republic pilipjas v shell corp

Facts:
On 16 April 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8180,[4] otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" took effect. It provides, among others, for the reduction of
the tariff duty on imported crude oil from ten percent (10%) to three percent (3%).
Prior to its effectivity, petitioner's importation of 1,979,674.85 U.S. barrels of Arab Light
Crude Oil, thru the Ex MT Lanistels, arrived on 7 April 1996 nine (9) days earlier than the
effectivity of the liberalization provision
More than four (4) years later or on 1 August 2000, petitioner received a demand letter[5]
dated 27 July 2000 from the Bureau of Customs (BOC), through the District Collector of
Batangas, assessing it to pay the deficiency customs duties in the amount of
P120,162,991.00
Petitioner protested the assessment on 14 August 2000
Seeking clarification as to what course of action the BOC is taking, and reiterating its
position that the respondent's demand letters dated 29 October 2001 and 27 July 2000 have
no legal basis, petitioner sent a letter to the Director of Legal Service of the BOC on 3
December 2001 for said purpose.
On 11 April 2002, the BOC filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against petitioner,
together with Caltex Philippines, Inc. as co-party therein, docketed as Civil Case No.
02103239, before Branch XXV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), of the City of Manila.
Consequently, on 27 May 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a
Petition for Review, raffled to the Former First Division (CTA in Division)
CTA in Division ruled to dismiss the Petition for Review on C.T.A. Case No. 6485 for lack of
merit and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay the entire amount of P936,899,883.90
CTA Former En Banc affirmed the CTA in Division's ruling pertaining to the implied
abandonment caused by petitioner's failure to file the Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration within the 30-day period, and transfer of ownership by operation of law to the
government of the subject shipment in accordance with Sections 1801 and 1802, in relation
to Section 13.01, of the TCCP... judicial no
Issues:
that the subject Memorandum dated 2 February 2001 was neither identified nor offered in
evidence by respondent during the entire proceedings before the CTA in Division.
CTA likewise cannot motu proprio justify the existence of fraud committed by petitioner by
applying the rules on judicial notice.
Ruling:
Unless any of the party formally offered in evidence said Memorandum, and accordingly,
admitted by the court a quo, it cannot be considered as among the legal and factual bases in
resolving the controversy presented before it.
it would also be an error for the CTA in Division to even take judicial notice of the subject
Memorandum being merely a part of the BOC Records submitted before the court a quo,
without the same being identified by a witness, offered in and admitted as evidence, and
effectively, depriving petitioner, first and foremost, an opportunity to object thereto. Hence,
the subject Memorandum should not have been considered by the CTA in Division in its
disposition.
Principles:
evidence
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents' not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
evidence
The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is
deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that
the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because
to do so would ''condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order
which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of
justice."

ALEGRE vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (1929)

G.R. L-30783

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign
markets. He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to
England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted
to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board.

So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the
Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular,
sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a
delegation of legislative power.

HELD: NO. The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading
and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a
board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work.

Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation
of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In
the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and
from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission.

The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading
and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by
such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that
there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its
constitutionality.

TOLEDO V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 202 SCRA 507 (1991)

202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras

Facts:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager
of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time
Toledo was already more than 57 years old. Toledo’s appointment papers and his oath of
office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation.
However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the
CSRPAP—which prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into
government service without prior CSC approval—was secured. Petitioner then reported for
work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo
Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledo’s
appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his
appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
Held:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no
provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person
already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such,
was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA
2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after
publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the
CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;
prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which
it was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of
promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no
prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any
provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing to carry into effect
through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement
the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to
supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to
Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required
by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a “mere reiteration of existing law”
and “circularized” cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.
Fact: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law
of public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be made between laws of
general applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication”? Where is the
publication to be made? When is the publication to be made? the petitioners suggest that
there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not;
that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith
in the Official Gazette
Issue: Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper
of General Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?
Held: Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to
say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that
a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to
the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. The conclusive presumption
that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.