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Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

de facto government

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH


G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation
were no de facto government.
Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said
judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings
of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and
valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a
political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the
well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of
a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were
good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention
of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a
matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually
take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals
to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this
connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with
the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by
the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by
the occupant of transient character.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Conflict with fundamental law; Police power

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.

Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others,
are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of
the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.”

In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985


Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the
required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born
in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice
law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of
profession between the republic of the phils.

Issue:

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the
republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to
govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for
the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.