DIRECTOR OF LANDS v.

CA
(Panganiban, July 1997)

FACTS:

- Teodoro Abistado filed for petition for original registration of his land – 648 sq.m under
PD 1529, assigned to Branch 44 of RTC Occidental Mindoro
- During pendency, Abistado died. Abistado heirs represented by aunt Josefa, substituted
as applicants.
- Land Reg. Court dismissed petition for want of jurisdiction HOWEVER found that
predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of subject land since 1938.
- Trial Court reasoned: that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23
(1) of PD 1529 requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E')
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published
in the Official Gazette
- Therefore, it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation
- Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982: OG – jurisdictional, Court will be
powerless if not posted. Newspaper of Gen. Circulation – Procedural, due process.
- CA: it was merely procedural and that failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the Trial Court of its authority to grant such application. Solgen disagreed and filed
petition to set aside decision.

ISSUE: Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?

HELD: MANDATORY.

PD 1529, Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

“shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”

The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
In Republic v. Marasigan, Court held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial
hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied
with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail
the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15
of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed
provision.

Being a procedure in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against
all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with.

Or else, persons interested whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application. As a rule, a party seeking inscription of realty of land must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership but identity of the same, so he can
enforce it against the world.

Why mandatory? DUE PROCESS so it can be WIDELY READ.

In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in
as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Philippine Registered Electrical Practiioners, Inc.(PREPI) v. Francia, PRC Commissioner
(Quisumbing, Jan. 2000)

FACTS:
PREPI is an org of professional electrical engineers, associate, assistants, and master
electricians.
It filed for a declaratory relief assailing validity of Reso. 1 of 1986 by board of EE headed by
Mederico Cortez. PRC approved.
Adopted guidelines for implementation of Continuing Professional Education including a
requirement that beginning on Jan. 1 1988, every EE must earn credit units of CPE before his
license is renewed. To earn credit units, he must first apply for accred in Institute of Integrated
Electrical Engineers
Assailed for violating equal protection and due process clause, prohibition vs bills of attainder,
ex post facto law, and mandate for protection of rights of workers.
“III. POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS:
A. 60 and above
B. top gov official of at least VP or bureau director level in private sector
C. post-doctoral studies
D. RPC or Board of EE recommended
IV. Method of Eval. And Credit units
A. Renew every 3 years
B. Secure IIEE certificate
C. Following credit units required for 3 years: Registered Master Electrician (100 units) and
Reg. EE (200 units)
TC dismissed petition for failure to establish clear violation of Constitution. Cited presumption
of validity.
Directly appealed to SC.
CONTENTIONS:
PETITIONER: (Statute Reference) Section 6(a) of P.D. No. 223 – “Board only has
visitation powers, "to see [to it] that proper compliments of professionals are employed
and given proper responsibilities and remuneration." - only conduct inspections of sites
where electrical engineering jobs are conducted, primarily to safeguard the welfare of
electrical engineers. Petitioner points out that under Section 32 of R.A. No. 184, the
Board has the power to suspend licenses only upon proper notice and hearing; that the
license to practice a profession is not a mere privilege but a property right. (Due process)
They are fearing that licenses are automatically revoked for non- compliance.
RESPONDENT: (Statute Reference) Board had the authority to promulgate the
questioned resolution pursuant to Section 3, R.A. No. 184 and Section 6, P.D. No. 223.
The latter law is not limited to the power of inspection and visitation as petitioner
contends. It includes the power to formulate policies and programs as may be necessary
to improve the practice of a profession. (Due process clause) Resolution No. 1, Series of
1986 is not violative of the Constitution since there is no automatic revocation for non-
compliance as the petitioner fears. (No violation of EQC AS WELL): He claims that
there are those who, by reason of age and expertise, may reasonably be exempted from
the CPE requirement. (No violation of Art. VI, Sec. 28 of Const.) "(2) The Congress
 may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government." – Not applicable.

ISSUE: 1. Does Board of EE had authority to issue resolution? 2. Was it constitutional?

HELD:
1. Court noted the Board issued the resolution as a means purportedly to upgrade the
knowledge and skills of electrical engineers with the following objectives:
a. Update technical knowledge
b. Effect transfer of technology from experts
c. Stimulate self-improvement
d. Broaden practicioners horizon
Section 3, of R.A. No. 184 mandates the board to recommend to PRC adoption of measures as
may be deemed proper for the maintenance of good ethics and standards in the practice of
electrical engineering in the Philippines.
Sec. 6(a) of P.D. 223 gives professional boards the power to, whenever necessary, adopt
such measures as may be deemed proper for the enhancement of the profession or occupation
and/or the maintenance of high professional, ethical and technical standards.
Furthermore, the conduct of ocular inspections is merely directory and not mandatory.
We are, therefore, constrained to concede to the Board the existence of the power to issue the
assailed resolution, in pursuance of its mandates under R.A. 184 and P.D. 223

2. MOOT AND ACADEMIC. On July 25, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 266, entitled "Institutionalization of the Continuing Professional
Education (CPE) Programs of the Various Professional Regulatory Boards (PRBs) under
the Supervision of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)." E.O. No. 266 found
it imperative to impose upon registered professionals the completion of the CPE as a pre-
requisite for the renewal of their licenses. Avowedly, CPE would enable the professionals

PETITION DENIED FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

BERCES v. Exec. Sec. Guingona
(Quiason, Feb. 1995)

FACTS:
Petitioner filed 2 admin cases vs Naomi Corral, Mayor of Tiwi Albay with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for:
1. Abuse of authority for non payment of accrued leave benefits
2. Dishonesty for installing water pipeline operated and maintained by municipality
1993, Sangguniang Panlalawigan granted petition.
1. For admin case 1, she is to pay P36, 779.02 and suspension ordered for 2 months
2. For admin case 2, suspension for 3 months.
Mayor appealed to office of president, questioning decision and prayed for stay of execution of
appeal pursuant to Sec. 67(b) of LGC, providing Admin appeals within 30 days of receipt maybe
done with xx xx (b) office of president, in decisions of SPs, etc.
Stay of execution governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987:
Sec. 68: The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal
Sec. 6: the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon filing of the
appeal within the period prescribed herein
Office of President granted petition.
Petitioner filed MR – denied.
petitioner contends that the governing law in this case is (1991) RA 7160, which mandates that
an appeal “shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.” And it repealed
(1987) admin. Order no. 18 (Governing appeals from OP), pursuant to sec. 530 of RA 7160
which is repealing clause.

ISSUE: W/N RA 7160 effectively repealed AO 18

HELD: NO. Aforementioned clause is not an express appeal for it did not identify the laws
which it repeals. Implied appeal is not favored. An implied repeal predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior
laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible We find that the provisions of Section 68 of
R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.

First sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory. – there is room to construe that officials are given discretion to
stay execution of appealed decisions. This authority is procedural. The term "shall" may be read
either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in
which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way
or the other.

PETITION DISMISSED.
ERECTORS, inc. v. NLRC
(Puno, May 1996)

FACTS: