TORTS 59 CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a

new one is hereby rendered:

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
1. In Civil Case No. SM-950, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants, with legal
interest from the date when this decision shall become final and executory, the following:
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents. A. Actual damages, to wit:

DAVIDE, JR., J.: 1) Gaudencio C. Rayo, Two Hundred Thirty One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Pesos (P231,260.00);

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court urging this Court to set aside the 19 2) Bienvenido P. Pascual, Two Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P204.500.00);
August 1991 consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA.-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-931 which reversed the Decision of
Branch 5 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, and held petitioners National Power
3) Tomas Manuel, One Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P155,000.00);
Corporation (NPC) and Benjamin Chavez jointly and severally liable to the private respondents for actual and moral damages,
litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
4) Pedro C. Bartolome, One Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Pesos (P147,000.00);.
This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints 2 for damages filed against the NPC and Benjamin
Chavez before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover actual and other damages for the 5) Bernardino Cruz, One Hundred Forty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos
loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October (P143,552.50);
1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the
Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and
maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin 6) Jose Palad, Fifty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P57,500.00);
Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24
October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at 7) Mariano S. Cruz, Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00);
the dam; 4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants
suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which
inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their 8) Lucio Fajardo, Twenty nine Thousand Eighty Pesos (P29,080.00); and
animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. 3
B. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the
operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its 2. In Civil case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellant, with legal
employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and executory, the following :
impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary
precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to
people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);.
the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants B. Moral damages of five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and.
averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.4
C. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);.
Upon motion of the defendants, a preliminary hearing on the special defense was conducted. As a result thereof, the trial court
dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does
not contemplate actions based on tort. The parties do not, however, dispute the fact that this Court overruled the trial court and 3. In Civil Case No. SM-953, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with legal interest from the date
ordered the reinstatement of the complaints as against the NPC.5 when this decision shall have become final and executory;

Being closely interrelated, the cases were consolidated and trial thereafter ensued. A. Plaintiff-appellant Angel C. Torres:

The lower court rendered its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible 1) Actual damages of One Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P199,120.00);
evidence."6 Consequently, the private respondents seasonably appealed therefrom to the respondent Court which then docketed
the cases as CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93. 2) Moral Damages of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);

In its joint decision promulgated on 19 August 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages B. Plaintiff-appellant Norberto Torres:
in favor of the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Page 1 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

 1) Actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); As early as October 21, 1978, defendants-appellees knew of the impending onslaught of and imminent danger posed by
typhoon "Kading". For as alleged by defendants-appellees themselves, the coming of said super typhoon was bannered
by Bulletin Today, a newspaper of national circulation, on October 25, 1978, as "Super Howler to hit R.P." The next day,
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
October 26, 1978, said typhoon once again merited a headline in said newspaper as "Kading's Big Blow expected this
afternoon" (Appellee's Brief, p. 6). Apart from the newspapers, defendants-appellees learned of typhoon "Kading' through
C. Plaintiff-appellant Rodelio Joaquin: radio announcements (Civil Case No. SM-950, TSN, Benjamin Chavez, December 4, 1984, pp. 7-9).

1) Actual damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat Dam can safely hold a normal maximum headwater elevation of 217
meters (Appellee's brief, p. 12; Civil Case No. SM-951, Exhibit "I-6"; Civil Case No. SM-953, Exhibit "J-6"; Civil Case No.
SM-1247, Exhibit "G-6").
2) Moral damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and

Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation even beyond its maximum and
D. Plaintifsf-appellants litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); safe level, thereby giving no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that will inevitably be brought by
the coming typhoon.
4. In Civil case No. SM-1247, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with legal interest from the date
when this decision shall have become final and executory : On October 24, 1978, before typhoon "Kading" entered the Philippine area of responsibility, water elevation ranged from
217.61 to 217.53, with very little opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1 meter. On October 25, 1978, when typhoon
A. Plaintiffs-appellants Presentacion Lorenzo and Clodualdo Lorenzo: "Kading" entered the Philippine area of responsibility, and public storm signal number one was hoisted over Bulacan at
10:45 a.m., later raised to number two at 4:45 p.m., and then to number three at 10:45 p.m., water elevation ranged from
217.47 to 217.57, with very little opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1 meter. On October 26, 1978, when public
1) Actual damages of Two Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P256,600.00); storm signal number three remained hoisted over Bulacan, the water elevation still remained at its maximum level of 217.00
to 218.00 with very little opening of the spillways ranging from 1/2 to 2 meters, until at or about midnight, the spillways
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); were suddenly opened at 5 meters, then increasing swiftly to 8, 10, 12, 12.5, 13, 13.5, 14, 14.5 in the early morning hours of
October 27, 1978, releasing water at the rate of 4,500 cubic meters per second, more or less. On October 27, 1978, water
elevation remained at a range of 218.30 to 217.05 (Civil Case No. SM-950, Exhibits "D" and series, "L", "M", "N", and "O"
B. Plaintiff-appellant Consolacion Guzman : and Exhibits "3" and "4"; Civil Case No. SM-951, Exhibits "H" and "H-1"; Civil Case No. SM-953, Exhibits "I" and "I-1";
Civil Case No. SM 1247, Exhibits "F" and "F-1").
1) Actual damages of One Hundred forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00);
xxx xxx xxx
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was
C. Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Guzman : caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27,
1978.9
1) Actual damages of Two Hundred Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (205,520.00); and

The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early warning written notices" to the towns of
D. Plaintiffs-appellants litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00). Norzagaray, Angat, Bustos, Plaridel, Baliwag and Calumpit dated 24 October 1978 which read:

In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants TO ALL CONCERN (sic):
attorney fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded.

Please be informed that at present our reservoir (dam) is full and that we have been releasing water intermittently for the
No pronouncement as to costs.7 past several days.

The foregoing judgment is based on the public respondent's conclusion that the petitioners were guilty of: With the coming of typhoon "Rita" (Kading) we expect to release greater (sic) volume of water, if it pass (sic) over our
place.
. . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence . . . in the management and operation of Angat
Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, And the magnitude of the water released, are all In view of this kindly advise people residing along Angat River to keep alert and stay in safe places.
but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inundation
of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have been avoided had defendants-appellees
prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allow room for the expected BENJAMIN L. CHAVEZ
torrential rains.8 Power Plant Superintendent10

This conclusion, in turn, is anchored on its findings of fact, to wit: because:

Page 2 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

 Said notice was delivered to the "towns of Bulacan" on October 26, 1978 by defendants-appellees driver, Leonardo
Nepomuceno (Civil Case No. SM-950, TSN, Benjamin Chavez, December 4, 1984, pp. 7-11 and TSN, Leonardo
Nepomuceno, March 7, 1985, pp. 10-12).
Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates at midnight of
October 26, 1978 and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so served, for the volume of water to be
released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents near or along the Angat River, even those one (1)
kilometer away, should have been advised to evacuate. Said notice, addressed "TO ALL CONCERN (sic)," was delivered to
a policeman (Civil Case No. SM-950, pp. 10-12 and Exhibit "2-A") for the municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice was not
thus addressed and delivered to the proper and responsible officials who could have disseminated the warning to the
residents directly affected. As for the municipality of Sta. Maria, where plaintiffs-appellants in Civil Case No. SM-1246
reside, said notice does not appear to have been served.11
Relying on Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals,12 public respondent rejected the petitioners' plea that the incident in
question was caused by force majeure and that they are, therefore, not liable to the private respondents for any kind of damage
— such damage being in the nature of damnum absque injuria.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, as well as the motion to modify judgment filed by the public
respondents,13 were denied by the public respondent in its Resolution of 27 December 1991.14
Petitioners thus filed the instant petition on 21 February 1992.
After the Comment to the petition was filed by the private respondents and the Reply thereto was filed by the petitioners, We
gave due course to the petition on 17 June 1992 and directed the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, 15 which they
subsequently complied with.
The petitioners raised the following errors allegedly committed by the respondent Court :
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING OF NAKPIL & SONS V. COURT OF
APPEALS AND HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WRITTEN NOTICES OF WARNING ISSUED BY
PETITIONERS WERE INSUFFICIENT.
conclusions are biding upon Us, there being no showing of the existence of any of the exceptions to the general rule that findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. 19 Elsewise stated, the challenged decision can stand on its own
merits independently of Our decision in G.R. No. 96410. In any event, We reiterate here in Our pronouncement in the latter case
that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals20 is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case
of force majeure is concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held:
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of
God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;
(b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the
injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v.
Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
657).
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or
violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the
violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be
from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed
from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is
not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from
liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49 O.G. 4379;
Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657). 21
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage
sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned
exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then
of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the
whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DAMAGE SUFFERED BY PRIVATE WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Consolidated Decision of the Court of
RESPONDENTS WAS NOT DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93 is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR
SO ORDERED.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION.16

These same errors were raised by herein petitioners in G.R. No. 96410, entitled National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,17 which this Court decided on 3 July 1992. The said case involved the very same incident subject of the instant
petition. In no uncertain terms, We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs
therein — who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein — was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24
October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar,
was insufficient. We thus cannot now rule otherwise not only because such a decision binds this Court with respect to the cause
of the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978 which resulted in the loss of lives and the
destruction to property in both cases, but also because of the fact that on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the
evidence adduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent found as conclusively
established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in
the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the
water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."18 Its findings and

Page 3 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 60 The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that subject school building had a "defective roofing
structure," found that, while typhoon "Saling" was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private respondents' houses
"could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of [petitioner's] building was not faulty." The dispositive portion of the
G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998
lower court's decision 7 reads, thus:

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC., petitioner,

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment (sic) in favor of the plaintiff (sic) and against the
defendants, (sic) ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the former as follows:
vs.
a) P117,116.00, as actual damages, plus litigation expenses;
COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.
b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

PURISIMA, J.:
c) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees;

Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 31, 1996, and
d) Costs of the instant suit.
Resolution 2 dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. No. 41422, entitled "Juanita de Jesus vda. de
Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.", which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to
P200,000.00. 4 The Resolution under attack denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The claim for exemplary damages is denied for the reason that the defendants (sic) did in a wanton fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building
along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit Metro In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as errors, 8 that:
Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and
destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents' house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TYPHOON "SALING", AS AN ACT OF GOD, IS NOT "THE
destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent
SOLE AND ABSOLUTE REASON" FOR THE RIPPING-OFF OF THE SMALL PORTION OF THE ROOF OF
aspects of the latter's Report 5 dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
SOUTHEASTERN'S FOUR (4) STOREY SCHOOL BUILDING.

5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the building in the area and the
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROOF OF DEFENDANT'S
general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus,
SCHOOL BUILDING WAS FAULTY" NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADMISSION THAT THERE WERE TYPHOONS
with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the building becomes a big funnel-like
BEFORE BUT NOT AS GRAVE AS TYPHOON "SALING" WHICH IS THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are
THE INCIDENT.
portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofing structural trusses is the improper
FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS OF SUIT TO DIMAANOS WHEN THEY HAVE NOT INCURRED
anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2' diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams
ACTUAL DAMAGES AT ALL AS DIMAANOS HAVE ALREADY SOLD THEIR PROPERTY, AN INTERVENING
which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not
EVENT THAT RENDERS THIS CASE MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.

IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION INSPITE OF THE
It then recommended that "to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the
PERFECTION OF SOUTHEASTERN'S APPEAL WHEN THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON FOR THE
vicinity," the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a "structural hazard."
ISSUANCE THERETO.

In their Complaint 6 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private
As mentioned earlier, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's disposition by reducing the award
respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others'
of moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. Hence, petitioner's resort to this Court, raising for resolution the issues
houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages,
of:
P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorney's fees; plus costs.

1. Whether or not the award of actual damages [sic] to respondent Dimaanos on the basis of speculation or conjecture,
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in
without proof or receipts of actual damage, [sic] legally feasible or justified.
the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said
school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore,
typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the 2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to respondent Dimaanos, with the latter having suffered, actual damage has
damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part. legal basis.

Page 4 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

 3. Whether or not respondent Dimaanos who are no longer the owner of the property, subject matter of the case, during its
pendency, has the right to pursue their complaint against petitioner when the case was already moot and academic by the
sale of the property to third party.
4. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees when the case was already moot academic [sic] legally justified.
5. Whether or not petitioner is liable for damage caused to others by typhoon "Saling" being an act of God.
6. Whether or not the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, ex-parte or without hearing, has support in law.
The pivot of inquiry here, determinative of the other issues, is whether the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of
typhoon "Saling", was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event? If so, petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages
suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as "an event which takes place by
accident and could not have been foreseen." 9 Escriche elaborates it as "an unexpected event or act of God which could neither
be foreseen nor resisted." 10 Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that "[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes:
(1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion,
attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc." 11
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence
or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. 12 An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a
person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person's
negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of the participation of man — whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act — the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 13
In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject
school building's roofing had "no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds." Based on
such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule
that factual findings by the trail court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. 14 After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold
that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. 15 In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence
engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. 16 In other words; the person
seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which
naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, 17 or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man,
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do. 18 From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it were not, the damage
caused to private respondents' house could have been avoided?
Page 5 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence, 19 not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in
establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made
an ocular inspection of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means
of actual sight or viewing. 20 What is visual to the eye through, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one
who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It
could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly
shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the
partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design
of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans
and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. 21
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the
original plans and design of petitioner's school building were approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was
a legal requirement before the construction of any building to obtain a permit from the city building official (city engineer, prior
to the passage of the Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be secured
from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having obtained both building permit and
certificate of occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school
building. 22
Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon "Saling", the same city official gave the go-
signal for such repairs — without any deviation from the original design — and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire
fourth floor of the same building. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the report
that its "U-shaped" form was "structurally defective." Having given his unqualified imprimatur, the city building official is
presumed to have properly performed his duties 23 in connection therewith.
In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual maintenance
inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its
maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his
testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president's narration.
Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no
complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at
bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing
was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than
"Saling."
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold
that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in
question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.
With this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents' claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorney's fees must
fail. 24 Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. 25 More so because no bad faith or willful act to cause
damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. 26 It is not
enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out
specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. 27 Private respondents merely
submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof their subject building. What is more, whether the "necessary
repairs" were caused ONLY by petitioner's alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary
wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential question that remains indeterminable.
The Court deems unnecessary to resolve the other issues posed by petitioner.
As regards the sixth issue, however, the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 by the trial court is hereby nullified and set
aside. Private respondents are ordered to reimburse any amount or return to petitioner any property which they may have
received by virtue of the enforcement of said writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision is REVERSED. The complaint of private respondents in
Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a quo is ordered DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in said
case is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, private respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or property received by
them by virtue of said writ. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
TORTS 61
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the
private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned
by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with
it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the
maritime collision.
Page 6 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence
of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made
by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29,
1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. 1
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the
Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.2 The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that
under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict
like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years
from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that
accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The
petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of
action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be
computed from the said date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same
was seasonably filed.
In an Order dated September 25, 1986,4 the trial court denied the Motion filed by the private respondent. The trial court observed
that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to
such collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and
Regulations, which took effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 208 issued on August 12, 1974 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, precisely to answer the need. The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period
provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court are as
follows —
Considering that the action concerns an incident involving a collision at sea of two vehicles and to determine negligence for
that incident there is an absolute need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collisions. It is obviously to
answer such a need that the Marine Board of Inquiry (Sic) was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules
and Regulations which became effective January 1, 1975 under Letter of Instruction(s) No. 208 dated August 12, 1974. The
relevant section of that law (Art. XVI/b/ provided as follow(s):
1. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) — Shall have the jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents or casualties relative to
the liability of shipowners and officers, exclusive jurisdiction to investigate cases/complaints against the marine
officers; and to review all proceedings or investigation conducted by the Special Boards of Marine Inquiry.
2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. — Shall have original jurisdiction to investigate marine casualties and disasters
which occur or are committed within the limits of the Coast Guard District concerned or those referred by the
Commandant.
The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine incidents have those 'peculiarities which only persons of
special skill, training and exposure can rightfully decipher and resolve on the matter of the negligence and liabilities of
parties involved and inasmuch as the report of the Board of Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the
prescriptive period provided x x x under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from that date. The complaint
was filed with this Court on May 10, 1985, hence the statute of limitations can not constitute a bar to the filing of this case.5
The private respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the
petitioners. The case was assigned to the Second Division of the appellate court and was docketed as Case No. CA-G.R. SP No.
12032.6
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987,7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988,8 the Court of Appeals granted the
Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The pertinent portions of the
Decision of the appellate court are as follows —
It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer)
accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained
by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have
immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident
because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite the
negligence on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the
collision that resulted in the total loss of their x x x boat.
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place,
that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of
action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative
body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file
an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can
seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976.
The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

We can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of the marine collision
SO ORDERED.
that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive period should only commence from the
finality of the investigation conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) and the decision of the Commandant, Philippine
Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of
the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault,
still the former (court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision could be entirely
or partially admitted, modified, amended, or disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion. For
another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies,
then necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of such agencies. Said alternative it is
easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag and then witnesses in the
meantime might not be available or disappear, or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid. ... 9

The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated May 27, 1988.10

Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner before the trial court are reiterated.11 In addition
thereto, the petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals 12 The private respondent filed its Comment on the
Petition seeking therein the dismissal of the same.13 It is also contended by the private respondent that the ruling of the Court in
Vasquez is not applicable to the case at bar because the said case involves a maritime collision attributable to a fortuitous event.
In a subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations cannot have
the effect of repealing the provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of actions.14

On September 19,1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. 15 After the parties filed their respective
memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,16 this
Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to
respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only
when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .

Page 7 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 62 Neck — stab wound 1 inch wide 1 inch deep, left side.

G.R. Nos. 111517-19 July 31, 1996 Shoulder — stab wound 1 inch wide, thru & thru lateral third,
right.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Chest — presence of multiple stab wounds, nine (9) in
ROGER AUSTRIA Y NAVARRO alias "BERNIE," accused-appellant. number of same sizes, 1 inch wide, but different
depths of penetration.
ROMERO, J.:p
Abdomen — stab wound 1 inch wide, 7 inches depth 1/2 inch
away from navel right side.
Appellant Roger Navarro Austria was charged with the crimes of Frustrated Murder and Murder in three separate informations
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, to wit:
— stab wound 1 inch wide, 5 inches in depth, above
eliac chest left side.
INFORMATION

Extremities:
The undersigned hereby accuses ROGER N. AUSTRIA @ "Bernie" of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed
as follows:
Upper — stab wound 1 inch wide, three inches deep, middle
portion of arm, lateral side left.
That on or about the 25th day of September 1989, in the morning, in barangay Domalandan West, municipality of Lingayen,
province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of his superior — incised wound 2 inches long, one (1) inch below
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and stab Mylene Samson in her dwelling, inflicting cubital fosea left forearm.
upon her the following injuries:
— incised wound 2 inches long, lateral side arm, right.
— Stab wound 2 cm mid epigastric area penetrating — perforating left lobe liver.
— incised wound 2 inches long palm, left.
— Stab wound 2 cm left hypochondriac area with omental avisceration, penetrating the body of pancreas,
which caused her death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce of reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
timely medical assistance rendered to said Mylene Samson which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice.

Lingayen, Pangasinan, November 20, 1989.2

Contrary to Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

INFORMATION
Lingayen, Pangasinan, November 20, 1989.1

The undersigned hereby accuses ROGER AUSTRIA alias "Bernie" of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
INFORMATION

That on or about September 25, 1989 in barangay Domalandan West, municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan,
The undersigned hereby accuses ROGER AUSTRIA y Navarro @ "Bernie" of the crime of MURDER, committed as
New Republic of the Philippines and within jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a
follows:
"balisong," with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with abuse of superior strength did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and stab Tyrone Samson inflicting upon him the following injuries:
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1989, at barangay Domalandan West, municipality of
Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
CHEST:
above-named accused, armed with a pointed sharp baled weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation
and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab Myrna C. Samson,
inflicting upon her the following injuries: — stab wound 1 inch wide, ½ inch deep, manubruim sterne,

Thoracic Cage: — stab wound 1 inch wide, ½ inch deep just above the right
areola,

Page 8 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

 — stab wound 1 inch wide, ½ inch deep, level of the 4th KS Under Criminal Case No. L-4166, Four (4) Years and Six (6) Months of prision correccional to Sixteen (16) Years and Six
mid-axillary line, right side. (6) Months of prision mayor;

BACK: And under the said three (3) cases, to indemnify the heirs of Myrna dela Cruz Samson in the amount of P50,000.00, and the
heirs of Tyrone Samson in the same amount of P50,000.00, and Mylene Samson in the amount of P40,000.00.
— presence of multiple stab wounds, seventeen (17) in number
with uniform width, (1 inch wide) but different depth raging And to pay costs.
from 1/2 inch to nine (9) inches.
SO ORDERED.4
UPPER EXTREMITY:
The prosecution's version of the events leading to appellant's conviction is as follows:
— stab wound, 1 inch wide, 1 inch deep arm, right.
On September 25, 1989, between 12:00 midnight and 1:00 in the morning, Myrna dela Cruz Samson and six of her seven
LOWER EXTREMITY: children namely, victim Mylene, Mary Ann, Melanie, Myra Liza, Teddy and victim Tyrone were fast asleep in their house
located at Barangay Domalandan, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Myrna and her sons Tyrone and Teddy, were sleeping in one room
while Myrna's daughters were sleeping in another bedroom.
— stab wound 1 inch wide, 2 ½ inch deep lateral side, thigh
right,
Appellant, who was the Samsons' next door neighbor, suddenly entered their house, without their knowledge and consent, and
proceeded to the room where Myrna and her two sons were sleeping. He stabbed Myrna and Tyrone with a "balisong" several
— stab wound 1 inch wide, 3 inches deep lateral side, thigh,
times. The victims managed to run away but appellant chased them, continuing with the stabbing until Myrna fell dead by the
left.
stairs and Tyrone in front of the altar, in the vacant third bedroom.

— stab wound 1 inch wide, 7 inches deep below the tip of

While the stabbing was going on, Myrna's 12-year old daughter Mylene woke up and peeped through an opening of their
scapula, right penetrating the lower lobe of right lung;
bedroom's door which was adjacent to the bedroom of her mother. She saw appellant stabbing her mother first, then her brother
Tyrone. When appellant noticed her peeping, he went after her and likewise stabbed her several times inside the room.
— stab wound 1 inch wide, 8 inches deep level of the 6th Thereafter, he left the house through the kitchen door.
entercostal space, posterio axillary line, left side,
penetrating the lower lobe of left lung;
Guadalupe dela Cruz, mother of Myrna, was awakened from sleep by the commotion and moaning in her daughter's house,
which was only about five (5) meters away from her own house. She rushed to the victims' house and opened the door. Upon
— stab wound, 1 inch wide, 9 inches deep, level of the 7th entering the house, she saw her daughter Myrna sprawled dead on the floor. Thereupon, she rushed to the kitchen and saw
entercostal space, posterior axillary line, left side, appellant running away with a "balisong." She looked for her grandson Tyrone and found him also sprawled dead on the floor
penetrating the inferior lobe of left lung. while her granddaughter Mylene was in a room, already weak because of her stab wounds.

which injuries directly cause his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. Guadalupe dela Cruz called the barangay captain, informed him of what transpired and requested him to report the incident to
the police of Lingayen, Pangasinan. Mylene was brought to the Pangasinan General Hospital in Dagupan City for treatment of
her stab wounds while the bodies of Myrna and her son Tyrone were brought to the Funeraria de Guzman.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dr. Noel Manaois examined Mylene and found two (2) stab wounds, both of which were deep and could have caused her death
Lingayen, Pangasinan, November 20, 1989.3 were it not for the timely medical attention given.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes charged in the foregoing Informations. The three cases were tried jointly and Dr. Jose S. Rosario, Municipal Health Officer of Lingayen, conducted autopsies on the bodies, prepared the autopsy reports and
on June 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states: described the injuries suffered by the victims.

WHEREFORE, the accused, Roger Austria y Navarro, alias "Bernie", is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
three (3) crimes of Murder on two (2) counts, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal under Criminal
Case Nos. L-4168 and L-4189, and, under Criminal Case No. L-4166, of Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
Under Criminal Cases Nos. L-4168 and L-4169, imprisonment of double reclusion perpetua; and
On his part, appellant denied having killed Myrna Samson and her son Tyrone Samson and denied attempting to kill Mylene
Samson.5 He claimed that he had no prior misunderstanding with Myrna Samson or her husband or her children. 6
Appellant sought to establish the defense of insanity by presenting Dr. Constantine D. Della, a psychiatrist at Baguio General
Hospital, who examined and treated appellant on April 23, 1991 and who issued a "Psychiatric Evaluation" dated November 14,
1991 stating that:

Page 9 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

 In view of the foregoing history, examinations, interviews, and observations, the patient Roger N. Austria is found to be
suffering from a long-standing illness classified as Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid type. This is manifested by the patient
as follows: (1) deterioration in areas of work, social relations, and personal hygiene; (2) auditory hallucinations; (3)
incoherence and irrelevance; (4) talking by himself; (5) delusions of grandeur; (6) delusion of persecution; (7) poor impulse
control, judgment, and insight; (8) walking aimlessly; (9) failure to sleep well; and (10) violent and destructive behavior. 7
The trial court, however, found that appellant was sane when he committed the crimes charged and forthwith convicted him.
Before us now on appeal, appellant assigns the following errors:
I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF AND
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION BY DR. CONSTANTINE D. DELLA FINDING THE ACCUSED ROGER AUSTRIA
TO BE LABORING FROM A LONG-STANDING MENTAL ILLNESS CLASSIFIED AS "SCHIZOPHRENIC
PSYCHOSIS," PARANOID TYPE.
II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY
AND ABUSED (SIC) OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND CONSEQUENTLY IN
SENTENCING THE ACCUSED OF DOUBLE RECLUSION PERPETUA IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. L-4168 AND L-
4169 AND IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-4166 FOR FOUR (4) YEARS AND SIX (6) MONTHS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL TO SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND SIX (6) MONTHS OF PRISION MAYOR.
In amplification of his first assignment of error, appellant contends that he was first admitted to a Mental Hospital in 1972,
diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid type and was confined therein for about a month; the second time in 1977 for
three weeks, the third time in 1988 for about a month, and the last time on April 8, 1991. 8
Accordingly, appellant argues, the trial court erred in presuming that he was mentally stable since being released from
confinement, as it was only the schizophrenic manifestations that disappeared — not the disease itself.
The main issue presented before us is whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, as
would exempt him from criminal liability. The answer and resultant decision, therefore, hinges on the meaning of "insanity."
For a person to be adjudged insane under Art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. 9
On various occasions, this Court has also declared that "insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability."10
Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code defines insanity as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellectual faculties, or by impaired or
disorder volition."
However, there is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger
that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.11
In the present case, the accused had been treated before for schizophrenia, paranoid type.
Schizophrenia is defined as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and
often accompanied by hallucinations and delusion.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Page 10 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
A "Paranoid Type Schizophrenia" is described as follows:
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by poor interpersonal rapport. Often
he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude,
and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic remarks.
Sometimes flippant, facetious responses cover an underlying hostility.
. . . The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference
are among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an unpleasant emotional aggressiveness.
Through displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his
delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and changeable . . . Delusions of persecution are the most prominent
occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish-fulfilling ideas and hypochrondriacal and
depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to vague magical forces; and his
explanations become extremely vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of
reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major aggressive tendencies may be released in a major
outburst; some inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are
irritable, discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surly aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an
unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may live in a bitter aloofness.13
Does schizophrenia therefore fall under the recognized definitions of insanity which would qualify it as an exempting
circumstance? It depends.
We have stated that when insanity of the defendant is alleged as a ground of defense or reason for his exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding to act under prosecution or at the very moment of its
execution. In such case, it is incumbent upon defendant's counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or that he
acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity or that he was generally regarded as insane when he executed the act
attributed to him. 14 In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of
disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external acts.
Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to those of people
of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice. 15
Under present-day American jurisprudence, the states have a variety of rules regarding who hears the burden of proof in insanity
defense cases. Many states and the federal government have placed the burden on the defendant to prove legal insanity by a
preponderance of evidence. This is now the majority rule.16
In People v. Rafanan,17 the defense of insanity due to schizophrenia was rejected by the Court as the evidence presented showed
that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. Thus, accused Rafanan was charged with rape and the prosecution was able to
prove that he was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of the sexual assault. In other words, there was no "complete loss of
intelligence" that would have entitled the accused to the exempting circumstance of insanity.
Likewise, in the earlier case of People v. Puno,18 this Court held that the accused Puno was not legally insane when he killed his
victim because he was not completely deprived of reason or will. It was the testimony of the three psychiatrists presented by the
defense to the effect that Puno acted with discernment that ultimately led to his conviction.
In the instant case, Dr. Della testified during cross-examination that appellant's long-standing illness cannot be cured by
medication.
PROS. BUGARIN: —
 Q. With this kind of mental illness, Doctor, your findings would show that with the proper application of medicines, the
patient will be cured?
A. The admission will not provide cure, but only improvement of the patient. It is like a diabetis. The medications will only
control the sickness but will not actually eradicate the disease.19
He also testified that when the crimes occurred, appellant was suffering auditory hallucinations and having a relapse. 20
Evidence of the accused's mental and emotional state prior to the commission of the crimes is contained in the Psychiatric
Evaluation prepared by Dr. Della:
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 or article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
Thus, following the above provision, the accused must make indemnification to the heirs of his victims, Myrna C. Samson and
Tyrone Samson and to the victim who survived, Mylene Samson, in the following amounts:
1. P50,000.00 to the heirs of Myrna de la Cruz Samson;
2. P50,000.00 to the heirs of Tyrone Samson; and

In September 1989, Roger was behaving unusually again. The auditory hallucinations recurred; this time he was hearing the 3. P40,000.00 to Mylene Samson.
devil speaking to him, he was unable to sleep well at night and he walked aimlessly. One week later, on September 24,
1989, after having been intoxicated by ten bottles of beer he was suddenly overpowered by the urge to have sexual
Finally, since appellant is not criminally responsible, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength
intercourse with Myrna. In the darkness of the night, he went to Myrna's house to find her and her children fast asleep. She
are not applicable either. For the above aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, it must be shown that appellant consciously
(sic) forced her into having sex with him but Myrna vehemently resisted. In that moment of rejection, Roger remembered
adopted the same as a mode of attack against his victims to insure its commission without risk to himself. 21
having been ordered by voices coming from the environment to kill Myrna, he immediately took hold of a knife and stabbed
Myrna to death. Myrna's two children who witnessed the crime cried frantically. Again, the voices commanded Roger to kill
both children. He succeeded in killing one but the other, while sustaining several wounds, survived. In this frenzy, he This is not the case at bar.
inadvertently lacerated his right palm. After the attack, he hurried home. (Psychiatric Evaluation, Re: Roger N. Austria, p.
3).
WHEREFORE, the Court ACQUITS appellant Roger Austria of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder by reason of
insanity and he is ordered confined at the National Mental Hospital for treatment until further notice. The Court further orders
The Court is convinced that the testimonial and documentary evidence marshalled in this case by acknowledged medical experts appellant to indemnify the heirs of Myrna de la Cruz Samson in the amount of P50,000.00, the heirs of Tyrone Samson in the
have sufficiently established the fact that appellant was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes. His previous same amount of P50,000.00, and Mylene Samon in the amount of P40,000.00.
confinements, as early as 1972, his erratic behavior before the assaults and Dr. Della's testimony that he was having a relapse all
points to a man deprived of complete freedom of will or a lack of reason and discernment that should thus exempt him from
criminal liability. However, he is still civilly liable under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code which states: SO ORDERED.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions
1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforce subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In case falling with subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events whenever the damage has been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.

Page 11 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 63
G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident which occurred in Caloocan on the night of
August 8, 1909.
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the
municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to
enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in
a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the
rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the rails were above-ground,
but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the
tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also
negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and under
the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a
judgment of P1,000.
The question before us is stated by the defendant thus: "Accepting the findings of the trial court that both plaintiff and defendant
were guilty of negligence, the only question to be considered is whether the negligence of plaintiff contributed t the 'principal
occurrence' or 'only to his own injury.' If the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court was correct in apportioning
the damages."
The questioned as stated by plaintiff is as follows: "The main question at issue is whether or not the plaintiff was negligent, and,
if so, to what extent. If the negligence of the plaintiff was the primary cause of the accident then, of course, he cannot recover; if
his negligence had nothing to do with the accident but contributed to his injury, then the court was right in apportioning the
damages, but if there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff, then he should be awarded damages adequates to the injury
sustained."
In support of the defendant's contention counsel says: "Defendant's negligence was its failure properly to maintain the track;
plaintiff's negligence was his intoxication; the 'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's fall from his calesa. It seems clear that
plaintiff's intoxication contributed to the fall; if he had been sober, it can hardly be doubted that he would have crossed the track
safely, as he had done a hundred times before."
While both parties appealed from the decision, the defendant on the ground that it was not liable and the plaintiff on the ground
that the damages were insufficient according to the evidence, and while the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial upon the
statutory grounds and took proper exception to the denial thereof, thus conferring upon this court jurisdiction to determine the
question of fact, nevertheless, not all of the testimony taken on the trial, so far as can be gathered from the record, has been
brought to this court. There seems to have been two hearings, one on the 31st of August and the other on the 28th of September.
Page 12 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
The evidence taken on the first hearing is here; that taken on the second is not. Not all the evidence taken on the hearings being
before the court, we must refuse, under our rules, to consider even that evidence which is here; and, in the decision of this case,
we are, therefore, relegated to the facts stated in the opinion of the court and the pleadings filed.
A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us to the conclusion that there is nothing in the opinion which sustains
the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the accident which is the basis of this action. Mere
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can
be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. (Ward vs. Chicago etc., R. R. Co., 85 Wis., 601; H &
T. C. R. Co. vs. Reason, 61 Tex., 613; Alger vs. Lowell, 3 Allen, Mass., 402; Central R. R. Co. vs. Phinazee, 93 Ga., 488;
Maguire vs. Middlesex R. R. Co., 115 Mass., 239; Meyer vs. Pacific R. R. Co., 40 Mo., 151., Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. vs.
Drake, 33 Ill. App., 114.)
If intoxication is not in itself negligence, what are the facts found by the trial court and stated in its opinion upon which may be
predicated the finding that the plaintiff did not use ordinary care and prudence and that the intoxication contributed to the injury
complained of? After showing clearly and forcibly the negligence of the defendant in leaving its tracks in the condition in which
they were on the night of the injury, the court has the following to say, and it is all that can be found in its opinion, with
reference to the negligence of the plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr. Wright was on returning to his house on
the night in question, the testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was the physician who attended him an hour after the accident,
demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . .
If the defendant or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street
where there is a large amount of travel, the plaintiff was no less negligent, he not having abstained from his custom of taking
more wine than he could carry without disturbing his judgment and his self-control, he knowing that he had to drive a horse
and wagon and to cross railroad tracks which were to a certain extent dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated above
the level of the street.
If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken
condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received, although the company, on its part, was negligent
in maintaining its tracks in a bad condition for travel.
Both parties, therefore, were negligent and both contributed to the damages resulting to the plaintiff, although the plaintiff,
in the judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages that did the defendant.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The
conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say
that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with
not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle
no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a
drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the appellant
company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., above; and we do not find facts in the
opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.
TORTS 64
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, although we conform to the
trial court's disposition of the case — its dismissal.
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there being no error committed by the lower court in dismissing the
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
plaintiff-appellant's complaint, the judgment of dismissal is hereby affirmed.
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
FELICIANO, J.:
SO ORDERED. 3
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask this
at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running
Court to award her actual or compensatory damages as well as moral damages.
along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and,
shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by
ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San
petitioner. The relevant language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again:
Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries
on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee,
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left. 1
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be
treated upon our injuries. (Emphasis supplied)
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them
and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to
transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers,
the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 4 A waiver may not casually be attributed to
including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things:
a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met an accident
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar
at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
Express Transit (supra), where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to mechanical defect and went off the road and
. . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signed
turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us;
the document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in
properly giving us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against the
xxx xxx xxx
operator of the Samar Express Transit."
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
xxx xxx xxx
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be
treated upon our injuries.
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their
right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document
xxx xxx xxx 2
proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver
of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of
(Emphasis supplied)
Spain of July 8, 1887) — which is not the case of the one relied upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant
contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the
case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint
vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental
Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects
suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint
friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed
Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for
passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the
Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and
waive any right of action against private respondent.
moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian
signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of
whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she
against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
bus.
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common
carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but
affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages:
Page 13 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of
her right of action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral damages as a matter of course.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a
common carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault
or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755."
8 In fact, because of this statutory presumption, it has been held that a court need not even make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome this presumption, the common carrier
must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The standard of extraordinary
diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the
diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of society. A common carrier
is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances". 11
Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private respondent has successfully proved that he had exercised
extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence
showing that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously, respondent did not even attempt,
during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent
did try to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But allegation is not proof
and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability
for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the
efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. Any
participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. In Servando v.
Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 12 the Court summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with
approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Española:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from
liability non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as 'an event
that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robber.
In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In legal sense and, consequently,
also in relation to contracts, a "caso fortuito" presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor.
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In
her direct examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a
"snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out, "What happened?"
("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver
did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked
physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver
had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a
modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure
of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-
bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize
because of the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was
supposed to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job which she had held off and
on as a "casual employee." The Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in
a public school since, being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of
Page 14 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
her employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after
and by reason of the accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to due respect from this
Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may not be awarded
damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. 14
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to
the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury
upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is
relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages for, among other things, the
surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there held:
We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are
inadequate. In allowing not more than P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and — something like an
inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the court
below overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible and
restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention was needed, for which the doctor's charges would
amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore, the operation, according to
Dr. Diño, would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while removal of the scar on the face
obviously demanded plastic surgery.
xxx xxx xxx
The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not
called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not be
reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition
is undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over
the parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity.
. . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by
the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character
of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original
state, we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18,000.00.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16
Upon the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by petitioner, testified that the cost would probably
be between P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed
since the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of removing
the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.
Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule is that moral damages may be awarded where gross
negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and
his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and
recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages
even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the
extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar
on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as
atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as well as the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of La Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic
surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees,
the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until full
payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED.

TORTS 65
G.R. No. 79688 February 1, 1996
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner's agent, a builder in good
faith? This is the main issue resolved in this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in
CA-G.R. No. 11040, promulgated on August 20, 1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case (along with several others)
to the Third Division. After due deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the
undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road,
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that
time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by
respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
(CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even
before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and
another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to Kee's taking actual
possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida
Octaviano, accompanied Kee's wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano
was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement,
but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When
Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a
complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
Page 15 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further ruled that petitioner and CTTEI
could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin construction required under
paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-sari store without the prior approval of petitioner
required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was merely to regulate the type of
improvements to be constructed on the Lot.3
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter's failure to pay the
installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was
instituted. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner.
Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 9, covered by TCT No. 106367 and to remove all
structures and improvements he introduced thereon;
2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P15.00 a day computed from the time this
suit was filed on March 12, 1981 until he actually vacates the premises. This amount shall bear interests (sic) at the rate of
12 per cent (sic) per annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Subdivision are ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly
and severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and P700.00 as cost and litigation expenses.4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were
not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee 5 . It
found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was,
nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice
to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the order against the defendant to vacate the premises
of Lot No. 9 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367 of the land records of Bacolod City; the removal of all
structures and improvements introduced thereon at his expense and the payment to plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P15.00)
Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from January 30, 1981, the date of the demand, and not from the date of the
filing of the complaint, until he had vacated (sic) the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per annum. This Court further
renders judgment against the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees,
plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville Development Corporation and C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party Defendants to pay attorney's fees to plaintiff and costs of
litigation is reversed.6
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of
the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong
delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The appellate court also ruled that the award of rentals was
without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he introduced on Lot 9, and is entitled to
the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily liable
under the following circumstances:
A. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures, the third-
party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or rendered
useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount representing the
value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are ordered to pay in
solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the determination of the actual value of the improvements
and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code. 7
Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent Court's Decision, as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or the the (sic) applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by ordering third-party defendants to pay the demolition expenses and/or
price of the land;
2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings, by granting to private
respondent-Kee the rights of a builder in good faith in excess of what the law provides, thus enriching private respondent
Kee at the expense of the petitioner;
3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed the rights of the parties, it becomes imperative to set
aside or at least modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to harmonize with justice and the facts;
4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the lower court is clearly a builder in bad faith, having
violated several provisions of the contract to sell on installments;
Page 16 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal, Pleasantville Development Corporation (liable) for the acts
made by the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in violation of the provision of the law;
6. The award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent to putting a premium in (sic) court litigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's ruling that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in
good faith. We agree with the following observation of the Court of Appeals:
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to
Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence
on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing
all improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would follow.
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property. Lot 8 is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367.
Hence, under the Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the
property with which he is dealing. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what
was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developer's agent and applied and paid for
the relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. Upon Kee's receipt of the
map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that
the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of
the company's positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The
steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia
cautela, such as being present during the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to
countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday
business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's efforts all went
to naught.8
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
title 9 . And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee 10 .
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware
that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale,
Installment. wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.

We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of The deed of sale contained the following provision:
mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action
against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder
1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled "Jardinico vs. Kee" which is now pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, regardless
in good faith.
of the outcome of the decision shall be mutually disregarded and shall not be pursued by the parties herein and shall be
considered dismissed and without effect whatso-ever; 16
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment covering Lot 8 between it and Kee
was rescinded long before the present action was instituted. This has no relevance on the liability of petitioner, as such fact does
Kee asserts though that the "terms and conditions in said deed of sale are strictly for the parties thereto" and that "(t)here is no
not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot. to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives
waiver made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award the honorable respondent Court of
Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee.
Appeals may make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and/or private respondent C.T.
Torres Enterprises; Inc." 17
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was erroneously pointed out to him" because the latter agreed to
the following provision in the Contract of Sale on installment, to wit:
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we have earlier stated, petitioner's liability is
grounded on the negligence of its agent. On the other hand, what the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and
13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has personally examined or inspected the Jardinico; it stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the outcome of the case.
property made subject-matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and from the
date hereof whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of the
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her. 11

2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily liable
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and condition of the lot due to erosion.
under the following circumstances:
It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the
expenses resulting from such change.
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures, the third-party
defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or rendered
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from
useless;
petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law." 12 b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount representing the
value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico. 18
The Second Issue: Petitioner's Liability
Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be unjustly enriched at its expense. In other words,
Kee would be able to own the lot, as buyer, without having to pay anything on it, because the aforequoted portion of respondent
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was dismissed by the RTC after ruling that there was no
Court's Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly and solidarily to "answer" or reimburse Kee therefor.
evidence from which fault or negligence on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can be inferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed
and found CTTEI negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot by Octaviano, its employee.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an
act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and consequently, CTTEI I alone should be liable. It asserts that "while Petitioner' s liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for
[CTTEI] was authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was never authorized to deliver the wrong lot to damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence
Kee" 13 . is adduced. However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court; hence no damages could
flow be awarded.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated
by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the
the application of such law, on the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled
damage caused to third persons 14 . On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage 15
through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision [as reproduced above] holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable.
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In
acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as
The Third Issue: Attorney's Fees
principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.

Page 17 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in
his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of
Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.

The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each case 19 . We shall
not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and
for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent 20 .

In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights
granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by Kee
and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. There is also no further need, as ruled by
the appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of origin "for determination of the actual value of the improvements and the
property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code."

WHEREFORE , the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;

(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily
liable for damages due to negligence; however, since the amount and/or extent of such damages was not proven during the
trial, the same cannot now be quantified and awarded;

(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to pay in
solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses; and

(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 66
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home
— he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general
manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at
Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2
meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the
same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew
(not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to
avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of
two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the
dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures of
plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff brought about the
accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected and sudden
withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social
humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life
experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of defendants to settle
amicably this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; and
Page 19 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of
the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the
appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had
voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely attributable to
the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence
reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner in which the dump
truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was negligence on
the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's
injuries. We note, however, that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal
and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the reckless way in
which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its
questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of
Dionisio's negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis of which
the trial court and the appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in
which Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner
in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. The
need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to the trial court after
eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record
pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid
and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump
truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately
after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had
taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the
Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with
Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the
explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years after the
accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This
certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however,
specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent
Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew
pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he
had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in
the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court and the appellate court were
completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost
immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified
that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its
headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had
just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights
failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did not fag within any of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact that
the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of
the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the
occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought
processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective
thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a
sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around
at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as
it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact
with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally
malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of
Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners'
contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the
police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that
the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his
headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The evidence here consisted of
the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from
his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This testimony has to be taken in
conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We
do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much
liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are
also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the
night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was
parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Page 20 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause
of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other
words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence
on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private
respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be
regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the
petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we
are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the
United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been
"almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the
act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not
escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not
the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability
not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having
so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck
driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor and
Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig
spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who
leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent
source. ... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result
and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the
risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within
the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening
causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
 Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary
forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on
the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. ... [The standard of
reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the
ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff
is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without
lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. --- 10
Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to
the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix
is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory
damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the
injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while
the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear
chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in
the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if
any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. 15

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a
general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a
court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate
cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the
plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act
or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks
and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16in
supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that
Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to
bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the
failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand
and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except
the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent

Page 21 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 67 1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death;

G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989 2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt; and

GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, 3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although the circumstances of the
vs. victim and the accused (petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the petition for review are factual. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon us (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351;
Vda. De Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated October 10, 1974, affirming the
conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are:
Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).

On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an old woman who was
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is devoid of merit. The
crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig was following another at a
prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente,
distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was
[1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to
going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead
P30,000.
of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The appellant
continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in market in order to celebrate the
coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby
when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck
by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The
SO ORDERED.
victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later (Exh. C). The findings after an
autopsy are as follows:

Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and Occipito-Parietal Regionas Fracture Occipito-Parietal Bone Cerebral
Hemorrhage.

The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)

Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855).
The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and sentenced him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum,
to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the costs" (p. 3, Appellant's Brief, p. 56, Rollo).

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on October 10,1974,conviction of the accused but
increased his civil liability to P12,000. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from except in the amount of indemnity to be paid to the heirs of
the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera, which is the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which
should be raised to P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed in all other respects with costs.
(P. 37, Rollo.)

After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision was denied, he filed a petition for review in this Court,
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

Page 22 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

TORTS 68 A post-mortem examination by Dra. Ignacia Reyes Ciriaco, Municipal Health Officer of Itogon, Benguet, determined the cause
of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to electrocution. 2 She also observed a small burned
area in the middle right finger of the victim.
G.R. No. 165969 November 27, 2008

Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high tension wires above the trail hung
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
very low, just about eight to ten feet above the ground. They noted that the residents, school children, and pocket miners usually
vs.
used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires. The trail was the only viable way since the other side was a
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN, respondents.
precipice. In addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the trail.

DECISION
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor Cresencio Pacalso, informed the General Manager of NPC in Itogon of
the incident. After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging transmission lines and put up warning
REYES, R.T., J.: signs around the area.

PETITIONING power company pleads for mitigation of awarded damages on ground of contributory negligence. But is the
victim in this case partly to blame for his electrocution and eventual demise?
This is a review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which found the National Power Corporation (NPC)
liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to electrocution from the company’s high tension transmission lines.
The Facts
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Benguet. In its answer, NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the high tension transmission lines. It averred
that there were danger and warning signs installed but these were stolen by children. Excavations were also made to increase the
necessary clearance from the ground to about 17 to 18 feet but some towers or poles sank due to pocket mining in the area.
At the trial, NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution because the victim did not suffer
extensive burns despite the strong 69 KV carried by the transmission lines. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it
was due to his own negligence. The company counter-claimed for attorney’s fees and cost of litigation.

The facts, as found by the trial court are as follows:

RTC Disposition

Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life on June 27, 1995. He On February 17, 1998, the RTC decided in favor of respondents. The fallo of its decision reads:
would have turned 20 years of age on November 9 of that year. Noble was originally from Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. He worked as a
pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant NPC as follows:
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. Sometime
in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. 1. Declaring defendant NPC guilty of Negligence (Quasi-Delict) in connection with the death of Noble Casionan;
Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten
feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution especially during the wet season.
2. Ordering NPC as a consequence of its negligence, to pay the plaintiffs Jose and Linda Casionan, as heirs of the
deceased, Noble Casionan, the following Damages:
As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to
protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. On June 18, 1991 and February 11, 1993, Pablo and Pedro Ngaosie, elders
a. P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son Noble Casionan;
of the community, wrote Engr. Paterno Banayot, Area Manager of NPC, to make immediate and appropriate repairs of the high
tension wires. They reiterated the danger it posed to small-scale miners especially during the wet season. They related an
incident where one boy was nearly electrocuted. b. P100,000.00 as moral damages;

In a letter dated March 1, 1995, Engr. Banayot informed Itogon Mayor Cresencio Pacalso that NPC had installed nine additional c. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV line. They likewise identified a possible rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of 1.7
million pesos to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.
d. P52,277.50 as actual damages incurred for the expenses of burial and wake in connection with the death of Noble
Casionan;
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their
pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on his
e. P720,000.00 as the loss of unearned income; and
shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the
trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
f. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit; and
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling
high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Noble’s pole 3. Dismissing the counter claim of the NPC for lack of merit.3
touched the wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and
shook him but the latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchor’s shout for help and together they brought the body
of Noble to their camp.

Page 23 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6

The RTC gave more credence to the testimony of witnesses for respondents than those of NPC who were not actually present at
the time of the incident. The trial court observed that witnesses for NPC were biased witnesses because they were all employed
by the company, except for the witness from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC found:
Melchor Jimenez was very vivid in his account. He declared that he and Noble Casionan cut two bamboo poles, one 14 feet
and the other about 18 feet. The shorter bamboo pole was carried by Noble Casionan and the longer bamboo pole was
carried by him. And they walked along the trail underneath the transmission lines. He was following Noble Casionan. And
when they were going uphill in the trail and Noble Casionan was to turn left in a curve, the bamboo pole of Casionan swung
around and its tip at the back touched for one or two seconds or for a split moment the transmission line that was dangling
and a buzzing sound was heard. And Casionan immediately fell dead and simply stopped breathing. What better account
would there be than this? Melchor Jimenez was an eye witness as to how it all happened.4 (Emphasis added)
The RTC ruled that the negligence of NPC in maintaining the high-tension wires was established by preponderance of evidence.
On this score, the RTC opined:
2. On the matter of whether plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant NPC, obviously, they would have. x x x This
negligence of the NPC was well established and cannot be denied because previous to this incident, the attention of NPC
has already been called by several requests and demands in 1991, 1993 and 1995 by elders and leaders of the community in
the area to the fact that their transmission lines were dangling and sagging and the clearance thereof from the line to the
ground was only 8 to 10 feet and not within the standard clearance of 18 to 20 feet but no safety measures were taken. They
did not even put danger and warning signs so as to warn persons passing underneath.5 (Emphasis added)
Disagreeing with the ruling of the trial court, NPC elevated the case to the CA. In its appeal, it argued that the RTC erred in
ruling that NPC was liable for Noble’s death. Further, even assuming that Noble died of electrocution, the RTC erred in not
finding that he was guilty of contributory negligence and in awarding excessive damages.
CA Disposition
On June 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages
is REDUCED to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) is DELETED.6
The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages from P100,000.00
to P50,000.00. The CA further disallowed the award of attorney’s fees because the reason for the award was not expressly stated
in the body of the decision.
Issues
The following issues are presented for Our consideration: (i) Whether the award for damages should be deleted in view of the
contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award for unearned income, exemplary, and moral damages should
be deleted for lack of factual and legal bases.7
Our Ruling
I negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.14
That the victim Noble died from being electrocuted by the high-tension transmission wires of petitioner is not contested by
petitioner. We are, however, asked to delete or mitigate the damages awarded by the trial and appellate courts in view of what
petitioner alleges to be contributory negligence on the part of the victim.
Page 24 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
As a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The finding of negligence on the part
of petitioner by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which We cannot pass upon since it would entail
going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based. 8 Corollary to this, the finding by both courts of the lack
of contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual issue which is deemed conclusive upon this Court absent any
compelling reason for Us to rule otherwise.
But even if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the part of petitioner must stay.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the victim’s death. Instead, it
was Noble’s negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the
bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is especially true because other people traversing the trail
have not been similarly electrocuted.
Petitioner’s contentions are absurd.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8
to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner,
the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,9 this Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of
preventing derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent in ascertaining that the
rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an accident. Said the Court:
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of
due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come
loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12"
long and 3 ½" thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they
could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at
the scene of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose, inter alia, of preventing derailments, was the
responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Reyes, its own witness,
who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were
frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have
taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.10
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s part.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 11 On the other hand, contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.12 There is contributory negligence when
the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.13 It is an
act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. 15 If indeed there was contributory
negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code
provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the
Civil Code is explicit on this score:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body.
This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as there was no showing that the caboose where he
was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. 16
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning
signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the
trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary
routine to other workers in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.
In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals,17 this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was
the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the
statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations
when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. We quote:
x x x The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently
established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that
it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his
obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But
such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or
comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular
circumstances reasonably require. To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous
circumstances of the accident.
xxxx
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In
the absence of statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other
warning devise onto a bicycle. In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a
matter of law but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in producing a collision
with a motorist. The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute
negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a
proximate cause of the collision; however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of
the accident was well illuminated by street lights, if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist
visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to
see the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support
a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a contributing
cause of the accident.
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices,
whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is
established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam,
wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it
Page 25 of 26 TORTS MEETING 6
substantially contributed thereto. Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was
the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.18 (Emphasis added)
That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling. We quote
with approval the observation of the RTC on this matter:
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to operate within the area of Dalicno, Itogon, Benguet as there was
no permit issued by DENR is beside the point. The fact is that there were not only pocket miners but also there were many
residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet using the trail. These residents were using this trail underneath
the transmission lines x x x. They were using this trail even before the transmission lines were installed in the 1970’s by
NPC. The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who have to
eke out a living in the only way they know how. The fact that they were not issued a permit by the DENR to do pocket mining
is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission lines dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing
danger to the life and limb of everyone in said community. x x x19(Emphasis added)
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
II
We now determine the propriety of the awards for loss of unearned income, moral, and exemplary damages.
From the testimony of the victim’s mother, it was duly established during trial that he was earning P3,000.00 a month. To
determine the compensable amount of lost earnings, We consider (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise
have lived (life expectancy); and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed by
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial
Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings
of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and
other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula
used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross
annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)].20
We sustain the trial court computation of unearned income of the victim:
x x x the loss of his unearned income can be computed as follows: two-thirds of 80 years, minus 20 years, times P36,000.00
per year, equals P1,440,000.00. This is because Noble Casionan, at the time of his death, was 20 years old and was healthy
and strong. And, therefore, his life expectancy would normally reach up to 80 years old in accordance with the above
formula illustrated in the aforesaid cases. Thus, Noble Casionan had 60 more years life expectancy since he was 20 years
old at the time of his death on June 27, 1995. Two-thirds of 60 years times P36,000.00 since he was earning about P3,000.00
a month of P36,000.00 a year would be P1,440,000.00.
However, in determining the unearned income, the basic concern is to determine the damages sustained by the heirs or
dependents of the deceased Casionan. And here, the damages consist not of the full amount of his earnings but the support
they would have received from the deceased had he not died as a consequence of the unlawful act of the NPC. x x x The
amount recoverable is not the loss of the entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the earnings which the heirs would
have received as support. Hence, from the amount of P1,440,000.00, a reasonable amount for the necessary expenses of
Noble Casionan had he lived would be deducted. Following the ruling in People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279, the Court
deems that 50 percent of the gross earnings of the deceased of P1,440,000.00 should be deducted for his necessary expenses
had he lived, thus leaving the other half of about P720,000.00 as the net earnings that would have gone for the support of his
heirs. This is the unearned income of which the heirs were deprived of. 21
In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty of gross negligence. 22 Gross negligence has been
defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.23
Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members of the community of Dalicno who used the trail regularly
when it failed to address the sagging high tension wires despite numerous previous requests and warnings. It only exerted efforts
to rectify the danger it posed after a death from electrocution already occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent, warranting
the award of exemplary damages.

As to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of the award. Moral damages are designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich the complainant but to
enable the injured party to obtain means to obviate the moral suffering experience. Trial courts should guard against the award of
exorbitant damages lest they be accused of prejudice or corruption in their decision making. 24 We find that the CA correctly
reduced the award from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.

As for the award for attorney’s fees, well-settled is the rule that the reason for the award must be discussed in the text of the
court’s decision and not only in the dispositive portion.25 Except for the fallo, a discussion on the reason for the award for
attorney’s fees was not included by the RTC in its decision. The CA thus correctly disallowed it on appeal.

WHREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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