International Negotiation 22 (2017) 1–32

brill.com/iner

Camp David and Dayton: Comparing Jimmy Carter

and Richard Holbrooke as Mediators

Hamza Karčić1
Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Skenderija 72, Sarajevo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
hamza.karcic@fpn.unsa.ba

Received 13 February 2016; accepted 13 August 2016

Abstract

U.S. mediation towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s and Balkan con-
flicts in the 1990s may not seem comparable at first. Differences between these conflicts
in terms of history, duration and dynamics abound. The nature and level of U.S. involve-
ment provides further contrasts. Yet, the Camp David negotiations in 1978 and the Dayton
Peace Talks in 1995 offer striking parallels in terms of third-party mediator actions under-
taken. This article compares the two summits by applying the analytic framework devel-
oped by Curran, Sebenius and Watkins to categorize third party mediator strategies. The
analysis builds on this framework and deduces common tactics employed by third-party
mediators at Camp David and Dayton.

Keywords

mediation – Arab-Israeli conflict – Balkan conflict – Camp David negotiations –

Dayton peace talks

1  Hamza Karčić is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political

Science at the University of Sarajevo. He defended his doctoral dissertation on the role of
Congress in shaping U.S. policy towards Bosnia during the 1992–1995 war at the University
of Sarajevo in 2014.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/15718069-12341354

2 Karčić

A Democratic governor from the South, with limited foreign policy experience,
runs as a Washington outsider against a Republican incumbent and wins.2 He
inherits a foreign policy crisis – an international conflict – and embarks on
high-stakes peace negotiations and emerges with a major achievement. The
description may be used for both Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. At first sight
it may seem that the peace negotiations at Camp David in 1978 and Dayton in
1995 have little in common. The first sought to achieve a breakthrough in the
three decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict, while the latter sought to put an end
to complicated Balkan conflicts. Yet, both of these peace negotiations can be
studied as successful examples of third-party mediation. Richard Holbrooke
even recounts preparing for Dayton by reading accounts of Camp David nego-
tiations and interviewing several former Camp David participants including
Jimmy Carter (Holbrooke 1998).
Camp David and Dayton may be compared on several levels. Multilateral
Geneva conferences preceded both Camp David and Dayton. From multi-
lateral frameworks, the peace process turned into U.S.-led peace summits.
Camp David negotiations were led by a sitting president; Dayton was led by an
Assistant Secretary of State. Peace negotiations that brokered the first Arab-
Israeli peace treaty lasted thirteen days in September 1978; by contrast, Dayton
lasted twenty-one days in November 1995. The negotiations at Camp David
were conducted at the highest-level with top U.S. officials directly involved
throughout the thirteen days. At Dayton, high-level U.S. officials were brought
in to prevail upon negotiating parties at sequenced intervals. Camp David
involved brokering peace between two states; Dayton included three states
at war. Egyptian and Israeli delegations negotiated at the Camp David presi-
dential retreat, indicating a level of prestige; Bosnians, Serbians and Croatians
negotiated at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, itself a symbol of U.S. military
power.
Both settings − Camp David and Dayton − allowed third-party mediators
to reduce leaks and control the talks (Reynolds 2009). At both Camp David
and Dayton, negotiating parties were not allowed to talk to the press. At Camp
David, the only official authorized to brief the press was White House spokes-
person Jody Powell while at Dayton, it was State Department spokesperson
Nick Burns.
The participants at the two summits provide for striking comparisons. Most
principals at both summits were battle-hardened. Menachem Begin had made
a name for himself in the underground and Anwar Sadat began the 1973 war.

2  I would like to thank Fehim Hadžić for research assistance and the anonymous reviewers for
their comments.

International Negotiation 22 (2017) 1–32

Camp David and Dayton 3

Alija Izetbegovic led the defense of Bosnia, Franjo Tudjman defended and
recaptured lost Croatian territory, while Slobodan Milosevic had launched
three wars. Several principals brought longstanding associates. Sadat’s team
included Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel from his days in the underground, while
Begin brought a decades-long associate Yechiel Kadishai. Izetbegovic’s foreign
minister, Mohamed Sacirbey, was the son of the Bosnian president’s old friend
from his days as a communist dissident.
Carter’s wife, Rosalynn, was present at Camp David and played a supporting
role to her husband, as did Kati Marton to Holbrooke at Dayton. Carter had
hoped that Sadat’s and Begin’s wives could ease the tensions and serve as a
bridge between the two leaders. (Reynolds 2009; Wright 2014). While Begin’s
wife, Aliza, attended the summit, Sadat’s wife, Jehan, did not. By comparison,
no wives of Balkan leaders attended Dayton. At Camp David, Moshe Dayan
and Ezer Weizman served as politicians with military credentials. Conversely,
at Dayton, there was no similar military leader among any of the delegations.
In terms of the principals’ backgrounds, Begin had legal training, which influ-
enced his style and negotiation (Reynolds 2009). At Dayton, Izetbegovic and
Milosevic both had law degrees. At Dayton, Americans advised both the Serbian
and the Bosnian delegations, which was not the case at Camp David in 1978.
Milosevic’s delegation was advised by a long-time leader of the Democratic
Party in New Hampshire, Chris Spirou.3 The Bosnian delegation was assisted
by Ronald Reagan’s assistant defense secretary, Richard Perle, who advised the
Bosnians on the military annex.4
Both summits resulted in immediate dissatisfaction among some delega-
tions. Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel resigned in protest over the signing of the
Camp David Accords (Kamel 1986: 368), while several Egyptian delegation
members opted to skip the signing ceremony in the East Room (Lewis 1998;
Saunders 1993). In the case of Dayton, Bosnian Croat leader Krešimir Zubak
refused to initial the agreement (Granić 2005). Milosevic initialed the final
agreement on behalf of Bosnian Serbs in his delegation who had refused to

3  Spirou was introduced to Milosevic by Milan Milutinovic who had served as Serbian ambas-
sador to Greece. Spirou was quoted as saying that he was “a good friend of Milosevic” and that
they had worked together to bring peace to the Balkans. Spirou was the only non-Serb in the
Serb delegation at Dayton (Holbrooke 1998).
4  Perle paid his own trips to Dayton and was not around continually. One of the reasons Hol-
brooke approved of Perle’s participation was to win influence for the upcoming congressio-
nal debate on troop deployment to Bosnia. As Dobbs asked “If a Republican hard-liner like
Perle can bring himself to approve a Bosnian peace settlement, who could say no?” (Dobbs
1995).

International Negotiation 22 (2017) 1–32