalo" 41 dated
January 21, 1993. This affidavit was earlierfiled by
Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in connection with his
claim for attorney's fees in Civil Cases Nos. 43049 and 56637
which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn, 42 however, as it
was unsigned and unsubscribed.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically commands
that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the
same Canon provides that a member of the bar shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
directs that a lawyer must employ such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law. 43
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from
lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before the
courts. 44 They have an obligation to the court as well as to
the opposing party to make only truthful statements in their
pleadings. 45 The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted
by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the
task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. 46
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillo's
administrative culpability, his charge against Asa and Oliveros
of filing groundless disbarment cases against him and Ginger
Anne necessarily fails.
As regards Castillo's claim that Asa secretly pocketed
$24,500 and $160,500, the undated certification issued by
RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000,
Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar Savings
Account at our Business Center. A credit was
made to his assigned Dollar Savings
Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount
of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand
Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial
transaction. We further certify that on April 19,
2000, there was a debit made for said account
in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same
amount was placed in the Dollar Time Deposit
Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left
the amount of USD: Five Hundred in his
account to serve as the maintaining balance
requirement. Subject Dollar Savings Account
had closed already, 47
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
Guardian 48 dated February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles
City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that:
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad
Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his Principal
Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday
III received by way of settlement from one of
the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry Lee
Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through
her Guardian Ad Litem, Milagros Feliciano, the
amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00)
which was deposited with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St.
Francis Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig
City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-
 000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the
name of "Salvador H. Laurel, in trust for
Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan", in
compliance with the Order of this Honorable
Court dated April 26, 2000; CAIaHS
4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders
of this Honorable Court, the Guardian Ad
Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III
disbursed the following amounts for the
purposes indicated:
A. ATTORNEY'S FEES & OTHER
NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador
H. Laurel for consenting to be the guardian ad
litemof the Nonan children and accepting all
responsibilities attached to said
position US$100,000.00
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel
for expenses incurred during the last six (6)
years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls,
and representation and other incidental
expenses while in the various states in the
United States in order to pursue the claim of
the Nonan children against the Hillblom
estate US$60,000.00
xxx xxx xxx 49 (Underscoring supplied),
validate Asa's explanation that the amount of $160,500
belonged to Dr. Laurel but was merely temporarily placed
in his (Asa's) account.
The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian
shows that $12,500 was received by Asa as attorney's fees for
assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996
2000. 50 Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt 51 dated
April 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the
$25,000 attorney's fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon
by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the Laurel
Law Offices as Official Receipt No. 1766 52 issued by the
treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April 19,
2000 shows:
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the
sum of Twelve thousand five hundred US
Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%)
share of LLO [Laurel Law Offices] in attorney's
fees of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222
of RTC Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash US$12,500-
By: Sgd.
Treasurer/Cashi
er
On Asa's alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillo's
attorney's fees: It appears that Asa and Castillo each received
$25,000 as attorney's fees but pursuant to their February
2000 Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be
divided between them, and Castillo would receive 75% thereof
or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The
records show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he
having remitted, as reflected above, the remaining $12,500 to
the Laurel Law Offices.
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the
$12,500 which Asa remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as
reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
Guardian. 53
Respecting Castillo's claim that, in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros
"embarked on another sinister strategy to spite, insult and
provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted to
continue as [Dr. Laurel's] lawyer in furtherance of their
conspiracy to force him into resignation for them to replace
to
him and have absolute control over the guardianship case, the
funds of the estate and the attorney's fees," the same is
unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration.
 As to Castillo's charge against Asa and Oliveros of
embezzlement due to alleged scandalous mismanagement of
the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on the October 13,
2003 RTC Order 54 in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the
evidence presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of
sanctions against them.
Finally, on Castillo's Omnibus Motion to Appoint a
Commissioner, the matters raised therein 55 being entirely
inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these
administrative proceedings, the same is denied.
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being
engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying.
Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between
brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this
Court. 56 Personal colloquies between counsels which
promote unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully
avoided. 57
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended
for Six (6) Months by this Court in CBD Case No.
176,Bongalonta v. Castillo, 58 for committing falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future would call for the
imposition of a more severe penalty. This Court thus imposes
upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of One (1) year. CSHcDT
WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against
Atty. Leon L. Asa and Atty. Jose A. Oliveros are DISMISSED.
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive and
improper language in her pleadings.
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of
breach of Canons 8, as well as Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of One (1) Year, effective upon
receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective
personal records of Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and of Atty.
Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let
copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Asa v. Castillo, A.C. No. 6501 (CBD Case Nos. 03-1076, 03-
1108, 03-1109, 03-1125), [August 31, 2006], 532 PHIL 9-28)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON,
JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER,
SR., respondent.
FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T.
Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law,
or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with
opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive,
offensive and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The said
document purported to be a notarized document executed at a
date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.
Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently
drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, “Laban kung
laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng
pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, angabogadonarito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi
kayo taga-rito” at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet
before the start of a hearing.
The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first
disbarment case against repeating his unethical act;
yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in
Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave
threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two
years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner
found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s
violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty.
Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the
falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the
absence of evidence that the document had in fact
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it.
The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty.
Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him
in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing. On June 29, 2002
the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting
and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension
to only one year.
ISSUE:
DID THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE IBP
INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER ERR IN FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM
AND IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED WAS JUSTIFIED?
HELD: The Supreme Court examined the records of this
case and finds no reason to disagree with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and
the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who
meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow
lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon.
The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon
the falsification of an affidavit without evidence that
the document had indeed been falsified. Moreover, Atty.
Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a
proper forum and without using offensive and abusive
language against a fellow lawyer. The Court has
constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language
in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our
legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession
at all times. Several disinterested persons confirmed
Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon
shortly before the start of a court hearing and Atty.
Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence denying the
said charge against him.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s
display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
and misconduct in the performance of his duties both
as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public
and the court, was a patent transgression of the very
ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold. Consequently,
the penalty of suspension of one from the practice of
law is deemed just and proper
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is
claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and
filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T.
Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit 1 with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension
from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z.
Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as
plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a
reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper
language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon
presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge
against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for
alleged falsification of public document when
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his
the document allegedly falsified was a
answer with motion to dismiss:
notarized document executed on February 23,
1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not
yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines
Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to
the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the
courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet
before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer,
evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon
saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines
Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines
Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of
falsification of public document without
bothering to check the copy with the Office of
the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of
the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and
authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in
his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge
for sexual harassment of an office secretary of
the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October
2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to
falsify the daily time record of his son who
worked with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems, Department of Justice. When
Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly
harassed him with inflammatory language.
1. Instead of having the alleged forged
document submitted for examination, Atty.
Barandon filed charges of libel and grave
 threats against him. These charges came about
because Atty. Ferrer's clients filed a case for
falsification of public document against Atty.
Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification
case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her
thumbmark in the waiver document had been
falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly
uttered the threatening remarks against Atty.
Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in
session. It was improbable that the court did
not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty.
Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence
in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer
was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had
received various citations that speak well of
his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats
that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer
were still pending. Their mere filing did not
make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty.
Barandon was forum shopping when he filed
this disbarment case since it referred to the
same libel and grave threats subject of the
criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a
sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December
29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on
board his son's taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle,
resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle's
passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-
passengers helped the victims and, during the police
investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and
blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also
prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to
the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case
against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the
citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary,
in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter
opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not
have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry
and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a
criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a
disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP
chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two
years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found
enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer's violation
of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel
in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff's
affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the
document had in fact been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating
Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the
threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of
other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the
start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6 adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but
the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002
on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to
the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the
Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8 On May 22,
 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation 9 of the Investigating
Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer's motion for
reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment
on Board of Governors' IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008. 11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat
Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition for review under Rule
139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his
comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP.
Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by
courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against
appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and
the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding
respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him;
and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty
imposed on him is justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and
find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the
Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers
who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code
provides:
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this
Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty.
Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the
plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the
same. aHIDAE
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of
falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive
and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote
portions of what he said in his reply with motion to
dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave
and culpable misrepresentation and
"FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to
mislead this Honorable Court, but with
concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for
Defendants, for distortion and serious
misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a
grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of
his oath of office as a government employee
and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that,
Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never
executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein
her fingerprint has been falsified, in view
whereof, hereby DENY the same including the
affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge
or information to form a belief as to the truth of
the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are
all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground
for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for
said falsification and distortions.” 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use
dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
 Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court finds
the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins that he has been accorded due process. The essence of
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides: be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support
of one's defense. 18 So long as the parties are given the
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due
conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
process are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the
private life behave in scandalous manner to the
opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the
discredit of the legal profession.
allegations of Atty. Barandon.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
Ferrer's drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the
before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not
dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
present convincing evidence to support his denial of this
themselves honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer's display of
particular charge. He merely presented a certification from
improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct
the police that its blotter for the day did not report the
in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and
threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented,
officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a
however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that
patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are
recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
sworn to uphold.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na
809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer,
rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa
Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered
receipt of this Decision.
these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and
discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty.
personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in Ferrer's personal record as an attorney with the Office of
court. These language is unbecoming a member of the the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the
legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it. IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts in the land.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, SO ORDERED.
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
||| (Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, [March 26, 2010],
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place
630 PHIL 524-533)
in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to
have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he FIRST DIVISION
chose to express his indignation. SaIEcA
 [G.R. No. 129988. July 14, 2003.]
CHINA AIRLINES, LTD., petitioner, vs. COURT O
F APPEALS, ANTONIO S. SALVADOR and
ROLANDO C. LAO, respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako for private
respondents.
Facts:
Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao
planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable
business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films.
Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with China
Airlines (CAL).
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates
than American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the
services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and
Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to
Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued previously
to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL
prevented them from boarding because their names were not
in the passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations
when Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were
able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of
carriage.
2. Whether or not there there was bad faith.
3. Whether or not there was sufficient claims for
damages.
Held:
1. Yes. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract
of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect
that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in
possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its
airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it
ocnsituted a breach of contract of carriage.
2. No. Bad faith should always be established by clear
and convincing evidence since the law always presumes good
faith.
In the case, there were three reasons why CAL
cancelled the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized
use of the record locator number. Second was CAL's
negligence in confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third
was the absence of the correct contact numbers of private
respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of
CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other
passengers.
3. Not entitled to moral damages because not every
case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the award of
moral damages.
 Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was
not in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Not entitled to actual damages because respondents
did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents
would have been entitled to the price difference between the
tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than
the former but this was not the case. Evidence shows that
Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets ($629).
The court cannot order reimbursement of the Northwest
tickets because this would have enabled respondents to fly
for free. The cost of the tickets were a necessary expense
that private respondents could not pass on to CAL.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the
plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant
an award of actual damages.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in the first week of June 1990, private
respondents Antonio S. Salvador and Rolando C. Lao planned
to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable business
deal involving the distribution of Filipino films and programs in
Los Angeles. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency ("Morelia")
booked private respondents' flight with ChinaAirlines (CAL).
Morelia scheduled the flight for Manila-Taipei-Los Angeles on
13 June 1990. On discovering that Morelia charged higher
rates than American Express Travel Service Philippines
("Amexco"), private respondents dropped the
services of Morelia. Instead, private respondents engaged the
services of Amexco through Lao who was an Amexco
cardholder. Lao called up Amexco claiming that he and
Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to
Amexco the record locator number or booking reference
number (No. 4RJ2CJ) that CAL had previously issued to
Morelia when Morelia booked the reservations of private
respondents. In the afternoon of the same day, Amexco called
up CAL to finalize private respondents' reservation for CAL's
13 June 1990 flight. Amexco used the record locator number
given by Lao in confirming the reservations of private
respondents. CAL confirmed the booking. Amexco then issued
to private respondents the confirmed tickets for the 13 June
1990 flight of CAL. On the same day, CAL called up Morelia to
reconfirm the reservations of private respondents. Morelia
cancelled the reservations of private respondents. On 13 June
1990, private respondents were at the airport to board CAL
Flight 632, but CAL personnel prevented them from boarding
the airplane because their names were not in the passengers'
manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia
revoked the booking it had made for private respondents. They
were only able to leave for Los Angeles the following day on a
different airline, Northwest Airlines. They then filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan a complaint
for damages against CAL and Amexco. The Regional
Trial Court ruled in their favor and awarded them moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. CAL appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, but deleted the
award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees. According to the Court, bad faith on the part of CAL is
not evident in the case at bar. CAL was not wanton or reckless
in canceling private respondents' reservations. CAL made the
cancellation in conformity with its usual procedure, which
was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary considering that CAL
cancelled the reservations at the behest of Morelia. While
Morelia did not issue any ticket to private respondents, on
record Morelia still stood as the travel agent that booked the
reservations of private respondents since neither CAL nor
Morelia endorsed the booking to Amexco. Thus, when Morelia
cancelled the reservations, CAL had to accede as if private
respondents themselves had asked for the cancellation.
Private respondents' names were consequently not included
in the passengers' manifest. CAL's negligence caused it to
breach its contract of carriage. CAL's negligence is, however,
not so gross to amount to bad faith. Mere negligence, even if it
causes the plaintiff to suffer mental anguish or serious fright,
is not a ground for awarding moral damages. The Court also
ruled that the award ofexemplary damages is likewise
unwarranted in the case at bar because CAL was not in bad
faith and its employees did not act in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Petitioner was
ordered. to pay private respondents nominal
damages of P5,000.00 each.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; ACTION FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIAGE; AGGRIEVED
PARTY DOES NOT HAVE TO PROVE THAT COMMON CARRIER
WAS AT FAULT OR WAS NEGLIGENT; ALL THAT HAS TO BE
PROVEN IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT AND THE
FACT OF ITS NON-PERFORMANCE. — The nature of an airline's
contract of carriage partakes of two types, namely: (1) a
contract to deliver a cargo or merchandise to its destination,
and (2) a contract to transport passengers to their
destination. In this case, when CAL confirmed the
reservations, it bound itself to transport private respondents
on its flight on 13 June 1990. The airline business is intended
to serve the traveling public primarily and is thus imbued with
public interest. The law governing common carriers
consequently imposes an exacting standard. Thus, in an
action based on a breach of contract ofcarriage, the
aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common
carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove
is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
performance by the carrier.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CONFIRMED TICKETS ISSUED BY
THE TRAVEL AGENCY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS UPON
PETITIONER'S CONFIRMATION OF THE RESERVATIONS ARE
UNDENIABLE PROOF OF THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. —
CAL does not deny its confirmation of the reservations made
by Amexco. The confirmed tickets issued by Amexco to private
respondents upon CAL's confirmation of the reservations are
undeniable proof of the contract of carriage between CAL and
private respondents. In Alitalia Airways v. CA, et al., we held
that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed
for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises. The passenger then has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage. CAL did not allow private
respondents, who were then in possession of the confirmed
tickets, from boarding its airplane because their names were
not in the passengers' manifest. Clearly, CAL breached its
contract of carriage with private respondents. We, however,
rule out bad faith by CAL.
3. ID.; DAMAGES; BAD FAITH SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE; IT IS A
QUESTION OF INTENTION. — Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong. It means breach of a known duty through some motive,
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. A
finding of bad faith entitles the offended party to moral
damages. The settled rule is bad faith should be established
by clear and convincing evidence since the law always
presumes good faith. Thus, the person who seeks damages
due to the acts of another has the burden ofproving that the
latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. Bad faith is in
essence a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of the person accused of acting in bad faith, the
courts must carefully examine the evidence as to the conduct
and outward acts from which the inward motive may be
determined. Since bad faith is a question of intention, a clear
understanding of the confirmation and pre-flight checking
procedure of CAL is vital to determine if CAL indeed bumped
off private respondents in favor of other passengers. The
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are wanting
in this regard. The two courts only made passing references
to the testimonies ofCAL's witnesses who were CAL's former
reservations officers. Their narration of their respective duties
and transactions with Amexco and Morelia is crucial in
ascertaining the presence of bad faith in CAL's
cancellation of the reservations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BAD FAITH IS NOT EVIDENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — Unlike in Zalamea, bad faith is not evident in this
case. It was CAL's hasty confirmation of the
reservations of Amexco that established the
contract of carriage between CAL and private respondents as
evidenced by the tickets issued by Amexco to private
respondents. CAL failed to honor its contract of carriage.
However, CAL was not wanton or reckless in cancelling
private respondents' reservations. CAL made the cancellation
in conformity with its usual procedure, which was neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary considering that CAL cancelled the
reservations at the behest of Morelia. While Morelia did not
issue any ticket to private respondents, on record Morelia still
stood as the travel agent that booked the
reservations of private respondents since neither CAL nor
Morelia endorsed the booking to Amexco. Thus, when Morelia
cancelled the reservations, CAL had to accede as if private
respondents themselves had asked for the cancellation.
Private respondents' names were consequently not included
in the passenger's manifest.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S NEGLIGENCE NOT SO
GROSS TO AMOUNT TO BAD FAITH. — CAL's negligence,
caused it to breach its contract of carriage. CAL's negligence
is, however, not so gross to amount to bad faith. Mere
negligence, even if it causes the plaintiff to suffer mental
anguish or serious fright, is not a ground for awarding moral
damages. The law distinguishes a contractual breach effected
in good faith from one attended by bad faith. Absent fraud or
bad faith on defendant's part in breaching his contract, his
liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, which the
parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In
such a case, the liability would not include moral damages.
For this reason, not every case of mental anguish, fright or
serious anxiety calls for the award of moral damages. DCaSHI
6. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; UNWARRANTED IN
CASE AT BAR. — As for exemplary damages, Article
2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-
contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." CAL was not in
bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The
award of exemplary damages is therefore unwarranted in this
case.
7. ID.; ID.; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARDED IN
LIEU OF ACTUAL DAMAGES. — Private respondents' remaining
claim is for actual damages. However, private respondents did
not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Amexco voided
the CAL tickets when private respondents requested Amexco
to book them in another airline. Amexco eventually booked
their flight with Northwest. Private respondents would have
been entitled to the price difference between the
tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than
the former. The price difference would have been a damage
reasonably attributed to CAL's breach of its
contract of carriage because private respondents would not
have flown via Northwest were it not for CAL's non-
performance of its obligation. The evidence, however, shows
that the Northwest tickets at US$625 each cost less than the
CAL tickets priced at US$629 each. We cannot also order a
reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this would
have enabled private respondents to fly to Los Angeles
without paying any fare. As correctly pointed out by the trial
and appellate courts, the costs of the airplane tickets were a
necessary expense that private respondents could not pass
on to CAL. Undeniably, however, private respondents suffered
some form of injury. CAL confirmed the reservations of private
respondents carelessly. Private respondents relied on this
confirmation. Private respondents went through the
trouble of going to the airport at the appointed time expecting
that they would be able to board CAL Flight 632. To their
consternation, CAL personnel prevented them from boarding
because Morelia cancelled their reservations. When plaintiff
suffers some species ofinjury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages, the court may award nominal
damages. The court may award nominal damages purely to
vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated reservations of private respondents. In the afternoon of the
and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered. same day, Amexco called up CAL to finalize private
The court may award nominal damages in every obligation respondents' reservation for CAL's 13 June 1990 flight.
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Amexco used the record locator number given by Lao in
Code, or in any case where there is an invasion of any confirming the reservations of private respondents. CAL
property right. We find P5,000 as a reasonable confirmed the booking. Amexco then issued to private
award of nominal damages to each of the private respondents. respondents the confirmed tickets for the 13 June 1990
flight of CAL. On the same day, CAL called up Morelia to
reconfirm the reservations of private respondents. Morelia
cancelled the reservations of private respondents.
DECISION
On 13 June 1990, private respondents were at the
airport to board CAL Flight 632 but CAL personnel prevented
CARPIO, J p: them from boarding the airplane because their names were
not in the passengers' manifest. CAL cancelled the
The Case reservations when Morelia revoked the booking it had made
for private respondents. Private respondents were only able to
Petitioner China Airlines Ltd. ("CAL") assails the 31 July
leave for Los Angeles the following day on a different airline,
1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Northwest Airlines ("Northwest"). SACEca
award of damages made by the trial court in favor of private
respondents Antonio S. Salvador ("Salvador") and Rolando C. Private respondents through counsel sent a demand
Lao ("Lao"). aEHIDT letter 2 to CAL dated 13 August 1990 for payment of moral
damages totaling P500,000. In a letter dated 10 September
The Antecedent Facts
1990, CAL explained that it found out upon investigation that
Sometime in the first week of June 1990, private while private respondents "indeed made their booking with
respondents planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to Amexco, they failed to pick up their tickets from its offices so
pursue a cable business deal involving the that the latter caused the cancellation of their
distribution of Filipino films and programs in Los Angeles. bookings." 3 CAL further stated that private respondents' own
Initially, Morelia Travel Agency ("Morelia") booked private negligence caused their failure to board CAL. Thus, CAL
respondents' flight with CAL. Morelia scheduled the flight for denied private respondents' exorbitant claim for damages. 4
Manila-Taipei-Los Angeles on 13 June 1990. On discovering
that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express In a letter 5 dated 1 October 1990, private respondents
Travel Service Philippines ("Amexco"), private respondents informed CAL that they did not fail to pick up the tickets since
dropped the services of Morelia. Instead, private respondents they were able to present their tickets at the CAL counter at
engaged the services of Amexco through Lao who was an the designated check-in time. In a letter 6 dated 27 November
Amexco cardholder. 1990, CAL explained that its records showed that Morelia and
not Amexco made the bookings. Morelia also sought the
On 11 June 1990, Lao called up Amexco claiming that cancellation of the booking and CAL merely accepted the
he and Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then cancellation. CAL argued that private respondents'
gave to Amexco tire record locator number or booking cause of action should not be against it, but against the travel
reference number (No. 4RJ2CJ) that CAL had previously agencies.
issued to Morelia when Morelia booked the
 Private respondents also wrote a demand letter 7 dated
13 December 1990 to Amexco. Amexco in its letter dated 11
March 1991 denied any liability. 8
On 11 June 1992, private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan a complaint
for damages against CAL and Amexco. Private respondents
alleged in their complaint that the one-day delay in their flight
to Los Angeles caused them to lose business opportunities
entitling them to actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 366-
M-92.
On 25 January 1996, the Regional Trial Court issued its
decision in favor of private respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,
ordering defendant ChinaAirlines, Ltd. (CAL) as
follows:
1. To pay each of herein plaintiffs the
amount of P100,000.00 as and by
way of moral damages;
2. To pay both plaintiffs the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of exemplary damages;
3. To pay both plaintiffs another
amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of attorney's fees; and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Upon the facts found and the law
applicable this case is ordered dismissed,
insofar as defendant PCI Travel
Corporation/American Express Travel Service
Philippines is concerned, whose counterclaim,
like the cross-claim against it by defendant
CAL, should be, as it is hereby, dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to show its right to
such relief.
SO ORDERED.
CAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 July 1997,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, thus:
The FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court disregarded CAL's argument that it had
to cancel private respondents' reservations because ofthe
advice of Morelia, the booking agent, and that Amexco had no
right to use the booking and record locator number of Morelia.
The trial court ruled that CAL already knew that private
respondents had confirmed their 13 June 1990 flight, even
though Amexco and not Morelia made the confirmation. The
trial court found that CAL's cancellationof the reservations
despite knowledge of the prior confirmation by Amexco was
unjustified and tainted with bad faith.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Lea
Hamil-Balderas ("Lea"), the booking agent of Amexco, who
testified that she called up CAL identifying herself as "Lea-
Amexco." Lea used the record locator number that Lao gave
Amexco. Lea claimed she did not know that CAL had already
assigned the record locator number to Morelia. The
trial court pointed out that even if Amexco wittingly or
unwittingly missed the truth with respect to the record
locator number, CAL should have known better as it was the
assignor of the record locator number. CAL should not have
confirmed the booking made by Lea who was not a familiar
caller from Morelia.
The trial court wondered why CAL took the
initiative of calling up Morelia on the same afternoon that
Amexco had already finalized and confirmed the
reservations of private respondents. At that point, Morelia
cancelled the reservations of private respondents. The
trial court believed that CAL's action was highly suspicious
because CAL should have waited for Morelia to confirm the
reservations. When CAL discovered that Lea was not from
Morelia and the record locator number she gave belonged to
Morelia, CAL took this, in the view of the trial court, as an
excuse to cancel private respondents' reservations. The
trial court concluded that CAL's actions justified private
respondents' accusation that CAL bumped them off in
favor of other passengers.
The trial court was not convinced that CAL tried to
contact private respondents before it cancelled private
respondents' reservations. The trial court did not believe that
CAL failed to contact private respondents only because they
gave a different telephone number to Morelia. The
trial court opined that if CAL was truly sincere in its attempt
to save private respondents' booked flight, CAL should have
contacted "Lea-Amexco." The trial court stressed that Lea
was not a familiar caller from Morelia. The
trial court surmised that if indeed the industry policy
prohibited a travel agency from using the bookings made by
another travel agency, then CAL should not have entertained
Lea's call or CAL should have checked first with Morelia. The
trial court also refused to believe that CAL thought that Lea
was from Morelia. The trial court pointed out that when CAL
finally decided to check with Morelia, immediately after CAL
had confirmed to "Lea-Amexco" the reservations of private
respondents, CAL telephoned not Lea but a certain
"Joel" ofMorelia.
In absolving Amexco of any liability, the
trial court noted that Amexco did not misrepresent itself to
CAL by posing as Morelia when Amexco confirmed the
reservations of private respondents. Amexco did not know
that the record locator number it was using in confirming the
reservations of private respondents belonged to Morelia.
Amexco assumed that private respondents acquired the
record locator number from CAL itself. All that Amexco wanted
was to sell to private respondents the CAL tickets and for
Amexco to do this, CAL had to first confirm the reservations.
The trial court declared that CAL should have informed
Amexco that private respondents' booking agent was Morelia
and that "it (Amexco) could not sell the tickets to plaintiffs
(private respondents) even if it wanted to, because CAL itself
would not finalize the booking confirmation without Morelia's
indorsement . . . ." 9 CAL failed to do this. Instead, CAL
confirmed the tickets of private respondents only to cancel it
immediately on the afternoon of the same day. The
trial court thus concluded that CAL, cancelled private
respondents' reservations "obviously for some reason or
motive only of its own, not justifiable at all under the
circumstances." 10
Upon the finding of bad faith, the trial court awarded
each of the private respondents P100,000 as moral damages,
P50,000 as exemplary damages and P50,000 as attorney's
fees. However, the trial court ruled that private respondents
are not entitled to actual damages for the costs of their
Northwest plane tickets and the car rental expenses they
incurred in proceeding to San Francisco. The trial court held
that these expenses were necessary in their pursuit of their
cable business deal.
The trial court also denied the claim of private
respondents for payment of unrealized income. The
trial courtpointed out that private respondents planned to
take the business trip to the United States any day from 10
June to 17 June 1990. Private respondents were able to book
the 13 June 1990 flight of CAL. When CAL prevented private
respondents from taking that flight, Amexco booked private
respondents with Northwest for its flight the next day, 14 June
1990. The trial court stated that private respondents' flight to
the United States on 14 June 1990 with Northwest was still
within the schedule set by private respondents. The
trial court ruled that a delay of one day could not have
resulted in the loss of business opportunity when private
respondents could have still pursued the business deal until
17 June 1990. The trial court concluded that there was a pure
failure of business negotiations that private respondents
could not blame on CAL since there was nothing certain with
private respondents' negotiations for the television cable BY EMPLOYEES OF A BOOKING AGENT
deal. AND NOT BY IT OR ITS EMPLOYEES AND
DESPITE IMPROBABILITY OF THE
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
BASES OF THE CLAIM COUPLED WITH
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of CAL. THE LACHES OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS." 11
Adopting the factual findings of the trial court,
the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that CAL was The Ruling of the Court
in bad faith when it cancelled the confirmed
The petition is partly meritorious.
reservation of private respondents.
The Court of Appeals considered another fact. Liza Melo Laches and Use of Objectionable Language in the
("Melo"), a witness of CAL, testified that she was reluctant to Comment
cancel the bookings because they had already finalized the
Before delving into the core issues of this case, we first
seating arrangements with Lea. The appellate court was
resolve two preliminary issues raised by CAL. CAL argues that
convinced that such reluctance indicated CAL's bad faith.
laches has set in and barred the present action. Moreover,
The Court of Appeals held that CAL cancelled the private respondents used improper and abusive language in
reservations of private respondents without prior notice, in their Comment, which CAL wants stricken from the records.
total disregard of private respondents' rights. Such conscious
We are not convinced that laches has barred the
disregard of a passenger's right makes CAL answerable for
present action. The essence of laches or "stale demands" is
moral and exemplary damages.
the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
The Issues length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a
CAL seeks the reversal of the decisions of the trial and
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
appellate courts on these grounds:
abandoned or declined to assert it." 12
1. "THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
Private respondents' action is based on a written
FOUND THE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR
contract. Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code provides that the
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
prescriptive period for an action on a written contract is 10
TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT
years from the time the right of action accrues. Private
THE PETITIONER DID ALL THE ACTS
respondents' right of action accrued on 13 June 1990 when
THAT AN AIRLINE COMPANY IS
CAL disallowed them from boarding its flight. Private
SUPPOSED TO DO UNDER THE
respondents filed this case on 11 June 1992. Clearly, private
CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT IN THE
respondents did not tarry in vindicating their claim when they
INSTANT CASE."
filed this suit within the 10-year period expressly provided by
2. "THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT law. 13 Moreover, private respondents vigorously pursued their
SUSTAINED LIABILITY AGAINST THE claim as shown by the demand letters that they sent CAL and
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT Amexco before filing this case.
THE ACTS RESULTING IN THE
CAL calls our attention to the "highly excessive and
COMPLAINT AGAINST IT BY PRIVATE
abusive language" 14 in the Comment of private respondents.
RESPONDENT SALVADOR WERE DONE
The excessive language employed by counsel of private Breach of its Contract of Carriage
respondents allegedly transgresses Canon 8 ofthe In the course of the review of this case, we found the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 15 CAL thus urges us to factual findings of the trial and appellate courts insufficient in
expunge from the records the abusive language ofprivate explaining how the cancellation of private respondents'
respondents' counsel. confirmed reservations with CAL came about. We thus made a
We have to examine the foregoing clause, phrase and thorough examination of the records.
word in the context of their use in private respondents' The confusion with the confirmation and
Comment. Private respondents were frustrated that CAL cancellation of the reservations began when Lao gave to
continued to raise questions of fact in its petition. In Amexco the record locator number that CAL had already
expressing private respondents' frustration, their counsel assigned to Morelia. A record locator number is a
used the clause (1) "cleverly and adroitly to camouflage the combination of letters and numbers issued by an airline to a
issues of fact," the phrase (2) "insidious ploy" and the word (3) travel agency when the airline confirms the travel agency's
"bleating" in this manner: booking. 20 The record locator number in question is No.
(1) Well aware of this, petitioner 4RJ2CJ. Based on the testimonies of the witnesses of Amexco
has cleverly and adroitly camouflaged the and CAL, industry practice prohibits a travel agency to use the
issues of FACT it raises in its Petition by record locator number of another travel agency, as this will
disguising them as questions of LAW. 16 usurp the booking of another travel agency.

(2) The insidious ploy employed in the Morelia was the assignee of the record locator number
above presentation of the issues brought used by Amexco. CAL issued the record locator number to
before this HonorableCourt is to mislead it into Morelia when it confirmed the booking of Morelia for private
assuming certain FACTS to respondents' reservations. However, since private
be true and established, when the truth is quite respondents found the rates of Morelia to be steeper than
the contrary, and to make it render a decision those offered by Amexco and Lao happened to be an Amexco
based on such falsehoods. 17 card member, private respondents decided instead to secure
their reservations through Amexco. It would have been
(3) What "FACTS" are [sic] perfectly all right for private respondents to switch to
petitioner bleating about? The FACTS as found Amexco, until Lao gave to Amexco the record locator number
by the respondent Court ofAppeals, and the CAL had already assigned to Morelia. This now set into motion
Regional Trial Court, are precisely the the events leading to the cancellation ofprivate respondents'
CONTRARY: we quote — . . . . 18 reservations.
Indeed, counsel of private respondents used brash Curiously, the trial and appellate courts failed to point
language but it is not "highly excessive and abusive out that prior to Amexco's confirmation with CAL, Amexco had
language." Lawyers enjoy some latitude of remark or tried in vain to book private respondents' flight with CAL and
comment in stressing their arguments. For the felicity of their the other airlines, as it was the peak season then. 21 Amexco
clients, courts pardon them for some was only able to book private respondents' flight with CAL
infelicities of phrase. 19 We do not therefore expunge from the when it used the record locator number of Morelia. In short,
records the assailed language, which shall stand as a on its own account, Amexco could not have successfully
testament to the counsel's style of prose, or lack of it. booked the reservations ofprivate respondents with CAL.
Thus, Amexco had no recourse but to use Morelia's record
locator number in booking private respondents with CAL.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that Amexco did
not misrepresent itself to CAL when Amexco used the record
locator number of Morelia. Thus, Amexco was not liable to
private respondents. There was also no categorical
finding of Lao's intention in giving the record locator number
to Amexco, or if he indeed disclosed to Amexco that the
record locator number was already assigned to Morelia.
Lea, the booking agent of Amexco who dealt with Lao,
testified that Lao did not inform her that the record locator
number was from Morelia. 22 Lea further declared that had
she known that the record locator number belonged to
Morelia, she would not have used the record locator number
or she would have requested private respondents to ask
Morelia to endorse the same to Amexco. 23 On the other hand,
private respondents claimed in their answer to CAL's written
interrogatories that they informed Amexco that they made
their original booking with Morelia and that Lea of Amexco
checked this matter with CAL. 24 Private respondents also
declared that they informed Morelia through Ms. Gavelino
Gironella that they were dropping Morelia's services. 25
The trial and appellate courts did not pass upon the
two conflicting versions of Lao and Amexco. Nevertheless, Lao
should have made it known to Amexco that the record locator
number belonged to another travel agency, Morelia. On the
other hand, Amexco should not have hastily presumed that
private respondents themselves obtained the record locator
number from CAL and that they engaged the
services of Amexco purely for ticketing purposes since Lao
was an Amexco card member. Amexco should have inquired
how Lao got hold of the record locator number considering
that it was difficult for a travel agency at that time to secure
reservations with the variousairlines including CAL.
Lao and Amexco are not blameless. Lao's act in giving
Morelia's record locator number to Amexco, after deciding to
terminate Morelia's services, amounted to accepting the
benefit of Morelia's services without paying for it. Amexco
used Morelia's record locator number when Amexco found out
it could no longer book private respondents without Morelia's
record locator number. However, the greater blame falls on
CAL. When CAL confirmed the reservations of private
respondents, a contract of carriage arose between CAL and
private respondents, even if Amexco, not Morelia, confirmed
the reservations of private respondents. Because of CAL's
confirmation, Amexco issued to private respondents the
confirmed tickets.
The nature of an airline's contract of carriage
partakes of two types, namely: (1) a contract to deliver a
cargo or merchandise to its destination, and (2) a contract to
transport passengers to their destination. 26 In this case,
when CAL confirmed the reservations, it bound itself to
transport private respondents on its flight on 13 June 1990.
The airline business is intended to serve the traveling
public primarily and is thus imbued with public
interest.27 The law governing common carriers consequently
imposes an exacting standard. 28 Thus, in an action based on
a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was
negligent. 29 All that he has to prove is the existence of the
contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. 30
CAL does not deny its confirmation of the reservations
made by Amexco. The confirmed tickets issued by Amexco to
private respondents upon CAL's confirmation of the
reservations are undeniable proof of the contract ofcarriage
between CAL and private respondents. In Alitalia Airways v.
CA, et al., 31 we held that when an airline issues a ticket to a
passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every
right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that
date. 32 If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit
for breach of contract of carriage. 33
CAL did not allow private respondents, who were then
in possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its
airplane because their names were not in the passengers'
manifest. Clearly, CAL breached its contract of carriage with
private respondents. We, however, rule out bad faith by CAL.
Absence of Bad Faith
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. 34 It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. 35 It means
breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. 36 A finding of bad
faith entitles the offended party to moral damages.
The trial and appellate courts believed that the
confluence of the following circumstances proves that CAL
cancelled private respondents' reservations in bad faith: (1)
Lea, the booking agent of Amexco identified herself as "Lea-
Amexco" when she called up CAL to confirm the
reservations of private respondents; (2) Lea was not a familiar
caller of Morelia and yet CAL entertained her call; (3) CAL
called up Morelia on the very same afternoon that CAL had
already confirmed the reservations of private respondents
although the confirmation was made by another travel agent,
Amexco; (4) CAL called up Morelia looking for a certain Joel to
reconfirm the reservations of private respondents; (5) CAL
told Joel that it was hesitant to cancel the
reservations of private respondents because the seating
arrangements had already been finalized with Lea; and (6)
CAL did not notify private respondents or Amexco that it was
cancelling the reservations even though "Lea-Amexco" left a
telephone number with CAL.
As a rule, the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts are binding on the Court. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule. These are: (1) when the
findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuseof discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is
premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed
to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into
account, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence upon which they are based; and (8) when
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 37
The settled rule is bad faith should be established by
clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumes
good faith. 38 Thus, the person who seeks damages due to
the acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter
acted in bad faith or with ill motive. 39 Bad faith is in essence
a question of intention. 40 In ascertaining the intention of the
person accused of acting in bad faith, the courts must
carefully examine the evidence as to the conduct and outward
acts from which the inward motive may be determined. 41
Since bad faith is a question of intention, a clear
understanding of the confirmation and pre-flight checking
procedure of CAL is vital to determine if CAL indeed bumped
off private respondents in favor of other passengers. The
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are wanting
in this regard. The two courts only made passing references
to the testimonies of CAL's witnesses who were CAL's former
reservations officers. Their narration of their respective duties
and transactions with Amexco and Morelia is crucial in
ascertaining the presence of bad faith in CAL's
cancellation of the reservations.
We have held that in a case for recovery of damages
arising from a breach of contract, the trial court cannot
totally disregard the testimonies of the officers of an airline
on the basis alone of the employment relationship. 42When
the trial and appellate courts commit this grievous error, their
factual findings lose their binding effect on theCourt, and we
will again weigh and evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties. 43 We were thus compelled to examine anew the
testimonial evidence in this case. STaHIC
 Based on the testimonies of the reservations
officers of CAL, not one but two officers made the
confirmation and pre-flight checking of the airline. Amity
Chang ("Chang"), a reservation officer of CAL, received
Amexco's call confirming the reservations of private
respondents. Melo, another reservation officer of CAL, was in
charge of the pre-flight checking of private respondents'
reservations. Melo called up Morelia to reconfirm the
reservations.
The trial and appellate courts accepted private
respondents' theory that CAL cancelled their reservations
under the pretext that CAL had not authorized Amexco to use
the record locator number of Morelia. Private respondents
assert that in reality CAL just wanted them bumped off to
accommodate other passengers. However, private
respondents failed to substantiate this particular allegation.
We will now point out why the circumstances mentioned by
the trial and appellate courts are inadequate to prove CAL's
bad faith in cancelling private respondents' reservations.
First, the trial and appellate courts stress that Lea, the
booking agent of Amexco, identified herself as "Lea-Amexco"
when she called up CAL to confirm the reservations of private
respondents. However, the testimonies ofChang and Melo do
not show that they heard or recorded that "Lea-Amexco" made
the confirmation. Melo unequivocally stated in open court that
what the computer monitor recorded was the name Lea and
not "Lea-Amexco." 44 Accordingly, when Melo called up
Morelia to reconfirm the booking, she asked if there was a
person named Lea in Morelia. 45
Second, we agree with the trial and appellate courts
that CAL should not have accepted the confirmation of Lea
who is not a familiar caller from Morelia. CAL should have
screened and verified the name of the person or travel agency
confirming the reservations. Assuming that Lea indeed
identified herself as "Lea-Amexco," CAL all the more should
not have confirmed the reservations made by Amexco using
the record locator number of another travel agency. CAL
should have informed Amexco to secure first the
endorsement of Morelia. CAL's negligence at this stageof the
confirmation process is clear. However, both courts erred in
readily imputing bad faith when CAL was only guilty of simple
negligence.
Third, it is the standard practice of CAL to re-confirm
reservations by calling up the travel agency or passenger two
days or even as close as a day before the intended departure
date. 46 This is the pre-flight checking procedure ofCAL.
There is therefore nothing unusual or suspicious in CAL's
"initiative" in calling up Morelia. Melo was not aware that
"Lea-Amexco" made the confirmation. As far as Melo was
concerned, a certain "Lea" made the confirmation and Melo
assumed she was from Morelia because Lea used the record
locator number that CAL had assigned to Morelia. Since
Morelia is the assignee of the record locator number, CAL
dealt with Morelia.
The trial court termed the confirmation of Amexco as a
"final confirmation" of the reservations that should not have
required another re-confirmation from CAL. The
trial court believed that CAL's re-confirmation of the
reservation on the same day that Amexco made the
confirmation is suspicious. Suspicion, however, cannot take
the place of evidence. Obviously, CAL did not consider private
respondents' confirmation through Amexco as a "final
confirmation." CAL still went on with its pre-confirmation
procedure precisely because the name Lea registered on its
computer was not a familiar caller from Morelia. Thus, when
Melo called up Morelia, she asked if there was a certain "Lea"
with Morelia.
Fourth, Melo testified that she assumed that a certain
telephone number was the contact number of private
respondents. 47 Melo dialed the number and a certain Gemma
answered the phone. 48 Gemma denied any knowledge of the
booking made by private respondents or by Lea. 49 Melo then
decided to call up Morelia. 50
Melo indeed looked for a certain Joel when she called
up Morelia. Melo admitted that Joel has been with Morelia
"ever since." 51 Melo's admission indicates that Joel is the
familiar caller from Morelia with whom CAL regularly
transacted in confirming the bookings of Morelia.
Understandably, it was Joel whom Melo looked for when Melo
called up Morelia.
Melo first tried to contact private respondents, showing
CAL's lack of malice. Since the number was not the contact
number of private respondents and Lea, Melo had no recourse
but to check with Joel of Morelia.
Fifth, Melo did express to Joel her reluctance to cancel
the reservations because a certain Lea had already ended the
seating arrangements. Despite Melo's hesitation, the
cancellation still pushed through for three reasons: (1) Joel
insisted on it; (2) Lea was not from Morelia; and (3) Melo failed
to contact private respondents and Lea.
TheCourt of Appeals took Melo's reluctance to cancel the
reservations as an indication of CAL's bad faith when such
fact is a badge of good faith. CAL cancelled the reservations
with trepidation. CAL, therefore, did not make the cancellation
wantonly and recklessly.
Lastly, CAL did not have the addresses of private
respondents. Melo first tried to notify private respondents
through a telephone number presumably given by Lea.
However, the telephone number turned out to be a wrong
number.
To its credit, CAL still exerted its best efforts to notify
private respondents. In reconfirming the reservations, Melo
called up Morelia twice. The first time was two days before
the scheduled flight of CAL. 52 In that first telephone call,
Joel told Melo that he would first check if private respondents
were definite in taking the 13 June 1990 flight. 53Melo called
up Morelia the next day or a day before the scheduled
flight. 54 Joel informed Melo that Morelia was cancelling the
reservations because private respondents did not return to
Morelia. 55 Melo then asked Joel if he was sure of the
cancellation because a certain Lea had finalized the
reservations. 56 Joel said that he did not know of a certain
Lea and had no knowledge of Lea's booking. 57 Melo then
accepted Morelia's cancellation because Joel seemed
confident that there was basis in cancelling the
reservations. 58
CAL did not deliberately bump off private respondents
to accommodate other passengers. Amexco's unauthorized
use of the record locator number of Morelia was not just a
convenient excuse that CAL used to conceal a supposed
malicious intent. There were three reasons CAL cancelled the
reservations and did not notify private respondents of the
cancellation. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of the
record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in
confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the
absence of the correct contact numbers ofprivate
respondents and Lea.
There was no concerted effort on the part of CAL's
employees to cancel private respondents' reservations in
favor of other passengers. In fact, Melo testified that while
she knew that the 13 June 1990 flight was fully booked, she
was not aware if there were other prospective passengers
who wanted to get booked for that flight because ofthe
computerized booking. 59 Melo also had no way of knowing if
the cancelled reservations of private respondents were given
to other passengers since another officer was in
charge of this function. 60
The peculiar circumstances in this case set it apart
from Zalamea v. Court of Appeals, 61 the case lengthily
quoted by the Court of Appeals in justifying the
award of moral damages. The petitioners in Zalamea were
passengers of Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("TWA") who held
confirmed discounted tickets. Petitioners were, however, wait-
listed and eventually prevented from boarding the airplane
because TWA had overbooked the flight and gave preference
to other passengers who were holders of full-fare tickets. TWA
observed the practice of overbooking and the
system of boarding priorities. We held TWA liable for moral
damages because TWA did not stipulate these policies in the
contract and did not inform the petitioners of the overbooked
condition of the flight or of the hierarchy ofpriorities in
booking passengers. TWA was in bad faith when, failing to
thus inform petitioners when it could have easily done so,
TWA kept them as passengers up to the last minute. TWA's
conscious disregard of petitioners' rights made it liable not
only for actual but moral damages as well.
Unlike in Zalamea, bad faith is not evident in this case.
It was CAL's hasty confirmation of the reservations ofAmexco
that established the contract of carriage between CAL and
private respondents as evidenced by the tickets issued by
Amexco to private respondents. CAL failed to honor its
contract of carriage. However, CAL was not wanton or
reckless in cancelling private respondents' reservations. CAL
made the cancellation in conformity with its usual procedure,
which was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary considering that
CAL cancelled the reservations at the behest of Morelia. While
Morelia did not issue any ticket to private respondents, 62 on
record Morelia still stood as the travel agent that booked the
reservations of private respondents since neither CAL nor
Morelia endorsed the booking to Amexco. Thus, when Morelia
cancelled the reservations, CAL had to accede as if private
respondents themselves had asked for the cancellation.
Private respondents' names were consequently not included
in the passenger's manifest.
Damages
CAL's negligence caused it to breach its
contract of carriage. CAL's negligence is, however, not so
gross to amount to bad faith. Mere negligence, even if it
causes the plaintiff to suffer mental anguish or serious fright,
is not a ground for awarding moral damages. 63
The law distinguishes a contractual breach effected in
good faith from one attended by bad faith. 64 Absent fraud or
bad faith on defendant's part in breaching his contract, his
liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, which the
parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. 65 In
such a case, the liability would not include moral damages.
For this reason, not every case of mental anguish, fright or
serious anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil
Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-contractual
relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner." CAL was not in bad faith
and its employees did not act in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The
award of exemplary damages is therefore unwarranted in this
case.
Private respondents' remaining claim is for actual
damages. However, private respondents did not shell out any
money for their CAL tickets. Amexco voided the CAL tickets
when private respondents requested Amexco to book them in
another airline. 66 Amexco eventually booked their flight with
Northwest. Private respondents would have been entitled to
the price difference between the tickets of CAL and
Northwest had the latter cost more than the former. The price
difference would have been a damage reasonably attributed
to CAL's breach of its contract ofcarriage because private
respondents would not have flown via Northwest were it not
for CAL's non-performance ofits obligation. The evidence,
however, shows that the Northwest tickets at US$625 67 each
cost less than the CAL tickets priced at US$629 68 each. We
cannot also order a reimbursement of the Northwest tickets
because this would have enabled private respondents to fly to
Los Angeles without paying any fare. 69 As correctly pointed
out by the trial and appellate courts, the costs of the airplane
tickets were a necessary expense that private respondents
could not pass on to CAL.
Undeniably, however, private respondents soldered
some form of injury. CAL confirmed the reservations ofprivate
respondents carelessly. Private respondents relied on this
confirmation. Private respondents went through the
trouble of going to the airport at the appointed time expecting
that they would be able to board CAL Flight 632. To their
consternation, CAL personnel prevented them from boarding
because Morelia cancelled their reservations. When plaintiff
suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages, the court may award nominal
damages. 70 The court may award nominal damages purely to
vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated
and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has
suffered. 71 The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article
1157 of the Civil Code, 72 or in any case where there is an
invasion of any property right. 73 We find P5,000 as a
reasonable award of nominal damages to each of the private
respondents.
The fact that private respondents were compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim
does not justify the award of attorney's fees. 74 The court may
award attorney's fees only in the instances mentioned
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and this case is not
one of them. Moreover, when there is no basis to award moral
and exemplary damages, there is also no basis to award
attorney's fees. 75
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals with MODIFICATION by
deleting the award ofmoral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees. Petitioner China Airlines, Ltd. shall pay
nominal damages ofFive Thousand Pesos (P5,000) each to
private respondents Antonio S. Salvador and Rolando C. Lao.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (China Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129988, [July
14, 2003], 453 PHIL 959-987)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 10303. April 22, 2015.]
JOY A. GIMENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PAUL
CENTILLAS ZAIDE, respondent.
FACTS:
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint3
with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with:
(1) usurpation of a notary public's office;
Gimeno alleged that even before Zaide became a lawyer, he notarized a
partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6
She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his
notarial registers.
In his defense, Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition. Zaide countered that his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. Further
Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he
notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
(2) falsification;
Allegedly, Atty Zaide simultaneously used several notarial registers in his
separate satellite offices. This was evident in the irregular and non-
sequential entries in his notarial registers.
Zaide reasoned that he needed several notarial registers in several offices
better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing
number.
(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language;
Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in
the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her. In
another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty.
Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious
mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings. According to Gimeno, these
statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a
lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
Zaide denied all these.
and

(4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
Gimeno alleged that Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting clients' interests. She posited that Atty. Zaide
was once her lawyer in a case in an annulment of title case that involved her
husband and her parents-in-law. However, Zaide represented another client
in another civil case, this time against Gimeno, her former client. Gimeno
claimed that with such act of Zaide arises a conflict of interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Zaide’s acts constituted violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide was found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language
in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
It was ruled that he was not guilty of the act of usurpation of notarial office,
and was also not guilty of representing conflicting interests.
His notarial commission, was REVOKED, and he was declared DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He
was also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
On the issue of Usurpation of a notarial office, Gimeno failed to present
concrete evidence that Atty Zaide commited such act.
On the other hand, the Court ruled that Atty. Zaide indeed maintained
different notarial registers in separate notarial offices, thereby violating the
Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several
offices. Because of this practice, several notarized documents had been
irregularly numbered and entered. Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial
Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect
and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological
official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a
notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time."
On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is
not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
Further, it was also proven that Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another
case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and
immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing
counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of
Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her
incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of
his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
Thus, Atty. Zaide violated the CPR. The prohibition on the use of
intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional
dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based
on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
Lastly, on the issue that Atty. Zaide represented conflicting clients' interests,
the Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Zaide did not commit such act.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The Court stated that one of the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interests between and among his client is whether
the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.
Applying these tests, the Court found no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The prior case where
Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained
to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case
since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case
where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's
Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the
funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption
as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment
of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
His notarial commission, if existing, was REVOKED, and he was declared
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He was also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
law.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-264 1 of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ( IBP)
in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul
Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from
being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice
Rules). 2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno
(Gimeno) filed a complaint 3 with the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of
a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of
intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4)
violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before
Atty. Zaide's admission 4 to the Bar and receipt 5 of his
notarial commission, he had notarized a partial
extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March
29, 2002. 6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false
and irregular entries in his notarial registers. 7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's
former client. She engaged the services of his law firm
Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices ( ZMZ) in an
annulment of title case that involved her husband and her
parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,
Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint
forestafa and violation of RA 3019 8 that one Priscilla
Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the
Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a
former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against
the representation of conflicting clients' interests. 9
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her
a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative
complaint that Somontan filed against her. 10 In another
civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed
that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as
someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in
one of his pleadings. 11 According to Gimeno, these
statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive
language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his
dealings.
In his answer 12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty.
Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the
notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten
name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually
notarized this document. 13 Atty. Zaide claimed that
Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he
notarized it before his admission to the Bar. CAIHTE
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries,
Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously
use several notarial registers in his separate satellite
offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients
and accommodate their growing number. 14 This explains
the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial
registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never
his client since she did not personally hire him as her
counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he
previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of
Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case
was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's
partners. 15 On this basis, the respondent should not be
held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate,
offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings. 16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order
setting the case for mandatory conference. 17 After this,
both parties were required to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation 18 dated May 18,
2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for
violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing
conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting
language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and
1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different
offices. These provisions respectively require a notary
public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered
papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at
any given time." 19
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty.
Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this
issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and
notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition
even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his
notarial commission. 20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the
evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty.
Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's
defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally
hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case.
The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all
its lawyers. 21 But despite this previous attorney-client
relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that
Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is
totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that
Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that
Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist"
in one of his pleadings. 22 DETACa
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be
suspended for three months, and for another six months
for employing abusive and insulting language. 23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of
Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully
supports the findings of the investigating commissioner.
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty
and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from
being commissioned as a notary public. 24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration 25 of the
Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also
denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution. 26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors'
findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly
confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall
discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice
Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno
did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty.
Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of
his notarial commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the
name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. Atty.
Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name,
roll number, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, were merely
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details
stamped on the document are his true information.
However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed
the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his
notarial register and was never included in his notarial
report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno
falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make
it appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was
purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and
as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to
the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have
obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his
roll number, PTR number, IBP numberand the expiration
date of his notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any
evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to
the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the
conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the
document before his Bar admission and receipt of his
notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details,
which were only generated after his Bar admission, were
stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this
happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in
separate notarial offices
 We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial the notarial acts 29 that the law authorizes him to execute.
Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers This important duty is vested with public interest.
in several offices. Because of this practice, the following Thus,no other person, other than the notary public, should
notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and perform it.
entered: aDSIHc
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register
Document 27 Date Doc. No. Page Book need to be in chronological sequence in order to address
and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces
wer of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 in the notarial register to allow the antedating of
Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 notarizations.
Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's
Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25
explanation that he needed to maintain several active
Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25
notarial registers in separate offices so he could
accommodate the increasing number of his clients
Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25
requiring his notarial services.
opy
Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 This Court stresses that a notary public should not
n of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are
solute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 impressed with public interest. 30 A notary public's office
is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public
duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
Section 1 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously
Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, perform.
protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the
these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of
requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice
numbered pages." The same section further provides that
Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It
"a notary public shall keep only one active notarial
amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
register at any given time." 28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial
[should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
and promote respect for law and legal processes."ETHIDa
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a
Representing conflicting interests
notary public to maintain only one active notarial register
and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically The investigating commissioner properly noted that
arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial conflicting clients' interests.
registers to different offices manned by assistants who Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
perform notarial services on his behalf. Responsibility provides:
Since a notarial commission is personal to each Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not
lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer represent conflicting interests except by
 written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, 31 the Court laid down the
tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. 32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment. 33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest
when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law
firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide
and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover,
the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an
entirely different subject matter and is not in any way
connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against
Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where
Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the
annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to
this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On
the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman
complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of
the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for
Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of
title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of
Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his
services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly,
nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against
Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired
while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title
case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not
be held liable for violating the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and
abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive
and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings,
whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is
based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: cSEDTC
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis
supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that
he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist." 34 And in another case, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning
and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel:
 Her declaration in Public put a shame,
DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in
the whole Justice System, and the
Department of Justice in particular,
where the taxpayers paid for her salary over
her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor. . . This is a clear manifestation
that the Public prosecutor suffers serious
mental incompetence as regard her mandate
as an Assistant City Prosecutor. 35(emphasis
supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint
in the use and choice of his words — a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating
but not offensive. 36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the
members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language
even in his pleadings, must be dignified. 37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Gimeno v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, [April 22, 2015])
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6131. February 28, 2005.]
EDUARDO L. NUÑEZ, EUGENIO O. NUÑEZ,
ELISA NUÑEZ-ALVARICO and IMELDA L.
NUÑEZ,complainants, vs. Atty. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, respondent.
Complainants: Eduardo L. Nunez, Eugenio O. Nunez, Eliza Nunez-
Alvarico and Imelda Nunez
Respondents: Atty. Arturo B. Astroga
Ponente: Panganiban, J
FACTS: In 1968 the late Maria Ortega Vda de. Nunez executed a
Sale of a lot OCT 2651 ( Now 8955) with “Right to Repurchase” in
favor of Eugenio Nunez within 10 years from date of execution. The
expiration to repurchase expired and was not exercise even up to
date and Eugenio with his children are presently residing in the said
lot. The son of Maria Ortega, Ricardo Nunez extra judicially partitioned
his estate. Ricardo appointed Atty. Astorga as administrator and
alleged that complainants have no right over the same lots. Ricardo
sold the same lot to Imelda and Elisa the lot that they were occupying
and after which Elisa filed Estafa against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte. Another criminal case of which
is grave threat was again filed against Atty. Astroga by Eduardo Nunez
for uttering words ipaposil ta ka' which means 'I'll have you shot.”
while in the house of Eduardo
In Atty. Astroga’s defense He denied that he had utilized his
profession to circumvent the law and averred that there were already
several pending cases involving the same issues raised by
complainants in the present administrative action. Furthermore it will
only suspend further hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Astroga is guilt of serious misconduct.
HELD: No, however the Court ruled that the offensive language of
Atty. Astroga to complainants and their counsel is unbecoming an
attorney. “The legal profession exacts a high standard from its
members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on their fitness to practice law”
He hurled insulting language in describing the opposing
counsel and cast doubts on the latter are integrity by implying that the
lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated
the rules on non-forum shopping and committed malpractice.
However there were no clear evidence that would show proof that
Atty. Astroga’s deceit and gross misconduct. The mere existence of
pending cases that constitute of serious misconduct is not a ground
that someone has been behaving in a misconduct manner. Conviction
of a crime is needed before it would be a ground for disciplinary
actions. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold
the administration of justice and is no longer is possession of good
moral character.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by violation of his
oath which includes gross misconduct, malpractice, being convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude and many more. But the wise Court
said that disbarment and suspension are sever forms of disciplinary
action and must be imposed with great caution. Without clear and
convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted
serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges
cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To
hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys
through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most
severe forms of disciplinary action; thus, they should be
imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for
duly proven serious administrative charges. 1
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-
Affidavit 2 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuñez,
Eugenio O. Nuñez, Eliza Nuñez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuñez.
Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar. The material averments of
the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
"Complainants allege that sometime on
June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De
Nu[ñ]ez executed a Sale with Right to
Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[ñ]ez
Lot No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now
TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq.
ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said
contract, the stipulated time of repurchase was
ten (10) years from the date of execution
thereof or until June 5, 1978. That said period
of vendor's right to repurchase expired without
any agreement of extending said period of
repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late
Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[ñ]ez have not
exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year
after the execution of the said pacto de
ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de
Nu[ñ]ez and her son Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez, as the
surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[ñ]ez,
extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among
others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was
adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez which
eventually was the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez.
Eugenio O. Nu[ñ]ez [has] occupied and
possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40
years up to the present and it is also where his
children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all
surnamed Nu[ñ]ez, grew and [are] presently
residing.
"By virtue of a power of attorney
executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses
Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez and Paterna Nu[ñ]ez
appointing respondent as administrator, as well
as on the alleged judicial confirmation of
respondent's wife, as acknowledged natural
child of Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez, respondent, on the
pretext of administering the properties of the
late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful
occupation and possession of complainants of
Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants
have no right over the same. With our desire to
peaceably settle the controversy, complainants
agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent,
who, without being appointed by the court as
administrator of the intestate estate of the late
spouses Ricardo Nu[ñ]ez and Paterna Nu[ñ]ez,
sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[ñ]ez and Elisa
Nu[ñ]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106
they were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[ñ]ez-
Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa
against respondent before the Municipal Trial
Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as Criminal
Case No. R-4013-A.
"Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around
7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the
house of Eduardo L. Nu[ñ]ez at corner J.P.
Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and
threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[ñ]ez by uttering
the words 'ipaposil ta ka' which means 'I'll have
you shot.' A complaint for Grave Threats
docketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by
Eduardo L. Nu[ñ]ez before Municipal Trial Court
of Baybay, Leyte." 3
In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants
appeared with their counsel, while respondent was
represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not
yet filed his answer to the Complaint despite a previous Order
dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to do so. The hearing was thus reset to
June 26, 2002. 4
On June 26, 2002, only respondent's counsel, Atty.
Arnold Logares, was present. Respondent filed a Motion
seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another
extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer.
He was thus granted a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days within which to do so. 5
On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his
Answer. 6 He denied that he had utilized his profession to
circumvent the law and averred that there were already
several pending cases involving the same issues raised by
complainants in the present administrative action:
"2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega
Vda. De Nuñez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in
nature and can be best threshed out in the
amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-
27, entitled [']The Intestate Estate of the late
Spouses Ricardo O. Nuñez, et al versus
Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al['] for
Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original
complaint was filed in October 2001 at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte;
an amended complaint of which is filed where
one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity
of the foregoing questioned deed of sale with
right to repurchase because if this document is
really valid and existing then why did
complainant Eugenio Nuñez [affix] his
signature as one of the instrumental witnesses
in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among
Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuñez and Ricardo O.
Nuñez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would
have protested at the time of the execution
thereof because he is the temporary owner of
Lot No. 106, one of the properties subject of
partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O.
Nuñez to take control and full possession and
ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the
partition in 1969? TEHIaA
xxx xxx xxx
"[3] b) It is not only the authority of the
Spouses Ricardo O. Nuñez and Paterna
Baltazar that herein respondent is relying as
administrator of the said intestate estate but
the same had been duly confirmed by the
judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O.
Nuñez, namely, respondent's wife Dr. Linda
Teresa Tan-Nuñez who confirmed
undersign[ed]'s authority as administrator of
the aforenamed estate;
"[3] c) With the discovery of the
aforenamed deed of sale with the right to
repurchase only recently, the complainants
were emboldened to actively [question] [the]
estate as they now [refuse] to recognize the
ownership and long time possession of the real
properties forming part of the aforenamed
[estate] to belong to the offspring of the late
Ricardo O. Nuñez;
"[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not
utilize his profession to circumvent the law.
Complainants Elisa L. Nuñez and Imelda L.
Nuñez are actually renting the cornermost
portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and
107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area only
of 201 square meters, more or less, and when
respondent was trying to eject them,
complainants negotiated with the respondent
to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented and
in fact actually advanced part of the agreed
consideration until their father Eugenio Nuñez
discovered an existing document of sale with
right to repurchase when they, ill-advised by
their counsel [started] filing [a] series of
criminal, civil and administrative cases against
respondent and his wife at the instigation of
their lawyers, the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and
their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a
way of pressuring respondent and wife to give
up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No.
106[,] including [the] portion which
complainant Eduardo Nuñez is now renting of
Lot No. 89;
"4. That respondent in response to
paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the
pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which
was personally filed by Elisa L. Nuñez without
the intervention from any government
prosecutor but said case is no longer pending
in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte
when then same was recommended for
dismissal . . . . Later it was ordered dismissed
by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U.
Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor
Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 . . . but
complainants elevated the case for review to
the Department of Justice . . . . Because of the
pendency of this criminal case with the
Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question
now exist[s] whereby this administrative case
should be suspended until the resolution of
that petition for review by the Department of
Justice;
 "5. That respondent specifically denies
the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and
10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is
that Amado Caballes at the instigation of the
complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal
Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal Trial
Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial.
Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same was
filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, . . . .
But before the filing of this present action
initiated by Mr. Caballes's counsel and
complainants Eduardo Nuñez and Eugenio
Nuñez required Mr. Caballes to execute a
document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite
knowing that the same has already been long
redeemed by respondent . . . . Despite legal
redemption, and despite Amado Caballes
having executed . . . a Deed of Resale which
was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuñez .
. ., the complainants convinced Amado
Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] . . . .
That by virtue of the pendency of Criminal
Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial
question and that further hearing of the
present administrative action should be
suspended until the outcome of this criminal
case; ECDAcS
"6. That respondent is duly authorized to
negotiate for the disposal of any part of the
Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O.
Nuñez and Paterna Baltazar . . . .
"7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of
the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence
and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not
be a part of this complaint because this will be
threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of
the matter is that respondent had been already
acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 . . . .
"8. That similar to other cases filed at
the instance of the Nuñezes, there is also filed
Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by
complainant Eduardo Nuñez and now pending
in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite
the lack of witnesses . . . . Again, the pendency
of this case will constitute a prejudicial
question which necessarily will suspend
further hearing of the present administrative
action until the final outcome of the aforesaid
Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;" jur2005cd
xxx xxx xxx. 7
On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their
Reply. 8 Thereafter, IBP-CPD Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing on December
11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was a
granted a period of fifteen (15) days to file his rejoinder. The
parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda on January 15,
2003, after which the case was to be considered submitted
for resolution. 9
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report, 10 Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found
respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Thus, the
investigating commissioner recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one year.
In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the
Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case,
was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent
also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP
Board of Governors.
The Court's Ruling
 We disagree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP, but find respondent's offensive language against
complainants and their counsel unbecoming an attorney.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The legal profession exacts a high standard from its
members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall they,
whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. 11 In Gonzaga
v. Villanueva, 12 this Court, citing Tucay v. Tucay, 13 held thus:
"A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among
the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice;
gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral
conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or
willful appearance as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The grounds
are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind
of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in
his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity
and moral fiber, which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein." 14
However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension
are severe forms of disciplinary action and must be imposed
with great caution. 15 The allegations in the Complaint were
not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft of
convincing proof of respondent's deceit and gross
misconduct. DCSTAH
The admission of respondent that there are various
cases filed or pending against him does not ipso
factoconstitute serious misconduct. His contention that the
pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that
will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise
bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the IBP investigating
commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending
cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of
respondent.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter
of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has
been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such
conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good
moral character. 16 In the present case, however, while
respondent has been charged with several criminal cases
involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of
them.
Without clear and convincing evidence that he
committed acts that allegedly constituted serious
misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges
cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of
respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to
harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous
criminal cases against them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was
violated when the IBP investigating commissioner failed to
conduct a formal investigation. 17 As borne by the records,
Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted
hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during
which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared.
Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well as his
Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the
December 11, 2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed such language as may be properly addressed by one
submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed gentleperson to another. 24
his Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of
that he was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges
the charge of serious misconduct, but is held liable for
filed against him.
conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand
While we are not convinced that complainants have pesos. HIcTDE
clearly and convincingly proven the charges of serious
SO ORDERED.
misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive
language in respondent's pleadings. The Code of Professional ||| (Nuñez v. Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, [February 28, 2005], 492
Responsibility mandates: PHIL 450-460)
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
EN BANC
toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. [G.R. No. L-30191. October 27, 1973.]

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
appellee, vs. FERNANDO MOLINA, defendant-
appellant.
In his Memorandum 18 dated January 15, 2003, the
opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego, points out the manner
and tenor of the language in the Answer 19 and the Rejoinder Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
of respondent. 20 The latter suggested that complainants and Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista and Solicitor Pedro
their counsel had caused the filing of several baseless suits, A.Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
including the present charge, merely to harass and place him Jose W . Diokno, Counsel de Oficio for defendant-
in a bad light. 21 He hurled insulting language in describing appellant.
the opposing counsel 22 and cast doubts on the latter's
integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the filing
of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-
forum shopping and committed malpractice. 23 DECISION

Indeed, these statements, particularly the words "who

he is despite . . . his shortness not only in size but in
FERNANDO, J p:
arrogance," constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the
legal profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
From a rape conviction, the accused, Fernando
A lawyer's language may be forceful, but should always Molina, elevated the case to us. There was no denial of the
be dignified; emphatic, but respectful as befitting an sexual act having been committed, but he would impress
advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be on us that the element of force had not been shown.
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should use Consequently, he would have us reverse, there being an
insistence on his part that his version of the occurrence As set forth at the outset, the accused, who
was the more credible. At the very least then, he could and admitted that there was indeed such sexual intercourse,
does rely on the constitutional presumption of but denied the use of force, was found guilty and
innocence 1 to overcome which there must be proof sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal, with full
beyond reasonable doubt. A careful reading of the recognition of the vailing doctrine that he was up against a
evidence, however, yields more than enough support for formidable obstacle in his hope for a reversal, he would
sustaining the decision of the court, especially so as the challenge the lower court's finding on the question of
testimony of the offended party, barely in her teens, as to credibility. 20 Again, as mentioned earlier, he did rely on
how this unfortunate occurrence transpired meets the test the constitutional presumption of innocence which, in his
of moral certainty. opinion, was not overcome, the proof against him not
showing his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. So his
The testimony as to the guilt of the accused is to
counsel 21 did vigorously argue in a brief notable for its
the effect that as the evening of April 7, 1968 was just
thoroughness. It could have been improved, had there
commencing, about half-past six, the thirteen-year-old
been no undue reliance on American authorities and, what
Jesusita Saguin, who had just finished watering her flower
is worse, on such a secondary source as American
plants beneath her house in barrio Kinangay Norte, Clarin,
Jurisprudence. It was not entirely out of levity that the late
Misamis Occidental, was approached by the accused
Professor Moore, speaking of such work as well as Corpus
Fernando Molina. He seized her from behind, covered her
Juris, noted that the text thereof appeared to be the
mouth with the palm of his hand, and dragged her to a
product of a far from accurate thinking of impecunious
brook about 40 meters away from her house. She tried to
young lawyers not yet established practice. He did add, in
free herself from his grip, but she failed. 2 On reaching that
a more serious vein, that to extent that it would yield the
spot, she was boxed on the epigastric region by appellant,
impression of a so-called American common law, it is likely
who laid her down face upward. 4 She was, as a
to incur the vice of inaccuracy, especially so after the
consequence, silenced. 5 Appellant was thus enabled to
epochal decision in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins. 22 By this
raise her skirt and remove her panties, 9 While thus being
time, with one hundred ten volumes of Philippine Reports
subjected to such unwelcome and unsought-for act, father
as well as fifty-on volumes of Supreme Court Reports
noticed her disappearance from home. 10 He was worried,
Annotated, Philippine lawyers, especially in criminal law
it was not her wont to leave her house without permission
cases, are well advised to rely primarily on Philippine
from any member of the family. Apprehensive, he began his
decisions. More specifically, with reference to
search for her. 12 Not long after, she made her appearance.
prosecutions for rape, with the offended party being a
She was in tears and explained the cause thereof. She had
person of tender years, as in this case, much
been raped by the appellant near the brook. 15 The family
enlightenment is applied by opinions coming from such
thus learned of the sad affair and decided to file a
eminent jurists as Chief Justices Avanceña, Paras,
complaint against the appellant. 16 That they did the next
Bengzon and Concepcion, and Justices Torres, Villamor,
morning, when Jesusita and her father, brothers Miguel
Romualdez, Villa-Real, Pablo and Dizon, For all the labored
and Alberto and a friend, Leoncia Dula, went to the
attempts of counsel then, we have no justification for a
municipal mayor of Clarin, Antero Roa, for that purpose.
reversal.
They were advised to have Jesusita examined by a
physician. 19 1. Appellant's lone assignment of error reads: "[The
trial court erred in finding your accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under an information
charging commission of the crime by means of force, court in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
violence and intimidation, based upon the evidence doubt.
presented]." 23 To support such a contention, stress is laid
2. There is merit of course in the proposition
on inconsistencies allegedly vitiating the testimony of the
advanced by appellant that unless the evidence presented
offended party. What was said by Justice Dizon in People v.
by the prosecution did suffice to overcome the
Modelo 29 "It is undisputed that the victim of the heinous
constitutional presumption of innocence, he was entitled
offense was only a young girl of 14 years, a virgin. innocent
to an acquittal. So it was clearly held in the 1968 decision
and unsophisticated, and as a student of a religious
of People v. Alto 33 and reaffirmed in 1970 in People v.
school, there is no reason for her to concoct a story of
Pagkaliwagan. 38
defloration, allow an examination of her private part and
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public What other conclusion could the trial court arrive at
trial; if she was not motivated solely by a desire to have then, except that it was "satisfied from the evidence that
the culprit apprehended and punished. No young Filipina of the accused raped Jesusita in the manner described in the
decent repute would publicly admit that she been information." 39 So is this Court.
criminally abused, unless that is the truth. For it is her WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of January 1969
natural instinct to protect her honor." 30 It was not an easy is affirmed. With costs against appellant.
task therefore for appellant, considering the state of the
law, to elicit a favorable response to his plea for acquittal. ||| (People v. Molina, G.R. No. L-30191, [October 27, 1973], 153
Moreover, the fact that seventeen pages of the twenty-six- PHIL 246-255)
page brief would deal with what he would consider the
failure of the offended party to make patent her resistance
to the act of sexual aggression, cannot avail view of the THIRD DIVISION
prevailing doctrine as set forth in the latest case of People
v. Olden. 31 In the language of the then Justice, now Chief [A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC. January 31, 2008.]
Justice, Makalintal: "Appellants point out that even
assuming that they had sexual intercourse with Edwina
RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G.
Maranga there is no evidence that they, employed force or
ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
intimidation. It is true that she could have shown greater
121, CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
physical resistance to their advances than she actually
Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
did. Another woman would probably have tried to fight
them off, even to the jeopardy of life or limb. But not all
women are of the same mettle. What is clear and Facts:
undisputable here is that Edwina was far from being a
willing victim; and if her protestations lacked vigor and Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610. Senior State
vehemence it was obviously because of the fact that some Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice
of the men who took turns with her were armed with guns (DOJ) wrote a letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible
and others with bolos which they displayed to cow her into to order the immediate suspension of the respondent. The matter was
submission. If there was no appreciable force employed, referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation where they
there was definitely intimidation." 32 It cannot be said, recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended. The Court's
then, the there was such an error committed by the lower
Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending
respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final
resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration; he claimed that the suspension order was wielded against
her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not
furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint.
Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust.
Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her
are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As
such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence
and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a
prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation
manifesting that respondent continuously defied the court’s Resolution.
Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse,
respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence
and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is
using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain
and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Issues: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the
respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case.
Held:
We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree
with the recommendation of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of
respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her
suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same
has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues. Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint
leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye,
for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment. 41 As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges
may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse
consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other
than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered
against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful
grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the
foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that
preventive suspensionpendente lite does not violate the right of the accused
to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on
preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the
Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's
argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her
present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render
a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been
rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and
convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive
suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's
pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To
reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use of
disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard
expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of
the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in
language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's hostile
mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and
power"; "(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of
the trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and
misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy,
then it is time for him to step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock,
respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude
was aggravated by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he
used his influence to secure a position for his son at the
RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed by
Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son
be assigned to the library to enable the latter to
 conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar
examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of
the motion for reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on
SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate from the
poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different from
garbage that should be rejected outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is
no less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position
could cause pressure to bear among government officials. This brings forth a
nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause
pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative
cases lodged against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own
ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent
should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and
insulting language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The
judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
number of restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting
and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. One
final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that
they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge
them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion,
may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege
must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds,
and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give
them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow
their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of
two irresponsible children.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Before this Court is yet another administrative case
confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator 1 (OCA) recommending that she be
suspended pending the outcome of this administrative
case.
The Facts
On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City
rendered a Decision 2 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56
convicting respondent of violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
7610. 3 The criminal cases are now on appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA). 4
On July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter 5 to then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible for
this Court, in the public interest, motu proprio to order the
immediate suspension of the respondent in view of the
aforementioned RTC Decision. SSP Velasco opined:
1. Judge Angeles now stands
convicted on two counts of a crime, child
abuse under Republic Act 7610, which
involves moral turpitude. Until she clears her
name of such conviction, her current moral
qualification to do the work of a judge is
under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking justice
in our courts are entitled to a hearing by
judges whose moral qualifications are not
placed in serious doubt.
2. Although her conviction is not yet
final, the presumption of innocence that
Judge Angeles enjoyed during the pendency
of the trial has already been overcome by its
result. The presumption today is that she is
guilty and must clear her name of the
charges.
xxx xxx xxx
 It simply would not be right to have a
person presumably guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude to hear and adjudicate the
cases of others. HDaACI
3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the RTC of
Quezon City convicted Judge Angeles of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, sheno longer
has a right to bail and, therefore, should
ordinarily be held in prison pending
adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC of
Quezon City chose to exercise its
discretionary power to nonetheless grant her
bail does not change the fact that, except for
the bail, Judge Angeles' rightful place by
reason of conviction is within the
confinement of prison.
It would seem incongruous for the
Supreme Court to allow convicted felons out
on bail to hear and adjudicate cases in its
courts.
4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields
power over all persons appearing before her
and has immeasurable influence within the
judicial system as one of its members, Judge
Angeles could definitely cause pressure to
bear, not only on the members of the Court of
Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but
also on the Office of the Solicitor General
that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only
temporary suspension from official function,
pending resolution of her case, will neutralize
her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind
of suspicion that justice is not going well in
her case.
On July 27, 2006, the matter was referred to the
OCA for comment and recommendation. 6
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter and by virtue of
this Court's Resolution 7 dated March 31, 1981, the OCA
submitted to this Court a Report 8 dated August 25, 2006
with an attached Administrative Complaint, 9 the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
that this administrative complaint be given
due course and, respondent be ordered to file
her Comment within ten (10) days from
receipt. Considering the evidence is prima
facie strong, it is respectfully recommended
that she be INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED pending the outcome of the
instant case or until further orders from this
Court. It is further recommended that after
the Comment is filed, the administrative
proceeding be suspended to await the final
outcome of the criminal cases filed against
her.
In a Resolution 10 dated September 18, 2006, this
Court's Second Division approved all of these
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from
performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final
resolution of her criminal cases or until further orders from
this Court.
On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration 11 of the aforementioned
Resolution. Respondent claimed that the suspension order
was wielded against her without affording her the
opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished
copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative
Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her
suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent
manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on
appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained
finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes
with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment
of her guilt.
 On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco
filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation 12 to the Court En
Banc on the alleged unethical conduct of respondent,
seeking the immediate implementation of this Court's
Resolution dated September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007,
SSP Velasco filed an Opposition to the said Motion for
Reconsideration, 13 manifesting that respondent
continuously defied this Court's Resolution dated
September 18, 2006 as she did not desist from performing
her judicial functions despite her receipt of said Resolution
on October 6, 2006. SSP Velasco stressed that an order of
suspension issued by this Court is immediately executory
notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, SSP Velasco reiterated that due to her
conviction on two counts of child abuse,
respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in
order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence
to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. aATHIE
Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA
Chapter), through its Public Relations Officer (PRO) Atty.
Emiliano A. Mackay, wrote a letter 14 dated October 18,
2006 addressed to the Second Division of this Court
inquiring as to the effectivity of the Resolution suspending
the respondent so as not to sow confusion among the legal
practitioners and party litigants with pending cases before
the respondent's sala. Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter
manifested that respondent did not cease to perform her
judicial functions as evidenced by a Commitment
Order 15 issued by respondent on October 16, 2006, and
handwritten manifestations 16 of some party litigants
attesting that on various dates they attended hearings
before respondent's sala. In the same vein, in an undated
letter 17 addressed to Associate Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Concerned Trial Lawyers in the
City of Caloocan raised the same concern before this
Court.
In her Reply 18 to SSP Velasco's Opposition,
respondent admitted that she continued discharging her
bounden duties in utmost good faith after filing her motion
for reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the
slightest intention to defy or ignore this Court's Resolution
which did not categorically state that the said suspension
is immediately executory. Respondent reiterated her
arguments against the suspension order on the grounds
that she was deprived of due process; that her conviction
is not yet final; and that the crimes for which she was
convicted have nothing to do with the discharge of her
official duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the instant
case is but another harassment suit filed against her by
SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an administrative
complaint against the latter for maliciously indicting
respondent with respect to another case of child abuse.
On October 25, 2006, respondent filed a
Manifestation of Voluntary Inhibition 19 stating that she is
voluntarily inhibiting from handling all cases scheduled for
hearing before her sala from October 25, 2006 to
November 13, 2006.
On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial
audit in respondent's sala. Per Report 20 of the judicial
audit team, it was established that from October 6, 2006 to
October 23, 2006, respondent conducted hearings, issued
orders, decided cases and resolved motions, acting as if
the order of suspension which the respondent received on
October 6, 2006 was only a "mirage." The Report was
brought to the attention of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock). 21
On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an
Administrative Complaint against respondent for violation
of the Court's Circulars, the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and for Gross
Misconduct, asseverating, among others, that the
suspension order was immediately executory 22 and that
integrity as mandated by the New Code of Judicial
Conduct is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
In her Comment, 23 respondent, in addition to her
previous contentions, argued that the Resolution dated
September 18, 2006 ordering her suspension was issued
only by a Division of this Court contrary to Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that " the
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon." EHaCID
On November 9, 2006, SSP Velasco filed a
Supplement to the Opposition to Respondent's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration 24 of the Resolution dated
September 18, 2006. Thereafter, numerous
pleadings 25 were filed by both parties practically
repeating their previous allegations.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 19,
2007, this Court lifted the suspension of respondent on the
ground that:
Upon verification, it appears that the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division,
indeed failed to attach a copy of the OCA
complaint to the copy of our resolution dated
September 18, 2006 sent to Judge Angeles.
Due process requires that Judge Angeles be
accorded the opportunity to answer the
complaint.
Respondent was then given a fresh period of ten
(10) days from the receipt of the OCA Administrative
Complaint within which to file her comment.
On March 15, 2007, respondent filed her
Comment 26 with the following material assertions: (1) that
CA Lock as Court Administrator and who in behalf of the
OCA stands as the complainant in this case,
has no personal knowledge of the facts, issues and
evidence presented in the criminal cases; (2) that the
instant case, filed eleven (11) years after the criminal
charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar and
Proclyn Pacay, smacks of malice and bad faith on the part
of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is a friend and former
subordinate of then National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father of
herein party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive
against respondent is clear; (4) that CA Lock should not
use the OCA to harass a member of the judiciary; (5) that
the decision in the aforementioned criminal cases has not
yet become final; (6) that the acts for which she was
convicted are totally alien to her official functions and
have nothing to do with her fitness and competence as a
judge; (7) that there is no wisdom in the imposition of the
suspension which in this case is preventive in character
because respondent cannot do anything through her office
that could possibly cause prejudice to the prosecution of
the child abuse case; (8) that the lifting of the suspension
order retroacts to the date of its issuance; (9) that the
instant case should be struck down because the judgment
of conviction was contrary to law and jurisprudence; and
(10) that under the circumstances, all the charges were
merely concocted by respondent's detractors in order to
embarrass, humiliate and vex her.
In his Motion for Reconsideration 27 of this Court's
Resolution dated February 19, 2007, SSP Velasco argued
that respondent's deprivation of her right to due process
was cured when she filed her motion for the
reconsideration of the suspension order; thus, there
is no need to lift such order. He reiterated his previous
statement that "as a sitting judge who wields power over
all persons appearing before her and thus has
immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one
of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause
pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of
Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her
case on appeal. Only her suspension from official function,
pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial
clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice
is not going well in her case." 28
In response, respondent filed a Comment/Opposition
to the said motion with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in
contempt of Court 29 due to this aforementioned
statement. Respondent argued that such statement
betrays SSP Velasco's cheap and low perception of the
integrity and independence of this Court, of the CA and of
the OSG. It also shows his utter lack of respect for the
judicial system. Moreover, respondent added that since she
was not furnished a copy of the OCA Administrative
Complaint, the issuance of the suspension order deprived
her of her right to due process and prevented her from fully
ventilating her arguments. Respondent, likewise,
questioned SSP Velasco's legal personality in this case as
it was the OCA which, motu proprio, initiated the filing of
the said case.
In a Resolution dated July 4, 2007, this Court, among
others, directed SSP Velasco to file his comment on
respondent's motion to cite him for contempt. On August
21, 2007, SSP Velasco filed his Comment claiming that he
has legal personality to file pleadings before this Court
because it was he who initiated the filing of this case
through his letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban on July 25, 2006. He admitted that the
allegedly contemptuous statements were merely lifted
from said letter. He argued that the former Chief Justice or
the Court for that matter, did not find any contemptuous
statement in the letter. Taking the letter in its entire
context, SSP Velasco posited that he did not commit any
act of disobedience to the orders of this Court; neither did
he bring the Court's authority and the administration of
law into disrepute nor did he impede the due
administration of justice. Nowhere in the letter was it
stated that this Court, the CA and the OSG could be
pressured; the letter merely stated that respondent could
cause pressure. SSP Velasco pointed that the letter to the
then Chief Justice, in itself, shows his respect for the
judiciary and the promotion of the administration of
justice. HaAIES
In her Reply 30 to said Comment, respondent argued
that it cannot be said that somebody could cause pressure
if no one is believed to be susceptible to pressure. Thus,
the use of this kind of language tends to degrade the
administration of justice and constitutes indirect
contempt. She stressed that SSP Velasco's act of
misrepresenting himself as the complainant in this case
while it is clear from the Resolution of this Court that the
OCA motu proprio filed the same, is per se contemptuous.
Meanwhile in its Memorandum, 31 the OCA
reiterated its earlier position that respondent should be
suspended pending the outcome of this administrative
case. The OCA opined that the Resolution lifting the
suspension order was basically premised on the ground
that respondent was not accorded her right to due
process. By filing her Comment raising arguments against
her suspension, respondent has fully availed herself of
such right. However, the OCA submitted that respondent's
arguments are devoid of merit on the following grounds: (1)
the Court Administrator need not personally know about
the criminal cases of respondent because the instant case
is based on a public document, i.e., the decision of
the RTC convicting the respondent of child abuse; (2) the
fact that said decision has not attained finality is
of no moment for what is being sought is merely
preventive suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent
is acquitted in the criminal cases of which she stands
accused, she will receive the salaries and other benefits
which she would not receive during her suspension; (3)
even if the acts of child abuse have no connection with
respondent's official functions as a judge, it is established
that the private conduct of judges cannot be dissociated
from their official functions; (4) respondent's preventive
suspension shall serve an important purpose: it will
protect the image of the judiciary and preserve the faith of
the people in the same; and (5) citing the case of Leonida
Vistan v. Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, 32 the RTC decision
convicting respondent of child abuse is prima
facie evidence that respondent committed the said crime
which indicates the moral depravity of the offender and, as
such, warrants the punishment of dismissal from the
service. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be
suspended pending the outcome of this administrative
case and that the CA be directed to resolve the criminal
cases with dispatch.
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues in this case:
First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP
Velasco for indirect contempt of Court; and
Second, whether or not grounds exist to
preventively suspend the respondent pending the
resolution of this administrative case.
The Court's Ruling
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C.
Albarracin, 33 we held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court, such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or
their witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt
punishable by law: direct contempt and
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt
or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court.
Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice would constitute
indirect contempt. TIaDHE
In her Comment/Opposition with Motion to Declare
SSP Velasco in contempt of Court, respondent espoused
the view that SSP Velasco is guilty of indirect contempt for
using language which tends to degrade the administration
of justice. But if this were so, respondent should have
availed herself of the remedy in accordance with Section
4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.
— Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against
which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect
contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the
form of a verified petition if it is not initiated directly by
the court against which the contemptuous act was
committed. On previous occasions, we clarified that such
petition is in the nature of a special civil action. Certified
true copies of related documents must be submitted with
the petition and appropriate docket fees must be paid. The
requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. As Justice
Florenz D. Regalado has explained:
 This new provision clarifies with a
regulatory norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as a
special civil action under the former Rules,
the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the
courts, has been for any party to file a mere
motion without paying any docket or lawful
fees therefor and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is
now required in the second paragraph of
[Section 4]. 34 ECaSIT
On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we
therefore find that SSP Velasco's statement, while
irresponsible, did not necessarily degrade the
administration of justice as to be considered
contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power to
punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks
explaining his position in a case under consideration do
not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies
the court's exercise of the power of contempt. 35 We note
that SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his
argument for the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e.,
to prevent the respondent from using her current position
to alter the course of the investigation and the disposition
of the appealed criminal cases.
Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in mind that
as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We
remind him of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the
following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
Canon 8. Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's
sworn and moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily
destroy the people's high esteem and regard for the courts
so essential to the proper administration of justice. A
lawyer's language may be forceful but should always be
dignified; emphatic but respectful, as befitting an
advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel, and should
use such language as may be properly addressed by one
person to another. 36
We likewise resolve the second issue in the
negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the
recommendation of the OCA.
Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco
v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles , 37 which involved the same
parties and where we held:
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge
of judicial functions may give rise to
administrative liability even when such act
constitutes a violation of penal law. When the
issue is administrative liability, the quantum
of proof required is only substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal
case against the respondent in an
administrative case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative
case. Conversely, conviction in the criminal
case will not automatically warrant a finding
of guilt in the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal
 and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the
law applicable to it.
In Nuñez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, 38 the Court held
that the mere existence of pending criminal charges
against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for
disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise
would open the door to harassment of attorneys through
the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's
conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her
suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that
since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is
currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet
attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself
destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence
unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the
evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation,
proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the
presumption of innocence continues. 39 In Mangubat v.
Sandiganbayan, 40 the Court held that respondent
Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion,
correctible by certiorari, when it ruled that despite her
convictions, "Preagido has still in her favor the
constitutional presumption of innocence . . . (and until) a
promulgation of final conviction is made, this
constitutional mandate prevails." The Court therein further
held that such ruling is not bereft of legal or logical
foundation and cannot, in any sense, be characterized as a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment. So also
must we hold in this case. HSDaTC
Moreover, it is established that any administrative
complaint leveled against a judge must always be
examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential
effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal
or disbarment. 41 As aforementioned, the filing of criminal
cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them
and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The
OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other
than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse
was rendered against the respondent, which is still on
appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the
imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the
foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that,
while it is true that preventive suspension pendente
lite does not violate the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, 42 the
rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been
expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. 43 Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that
there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as
the criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she
cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do
anything to influence the CA to render a decision in her
favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been
rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this
administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP
Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample
grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive
suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in
respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but
also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous
ruling involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful
language in her Comment is certainly below the standard
expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position
of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience
and courtesy both in conduct and in
language. 44 Illustrative are the following statements: "CA
Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; 45 "In
a frenzied display of arrogance and power"; 46 "(CA Lock's)
complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the
trial court"; 47 and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his
objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office
to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him
to step down." 48 In the attempt to discredit CA Lock,
respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the
controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA
Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his
embarrassment when the undersigned
mentioned to him that she knew how he used
his influence to secure a position for his son
at the RTC Library of Pasay City which was
then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA
Lock had made sure that his son be assigned
to the library to enable the latter to
conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing
for the bar examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the
respondent said: "A reading of the motion for
reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly
anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about
the guilt of the undersigned. Speculations, especially
those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of
attention-seeking individuals, are no different from
garbage that should be rejected outright" ; 49 and
"His malicious insinuation is noless than a revelation of
his warped mindset that a person's position could cause
pressure to bear among government officials. This brings
forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position
at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a
favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged
against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own
ghost?" 50
It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of
justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament
at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She
must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and
imposes a number of restrictions. This is the price that
judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their
exalted positions in the administration of
justice. 51 DcTaEH
One final word. The parties herein have admitted in
their various pleadings that they have filed numerous
cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the
prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their
opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind
them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence,
when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the
pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give
them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless
abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a
puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible
children.
Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind
that they are high-ranking public officers whom the people
look up to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public
service. Name-calling hardly becomes them.
Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant
consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the
public service, we find both officials wanting in the
conduct demanded of public servants.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless,
respondent Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is
hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language
in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe
sanction.
Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the
Department of Justice is hereby WARNED that he should
be more circumspect in the statements made in his
pleadings and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is
DENIED for lack of merit.
 The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-
G.R. CR No. 30260 involving respondent Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC,
[January 31, 2008], 567 PHIL 189-211)
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 10543. March 16, 2016.]
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY.
ROMEO G. AGUILOS, respondent.
SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. AGUILOS
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 |Bersamin, J.,
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an
attorney towards his client in which the former is found and declared to
be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish
tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his professional
engagement?
FACTS
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's
refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the
contemplated professional services.
 She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of
the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her
marriage with her estranged husband.
 She subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested
the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do
the same as he had already started working on the case; that
she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed
 That the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his
not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her; 5 and
that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to
bring an administrative complaint against him 6 in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared
that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a
petition for legal separation based on the psychological
incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable
because he himself was apparently not conversant with the
grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some
legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive
only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as
acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services
rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that,
accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of
P30,000.00.
IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months.
ISSUE(S)
(a) Whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) Whether or not
he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.
RULING
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be
ordered to return the entire amount received from the client

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional
competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing
findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the
grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage.
Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as
a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either
causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to
pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case
unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services
was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the
complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of
marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation
at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more
as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was,
therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on
him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01,
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which
he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his
professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his
use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney,
with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely
punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the
complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00,
plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this
decision until full payment.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
This administrative case relates to the performance
of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge
and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum
meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks
which he is naturally expected to perform during his
professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged
respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of
P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services
despite his not having performed the contemplated
professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she
sought the legal services of the respondent to represent
her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00,
plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she
then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that
she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on
the developments in her case, but he told her that he
would only start working on the case upon her full
payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned
then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a
petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of
her marriage; that he further told her that she would have
to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her
marriage; 2 that she subsequently withdrew the case from
him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid,
but he refused to do the same as he had already started
working on the case; 3 that she had sent him a letter,
through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of
her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the
legal services he had already performed; 4 that the
respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not
having rendered any appreciable legal services to
her; 5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts
prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against
him 6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007, 7 the respondent
alleges that the complainant and her British fiancée
sought his legal services to bring the petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of
her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for
legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity
of her husband; that she and her British fiancée agreed on
P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for
legal separation, with the fiancée paying him P70,000.00,
as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8that for
purposes of the petition for legal separation he required
the complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract
and the birth certificates of her children with her husband,
as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to
establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancée upon finalizing the
petition, but they did not promptly respond to his
communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him
that she had spent the money that her fiancée had given to
pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the
prepared petition for legal separation essentially
requesting him not to file the petition because she had
meanwhile opted to bring the action for the annulment of
her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand
letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he dismissed the
letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand
lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last
part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the
demand letter the following:
Hence, respondent accordingly treated
the said letter demand for refund dated 15
August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as
a mere scrap of paper or should have been
addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C.
MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on
an unverified information furnished him, to
the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
serve its rightful purpose. 9 cSEDTC
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
summoned the parties to a mandatory conference on
August 3, 2007, 10 but only the complainant and her
counsel attended the conference. On his part, the
respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-
CBD to reiterate his answer. 11 Due to his non-appearance,
the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day,
but required the complainant to submit a verified position
paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper
in the end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25,
2008, 12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that
he could have brought a petition for legal separation based
on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's
husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal services
to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only
P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as
acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the
services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit;
and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her
the amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
observed that the respondent's statement in the last part
of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by
Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be
treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed
"to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its
rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he
opined that such offensive and improper language uttered
by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule
8.01 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
ultimately recommended as follows:
The undersigned Commissioner is most
respectfully recommending the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to
the complainant the amount of
P30,000.00 which he received for
the purpose of preparing a
petition for legal separation.
Undersigned believes that
considering the degree of
professional services he has
extended, the amount of
P40,000.00 he received on March
10, 2005 would be sufficient
payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the
grounds for legal separation and
annulment of marriage,
respondent should be
sanctioned. AIDSTE
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness towards
his colleagues and for using
offensive or improper language in
his pleading, which was filed right
before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, he must also be
sanctioned and disciplined in
order to avoid repetition of the
said misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
it is most respectfully recommended that
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to
complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of
P30,000.00 which the former received as
payment for his services because it is
excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months
for failure to show his respect to his fellow
lawyer and for using offensive and improper
language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008, 14 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the
penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully
 supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's failure to show respect to his
fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and
improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice. 15
The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, 16 which the IBP Board of Governors
denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March
23, 2014. 17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are:
(a) whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or
not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the
recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct,
and he should be ordered to return
the entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant
as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the
annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay
P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees
and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that
amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his
professional relationship with the complainant as his
client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and
findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama,
Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the
handwritten retainer's contract between the
respondent and the complainant, there is a
sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-
client relationship. The respondent agreed to
accept the case in the amount of
P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed
upon to be paid on installment basis.
Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal
documentation.
That next question is — for what case
the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it
intended for the filing of the annulment case
or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the
respondent, even the latter is quite confused
as to what action he is going to file in court.
The intention of the British national and the
complainant was to get married. At that time
and maybe up to now, the complainant is still
legally married to a certain Jovencio C.
Sanchez. That considering that the two are
intending to get married, we can safely
assume that the complainant was
contemplating of filing a petition for
annulment of marriage in order to free her
from the marriage bond with her husband. It
is only then, granting that the petition will be
granted, that the complainant will be free to
marry the British subject. The legal
separation is but a separation of husband and
wife from board and bed and the marriage
bond still exists. Granting that the petition for
legal separation will be granted, one is not
free to marry another person.
 A reading of the answer filed by the child of the petitioner, to engage
respondent would show that he himself is not in prostitution, or connivance in
well versed in the grounds for legal such corruption or
separation. He stated the following; inducement;AaCTcI
. . . respondent suggested (d) Final judgment
to them to file instead a legal sentencing the respondent to
separation case for the imprisonment of more than six
allegedpsychological years, even if pardoned;
incapacity of her husband to
(e) Drug addiction or
comply with his marital
habitual alcoholism of the
obligations developed or of their
respondent;
marriage on February 6, 1999.
(please see par. 2 of the (f) Lesbianism or
Answer). homosexuality of the
respondent:
If the intention was to file a petition for
legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the (g) Contracting by the
grounds are as follows: respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in
Sec. 2. Petition. —
or outside the Philippines;
(a) Who may and when to
(h) Sexual infidelity or
file — (1) A petition for legal
perversion of the respondent;
separation may be filed only by
the husband or the wife, as the (i) Attempt on the life of
case may be, within five years petitioner by the respondent; or
from the time of the occurrence (j) Abandonment of
of any of the following causes: petitioner by respondent without
(a) Repeated physical justifiable cause for more than
violence or grossly abusive one year.
conduct directed against the Psychological incapacity, contrary to
petitioner, a common child, or a what respondent explained to the
child of the petitioner; complainant, is not one of those mentioned in
(b) Physical violence or any of the grounds for legal separation.
moral pressure to compel the Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of
petitioner to change religious or the Philippines, psychological incapacity is
political affiliation; never a ground for the purpose of filing a
(c) Attempt of respondent petition for legal separation.
to corrupt or induce the On the other hand, psychological
petitioner, a common child, or a incapacity has always been used for the
 purpose of filing a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of
the New Family Code, it states that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the
legal developments and participate in
continuing legal education program (Canon 5
of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in
order to prevent repetition of such kind of
advise that respondent gave to the
complainant. In giving an advise, he should
be able to distinguish between the grounds
for legal separation and grounds for
annulment of marriage. But as the respondent
stated in his answer, it appears that he is
mixed up with the basic provisions of the
law. 18
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his
professional competence and skill to the complainant. As
the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the
distinction between the grounds for legal separation and
for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have
been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a
professional engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the
action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case
unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which
his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband
with the intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did
not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal
separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry.
That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he
had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she
had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have
the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond
comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the
standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE
HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 — A lawyer shall not
undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle
any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the
attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney is
entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney
is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve
the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for such services. 19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the
retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney,
which constitutes the law between the parties for as long
as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy or public order. 20 The underlying theory is
that the retainer's agreement between them gives to the
client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the
fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned
to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is
determined on the basis of what he and the client
agreed. 21 In the absence of the written agreement, the
lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit,
which means "as much as he deserved." 22 The
determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable
cause, was not able to finish the case to its
conclusion." 23 Moreover,quantum meruit becomes the
basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where
the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will
be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the
attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every
case what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances, 24 provided that the attorney
does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping
with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: EcTCAD
Section 24. Compensation of
attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of
the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as
to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The court's supervision of the lawyer's compensation for
legal services rendered is not only for the purpose of
ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's
fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession. 25
The respondent should not have accepted the
engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way
above his ability and competence to handle the case for
annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had nobasis
to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the
complainant. He did not even begin to perform the
contemplated task he undertook for the complainant
because it was improbable that the agreement with her
was to bring the action for legal separation. His having
supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation
instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was
either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his
means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him
to retain the amount he had already received. SDHTEC
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows
that the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance
fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant
rested on his claim of having already completed the first
phase of the preparation of the petition for legal
separation after having held conferences with the
complainant and her British fiancée. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the
respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00
because the respondent had rendered some legal services
to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the
complainant undergo further interviews towards
establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing
into writing the grounds discussed during the interviews
based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and
2) after he could not understand the written statement
prepared for the purpose by her British fiancée; (c)
requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her
husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the
certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy,
Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed
Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her
petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of
April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la
Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too generous. We
cannot see how the respondent deserved any
compensation because he did not really begin to perform
the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he
would prepare the petition for legal separation instead of
the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who
fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and
expectedly perform during his professional engagement
does not discharge his professional responsibility and
ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus
guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to
the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may
be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received
from the latter in consideration of the professional
engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if
warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his
professional competence, and he is further to be ordered
to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from
the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the date of this decision until full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the
Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged." 26 This
duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of
Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our
legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong
language in the advancement of the interest of their
clients. 27 However, as members of a noble profession,
lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent
their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a
personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that
should not be used as license for the use of offensive and
abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer's language — spoken or in
his pleadings — must be dignified. 28 As such, every lawyer
is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect
not only towards his clients, the court and judicial officers,
but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession. AScHCD
The respondent's statement in his answer that the
demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere
scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel . . . to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
service its rightful purpose" constituted simple
misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent
tried to justify the offensive and improper language by
asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for
and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for
maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However,
his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and
impropriety of his language. He could have easily been
respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
 As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is
reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of
the offense will be severely punished.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with
the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is
hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his
professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and
improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the
stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be
severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos
to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from
notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full
payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of
the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination
to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, [March 16, 2016])
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5910. September 21, 2005.]
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and MRS. NATIVIDAD
CELESTINO, complainants, vs. ATTY. JOSE
CONCEPCION JAVIER, respondent.
Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent
to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is not covered by the
absolute immunity or privileged communication.
Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged
Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct
in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer’s oath for
employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are
false, unsubstantiated, with malicious imputation, abusive,
offensive and improper with the character of an attorney as a
quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing
his pleadings considering that his wife was included to the
burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that those
statements he made are privileged communication, it forming
part of a judicial proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the
alleged offensive statements he made in his pleadings
HELD:
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons
of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent
and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious
they may be. A matter, however, to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy or impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading
need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or
so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become
the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark
stated in his pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the
fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife.
This excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is
representing his wife is not at all an excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s
language must be dignified and choice of language is important
in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s
rights, a lawyer — even one gifted with superior intellect — is
enjoined to rein up his temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent
was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty.
Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity
does not extend.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY;
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION;
UTTERANCES MADE IN THE COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING ALL KINDS OF PLEADINGS,
PETITIONS AND MOTIONS, ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED SO
LONG AS THEY ARE PERTINENT AND RELEVANT TO THE
SUBJECT INQUIRY. — It is well entrenched in Philippine
jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances
made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds
of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged
so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject
inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. The
requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that
the protection given to individuals in the interest of an
efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a
cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified. If
the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and
alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege. A matter, however, to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt
its irrelevancy or impropriety. That matter alleged in a
pleading need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately
related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the
course of the trial.
2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; IN KEEPING WITH THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A LAWYER'S
LANGUAGE MUST BE DIGNIFIED. — In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer's language must be dignified
and choice of language is important in the preparation of
pleadings. In the assertion of his client's rights, a lawyer —
even one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up
his temper.
3. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER'S ARGUMENTS IN HIS PLEADINGS
SHOULD BE GRACIOUS TO BOTH THE COURT AND OPPOSING
COUNSEL. — Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: "CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL
CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL
AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. —
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
instructs that respondent's arguments in his pleadings should
be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of
such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman
to another. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
By complaint 1 dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo
L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino (complainants) charge
Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice,
gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of
the lawyer's oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks
made by respondent in the pleadings he filed in a petition for
audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty
Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein petitioners
UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former
UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-
LRD (audit case), 2 and from the pleadings filed by respondent
in another labor case as counsel for the one hundred seventy
six (176) faculty members of the University of the East
complainants against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L.
Torres, et al., 3 docketed as NCR-0D-0201-0005-LRD
(attorney's fees case). 4
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action
against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on respondent's
"Urgent Motion to Expedite with Manifestation and Reiteration
of Position" (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case which
complainants allege contained statements which are
absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious
imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFA's funds,
destruction or concealment of UEFA's documents and some
other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon their persons. 5 Portions of the questioned motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to
manifest — just so it can not be said later on
that he kept mum on the matter — that when
individual respondents-appellants realized that
an audit of Union funds was looming, it appears
that they decided to destroy or conceal
documents as demonstrated by an "Incident
Report Re Robbery" dated May 6, 2002 (a copy
just recently secured by the undersigned),
attached hereto as Annex "A", where the police
investigator stated that "no forcible entry" was
noted by him but "that air condition on the
respective rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic)
to mislead that suspect as the same as their
point of entry.["] The police officers stated that
"no cash of (sic) money were stolen but instead
claimed that still undetermined
documents/important papers were stolen by
the suspects."
This brings to mind the United States
case against Andersen officials who shredded
documents related to the Enron scandal when
they thought nobody was looking. As in
the Andersen/Enron case, the individual
respondents-appellants in the instant case
knew that the law was going to come knocking
at their door, asking a lot [of] questions about
financial matters.
From the undersigned's standpoint, the
alleged "robbery" of "still undetermined
documents/papers" was an inside job as
investigation has shown that there
is no evidence of forced entry. Besides, it
would be a cinch to establish a motive by
individual respondents-appellants Torres and
Celestino to destroy documents related to the
audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E.
Maraan. In any event, the undersigned thinks
that the legal process should go on. Lumang
gimmick na 'yang "robbery' ng mga
evidensya. They may try to cover up the
"looting" of union funds, but there is such a
thing as secondary evidence, not to mention
the power of this Honorable Office to
 issue subpoenas even to the union's depositary
banks. 6 (Underscoring supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent violated the
attorney's oath that he "obey the laws" and
"do no falsehood,"the Code of Professional Responsibility
particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically
paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules of Court for directly pointing to
them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery
at the UEFA office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case
which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the subject
of quasi-judicial inquiry. 7
As second cause of action, complainants allege that in
the attorney's fees case, respondent, in his "Reply to
Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment" filed
before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive,
offensive, and improper, 8 inconsistent with the character of
an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer. 9
As third/last cause of action, complainants quote
respondent's statement in the aforesaid Reply, to wit: aHcACI
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers
to hear notaries public asking their sons,
wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a
notarial office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits,
administer oaths and certify documents. . . ., 10
and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity
of the legal profession, "uncalled for and deserve[s]
censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession and the
solemnity of a notarial document." 11
By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he
was angry 12 while he was preparing his "Motion to Expedite"
in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that the
UEFA office had been burglarized and complainant Atty. Torres
had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients
including his wife to the burglary. 13
Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to
inform the BLR of the loss of the vital documents so that the
resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by
complainants would be expedited; 14 and that the information
regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case
as a figure of speech were relevant in drawing a link between
the burglary and the audit — the burglary having rendered the
complete implementation of the audit unattainable. 15
With respect to the attorney's fees case, respondent
claims that Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the
issues thereof but instead "mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed]
and distort[ed] realities" 16 by including malicious, libelous
and impertinent statements and accusations against his wife
which exasperated him. 17 A portion of Atty. Torres' Answer in
the attorney's fees case reads:
. . . in her incumbency as President of
the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got only
about P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect
only [in] 1994, with no other substantial
improvements of the teacher's benefits, and yet
she spent for more than half a million
negotiation expenses from the UEFA's funds.
Her 1994-1999 CBA was only a carbon copy of
her old 1989-1994 CBA with no substantial
improvements, with uncertain amount of her
expenses, because she removed/concealed all
the financial records of the UEFA during her
term. . . I and the other lawyers/teachers
denounced her unlawful deduction of 10%
attorney's fees from the small backwages
received by the teachers on April 28, 1993
although there was actually no lawyer who
worked for it . . . and there was no Board nor
General Membership Assembly Resolutions
passed . . . the assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was
apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when
she was booed while talking on the floor, like a
confused gabble (sic). . . 18
 Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty.
Torres, respondent admits having responded with a counter-
attack in his "Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez)
Answer/Comment" 19 wherein he stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty.
Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres
just cannot kick the habit of injecting
immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters
in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through
his teeth. The undersigned thinks that if he has
any common sense at all he should shut up
about his accusationthat Prof. Javier spent
more than half a million pesos for negotiation
expenses . . . she obtained only P2-increase in
union members salary, etc. because of the
pendency of the damage suit against him on
this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of
his life as a practitioner when he lost out to
Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (CaseNo.
NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain
"pogi" points prior to the UEFA election in
1994. 20
xxx xxx xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has
any common sense at all, he should stop
making irrelevant, libelous and impertinent
allegations in his pleadings. This means
changing his "standard tactic" of skirting the
main issues by injecting a web or a maze of
sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous
matters. 21(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the
BLR's attention that Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling
baseless accusations against his wife to embarrass her,
including one for unjust vexation and another for collection
and damages both of which were dismissed after trial on the
merits, thus prompting him to state that "these dismissed
cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres' pattern of mental
dishonesty." 22
Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the
same attorney's fees case, Atty. Torres accused his client,
Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and
of "deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax
Certificate" in order to justify the dismissal of the case
against him (Atty. Torres); 23 and that Atty. Torres continued
harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless
complaints for falsification of public document. 24Hence, in
defense of his clients, the following statements in his Reply:
Respondent further concluded that lead
petitioner Prof. Maguigad "falsified the said
petition by causing it to appear that he
participated" in the falsification "when he did
not in truth and in fact participate thereat" . . .
obviously oblivious of the obvious that it is
highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have
forged the signature of the notary public. If he
intended to forge it, what was the big idea of
doing so? To save Fifty Pesos (P50.00) for
notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation
that lead (sic) petitioner Maguigad used a
falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded
and malicious.
But that is not all. Respondents went
further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu,
Ramirez and Javier with the same crime of
falsification of public document . . . "by causing
it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had indeed
participated in the act of verifying/subscribing
and swearing the subject petition before notary
public Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth
and in fact he did not participate thereat."
To the mind of the undersigned, this is
the height of irresponsibility, coming as it does
from a member of the Philippine Bar. There
is no evidence to charge them with falsification
of public document, i.e. the "verification"
appended to the present petition. They did not
even sign it. The crime imputed is clearly
bereft of merit. Frankly, the undersigned thinks
that even a dim-witted first-year law student
of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating
would not oblige with such a very serious
the
charge.
inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings.
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s]
The
to hear notaries public asking their sons,
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation read:
wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to "operate" a
notarial office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits,
administer oaths, and certify documents.
Believing that the said "verification" was
signed by an impostor-relative of the notary
public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan]
through no fault of his client, Prof. Maguigad,
the undersigned sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On May
2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the
undersigned to inform him that he arrested in
the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen
whom he caught in flagrante delicto notarizing
an affidavit of loss and feigning to be Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.25
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners devoted so much space in
their answer/comment vainly trying to prove
that Profs. Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu,
Ramirez, and Javier committed the crime of
falsification of public document reasoning out
that they made "untruthful statements in the
narration of facts" in the basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of the
Philippine Bar. But what law books is he
reading?
He should know or ought to know that
the allegations in petitioners' pleading are
absolutely privileged because the said
allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues. 26 (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar
Code of Professional Responsibility for using
pertinent portions of the Investigating
Respondent admits that he was angry
when he wrote the Manifestation . . . and
alleges that Complainant implicated his wife in
a burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges that
Complainant has been "engaged in intimidating
and harassing" his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and
herein Respondent's wife have had a series of
charges and counter-charges filed against each
other. Both parties being protagonists in the
intramurals within the University of the East
Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein
Complainant is the President of the UEFA
whereas Respondent's wife was the former
President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat
this matter of charges and counter-charges
filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous,
peripheral, if not outright irrelevant to the issue
at hand.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, [r]espondent's primordial reason
for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings
was hisemotional reaction in view of the fact
that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute
with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained.
Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive
 and inappropriate. That the Respondent is complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the
representing his wife is not at all an burglary — the concealment and destruction of vital
excuse. 27 (Underscoring supplied) documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false
but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
resolution of the audit case. In that light, this Court finds that
recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
the first cause of action may not lie.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that
Philippines (IBP), by Resolution 28 of October 7, 2004, adopted
respondent was irked by Atty. Torres' Answer to the complaint
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
in the attorney's fees case wherein he criticized his
Investigating Commissioner.
(respondent's) wife's performance as past President of UEFA.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken
This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres'
but not its recommendation to reprimand him.
incorporating in his Answer in the attorney's fees case
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for statements such as "the assembly . . . was apparently irked by
reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the
judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions floor like a confused gabble (sic)." But neither does it
and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they countenance respondent's retaliating statements like "what
are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?," "he lies through his teeth," "if
false or malicious they may be. 29 he has any common sense at all he should shut up," and "Atty.
Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner
The requirements of materiality and relevancy are
when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which
imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the
he filed to gain pogi points." Nor respondent's emphasis that
interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be
Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling baseless accusations
abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be
against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases
gratified. 30 If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of
against his wife, of which Atty. Torres was the complainant,
the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous,
"indubitably indicate Atty. Torres' pattern of mental
he loses his privilege. 31
dishonesty."
A matter, however, to which the privilege does not
The issue in the attorney's fees case was whether the
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
10% attorney's fees "checked off" from the initial
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt
backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the
its irrelevancy or impropriety. 32 That matter alleged in a
above-quoted statements of respondent in the immediately
pleading need not be in every case material to the issues
preceding paragraph cannot be said to be relevant or
presented by the pleadings. It must, however,
pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted
be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject
himself improperly is not a justification for respondent to be
of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
relieved from observing professional conduct in his relations
the course of the trial. 33
with Atty. Torres.
The first cause of action of complainants is based on
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may
respondent's allegation in his "Motion to Expedite" that a
be the ill-feeling existing between clients should not be
burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to
allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each
other or toward suitors in the case. 34
In the attorney's fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as
counsel for himself as respondent and complainant was
acting as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although it is
understandable, if not justifiable, that in the defense of one's
clients — especially of one's wife or of one's self, the zeal in
so doing may be carried out to the point of undue skepticism
and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the
spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in
bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, and detract
from the dignity of the legal profession. 35
Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the
attorney's fees case on the basis of the alleged forgery of the
notary public's signature, respondent did not only endeavor to
point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an
argument, but personally attacked Atty. Torres' mental fitness
by stating that "the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted
first-year law student would not oblige with such a very
serious charge," and "[r]espondent Torres is a member of the
bar [b]ut what law books is he reading." DACTSH
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language must be dignified and choice of language is
important in the preparation of pleadings. 36 In the assertion
of his client's rights, a lawyer — even one gifted with superior
intellect — is enjoined to rein up his temper. 37
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory
statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to
his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the
mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Personal
colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote
unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided. 38
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for
falsification of public documents against respondent's clients
as a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate
recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the
course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the courts being
ever vigilant in the protection of a party's rights. 39
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT
HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
instructs that respondent's arguments in his pleadings
should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel
and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another. 40 The language vehicle does not
run short of expressions which are emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive. 41
As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate
and contemptible practice of notaries public — basis of the
last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that
should characterize the legal profession and the solemnity of
a notarial document, respondent, who justifies the same as
legitimate defense of his client who was being accused by
Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the
statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the
benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint — Annex "EJ-A" 42 to
the Comment of respondent filed by his wife, Prof. Eleonor R.
Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be
consolidated with the present administrative case since the
parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely
different from those of the present complaint.
 WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper
language in his pleadings, respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1)
Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the country for their information and
guidance. CSHcDT

SO ORDERED.

||| (Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, [September 21, 2005], 507
PHIL 397-409)