Barrios vs. Martinez

1/16/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 442
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Barrios vs. Martinez
*
A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004.
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY.

FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Gross Misconduct; Under Section 27, Rule

138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any of the following reasons.—Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
Same; Same; Same; “Moral Turpitude,” Defined.—Moral
turpitude “includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It involves “an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Issuance of a check knowing that
he or she does not have sufficient funds is a manifestation of moral
turpitude.—The act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the
time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its
presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a lawyer in issuing a
check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in law and lawyers.—The act of a lawyer in
issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016854b607d2f44b7a57003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 325
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the

public confidence in law and lawyers. And while “the general rule
is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for
misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where,
however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the
law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing him from the office of attorney.”
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; The Court may disbar or
suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as officers of
the Court.—The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is “to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable
and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.” “A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.”
“Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is noteworthy that in the past,
the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard
of its orders to file comments or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty for

disobedience thereof.—In Pajares v. Abad Santos, we reminded
attorneys that “there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which
provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information
326
and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action. It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined
lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file
comments or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty for disobedience
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership in the legal profession
is a privilege, demanding a high degree of good moral character.—
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege,
demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent falls
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of
the legal profession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.—In this case as
well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. “Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.”
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
1
1
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against
Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final
judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving
_______________
1 16 May 1996, filed by Michael P. Barrios, Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
327
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 327

moral turpitude by Branch

2
8 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City.
The dispositive portion of the same states:
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the Information. He is
imposed a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and fine
double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND
(8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 3
205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.”
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13

March 1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court
dated 20 March 1996. 4
On 03 July 1996, we required respondent to comment
on said petition within ten (10) days from notice.5
On 17
February 1997, we issued a second resolution requiring
him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with our earlier
Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997,
we imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondent’s failure to file
said Comment and required him6 to comply with our
previous resolution within ten days. On 27 April 1998, we
fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to
comply with the resolution requiring his comment within
ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest 7
for a
period of five (5) days or until his compliance. Finally, on
03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we
_______________
2 Entitled People of the Philippines v. Francisco Martinez for violation

of B.P. Blg. 22, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09899 and
by this Court in G.R. No. 118049.
3 Per Order, dated 10 May 1996, of Judge Mateo Leanda of the said
trial court, Rollo, Vol. I, p. 4.
4 Resolution, Id., at p. 23.
328

declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under

Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
ordered his imprisonment
8
until he complied with the
aforesaid resolutions.
On 059 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation
reported that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on
26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17
February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by remitting the amount
of P2,000 and submitting 10
his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment dated 16 March 1999, respondent
stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17

February 1997 as he was at that time undergoing
medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in
Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away
sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a
civil case which was decided in respondent’s favor
(as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that
as a result of his moving for the execution of
judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter
filed the present administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert

Visbal of the Provincial
11
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City
submitted a letter to the First Division Clerk of Court
alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in
another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving
the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the
Regional Trial Court
_______________

9 Letter from NBI Supervising Agent Arlis Vela to Second Division
Clerk of Court Teresita Magay-Dris, Id., at p. 100.
10 Id., at pp. 112-113.
11 Id., at pp. 49-50.
329
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 329

of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against

him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the Court
of Appeals.
In the said Decision 12of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court of Basey, Samar, it appears that herein respondent
Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of
the Doña Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff
in the said civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by
Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of
his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff
to endorse said check, which was then deposited in the
account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez’s wife. When
plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a
total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining
P60,000 as his attorney’s fees. Holding that it was “absurd
and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service . . . he
would collect 2/3 of the money claim,” the trial court
ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the
amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of
Martinez’s dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen
(14) specific instances thereof. Martinez’s appeal from the
above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for
his failure to file his brief, despite having
13
been granted
three thirty (30)-day extensions to14do so.
On 16 June 1999, we referred the present case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
15
The report of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston
D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 52-60.
13 Id., at pp. 61-62.

15 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 200-205.
330

“Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none
of the parties appeared before the Commission, until finally it was
considered submitted for resolution last 27 June 2002. On the
same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997
and that dismissal is warranted because “the case filed by him
does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is
extinguished upon his death.”
“We disagree with respondent’s contention.
“Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu
proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called
by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been
perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.
“As earlier cited, respondent lawyer’s propensity to disregard
or ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he
was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of
good moral character.
“Respondent’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
(estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness
to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the
imposition of sanctions against him (see In Re: Abesamis, 102
Phil. 1182; In Re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In Re: Vinzon, 19
SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda,
Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.”
On 27 September
16
2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed
a Resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez 17filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, in the
instant case alleging that:
_______________
16 Id., at p. 199.
17 Id., at pp. 215-218.
331
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 331

1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Investigating Commissioner is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law,
although admittedly the practice of law is a
privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his
day in court and allowed to adduce evidence, the
result/outcome would be entirely different from that
arrived at by the Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served
the judiciary in various capacities (from acting city
judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter
President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his
law practice.
18
On 14 January 2004, we required complainant to file a
comment within ten days. On 16 19February 2004, we
received a Manifestation and Motion from complainant’s
daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they
had not been furnished with a copy of respondent’s Motion,
notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives
next door to complainant’s family. Required to Comment on
17 May 2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to
furnish a copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The
records also show that respondent was given 20
several
opportunities21
to present evidence by this Court as well as
by the IBP. Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he
has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do
so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this
court to receive his evidence.
_______________

19 Id., at pp. 253-255.
20 Resolutions dated 3 July 1996, 17 February 1997, 7 July 1997, 27
April 1998, 3 February 1999; supra, Note Nos. 4-8.
21 IBP Order dated 08 February 2000, Records p. 156; Notice of Hearing

dated 29 November 2001, Records, p. 163, Order dated 24 January 2002,
Records, p. 169; Order dated 27 June 2002, Records, p. 183.
332

This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same

patience that it did when it waited for his comment on the
original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration
of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on
record sufficient to support the IBP’s findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty
and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The
issue with which we are now concerned is whether 22
or not
the said crime is one involving moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude “includes everything which is done 23
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It
involves “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
24
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
_______________
22 In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,

Adm. Case No. 229, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil. 323; De Jesus-Paras v.
Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, 12 April 1961, 111 Phil. 569, 1 SCRA 954.
23 In Re Basa, 7 December 1920, 41 Phil. 275.
24 Villaber v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148326, 15 November
2001, 369 SCRA 126, citing Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 121592, 05 July 1996, 258 SCRA 483.
333
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 333

25
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda, where the
erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we
held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted

also import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to “obey the laws of the land.” Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects26
the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated 27the above ruling in

Villaber v. Commission on Elections and disqualified a
congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final
judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
accordance with Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications.—Any person who has been declared

by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the

act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral
turpitude. Notwith-
_______________
25 Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692.

26 Id., at p. 697.
27 Supra, Note No. 24.
334

standing therein petitioner’s averment that he was not a

lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v.
Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, “imports deceit” and
“certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person.” [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a worthless check,
as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through
Justice Pedro L. Yap, “transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public” since the circulation of valueless commercial papers “can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.” Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and28customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals. (emphasis supplied)
29
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, we
stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having

been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No.
4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks
also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public
order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer’s
low regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken when
she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez
v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003, 412 SCRA 569]
_______________
28 Id., at p. 134.
29 Adm. Case No. 6408, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 209.
335
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 335

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check

without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine
the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while “the
general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity, where, however, the
misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is
so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified 30 in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.”
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself
admits, the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a
proceeding for disbarment is “to protect the administration
of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable; men
31
in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.” “A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
32
official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.”
“Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to
_______________
30 Co v. Bernardino, Adm. Case No. 3919, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA

102, citing In Re Pelaez, 3 March 1923, 44 Phil. 567 and In Re Sotto, No.
14576, 6 September 1918, 38 Phil 532.
31 In Re MacDougall, No. 1167, 16 December 1903, 3 Phil. 70, 78.
32 Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, Adm. Case No. 2884, 28 January 1998, 285
SCRA 93.
336

society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their

conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor—or 33
to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.”
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent’s
plea that if “given another chance to have his day in court
and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at.” We note with
displeasure the inordinate length of time respondent took
in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment
on the original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute
a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court,
which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus,
from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July
1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March
1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his
release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of
time it took respondent to comply, his Comment consists of
all of two pages, a copy
34
of which, it appears, he neglected to
furnish complainant. And while he claims to have been
confined while undergoing medical treatment at the time
our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely
reserved the submission of a certification to that effect.
Nor, indeed, was
_______________
33 Ibid.; Nakpil v. Valdes, Adm. Case No. 2040, 4 March 1998, 286
SCRA 758; Calub v. Suller, Adm. Case No. 1474, 28 January 2000, 323
SCRA 556; Cruz v. Jacinto, Adm. Case No. 5235, 22 March 2000, 328
SCRA 636.
34 Manifestation and Motion of Diane Frances Barrios Latoja dated 06
February 2004, Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 253 to 255. Respondent has failed to
comment within the period given him to do so.
337
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 337

he able to offer any explanation for his failure to submit his

Comment from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03
July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment

alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios,
passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the
latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said
Petition against him, which argument has already been
resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties
to appear before the Commission as the main reason for the
long delay, until the same was finally submitted for
Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore,
squandered away seven years to “have his day in court and
adduce evidence” in his behalf, which inaction also unduly
delayed the court’s prompt disposition
35
of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos, we reminded attorneys that
“there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5
of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which
provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation
of this36rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action. It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has
disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its
orders to file comments 37or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty
for disobedience thereof.
_______________
35 G.R. No. L-29543, 29 November 1969, 30 SCRA 748.

36 Id., at p. 753.
37 In The Matter Of Attorney Lope E. Adriano, Member of the Philippine
Bar, People of the Philippines v. Remigio Estebia, G.R. No. L-26868, 27
February 1969, 27 SCRA 106; People v. Rosqueta, G.R. No. L-36138, 31
January 1974, 55 SCRA 486; People v. Manangan, G.R. Nos. L-32918-19,
30 April 1974, 56 SCRA 817; People v. Dalusag, G.R. No. L-38988, 25
February 1975, 62 SCRA 540; Casals v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-35766, 12
July 1973, 52 SCRA 58.
338

For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take

respondent’s old age and the fact that he served in the
judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold
respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be
the embodiment
38
of competence, integrity, and39
independence, and his conduct should be above reproach.
The fact that respondent has chosen to engage in private
practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in
less honorable—or indeed in a less than honorable—
manner.
We stress
40
that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege, demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
but 41also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in
this case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld
the imposition of one year’s suspension for non-payment of
debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of 42
six months upon partial payment of the obligation.
However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of the
issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for
either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law.
_______________
38 Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct, 05 September 1989.

39 Canon 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 62,
Department of Justice, 01 August 1946).
40 Dumadag v. Lumaya, Adm. Case No. 2614, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA
513; National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120, 21
February 2000, 326 SCRA 109.
41 Supra, Note No. 28; supra, Note No. 26.
42 Supra, Note No. 25.
339
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 339

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been

found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,
which is similar to this case in that both respondents were
convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to
be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from

the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until
further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were
decided after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter
43
of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, we disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa
without discussing the circumstances behind his
conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude.

The review of respondent’s conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege
bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
44
administration of justice.
45
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles, a lawyer was
convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. “And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7
C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it
sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained
to decree
46
his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule
127.”
47
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces, the
erring lawyer acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting
_______________
43 Adm. Case No. 229, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil. 323.

44 Id., at p. 324.
45 Adm. Case No. 350, 07 August 1959, 106 Phil. 1.
46 Id., at p. 2.
47 Adm. Case No. 439, 12 April 1961, 111 Phil. 569, 1 SCRA 954.
340

to be a last will and testament, which later turned out to be a

forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of falsification of public document, which the Court held to be a
crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice,

honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment
48
Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado
Q. Gutierrez, Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for murder.
After serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the
pardon was not absolute and thus did not reach the
offense itself but merely remitted the unexecuted portion
of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
49
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Atty. Vinzon was
convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the
amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We
held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there
can be no question that the term “moral turpitude” includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and
in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good
morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary; In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent’s guilt cannot now
50
be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)

51
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña, the conditional pardon
extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also
failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment imposed
by this court.
52
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, a lawyer was
charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification of
public document for having prepared and notarized a deed
of sale of a parcel of
_______________
48 Adm. Case No. 363, 31 July 1962, 115 Phil. 647, 5 SCRA 661.
49 Adm. Case No. 561, 27 April 1967, 126 Phil. 96, 19 SCRA 815.
50 Id., at p. 100; p. 819.
51 Adm. Case No. 407, 15 August 1967, 127 Phil. 426, 20 SCRA 1012.
52 Adm. Case No. 2410, 23 October 1982, 203 Phil. 79, 117 SCRA 713.
341
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 341

land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and

that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled
that disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer’s conviction

by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and since
the crime of falsification of public document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered respondent’s name stricken off the roll of
attorneys.
53
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, we
upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa
through falsification of public documents, because she 54
was
“totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession.”
55
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson, a
lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted of estafa
by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his
client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the

appropriate penalty. “Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot
and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to
his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate
56
and dangerous elements of the body
politic.”
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez
is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member
of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
_______________
53 CBD Case No. 251, 11 July 1995, 245 SCRA 707.

54 Id., at p. 709.
55 Adm. Case No. 1037, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 129.
56 Supra, Note No. 44, p. 651, citing Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27
Law Ed., 552, 556.
342

Republic vs. Orfinada, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-
Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., On Official Leave.
Corona and Tinga, JJ., On Leave.
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez disbarred.
Note.—Disbarment should never be decreed where any

lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. (T’Boli
Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. [TADI] vs. Solilapsi, 394
SCRA 269 [2002])
——o0o——
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1/16/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 442

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY.

Attorneys; Duties; Gross Misconduct; Under Section 27, Rule

VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 12, 2004 325