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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

[1] X xxx xxx xxx

3. That at the time of the sale, appearing in Doc. No. 54, Page 81, Book No. 7, S. 1947,
in the book of Notary Public Basilio Binaoro of Tangub, Mis. Occ., Cresencia was a
EN BANC minor being only 16 years old, while Josefina who was long married and of legal age did
not know about the sale and/or did not give her consent to the same;
G.R. No. L-17299 July 31, 1963
4. That the plaintiffs commenced this case against the defendant on June 20, 1957 and
JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS the judicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but defendant
OMULON, plaintiffs-appellees, received the same on July 2, 1957.
vs.
MARIANO T. TIANO, defendant-appellant. After the hearing, the court a quo rendered the following judgment —

Pablito C. Pielago for plaintiffs-appellees. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring that
Prud. V. Villafuerte for defendant-appellant. the plaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property in question and therefore Judgment
is hereby ordered declaring them entitled to partition the property in question in
PAREDES, J.: proportion of 1/8 each of them, plus damages for both of them in the amount of
P1,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P200.00.
Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, were parents of five children, Isabelo, Lourdes,
Clemente, Josefina, and Cresencia. Gregoria died before the second world war, The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff, to
together with Clemente, single. During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties, partition the property in question and render a report within 30 days. Defendant moved
among which was a parcel of agricultural land, of about seven (7) hectares, located at for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that prescription had already set in, and
barrio Manga, municipality of Tangub, Misamis Occidental, planted to coconuts and his (defendant's) title, had become irrevocable, and that the award of damages had no
fruit-bearing trees. On July 2, 1947, Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three (3) factual and legal basis. The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1960.
children (Isabelo, Lourdes and Cresencia), purportedly sold the above mentioned parcel The Commissioner's report, partitioning the property was submitted on April 11, 1960.
to herein defendant Mariano T. Tiano, for P3,500.00. At the time of the sale, Cresencia Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, and on May 14, 1960, the same was
was a minor, and the other child, Josefina, did not sign the deed of sale, and did not given due course and elevated to this Court.
know about the transaction.
In claiming that prescription had taken place, appellant insists that the period should be
Under date of June 20, 1957, in action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with counted from the date the summons was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It
Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the complaint, it was was agreed, however, that the complaint for the recovery of the land in question was
alleged that they were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the presented on June 20, 1957, and the summons was sent out the following day. The Civil
sale and Crescencia was a minor; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions Code, provides that—
belonging to them, to their damage and prejudice in the amount of P7,000.00, which
consisted of their share in the produce of the property, during the period of defendant's The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when
possession. there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155)
In answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and that he was
not aware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense, defendant Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the ten (10) year period within
alleged that he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten (10) which to file the action had not yet elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was
years, from the date of purchase. Before the trial, the parties agreed to a stipulation of presented. While it is true that the sale in question had taken place before the effectivity
facts, parts of which recite — of the new Civil Code and the law then on matter of prescription was Act No. 190, said
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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

law, however, contained no specific provision on the interruption of the prescriptive


period; and the established rule then, as it is the rule now, is that the commencement of
the suit prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, interrupts the running of
the statute, as to all parties to the action (34 Am. Jur., Sec. 247, pp. 202-203; Peralta, et
al. v. Alipio, G. R. No. L-8273, Oct. 24, 1955). The fact that summons was only served
on defendant on July 2, 1957, which incidentally and/or coincidentally was the end of the
ten (10) year period, is of no moment, since civil actions are deemed commenced from
date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking
into account the issuance and service of summons (Sotelo v. Dizon, et al., 67 Phil. 573).
The contention that the period was not interrupted, until after defendant received the
summons is, therefore, without legal basis.

Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the property
in question because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession
(Art. 1123, N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957. Conceding, for the
purposes of argument, that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail
himself of acquisitive prescription, for the simple reason that no finding was made by the
trial court that his possession from the time of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title,
in good faith, in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted
(Arts. 1117 & 1118, N.C.C.). Good faith is a question of fact which must be proved (Art.
1127, N.C.C.). For the purposes of acquisitive prescription, just title must also be proved,
it is never presumed (Art. 1131, N.C.C.). The factual requisite of adverse possession do
not appear in the stipulation of facts and the trial court did not make findings to this effect.
These circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated, had the appeal been
taken to the Court of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen to appeal the [2] X
decision directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived questions of fact and raised
only questions of law. There being no factual finding by the lower court of the presence
of the requisites of acquisitive prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, THIRD DIVISION
said defense. Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10)
years necessary for acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period
terminated on that very day.1äwphï1.ñët
[G.R. No. 141833. March 26, 2003]
As to the award of damages, We find Ourselves devoid of ample authority to review the
same, since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found by the lower
court, that plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land. Verily, they should also
share in the produce, which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the defendant-appellant herein. LM POWER ENGINEERING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL
CONSTRUCTION GROUPS, INC., respondent.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs
against appellant in both instances.
DECISION

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and PANGANIBAN, J.:
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs -- like arbitration, mediation, In its Order[12] dated September 15, 1987, the RTC denied the Motion on the
negotiation and conciliation -- are encouraged by the Supreme Court. By enabling ground that the dispute did not involve the interpretation or the implementation of the
parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they provide solutions that are less Agreement and was, therefore, not covered by the arbitral clause.[13]
time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and more productive of goodwill and
lasting relationships.[1] After trial on the merits, the RTC[14] ruled that the take-over of some work items by
respondent was not equivalent to a termination, but a mere modification, of the
Subcontract. The latter was ordered to give full payment for the work completed by
petitioner.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Court, seeking to set aside the January 28, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA)
in CA-GR CV No. 54232. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and ordered the referral of the case to
arbitration. The appellate court held as arbitrable the issue of whether respondents
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The take-over of some work items had been intended to be a termination of the original
parties are ORDERED to present their dispute to arbitration in accordance with their contract under Letter K of the Subcontract. It ruled likewise on two other issues: whether
Sub-contract Agreement. The surety bond posted by [respondent] is [d]ischarged. [4] petitioner was liable under the warranty clause of the Agreement, and whether it should
reimburse respondent for the work the latter had taken over. [15]

Hence, this Petition.[16]


The Facts

On February 22, 1983, Petitioner LM Power Engineering Corporation and The Issues
Respondent Capitol Industrial Construction Groups Inc. entered into a Subcontract
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
Agreement involving electrical work at the Third Port of Zamboanga.[5]
consideration:
On April 25, 1985, respondent took over some of the work contracted to
A
petitioner.[6] Allegedly, the latter had failed to finish it because of its inability to procure
materials.[7]
Whether or not there exist[s] a controversy/dispute between petitioner and respondent
Upon completing its task under the Contract, petitioner billed respondent in the regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Sub-Contract Agreement dated
amount of P6,711,813.90.[8] Contesting the accuracy of the amount of advances and February 22, 1983 that requires prior recourse to voluntary arbitration;
billable accomplishments listed by the former, the latter refused to pay. Respondent also
took refuge in the termination clause of the Agreement. [9] That clause allowed it to set off B
the cost of the work that petitioner had failed to undertake -- due to termination or
take-over -- against the amount it owed the latter.
In the affirmative, whether or not the requirements provided in Article III [1] of CIAC
Because of the dispute, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Arbitration Rules regarding request for arbitration ha[ve] been complied with[.] [17]
Makati (Branch 141) a Complaint[10] for the collection of the amount representing the
alleged balance due it under the Subcontract. Instead of submitting an Answer,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,[11] alleging that the Complaint was premature,
The Courts Ruling
because there was no prior recourse to arbitration.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

The Petition is unmeritorious. G. TIME SCHEDULE

[Petitioner] shall adhere strictly to the schedule related to the WORK and
First Issue: complete the WORK within the period set forth in Annex C hereof. NO time
Whether Dispute Is Arbitrable extension shall be granted by [respondent] to [petitioner] unless a
corresponding time extension is granted by [the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways] to the CONSORTIUM.[20]
Petitioner claims that there is no conflict regarding the interpretation or the
implementation of the Agreement. Thus, without having to resort to prior arbitration, it is Because of the delay, respondent alleges that it took over some of the work
entitled to collect the value of the services it rendered through an ordinary action for the contracted to petitioner, pursuant to the following provision in the Agreement:
collection of a sum of money from respondent. On the other hand, the latter contends
that there is a need for prior arbitration as provided in the Agreement. This is because K. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
there are some disparities between the parties positions regarding the extent of the work
done, the amount of advances and billable accomplishments, and the set off of
[Respondent] has the right to terminate and/or take over this Agreement for
expenses incurred by respondent in its take-over of petitioners work.
any of the following causes:
We side with respondent. Essentially, the dispute arose from the parties
ncongruent positions on whether certain provisions of their Agreement could be applied xxxxxxxxx
to the facts. The instant case involves technical discrepancies that are better left to an
arbitral body that has expertise in those areas. In any event, the inclusion of an 6. If despite previous warnings by [respondent], [petitioner] does not
arbitration clause in a contract does not ipso facto divest the courts of jurisdiction to execute the WORK in accordance with this Agreement, or persistently
pass upon the findings of arbitral bodies, because the awards are still judicially or flagrantly neglects to carry out [its] obligations under this
reviewable under certain conditions.[18] Agreement.[21]
In the case before us, the Subcontract has the following arbitral clause:
Supposedly, as a result of the take-over, respondent incurred expenses in excess
6. The Parties hereto agree that any dispute or conflict as regards to of the contracted price. It sought to set off those expenses against the amount claimed
interpretation and implementation of this Agreement which cannot be settled by petitioner for the work the latter accomplished, pursuant to the following provision:
between [respondent] and [petitioner] amicably shall be settled by means of
arbitration x x x.[19] If the total direct and indirect cost of completing the remaining part of the WORK exceed
the sum which would have been payable to [petitioner] had it completed the WORK, the
Clearly, the resolution of the dispute between the parties herein requires a referral amount of such excess [may be] claimed by [respondent] from either of the following:
to the provisions of their Agreement. Within the scope of the arbitration clause are
discrepancies as to the amount of advances and billable accomplishments, the 1. Any amount due [petitioner] from [respondent] at the time of the termination of this
application of the provision on termination, and the consequent set-off of expenses. Agreement.[22]

A review of the factual allegations of the parties reveals that they differ on the
The issue as to the correct amount of petitioners advances and billable
following questions: (1) Did a take-over/termination occur? (2) May the expenses
accomplishments involves an evaluation of the manner in which the parties completed
incurred by respondent in the take-over be set off against the amounts it owed petitioner?
the work, the extent to which they did it, and the expenses each of them incurred in
(3) How much were the advances and billable accomplishments?
connection therewith. Arbitrators also need to look into the computation of foreign and
The resolution of the foregoing issues lies in the interpretation of the provisions of local costs of materials, foreign and local advances, retention fees and letters of credit,
the Agreement. According to respondent, the take-over was caused by petitioners delay and taxes and duties as set forth in the Agreement. These data can be gathered from a
in completing the work. Such delay was in violation of the provision in the Agreement as review of the Agreement, pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:
to time schedule:
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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

C. CONTRACT PRICE AND TERMS OF PAYMENT regarded as the wave of the future in international civil and commercial
disputes.[26] Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the
xxxxxxxxx parties would be a step backward.[27]

Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute


All progress payments to be made by [respondent] to [petitioner] shall be resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such
subject to a retention sum of ten percent (10%) of the value of the approved clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to
quantities. Any claims by [respondent] on [petitioner] may be deducted by arbitrate should be granted.[28] Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.[29]
[respondent] from the progress payments and/or retained amount. Any
excess from the retained amount after deducting [respondents] claims shall
be released by [respondent] to [petitioner] after the issuance of [the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways] of the Certificate of Completion and final Second Issue:
acceptance of the WORK by [the Ministry of Public Works and Highways]. Prior Request for Arbitration

xxxxxxxxx According to petitioner, assuming arguendo that the dispute is arbitrable, the
failure to file a formal request for arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration
D. IMPORTED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT Commission (CIAC) precluded the latter from acquiring jurisdiction over the question. To
bolster its position, petitioner even cites our ruling in Tesco Services Incorporated v.
[Respondent shall open the letters of credit for the importation of equipment Vera.[30] We are not persuaded.
and materials listed in Annex E hereof after the drawings, brochures, and
Section 1 of Article II of the old Rules of Procedure Governing Construction
other technical data of each items in the list have been formally approved by
Arbitration indeed required the submission of a request for arbitration, as follows:
[the Ministry of Public Works and Highways]. However, petitioner will still be
fully responsible for all imported materials and equipment.
SECTION. 1. Submission to Arbitration -- Any party to a construction contract wishing to
have recourse to arbitration by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
All expenses incurred by [respondent], both in foreign and local currencies in
shall submit its Request for Arbitration in sufficient copies to the Secretariat of the CIAC;
connection with the opening of the letters of credit shall be deducted from the
PROVIDED, that in the case of government construction contracts, all administrative
Contract Prices.
remedies available to the parties must have been exhausted within 90 days from the
time the dispute arose.
xxxxxxxxx
Tesco was promulgated by this Court, using the foregoing provision as reference.
N. OTHER CONDITIONS
On the other hand, Section 1 of Article III of the new Rules of Procedure Governing
xxxxxxxxx Construction Arbitration has dispensed with this requirement and recourse to the CIAC
may now be availed of whenever a contract contains a clause for the submission of a
future controversy to arbitration, in this wise:
2. All customs duties, import duties, contractors taxes, income taxes, and
other taxes that may be required by any government agencies in connection
with this Agreement shall be for the sole account of [petitioner]. [23] SECTION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction An arbitration clause in a construction
contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an
agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction,
Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling
notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such
disputes,[24] arbitration -- along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation -- is
contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future
encouraged by the Supreme Court.Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration
controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission
also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind.[25] It is thus
agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)
[3]
The foregoing amendments in the Rules were formalized by CIAC Resolution Nos. Seventh Division. Written by Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and concurred in by
2-91 and 3-93.[31] Justices Corona Ibay-Somera (Division chairman) and Wenceslao I. Agnir Jr.
(member).
The difference in the two provisions was clearly explained in China Chang Jiang
Energy Corporation (Philippines) v. Rosal Infrastructure Builders et al.[32] (an extended [4] Assailed CA Decision, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 40-41.
unsigned Resolution) and reiterated in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of [5]
Appeals,[33] from which we quote thus: See Pay Item Nos. 7.01 to 7.26 of the Bill of Quantities; Records, pp. 16-25.
[6] See Letters dated March 15, 1985 and April 25, 1985, pp. 63-64.
Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a particular construction contract to fall within
[7]
the jurisdiction of CIAC, it is merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to See Letter dated March 7, 1985, p. 62.
voluntary arbitrationUnlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in [8] See Letter dated September 30, 1986, p. 65.
the Tesco case, the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree
[9]
to submit disputes arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to Records, pp. 68-69.
acquire jurisdiction over the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties [10]
agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their Id., pp. 1-3.
agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically [11] Id., pp. 32-34.
choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their
[12]
dispute before the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law, i.e., Presided by Judge Phinney C. Araquil.
E.O. No. 1008.[34] [13] Records, p. 41.
[14]
Clearly, there is no more need to file a request with the CIAC in order to vest it with Transferred to Makati, Branch 64. Presided by Judge Delia H. Panganiban.
jurisdiction to decide a construction dispute. [15] Assailed CA Decision, pp. 20-21; rollo, pp. 39-40.
The arbitral clause in the Agreement is a commitment on the part of the parties to [16] This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 25, 2001, upon this Courts
submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein. Because that clause is binding, they
receipt of respondents Memorandum signed by Atty. Henry S.
are expected to abide by it in good faith. [35] And because it covers the dispute between
Rojas. Petitioners Memorandum, filed on October 10, 2001, was signed by Atty.
the parties in the present case, either of them may compel the other to arbitrate. [36]
Eleazar G. Ferry.
Since petitioner has already filed a Complaint with the RTC without prior recourse to [17] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 223. Original in upper case.
arbitration, the proper procedure to enable the CIAC to decide on the dispute is to request
the stay or suspension of such action, as provided under RA 876 [the Arbitration Law].[37] [18] Bengson v. Chan, 78 SCRA 113, July 29, 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed [19] Subcontract Agreement, p. 10; rollo, p. 52. Italics supplied.
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[20] Subcontract Agreement, p. 6; rollo, p. 47.
SO ORDERED.
[21] Id., pp. 7-8 & 48-49. Italics supplied.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[22] Id., pp. 8 & 49.
[23] Id., pp. 3-10 & 44-51.
[24]
[1] See Panganiban, A Centenary of Justice, 2001 ed., p. 83. Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 373, February 7,
2001; Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc., 102 Phil. 1,
[2] Rollo, pp. 7-17. September 10, 1957.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)
[25] Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 558,
November 19, 1999.
[26] Heirs of Augusto L. Salas Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation, 320 SCRA 610,
December 13, 1999; BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267,
March 27, 1998.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corporation, 554 F2d
657 (US Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit), June 22, 1977.
[29] Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., 460 US 1, February 23, 1983;
Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F2d 382 (US
Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit), February 16, 1961.
[30] 209 SCRA 440, May 29, 1992.
[31] These were promulgated by the CIAC on June 21, 1991 and August 25, 1993,
respectively.
[32] GR No. 125706, September 30, 1996.
[33] 318 SCRA 255, November 17, 1999.
[34] Id., p. 268, per Davide Jr., CJ.
[35] Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 236,
December 7, 1992.
[36] See 6 of RA 876.
[37] SEC. 7. Stay of Civil Action. If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue
arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in
which such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the
action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement: Provided, That the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration.

[3]

THIRD DIVISION

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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

[G.R. No. 144074. March 20, 2001] ARBITER FELIPE P. PATI WHICH AWARDED MONETARY CLAIMS AND
OTHER RELIEF NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT, IN GRAVE ABUSE
OF THEIR DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.
MEDINA INVESTIGATION & SECURITY CORPORATION and ERNESTO Z.
MEDINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR PUBLIC APPELLEES GROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROMEO TABURNAL, respondents. DISCRETION, WHEN THEY HELD APPELLANT ERNESTO Z. MEDINA
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MISCOR, INSPITE OF
RESOLUTION THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Petitioners main contention is that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals was within the 60-day reglementary period pursuant to Rule 65. They insist that
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the Resolution dated when the assailed Order was received on April 3, 2000, the petition filed on May 31,
June 2, 2000 dismissing the petition for being filed beyond the 60-day reglementary 2000 was the 58th day, citing Section 1, Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
period and the Resolution dated July 12, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, and Article 13 of the Civil Code.
both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58968.
In his Comment, private respondent Romeo Taburnal alleges that he is aware that
Respondent Romeo Taburnal was hired by petitioner corporation as security guard Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure was later amended, which
on September 8, 1996 and was assigned to one of its clients, Abenson, Inc. at Sta. amendment took effect on September 1, 2000. He insists however that the petition filed
Lucia Grand Mall. On September 5, 1997, the client requested that respondent Taburnal with the Court of Appeals was not yet covered by said amendment. Private respondent
be relieved due to violations pursuant to the Service Contract such as reporting late for further avers that Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure
duty, below standard performance of duties, and exceeding the maximum six (6) months provide that appeal is the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by a decision of the Labor
duty in the company. In view of his replacement, respondent Taburnal filed a complaint Arbiter and the filing of a petition for certiorari with the NLRC by petitioners is definitely a
for Illegal Dismissal claiming for separation pay, non-payment of legal/special holiday wrong remedy.
and overtime pay, underpayment of 13th month pay and cash bond and tax refund. On
April 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering the reinstatement of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
respondent Taburnal without loss of seniority rights and the payment of full backwages Procedure (as amended by the Resolution of July 21, 1998) took effect on September 1,
and salary differentials. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the same for 2000 and provides, to wit:
lack of jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration thereto was denied. Herein
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
petition outright for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period or on the (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
67th day per its Resolution on June 2, 2000. The Court of Appeals ruled that the petition reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
was filed on the sixty-seventh (67th) day since petitioners received on November 10, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
1999 the Order dated August 26, 1999 of the NLRC and the Motion for Reconsideration
thereto was filed of November 19, 1999. Copy of the order denying the said motion was The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of
received by petitioners on April 3, 2000, while the petition was filed with the Court of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
Appeals on May 31, 2000. The Court of Appeals did not discuss the merits of the exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
petition. Hence, the petition raising the following grounds: also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITION the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
FOR CERTIORARI WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

PUBLIC APPELLEES COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN THEY No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
DISMISSED THE PETITION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF LABOR and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
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Contrary to the position of respondents that such amendment should not apply in
this case, we have ruled in the cases of Systems Factors Corporation and Modesto
Dean vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 143789 (promulgated on November 27,
2000) and Unity Fishing Development Corp. and/or Antonio Dee vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 145415 (promulgated on February 2, 2001) that the amendment under A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a petition for certiorari is reckoned from
receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration should be deemed
applicable. We reiterate that remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes.[1] Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected.[2] The reason is that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws.[3]
[4]
The above conclusion is consonant with the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that (T)hese Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. FIRST DIVISION

The other issues raised by petitioners should be addressed and resolved by the [G.R. No. 149692. July 30, 2002]
court below.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JULIAN DELA CRUZ AND MAGDALENA TUAZON,
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and July 12, 2000 are hereby represented by their Attorney-in-Fact and co-heir, VIRGILIO C.
SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further ALVENDIA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FLORENTINO QUINTOS, SR.,
proceedings. namely, FLORENTINO QUINTOS, JR. and GLORIA QUINTOS
BUGAYONG, respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioners


seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated May 29, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals[1] which dismissed their petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (Branch 38) on the ground that the petition was filed out
of time; and, the Resolution dated August 29, 2001[2] denying their motion for
reconsideration.

Sometime in 1996, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan an action for reconveyance with damages [3] against respondents
alleging, among others, that they are the children of the late Ariston dela Cruz, who was

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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

the only forced and legal heir of his deceased parents, Julian dela Cruz and Magdalena Petitioners counsel filed her Comment to respondents motion to dismiss alleging
Tuazon who died intestate; that sometime in 1897, Magdalena Tuazon purchased from that when she arrived in her office on April 3, 2000, she found copies of pleadings and
Herminigildo and Filomena Tiong a certain parcel of land located at Heroes Street, correspondence including a copy of the trial courts Resolution dated March 8, 2000
Lingayen, Pangasinan consisting of 605 square meters and since then respondents and denying her motion for reconsideration; that she thought that these pleadings and
their predecessors had been in continuous occupation and adverse possession of the correspondence were all received on April 3, 2000; that upon receipt of respondents
subject land; that sometime in 1987, private respondents predecessor Florentino motion to dismiss, she confronted her secretary who told her that the envelope
Quintos, Sr., filed an application for the judicial registration of a certain land which containing the Resolution was only opened on April 3, 2000 and her secretary could not
included petitioners land; that the land registration court granted Quintos application and recall if the Resolution was among those she received on March 16, 2000.
decreed the land in Florentino Quintos name and OCT No. 22665 was subsequently
issued; that OCT No. 22665 was partitioned into four separate lots and petitioners land On May 29, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners
was covered by TCT No. 173052; that respondents subsequently filed a complaint petition for review for being filed out of time. It found the explanation given by petitioners
(docketed as Civil Case No. 4118) for illegal detainer against petitioners for the latters counsel unconvincing since she failed to give the reason why the envelope was opened
refusal to vacate the subject land which resulted in petitioners ejectment from the only on April 3, 2000; that counsels secretary did not even admit that she actually
subject property. received the said Resolution; that it is the counsels duty to adopt and strictly maintain a
system that efficiently takes into account all court notices sent to her and she failed to
Respondents filed their answer with counterclaim, alleging that the subject land instruct and remind her secretary on what should be done with respect to such notices
had always belonged to respondents late father Florentino Quintos, Sr., who in turn and processes. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
inherited the same from his mother, Dolores Tuazon; that the affidavit evidencing August 29, 2001.
petitioners ownership of the subject land was not attached to the complaint; that
respondents predecessors merely tolerated petitioners possession of the subject land; Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
that petitioners never filed their opposition to respondents application for registration 1) The appellate court rejected and refused to consider the valid reason
despite knowledge thereof; that the land registration case which was the basis for the submitted by the petitioners counsel for the apparent delay in the filing of
issuance of OCT No. 22665 in the name of the predecessor of respondents was a the petition for review with said court; hence the dismissal of the petition
proceeding in rem which bound all persons whether notified or not. was tainted with grave abuse of discretion;
On January 29, 1999, a decision[4] was rendered by the MTC declaring petitioners 2) Granting, arguendo, that there is a basis for the dismissal of the petition,
as the legal owners of the land covered by TCT No. 173052 and ordering respondents the appellate court should have applied the principle of liberal
to convey to petitioners the subject land and to pay damages to petitioners. [5] construction of the Rules pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules
Respondents filed their appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, of Civil Procedure (1997 RCP), considering the valid and meritorious
Pangasinan (Branch 38). On January 19, 2000, the RTC[6] reversed the decision of the case of petitioners.
MTC dismissing the complaint, declaring respondents as the absolute owners of the 3) In either case, it is respectfully submitted that the appellate court has
subject land and ordering petitioners to pay damages to respondents. departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied in a dismissing outright the petition for review as to call for the supervision of
Resolution dated March 8, 2000.[7] this Honorable Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. [8]

On April 18, 2000, petitioners, through counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) We deny the petition.
a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review which she subsequently filed on Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, provides that the petition
May 2, 2000. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review for being filed shall be filed and served within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be
out of time since the certification issued by Postmaster Elizabeth I. Torio of Dagupan reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
City Post Office and the affidavit of Ricardo C. Castro, Clerk III of the Regional Trial time after judgment.[9] In the instant case, it has been established that the resolution
Court show that the trial courts Resolution dated March 8, 2000 denying petitioners denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was received
motion for reconsideration was received by the secretary of petitioners counsel by the secretary of petitioners former counsel on March 16, 2000, thus the last day of
on March 16, 2000, thus the filing of the petition was filed 28 days late. the 15-day period within which to file the petition for review with the respondent court
was March 31, 2000. Considering that counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file
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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

a petition for review with the respondent court only on April 18, 2000, the judgment of rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. (Limpot vs. CA, 170
the RTC subject of the petition for review had already become final and SCRA 369)
executory. Consequently, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for being filed out
of time since it has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition much less to alter a xxx xxx xxx
judgment.

This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. [10] The replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it
failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an
to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over earlier case, and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity
the case.[11] The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court,
accordance with the provisions of the law. [12] The party who seeks to avail of the same cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law aslong as it remains in force. The
must comply with the requirement of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists- and is now
lost. [13] still reverently observed- is `aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. (Aguila vs. CA, 160
SCRA 359)
We agree with the CA when it found that the reason advanced by petitioners
former counsel, which is that she received the resolution denying her motion for
At any rate, we find no reversible error committed by the RTC in dismissing
reconsideration only on April 3, 2000 as she found it on her table on the same date,
petitioners complaint for reconveyance against respondents. Petitioners claim of
unacceptable. The negligence of her secretary in failing to immediately give the trial
ownership was based on the affidavit of Herminigildo and Filomena Tiong executed on
courts resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration upon receipt to the
November 9, 1926 which stated among others that they were the former owners in
counsel and the negligence of counsel to adopt and arrange matters in order to ensure
common of the subject parcel of land which they sold to Magdalena Tuazon (petitioners
that official or judicial communications sent by mail would reach her promptly cannot be
predecessor in interest) on or about the year 1897. However, such affidavit was not
considered excusable. The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of the
accompanied by any instrument showing the sale between the Tiong spouses and
clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the
Magdalena Tuazon. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership,[17] thus it
latter.[14] The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because
cannot serve as the basis of ownership of the petitioners.Moreover, the RTC found that
otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
there was no tax declaration or title in the name of the Tiong spouses to evidence their
employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not be sufficiently diligent,
ownership of the subject land. On the other hand, respondents ownership of the subject
or experienced, or learned.[15]
land was by virtue of a land registration case where the land registration court found
Petitioners claim that there should be a liberal construction of the rules of sufficient the well documented evidence submitted by applicant Florentino Quintos, Sr.
procedure in order to effect substantial justice and appeal to this Courts exercise of ( respondents predecessor in interest ) to prove their ownership of 2,048 sq. meters lot
equity jurisdiction. We are not persuaded. There is no showing in this case of any which included the subject land.
extraordinary circumstance which may justify a deviation from the rule on timely filing of
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a
appeals. As held in the case of Tupas vs. CA:[16]
preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.[18] The RTC had correctly
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to ruled that petitioners failed to show sufficient proof of ownership over the subject land
suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, has covered by TCT No. 173052 so as to entitle them the return of the same.
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolution dated
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give May 29, 2001 and Resolution dated August 29, 2001 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy petitioners.
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and
SO ORDERED.
procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ACTIONS (RULE 1)

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, concurred in by Justices Romeo
xxxx
[9]Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing- A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk
of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[10]Villanueva vs. CA, 205 SCRA 537, 543 citing Reyes vs. Carrasco, 38 SCRA 296
(1971); Republic, et al. vs. Reyes, etc., et al., 71 SCRA 450 (1976); Borre, et al., vs. CA,
et al., 158 SCRA 560 (1988); Sublay vs. NLRC; 324 SCRA 188
[11]
Villanueva vs. CA, supra citing Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. vs. Lagradante, et al., 99
Phil 434 (1956); Pabores vs. Workmens Compensation Commission, et al., 104 Phil
505 (1958); A.L. Ammen Transportation , Co., Inc. vs.Workmens Compensation
Commission, et al., 12 SCRA 508 (1964).
[12]
Ibid, citing Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 152 SCRA 540
(1987); Borre, et al vs. CA, supra.
[13] Ibid, citing Ozaeta vs. CA, et. al., 179 SCRA 800 (1989).
[14] Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. CA, 162 SCRA 371, 375 (1988).
[15] Gacutana-Fraile vs. Domingo, 348 SCRA 414, 422 (2000).
[16] 193 SCRA 597, 600 (1991).
[17] Cequea vs. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216, 223-224 (2000).
[18] Javier vs. CA, 231 SCRA 498, 504 (1994).

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