Exclusion Voter Decision Final

Republic of the Philippines
19TH
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT
7TH Judicial Region
Balilihan-Sikatuna-Corella
Balilihan, Bohol
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION Election Case No. 001-2019

FOR THE EXCLUSION FROM THE
LIST OF VOTERS OF PRECINCT NO. For:
0009A, BARANGAY DEL CARMEN
WESTE, BALILIHAN, BOHOL Exclusion of Voter
ESTEBAN CHATTO,
Petitioner,
- versus –
PUREZA VELOSO CHATTO, AND

THE ELECTION REGISTRATION
BOARD, BALILIHAN, BOHOL
Respondents
x-------------------------------------x
DECISION
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage
may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise
disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are
residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election.
Sections 1, Article V of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years
of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
This petition contests the qualification of residency of not just any voter
of Balilihan, Bohol but of its highest public official, the municipal mayor.
1
It was filed pursuant to Section 35, Republic Act No. 8189 or the Voter’s
Registration act of 1996 on 31 January 2019. A reading of the petition
showed that it complied with the requirement of filing this case “at any
time except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x x”. The
petition was also accompanied by a certificate of service which shows
proof of compliance with Section 35’s requirement that the petition “shall
be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged
voter”.
In compliance with section 32b, the petition was set for hearing on
February 6, 2019 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. Respondent and her two
lawyers, Atty. Teodoro Lagang and Atty. Alona A. Crystal appeared on
the said date. Petitioner also appeared but without any lawyer. To ensure
that this case will not be won on account of legal knowledge and legal
technicalities often equipping a lawyer, petitioner was required to obtain
the services of counsel. It was also at this juncture that the undersigned
judge upon double-checking the records, observed that the two copies of
the petition filed by the petitioner were both photocopies. Petitioner was
thus required to submit an original copy of his petition in the afternoon
session.
The case was reset at 1:30PM where Atty. Danilo Bantugan appeared by
way of special appearance, merely to reset the case. So as not to waste
time, the COMELEC Election Board Chair of Balilihan was placed on the
witness stand for some clarificatory questions. Petitioner was then asked
if he would be able to prosecute this case pro se to which he answered
yes, but he was the only one present and his witnesses were not around.
To preempt the preposterous situation where petitioner would be asking
questions from himself and answering them, and considering that he has
not made any legal manifestations on his own, the court was constrained
to reset. But still in the afternoon session, petitioner failed to submit the
original copy of the petition prompting the undersigned judge to warn
him that if he would not be able to submit until 5PM of that day, his
petition will be dismissed on the ground that the photocopies of the
petition have no probative value and should be treated as unsigned
pleading or scraps of paper. This case was thereafter reset to the next day
for hearing or on February 7, 2019.
Petitioner before 5PM submitted an original copy of his petition. Along

with his submission and true to his manifestation in the afternoon
session, petitioner submitted a motion to inhibit the judge since the judge
proceeded with the hearing even if he was not represented by a lawyer.
This motion, however, was withdrawn by his two lawyers, Atty. Kristine
Liu and Atty. Antonio Robles on February 7, 2019 after it was explained
to petitioner that he was actually the one who was granted leniency
when this case was not outrightly dismissed because the petition filed in
2
court was a mere photocopy, and for his lack of preparation during the
first hearing of this case.
On February 7, 2019, petitioner presented testimonial evidence through

himself, Teofilo Hangad, Esmeralda Batac, Felipe Terec, and Buenvenida
Llorente. The petitioner through counsel then offered Exhibits A to G
and their component parts. In the afternoon of the same day, respondent
and her witnesses, Nimia Lungay and Ernesto Llorente testified and
offered Exhibits 1 to 18 and their component parts. These were all
admitted and the parties were informed that this case shall be decided in
accordance with Section 32(g) of RA8189.
Section 32(g) of RA8189 reads:
g) The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days
from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to the Regional Trial
Court shall be decided within ten (10) days from receipt of the
appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later
than fifteen (15) days before the election and the decision shall
become final and executory.
In accordance with Section 32(g) the last day to render the decision is
February 10, 2019. However, since this date falls on a Sunday, this
decision was scheduled to be issued on 11 February 2019. The parties
agreed to be present in open court to receive their copies of this decision
to enable the court to swiftly process the transfer of the records of this
case to the Regional Trial Court should any of the parties wish to appeal.
THE PETITION
The petition calls for the exclusion of the respondent mayor from the list
of voters in Precinct No. 009A on the ground that she never established
her domicile in Balilihan. Paragraph 25 of the petition claims that right
after respondent got married to Edgardo Chatto in 1992, “the newlyweds
settled and established their family home in Bagong Lipunan, Poblacion
3, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. They have been living in the said house from
1992 up to the present.” Petitioner claims that he has personal knowledge
of where the respondent is actually domiciled because he is the first
degree cousin of respondent’s husband, “having shared childhood
experience and having started our career in politics together” and that
they grew up together. He also mentioned that he worked for
respondent’s husband from the time the husband was a mayor, to vice
governor, to congressman and at present, as governor of the province of
Bohol. He claimed that as close relative and public officer, “we usually
hold our meetings at their residence in Tagbilaran’”. And as his first
3
degree cousin, he was often invited to their family gatherings in
Tagbilaran City1.
Petitioner adds that from the time respondent sought the transfer of her
voter’s registration to Barangay Del Carmen Weste up to last year, he
gave respondent the “benefit of the doubt” that she really wants to
establish her residency in Balilihan but even when respondent’s mother-
in-law died in 2016, respondent and her husband never moved into the
Chatto ancestral house in Balilihan.
In paragraphs 40 and 41 of the petition, petitioner furthermore alleges:
“40. Every single working day, Respondent is picked up by her

driver Alvin Punay (Driver, Province of Bohol) on board a red CRV
with plate number SHN-649 (registered under the province of
Bohol) from her residence at Bagong Lipunan, Poblacion 3,
Tagbilaran City going to Balilihan Municipal Hall. The government
driver of the Province then drives her back to her residence in
Tagbilaran after office hours.
“41. Through the years, the Respondent has merely treated elective
offices she has held at Balilihan as a mere “day job”. Respondent
has repeatedly circumvented the law to suit her convenience when
it is in fact of public knowledge that she never had any intention to
establish her residence in Del Carmen Weste, Balilihan.”
In relation to respondent’s “day job”, petitioner adds in paragraph 61 of

his petition that “[R]espondent does not have any connection in
Balilihan, except for reporting to work at the Municipal Office as mayor,
and after office hours, goes home to her abode in Tagbilaran City, on
board her government issued red CRV”.
In paragraph 74 of the petition, petitioner adds that respondent’s

husband had the option to stay at the “governor’s mansion” located at
CP Garcia Avenue, and possibly go home to Balilihan on weekends but
instead, “the spouses have established their family home in Bagong
Lipunan, Poblacion 3 x x x leaving the Governor’s mansion empty and
inutile”. He elucidates in paragraph 62 and 63 that:
“62. The Respondent has never stayed in the ancestral house of her
husband’s family, except for visits during special occasions (fiestas,
death, sumad). After every occasion, she would go back home to
Tagbilaran City.
“63. This is so because her vehicle is never parked in the Chatto

ancestral home. The red plate CRV issued by the Province of Bohol
1 Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the petition.
4
for her use must be returned and parked in the vicinity of the
Capitol, in compliance with COA Circular 75-6, Item 5.”
Petitioner additionally claims that this is public knowledge not only

among the residents of Purok 5, but in the whole barangay as attested to
by barangay residents who executed affidavits to these effect. He
attached to the petition, the affidavits of Teofilo Hangad, Esmeralda
Batac, Armando Conje, and Barangay Councilor Jaime Racho2. All
attested that they pass by the ancestral house of the Chattos in Purok 5,
Del Carmen Weste almost everyday, being residents in the area, and that
they have never seen the respondent or anyone around there except the
caretaker, Nang Bebe. They all indicated in their affidavits that the house
is “very lonely” and that it only becomes busy during the election, town
anniversary of Balilihan and the day of the dead.
Paragraph 29 of the petition also states that the couple’s only child was
enrolled and educated at Bohol Wisdom School in Tagbilaran City and
further proof of the respondent’s residence in Tagbilaran City, by way of
paragraph 30 is that respondent maintains two (2) businesses in that city,
particularly the First Flower Avenue along CP Garcia and the Bohol
HRD Review Center along Bagong Lipunan fronting their residence.
That respondent does not have any business interest or properties in
Balilihan only shows that “she has not contributed a single cent of tax to
the fund that pays for her salary”3, petitioner claims. Her only business
interest in Balilihan, Petitioner expounds, “is the business of politics
where she enjoys the perks and financial gains of the Mayor’s Office to
the prejudice of the voters in Balilihan”4. This, petitioner claims “is at the
expense of the Province of Bohol. The coffer of the province,
unfortunately, has to shoulder her daily commute expenses to and from
her residence in Tagbilaran City”5 and that “[E]very single working day,
Respondent takes advantage of provincial government resources (vehicle
and gas) to transport her to and from Balilihan, which is 22 kilometers
away from Tagbilaran”6.
Petitioner adds that respondent could not even go to the barangay hall to
personally obtain her community tax certificate, as “any normal
constituent would do” but instead summoned the barangay treasurer,
Felipe M. Terec to issue one for her and that Terec, “pressured and
intimidated”, obliged7. Felipe Terec executed an affidavit claiming that
from the time he entered office in 2014 until 2019, respondent sought the
issuance of Community Tax Certificates (CTC) either by instructing her
2 Annexes A, B, F, and G respectively.

3 Paragraph 43 of the petition.
7 Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the petition.
5
secretary, who is an employee of the province named Florencia Chatto to
obtain one from him, personally or via a text message, and asking him
(Terec) to bring the CTCs to the mayor’s office. Terec further disclosed
that “during those times that the mayor sought the issuance of CTC
through Florencia Chatto, she has never affixed her thumbmark in front
of me unlike other residents of the Barangay who would really go to the
Barangay hall to pick up their CTCs”8. The photocopies of the CTCs of
the respondent showing her lack of thumbmarks and signatures were
annexed to the petition as Annexes E to E-4.
The declared address of respondent in Balilihan, petitioner discloses in

paragraph 42 of the petition, “is the ancestral home of her husband
which he shares with his other siblings. For several years, the ancestral
home is just being maintained by their caretaker. This being so, petitioner
reasons that respondent “cannot conveniently claim undivided interests
of her husband from the estate of her in-laws as her own interest”9 and
that “[C]urrently, the said ancestral home is utilized as the ‘generic’
address of every Chatto family member who intends to run for public
office in Balilihan x x x for the purpose of maintaining their dynasty
which has been around for more than 60 years already”10.
Additionally, petitioner asserts that respondent and her husband are not
part of the households belonging to Purok 5, Del Carmen Weste11. In
support of this, paragraphs 50 to 60 reads:
“50. Every member of a Purok represents a household/ family. In

cases where the children of the owner of the main house gets
married, such new unit is counted as another household. Hence if a
house is occupied by mother and father, and with three children
who have families of their own, then it is counted as four
households.
“51. In the case of the Respondent, she was never a member of the
said Purok, from the time that the Purok Power Movement (PPM)
was institutionalized by her husband in 2011.
“52. The attendance sheet for Purok 5 – Batong meeting year 2017
reveals that there is only one household in the address that the
Respondent claims to reside. Note that the head of that household
was her mother in law who back then paid fines for not being able
to attend or send a representative in purok meetings. X x x
8 Paragraph 37 and Terec’s affidavit as per Annex D of the petition.

6
“53. For 2018, the name of the Respondent’s husband was added to
replace his mother as head of the household by default being the
only Bohol based child. However, he has not attended any of the
purok meetings in 2018. X x x
“54. Respondent as expected, has also not attended any of the

purok household meetings. X x x
“Xxx
“56. Interestingly, Respondent and her husband have never

attended any of the purok meetings, They did not send a
representative or pay fines for failure to attend.
“57. This only shows how disconnected and disinterested the

Respondent is in her claimed residence. Above all, as the town
mayor, she should have valued the purok system and attended
these purok meetings.
“58. Registered households, who have moved to Manila or Luzon

would even send a representative or pay fines, just to show their
“oneness” with their Balilihan community; a stark contrast with
Respondent’s case.
“59. Obviously, Respondent does not come home to Purok 5 in Del

Carmen Weste, Balilihan. Hence, Respondent is not aware of or
simply disinterested in any activities amongst bona fide
households in Purok 5.
“60. This callousness only bolsters the fact that she has no
community interest simply because she is not a resident of
Balilihan.”
Paragraph 55 of the petition refers to a certification issued by Barangay

Secretary Buenvenida M. Llorente attesting to the veracity of the
attendance sheets of purok meetings for the years 2017 and 2018.
THE ANSWER
Section 32 of RA8189 does not necessitate the filing of an answer, but on

the first day of hearing, respondent through counsel filed her answer.
Inasmuch as this is not proscribed under the rules, the same was
admitted in evidence as Exhibit 1.
7
In her answer, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition since it is
undated12 and filed way out of time, as it should have been filed when
respondent first registered as a voter in Balilihan in 1992 since exclusion
proceedings should be filed only upon the registration of the concerned
voter13. She adds that petitioner is barred by estoppel since petitioner was
well aware that respondent has been domiciled for 24 years yet he has
failed to question respondent’s residency at the most opportune time.
Also, during the hearing, respondent accused petitioner of unclean
hands, claiming that he was the one who was not qualified as a voter
since he does not have properties or business interests in Balilihan as
shown by Certifications marked as Exhibits 11 and 12, and that he has a
property registered in his name in Tagbilaran City as shown by a
certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Tagbilaran City and
marked as Exhibit 13.
Respondent denied most of the allegations of the petition as “baseless

semantics intended only to draw sympathy”14, that these are “baseless
and self-serving claims of a person known to be political allies of the
respondent’s contender in the Mayoralty post of Balilihan, Bohol come
May 13, 2019”15 and that these are “baseless and grounded on self-
serving allegations of the petitioner and that of his witnesses which, even
granting without admitting to be true, cannot overturn the established
fact that respondent is a registered voter of Balilihan, Bohol for more
than two decades where she is currently holding a public office”16.
Respondent in paragraph 16 proffers the defense that the questioned

CTCs should be considered as having been regularly issued since these
are public documents, and in paragraph 18, she discounts the attendance
sheets of purok meetings as proof of domicile, considering that these
sheets only contain the household heads. “Accordingly, the registered
household member then was the late Victoria Chatto. After the death of
respondent’s mother-in-law, it is Gov. Edgar M. Chatto who is the son of
the late Victoria Chatto who replaced as household head”.
Respondent likewise reasons that her frequent travel to Tagbilaran, “was

due to the fact that in 1995, her husband was elected as Vice-Governor of
the Province of Bohol and it is of judicial notice that the Seat of the
Provincial Government is in Tagbilaran City”17. She remained in
Tagbilaran City as her husband was elected as Congressman of the First
Congressional District in 2001 and later on as Governor in 2010 up to the
present. Throughout all these years, however, respondent states that they
12 Paragraph 33 of the answer.

13 See paragraphs 2, 4, 6, and 26 of the answer.
8
“continue to reside in Del Carmen Weste since every now and then, they
would attend Sunday masses in Balilihan and thereafter proceed to their
family farm named after the late Victoria Chatto in Sal-ing, Balilihan. Not
only that, respondent and her husband would attend masses during
Christmas eve, New Year, Holy Week, All Souls Day, Fieta, Sumad, and
any other special occasions. In fact, their constituents would celebrate
Christmas with the respondent and her family in their residence in Del
Carmen Weste since gift giving is a yearly traditional activity of the
family” 18.
Respondent furthermore, admits that her domicile of origin is Tagbilaran

City but she abandoned the same upon her marriage on June 22, 1991
when her husband was serving as municipal mayor of Balilihan, Bohol
and “by her subsequent overt act of applying registration as voter in the
year 1991 and updated on 22 June 1997 which she continuously
retains”19. She first voted in 1992 when her husband sought for re-
election as a mayor, as well as in subsequent elections until she was
elected as vice-mayor for the years 2013 to 2016 and subsequently as
municipal mayor from 2016 until the present. She presented her Voter
Certification as Exhibit 2 which shows that she has been a resident of
Balilihan for 24 years and 2 months.
In addition, respondent in paragraph 27 of her answer states that she and

her husband has fixed the family domicile in Del Carmen Weste,
Balilihan, Bohol on the basis of Article 69 of the Family Code, which
states:
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family.
Respondent cites the case of Limbona v. COMELEC and Alingan20 which

states that “[C]onsidering that petitioner failed to show that she
maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no
evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family
Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience”.

20 G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009.
9
Respondent added that petitioner failed to show that respondent and her
husband maintain separate residences, and petitioner did not bother to
contest Edgar Chatto’s residency as a voter21.
She claims that as a married couple, it was never their intention to

transfer their family domicile to Tagbilaran City, as they never built a
separate family domicile in the said city, and instead, occupied the
family dwelling (as described in the tax declaration no. 3B-0456 or
Exhibit 3) of the late Eladio Chatto, respondent’s father-in-law.
Respondent also attached to her answer, the affidavits of Timotea M.

Lansang, Nimia M. Lungay, and Gina Razon. The gist of these affidavits
is that respondent and her husband lived in the ancestral house of the
Chattos in Del Carmen Weste from the date of their marriage until 1995
or until the time that Edgar Chatto was mayor of Balilihan; and that even
as they occupied Eladio Chatto’s house in Tagbilaran City while Edgar
Chatto serves as a provincial official, the spouses would return to Del
Carmen Weste, Balilihan on weekends and holidays.
As to her facebook post, respondent in paragraph 28 of her answer

counters that, “there is nothing in any election laws which mentions that
the residence as posted on Facebook is determinative of one’s residency
for purposes of registration as voter.”
In paragraph 29, respondent belittles her lack of ownership of any real

property in Balilihan, explaining that ownership of property has never
been a qualification to vote. However, she presented a mayor’s permit
(Exhibit 4) that she signed herself indicating that she owns a business
with the tradename “EVMC Blocktienda” at Del Carmen Weste,
Balilihan, Bohol.
What is more important, respondent states, is that the people of Balilihan

has overwhelmingly voted for her as vice mayor and subsequently as
mayor of the town, thereby erasing all doubt as to her qualification,
including that of her residency. She presented as Exhibits 6 and 7, the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections (Exhibit 6) as well as the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for the May 9, 2016 elections (Exhibit 7) showing that she has
won by a landslide vote in the town’s political race for vice-mayor and
mayor in these elections.
During the afternoon hearing of 7 February 2019, respondent also sought

the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the original copy of the
petition was only submitted on February 6, 2019 which is beyond the
deadline set by COMELEC in filing petitions for exclusion of voters.
21 Paragraph 27 of the answer, page 71 of the records.
10
COMELEC Resolution 10429 sets the deadline for filing petition for
exclusion of voters on 1 February 2019.
THE COURT’S RULING
THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Respondent offered procedural technicalities which should have

compelled the court to dismiss the petition outright. The court believes
that these procedural issues need to be set aside, so that a ruling on the
merits of this case will instead be arrived at. The judge was also aware of
the summary nature of this proceeding which can be submitted on the
basis of the petition and the answer sans any presentation of evidence.
But the court conducted a marathon hearing to enable the parties to
present their respective evidence and to be confronted with the evidence
against each of them, with the chance to cross-examine the witnesses or
controvert the evidence presented. This worked exceedingly well in
ferreting out the truth behind the parties’ allegations, as shall be
explained subsequently.
That the court opted to relax procedural rules and conduct a marathon
hearing is in harmony with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kabataan
Party List v. COMELEC22, where the august body said:
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important

constitutional issue pertaining to the right of suffrage, the Court
views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of
compelling significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush
aside the foregoing procedural barriers and instead, resolve the
case on its merits.
This section discusses the reasons why these procedural technicalities

were brushed aside to give way to a decision on the merits.
Photocopies
Immediately after this case was filed in court, and considering the time
limitations with which the court will have to act on the petition, such as
the requirement that a notice of hearing shall be issued immediately
upon the filing of the petition, and that the court only has ten days
22 G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015.
11
within which to issue its decision from the time of the filing of the
petition, the undersigned judge read the contents of the petition, saw
compliance to the rules as espoused in RA8189 and immediately issued a
notice of hearing to the parties. She noticed that the signature of the
petitioner as appearing in the petition was very light, hence she
presumed that the two copies of the petition filed were originals. On the
day of the hearing, however, the undersigned judge took a second look
at the petition and discovered that the two copies of the petition filed
were mere photocopies, as were the annexes attached thereto. Hence she
gave a marching order to the petitioner to immediately submit an
original copy of the petition. The petitioner complied with this directive
in the afternoon of the same day.
On 7 February 2019, respondent through counsel questioned the belated

filing of the original petition, and manifested that such a belated filing of
the original petition should not be countenanced because it is beyond the
reglementary period allowed to file petitions for the exclusion of voters.
Respondent contends that since the petition filed on 31 January 2019 is a
photocopy, the same should have been deemed not to have been filed,
and that the actual filing of the original petition on 6 February 2019
should be the reckoning period to determine if the petition has been filed
on time.
The petition, however, contains serious allegations which affects the

highest public official of Balilihan. The respondent on the date of the
hearing, or on the same day that the petitioner was required to submit an
original copy of the petition, filed her answer to the petition. The answer
also contained allegations that required an opportunity to be heard.
This is also the first time that a petition for exclusion has been filed in
this court according to the COMELEC chair since 2004 or for a period of
fourteen (14) years. The issue involves the right to vote or the right of
suffrage, hence the judge deemed it best to proceed on the merits of the
case.
This prompted the undersigned judge to prudently relax the rules of

procedure. Considering the circumstances of this case, it was better to
have the parties ventilate their competing claims and arrive at a
judgment that rules on the basis of substantive grounds, instead of
dismissing this case on the ground of procedural infirmities. Moreso
because, the parties’ trading barbs could cause wounds to the affected
parties that produce abscesses. When outrightly dismissed due to
procedural infirmity or infirmities, this will only allow the abscess to
fester and produce maggots of doubt and speculation.
Undated Pleading
12
Respondent claims that since the petition was undated, then it should be
treated as an unsigned pleading and thus a scrap of paper. There is no
procedural rule, however, that when the pleading is undated, then it is
considered unsigned. The dates in a pleading are only considered when
these are material to the rules on prescriptive periods as to when they
should be filed. Since the petition was filed within the prescriptive
period, it is of no moment that it was undated.
Respondent next faults the petitioner for putting a date on the original
petition that he filed on 6 February 2019 which now appears to be
January 31, 2019 but the verification and certification of forum shopping
was notarized on 28 January 2019. In Peak Ventures Corp. v. Heirs of
Villareal23, the Supreme Court did not consider as fatally defective the
fact that a petition for review on certiorari's verification and certification
of non-forum shopping was dated November 6, 2008, while the petition
itself was dated November 10, 2008.
Prescriptive Period
Respondent posits that a petition for exclusion should be filed upon the
original registration of a voter and can never be filed thereafter.
Accordingly, she asseverates that this petition for exclusion should have
been filed when she first registered to vote in Balilihan in 1991; or at the
very least, when by operation of RA8189, the registration of voters was
required in 1997. Considering that this was filed 22 years after the
original registration, this case should be dismissed.
Section 35 of the “Voter’s Registration Act” provides:
Section 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. Any
registered voters, representative of a political party or the Election
Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of
a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address
and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except one
hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65)
days before a special election. The petition shall be accompanied by
proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter and shall
be decided within ten (10) days from its filing.
If the decision is for the exclusion of the voter from the list, the
Board shall, upon receipt of the final decision, remove the voter’s
registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter
the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the
inactive file.
23 G.R. No. 184618, November 19, 2014.
13
The said provision does not qualify that a petition for exclusion of voters
can only be filed upon the initial registration of a voter. On the contrary,
the provision is clear that any registered voter, representative of a
political party or the Election Officer may file a petition for exclusion
from the permanent list of voters.
What applies in the instant case is Comelec Resolution No. 10429 dated
October 1, 2018 which sets February 1, 2019 as the “last day to file
petition for the exclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters (Section
35, RA8189)”.
Furthermore, it is believed that residency, like citizenship, is a continuing

requirement to vote and this is the precise reason why Section 36 of
RA8189 mandates the election officer to “verify the list of the registered
voters of any precinct by regular mail or house to house canvass. The
said section adds that “[T]he Commission may enlist the help of
representatives of political parties and deputize non-government
organizations (NGOs), civic organizations and barangay officials to assist
in the verification and house to house canvass of registered voters in
every precinct”.
In Luna v. Hon. Tamin24, Mayor Pablo Luna of Zamboanga-Sibugay had

the same contention as the respondent that the petition for exclusion
should have been filed when Luna registered in 1997 under RA8189 only.
The Supreme Court said:
The contention has no merit.
R.A. No. 8189, §35 provides:

Xxx
This provision makes no distinction between voters registered

under the system of continuing registration of votes established
under R.A. No. 8189, §8 and those registered under the general
registration in 1997. Indeed, following petitioner's view, there can
never be any petition for the exclusion of voters not registered
under the continuing system of registration as the January 30, 1998
deadline has long passed. Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 2946-
A provides for the application of the 100-day limitation under R.A.
No. 8189, §35, by fixing January 30, 1998 as the deadline for filing
petitions for exclusion insofar as the May 11, 1998 national and
local elections are concerned. With respect to the May 14, 2001
national and local elections, applying R.A. No. 8189, §35, petitions
for exclusion of non-qualified registered voters should be filed not
later than February 2, 2001.(Per COMELEC Resolution No. 3258
issued on September 28, 2000). Clearly, the filing on January 31,
24 G.R. No. 147409.May 4, 2001.
14
2001 of private respondents' petition to exclude petitioner was
timely.
On the basis of Luna v. Hon. Tamin, this action has not prescribed and
petitioner cannot be deemed in estoppel for filing this petition 24 years
after respondent first registered as a voter, and was elected into public
office in Balilihan for the last two elections.
Unclean Hands
Respondent claims that this petition ought to be dismissed because

petitioner seeks reliefs with dirty hands, as he is the one who must be
excluded as a voter considering that: 1) petitioner has no properties in
Balilihan as evidenced by Exhibit 11; 2) petitioner does not have any
business interests in Balilihan as evidenced by Exhibit 12; and 3)
petitioner, unlike respondent actually has property in Tagbilaran City to
which he goes home to (Exhibit 13).
The court cannot apply the doctrine of unclean hands since to do so will
compel this court to look into the qualifications of respondent as a voter,
and consequently, this will result to the issue of whether petitioner must
be excluded from the voter’s list in Balilihan or not. To do so will treat
this case as one also as a petition for the exclusion of petitioner as a voter,
hence it will indirectly rule on an issue of exclusion that was filed out of
time since the last filing for petitions for exclusion for the 2019 elections
already lapsed on 1 February 2019. Besides, it was conceded by both
parties during the hearings in this case that neither property nor business
interests qualifies one to vote.
15
THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE
We now proceed to the sole substantial issue in the instant case, which is
whether or not respondent is a resident of Balilihan.
It is a basic postulation that in election laws, the word residence is

equivalent to domicile. There are three concepts of domicile under our
election laws: domicile of origin, domicile by operation of law, and
domicile by choice.
In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally

conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules,
namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired;
and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.25
Domicile by origin is not lost unless one adopts a domicile by choice or

adopts a different domicile by operation of law on account of change of
citizenship26, naturalization in a foreign country27, or by marriage since
there is a presumption that husband and wife are mandated to jointly
establish a family domicile as per Limbona. On the other hand, domicile
by choice has to satisfy three requirements, actual and physical presence
in the domicile of choice, intent to remain there; and intent to abandon
the original domicile.
Petitioner claims that respondent is not a resident of Balilihan on the

basis of the following allegations:
1. Respondent boasts on her personal facebook account that she is

a resident of, and lives in Tagbilaran City.28
2. Respondent is a resident of Tagbilaran City. She grew up and

was educated in the said city29.
3. Petitioner contends that right after the wedding of respondent to

Edgardo Chatto, the newlyweds established their family home
in Bagong Lipunan, Poblacion 3, Tagbilaran City. They have
been living in the said house form 1992 up to the present30. He
adds that he is the first degree cousin of respondent’s husband
and as such, he is privy to the information that the couple has
established a conjugal dwelling in Tagbilaran, that political
25 Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999.

26 Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012.
27 Caballero v. COMELEC, GR. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.
28 Paragraph 7 of the petition, Exhibit D.
30 Paragraphs 25 and 25 of the Petition, page 5 of the rollo
16
meetings are conducted in the said Tagbilaran residence, and
that she has never moved to Balilihan31.
4. Neighbors and residents of Del Carmen Weste, particularly

Teofilo Hangad, Esmeralda Batac, executed affidavits (Exhibits
B and D respectively) stating that respondent never lived in the
Chatto home since they got married in 199232;
5. The couple’s only child was enrolled and educated in Bohol

Wisdom School located in Tagbilaran City33;
6. Respondent established her businesses in Tagbilaran City,

particularly the First Flower Avenue along CP Garcia and the
Bohol HRD Review Center along Baguio Lipunan fronting their
residence34
7. Respondent never personally obtained community tax

certificates from the barangay treasurer and the fact that she
never personally showed up is evidenced by the fact that the
CTCs issued in her favor do not contain her signatures and her
thumbmark. Testifying to this is Felipe Terec, who executed an
affidavit that respondent never came before him to personally
obtain a CTC, but instead asked him to go to her office at the
municipal hall, or to request her secretary Florencia Chatto to
obtain the CTC35.
8. Respondent does not have any business interest or properties in

Balilihan.
9. Respondent never attended any purok meeting of Purok 5 since

the Purok Power Movement was instutitionalized by her
husband in 2011 and this is evidenced by attendance sheets of
purok meetings during the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.36
10.Respondent cannot claim as her home, the exclusive

paraphernal property of her husband, which is the ancestral
home of the Chattos.
31 Paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Petition, pages 7 to 8 of the rollo.

32 Paragraphs 26 to 28 of the Petition, Exhibits B and C.
33 Paragraph 29 of the Petition.
34 Paragraph 30 of the Petition.
35 Paragraphs 35 to 39, Exhibit E which is the affidavit of Felipe Terec, and Exhibits F to F-5 which are
the CTCs issued to respondents for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.
36 Paragraphs 49 to 59.
17
On the other hand, respondent claims that she is a resident of Balilihan
because:
1. Her Voter’s Certification (Exhibit 2) dated 1 February 2019

shows that she registered as a voter in Balilihan, Bohol on 22
June 1997 and that she has been a resident of Balilihan for 24
years and 2 months. She has been continuously voting in
Balilihan, Bohol particularly during the elections in 1992, 1995,
1998. 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016;
2. She maintains a business in Balilihan as evidenced by a mayor’s

permit issued to her pertaining to a business with the trade
name “EVMC BLOCKTIENDA” located at Del Carmen Weste,
Balilihan, Bohol (Exhibit 4).
3. Since she was married, she adopted her residence to be that of

her husband’s thus upon her marriage, she lived in the Chatto
ancestral house in Del Carmen Weste, Balilihan, Bohol and
resided while her husband served as vice-mayor and
subsequently as mayor of Balilihan town. However, in 1995 her
husband was elected as vice-governor, and subsequently as
congressman, and thereafter governor and this necessitated her
to occupy the residence of her husband in Tagbilaran City but
even so, they as a couple never abandoned the Chatto ancestral
home as they continuously return to the said residence during
fiestas and holidays. Respondent and her husband also intends
to be buried there and accordingly, they have already reserved
cemetery plots near the burial grounds of the parents of
respondent’s husband.
We now look into these pieces of evidence and rule on whether these are
determinative of respondent’s domicile with the elements of domicile
(actual bodily presence, and intent to keep returning), as well as the three
requisites of domicile of choice (actual physical presence, intent to
remain, intent to abandon the old one) as parameters of analysis.
Entry in respondent’s facebook account
Petitioner claims that respondent, has by self-ascription already

indicated her domicile to be Tagbilaran City as per her facebook account.
Respondent does not deny that indeed, there is an indication that she
“lives in Tagbilaran City” as per Exhibit D, however, she adds that there
is another entry in her account that she hails “from Balilihan, Bohol”.
The court cannot treat respondent’s facebook entry as an admission that

indeed she “lives” in Tagbilaran within the contemplation of election
18
law; unless there is showing that the facebook application knows the
stark difference between the concepts of residence and domicile as
applied in Philippine election law. It will be preposterous to assume that
the facebook application has defined the verb “lives” to be the
domiciliary concept of residence, unless facebook was primarily
conceptualized to cater to quirky election lawyers who treat residence
and domicile as per their technical definitions in election law. Rather,
facebook would use the verb “lives” in its general meaning, which as per
Webster’s Dictionary is “to pass through or spend the duration of”37 or to
refer to the place where the account user can be found.
Respondent’s domicile of origin
Petitioner next asserts that respondent has been raised and schooled in
Tagbilaran City thereby making this city her domicile of origin.
Respondent never denied this fact, but claims that she has abandoned
this domicile of origin upon her marriage to Edgardo M. Chatto.
Respondent’s domicile of choice
In the recent case of Poe Lamanzares v. COMELEC38, There are three

requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a
new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
According to the petitioner, respondent never abandoned her domicile of

origin because she never stayed at the ancestral residence of the Chattos
since her marriage, as after her wedding, she moved to Tagbilaran City
along with her husband and remained there up to this day. Petitioner
claims that even after her aunt, the late Victoria Chatto, respondent’s
mother-in-law died, respondent never attempted to occupy the ancestral
residence of the Chattos in Del Carmen Weste. Petitioner maintained that
respondent established a conjugal dwelling in Tagbilaran City and has
never abandoned the same in favor of Balilihan.
37 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/live, last accessed on 10 February 2019 at

22:37PM.
38 Poe-Lamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016.
19
However, on cross, petitioner admitted that the conjugal dwelling that he
referred to in his petition, is not a separate family domicile or a conjugal
dwelling that was exclusively established by the couple, but a building
owned by the late Eladio Chatto (Exhibit 3). Also as will be later on
discussed, petitioner’s assertion that the couple never occupied the
ancestral home of the Chattos in Balilihan, Bohol as their family home
was rebutted by respondent’s witnesses Nimia Lungay and Ernesto
Llorente who worked in the said ancestral house and observed that the
couple lived there from 1991 to 1994 while respondent’s husband was the
mayor in Balilihan, Bohol.
Ordinarily, a barangay captain’s word is given due consideration as to

the residency of any person in his or her barangay. What is lacking in the
records is that petitioner, who is the barangay captain while asserting
that respondent is not a resident in the barangay, failed to issue a
certification to that effect. The certification from the barangay chair of the
fact of respondent’s non-residency could have been given due
consideration, especially if it is corroborated by the records of the
barangay secretary who is mandated by law to keep a record of all the
inhabitants of the barangay. In Sabili v. COMELEC39, the Supreme Court
said:
We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay

Captain’s Certification and find the same tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s

Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would
also be entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made

in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and

Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc.,75 we explained that
the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official
records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another

person specially enjoined by law to do so;
39 G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012, also see Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010.
20
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient

knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the

Local Government Code to "keep an updated record of all
inhabitants of the barangay." Regarding the second requisite, we
have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,
that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the
residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite, the
Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to
his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the
Barangay Secretary.
While Felipe Terec, the barangay secretary as per his affidavit, testified
for the petitioner, it was with respect to Terec’s responsibility of issuing
Community Tax Certificates and not as to his responsibility to keep an
updated record of all the inhabitants of the barangay. Section 394 of
Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code provides this
responsibility, among others:
SEC. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers

and Duties. - (a) The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the
punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay
secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service
Commission.
(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified
voter and an actual resident of the barangay concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a
sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or
a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay secretary shall:
(1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang
barangay and the barangay assembly meetings;
(2) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the
sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly;
(3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly,
and have the same posted in conspicuous places within
the barangay;
21
(4) Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for
the conduct of barangay elections, initiatives, referenda
or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec;
(5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration
of births, deaths, and marriages;
(6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay containing the following items of
information: name, address, place and date of birth,
sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation, and such
other items of information as may be prescribed by
law or ordinances;
(7) Submit a report on the actual number of barangay
residents as often as may be required by the
sangguniang barangay; and
(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner and Terec testified that respondent is not a resident of Del

Carmen Weste, Balilihan, Bohol. However, neither did the petitioner nor
Terec make efforts to present this updated record as required by law. It
cannot be confirmed if Felipe Terec is the barangay secretary because
Buenvenida Llorente also claimed to be the barangay secretary.
Buenvenida Llorente testified that she had a copy of all the residents in
Purok 5 to which respondent claims to belong, but she did not present
such a copy. What Llorente presented is a Certification40, indicating that
she was the barangay secretary, in relation to Exhibits G to G-2, which
states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to our records on file, this Barangay

Assembly Attendance of Purok Purok 541 – Batong of Del Carmen
Weste, Balilihan, Bohol calendar year 2017 and 2018 is the true
copies42 of the original documents under my custody.
Corroborative witnesses. Petitioner next presented his witnesses to

corroborate his accusation that respondent was never actually domiciled
in Del Carmen Weste, Balilihan, Bohol. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC and
Erasmo, Sr.43, the Supreme Court said that the testimony or affidavits of
adjoining neighbors are more credible since they have a better chance of
noting the presence or absence of a person, as compared to those who
sporadically passed by the subject residence. Let us closely examine the
40 Page 49 of the records, Annex J of the Petition.
41 Stet.
42 Stet.
43 G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012.
22
testimonies of these witnesses to determine if these testimonies can
sufficiently establish that respondent is not a resident of Balilihan, Bohol.
Teofilo Hangad testified that he is a resident and a registered voter of Del

Carmen Weste, Balilihan, Bohol. His affidavit stated that he was born,
schooled, and got married in Del Carmen Weste. During all the time that
he was at Del Carmen Weste, he only witnessed “Manang Victoria” and
the caretaker, “Manang Bebe” occupy the Chatto ancestral house in Del
Carmen. He added that from the time Mayor Edgar and respondent got
married in 1992, there was never any time that they tried living in the
ancestral house of the Chattos. He never saw the vehicle used by the
respondent to be garaged or parked overnight at the Chatto residence.
He claimed that every morning when he passes by the Chatto house, the
house is unoccupied and “lonely” or “mingao” because nobody lives
there.
On cross, however, Hangad admitted that his observations were only

based on what he saw from the road, or that his vantage point was the
road and that in all those times that he made his observations, he never
went inside the house of the Chattos to actually determine if the
respondent was there because that will be tantamount to trespassing. He
said that his additional basis for determining as to whether respondent
was inside the house was whether or not the red CRV was parked in the
vicinity of the house. He also added on cross that throughout the years
of his observation, in all truth and fairness, he saw the respondent
actually occupying the said house.
The treatment of Hangad’s affidavit as a public document was

questioned by respondent’s lawyer since the affidavit was notarized by
Atty. Nicodemus A. Tago but Hangad testified that he does not know
who Atty. Nicodemus A. Tago is. He added that he only signed the
document in the presence of a certain Atty. Halmin Valdez.
It is interesting to note that when prompted about the procedure that he

undertook to have his affidavit notarized, Hangad candidly admitted
that he works as a repairman of vehicles, and that he is not always at his
residence and that there could have been times when he could have gone
to Tagbilaran City. This testimony, coupled with the fact that his vantage
point was merely at the road, show that his testimony as to who are
actually and physically present at the Chatto ancestral residence cannot
be appreciated. He was not always there to monitor as to who was
actually and physically present at the Chatto ancestral residence. At any
rate, he admitted, in all truth and fairness, that he saw the respondent
being actually and physically present at the Chatto ancestral residence
23
thereby contradicting the contents of his affidavit that since respondent
got married, she never tried residing in the said residence44.
Esmeralda Batac testified next and like Hangad, she identified and
confirmed the truth and veracity of her affidavit (Exhibit C). She said that
she is a barangay kagawad and a resident of Del Carmen Weste and that
it is easy to see if somebody “lives” in the Chatto house because it is
located by the road. She said that there is nobody living in the said house
except the caretaker, “Nang Bebe”. She added that the Chatto house is
only bustling with activity or “mabibo” during election time, during the
sumad (foundation day) of Balilihan, and during the day of the dead. She
also added in her affidavit that she already tried attending the fiesta in
the Chatto house in Tagbilaran in 2010 upon the invitation of the
governor.
Batac also identified the facebook account of respondent that showed the
description, “lives in Tagbilaran City”. She said that she asked her son to
open respondent’s account in facebook and she personally saw the said
description.
On cross, she added that she was not originally from Del Carmen Weste
but only established her residence in Del Carmen Weste because her
husband is from Del Carmen Weste. She added that she does not have
any facebook account but she asked his son to look for the facebook
account of respondent. It was her son who printed out the contents of the
facebook account of the respondent.
Upon clarificatory questions by the court, Batac explained what she

meant by the word “live” or “puyo”. She said that to live in a place
means to be there 24 hours of the day, seven (7) days a week. She
clarified that she expected respondent, who was the mayor of the town to
be in Balilihan 24/7.
Terec’s testimony shows that the concept of domicile should be

interpreted to mean physical presence in the place for 24 hours in every
day of the week. However, the concept of domicile has been clarified in
Dano v. COMELEC45, as not requiring a 24/7 presence in the domicile:
COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully

appreciate petitioner's evidence and fully explained absence from
Sevilla. Instead, it made a legal conclusion that a candidate who
has been physically absent from a locality for four out of the twelve
44 Paragraph 6 of Hangad’s affidavit reads: “6. Na katong nagpakasal si Mayor Edgar ni Puresa
katong tuig 1992, hangtod karon, wala man gyud sila naka suway ug puyo sa balay katiguwangan
sa mga Chatto;”
45 G.R. No. 210200, September 13, 2016.
24
months preceding the elections can never fulfil the residence
requirement under Section 39 of the LGC. In addition, COMELEC
cancelled petitioner's COC without any prior determination of
whether or not she had intended to deceive or mislead the
electorate. This omission also constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Xxx
In Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we held

that the averments of certain barangay health workers – that they
failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of
the locality of which he was supposed to be a resident – is of no
moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to
attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require a
person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
Couple’s only child was enrolled and educated in Bohol Wisdom School
located in Tagbilaran City. That respondent’s sole daughter was enrolled
and educated in Bohol Wisdom School located in Tagbilaran City does
not by itself establish that respondent is domiciled in Tagbilaran City.
Again in Sabili, the Supreme Court said:
Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa

City Division, indicating that the names Bernadette Palomares,
Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioner’s daughter) and Francis Meynard
Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on the list of graduates of
Lipa City. Private respondent also presented a Certification from
the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that the names of
these family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of
voters.
As the issue at hand is petitioner’s residence, and not the

educational or voting record of his family, the COMELEC properly
did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its
Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not

attend educational institutions in Lipa and are not registered voters
therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a business
therein nor has property in his name, petitioner is unable to show
the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay in Lipa City.
As to the Dissent’s first assertion, it must be stressed that the

children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even in
the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by
25
both husband and wife. In addition, we note that the transfer to
Lipa City occurred in 2007, when petitioner’s children were already
well into college and could very well have chosen to study
elsewhere than in Lipa City.
Also, it is petitioner’s domicile which is at issue, and not that of his

children. But even assuming that it was petitioner himself (rather
than his children) who attended educational institutions or who
registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held
that "absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence."
Respondent’s business interests. To show further proof that respondent

is domiciled in Tagbilaran City, petitioner alleged that respondent has
advertised herself to be the manager of a flowershop business and a
review center business. Respondent admitted co-managing these
businesses but added that she also had a business in Balilihan, the EVMC
Block Tienda which was issued a “Mayor’s Permit” to operate. At the
onset, the existence of such a business in Balilihan is unsubstantiated
considering that the Mayor’s Permit was issued by the respondent
herself.
Nevertheless, the presence or absence of businesses do not prove actual

physical presence in the locality. These do not prove the residency
requirement as required by our election laws, because to make this as
basis for residency will make owning businesses as a premium on the
right to vote. Again in Sabili, the Supreme Court said that, “[A]s to the
Dissent’s second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a
business in Lipa City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property
which both Suarez (the previous property owner) and Palomares swear
was purchased with petitioner’s own funds, the records also indicate that
there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod,
Lipa City63 which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and
Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa
City Assessor’s Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court
were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property
ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one
intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the
Constitution”.
Were the Community Tax Certificates Proof of Domicile? Felipe Terec

testified that he is a registered voter, and a resident of Del Carmen
Weste. He added that he is the barangay secretary and one of his
responsibilities is to issue Residence Community Tax Certificates (CTC)
or cedula. In such capacity, he testified as to the veracity of his affidavit
26
that since he started issuing CTCs in 2014 until 2019, respondent never
came to his office to request for the issuance of the CTC, instead
respondent asked her secretary Florencia Chatto to issue the said CTC
hence all the duplicate copies of the CTCs issued to respondent in the
possession of the barangay do not contain respondent’s thumbmark and
signature.
Considering that what was attached to the petition which Terec

identified were all photocopies, Atty. Kristine Liu, counsel for the
petitioner asked Terec to produce the originals. As the barangay hall was
just adjacent to the Balilihan hall of justice, Terec went to the barangay
hall and brought with him to the courtroom, the booklets of CTCs for the
years 2015 to 2019.
Upon cross, Terec was confronted with several CTCs that he issued
which also had no signatures and thumbmarks. Atty. Teodoro Lagang
marked some of these CTCs as Exhibits 14 to 18. Exhibits 14 to 18 for the
respondents, as well as Exhibits F to F-5 for the petitioners which are all
CTCs do not show any signatures and thumbmarks of those who were
named as holders of the same. All of these exhibits show that on the
blank where the signature is supposed to appear, the entry “B. B.
PAROCHA” is indicated.
The undersigned judge was also able to scan through these CTC booklets
and saw the numerous CTCs issued to persons that do not have
signatures or thumbmarks. She also discovered that in all these booklets,
there were CTCs issued to persons whose addresses did not indicate Del
Carmen Weste but indicated other addresses such as Cortes, Catigbian,
Inabanga, Panglao, Sevilla, and other towns in Bohol.
The court truly appreciates the candid and spontaneous presentation of

these CTC booklets as prompted by petitioner’s counsel and as shown by
Felipe Terec, witness for the petitioner. This candid presentation shows
the real picture in the issuance of CTCs in Barangay del Carmen Weste:
the CTCs are issued in the absence of the persons named therein, CTCs
without any thumbmark and signature do not belong to the respondent
alone but to several other numerous persons and that the CTCs were
issued even to persons who are not residents of the barangay. These
candid observations contradict petitioner’s statement in paragraph 35 of
the petition that it is normal for barangay constituents to drop by the
barangay hall and affix their thumbmarks and signatures on the CTCs
that they request to have.
Clearly, the court cannot appreciate the CTCs as indicia of domicile or

even bodily presence. By themselves, Exhibits F to F-5 create a
presumption that respondent could not even go to the barangay to obtain
27
a CTC, which raises doubt as to her physical presence in the barangay,
but Exhibits 14 to 18, as well as the booklets scanned by the presiding
judge show the whole situation wherein Felipe Terec issues the CTCs to
1) any representative of the requester, not only limited to the respondent;
2) any representative of the requester thereby negating the need for
physical bodily presence in obtaining the same; and 3) anyone, including
those residing in other municipalities can be issued a CTC.
Upon redirect, petitioner’s counsel tried to salvage the testimony of

Terec, by obtaining the answer that even if these was his practice, Terec
fully knew that respondent did not reside in their barangay. However,
such an observation by Terec is suspect, considering that he showed bias
in alluding that it was only respondent who was issued a CTC sans her
signature and thumbmark when in all truth, he has been indiscriminately
issuing numerous CTCs to all and sundry in the same manner.
Attendance in purok meetings. Buenvenida Llorente testified last for the

petitioner. She testified that she is the barangay secretary tasked to take
the attendance record of household heads in purok meetings. She
presented Exhibits G, G-1, and G-2 which were attendance sheets
indicating the household heads in purok meetings. Exhibit G she said,
which was the attendance sheet of purok meetings in 2016, showed that
no member of the household of Victoria Chatto attended the three purok
meetings for that year. Hence alongside the name of Victoria Chatto she
wrote the word, passive, which meant inactive household for failure to
attend purok meetings. Exhibit G-1 she added, which was the attendance
sheet of purok meetings in 2015, also showed that no member of the
household of Victoria Chatto attended the three purok meetings for that
year. Exhibit G-2 on the other hand, was the attendance sheet of purok
meetings in 2017, also showed that no member of the household of
Victoria Chatto attended the three purok meetings for that year. Another
document marked as Exhibit G-2 shows the attendance sheet of purok
meetings for the year 2018. In this sheet, the household of Victoria Chatto
was no longer indicated, instead, it was replaced with the name of
Edgardo Chatto M. It showed that Edgardo Chatto failed to attend 4 of 5
purok hearings.
Llorente was asked if the respondent was indicated in Exhibits G and

series, and said that what was indicated in Exhibits G and series were the
names of the household heads only. Due to this admission that Exhibits
G to G-2 merely reflect the household heads in Purok 5, the same cannot
be used to determine the members of each household in Del Carmen
Weste.
Moreover, when Llorente was asked where the respondent’s name was
in Exhibits G and series, she spontaneously pointed to the entry “Victoria
28
Chatto” in Exhibits G, G-1, and G-2; and to the entry “Edgardo Chatto
M.” in the other Exhibit G-2. This automatic response only shows that
respondent was considered to be part of the Chatto household that
resides in the ancestral house of the Chattos in Del Carmen Weste.
Based on the totality of evidence presented, petitioner was able to prove

that respondent’s domicile of origin was Tagbilaran City. However,
petitioner was not able to present convincing evidence that respondent
did not adopt Balilihan as her domicile. There is doubt as to his
testimony, as well as that of his witnesses, that respondent lacked actual
bodily presence in Balilihan. Moreover, the evidence they presented (i.e.
that respondent was seen during holidays) showed respondent’s intent
to keep on returning to Balilihan.
Petitioner and his witnesses failed to produce testimonial and/or

documentary evidence that respondent was actually missing in Del
Carmen Weste, Balilihan, Bohol. To sum it up, Hangad contradicted
himself when he actually saw the respondent residing in the Chatto
ancestral home. Batac had the wrong notion of what is expected of a
domicile since she expected respondent to stay in Del Carmen Weste 24
hours in 7 days. The CTCs were inordinately issued, and the purok
attendance sheets only showed household heads and not all of the
members of the household. These do not negate respondent’s bodily
presence in Balilihan.
On the contrary, petitioner and his witnesses all agree that they saw
respondent during special occasions like fiestas, sumad (foundation day),
day of the dead, and during election period. This is respondent’s intent
to continuously and permanently return to Balilihan.
It must be stressed that domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place and the intention of
returning there permanently.
Petitioner, furthermore did not prove that respondent failed to abandon

her old domicile. Her old domicile is in Tagbilaran City but since she is
also a resident of Tagbilaran City, as she maintains the house in Bagong
Lipunan that is owned by her father-in-law (as per Exhibit 3), her old
domicile of origin must specifically refer to the house in which she was
raised by her parents. There is no showing that she returned to this
house but instead she followed her husband and occupied the late Eladio
Chatto’s residence, thereby abandoning her domicile of origin.
It must be minded that there is no law which requires a voter to only

establish one residence, as a voter can have as many residences as s/he
wants. What is required by law is that a voter should only have one
domicile. The two terms are confusing but these can never be
29
interchanged. In the case of Imelda Marcos v. COMELEC46, the Supreme
Court distinguished residence from domicile, thus:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual

relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent
be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile
in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence"

is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since
no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are

dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
46 G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995.
30
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs.
Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
Petitioner argues that the only connection that respondent has in

Balilihan is her marital bond with Edgardo Chatto. Paragraph 64 of the
petition reads:
“64. While it is true that Respondent has been a “Chatto” for

almost 27 years by virtue of marriage, it does not make her an ipso
facto “Balilinhon” or a bona fide resident of Balilihan”
A mere squatter in a parapherenal dwelling? Petitioner also faults

respondent as only a mere occupant in the ancestral house of her
husband which is paraphernal property and over which she can never
have a claim by virtue of its being paraphernal in nature. However, our
laws on succession and family relations, property, and interpersonal
relations is not at issue here. What is at issue here is whether or not
respondent is allowed by law to establish her domicile in her husband’s
ancestral house. To this the Supreme Court in Jalosjos v. COMELEC and
Erasmo Sr.47, said:
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s
house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What
47 G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012.
31
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
The Supreme Court in Sabili v. COMELEC reiterated that a house, even

conjugal property at that, is not necessary to establish domicile, thus:
It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications

required of candidates for local election. Rather, it is a candidate’s
residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever
capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered
as evidence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice
the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a
candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of
governor. In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate’s
sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill
could not be considered as his residence for the purpose of
complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in

Palomares’s name does not prove petitioner’s residence as it
merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary formalities
or payment of taxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this

point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining petitioner’s
residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate
should have his own house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality,
even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.60 What is of
central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a
place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an
indefinite period of time.
Furthermore in Sabili, the petitioner Palomares therein, whose domicile

was being questioned, was living in the property registered to his
common-law wife. The Supreme Court resolved that even if Article 148
of the Family Code governs, and that the common-law wife executed an
affidavit stating that the said property was obtained solely through the
income of Palomares, the existence of said house and lot in the common-
law wife’s name supports the idea of Palomareses’ physical presence in
the locality, thus:
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself,

Palomares’ ownership of the Lipa property does not prove that she
or – and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner – resides
32
in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot
apparently owned by petitioner’s common-law wife, with whom
he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible
petitioner’s allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the
area.
Applying Sabili in the instant case, it is of no moment that the property

as of the moment, is exclusively owned by the intimate partner of the
resident whose domicile is being questioned. The existence of the
Palomares property in the name of the common-law wife, like the
existence of the ancestral house of respondent’s husband supports
respondent’s actual, physical, and bodily presence and intent to reside in
Balilihan.
Paradoxically, it is this same marital bond that makes the domicile of the
respondent all the more in Balilihan. It is correct that in Marcos v.
COMELEC, the marriage of Imelda Marcos to Ferdinand Marcos did not
ipso facto render abandonment of her domicile of origin. However, the
facts of this case do not fall squarely as that in Marcos v. COMELEC.
Unlike in Marcos, in the instant case, respondent abandoned her
domicile of origin when she came to live in Balilihan and followed her
husband’s domicile of origin by virtue of marriage.
Would it have been the other way around, where respondent maintained
Tagbilaran City as her domicile of origin and failed to adopt a domicile
by choice upon her marriage? This court does not believe so. While it can
be argued that petitioner established respondent’s physical presence in
Tagbilaran City, petitioner failed to establish respondent’s intent to
permanently return to Tagbilaran City. What is extant in petitioner’s
evidence is that respondent can be found wherever respondent’s
husband is and that respondent can be found at the ancestral house
during holidays and election time throughout the years, which shows
respondent’s intention to permanently return to Balilihan.
Had petitioner also impugned the domicile of respondent’s husband in

Balilihan and presented evidence to the effect that respondent’s husband
adopted the Tagbilaran home of the late Eladio Chatto as his domicile of
choice, then it would necessarily follow that respondent’s domicile
would be Tagbilaran City. It is peculiar that petitioner failed to question
the domicile of respondent’s husband, thereby categorically admitting
that respondent’s husband continues to adopt his domicile of origin, and
that since respondent has always followed her husband, then her
husband’s domicile of origin is legally presumed to be her domicile of
choice and her domicile by operation of law, upon applying Article 69 of
the Family Code.
33
Let us now determine if respondent indeed adopted Balilihan as her
domicile of choice.
Petitioner’s claim that respondent and her husband immediately after

their wedding, went to Tagbilaran City to establish a conjugal dwelling
was substantially rebutted by the respondent. During her testimony,
respondent admitted that she was born and raised in Tagbilaran City but
emphatically stated that she changed residence from Tagbilaran City to
Balilihan when she got married to Edgardo M. Chatto in 1991. She said
she remembers fully well that she changed her residency upon marriage
because one of the first things that her husband requested of her upon
their marriage, was for her to change her residence and register as a voter
in Balilihan, Bohol. She added that since then, she has been consistently
voting in Balilihan every election year for at least 24 years.
Respondent also presented her Voters Registration (Exhibit 1) to prove

that she has been a registered voter and a resident of Balilihan for 24
years. 1. She has been continuously voting in Balilihan, Bohol
particularly during the elections in 1992, 1995, 1998. 2001, 2004, 2007,
2010, 2013, and 2016.This, however, by itself is not indicative of proof or
residence as per Luna v. Tamlin where the Supreme Court said:
The term "residence" as used in election law is synonymous with

"domicile" which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention (Domino v. Commission on
Elections, 310 SCRA 546 (1999); Romualdez v. RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408 (1993). The fact that petitioner is
registered as a voter in Josefina does not prove that he is not
domiciled somewhere else. It is fact of the place of residence, not
where he is registered as a voter, which is decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency
qualification requirement under the Voter Registration Act (See
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 317 SCRA 641 (1999))
In Poe, the Supreme Court acknowledge the standing jurisprudence that

it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement
of residency.
Respondent testified that she has lived in the Chatto ancestral house in
Balilihan since 1991, during the period when her husband was mayor of
the town. However, when her husband was elected vice-governor, she
decided to occupy the residence of the Chattos in Tagbilaran City as it
was her obligation to live together with her husband. Since her husband
has been elected as a provincial official, the couple has been living in
34
Tagbilaran City well up to the time that she testified. She added that she
was actually physically present in Balilihan since she was elected mayor
because she reported for office and went around the barangays as part of
her responsibilities. It was only that she had to go home to Tagbilaran
City in the evenings because she had the obligation to sleep with her
husband.
Respondent added that although she had to go to Tagbilaran City in the

evenings to comply with a spousal obligation, she considered Balilihan
her home because everytime that the spouses have the opportunity, they
would occupy the Chatto ancestral house in Balilihan – during
weekends, fiestas, the day of the dead, and other holidays. They would
also go to Sal-ing where the Chattos have a farm and spend weekends or
holidays there. She said that she has all the intention to be in Balilihan
and to always go back to Balilihan as in fact, she and her husband
already have reserved cemetery plots at the Balilihan Catholic Cemetery
in which they would wish to buried when their time comes. These
reserved cemetery plots are near the cemetery plots where her in-laws,
the late Eladio and Victoria Chatto are buried.
Respondent emphasized that throughout her married life, she has been
occupying the Chatto houses specifically in Balilihan, and Tagbilaran
City and that there was no need to build a family house for their family’s
needs because of the existence of these houses which were not frequently
used by the other siblings of her husband inasmuch as three of them
were abroad, whereas one lived in Luzon.
Nimia Lungay thereafter testified for the respondent. She said she has
personal knowledge that the couple lived in the ancestral home of the
Chattos in Del Carmen Weste because she was employed as the nanny of
the couple’s only daughter, Trisha. She confirmed the veracity of her
affidavit (Exhibit 8) which stated that after the marriage of the
respondent to Edgardo Chatto, “the couple lived in Del Carmen Weste,
Balilihan and transferred their residence in the ancestral house of the late
Eladio Chatto and Victoria M. Chatto since Gov. Chatto was already the
mayor”48. Because she was one of the principal sponsors, Lungay
testified that respondent’s daughter Esther Patrisha V. Chatto was
christened in Balilihan, Bohol on 22 November 1992. She added in
paragraphs 10 to 12 of Exhibit 8 that during Sundays, midnight
Christmas, and Holy Week, Gov. Edgar Chatto, Puresa Chatto, and their
daughter Trisha attended masses in Balilihan. Specifically on Christmas,
the family would invite churchgoers to the Chatto ancestral house after
the governor would deliver his Christmas message in church.
48 Paragraph 7 of Exhibit 8, page 89 of the rollo.
35
Ernesto Llorente testified next. He testified that he worked in the Chatto
household as a working student for the period 1991 till 1994. He was
personally aware that respondent transferred residence in Balilihan since
he was also living with the respondent and her husband at the Chatto
Ancestral house, doing errands for them such as buying vegetables, fish,
bread, and other basic needs in the house.
What is clear from respondent’s testimony and that of her witnesses is

that respondent held two residences for more than two decades.
However, it was not shown that in residing in Tagbilaran City, she
abandoned her domicile of choice which is Balilihan. While respondent
was a minor, she followed the domicile of her parents which is in
Tagbilaran City. When respondent got married, she opted to stay in
Balilihan for a few years while her husband was a mayor and in so
doing, adopted the domicile of her husband. But when her husband
served as a provincial official, she followed the residence of her husband
and lived in Tagbilaran City at the house of her father-in-law, which is
still the residence of her husband. But throughout these decades,
respondent did not abandon her close ties to her domicile of choice as
she continued to stay in the Chatto ancestral house in Del Carmen Weste,
Balilihan during weekends and holidays. Both the witnesses for the
petitioner and the respondent are in unison in saying that they saw
respondent in the Chatto ancestral house during these occasions.
Incidentally, the COMELEC Election Officer of Balilihan was directed by

the court to produce the documents pertaining to the registration of
respondent as voter in Balilihan. The COMELEC submitted certified true
copies of the forms that she filled-up in compliance with Republic Act
10367 which required mandatory biometrics voter registration. Page 154
of the records also show a certified true copy of respondent’s voter
registration record when she first registered in Balilihan by virtue of
RA8189, which corroborates respondent’s testimony as well as that of her
witnesses, that she has been a resident of Balilihan Bohol since 1991 or
for six (6) years as of 22 June 1997, which is the date of registration.
The Supreme Court in Ugdoracion Jr. v. COMELEC and Tungol49 said

that “[D]omicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired
by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of
law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence
or intention.
The parties have no issue on respondent’s domicile of origin. What is

contested is respondent’s domicile of choice.
49 G.R. No. 179851 April 18, 2008.
36
The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost
only when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.50
In the instant case, however, respondent’s marriage prompted her to

voluntarily abandon her domicile by origin, that is her family home with
her parents and this amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of
her status as resident of Tagbilaran City; it constituted a change from her
domicile of origin, which was Tagbilaran City, Bohol, to a new domicile
of choice, which is Balilihan, Bohol. The undisputed testimony of the
respondent that there are cemetery plots reserved for respondent and her
husband at the Catholic cemetery in Balilihan, Bohol for good measure,
clinched respondent’s intent to remain in Balilihan for an indefinite time,
and indisputably buttressed her claim that she abandoned her domicile
of origin.
To hold that respondent has not established a domicile in Balilihan,

Bohol despite the loss of her domicile of origin (Tagbilaran City) would
violate the settled maxim that a person must have a domicile or residence
somewhere. To declare that she cannot adopt her husband’s domicile as
her domicile of choice because of issues on spousal exclusivity of
property would render the respondent a mere squatter in her husband’s
residence, and not one who is supposedly to be treated as a family
member, in accordance with Filipino customs and tradition. If
respondent is treated as an outsider by her husband’s community, she
needs all the more the protection of her husband, who at the very least,
should provide her solace in his ancestral home. Else, she would have
abandoned her domicile of choice for naught, and we will come up with
the legally-forbidden situation where a married woman like her, who
adopted her husband’s domicile as her domicile of choice, who has
followed her husband around wherever he lives -- becomes domicile-
less, or in common terms, homeless.
DAMAGES
Respondent is of the opinion that this is a harassment suit and the

petitioner should be made to pay her attorney’s fees in the amount of
Php80,000.00 and Php20,000.00 for transit expenses. However, these
expenses were largely unsubstantiated. Besides, on account of the limited
time that the court has in hearing and deciding this instant case, the court
cannot swiftly rule that this case was filed simply to harass the
respondent, or for the respondent or those behind her, to gain political
mileage for the upcoming elections, especially since respondent failed to
adduce evidence of these dubious motives.
50 Ugdoracion, Jr. v COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851 April 18, 2008.
37
But just a word of caution to the parties in this case: this decision does
not bar the filing of a similar petition in the future as it is not considered
res judicata. In Velasco v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court
unconditionally said:
In Domino v. COMELEC - where this Court faced the contention

that the decision of the first level court in an exclusion proceeding
on the issue of residence is final and conclusive on the COMELEC
hearing a COC denial/cancellation proceeding under Section 78 of
the OED - we ruled that the factual findings of the trial court and
its resultant conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings on
matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on and do not rise to the
level of a res judicata ruling with respect to the COMELEC. The
reason is that inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in
character, are summary proceedings. We further added that a
decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as
a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may
take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. X x x.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED.
10 February 2019 for Balilihan, Bohol.
JOY ANGELICA P. SANTOS DOCTOR

Acting Presiding Judge
38

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Republic of the Philippines

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION Election Case No. 001-2019

PUREZA VELOSO CHATTO, AND

Sections 1, Article V of the Constitution reads:

Petitioner before 5PM submitted an original copy of his petition. Along

On February 7, 2019, petitioner presented testimonial evidence through

Section 32(g) of RA8189 reads:

In paragraphs 40 and 41 of the petition, petitioner furthermore alleges:

“40. Every single working day, Respondent is picked up by her

In relation to respondent’s “day job”, petitioner adds in paragraph 61 of

In paragraph 74 of the petition, petitioner adds that respondent’s

“63. This is so because her vehicle is never parked in the Chatto

Petitioner additionally claims that this is public knowledge not only

2 Annexes A, B, F, and G respectively.

The declared address of respondent in Balilihan, petitioner discloses in

“50. Every member of a Purok represents a household/ family. In

8 Paragraph 37 and Terec’s affidavit as per Annex D of the petition.

“54. Respondent as expected, has also not attended any of the

“56. Interestingly, Respondent and her husband have never

“57. This only shows how disconnected and disinterested the

“58. Registered households, who have moved to Manila or Luzon

“59. Obviously, Respondent does not come home to Purok 5 in Del

Paragraph 55 of the petition refers to a certification issued by Barangay

Section 32 of RA8189 does not necessitate the filing of an answer, but on

Respondent denied most of the allegations of the petition as “baseless

Respondent in paragraph 16 proffers the defense that the questioned

Respondent likewise reasons that her frequent travel to Tagbilaran, “was

12 Paragraph 33 of the answer.

Respondent furthermore, admits that her domicile of origin is Tagbilaran

In addition, respondent in paragraph 27 of her answer states that she and

Respondent cites the case of Limbona v. COMELEC and Alingan20 which

18 Paragraph 20 of the answer.

She claims that as a married couple, it was never their intention to

Respondent also attached to her answer, the affidavits of Timotea M.

As to her facebook post, respondent in paragraph 28 of her answer

In paragraph 29, respondent belittles her lack of ownership of any real

What is more important, respondent states, is that the people of Balilihan

During the afternoon hearing of 7 February 2019, respondent also sought

THE COURT’S RULING

THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Respondent offered procedural technicalities which should have

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important

This section discusses the reasons why these procedural technicalities

22 G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015.

On 7 February 2019, respondent through counsel questioned the belated

The petition, however, contains serious allegations which affects the

This prompted the undersigned judge to prudently relax the rules of

Section 35 of the “Voter’s Registration Act” provides:

23 G.R. No. 184618, November 19, 2014.

Furthermore, it is believed that residency, like citizenship, is a continuing

In Luna v. Hon. Tamin24, Mayor Pablo Luna of Zamboanga-Sibugay had

R.A. No. 8189, §35 provides:

This provision makes no distinction between voters registered

24 G.R. No. 147409.May 4, 2001.

Respondent claims that this petition ought to be dismissed because

It is a basic postulation that in election laws, the word residence is

In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally

Domicile by origin is not lost unless one adopts a domicile by choice or

Petitioner claims that respondent is not a resident of Balilihan on the

1. Respondent boasts on her personal facebook account that she is

2. Respondent is a resident of Tagbilaran City. She grew up and

3. Petitioner contends that right after the wedding of respondent to

25 Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999.

4. Neighbors and residents of Del Carmen Weste, particularly